

MUSLIM WORLDVIEW AND FAMILY PLANNING

A Case Study of Islamabad

By

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ISLAMABAD**

2013

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FAMILY PLANNING:
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To

MY DEAREST DAUGHTER

Preface

If a research question has multiple answers, it does not necessarily mean that some of these answers are wrong. Neither it is important that all answers converge to a common conclusion or to develop synthesis in order to reconcile conflicting views. Disagreement is the essence of social science research, which keeps the urge alive. Quite often conflicting conclusions are the outcomes of the philosophical underpinnings that make up the research approach being followed. Although researchers seldom declare the approach they follow, they often leave in their writings sufficient traces for the readers to follow. The research undertaken in this book follows positivism, a popular approach being following in natural sciences by-and large by default. The ontological and epistemological positions of the study enable it to resolve one of the more bitter contests of the issue in contemporary Pakistan. The debate moves with an organized method of combining deductive logic with precise empirical observations of individual behaviour in order to discover and confirm central theme of the study, that is, to predict the general patterns of Pakistani society.

Title of the book itself speaks about giving an alternative perspective to the issue that is neither touched nor fully understood. The author has rationalized and operationalized each word of the title through his arguments and logic throughout the course of study. Using the word 'worldview' instead of 'paradigm' has its lucidity in social connotation of the issue. Even the term 'Muslim worldview' instead of 'Islamic worldview' has its rationality in studying prevailing practices of the Muslims in comparison to the theoretical positions of all the sects of Islam. So much so that the term 'family planning' instead of 'population planning' has its own specific implications that are relevant directly to all social as well as medical aspects of various contraceptive practices. Then, applying the findings of 'a

case study' on the entire country is also justified in the study while devising a representative sample keeping in view demographic characteristics of the whole population. Furthermore, the conjunction 'and' between two parts of the title works like a borderline between theoretical position and the practical disposition.

Thomas Malthus (1798) pointed out that natural resources tend to grow at arithmetic rate like 1,2,3,4,5,..., while human population grows at geometric pace like 1,2,4,8,16,... He also alarmed humanity that if population is not checked through preventive measures through family planning and population planning, the nature will do its job in the form of famines, diseases, wars, floods, etc. Thus, to rescue human population from all such disasters, it is inevitable to adopt preventive measures.

With reference to Pakistan, one of its founding fathers, Allama Muhammad Iqbal in his *Ilmul Iqtsad* (1903) addressed the issue and declared that family planning is not forbidden in the Islamic teachings. Various other religious scholars are also quoted in the book in support of family planning. The author mentions that a paradoxical deadlock was created in Pakistani society by the claim that Islam categorically forbids the idea of family planning in general and birth control in particular.

This debate is taken up in some detail in the book with the central argument that the real genesis of opposition to both the idea and practice of family planning by ordinary Muslims as well as clergy is derived from the prevalent agro-traditional worldview of the society and not the religion itself. The book comes up with the conclusion that the attitudes of Pakistan Muslims in general and Muslim residents of Islamabad in particular are determined mostly by subjective considerations, which are deeply embedded in the agro-traditional worldview of the society. These subjective considerations tend to play considerable role in shaping behavioural contours of the society. Clergy declares family planning unlawful in Islam because of the influence of this agro-traditional worldview. Muslim masses that are unable to escape from cultural boundaries are further

encircled by religious injunctions mediated through cultural symbols.

By-and-large, the book goes fairly in depth to draw support to its contention from various literary sources. Consistent effort is made to remain positive and not to indulge into assertions based on socio-religious norms. In this respect, the book is a useful piece of research for students of social sciences who choose to remain positive in their research endeavours.

15 October 2012

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This study is mainly based upon field survey, which was an extremely tough project for me. So, it is a pleasure giving expression to my feelings of deepest gratitude to all those who made it possible for me. This team of surveyors consisted of Amjad Ali Turi, Ihsan, Mian Zulfiqar, Amir Dogar, Fauzia Kareem, Salma, Naureen, Lubna Malik and above all Nemat-e-Uzma. A valuable cooperation of my uncle and aunt Mr. & Mrs. Mahmood Hussain Awan, Mr. & Mrs. Shafique and Mrs Mahmooda Khanum is also mentionable in this regard. The way they all went about their varied tasks reflects a sense of dedication that was wonderful. The affectionate cooperation of Mr. Shaukat

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Chapter 1

Introduction

The struggle for what Himes (1936), terms as “democratisation of birth control” reflects one of the most interesting episodes in the history of modern ideas. Birth control is widely known as all the methods used to regulate or prevent birth of children. It is a deliberate prevention or delaying of births by various artificial means (Sharif, 1996; 1; Mahmood, 1977; Omran, 1992 and others).

Synonymous with birth control are contraception, fertility control, planned parenthood, child spacing and family planning etc. Family planning or planned parenthood is the term generally used to refer more broadly to policies, programs and services designed to assist people in practicing birth control.

The birth control movement was initiated in Europe during the eighteenth century. In fact it was the industrial revolution and advancement in science and technology which increased production and curtailed the death rate causing a population boom as a result (Peterson, 1969; 487). Initially, Thomas Robert Malthus (1766-1834) put the concern with population growth in print in 1798. He wrote an *Essay on the Principle of Population*. The essay contended that man's ability to reproduce is so great that the population doubles in each generation. He also anticipated that the human species will increase geometrically, i.e. 1, 2, 4, 8, 16, 32, 64, 128, 256; while subsistence will increase in arithmetical progression i.e. 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9. He further asserted that population, if unchecked through 'moral restraints' or the postponement of marriage, (i.e. preventive checks) is kept in check by wars and natural calamities (i.e. positive checks).

Hence, it is in the better interest of humanity to check its population through 'moral restraints' i.e. births control. In this way, Malthus's ideas laid the foundation of the birth control movement in England. Later on, during the nineteenth century Francis Place (1872) in France, Charles Knowlton (1833) in America, Annie Besant and Charles Bradlaugh (1876) in England worked to promote the birth control movement (Peterson, 1969: 486-540).

In South Asia, the movement of birth control was initiated by Mrs. Edith How Martin, the then director of "London Birth Control International Information". Then Dr. Hutton, the Census Commissioner of India for the census of 1931, reported that the population of India was increasing at an alarming rate, and emphasized the importance and the need for popularizing and promoting birth control devices (*Ibid.*: 490).

Soon after independence, the governments of India and Pakistan lost no time in directly or indirectly adopting birth control as a part of their national policies. For instance, at the time of launching the First Five Year Plan (1955-60), the economic planners pointed out the severe consequences of high population growth in Pakistan. This statement from the plan shows the planners' concern.

The country appreciates that population growth is a rock on which all hopes of improved conditions of living may flounder. It admits of no approach except that the rate of growth must be low (*First Five Year Plan*, 1955-60).

So far as India is concerned, it claims to be a 'secular state'. So its policies need no religious sanctions behind them. Pakistan being an Islamic State has to get religious approval before the implementation of any new policy like birth control or family planning. That is why, the government's policy of family planning faced critical resistance in Pakistan. On the question of religion in Pakistan, Singer (1970) noted that Max Weber saw the Asian religions as a major obstacle to modernization because of their bulwark of traditionalism and religious

duties. The example of the Central Asian Muslim areas that had not experienced fertility decline as late as 1970, despite an impressive progress in education as well as in economy is quoted by Wriggins (1975: 17). Similarly, in Pakistan, the Islamic roots that underlie the social fabric of the people are deeply embedded in tradition and Islam and are not likely to change in the near future (*Ibid.*: 17).

It is not only the Muslim clergy which has opposed the idea of birth control, but also most of the world's other major religions are either silent or critical towards it on moral grounds (Sharif, 1996:8). In Pakistan, a large number of people, mainly influenced by the late Maulana Maududi, a renowned religious scholar, opposed this idea. They, indeed, consider it as repugnant to the basic teachings of Islam. In stark contrast other groups known as modernists see nothing repugnant in it to the spirit of Islam.

The present study is intended to probe into the worldview of the Muslims in Pakistan. The aim is to discover, why both the opponents and proponents of family planning have such divergent attitudes towards birth control despite their reference to the same sources i.e. the *Quran* and the *Sunnah* of the Prophet Muhammad (PBUH). It is important to point out that the present work is not intended to decide as to who is right and who is wrong. It is meant to be a descriptive not a prescriptive study. Its main purpose is to trace out only the directions and dimensions of the Pakistani Muslims' worldview and family planning without going into the moral issues of the case.

1.1 The Problem

For Muslims, the sources of Islamic law are primarily two, the *Quran* and the *Hadith*. Based on these two sources are two more, called the secondary sources: the consensus of jurists (*Ijma*) and analogy (*Qiyas*). In addition, there are supplementary sources, interpreted in the spirit of the *Shariah* (Principles of religion), which include: juristic preference (*Istihsan*), the examples of residents of Madina,

the public welfare (*al-masalih-al-mursalin*), the rule of concomitance (*Istishab*) and prevailing customs (*usf*), (Omran, 1992: 73).

Muslims believe that the *Quran* is divine revelation and it is the very words of God. According to Omran (1992), none of the contenders has produced even a single verse from the *Quran*, which supports or rejects the idea of family planning in a clear or explicit way. It means that the *Quran* is silent on the question of family planning. This silence, in my opinion, can be explained by the fact that in the early days of Islam the problem was not as acute as compared to other problems like alcoholism, adultery or the low status of women among the Arabs. These problems thus figure prominently in the *Quran* (Marrak, 1974: 268).

As for the *Hadith*, both the opponents as well as proponents of family planning have quoted some *ahadith* of the Holy Prophet (PBUH) of Islam in support of their contention. But it can be easily observed that except the *ahadith* on *azl* (Coitus interruptus), no other *Hadith* is directly relevant to the issue of family planning (Mahmood, 1977; Omran, 1992). *Azl* or *al-azl*, is an Arabic word which stands for separation, to set aside, to dismiss or to set apart. Thus the literal meanings of this word are insulation, separation, dismissal, segregation or removal. In view of these denotations, *azl* is generally taken to stand for a particular method which means withdrawal of penis from vagina before ejaculation i.e. coitus interruptus.

Since the statement of the Prophet (PBUH) can be interpreted in various ways, there is still controversy whether coitus interruptus (*azl*) is allowed or not (Marrak, 1974: 268). Muslims should, therefore, use their own reasoning to interpret the prophetic traditions in order to determine the rulings which may qualify the pre-requisites of new advancement provided that they are in accordance with the real spirit of Islam.

The task of this interpretation is taken up by a number of qualified jurists in the fourth century *A. H.* This gave

birth to a number of schools of *fiqh* called *mazahab*. These different schools carry the name of their founders (among the *Sunnis*) and of the chosen *Imam* (among the Shiah). All these schools of jurisprudence take *Quran* and the *Sunnah* as the primary sources. Their differences, indeed, lie in relation to some interpretations, validity of sources of jurisprudence i.e. secondary or supplementary sources, and the methodology of formulation of the rulings. A detailed list of the founders of different schools of jurisprudence and the time of their appearance is provided in figure 1.1

SUNNI

Imam Abu Hanifa (d. 767 A.D.) (Hanafi Mazhab)

Imam Malik (d. 795 A.D.) (Maliki Mazhab)

Imam Shafi (d. 820 A.D.) (Shaf'i Mazhab)

Imam Ahmad Ibn Hambul (d. 855 A.D.) (Hambuli Mazhab)

SHIAH

Imam Zaid Ibn Ali (d. 700 A.D.) (Zaydi Mazhab)

Imam Ja'far al-Sadiq (d. 765 A.D.) (Imami, Mazhab)

Imam Ismail (eighth century) (Ismaili Mazhab)

Figure 1.1 Names of Founders and Schools of Jurisprudence

Mahmood (1997: 37) has reported that in India the *Sunni* Muslims are invariably either *Hanafi* or *Shaf'i*. The *Shias* (Shiah) of India mostly follow the *Athna Ashari school (Imami)*. The *Maliki*, the *Hambuli* and the *Zaydi* schools have almost no followers in India. Linkage between the currents of thoughts and opinions among the Muslims of India, Pakistan and the Bangladesh is not irrelevant, having a common historical and cultural basis (*Ibid.*: 65). In spite of these linkages it is to be pointed out that still another school of *Shiah* community (the *Ismaili*) has its own centres in Pakistan. *Ismailis* have thus a considerable number of followers. Although a definite number of the followers of the schools mentioned above is not available. It can,

however, be inferred that the *Sunnis* in Pakistan generally follow the very same schools as in India (the *Hanafi* and the *Shafi*). The case of *Shiah* community in Pakistan, is somewhat different. The *Shiahs* in Pakistan mainly follow either the *Imami* school or the *Ismaili* school. So the views of only these four schools regarding family planning are discussed here in detail.

1.2 The *Hanafi* School (*Sunni*)

1.2.1 The Majority Position

The majority position of this sect is to permit *al-azl* as a contraceptive measure with differences as to the requirement of the wife's consent. The older and more popular position is that it is not allowed without the wife's consent. Later jurists, however, bypassed the wife's or husband's permission in times of religious decline 'bad times', (*fasad-al-zaman*) and in fear of begetting delinquent children (*Al-walad-al-sou*) (Omran, 1992: 153)

1.3 The *Shafi* School (*Sunni*)

1.3.1 The Majority Position

The characteristic position of the *Shafi* school is that *al-azl* is allowed without the wife's consent. However, there is some verbal disfavour or *Karaha tanzihyya*. Thus, when the wife is disliked, they mean it is less than impeccable. They argue that the woman has the right to intercourse, but not to ejaculation. Several jurists adopt the *jumhour* (majority) position by requiring the wife's consent. A few have disallowed *al-azl* altogether. (*Ibid.*, 1992: 159).

1.4 The *Imami* School (*Shiah*)

1.4.1 The Majority Position

The majority position of the *Imami* school (almost consensus) is in agreement with the *jumhour* position i.e. *al-azl* is permissible subject to the wife's consent. The *Imami* jurists add, however, that consent can be obtained

at the time of the marriage contract, once and for all. *Al-azl* is legal thereafter, even if the wife changes her mind. So important is the wife's consent that a few jurists allow monetary compensation to the wife every time the husband violates this condition. A position much similar to the *Maliki* except that the compensation here is fixed at ten *dinars* and is called *diya-o-nutfa* (compensation for the sperm) (*Ibid.*, 1992: 165).

1.5 The *Ismaili* School (*Shiah*)

The majority position of *Ismaili* school is equivalent to *jumhoor* position, i.e., *al-azl* is permissible with the wife's consent. The consent can, however, be obtained at the time of marriage contract. (*Ibid.*, 1992: 167).

Hence, the majority ruling given by eminent jurists is permissibility of *al-azl* with the wife's permission. Hence, it is very safely concluded that Islam is not against family planning. A number of researchers go beyond the need of family planning at family level and even think that it can be implemented at the national level also, if it is in the real benefit of family and Muslim community. (Sharif, 1996: 91; Mahmood, 1977; Omran, 1992; Marrak, 1974; Akbar, 1994; Ahmad, 1995: 8).

So far, only the textual or theoretical position of Muslims towards family planning has been discussed. We have not, however, touched upon the opinion or attitudes of the Muslims of Pakistan concerning this issue. A probe into the practical attitudes of Muslims in Pakistan reveals a great divergence among them. Some Pakistanis theologians have exhibited a modernist attitude in interpreting the religious texts and find nothing unIslamic in family planning. However, their sphere of influence is very limited. Consequently, a large number of Pakistani Muslims believe in the position of *ulema* like Maulana Maududi who believe it to be impermissible (Mahmood, 1977: 67).

Wajihuddin Ahmad (1974) has further pointed out that despite a religious sanction for contraception and encouragement to family limitation in the Islamic orthodoxy, the contemporary religious attitudes are still critical to the idea of family planning. He indeed suggests that the change is always influenced by non-religious factors. Most of the leaders of the orthodox *Deobandi* theological school, till the mid-forties, allowed both contraception and abortion. Some prominent names in issuing these religious edicts (*fatawas*) are Mufti Muhammad Shafi, Mufti Azizur Rehman and Maulana Rashid Ahmad Gangohi. Yet the contemporary disciples of these authorities have made the most virulent attacks on family planning in Pakistan (Ahmad, 1974: 287-288).¹

The support of these other parties to Maulana Maududi or their independent opposition to the idea of family planning shows that the Pakistani Muslims are divided into three major groups i.e. traditionalists, revivalists and modernists. It also depicts that their views are quite divergent. A detailed discussion on the distribution of these groups is made later on.

The first two groups i.e. traditionalists and revivalists stand amongst the opponents of family planning but with their own varying doctrines. The third group i.e. the modernists, is fully convinced that there is nothing unlawful about it. They not only consider it permissible in Islam but also take it to be fully authorized.

Now the problem that arises is as to why these three groups, while relying on the very same source, are so divergent in their views about family planning. Are they consistent in their word and deed? Are their practices really moulded by Islam or are they influenced by some

1 The author has gone through all the edicts of these three *ulema* but is unable to find out any edict for or against contraception or abortion. So, the authenticity of this source is not fully reliable.

other cultural, social, educational, psychological or political factors? By looking at these divergent views an attempt has been made here to answer these questions.

1.6 Literature Review

The topic under consideration has received considerable attention of scholars throughout the world. Some of them have taken Islam as an inward expression of the Muslims in Pakistan, while others have over-emphasized the outward manifestation of Islam by the clerics in Pakistan. Both the opponents and proponents of family planning have produced valuable work on the topic of Islam and family planning in general but very little with special reference to Pakistan.

Maulana Abul ala Maududi is known for his powerful attack on the movement of family planning. He wrote a book entitled *Islam Aur Zabt-e-Waladat [Urdu]* (Islam and birth control) in 1943. In this book he declared family planning absolutely repugnant to the interests of Islam. He has urged that a real Islamic State can have no place for birth control as a social or national policy. He rejects it mainly on three grounds:

- i. Conspiracy against Islam.
- ii. Moral malaise ranging from family break-down to sexual promiscuity; and
- iii. Unnecessary freedom of women.

A major portion of the Maulana's book is concerned with the 'socio-economic', rather than the theological aspects of the issue. Survey of *ahadith* by the Maulana is not comprehensive as is also mentioned by Omran (1992). Furthermore, the author has not devoted even a single page for the juristic interpretations of different *fiqhas*. He has supported his arguments only through the writings of Keynesians, Bertrand Russel (1954), Aldous Huxley (1959), Dudley Stamp (1960), Mac Cormick Collin Clark (1960), Joseph Spengler (1952), and medical anxiety-makers like

Mary Scharlib and Lurand Arnold (1922). It looks as if the Maulana is more critical of westernisation than of modernization. Since, family planning is a Western idea he rejects it due to its Western orientation. However, he does admit the permissibility of *al-azl* in the end. Nevertheless, he restricts the practice of family planning to the individual level and that too only in unavoidable circumstances like maternal illness, infant mortality and so on.

The Council of Islamic Ideology published another report against family planning in 1992. The central arguments of this report focus on two aspects of family planning i.e. individual and collective. It is stated that although the individual practice of birth control is allowed in certain conditions but the propagation of birth control at mass level, specifically in the form of a movement is altogether unIslamic. Indirect references from both the *Quran* and *Sunnah* have been quoted against family planning. The overall tone of the report resembles the writings of Maulana Maududi's. Similarly, the major portion of the report is focussed on the socio-economic aspects and to highlight the drawbacks of birth control. Even a single paragraph has not been dedicated to the juristic interpretation. The report, hence, declares that the family planning movement, as a national policy of the state, is absolutely unIslamic.

Let us now turn to those who support family planning. Tahir Mahmood, an Indian scholar has studied the problem of family planning in Islam (Mahmood, 1977). Starting with the support of *Quranic* verses and the prophetic verdicts, he has also quoted the opinion of classical jurists, both the assenting and dissenting ones. Concerning dissenting views he asserts that they express only dislike but not absolute rejection. Then after stating the policies of different modern Muslim states (those who approved of them), he discusses contemporary views in India. In conclusion he opines that now-a-days the contemporary

Muslims in India are not as opposed to family planning as they used to be in the past.

Tahir has also approved of all the natural, obstructive and medical or surgical devices including the termination of pregnancy. Finally, after discussing the fallacies of opposition he has concluded that one basic thing shared equally by all the Muslim opponents is that they all are generally *muqallids* (followers of classical jurists). It is understood that all the *muqallids* shall pay their *taqleed* to any of the chief jurists. At the same time the writer himself has mentioned earlier that all the classical jurists have approved of family planning. Thus, the author's primary supposition that "all the opponents of family planning are *muqallids*" is a contradiction in as far this particular practice is concerned. In another questionable argument he states that the *ulema* who insist on remaining rigid *muqallids*, with regard to all the aspects of life, suddenly become *mujtahid* (those who derive laws through *ijtihad* i.e. individual interpretation), concerning the question of family planning. Here he quotes the example of the Maulana Maududi as a follower (*muqallid*) of the *Hanafi* school. While Maududi was a pure *mujtahid* in this and some other matters. In this way the book starts with an ideal assertion but closes with self contradiction.

Another Indian sociologist called Sheikh Shabbir has written *Family Planning in Islam* (Shabbir, 1991). It is based on community-based research with multi-dimensional aspects, covering economic, social, cultural, religious and psychological aspects, its practical barriers and rejection. Although the sample he has used is very small — consisting of only three hundred families of Nagpur, Amravats and Wardha, the survey, however, is very useful. The research has been conducted in the theoretical framework of Joseph Singer (1969) i.e. that people increase or decrease the number of their children according to the cost, price and income of the family.

In this study, Shabbir concludes that Muslims consider family planning valid while others do not. He also points out that it is not only religion which determines their actions but some other cultural, social, educational, psychological and political factors have also considerable influence on their attitudes. He traces out that very few people consult religious leaders (*mullahs*) for practicing birth control. The book is very authoritative but the writer, being a sociologist, has over-emphasized the socio-economic and cultural variables in the political context.

Muhammad Sharif Chaudhry starts his *Family Planning in Islam* (1996), with a brief history of family planning and the concept of marriage and family in Islam. He comes up with some arguments from the *Quran* and the *Sunnah*, both for and against family planning and tries to support it. He records views of all the *Sunni* and *Shiah* schools of *fiqh* followed by the *fatawas* (edicts) declared by different scholars. Later on, he evaluates family planning in the context of basic Islamic doctrines of jurisprudence covering the doctrines of ease, necessity, capacity and permissibility. His conclusion reveals that Islam is not against family planning.

Although the book is very rich in information but it is based on a weak research methodology. It is basically a descriptive study with only the views of others and does not attempt to prove a research hypothesis. It has, however, tried to support family planning but with the help of very weak arguments. Ultimately, the writer's zeal to explain his views in detail has made him over-elaborative and considerably irrelevant.

Another book is by Abdur Rahem Omran (1992). This book consists of four parts including twelve chapters. The views of Sheikh Jadel Haq Ali, the grand *Imam* of *Al-Azhar*, given in prologue of the book introduces the subject and provides a perspective to it.

The first part of the book is focussed on the importance of family planning and the centrality of marriage in the Islamic context. It is followed by a statement “parents and child; rights of one obligations of the other”. This is followed by a discussion of the status of women as determined in Islam. This part closes with a supportive discussion on the basic precepts of Islam towards family planning.

The second part opens with a general introduction to the sources of Islamic jurisprudence. It also provides *Quranic* support to family planning followed by the supportive argument from the *Sunnah* of the Prophet (PBUH) of Islam.

The third part mainly focuses on family planning in Islamic jurisprudence. It starts with a chronology of different schools and essence of their independent entities. Then a justification of contraception in Islamic jurisprudence has been proved. The end of this part deals with more problematic issues like sterilization, artificial insemination abortion and repudiation of a child conceived despite contraception.

The fourth and last part of this book covers contemporary situations with their new challenges. It commences with the reflections of different conferences and publications. It argues that Islam with its accommodative capacity will successively tackle the new challenges. Possibilities of this can be found in the form of theological councils, *fatawas* and decision of the jurists conferences.

The book finishes with an epilogue: a poem by Sheikh Abdul Khatab — an Egyptian theologian. No doubt the book is an ideal research work with its proper references and sound arguments, however, its ultra-defensive tendency has made it over-elaborative and more complex.

Apart from these books there are some valuable articles as well. Rashid Ahmad presented his “Islam and Family

Planning" in the Ankara conference. In his study he attempts to prove the validity of family planning in Islam. He states that the *ulema* oppose family planning mainly on socio-economic grounds but not on theological and juristic ones. He opines that the Islamic *Shariah* does not ignore the *ummah's* interest. So, any such planning for the betterment of mankind will be compatible with the establishment of justice and equality as ordained by the *Shariah*.

Akbar (1994) supports birth control from the Islamic point of view. He takes support from all the sources of Islamic law for birth control as well as abortion. Finally, he concludes that family planning, as understood by Islam, is neither opposed to marriage nor to the begetting of children, nor does it imply disbelief in the doctrine of fate and Divine dispensation.

1.7 Significance of the Problem

A brief review of the literature on the subject reveals the lack of objectivity and the abundance of inaccuracies. With this background, the present study will use an empirico-analytical approach. It will give special consideration to objectivity. This study will mainly cover the contemporary period on which no valuable research work has been produced. As some political analysts have divided Muslims into sub-categories such as modernists, revivalists, traditionalists etc, we shall use them as the basis of our understanding of the religious views of these groups. This study also attempts to draw out some other relevant demarcations between these groups. So as to help us in understanding the differences and similarities of different types of Muslims towards family planning in the area of our country.

Leonard Binder (1961) has divided Pakistani Muslims into four categories i.e. traditionalists, modernists, fundamentalists and secularists. The traditionalist view is almost exclusively of those *ulema* who not only want to

uphold the tradition but also recognize Islam only with reference to their own institutions (Binder, 1961:7). Politicians, westernized businessmen and professionals mostly hold the modernist view. They argue that Islam is compatible with modern conditions of life and can be adapted to suit them as and when necessary (*Ibid.*: 7-8).

The major fundamentalist group in Pakistan is the Jamat-e-Islami. It is drawn from traditional middle class and have more influence in the general public. The secularists, although small in numbers, have impressive power with their important positions in the civil and military services. They are highly westernized and have great attraction for the newly emerging industrialist groups (*Ibid.*: 8).

Ervin I. T. Rosenthal (1965), in his study has just mentioned four groups: fundamentalists, orthodox, modernists and secularists. He has not drawn up even a roughly defined demarcation between them. However, in his eighth chapter, he has lightly differentiated only the traditionalists from the modernists.

The traditionalists (orthodox) were mostly anti-British and were committed to oppose the English educational system. They considered it dangerous to Islam and Muslims. Continuation of the highly traditional *madrassa* education was their main target. Moreover, they favoured Hindu-Muslim co-operation against the British government, administration and education (Rosenthal, 1965: 188-189). The modernists, under the championship of Syed Ahmad Khan, supported modern education on Western, specifically British lines (*Ibid.*: 189).

Mujawar Hussain Shah has dealt with this problem in more detail. He has initially divided the Indian Muslims into three main groups — Muslim Nationalists, Indian Nationalists and Islamic Nationalists. The Indian Muslim Nationalists were mostly modern with their support for the creation of Pakistan. The Islamic Nationalists were predominantly traditionalists, standing against the

creation of Pakistan. They themselves were divided into many groups like neo-traditionalists, traditionalists, modernists and secularists on one hand, *pirs* (spiritual leaders) on the other (Shah, 1996:9).

The neo-traditionalists believe in interpreting the text strictly adhering to the fundamentals of their faith. Being strict in *tauheed*, they discard the *imams*, *saints*, *sufis*, tombs and shrines. They emulate the good deeds of Prophet Muhammad (PBUH) and the *aslaf* (the pious companions and the extended family of the Prophet). Enforcement of the *Shariah* is their main aim. Rejecting the dogma of *taqleed* they embrace the authenticity of the dynamic motion of *ijtihad*. They are opponents of secular ideas but accept some beneficial modern ideas that conform to the basic tenets of Islam. Finally, Mujawar Hussain Shah has pointed out that many of them are revivalists and are attracted to the Jamat-e-Islami (*Ibid.*, 1996: 9-12). Indeed, these are the revivalists whom he has termed neo-traditionalists.

The traditionalists being the products of traditional Islamic education often tend to preserve not only the Islamic beliefs, customs and traditions as practiced in the classical Islamic period but also the Islamic period thereafter. *Sufism* (mysticism) and many local or regional customs and traditions usually referred to as "folk Islam" or "popular Islam" are acceptable to them. The most prominent features, which distinguish traditionalists from other factions of Muslims, is the rejection of *ijtehad* and the embracing of the dogma of *taqleed*. They tend to maintain the status quo and are reluctant to change. While opposing modernism they especially want to preserve the segregation of sexes. They generally desire the establishment of theocracy. In spite of many philosophical differences in their theological doctrines both the *Barelvis* and *Deobandis* are traditionalists in their orientation (*Ibid.*, 1996: 12-14).

The modernists with their dynamic outlook are vigorous proponents of *ijtehad*. They consider Islam as a progressive and dynamic religion with no place for the dogma of *taqleed*. The Modernists mostly recommend the reform of Islamic laws with the changing circumstances. In addition to their religious knowledge, modernists are mostly exposed to modern non-Islamic ideas and education (*Ibid.*, 1996: 14-19).

The secularists or pragmatists are generally Muslims by name and birth. Although they are faithful to their Islamic faith but they are not fully aware of its basic tenets. Occasionally, they observe rituals like *salat* (prayer) *saum* (fasting) and *haj* (pilgrimage). They mostly admire the basic ethical, moral and spiritual principles namely equality, justice, liberty, freedom, honesty, brotherhood and peace etc. With their wide exposure to Western education they approach Islam in a very liberal way (*Ibid.*, 1996: 19-21).

Finally, the *pirs*, being staunch proponents of mysticism, believe that salvation can only be achieved through loving union with God. Deviating from the orthodox Islam they establish their own way known as 'popular Islam'. With this cultural outlook they have more influence in the society.

So far a general survey of different views concerning the Muslims' divisions in Pakistan has been made. All the researchers who define these groups have themselves confessed that these divisions are approximate and inexact. However, Mujawar Shah seems to stand with a clearer classification but only in the specifically political context. In this thesis Pakistani Muslims are divided mainly into three groups — the traditionalists, the revivalists and the modernists. An effort has been made to define them explicitly.

1.7.1 The Traditionalists

The traditionalists uphold the classical Islamic traditions. They identify the establishment of Islam only

with reference to these ancient institutions. They firmly embrace *taqleed* and reject the institution of *ijtehad* while resisting all the new ideas and maintaining *status quo*. They believe in an absolute segregation of sexes. In these terms, both the *Barelvis* and the *Deobandis*, although having a lot of philosophical differences, are traditionalists in this respect. The main reason is that both of them unanimously embrace *taqleed* and reject *ijtehad*. Both of these sub-sects of Islam — the *Barelvis* and the *Deobandis* — are basically the offshoots of the main sect of *Ahlisunnah* or the *Sunnis*. The *Deobandis*, *Barelvis*, and other *Sunni* sects, which are parts of the *Ahlisunnah* are dealt with separately because they see themselves as being different from each other. The *Sunnis*, indeed, arrogate to themselves the claim of being the sole upholders of the tradition of Islam and the *sunnah* of the Prophet (as do all the other sects too). Nevertheless, the *Sunnis* in Pakistan, being the *muqallids* — of either the *Hanafi* or the *Shafi* schools of jurisprudence, are considered orthodox. So the followers of the *Sunni* or the *Ahlisunnah* sect will also be included among the traditionalists.

The *Shiah* with their firm attachment to *taqleed* will also be considered as traditionalists. Although at the higher level they promote *ijtehad* but every member of the *Shiah* community has an obligation of practicing *taqleed* (i.e. following) any *mujtahid* who in turn practices *ijtehad*. Notably all the *mujtahids* in the *Shiah* community are identified only with respect to their own *madrassas* (religious institutions). All their teachings and practices are in absolute conformity with their traditional *madrassa* orientation. That is why the *Shiah*, in spite of practicing *ijtehad*, are included among the traditionalists.

To sum up, all the Muslims embracing *taqleed* rejecting *ijtehad* and, therefore, resisting change will be considered as traditionalists.

1.7.2 The Revivalists

A revivalist is a person who highly admires Islam's politico-economic and socio-cultural ideology. He wants the state to maintain and enforce the Islamic *Shariah*. He rigorously rejects *taqleed* and embraces *ijtehad* but only within the limitations of Islamic fundamentals. He strictly opposes secular ideas except some applications of modern science and technology provided that they appear in conformity with the basic tenants of Islam. Having a revivalist orientation, they effectively participate in practical politics, like the Jamat-e-Islami.

With this operational definition, revivalists will primarily include those Muslims who are either formal members of the Jamat-e-Islami or informal sympathizers of the Jamat. Moreover, the *Ahlihadith* who reject the institution of *taqleed* and practice *ijtehad* but mainly rely on the *ahadith* (sayings of the Prophet), are also among the revivalists. It may be noted that such people too want to change society by State power like the Jamat-e-Islami.

1.7.3 The Modernists

The Modernists are those Muslims who have a liberal worldview due to their exposure to modern education. In addition to their religious know-how they are exposed to non-Muslim modern ideas as well. Like revivalists they are also rigorous opponents of *taqleed* and vigorous proponents of *ijtehad* but they adhere to *ijtehad* according to the prevailing needs. They consider Islam as an accommodating religion, which can adapt to modern ideas.

They are not the members of any specific group or the followers of any particular sect in the strict sense of the term. Rather, they are from amongst almost all the groups and sects. Their defining characteristics are a broad outlook and an accommodating attitude towards modern ideas. However, a comprehensive criterion set for an explicit demarcation of the modernists is given in the last chapter.

The Secularists, in my opinion, have no specific views of their own. They just admire the ideas of the modernists. Their views generally remain vague and changeable. Thus, the present work is including them among the modernists. Some of them have definite views and they refer to the modernist Muslims only because it has become difficult recently to give purely secular reasons in Pakistan.

After this classification, it is necessary to put a few words about the significance of the title of the present thesis. The word 'Muslim' in the title is not unintentional. It has been used deliberately in spite of its synonym 'Islamic'. The word 'Islamic' in fact, can only be used where something is defined in the textual context i.e. *Quran*, *Sunnah* and *fiqh*. While the word 'Muslim' refers to the explanation of anything with reference to the followers of Islam. It means that the study does not intend to probe into what Islam says about family planning but only into how the Muslims of Pakistan, or rather a particular part of it, look at it.

Moreover, the word 'worldview' has its special significance. It does not mean, how the Muslims should act or what their response ought to be. It only means what the Muslims think or feel about this problem and how they respond to it? So it will refer only to what their attitude towards family planning actually is rather than what it is expected to be or ought to be within their own belief system. The thesis may provide the policy makers and the public with insights into the problem of family planning.

In the agro-based society of Pakistan more children are required not only to enhance manpower but also the family's social status. Large families, especially those, who have more male children, are considered socially prestigious and more secure than others. Thus people tend to have more children and family planning efforts do not succeed fully in Pakistan.

Let me now refer to the attitudes and values of ordinary Pakistanis in more detail. These are based on what may be

described as an agro-traditional worldview. The idea of family planning is incompatible with this agro-traditional worldview. That is why, despite the fact that the chief jurists of Islam have approved the practice of family planning, the religious elite in Pakistan is still very critical of this idea.

Thus, it is hypothesized that the real genesis of the opposition to family planning, both by religious *ulema* as well as ordinary Muslims, is derived from the prevailing agro-traditional worldview of the society and not from the religion itself.

The present study claims that all apparently religious doctrines against family planning are actually the expression of their local worldview. Accordingly, the people consider their opposition to the idea of family planning justified in Islam, though in reality they derive their feelings from their own worldview.

1.8 Theoretical Framework

An explanation and operationalisation of terms, used here is required for formulating an operational theoretical framework for this study. In the term of agro-traditional, 'agro' is derived from the word agriculture. Agriculture includes all sorts of practices relating to the cultivating of land and rearing animals. The word 'traditional' refers to passing of beliefs and customs from one generation to the next, especially without writing (*Dictionary of Sociology*, 1988). So, in its operational form the agro-traditional worldview means all view, values, and attitudes based upon the traditions of an agricultural or agrarian society. Pakistan, being an agrarian society, still has a largely rural population. Although, the rural/urban population breakup reveals that share of rural population has declined from 71.7% in 1981 to 67.5% in 1998 (*Economic Survey of Pakistan*, 1998-99: 129), even then, since more than two third of the total population lives in rural areas the society may be presumed to have an agrarian worldview. Myrdal (1985:

1207) has also observed that most South Asians are still inspired by traditional practices and attitudes despite the modernization witnessed in the cities.

The term of 'worldview' is basically a conceptual construct in cultural anthropology, mainly used in the hostile characterization and comparison of cultures. The concept of worldview is indeed an output of the outstanding efforts of a group of scholars at the University of Chicago. They worked under the guidance of Robert Redfield in 1950. In his, *The Folk Culture of Yucatan*, (Redfield, 1941), he expressed his concern with the concept of worldview. However, the first explicitly elaborative concept of worldview was given by him in *The Primitive Worldview* (Redfield, 1952). In this study he clearly emphasized the validity of the individual self as an axis of the worldview i.e. the way a man in a particular society sees himself in relation to everything around him.

In order to provide thorough theoretical considerations of worldview, Redfield (1952), hypothesized that there are certain universal elements of worldview. He states that every worldview distinguishes:

- a. part of the self from another part, thus establishing, as it were, a dialogue within the self;
- b. a human nature with that which is non-human;
- c. classes and categories of the human i.e. social persons (e.g. groupings of persons who are intimate and similar, others who are far and different); and
- d. an entity called nature and another described in shorthand as God, within the non-human. Moreover, every worldview includes:
 - e. an orientation of the self in time and space by means
 - f. of major natural phenomena; and
 - g. a similar orientation to life crisis in human existence.

These explanatory hypotheses led Redfield to enquire the nature of the confrontation and the attitude that man takes toward the confronted. Later on, after observing some specific worldviews, Redfield opined that the worldviews vary greatly with respect to their central concerns; e.g. some are centred on man, some on God or nature, while the others confront man, nature and God almost equally. Furthermore, worldviews may also vary with respect to the attitudes of man towards his interaction with the confronted. It means that they may differ in the relative emphasis on cognitive and effective components, the conception of the degree of order and the type of structure to be found in the universe and the conception of the main duty of human being in relation to the confronted. While emphasizing the last mentioned possibility, Redfield states:

Worldview can be seen as a characteristic attitude of purpose or obligation toward that which is confronted, whether that be human nature, or God-Nature... whether the Non-Man is conceived as two things, Nature and God, or whether one of these two prevails over the other, or is involved with the other (Redfield, 1952: 33).

Although Redfield continued writing about the concept of worldview in his later works also (1953; 1955; 1956), but his basic concept did not change much. After his death in 1958, some other researchers of his own circle further tried to define this concept in more detail. Among these the names of Calixta Guiteras-Holmes (1961), Charles Loslie (1960), E. M. Mendelson (1965), are mentionable. But none of them could come up with a definitive definition. Some other researchers from outside the Redfield's circle also attempted to explain the concept of worldview but with no significant success. They are J. S. Slotkin and Clyde Kluckholm (1951) and Clifford Greetz (1957) of circles other than that of Redfield. Since the work of these later thinkers is less significant than that of Redfield, it is only the latter's work, which has been referred to in this study.

The concept of worldview can also be used to understand the attitudes and practices of Pakistani Muslims towards family planning. As Jalibi (1984: 46) highlights that:

... when we search for Pakistani culture, we have no doubt a feeling of identity of thought and action stemming from our common traditions and history; but this feeling is too faint to evoke in our minds the picture of a national culture; for at the national level we do not have any common characteristics as conspicuous as we find in the English, the French, the Japanese and the Chinese. As against this, when we look for common characteristics on a regional level we have a profound sense of a nation-wide identity of culture and way of thinking and acting.

These very distinctive ways of thinking and acting depict the distinguished 'self' of Pakistani Muslims. It also distinguishes the human nature of the society with that which is non-human. Various classes and categories i.e. social, economic, political and religious of the human, living in the society, can also be distinguished as part of the self from another part as well as from the outer world. Like every worldview it also distinguishes an entity called nature and another one described in shorthand as God. Muslims, with their faith in monotheism, distinguish human nature with the non-human or supra-human i.e. God.

Furthermore, Redfield (1952) identified two essential ingredients of worldview: "an orientation of the self in time and space by means of major phenomena; and a similar orientation to life crisis in human existence. Both these elements can visibly be found in the worldview of most rural people in the Islamabad plateau.

Indeed, it is only because of the practical problems of surveying the whole of Pakistan that this study restricts itself only to generalisation about Islamabad after field survey of this area. Some writers like Jalibi (1984:62) argue that similarities in different sub-cultures of Pakistan — especially those concerning religion and familial matters — are enough to warrant broad generalisation after the

empirical study of only one area. Such claims, however, are not being made for the present study. More modestly, the study sets out to measure certain attitudes, values and perceptions of the Muslims in and around Islamabad about family planning. All these attitudes, values and perceptions are part of a certain worldview. Hence, we may claim that the Muslims of the surrounding areas of Islamabad and hence, by extension, possibly of other parts of Pakistan have that worldview.

To elaborate further, this worldview is the way people see and feel themselves in the agro-based society of Islamabad in relation to the things around them, especially to their family, religion, marriage and family planning etc. The way this will be done is to look at certain variables which reflect attitudes, values and perceptions which as said earlier, are part of worldview.

1.9 Methodology

1.9.1 Field Survey

All scientific studies depend upon observation. In case of an anthropological research, much information needs to be gathered before an adequate experiment is designed. Field survey is a useful technique for gathering data for anthropological researches like the present one. Field survey, indeed, is a means of soliciting information. This technique is applied here to collect data for this research.

1.9.2 Sampling

A sample, as the name implies, is a smaller representation of a larger whole (Goode, 1952: 209)². The first step in sampling is to specify the group of persons or things to be studied. The objects of study are called the units of analysis. The units of analysis in the present study

2 Most of the terms used here about sampling structure are quoted from the 14th chapter of the same book.

will be all the 14 established urban sectors, including urban slums, townships and all the 100 villages situated in Islamabad. The sum total of all the units of analysis is called the population or universe. The total cover area of the federal capital, Islamabad i.e. 906.50 sq. kms, is the total universe of the present study. Each entity from the population that is the ultimate sampling objective is called a sampling element. All the individuals of child bearing age (i.e. 15-64), the living in the area under consideration, are being considered as sampling elements.

A sampling unit is either a single sampling element or a collection of elements. As the present study is aimed at studying the worldview of Islamabadi Muslims as it concerns family planning and these Muslims identify themselves as the follower of one or the other sect. So, to make this study more representative, the Muslims related to a specific sect are being treated as a single sampling unit. In this way all the different sectarian groups are treated as different sampling units. A sampling frame is the complete list of all units from which the sample is drawn. A detailed description and rationale of the whole sampling frame is given in some detail in the forthcoming chapter.

A sample of a total of 200 peoples — hundred males and hundred females respondents — was selected. The alternative techniques, which can be used to complete the sampling design, are random sampling, stratified sampling and purposive sampling. The latter technique of purposive sampling is applied here.

1.9.2.1 Purposive or Quota Sampling

More respondents have been selected here by quota sampling than any other type of sampling procedure. The general pattern of this technique is to give considerable freedom of choice to the interviewer, with the restriction that certain characteristics (age, sex socio-economic status, race etc), of the respondents be representative of the area, city, country, state, nation or the group being surveyed

(Goode, 1952: 230). Facing the economic, academic and time limitations of his own and social and cultural limitations of the society, the researcher feels that this technique suits this study. For this purpose, the researcher first of all devised a theoretical purposive sampling framework suiting the requirements of his study. This theoretical purposive sample served as a sampling guide map throughout the survey. The formation and structure of this sample is as follows.

First of all, the researcher divided the total sample of 200 respondents into two equal sub-samples of 100 each for male and female respondents. Then, a proportionate of all the respondents was set concerning different characteristics of the sample, matching the real characteristics of the society. These characteristics of the sample were meant for geographical distribution, age distribution, income and class distribution, level of literacy, occupational distribution and above all sectarian distribution. A detailed description of all these characteristics is given in the second chapter.

1.9.3 Questionnaire

In general the word questionnaire refers to a device for securing answers by using a form. This research tool contains mainly structured items i.e. a set of close-ended questions, all logically related to a central problem or problems (Goode, 1952: 133). After formulating a comprehensive sampling technique, two different questionnaires are prepared one for male respondents and other for females. The researcher interviewed most of the respondents. However, it is not possible for a male researcher to interview females on a topic like family planning in Pakistani society. Hence, the services of some female surveyors were utilized. The practical implementations were daunting, to see the least, but the researcher made all possible efforts to carry out as accurate and reliable a survey as possible.

1.9.4 Interview Guide

An interview guide is a list of topics or points that an interviewer must cover during the interview. It uses a greater proportion of unstructured or 'open ended' questions (Goode, 1952:133). The researcher used an interview guide while interviewing the religious *ulema*. The manner, order and the language of questions asked from the *ulema* of different sects was the same. Such interviews were aimed at knowing the prevailing theoretical viewpoints of different sects about family planning.

1.9.5 Tabulation

Tabulation is a technique of statistical preservation of acquired information in which collective data is arranged in a logical order. The whole data is tabulated to draw out some findings and results. The technique of cross tabulation of two or more attributes is applied, for this purpose. It is followed by a comprehensive analysis by these findings. Analysis is conducted empirically. All the inquiries are made through the deductive method of inquiry, which is supposed to be logically more certain.

1.9.6 Data Analysis

There are two aspects of scientific research, which make the process of analysis less problematic. The first of these is the appearance of an anomalous empirical regularity or the absence of an expected regularity. Such instances require analysis not anticipated by the original design. Similar to this is the use of data, gathered for one purpose, for quite another problem. Both these represent what is called secondary analysis. From a purely experimental point of view such analyses are considered to provide answers which are plausible (Goode, 1952: 343). While considering the type of questions and nature of the problems the second aspect of secondary analysis mentioned earlier, is applied to the present study. In this way the test factor of an antecedent variable is used for

explanation of the analysis. In other words, an observed relationship is explained in terms of a third factor which appears earlier than the independent variables and which is related both to it and the dependent variables. The causal factors are termed independent variables and values to be explained are dependent variables. Throughout the course of analysis, a worldview of the Muslims of Islamabad is an independent variable. The dependent variable is an attitude towards family planning. Religion, of course, plays the role of an antecedent variable as a test factor.

1.10 Locale of the Study

The locale of the study i.e. the federal capital, Islamabad, covers a total area of 906.50 sq kms. It is located at 14 kilometres north-east of Rawalpindi on the north-eastern fringe of the Islamabad plateau of the province of Punjab, on the Northern latitudes 33°49' and longitudes 72° 24' east of Greenwich. It is lying at altitude ranging from 457 to 610 meters. The site for the construction of the city was selected in June 1959 on the recommendation of the Federal Capital Commission. The city was named as Islamabad in February 24, 1960. Its construction started in October 1961, while its settlement commenced in October 1963. By now only 14 sectors have been established out of the total of 72 planned sectors. Five smaller townships, 6 slums and about 100 small villages and *dhoks* (small rural settlements) are also situated in this locality, apart from the 14 urban established sectors (Islamabad Guide Map, 1996).

The population of the area is 805,235 including 434,239 males and 370,996 females, showing a sex ratio of 117.05 (100 females for 117 males). The city's 65.7 percent population is living in urban areas, while the remaining 34.3 percent lives in rural areas. The average population density of the area is 889 persons per square kilometres. The mother tongue of 71.6 percent household is Punjabi, whereas Urdu and Pushto are spoken by 10.1 and 9.5

percent people respectively. The rest of 8.80% population comprises Sindhi and Balochi origin.

Muslims comprise 95.5 percent of the population. The literacy ratio is 72.4 percent i.e. 77.3 percent in urban and 62.5 percent in rural areas. The male literacy ratio is 80.6 percent as compared to 62.4 percent of females. There are 128,753 in the rural and majority of peoples i.e. 67.8 percent is living in housing units of 2 to 4 rooms. About 91.5 percent use electricity for lighting and 56 percent use gas for cooking. 78,956 persons of the area use television sets, 55,489 radio and 66,180 persons newspapers as source of information (*Population Census Organization Report, 1999*). This whole data shows that the selected locality is the most urbanized, educated and modern area of Pakistan. Although such urban areas are generally not representative of the whole country, Islamabad contains pockets of population representing the views of both urban and rural areas. Pakistan is a society in transition, which is most evident if one moves from the most modernized sectors of Islamabad to a village on the periphery of the capital. The sampling procedure used here is intended to capture the views of the different communities so that the conclusions we finally arrive at give some indication of the attitudes of Pakistani Muslims towards family planning in general and not only the attitudes of the residents of capital and its surrounding areas.

1.11 Outline of the Study

The next chapter goes on to describe briefly the characteristics of the sample. Chapter 2 shows that a number of factors, including geographical distribution, age differentials, income and class distinction, level of literacy and occupational distribution have considerable influence on determining the fertility differentials in Pakistan. Chapter 3 focuses on the Muslim worldview and religion, marriage and family in Islamabad. This chapter explores the hypothesis that urban people are not only more punctual in their religious practices but are also

comparatively modern in their attitudes towards marriage, family and family planning. Chapter 4 deals with the main concern of the study i.e. Muslim worldview and family planning in Islamabad. This chapter proves that although all the sects are opposed to the idea of family planning in principle, but a sizable proportion of their followers is adopting various measures of family planning in Islamabad. The findings and conclusion of the study follow chapter 4, which are given separately. In the end are given a selected bibliography and a number of appendices.

Chapter 2

Basic Characteristics of the Sample

Since the main purpose of this study is to deal with the worldview of the people of Pakistan in general and Islamabad in particular, regarding family planning, it is noteworthy to describe the basic characteristics of the society indicated by the sample.

2.1 Characteristics of the Sample

2.1.1 Geographical Distribution

In the present investigation, a sample of 200 Muslim respondents was taken from a total population of 805,235 from the urban established sectors, semi urban areas or townships and villages. The total area of the selected geographical universe consists of fourteen urban established sectors, six urban slums, 5 smaller townships and one hundred villages and “*dhoks*” (smaller rural settlements).

Concerning the urban proportion a total of 35 respondents were interviewed, with 28 from 14 established urban centres and 7 from urban slums. Before surveying the rural areas, ten groups were designed, consisting of ten villages each. One village was selected from each group while six respondents were interviewed from each selected village. Thus, a total of 60 respondents were interviewed in this way. Five respondents were interviewed at random from the smaller townships. The same proportion and criterion of distribution was applied to both male and female respondents. The Figure 2A shows this whole procedure quite clearly.

Male	Number of respondents	
Urban	35	
Rural	65	
Total	100	
Female		
Urban	35	
Rural	65	
Total	100	
Total size of the sample	200	
Rural		
Total villages	100	(100/10 = 10)
Designated group	10	
Villages selected	100	
Respondents from each village	6	(10X6 =60)
Township respondents	5	
Total rural respondents	65	(10x6=60+5 =65)
Urban		
Total sectors	14	
Respondents from sectors	28	
Respondent from urban slums	7	
Total urban respondents	35	(28+7=35)

Figure 2A: Interviewing Criterion of the Respondents.

The ten selected villages are as follows:

1. Chak Jabbi
2. Shahdara
3. Kalal
4. Kuri
5. Tarlai Kalan
6. Sihala
7. Rawat
8. Golra
9. Humak
10. Kirpa

The selected townships are:

1. Chak Shahzad
2. Rawal Town
3. Nur Pur Shahan
4. Said Pur
5. Pir Sohawa

Previous studies (Sathar, 1977; Rukanuddin & Farooqui, 1988), have pointed out fertility differentials between the rural and the urban areas. They opined that the Crude Birth Rate (CBR) is higher for rural areas than for the urban areas of Pakistan. The findings of many demographic surveys i.e. *Pakistan Fertility Survey (PFS)*, *Pakistan Labour Force and Migration Survey (PLM)* and *Pakistan Growth Survey (PGS)*, *Pakistan Contraceptive Prevalence Survey (PCPS)* and *Pakistan Demographic Survey (PDS)*, have also confirmed a higher fertility for the rural areas than the urban ones. Findings of the present study given in the Table 2.1 also confirm the same results.

Table 2.1: Urban-Rural Fertility Differentials

Locality	Male			Female		
	Total No. of respondents	Total No. of children	Average No. of children	No. of respondents	No. of children	Average No. of children
Rural	65	281	4.32	65	242	3.72
Urban	35	148	4.22	35	112	3.20
Total	100	429	4.29	100	354	3.54

The Table 2.1 shows the urban rural fertility differentials. The same data is demonstrated in the Figure 2.1 where vertical axis shows the total member of the sample data and horizontal axis shows the total and average number of children in both genders of the rural as well as the urban areas. It points out that, in case of both the rural males as well as the rural females, the average number of children is higher. However, the rate of urban-rural differentials is much higher in females as compared to males. The male differential is $4.32 - 4.22 = 0.10$, while in the case of females it is $3.72 - 3.2 = 0.52$, which is considerably higher.




Figure 2.1: Urban-Rural Fertility Differentials

2.1.2 Age Distribution

Distribution of a population by age is an important feature of the population. Mortality, fertility and migration determine the age of any population. But fertility is the major component, which mainly affects the age distribution in any society (Rukanuddin and Farooqui, 1988).

Table 2.2: Age Distribution

Survey	< 15	15- 64	≥ 65	Total
Male	45.9%	49.8%	4.3%	100.00
Female	44.1%	52.2%	3.7%	100.00

Source: PDS, 1994

Although it becomes too difficult to get accurate and reliable age statistics in a country with low literacy level like in Pakistan, however, a general age distribution is given in the Table 2.2 as measured by the Pakistan Demographic Survey (PDS, 1994). The enclosed data is also given in a graphical form in the Figure 2.2 where vertical axis shows percentage of population and horizontal axis shows age limit (below 15 years, between 15 to 65 years and above 65 years).




Figure 2.2: Age Distribution

The bar chart shows that almost 50 percent of the total population of Pakistan comprise the age group from 15-64. This age group is called as the productive segment of the society. The rest of the 50 percent population is dependent upon it in which more than 45 percent is below 15 years of age, which also indicates the higher fertility level in Pakistan. Only this productive group will be focused upon in this study.

In pursuance of the objectives of this study, a sample comprising the age groups ranging from 15 to 64 years is selected, covering equally both the male and female respondents. A detailed description of the age distribution and its comparison with the age statistics of Pakistan Demographic and Health Survey (PDHS, 1990-91) and Pakistan Contraceptive Prevalence Survey (PCPS, 1994-95), is given in table 2.3.

Table 2.3: Age Distribution and Fertility Differentials

Age grp	Female									Male									PDHS	PCPS
	Urban			Rural			Total %age			Urban			Rural							
	Res	Chil	Ave. Chil	Res.	Chil	Ave Chil	Res	Chil	Ave Chil	Res	Chil	Ave Chil	Res	Chil	Ave Chil	Res	Chil	Ave Chil		
15-20	3	4	1.33	6	4	1.5	7	10	1.4	2	1	0.5	4	6	1.5	6	7	1.2	6.6	6.7
21-25	5	5	1	25	12	2.08	17	30	1.8	5	11	2.2	10	17	1.7	15	28	1.9	16.4	16.7
26-30	3	8	2.66	62	17	3.6	20	70	3.5	5	25	5	8	31	3.8	13	56	4.3	22.8	20.7
31-35	7	17	2.42	43	11	3.9	18	60	3.3	7	26	3.7	10	38	3.8	17	64	3.8	18	18.6
36-40	5	17	3.4	58	14	4.1	19	75	3.9	5	18	3.6	10	46	4.6	15	64	4.3	14.6	17.7
41-45	6	38	6.33	39	17	7.8	11	57	6.8	3	14	4.6	7	39	5.5	10	53	5.3	12.6	10.2
46-50	3	15	5	9	2	4.5	5	24	4.8	3	10	3.3	8	61	7.6	11	71	6.5	9	9.2
51-55	0	0	-	0	0	-	0	0	0	2	22	11	5	28	5.6	7	50	7.1	-	-
56 s	3	8	2.66	0	0	-	3	3	1	3	21	7	3	15	5	6	36	6	-	-

Res: Respondents **Chil:** Children

Grp: group **Ave:** Average

The Table 2.3 shows the distribution of different age groups as taken in the present sample and its comparison with the age groups of PDHS, 1990-91 and PCPS, 1994-95. It shows that the distribution of the respondents of different age groups is same in all the three samples. The table mainly deals with the age distribution and fertility differentials. It points out that the older age groups have shown generally high level of fertility than those of the former groups. It means that the variables of age and number of children are directly proportional i.e. higher the age is higher the number of children will be, and vice versa. Indeed, the recent trend of higher age at marriage has contributed to the low fertility level in the lower age groups.

The Figure 2.3A and 2.3B also correspond to this interpretation. Two different bar charts are developed to address the complex narration of two elaborated parts of the Table 2.3. For that matter the Figure 2.3A addresses age distribution and fertility differentials among females and the Figure 2.3B deals with the same issue with reference to males.




Figure 2.3A: Age Distribution and Fertility Differentials among Urban and Rural Females

In both the Figure of 2.3A and 2.3B, the vertical axis depicts age and the horizontal axis depicts fertility differential through number of children and their percentage as per the respondents. The Figure 2.3A shows that average number of children is higher in the age group of 41-45 in both rural as well as urban female population.

On the other side the Figure 2.3B shows age distribution and fertility differentials amongst males in both the rural as well as urban areas. It shows that in aggregate the age group of 51-55 has the highest average of number of children i.e. 7.1. Notable factor in both the segments of male and female along with urban and rural denominations a positive correlation between the age distribution and fertility is there. Moreover, it can be inferred that the age distribution is not the only parameter to affect the fertility level. The age at marriage can still be another valuable index of fertility, but this will be discussed in the forthcoming chapter, since, geographical distribution is another determining factor in this respect.




Figure 2.3B: Age Distribution and Fertility Differentials among Urban and Rural Males

2.1.3 Income and Class Distribution

Class is basically one of the concepts of sociology. The sociologists identify the concept of class as one of the basic

types of social stratification. Major contributions to define this term are derived from Karl Marx and Max Weber. Marx analyzed class in relation to the ownership of capital and the means of production. While dividing the population into those owing property and those owing no property, he identified them as capitalists (or the bourgeoisie) and proletariat classes. The groups that did not fit into this framework were identified as the hangovers of the pre-capitalist economy and were accepted to vanish with the maturation of the capitalist system (*Dictionary of Sociology*, 1988: 35).

On the contrary, Weber defined his concept of class according to economic differences of market capacity that gave rise to different life chances. He considered capital as one source of market capacity, but skill and education as other ones. So, he identified four classes: i) the propertied class; ii) the intellectual, the administrative and managerial class; iii) the traditional bourgeois class of small businessmen and shopkeepers; and iv) the working class. Weber also noted the significance of another principle of stratification which differed from "social class" named social honour or status (*Dictionary of Sociology*, 1988, 35-36).

The modern British and American class theories often replace these concepts of class. The Post-war American sociologists saw their society as classless. This was partially because of almost an equal distribution of material reward there. However, they took up Weber's notion of status and replaced it with the economically determined classes. They suggested that most of the hierarchical schemes used to identify inequality assumed that occupations could be simply ranked as 'better' or 'worse' than others, according to the prestige and income their incumbents receive.

On the other hand, the British sociologists considered the division of labour as a basic determinant of class. They identified the classes mainly as those existing between

manual and non-manual occupations. So, this corresponded to the major social and economic differences. This distinction also considered the Weberian notion of life chances and declared this distinction as temporary and transferable. The transformation from economic category into socially meaningful group is called as structuration. The implication of this conceptual construct is not usually easy in practice. Hence, the criterion for the multiplicity of classes is based on different levels of market rewards, different types of work situation and different combinations of the two. It means that identification of different classes is mostly a matter of interpretation rather than being self evident and objectively determined. The division of the population into three main classes i.e., working, intermediate and upper class, is thus a conventional sociological model of the British class structure. The working class performs the manual work. The intermediate class practices low-level non-manual works such as clerks and technicians. The upper class consists of managers, administrators and professional experts' etc. In spite of all its criticism this division is more relevant to the present work.

Since no criterion is designed to define the class structure in Pakistan, this conventional sociological model of the British class structure is applied to this investigation. The present sample is primarily divided into three main classes — the lower, the middle and the upper class. Then the middle class is further divided into the lower-middle, centre middle and upper middle classes to refine this division even more accurately. Like the aforementioned British division of classes, the criterion set for this division too is based upon the social as well as the economic variables. Thus, the condition of residence, monthly income and some other modes of economy are taken as the determining variables to differentiate classes in Pakistan. Similarly, a separate criterion has been set to identify distinct urban and rural classes also. For instance, in a rural locality, those earning Rs.2,000 or less per month, residing

in an ordinary house of two or less rooms and availing only basic necessities of life i.e. bicycle and radio, are considered in the lower class. Those earning from Rs.2000 to 5,000 per month, residing in a house of three rooms and also enjoying some better modern facilities i.e. television (TV) and refrigerator are in the lower middle class. Those with the monthly income of Rs.5,000 to 10,000, living in the house of four rooms and enjoying some more facilities, i.e. television, refrigerator, motor bike, and video cassette recorder (VCR) stand in the centre middle class. While those earning Rs.10,000 to 30,000, with a house of five rooms and enjoying almost all the facilities i.e. television, refrigerator, VCR, and motor car etc. are considered in the upper middle class. Finally, those enjoying monthly income of more than Rs.30,000, a residence of six or more rooms including all modern facilities as well as luxuries, distinct the status of upper class.

Similarly, the urban population is also divided into the same classes, but with somewhat varying criterion. As, those having monthly income of Rs.2,500 or less, an ordinary house of two or less rooms and availing only basic facilities of life stand in the lower class. Those earning Rs.2,500 to 5,000 monthly, having house of three rooms and enjoying only a few modern facilities i.e. TV and refrigerator are ranked in the lower middle class. Those availing some more modern facilities i.e. TV, refrigerator, motor bike, telephone and VCR, earning Rs.5,000 to 15,000 and living in the house of four rooms are in the centre of the middle class. Those who earn Rs.15,000 to Rs.40,000 monthly, residing in a house of five rooms and enjoying all modern facilities i.e. TV, refrigerator, VCR and motor car etc. stand in the upper middle class. Finally, the people enjoying income of Rs.40,000 and above, a residence of six or more rooms including almost all the luxuries of life, are counted in the upper class. A compact criterion of this class structure is designed in the Figure 2.3C.

Classes	Income per month	Residence	Facilities
Lower class	≤ Rs.2,000	2 or less rooms	Bicycle, Radio
Lower middle	2,000 – 5000	3 rooms	Bicycle, Radio, TV, VCR, Motorbike
Centre middle	5,000 -10,000	4 rooms	Motorbike, Radio, TV, VCR, Refrigerator
Upper middle	10,000-30,000	5 rooms	Motorbike, Radio, TV, Car, Telephone, VCR
Upper class	≥30,000	6 or more rooms	TV, VCR, Car, AC, Satellite- receiver, telephone and so on
URBAN			
Lower class	< Rs. 2,500	2 or less rooms	Bicycle, Radio
Lower middle	2,500-6000	3 rooms	Bicycle, radio, TV, Refrigerator
Centre middle	6,000-15,000	4 rooms	Motorcycle, radio, TV, VCR, telephone, refrigerator
Upper middle	15,000-40,000	5 rooms	Refrigerator, deck, T.V., VCR, Car, telephone
Upper class	> 40,000	6 or more rooms	Refrigerator, deck, T.V., VCR, Car, AC, Mobile Satellite- receiver and so on

Figure 2.3C: Criterion of Class Distribution

Although an attempt has been made to make the class distribution succinct but some complications were faced in the field, like a person owning two or more houses, TVs. Cars, etc., which were adjusted accordingly by the researcher himself. Hence, a detailed quantum of class distribution is given in the following table.

Table 2.4: Quantum of Class Distribution

Type of Residents	Classes										Total
	Lower		Middles Classes				Upper		Upper		
	No.	%	Lower	Centre	Upper	Upper	No.	%	No.	%	
Rural male	26	40	14	22	13	20	7	10	5	8	65
Urban male	12	35	8	25	9	26	3	10	3	10	35
Total	38	38	22	22	22	22	10	10	8	8	100
Rural female	26	40	14	22	13	20	7	10	5	8	65
Urban female	12	35	8	25	9	26	3	10	3	10	35
Total	38	38	22	22	22	22	10	10	8	8	100

The Table 2.4 and its corresponding Figure 2.4 show that equal proportion is set both for male and female respondents, but different for urban and rural areas. For example, the first column indicates that 12 respondents (35%) are set for lower-urban class. While 40 percent proportion (26 respondents) is set for the rural lower class. Thus, the distribution is reflective of actual situation in Pakistan. As the rural society in Pakistan has comparatively a larger lower class than the urban one, such variations are kept in view throughout the course of this study.




Figure 2.4: Quantum of Class Distribution

A potential relationship can also be traced-out in the variables of income and class groups and the fertility. The poorer the family is, (especially among the land less labourers with no education and skill), the more important it becomes for the family to look for diversified ways of earning money and adding to farm labour. It is thus supposed that a larger number of children supplement the meagre family income (Rukanuddin and Farooqui, 1988). The data of the present study, however, does not completely confirm to the findings of Rukanuddin and Farooqui (1988).

Table 2.5: Class Differential and Number of Children

Class	Rural respondents						Urban					
	Male	No. of chil.	Aver. chil.	Female	No. of chil.	Aver. chil.	Male	No. of chil.	Aver. chil.	Female	No. of chil.	Aver. Chil.
Lower	26	112	4.3	26	87	3.3	12	39	3.2	12	56	4.6
Lower	14	79	5.6	14	56	4.0	8	40	5.0	8	16	2.0
Middle												
Centre	13	47	3.6	13	59	4.5	9	43	4.7	9	30	3.3
Middle												
Upper	7	23	3.2	7	27	3.8	3	12	4.0	3	5	1.6
Middle												
Upper	5	20	5.0	5	13	2.6	3	14	4.6	3	5	1.6
Total	65	281	4.3	65	242	3.7	35	148	4.2	35	112	3.2

The Figure 2.5 shows the gender and class differentials of rural and urban respondents on horizontal axis while the numbers of respondents and average children on vertical axis. The Figure shows that lower middle class male respondents have maximum children on average while females of centre middle class of rural areas have greater average children. In urban areas male respondents of lower middle class and female respondents of lower class have maximum children on average.

It shows that in the rural areas the variable of class does affect the number of children, perhaps because the significance of having a large family is owned equally by the whole rural society. However, the effect of class difference is clear in urban society, because the urban lower class perceives children as a source of income for the family.




Figure 2.5: Class Differential and Number of Children

2.1.4 Sectarian Distribution

Sect is basically a term in the sociology of religion. It, indeed, is a separate, voluntary and exclusive religious group of people, requiring an absolute commitment from its supporters and emphasizing its separate identification from the rest of society. These characteristics of sect have been debated at length and a variety of subsets have also been identified and studied by the Western sociologists. However, the church-sect is still a central focus of the sociology of religion in the West (*Dictionary of Sociology*, 1988).

Unfortunately, no attention has been paid to elucidate this concept in the East, especially in Pakistan. In the case of Pakistan, neither the State nor independent intellectual circles have ever deliberated over it, resulting in a dearth of even approximate data. Perhaps the critical ideological confrontations, prevailing in Pakistan are the main hurdle in the study of this subject.

However, Weeke (1978), in his *Muslim People*, has touched upon sectarian tendencies while discussing the Pakistani Muslims as Punjabis, Pushtoons, Balochis and Sindhis. "Since it was the Turks who brought Sunni Islam to the Punjab, the *Hanafi* school of *Shariah* dominates the Punjabi Muslim thought. However, one of every twelve Punjabis is *Shiah*, either *Athna Ashari* or *Ismaili*." (Weeke, 1978: 315). He also pointed out that two third of the Punjabi Muslims are under Sufi influence. *Qadiriya* and *Naqshbandia* are the two major mystic orders in Pakistani Punjab (*Ibid.*: 315).

Concerning Balochis, Weeke (*Ibid.*) says that Balochis mainly adhere to the Sunni Islam. However, some heterodox sects like the *Zikri* are also found. *Zikri*, indeed, is a group centered in the Pakistani part of Southern Balochistan, which worships a *Mehdi* (Messiah) of the fourteenth century.

While pointing out the sectarian tendencies of the Pushtoons, Weeke (*Ibid.*) points out that excluding the *Turis* of Kurram Agency who follow a *Shiah Imami* School, all the other Pushtoons follow the *Hanafi* — a Sunni Muslim School. However, some pre-Islamic indigenous beliefs and customs overshadow the religious scene, including the abound shrines of the saints. Religious leaders have a considerable influence in cultural and political spheres of Pushtoon life (*Ibid.*: 324). Sindhis are mostly Sunni Muslims. The Sindhi culture reflects a deep impression of traditional Islam in the practices of family laws and customs, food, taboos and fine arts etc. (*Ibid.*: 363).

This being just an intellectual or theoretical account of the sectarian profile in Pakistan is not duly clear and is thereof unduly reliable. The actual situation is more haphazard. In case of the Sunnis, most of the people are found either indifferent about their peculiar sect or are reluctant to discuss about it. So they responded poorly by just replying either that they are only Muslims or that they are simply Sunnis. Similar was the response of the members of Jamat-i-Islami. They were generally reluctant to show their affiliations with Jamat, and also in discussing their views openly. Some reluctance was also observed in *Shiahs*, however, it was not as high as among the Sunnis. They were comparatively more open and receptive in discussion.

Table 2.6: Sectarian Division

Respondents	Sunni sects										Shiah sect				Total
	Sunnis		Ahlihadith		Barelvi		Deobandi		Jamati-Islami		Imami		Ismaili		
	No	%	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%	No	%	No	%	
Female															
Urban	15	42.8	4	11.4	5	14.3	2	5.7	5	14.3	4	11.5	-	-	35
Rural	40	61.5	6	9.2	5	7.7	3	4.6	5	7.7	4	6.1	2	3.1	65
Total	55	55	10	10	10	10	5	5	10	10	8	8	2	2	100
Male															
Urban	13	37.1	2	5.7	7	20	2	5.7	5	14.3	4	11.4	2	5.7	35
Rural	41	63.1	6	9.2	7	10.8	2	3.1	5	7.7	4	6.1	-	-	65
Total	54	54	8	8	14	14	4	4	10	10	8	8	2	2	100

The Table 2.6 shows a roughly defined sectarian division in Pakistan, as is taken in this sample. It shows that 10% of the total sample devoted to that is further allocated as 8% to *Imamis* and 2% to *Ismailis*. Same proportion is set both for male and female respondents, which is more or less the same in real case. The Jamat-i-Islami shows its present strength at 4 millions constituting approximately 3.3 percent of the total population of Pakistan. However, in the present sample it is given 10% proportion of the total sample, because it denotes a major opponent group to the idea of family planning, with its unique approach as 'revivalists'. So, it needs more concentration than its proportion warrants. While rest of the 80% is covering all the other *Sunni* sects, as the people randomly told themselves to be. In this way *Sunnis* cover in aggregate 90% proportion of the total sample. However, the proportion of other *Sunni* sub-sects could have not been taken proportionately, due to the peoples' either inaccurate or indifferent response.

The sectarian division is graphically presented in the Figure 2.6A and the Figure 2.6B for females and males respectively. The graphical representation shows the percentage of respondents from different sects of Sunnis and Shias.




Figure 2.6A: Sectarian Division of Female Respondents

Owing to the aforementioned reasons and non-availability of any reliable data, the division given in Table 2.6 and in the Figure 2.6A and the Figure 2.6B is considered to be a rough profile of the sectarian division in Pakistan. A deliberate attempt has been made to design it as proportionately as possible encompassing all the sects.




Figure 2.6B: Sectarian Division of Male Respondents

Sect, indeed, is a very sensitive issue in Pakistan. That is why it is neither touched by the Population Census of Pakistan nor by any other demographic survey to trace its relationship with fertility. It even evades the attention of previous researches in demography. The present study is mainly focussed on this aspect. It needs a detailed description to understand the attitudes of different sects towards fertility or family planning. Hence, a complete chapter (No.4) is devoted to this issue where it will be dealt with detail.

2.1.5 Level of Literacy

The area under consideration has a maximum literacy level in the whole country. Its literacy rate ratio is 72.45%. Literacy rate in urban areas is 77.3% while in rural areas it is 62.5%. Further, the male literacy ratio is 80.6% as compared to 62.4% of females (Population Census, 1998).

The sample of this study comprises both illiterates and literate. The section on the literate is further graded into the respondents with primary, middle, matric, intermediate,

bachelor and master levels of education. A separate proportion is also set for those with the professional education. The researcher took every care to represent almost all the major disciplines and faculties of education, like commerce, arts, science, medicine, engineering and law etc. in the sample.

An inverse relationship between the fertility and level of education is well established. The level of education influences the fertility both through direct and indirect methods (UN, 1973). Such effects of fertility rate are also confirmed by the findings of Sathar (1984). The present study also traces out an interrelationship between the variables of literacy level and the number of children, which is shown in Table 2.7.

Table 2.7: Literacy Level and the Number of Children

Level of Literacy	Male Respondents											Female Respondents										
	Urban		No. of chil.	Ave. No. of chil.	Rural		No. of chil.	Ave. No. of chil.	Total	No. of chil.	Ave. No. of chil.	Urban		No. of chil.	Ave. No. of chil.	Rural		No. of chil.	Ave. No. of chil.	Total	No. of chil.	Ave. No. of chil.
	No.	%			No.	%						No.	%									
No education	17	48.6	70	4.1	33	5.7	163	4.9	50	223	4.4	14	40	61	4.3	36	55.4	145	4.2	50	206	4.1
Primary	1	2.8	3	3	4	6.1	18	4.5	5	21	4.2	3	8.6	5	1.6	5	7.6	26	5.2	8	31	3.8
Middle	1	2.8	3	3	4	6.1	18	4.5	5	21	4.2	3	8.6	11	3.6	4	6.1	15	3.7	7	26	3.7
Matric	2	5.7	10	5	5	7.6	12	2.4	7	22	3.1	3	8.6	8	2.6	5	7.6	20	4	8	28	3.5
Intermediate	5	14.3	19	2.2	5	7.6	15	3	10	26	2.6	4	11.4	6	1.5	5	7.6	11	3.2	9	17	1.8
Bachelor	4	11.4	24	6	5	7.6	19	3.8	9	43	4.7	3	8.6	7	2.3	5	7.6	13	2.6	8	20	2.5
Master	1	2.8	4	4	3	4.6	10	3.3	4	14	3.5	2	5.7	5	2.5	2	3.1	5	2.5	4	10	2.5
Professional	4	11.4	23	5.7	6	9.2	26	4.3	10	49	4.9	3	8.6	9	3	3	4.6	7	2.3	6	16	2.6
Total	35	100	148	4.2	65	100	281	4.3	100	419	4.1	35	100	112	3.2	65	100	242	3.7	100	354	3.5

Chil: Children. **Ave:** Average.




Figure 2.7: Literacy Level and Number of Children

In the Figure 2.7 horizontal axis depicts male and female respondents of urban and rural areas with average number of children while vertical axis represents averages which correlates respondent's literacy level and average number of children. The data shows that the total sample is equally divided into literate and illiterates with the ratio of 50% each for male and female respondents. Although this 50% proportion does not confirm with the real statistics of the area, it, however, suits to the requirements of the present study. It seemed impossible for the researcher to divide such a small sample according to the real literacy rate of the area into all the above mentioned levels of literacy. Secondly, it seems coherent with the national literacy level of the country which is 62.4%.

Keeping in view the actual literacy rate of 62.4% for females in the area, a literacy rate of 50% seems a bit unrealistic. With this discrepancy, males and females in computation will be dealt and analyzed separately, wherever needed. The table also mentions a detailed description of all the respective levels of education. It reflects that at the primary, middle and the matric level of education, female proportion is higher than that of the male respondents. Nevertheless, it does not mean that they have actually high, but that they have got duly low proportion in the upper levels of education. Concerning the professional education also, females have got a considerable proportion

(although lower than males). Indeed, the lady doctors and the LHVs (Lady Health Visitors) have mainly contributed to this proportion.

Concerning the fertility differential with reference to literacy levels, the present study confirms the findings of previous researches (UN, 1973; and Sather, 1984), but with little differences. The Table 2.7 shows clearly that the fertility level of the respondents with no education is considerably higher than the fertility level of educated respondents. Then from the primary to the intermediate levels of education it follows the trend that higher the education level is, lower is the fertility level there. At bachelor and master's levels of education, however, a slightly higher level of fertility is evident. It may be because of better economic positions, better health conditions, better child and maternal care or less mortality level and older age level of the respondents. As it has been explored previously in the topic of age distribution and fertility differential that the people with more age have considerably high fertility level so it can be inferred that an increase in education, people are realizing the intensity of the situation more rigorously. However, the proper reason of this differential is not traced out here. The table also shows that the people with professional education have comparatively high level of fertility. These effects, however, are lesser in case of females. This is mainly because most of the females with professional education are themselves working as doctors and nurses. Finally, the effect of education on the fertility differentials is stronger in the case of females than that of males.

2.1.6 Occupational Distribution

An interrelationship between the variables of occupational distribution and the number of children is also necessary to discuss here. In this respect no previous research has attempted to draw a correlation between the variables of specific occupational attachment and the fertility in Pakistan. However, some studies have indicated

generally a negative relationship between the levels of fertility and the employment of women, particularly if they are employed in somewhat modern sector (UN, 1973). Then the findings of Pakistan Fertility Survey (PFS), and Pakistan Labour Force and Migration Survey (PLM) also indicate a negative association of female labour force participation and cumulative fertility. No study has, however, probed into the male occupational differentials and the number of children. The present study has tried to explore this factor. Table 2.8 shows the occupational distribution among both the male and female respondents and its impact on the number of children.

The Table 2.8 shows a detailed account of the occupational distribution of the respondents and its interrelationship with the number of children. Primarily, the table shows that quite like the real situation of the country, here also, the major occupation is occupied by agricultural sector, with the 33 percent proportion of the total sample. This proportion is even higher in the rural areas i.e. 44.61 percent. In the case of females, 80 percent of the total respondents were predominantly housewives, and most of them also assisted their male partners in their farming activities. In this way they were also attached to the agriculture sector. If so, the agriculture sector will cover almost 60 percent proportion of the total sample. The second main occupation is that of the serving class with its 31 percent proportion in case of male and 9 percent in case of female respondents.

Table 2.8: Occupational Differentials and the Number of Children

Occupations	Male Respondents										Female Respondents											
	Urban		No. of chil.	Ave. No. of chil.	Rural		No. of chil.	Ave. No. of chil.	Total	No. of chil.	Ave. No. of chil.	Urban		No. of chil.	Ave. No. of chil.	Rural		No. of chil.	Ave. No. of chil.	Total	No. of chil.	Ave. No. of chil.
	No.	%			No.	%						No.	%			No.	%					
Agriculture	4	11.4	25	6.8	29	44.6	140	4.8	33	165	5	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Services	16	45.7	58	3.6	15	23.1	48	3.2	31	106	3.4	6	45.7	11	1.8	3	4.6	8	2.6	9	19	2.1
Professional	6	17.1	35	5.8	2	3.1	5	2.5	8	40	5	3	8.6	9	3	2	3.1	2	1	5	11	2.2
Labor	4	11.4	10	2.5	1	1.5	2	2	5	12	2.4	3	8.6	9	3	1	1.5	0	0	4	9	2.2
Trade	-	-	-	-	4	6.1	35	8.5	4	34	8.5	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Businessmen	5	14.3	20	4	14	21.5	52	3.7	19	72	3.8	-	-	-	-	2	3.1	12	6	2	12	6
Housewives	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	23	65.7	83	3.6	57	87.7	220	3.8	80	303	3.7
Total	35	100	148	4.²	65	100	281	4.3	100	429	4.2	35	100	112	3.2	65	100	248	3.8	100	354	3.5

Chil: Children **Ave:** Average

Serving class means, here, the people serving in all sorts of administrative, clerical, teaching, nursing and sales jobs etc. Production workers rank at the third number with respect to numbers. This occupation encompasses the industrial labour, shopkeepers and businessmen. They share 28 percent proportion in case of male and only 6.0 percent in the female. In the end stands the professional class, which shares only 8.0 percent of the male and 5.0 percent of the female respondents.




Figure 2.8A: Occupational Differentials and the Number of Children in Male Respondents

The Figure 2.8A depicts the interrelationship of ten variables based on occupational differences and average number of children among rural and urban respondents. The horizontal axis represents the occupation while horizontal axis represents average number of children and percentage of respondents. The bars in the chart depicts that majority of the rural male respondents are related to agriculture sector while in urban areas majority of the respondents of sample date are working in services sector. A small proportion of the sample data depicts that trade related rural male respondents have more children on average while in aggregate terms male respondents of agriculture sector has maximum children on average, both in rural as well as urban areas.




Figure 2.8B: Occupational Differences and Number of Children in Female Respondents

In the Figure 2.8B, horizontal axis depicts the occupation of the female respondents of urban and rural areas and vertical axis represents the averages of respondents and children. The Figure shows that majority of the female respondents are house wives and among rest of the female respondents majority is working in services sector. In aggregate house wives respondents have highest number of children in urban as well as rural areas.

Here it is to be clarified that while showing the educational profile of the sample the table of literacy level indicated that 6.0% of the females had professional education while they cover only 5% proportion of the population otherwise. Indeed, one female having a professional degree was leading her life as a housewife in the rural area. The same thing also creates a difference here in the effect of this occupation on the level of fertility. This occupational distribution of the sample is not only representing almost all the occupational segments of the society rather it can be compared with the real occupational statistics of the country.

Concerning the occupational differentials and the number of children, the table shows clearly that the people related to the agricultural sector have considerably higher number of children than the people of serving occupations. While in other occupations, the professional workers and

the people concerned with trade have also much higher number of children. The male business class has shown a mediatory trend but female business class has highest number of children. Male serving people occupy the second last position in the lower number of children while serving females show lowest number of children. It means that this Figure confirms the findings of previous researches.

A detailed description of the basic characteristics of the sample reveals that a number of factors like geographical location; age distribution, income, class, level of literacy and occupational distribution have considerable influence to impress upon the fertility differentials in Pakistan. The average number of children is higher in the rural areas than in the urban areas and the older age groups show higher level of fertility than the younger ones. As far as the variable of class difference is concerned, it does not affect the number of children in rural areas. In urban areas, however, fertility patterns are influenced by income and class differential. Consequently, the urban lower class has more children than that of urban upper class. The study also finds out an inverse relationship between literacy and fertility. This variable seems more effective in females. Finally, those attached with agricultural occupation have considerably higher number of children, as compared to those engaged in the services sectors. After establishing various characteristics of the sample, the discussion proceeds to the analysis of the worldview of the respondents concerning religion, marriage and family in the perspective of family planning.

Chapter 3

Muslim Worldview, Religion, Marriage and Family

Trying to understand the actual position of the Muslim worldview about family planning, an attempt is being made to comprehend the attitude of the respondents towards religion, marriage and family. For a clear analysis a number of variables may be considered. These are:

- i. The number of prayers observed by the respondents. This includes the daily prayers, *Juma* (weekly gathering of Muslims on Friday) and *Khutba* (oration of *Juma*).
- ii. Marriageable age.
- iii. Present and desired number of children and the desire of male children.
- iv. Present and expected practices of family planning in future.
- v. Approval or disapproval of family planning advertisements.
- vi. Counselling with spouses or others in regard to family planning.
- vii. Practicability of sterilization.

3.1 Observance of Daily Prayers, *Juma* and *Khutba*

3.1.1 Prayer

Prayer or *Salat* stands among one of the five basic tenets of Islam (*Arkan-e-Islam*). For all adult Muslims, observance of prayer five times a day is obligatory. In the present Pakistani society, however, people seem to be somewhat slapdash about it. A detailed account of the

performance of daily prayers by the respondents of the present sample is given in the Table 3.1.

The information provided by the respondents about offering their prayers as shown in the Table 3.1 is taken as a determinant of their religious attitudes. The table illustrates that in the urban areas, both the males and females are more devoted to prayers as compared to their rural counterparts. With 70.8 percent males and 67.7 percent rural females in comparison to 85.8 percent males and 65.8 percent females in urban areas offer their prayers in varying numbers. In aggregate, 24 male respondents (urban and rural combined) and 26 females (urban and rural combined) offer no prayer in a day. In short, if the observance of prayers is an indicator of religiosity, urban people are slightly more religious than rural ones.

Table 3.1: No. of Prayers Offered by Respondents

No. of prayers offered by the respondents in a day	Respondents' observance of prayers									
	Female Urban		Female Rural		Total No. females	Male Urban		Male Rural		Total No. males
	No.	%	No.	%		No.	%	No.	%	
0	5	14.2	21	32.3	26	5	14.2	19	29.2	24
1	0	0	2	3	2	1	2.9	1	1.6	2
2	1	2.9	6	9.2	7	2	5.7	5	7.7	7
3	8	22.9	9	13.9	17	1	2.9	13	20	14
4	10	28.6	4	6.2	14	4	11.4	4	6.2	8
5	11	31.4	23	35.4	34	22	62.9	23	35.3	45
Total	35	100	65	100	100	35	100	65	100	100

In the Figure 3.1 horizontal axis represents number of prayers (in the axis 1 represent 0 prayer and similarly consider ascending values i.e. 6 represents 5 prayers). As the origin of chart has 0 value so the axis starts its values from 1 which is actually representation of 0 prayers according to the Table 3.1. Furthermore, vertical axis represents the percentage of male and female respondents offering their prayers. The chart shows that rural females offer more prayers as compared to urban females while on the other hand urban males offer more prayers as compared

to rural males. In aggregate urban respondents offer more prayers as compare to the rural respondents.




Figure 3.1: No. of Prayers Offered By Respondents

Furthermore, the respondents were also asked about their offering of *Juma* prayers and listening to its *Khutba* (sermon) in full. This too was done to gauge the level of their religiosity. The Table 3.2 presents the details of their response concerning this issue. Here, the columns for females who do not proffer the *Juma* prayers themselves demonstrate the attitude of their husbands. This is because in this respect they were asked about the practices of their husbands.

The Table 3.2 shows that the prayer of *Juma* is offered more in urban areas than in the rural ones. However, a little difference is found in the response of male and female respondents. The female columns show lesser percentages mainly due to either ignorance or unawareness about the performance of their husbands in this respect. On the other hand, the ratio of listening to the full *Khutba* was reported to be considerably higher in the rural areas. Indeed, the urban people appear to perform the *faraiz* (religious duties) in mosques and try to get their religious knowledge from other sources i.e., religious books, media and other religious material etc.

Table 3.2: Offering of *Juma* and *Khutba*

Whether offered / attended	Percentage of respondents offering <i>Juma</i> prayers and <i>Khutba</i>					
	Out of 35 female urban	Out of 65 female rural	Average (%)	Out of 35 male urban	Out of 65 male rural	Average (%)
<i>Juma</i>	%	%		%	%	
Yes	80.0	77.0	78.5	85.7	72.3	78.95
No	20.0	23.0	21.5	14.3	27.7	20.75
Total	100.0	100.0	100	100.0	100.0	100
<i>Khutba</i>						
Yes	51.4	69.2	60.3	68.6	64.6	66.6
No	58.6	30.8	44.7	31.4	35.4	33.4
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0

Statistics given in the Tables 3.1 and the Table 3.2 show that religion exerts much influence upon the lives of urban as well as rural Muslims in Pakistan. From this it may be inferred that it also affects the worldview of both the urban and the rural people concerning family planning in Pakistan. However, the contention of this study is that this is not so. As has been explored in the previous chapter, the fertility rate is higher in the rural areas than in the urban ones.

In the Figure 3.2 horizontal axis represents the urban and rural respondents who offer their *Juma* prayers and be present at *Khutba* while vertical axis represents respondent's respective percentages of offering *Juma* prayer and listening *Khutba*. In aggregate 78 percent of the female respondents offer their *Juma* prayers while 65 percent listen or attend *Khutba*. This ratio is a bit higher in males in offering *Juma* prayers as well as in attending *Khutba*.




Figure 3.2: Offering of *Juma* and *Khutba*

3.2 Attitude towards Marriage

3.2.1 Age at Marriage

Marriage is considered as a social institution in Islam. Indeed, Islam declares it obligatory on every youthful man and woman. Only marriage and concubine (under certain conditions), is the legitimate outlet for sexual gratification in an Islamic society. It is pointed out that girls usually enter into marriage at an early age among Muslims (Omran, 1974-1:232). Generally, 70 to 86 percent of the women of reproductive age are married in Muslim countries. Less than 3 percent of them never marry. It means that Muslim women spend most of their reproductive years in marital life. In the case of Pakistan also, low age at marriage is reported as one of the main causes of high growth rate (Rukanuddin & Farooqui, 1988: 91).

Early marriage of girls is also considered as a social and cultural norm of the society. However, the age at marriage both for males and females has risen upward from 17.9 and 23.4 years to 20.8 and 25.4 years respectively, over the inter-censal period of 1951-1981 i.e., the period between the first and the last census of which figures are available. The data of the present study, like earlier figures, also show comparatively lower age of marriage for female respondents than males. It also shows a trend for early

marriages in rural areas in case of both the male as well as female respondents. The Table 3.3 shows the details of age at marriage of the respondents.

Table 3.3: Age at Marriage

Age Groups	Respondents									
	Female Urban		Female Rural		Total No.	Male Urban		Male Rural		Total No.
	No.	%	No.	%		No.	%	No.	%	
10-15	4	11.4	16	24.6	20	0	-	0	-	-
16-20	15	42.8	29	44.6	44	9	25.7	22	33.8	37
21-25	14	40.0	15	23.1	29	15	42.8	37	56.9	46
26-30	2	5.8	5	7.7	7	10	28.6	5	7.7	15
31-35	0		0	-	0	1	2.9	1	1.6	2
Total	35	100	65	100	100	35	100	65	100	100

Both the Table 3.3 and the Figure 3.3 show that 20 percent of the total female respondents (11.4% in urban and 24.6% in rural areas) were married during the age of 10 to 15 years, while no male respondent was married in this age group. The largest age group of marriage is between 16-20 years in females while in the case of males it covers the age group of 21-25. Later on, a declining trend is observed in the older age groups. While the last age group i.e. 31-35 years has no unmarried female respondents, it does have nevertheless two males. All these figures show that relatively females get married at an earlier age than males. The Table 3.3 also shows clearly that both the male as well as female respondents get married at an earlier age in rural areas than in urban ones. It means that the geographical and cultural environment influences the decisions of people concerning the age of marriage.




Figure 3.3: Age at Marriage

In the Figure 3.3, horizontal axis depicts male and female respondents of urban and rural areas and vertical axis represents respondents' age at marriage. The bars in the chart show that majority of the female respondents got married in the age group of 16-20 and in aggregate more than 46 percent of the respondent males got married at the age 21-25. It is also clear from the bar chart that early age marriage trend is commonly practiced in rural areas for both males as well as females.

Table 3.4: Desired Age of Marriage

Age Groups	Respondents									
	Female Urban		Female Rural		Total No.	Male Urban		Male Rural		Total No.
	No.	%	No.	%		No.	%	No.	%	
Younger	8	22.9	23	35.4	31	11	34.4	21	32.3	33
Older	27	77.1	42	64.6	69	24	18.6	44	67.7	67
Total	35	100	65	100	100	35	100	65	100	100

The same response was observed towards urban/ rural and male/female differentials when the respondents were asked about the desired age of marriage (See Table 3.4). Here an age limit of 22 years was set for the middle demarcation and the respondents were asked whether they approved of marriage at a younger or an older age.




Figure 3.4: Desired Age of Marriage

In the Figure 3.4, horizontal axis represents the whole sample data comprised of males and females of urban and rural areas while vertical axis represents the response of the respondents regarding their desired age of marriage. In the Table 3.4 and the Figure 3.4, the response of the urban females was observed to be very positive towards older age at marriage, as only 22.9 percent of them approved of early age marriages, while 34.4 percent rural females approved of young age marriages. However, in case of male respondents very slight difference is observed between rural and urban respondents. 31.4 percent urban and 32.3 percent rural respondents approved of early-age marriages. The data shows that the females more consciously favour older age at marriage, which is a positive sign for the promotion of family planning practices.

3.3 Attitude towards the Ideal Size of a Family

While exploring the existing values about the ideal size of a family in Pakistan, an attempt has been made to explore the opinion of the respondents about the appropriate number of children a Muslim couple should have. The opinion of the couples was sought about the desired number of children and it was compared with the actual number of children the informants had.

3.3.1 Number of Children

A detailed description of the actual and the desired number of children of the respondents is given in the Table 3.5 which shows comparative figures between the actual and the desired size of family (children) of the respondents. A scrutiny of the table reveals a discrepancy between the desired and existing number of children. The table shows that 10 percent of the female and the same proportion of the male respondents have no child, mostly because of the short period of the marriage. Then the female columns show that a large number of female respondents appear in the rows of those having less numbers of children i.e. 1-5 children.

The columns for male respondents show their considerable proportion in almost all the rows of the number of children. It means the actual number of children is comparatively less in female respondents than in males. Such a trend can also be traced in the desired number of children. No male respondent wants to have less than three children and only 7 respondents desired to have only 3 children. While in the case of females, 5 respondents are content to have two children and 21 respondents have 3 children. Thus, 74 percent of the female respondents desire to have four or less children. In the case of males this proportion stands at 69 percent. On the average, however, both men and women desire to have five children. Finally, only 9 percent in each gender find themselves content with the Will of God as a deciding factor in the number of children they do have.

Table 3.5: The Actual and Desired Number of Children

No. of Children	Respondents																			
	Female Urban				Female Rural				Total		Male Urban				Male Rural				Total	
	Actual		Desired		Actual		Desired		Actual	Desired	Actual		Desired		Actual		Desired		Actual	Desired
	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%		
0	5	14.3	0	-	5	7.7	0	-	10	0	4	11.4	0	-	6	9.2	0	-	10	0
1	4	11.4	2	5.7	4	6.1	3	4.6	8	5	3	8.6	0	-	1	1.5	0	-	4	0
2	4	11.4	9	25.7	15	23.1	12	18.5	19	21	0	-	2	5.7	12	18.4	5	7.7	12	7
3	8	22.8	5	14.3	9	13.8	8	12.3	17	13	4	11.4	8	23.8	4	6.1	16	24.6	8	24
4	7	20	14	40.0	13	20.0	21	32.3	20	35	9	25.7	13	37.1	10	15.4	25	38.5	19	38
5	4	11.4	2	5.7	5	23.1	4	6.1	9	6	8	22.8	3	8.6	13	20.0	9	13.8	21	12
6	0	-	0	-	6	9.2	6	9.2	6	6	2	5.7	3	8.6	6	9.2	3	4.6	8	6
7	0	-	0	-	1	1.5	0	-	1	0	2	5.7	0	-	6	9.2	2	3.1	8	2
8	1	2.8	0	-	4	6.1	2	3.1	5	2	0	-	0	-	3	4.6	1	1.5	3	1
9	1	2.8	0	-	1	1.5	0	-	2	0	1	2.8	0	-	3	4.6	0	-	4	0
9>	1	2.8	0	-	2	3.1	3	4.6	3	3	2	5.7	0	-	1	1.5	1	1.5	3	1
*		-	3	8.6		-	6	9.2		9		-	6	17.1		-	3	4.6		9
Total	35	100	35	100	65	100	65	100	10	100	35	100	35	100	65	100	65	100	100	100

* Those who respond: 'According to the Will of Almighty God.'




Figure 3.5A: Actual and Desired number of Children for Female Respondents

The Figures 3.5A and 3.5B represent the actual and desired number of children for males and females respectively on horizontal axis and total number of respondents and their percentages on vertical axis.




Figure 3.5B: Actual and Desired number of Children for Male Respondents

It was widely observed by this researcher that most of the respondents desired to have more male children than female ones. One of the field questions was phrased as follows: "Would you continue producing or bearing children till the birth of a male child?" It was to determine the intensity of the desire for a male child. In this respect the male desired sons more strongly than the females. This is shown in the Table 3.6. It is clear from the bar chart that

majority of the urban as well as rural female desire four children. The bar chart also depicts that very few females desire more than 6 or 7 children. As in the case of female respondents, the Figure 3.5B also shows the same tendency of desiring four children in most of the male respondents of both urban as well as rural areas.

The Table 3.6 and the diagram 3.6 show the degree of son-preference both in female and male respondents. It illustrates that urban women do not desire sons as strongly as rural ones or men do. Only 22.9 percent of them replied that they would keep bearing children till the birth of a son. But the response of rural females was quite different i.e. 56.9 percent of them showed their firm desire for a son, even at the cost of having an unlimited number of children. In the case of male respondents, this urban rural differential about the son-desire was awfully minor (i.e. 69.2 rural - 68.6 urban = 0.6). The males, indeed, want to continue their lineage, which is possible only through male children, both in urban and rural societies.

Table 3.6: Son Preference

Response	Respondents % age					
	Female urban (Out of 35)	Female rural (Out of 55)	Average	Male urban (Out of 35)	Male rural (out of 65)	Average
Yes	22.9	56.9	33.9	68.6	69.2	68.9
No	77.1	43.1	60.1	31.4	30.8	31.1
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0

In the Figure 3.6, horizontal axis represents the male and female respondents while vertical axis depicts the level of preference from the respondents. In females of rural areas, desire for son is much higher than that of urban areas. On the other hand, majority of the both urban as well as rural males prefer son.




Figure 3.6: Son Preference

Furthermore, an attempt is also made to find out the general attitude of the respondents towards the economic value of their children, i.e. the parents see their children as a source of income or as a burden.

Table 3.7: Children as a Source of Income/Burden

Response	Children as an Economic Unit							
	Source of Income				Source of Burden			
	yes	%	No.	%	yes	%	No.	%
Female urban	7	20.0	28	80.0	30	85.7	5	14.3
Female rural	35	53.9	30	46.1	45	69.2	20	30.8
Total (%age)	42		58		75		25	
Male urban	13	37.1	22	62.9	23	65.7	12	34.3
Male rural	33	50.8	32	49.2	44	67.7	21	32.3
Total (%age)	46		54		67		33	

The Table 3.7 and the Figure 3.7 show the economic value of the children. Here an affirmative answer in one column is comparable with the negative in the other. This is mainly because those considering children as a source of income do not consider them as a burden for themselves and vice versa. In this respect both urban male and female respondents are in complete conformity. As 20 percent (7 respondents) take their children as a source of income and 14.3 percent i.e. 5 respondents do not consider their children as a burden. Similarly, 13 urban male respondents i.e. 37.1 percent consider their children as a source of income and 12 respondents (34.3%) do not see them as a

burden. It means that, on the whole, people do not take their children as a burden but as a source of income.




Figure 3.7: Children as a Source of Income/Burden

The horizontal axis in the Figure 3.7 depicts the two main categories i.e. children as a source of income or source of burden while vertical axis depicts the number and percentage of the response of the respondents.

The response in the rural areas is somewhat confusing. As almost 50 percent of both the male and female rural respondents think that children are a source of income to them. And at the same time about 69 percent female and 68 percent male rural respondents consider more children as a burden on them. Indeed, this seems to be self-contradictory. This contradiction is visible in an almost similar degree among both the male and the female respondents. It shows that in rural areas people keep on producing children with the view to enhance their economic resources and as old age security. However, they ignore the negative aspects of having more children. Consequently, they have to bear economic burden of their excessive number of children as an unintended consequence of their choices.

Owing to this controversy it also becomes clear that there are some other factors determining the value of children in rural society. The potential factor is that of the social prestige and value of children. In order to test the interrelationship between these two variables another table is formed. (See Table 3.8)

The data given in the Table 3.8 and the Figure 3.8 indicate that irrespective of the urban and rural differences, male respondents regard a high number of children as a source of respect for them. In urban areas 11.4 percent females consider children as a source of respect whereas 37.1 percent males have this attitude towards children. Similarly, the proportion of females (35.4%) is less than that of rural males (76.9%) in this regard.

On the other hand, an investigation into the variables of fewer children and less respect suggests two things. First, that in aggregate terms the attitude of both the male and female respondents is the same towards lesser number of children i.e. 34 percent believe that less children mean less respect, while the rest of the 66 percent in each showed indifference in this respect. Secondly, the female respondents who perceived no connection between more children and more respect are, however, concerned about having less respect in case of having less children. For instance, only 11.4 percent urban females regarded children as a source of respect but 22.8 percent, (exactly double), are conscious about fewer children resulting in less respect. Similarly, 35.4 percent rural females opined that more children may enhance their respect but 40 percent of them felt that there would be less respect due to fewer children. It means that the female's respect is highly affected due to smaller number of children.

Table 3.8: Children as a Source of Social Respect

Respondent	More children more respect				Less children less respect			
	Yes		No		Yes		No	
	No	%	No.	%	No	%	No.	%
Female urban	4	11.4	31	88.6	8	22.8	27	77.2
Female rural	23	35.4	42	64.6	26	40.0	39	60
Total (%age)	27	27	73	73	34	34	66	66
Male urban	13	37.1	22	62.9	7	20.	28	80
Male rural	50	76.7	15	23.1	27	41.5	38	58.5
Total (%age)	63	63	37	37	34	34	66	66

In the Figure 3.8, horizontal axis represents the response of the respondents regarding number of children and their respective respect while vertical axis represents the number and percentages of the respondents regarding their answers.




Figure 3.8: Children as a Source of Social Respect

3.3.2 Training of the Children

Awareness of the need to give good training to the children can be another variable to judge the attitude of the people towards their children. The respondents were asked about the interrelationship of the number of children and its impact upon their training. Most of the respondents agreed about the need for good training of the children if their number was less. However, the details concerning this issue are enclosed in the Table 3.9.

Table 3.9: Number of Children and their Training

The lesser the number of children the better their training	Respondents									
	Female Urban		Female Rural		Total No.	Male Urban		Male Rural		Total No.
	No.	%	No.	%		No.	%	No.	%	
Yes	32	91.4	53	81.5	85	28	80	61	93.8	89
No	3	8.6	12	18.5	15	7	20	4	60.2	11
Total:	35	100	65	100	100	35	100	65	100	100

In the Figure 3.9, horizontal axis represents the reply of all the respondents in the sample while vertical axis represents the number and percentage of the respondents regarding their reply. The Table 3.9 and the Figure 3.9

show an inverse relationship between the number of children and their training i.e. more children result in poor training and fewer children mean that they can be trained better.




Figure 3.9: No. of Children and their Training

In urban areas the degree of this awareness or realization is observed to be higher in females with the rate of **91.4 percent** (as compared to 80% males), while in the rural areas this credit is taken by males with the ratio of **93.8 percent** (as compared to 81.5% females). In aggregate terms, more males (89%) as compared to females (85%) are of the view that it is easy to give good training to a small number of children.

3.4 Practice of Family Planning

To deal with the main issue of family planning practices, a major question asked was to check whether the respondents practice it or not or will they practice it in future or not? The survey reveals that irrespective of male and female difference the respondents belonging to the urban areas adopt the measures of family planning more frequently. In the rural areas this proportion of the practitioners of family planning is comparatively less. This clearly suggests that the acceptance of family planning practice is positively associated with the urban areas and that the non-acceptance or indifference to the practice of family planning is inversely related with the rural areas.

This positive association of urban living and the practice of family planning may also be attributed to the factor of education.

Table 3.10: Practice of Family Planning

Practice	Respondents									
	Female Urban		Female Rural		Total No.	Male Urban		Male Rural		Total No.
	No.	%	No.	%		No.	%	No.	%	
Practicing presently										
Yes	14	40	15	23.0	29	13	37.1	16	24.6	29
No	21	60	50	77.0	71	22	62.9	49	75.4	71
Total	35	100	65	100	100	35	100	65	100	100
Will practice in future										
Yes	20	57.1	19	29.2	39	16	45.7	20	30.8	36
No	15	42.9	46	70.8	61	19	54.3	45	69.1	64
Total	35	100	65	100	100	35	100	65	100	100

This is suggested by the fact that the level of literacy is higher in urban areas than in rural areas and also that the literacy level is inversely related to the size of the family or family planning (see chapter 2). The Table 3.10 is about the details of the present and expected practice of family planning.




Figure 3.10: Practice of Family Planning

The Figure 3.10 represents reply of the respondents regarding family planning on horizontal axis and number and percentage of the respondents regarding reply on the vertical axis. It can be seen from the Table 3.10 and the Figure 3.10 that the proportion of the present practitioners of family planning is more or less the same both in urban male and female respondents. It shows that 14 urban females are practicing family planning as compared to 13 male respondents. Similarly, in rural areas 15 females as compared to 16 male respondents are practicing it. Even this meagre difference vanishes in aggregate terms where 29 respondents are equally practicing it both in the case of males and females. However, concerning future practice, urban females are keener towards family planning than their male counterparts. For instance, 14 urban females are presently practicing it while 20 urban females said they would practice family planning in future i.e. $20-14=6$ respondents are expected potential practitioners in future. In comparison only three urban males are expected potential practitioners — 16 future practitioners minus 13 expected practitioners ($16-13=3$). However, the proportion of expected practitioners in future is more or less the same both among males as well as female rural respondents i.e. $23-15=8$ respondents for females and $23-16 = 7$ respondents for males.

3.4.1 Number of Children and Family Planning

The data in respect of the number of children, after which the respondents are taking or will take the measures of family planning, may also help in scrutinizing the real attitude of the respondents towards family planning. So the data concerning these two variables i.e. the number of children and the practice of family planning are shown in the Table 3.11.

Table 3.11: Number of Children and Practice of Family Planning

No. of children	Respondents' % age of Practicing Family Planning									
	Female Urban		Female Rural		Total No.	Male Urban		Male Rural		Total
	No.	%	No.	%		No.	%	No.	%	
01	4	11.5	10	15.2	14	2	5.7	-	-	2
02	5	14.3	1	1.6	6	1	2.8	1	1.6	2
03	7	20.0	4	6.2	11	3	8.6	1	1.6	4
04	3	8.6	3	4.6	6	6	17.3	6	9.1	12
05	1	2.8	2	3.1	3	1	2.8	7	10.7	8
06	0	0	1	1.6	1	2	5.7	3	4.6	5
07	0	0	0	-	-	1	2.8	2	3.1	2
08	0	0	1	1.6	1	-	-	1	1.6	1
09	0	0	1	1.6	1	-	-	2	3.1	2
Total Practitioners	20	57.2	23	35.4	.43	16	45.7	.23	35.4	38
Non Practitioners	15	42.8	42	64.6	57	19	54.3	42	64.6	.62
Total Respondents	35	100	65	100	100	35	100	.65	100	100

A thorough survey of the above table shows that in aggregate terms more women (43%) take measures for family planning as compared to men (38%). This difference is mainly created in urban area where 20 females (57.2%) and 16 males (45.7%) are amenable to this idea. In the rural areas, however, the proportion of practitioners is the same both for male and female respondents i.e. 35.4 percent (23 respondents each).

Furthermore, an overall comparison between the urban and rural respondents also shows varying results. Twenty urban female practitioners have a total number of 52 children, while, 16 urban male practitioners have a total of 54, making a total sum of $52+54 = 106$ children in all. In aggregate terms those 36 respondents (i.e. $20+16=36$), have an average number of 2.94 children per respondent. On the other hand, the rural practitioners, numbering 23 for female and male respondents have 69 and 122 children respectively. It makes a total of 116 children divided by 46 respondents. This is calculated as an average of 4.15

children for each respondent. This difference of 2.94 children in urban and 4.15 children in rural respondents cannot be ignored. Another factor of male and female differentials as far as the average number of children is concerned, is shown in the Table 3.11. However, the researcher is unable to give it the required attention because it lies beyond the scope of this study.




Figure 3.11: No. of Children and Practice of Family Planning

In the Figure 3.11, horizontal axis represents the both male and female respondents of urban and rural areas practicing/non-practicing family planning while vertical axis represents the number and percentage of the respondents. For further confirmation, however, the demonstration of the Figure 3.11 is comparable with the data of the desired number of children (Table 3.5). The data show that at the moment almost 60 percent of the population is non-practitioner of family planning i.e. neither presently practicing nor expected to practice family planning in future.

3.5 Attitude towards Advertisement

Family planning needs an extensive programme in Pakistan, where widespread cultural, social, economic and ethnic differences are present. This programme is, however, implemented through several components. In this regard, the Information, Education and Communication (IEC), has been an integral component of the programme. Hence, IEC

is supposed to play an important role in making it possible for individuals and groups to adopt an appropriate practice. As during the Seventh Five Year Plan (1988-1993), about Rs.75 million were spent on IEC but the gap between knowledge and practice remained still very wide i.e. the specific knowledge of any method was around 84 percent while practice was only 24 percent (NIPS, 1996). Understandably, the techniques of IEC have only limited potentialities in actually motivating people. Researchers in this sphere could be desired to answer questions such as which media are popular in the village? Where would most of the people come into contact? Which type of messages capture their attention? What is the relative effectiveness of these media for the rural and urban population? Which of the incentives help to motivate them? What is the scope for family planning, population education, health education and IEC etc?

In view of the above, the study now focuses on the difference of attitudes of the respondents towards the advertisement of family planning. A general description of this difference is given in the Table 3.12.

Table 3.12: General Attitude towards Advertisement

Should Family Planning policy be Advertised	Respondents									
	Female Urban		Female Rural		Total No.	Male Urban		Male Rural		Total No.
	No.	%	No.	%		No.	%	No.	%	
Yes	27	77.1	32	49.2	59	23	65.7	35	53.8	58
No	8	22.9	33	50.8	41	12	34.3	30	46.2	42
Total	35	100	65	100	100	35	100.0	65	100	100

The Table 3.12 and the Figure 3.12 clearly show the consenting and dissenting attitudes of the respondents towards advertisement. Indeed, they were asked, should the policy of family planning be advertised publicly or not? In the Figure 3.12, horizontal axis represents the reply of

sample respondents and vertical axis represents the number and percentage of the respondents regarding their reply.

In this regard the data concerning both the males and females is comparable in aggregate terms i.e. 59 females and 58 males stood for and 41 females and 42 males against advertising. However, with a percentage of 77.1 (27 respondents) urban females had the highest proportion of respondents in favour of advertisements, while 65.7 percent (23 respondents) urban males were for it. However, in rural areas, 53.8 percent (35 respondents) males favoured the advertisement of family planning as compared to 49.2 percent females (32 respondents). It means that in urban areas more females are receptive to the advertisement of family planning while the case is reverse in the rural areas.




Figure 3.12: General Attitude towards Family Planning

3.5.1 Effectiveness of Different Communication Channels

With the main objectives of narrowing the gap between knowledge and practice and motivating couples for having small families, all the channels of mass media (TV, radio, press) and print media (newspapers, articles, pamphlets etc.) were utilized through the IEC programme (NIPS, 1996). Since the effectiveness of all these channels was not up to the standard, the present study has tried to find out the prevailing preferences of the respondents to suggest some effective measures. In this regard the present study has

divided all the channels into three main groups. An elaborate distribution of these groups is as under: -

- **Personal communication:** clinics, hospitals, home visits, etc.
- **Public communication:** newspapers, radio, television, films and printed materials, public meetings, education etc.
- **Miscellaneous communication:** all appropriate means.

In view of these innumerable media, the most highly used sources of the communication of family planning were listed. The Table 3.13 depicts the various media which are acceptable by males and females about family planning. The respondents have indicated that sometimes they get information from more than one channel. The data show that females are more receptive to the channels of personal and public communications than males. Considering all variables, one can say that females are more receptive towards the advertisement of family planning than males. However, in the rural areas the males were more receptive towards the miscellaneous channels of communication. It shows that males are highly influenced by the cultural norms of the society. That is why the males, having a traditional worldview, remain more critical towards the modern channels of communication.

Table 3.13: Acceptability of Different Communication Channels

Respondents	Personal Communications			Public Communications					Miscellaneous Communications				Not at all	Aggregate %age
	Clinics & Hospitals	Home visits	Total No.	Public meeting & education	Private material & newspaper	Radio & TV	Films	Total No.	All means	Appropriate means	Religious means	Total No.		
FU	3	4	7	-	3	4	-	7	16	1	2	19	2	35
FR	2	11	13	6	3	2	-	11	16	3	1	20	21	65
Total %age	5	15	20	6	6	6	-	18	32	4	3	39	23	100
MU	-	8	8	2	1	-	1	4	6	8	2	16	7	35
MR	-	7	7	-	3	2	1	6	30	1	1	32	20	65
Total %age	-	15	15	2	4	2	2	10	36	9	3	48	27	100

FU = Female urban

FR = Female rural

MU = Male urban

MR = Male rural




Figure 3.13: Acceptability of Different Communication Channels

In the Figure 3.13, horizontal axis represents the total sample of respondents while vertical axis represents the number and percentages of the respondents regarding communication channels. Bars in the chart represent different channels of communication and their level of acceptability.

3.6 Attitude towards General Counselling

The attitude towards general counselling by the respondents is, indeed, an important dimension of the decision making about family planning. This counselling involves the inter-spousal counselling and general consultation with the doctor the friend or the *Maulvi* (religious guide). Before discussing the husband-wife communication or inter-spousal counselling specifically, it is required to sort out those who consult or do not consult anyone else, other than their spouse. A detailed response of the respondents in this respect is enclosed in the Table 3.14.

Table 3.14: Attitude toward General Consultation

Consulted with	Respondents									
	Female Urban		Female Rural		Total	Male Urban		Male Rural		Total
	No.	%	No.	%	No.	No.	%	No.	%	No.
Doctor	11	31.5	4	6.2	15	4	11.4	15	23.1	19
Friend	4	11.4	9	13.8	13	-	-	1	1.5	1
Maulvi	-	-	1	1.5	1	-	-	2	3.1	2
Doctor & Friend	4	11.4	6	9.3	10	1	2.9	-	-	1
All the three	2	5.7	-	-	2	-	-	2	3.1	2
Total Consulting	21	60	20	38.8	41	5	14.3	20	38.8	25
Consulting no one	14	4	45	69.2	59	30	85.7	45	69.2	75
Total	35	100	65	100	100	35	100	65	100	100




Figure 3.14: Attitude towards General Consultation

In the Figure 3.14, horizontal axis represents the male and female respondents with their practice regarding consultation and vertical axis represents the number and percentage of the respondents regarding consultation with different people as mentioned in the table 3.14.

The Table 3.14 and the Figure 3.14 indicate the respondents' general attitude towards consulting any one other than their spouse about family planning. It reflects that females are generally more prone to such consultation. Although the number of consulting respondents (both male & female) is equal in rural nativity i.e. 20 respondents (38.8%) each yet this difference is much higher in urban areas where 21 out of 35 females (60% respondents) as

compared to only 5 males (14.3%), consult about family planning. The reason behind this difference may be that either urban male are usually literate and well informed or have comparatively broader outlook so they need no consultation with any one other than their wives.

A separate question was asked about inter-spousal counselling to probe into personal limitations and the real worldview of the respondents. The data concerning inter-spousal counselling are enclosed in the Table 3.15.

Table 3.15: Inter-spousal Counselling

Counsel with the spouse	Respondents									
	Female Urban		Female Rural		Total No.	Male Urban		Male Rural		Total No.
	No.	%	No.	%		No.	%	No.	%	
Yes	23	65.7	22	33.8	45	16	45.7	41	63.1	57
No	12	34.3	43	66.2	55	19	54.3	24	36.9	43
Total	35	100.0	65	100	100	35	100	65	100	100




Figure 3.15: Inter-spousal Counselling

In the Figure 3.15, horizontal axis represents both male and female respondents of urban and rural areas while vertical axis represents number and percentage of respondents regarding inter-spousal counselling. While showing inter-spousal counselling, the Table 3.15 and the Figure 3.15 shows that in aggregate terms males are comparatively more open towards counselling their wives about family planning than females. This is based on the

fact that a total number of 57 males were positive about counselling their wives as compared to only 45 females. However, in urban areas, females are found more positive towards inter-spousal counselling. For instance, 23 urban females (65.7%) were counselling as compared to only 16 urban males (45.7%). It may be due to the liberal social environment of the urban society. But the case was absolutely opposite in the rural areas. Here only 22 female respondents (33.8%) affirmed this counselling. While, in the very same context, the number of rural males was as high as 41 respondents (63.1%). The reason behind this is that in rural areas only males may discuss such issues with their wives, while the females generally do not.

3.7 General Attitude towards Sterilization

Sterilization means to treat the husband and/or wife, or only one of them, in such a way as to prevent procreation. It does not, however, involve removal of the sex glands as occurs in castration. This operation has, therefore, no effect on sexual potency, which is the major apprehension of the non-acceptors. Sterilization mainly involves two methods i.e., tubectomy for females and vasectomy for males.

The query was made to know the prevailing opinions of the respondents about both the above mentioned methods. A detailed description of this query is given in the Table 3.16. The Table 3.16 shows the respondents' attitude towards the practice of sterilization. The question "Whether they have, may or may never practice sterilization?" was asked to the respondents to know their acceptability towards the sterilization methods. In response females were found comparatively more receptive to it than their male counterparts. In all urban females 4 respondents (11.4%) had already got themselves tubectomised and 14 respondents (40%) showed their acceptability to it. In urban males, however, only 2 respondents (5.7%) told them to be vasectomized and only 6 more respondents (17.1%) showed their acceptability to the same. However, in case of rural respondents (male and

female both) the same number of respondents (i.e. one respondent each) had already been sterilized. The ratio of expected practitioners, however, remains once again high in the female respondents. As in all 35 percent females (urban and rural combined) as compared to only 21 males (urban and rural combined) told that they may practice sterilization in future. It is worthwhile to point out that in addition to the data results enclosed in the Table 3.16, it was also observed during the field survey that males were too reluctant to get themselves vasectomized, however, if required, they might get their wives tubectomised.

Table 3.16: General Attitude towards the Practice of Sterilization

Practice	Respondents									
	Female Urban		Female Rural		Total No.	Male Urban		Male Rural		Total No.
	No.	%	No.	%		No.	%	No.	%	
Have practice	4	11.4	1	1.5	5	2	5.7	1	1.5	3
May practice	14	40.0	21	32.3	35	6	17.1	15	23.1	21
Will never practice	164	5.7	41	63.1	57	26	74.3	48	73.9	74
No comments	1	2.9	2	3.1	3	1	2.9	1	1.5	2
Total	35	100	65	100	100	35	100	65	100	100




Figure 3.16: General Attitude towards the Practice of Sterilization

In the Figure 3.16, horizontal axis represents male and female respondents of urban and rural areas and vertical axis represents number and percentages of respondents regarding practice of sterilization. The bars in the chart showing explicitly that majority of the respondents do not and will never practice sterilization.

An aggregate account of the Muslims' general attitude towards religion, marriage and family and to different measures of family planning has been presented hitherto. This overall response of the respondents looks quite enough to infer some new findings. But, then, sectoral differentials might be overlooked. In order to avoid this discrepancy, the respondents are required to be analyzed sect wise. So that the researcher may arrive at a conclusion whether their attitudes are determined by their respective ideological profiles or by their commonly shared worldview? A detailed chapter is devoted to seek an insight into the sectarian differences and their influences on the acceptability of family planning practices in Pakistan.

Chapter 4

Muslim Worldview and Family Planning

Population explosion was not a grave problem in the early days of Islam or in the period of Islamic legislation. Thus, no explicit negation or affirmation of it is available either in the religious texts or in the religious jurisprudence or law. That is why presently the *ulema* from both the ends — the opponents as well as the proponents of family planning — extract some selective *Quranic verses*, *Ahadith* and inferences of jurisprudence in favour of their respective viewpoints. Such diverging views have made the future of family planning programmes uncertain in Pakistan.

With this background, the present study shows that in the contemporary situation, it is solely the individual who makes the final decision about approving or disapproving family planning. This decision-making process is influenced by a number of personality variables, such as the personality characteristics of a person, whether he is an introvert or extrovert, anxious or relaxed, conservative or radical, religious or secular, modernized or traditional, superstitious or scientific, educated or illiterate, forward or backward in outlook, flexible or rigid, intelligent or dull, achievement-oriented or affiliation-oriented, fatalist or rationalist so on and so forth (Pareek and Rao, 1974: 32). Hence, the author, while relating the aforementioned variables to the individuals' acceptance of family planning is supposed to explore the influence of subjective or ideological variables as well as the objective and socio-economic variables.

In pursuance of this objective, the author has attempted in this chapter to analyze and to highlight the perception of family planning by Muslim residents of

Islamabad. The people surveyed are predominantly from different social, geographical and economic backgrounds and from different religious callings, along the sectarian gamut. The researcher's task has thus been to observe responses and to point out whether the objective variables i.e. place of origin, income and class etc. are more significantly associated with the knowledge, attitude and practice of family planning or the subjective variables like religion and sect appear to be an important determining factor of family planning practice in Islamabad and by extension, in Pakistan?

Right from its inception, Pakistan's population programme has been, indeed, the focus of controversies and criticism by religious leaders. Although with varying approaches, almost all the religious sects in Pakistan are equally critical of the idea of family planning. Thus, in order to check the intensity of this criticism, its effectiveness in society and the peoples' response to it, a field survey was conducted. All the respective sects were surveyed and analysed separately in their due proportion, set in chapter 2. This will make the findings of the analysis clear and reliable. The division of the three main groups i.e. traditionalists, revivalists and modernists is also the same. However, a clear-cut demarcation is drawn in the forthcoming part of this chapter.

Respondents from all these three groups were interviewed with some direct questions about Islam and family planning. These questions were expected to explore the subjective as well as objective influences on the actions and the attitudes of the respondents.

The questions are as follows:

1. Do you think that Islam permits family planning or not?
2. Have you ever practiced, are practicing or may practice family planning in future?
3. Do you consult your spouse, friend, doctor or religious leader (*Maulvi*) about family planning?

4. Have you get sterilized or are inclined to do so in future?

All of these questions were made multifarious in their nature, with a variety of answers like yes, no, may be or do not know. In response to the first question 87 respondents (i.e. 43.5%) replied in affirmation whereas 105 respondents (i.e. 52.5%) responded that Islam does not permit it. The remaining 8 respondents (4%) refused to commit themselves by saying that they do not know about it.

Concerning the practice of family planning, 58 respondents (29%), out of a total of 200 respondents, confirmed that they are practicing it. 22 respondents (11%) said that they were expected to be potential practitioners of family planning in future. However, 120 respondents (60%), reported that they are neither practicing nor will practice family planning in future, because they are altogether against it.

The study further reveals that 189 respondents making 94.5 percent of the total sample were consulting about family planning. This consultation was supposed to be with anyone or more than one of the four potential consultants i.e. doctor, spouse, friend or *Maulvi*. The minimum consultation was with that of the *Maulvi* e.g. only 7 respondents (3.5%) said that they had consulted the religious leader in this respect. The highest number of consultations was inter-spousal consultations 53 percent (106 respondents). The second was the number of consultations with the doctor who owed 23.5 percent proportion (47 respondents). Then was the number of consultation with friends with whom a total of 29 respondents (14.5%) had consulted.

Sterilization, however, brought forth a very poor response. Only 9 respondents (4.5%) affirmed that they had got sterilized. All of them were females. Not even a single male respondent reported to having got him sterilized. A considerable number of 135 respondents (67.5%) were critically against it. The rest of the 56 respondents (28%),

however, said that they might go for sterilization in future, if found necessary.

An overall analytical review of these responses indicates, firstly, a large number of the Muslims do not agree with the views of the traditional *Mullah* or *Maulvi*. Despite the *Mullah's* critical rejection of family planning, 43.5 percent respondents opined that Islam approves of it. Secondly, the figures of 29 percent practitioners include the figure of 11 percent potential future practitioners. This suggests that 40 percent of the total population accept the idea of family planning. Thirdly, maximum proportions of 94.5 percent consulting respondents highlight the fact that most people are not only aware of this problem but also discuss it with each other. Finally, the lack of consultation with the *Maulvi* shows that the people do not consider family planning as a religious issue. The poor response towards sterilization, especially towards male sterilization or vasectomy, suggests the existence of strong cultural taboos of an agrarian, male-dominated society.

These are the outcomes of a general analysis of the Islamabadi Muslims' response towards family planning. A comprehensive analysis of every group along with the band of different sects is as under:

4.1 Traditionalists

Traditionalists, as defined earlier, are those who follow any of the classical jurists of Islam, while rejecting the institution of *Ijtehad*. Thus, they are always critical of change. A detailed account of their attitude towards the idea and the practices of family planning are depicted here.

4.1.1 Ahlisunnah

Ahlisunnah or Sunnis being the followers of Imam Abu Hanifah (d: 767 AD), cover the mainstream of traditionalists. They are further divided into two main groups i.e. *Barelvis* and *Deobandis*. Despite having a lot of philosophical differences, both the *Barelvis* and the *Deobandis* are commonly the followers of Abu Hanifah. So they are

collectively considered as traditionalists. A detailed description of the attitudes of the respondents from both these groups will be discussed at length later on. Here only an account of the mainstream *Ahli-sunnah* is being mentioned.

4.1.1.1 Theoretical Considerations

Theoretically speaking the followers of the *Ahli-sunnah* sect have produced nothing for or against family planning on their own. However, they generally refer either to the book of Maulana Maududi or the *Family Planning Report of the Council of Islamic Ideology* (CII). Both these works basically reject the practice of family planning in Islam. Then the report has further given the decision that, according to the revealed law, birth control is permissible at the individual level but only in three types of cases:

- i. When the pregnancy is injurious to the health of the perspective mother;
- ii. If the mother is already ill and pregnancy may increase the illness;
- iii. When the pregnancy may cause problems for the health of the suckling infant.

The report has finally declared the practice of birth control absolutely unlawful, if practiced on economic grounds. With this perspective, the report has also condemned the government's policy of family planning and has asked the government to desist from it.

Nevertheless, the opinions of the *Ulema* of *Ahli-sunnah* are diversified. Having a large number of sub-sects, the *Ahli-sunnahs' Ulema* are attached with one or the other sub-sect. For instance, both Dr. Anees (included among revivalists) and Dr. Khalid (included among modernists) have declared themselves to be *Ahli-sunnah*, whereas the views of both these scholars are poles apart. It shows that the theoretical viewpoint of the *Ahli-sunnahs' Ulema* is not well furnished.

Table 4.1: Ahlisunnahs' Attitude towards Family Planning

Respondents	No	Does Islam permit			Do you practice			Do you consult				Have you get sterilized		
		Yes	No	Do Not Know	Yes	No	May	Doc	Spouse	Friend	Maulvi	Yes	No	May
Male														
Urban	13	4	9	0	6	6	1	5	7	0	0	0	10	3
Rural	41	16	24	1	10	30	1	11	30	1	2	1	30	10
Total %age	54	20	33	1	16	36	2	16	37	1	2	1	40	13
Female														
Urban	15	10	5	0	8	6	1	7	16	4	0	1	6	8
Rural	40	19	20	1	12	26	2	7	18	10	1	1	29	10
Total %age	55	29	25	1	20	32	3	14	34	14	1	2	35	18

4.1.1.2 Attitude towards Practice

A review of merely the theoretical considerations of the *AhliSunnah* is not enough to understand the real attitudes of its followers towards family planning. It demands a deep probe into their currently prevailing practices, which are given in the table 4.1




Figure 4.1: Ahlisunnahs' attitude towards Family Planning

In the Figure 4.1, horizontal axis represents four main questions regarding family planning (Does Islam permits, Do you practice, Do you consult and Have you get sterilized) and vertical axis represents numbers and percentages of respondents (*AhliSunnahs'*) reply. The data given in the table 4.1 and its graphical presentation in the figure 4.1 show the practical response of the *AhliSunnah*. The total number of male respondents is 54, comprising 13 urban and 41 rural respondents. The total number of female respondents are 55, consisting of 15 urban and 40 rural respondents. The data show that concerning the question of permissibility in Islam, 20 male respondents (37.1%) opine that Islam permits family planning. These 20 respondents consist of 4 urban (7.4%) and 16 rural (29.6%) respondents. In response to the same question 29 females (52.7%) in aggregate — comprising of 10 urban (18.2%) and 19 rural (34.5%) — reply that Islam approves of the practice of family planning. Whereas, a sum of 33 males consisting of 9 urban (16.3%) and 24 rural respondents and a sum of 25 females (45.4%), consisting of 5 urban (9.1%) and 20 rural

respondents (36.3%) have replied that Islam does not permit the family planning. One rural male and one rural female say 'don't know' in response.

Discussing specifically about the practice of family planning, 16 males (29.6%) and 20 females (36.4%) reported of practicing it. Further, 2 males, one each from rural and urban areas and 3 females — one urban and 2 rural residents, said that they may practice family planning in future. In comparison a sum of 36 males (66.7%) and 32 females (58.2%) were highly critical to this practice. It suggests that in both the urban as well as rural areas, females surpass the males in practicing family planning.

Concerning the matter of consultation, 5 urban males consult with the doctor, 7 with their spouse and not even one respondent consults either with his friend or with *Maulvi*. In rural areas, 11 respondents consult with doctors, 30 with spouses, one with his friend and two with the *Maulvi*. Among urban females, 7 consult with doctors, 16 with spouses, 4 with friends and no one with the *Maulvi*. In rural females, 7 consult with doctors, 18 with their spouse, 10 with their friends and one with the *Maulvi*. The present data indicate that irrespective of the gender, the rural respondents consult more with some one or the other, than the urban ones. The main reason is that the urban people are self reliant in such matters, while the rural ones, having restricted knowledge of the world are uncertain about what to do.

On the matter of sterilization, no urban male is presently sterilized. However, one rural male reports of having got it done. 3 urban and 10 rural males show their willingness about getting it done in future. On the other side, one female each from rural and urban localities reports of being already sterilized. Further 8 urban and 10 rural females show their inclination towards getting them sterilized in future.

All the aforementioned data suggest that the followers of *Ahli-sunnah* sect are much diversified in their practices like their religious leaders in theory. That is why, in aggregate terms they are not very critical of the different measures of family planning.

4.1.2 *Barelvis*

As has earlier been mentioned, the *Barelvis* are basically a sub-sect of the *Ahli-sunnah*. They are further divided into two groups in Pakistan. One is that of Maulana Tahir-ul-Qadri and the other of Maulana Abdul Sattar Niazi. A brief account of both these groups is mentioned here.

4.1.2.1 Theoretical Considerations

Concerning the theoretical considerations of the former group, Professor Qadri, simply referred to his written verdict published in *Asr-e-hazir ke Jadid Masail aur Professor Dr. Muhammad Tahir-ul-Qadri* (Mujahid & Ahmad, 1997:54-56). In his verdict, he approves of family planning in Islam but only under the following conditions:

- i. When the pregnancy is expected to cause maternal death;
- ii. When the pregnancy is supposed to result in infant mortality;
- iii. If conception is injurious or may cause an irremediable loss to maternal health;
- iv. If the next child is not expected, to be healthy enough to survive or to attain good health; and,
- v. When the potential economic conditions are extremely bad and a higher number of children may compel their parents to earn money dishonestly.

These conditions enable Professor Qadri to approve of the government's policy of family planning. He, therefore, declares it necessary for the well being of mankind. On the other side the views of Maulana Niazi are altogether different. He is highly critical not only of the family planning movement but also to all its requisites like propagation,

advertisement and concealing etc. He declares that family planning is an entirely unnatural and un-Islamic idea. After refuting the modernist view about the approval of birth control by classical jurists of Islam, Maulana Niazi condemns its practice as a heinous sin. He further opines that all the measures of family planning are creating nothing more than sexual misdemeanours and waywardness in the society.

Hence, he declares family planning to be unacceptable in an Islamic society, like that of Pakistan. Finally, he suggests Jihad (a religious war), as an ideal solution to the problem of over-population. In such a way if non-Muslims are killed then that will be good riddance. If, however, the Muslims are killed then they will become martyrs. Both eventualities, according to the Maulana, are blessings. Consequently the world's population will automatically attain an optimum level. Additionally, says Maulana Niazi, Islam will also spread in this way.

The above-mentioned views of both the *Barelvi* groups indicate that both are poles apart. The former group looks somewhat moderate while the latter one is not.

4.1.2.1. Attitude towards Practice

In aggregate terms, the attitudes of the *Barelvis* were comparatively conservative towards family planning. Being traditionalists, they have shown a typical traditional attitude. A profile of the *Barelvis'* attitude towards the practice of family planning is noted in the table 4.2.

The table 4.2 shows the total strength of the *Barelvis* in our sample i.e. 24 respondents, 14 males and 10 females. Out of the males 7 are living in urban and 7 in rural areas, among the females 5 are from urban and 5 from rural areas.

The data indicate that 4 male respondents (28.6%), including 3 urban and a rural one agree that Islam permits the practice of family planning. The same number of female respondents i.e. 4 or 40 percent, out of which 2 are from

urban and 2 from rural areas, agree with the Islamic permissibility of family planning.

As for the practice of family planning among males, only 2 urban respondents (14.3%), and among females 3 respondents (30%) have reported that they practice it. No male respondent has shown his inclination towards planning his family in future. However, 2 rural females have done so. This suggests that the *Barelvi* female respondents are rather more inclined towards family planning than their male counterparts.

With respect to consultation, no male respondent reports of consulting with the doctor. Two urban females do, however, consult the doctor. 3 urban males (21.4%) and the same number of urban females (30%) consult their spouses. No male, but 2 females (20%), one each from urban and rural areas, consult their friends. However, no male or female respondent consults the *Maulvi*.

Table 4.2: *Bareilvis'* Attitude towards Family Planning

Respondents	No	Does Islam permit?			Do you practice?			Do you consult?				Have you get sterilized?		
		Yes	No	Do not know	Yes	No	May	Doc.	Spouse	Friend	Maulvi	Yes	No	May
<u>Male</u>														
Urban	7	3	4	0	2	5	0	0	3	0	0	0	6	1
Rural	7	1	6	0	0	7	0	0	0	0	0	0	6	1
Total %age	14	4	10	0	2	12	-	-	3	-		-	12	2
<u>Female</u>														
Urban	5	2	3	0	3	2	0	2	3	1	0	1	2	2
Rural	5	2	3	0	0	3	2	0	0	1	0	0	3	2
Total %age	10	4	6	0	3	5	2	2	3	2	0	1	5	4

The question about sterilization got a critical response. No male has practiced it yet. However, 2 of them (14.3%), one each from urban and rural areas has indicated his willingness of getting sterilized in future. On the contrary one urban female has already been sterilized, while 4 more females, 2 each from urban and rural areas indicate that they may get sterilized in future.




Figure 4.2: *Barelvis'* Attitude towards Family Planning

In the figure 4.2, horizontal axis represents four main questions (Does Islam permits? Do you practice? Do you consult? and Have you get sterilized?) and vertical axis represents numbers and percentages of respondents (*Barelvis'*) reply. The above data reveals some basic realities. First, that all the *Barelvis* do not consider the idea of family planning as repugnant to Islam. Secondly, that some of them (29.2%) are either practicing or are willing to practice it in future. Thirdly, that irrespective of gender, urban respondents are fairly receptive to this idea. And finally, females are comparatively more receptive towards family planning as compared to their male counterparts.

4.1.3 *Deobandis*

Being pure traditionalists, the *Deobandis* are highly critical of all the modern ideas like that of family planning. Their theoretical considerations about family planning are as follows:

4.1.3.1 Theoretical Considerations

The *Deobandis* have produced no theoretical literature by themselves in this regard. Quoting the verdict of Maulana Maududi, they generally refer to the personal opinion of one of their own Muftis (jurist or an expounder of Muslim law). Finding no written material the researcher had to interview two main figures from the said group. One, Maulana Muhammad Abdullah (assassinated later on) and the other, Mufti Muhammad Farooq. Both of them are of the opinion that family planning is acceptable but only at the individual level and that too only in unavoidable conditions. An economic oriented family planning movement at the national level is totally an un-Islamic act. All the basic sources of Islamic law i.e. the *Quran*, the *Hadith* and the *Fiqh* (Islamic jurisprudence), have refuted the idea of family planning in Islam. Both these *Ulema* declare that all the religious leaders who are supporting family planning movement are the paid servants of the government and adduce very equivocal arguments in its favour. Mufti Farooq's response, is, however, more rigid in this regard. So much so, that he declares the television as an un-Islamic instrument. He also mentions that both our culture and religion are highly appreciative of the big family. Finally, after approving of early age at marriage, he recommends an increase in the *Ummah* [followers of Prophet Muhammad (PBUH)] through rapid reproduction.

4.1.3.2 Attitude towards Practice

In practical terms too attitudes of the *Deobandis* are highly critical towards the practice of family planning and sterilization. They are even critical of the advertisement as well as the counselling for family planning. In this way, as expected of traditionalists in general, they have opposed family planning with great vigour and hostility. However, a detailed account of their practical response towards family planning is given in the table 4.3.

Table 4.3: Deobandis' Attitude towards Family Planning

Respondents	No.	Does Islam permit?			Do you practice?			Do you consult?				Have you get sterilized?			
		Yes	No	No comt.	Yes	No	May	Doc.	Spouse	Friend	Mauli	Yes	No	May	No comt
<u>Male</u>															
Urban	2	1	1	0	0	2	0	0	1	0	0	0	2	0	
Rural	2	0	2	0	0	1	1	0	1	0	1	0	1	1	
Total %age	4	1	3	0	0	3	1	0	2	0	1	0	3	1	
<u>Female</u>															
Urban	2	2	0	0	0	2	0	0	2	0	0	0	1	1	
Rural	3	2	1	0	0	3	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	2	
Total %age	5	4	1	0	0	5	0	0	2	0	0	0	2	3	

Both the table 4.3 and the figure 4.3 show that in males only one out of four respondents (25%) and in females 4 out of 5 respondents (80%), containing 2 respondents each from urban and rural regions, agree that family planning is permissible in Islam. No male or female respondent is presently practicing family planning. Only one rural male is supposed to practice family planning in future. No male or female respondent consults with either doctor or friend. 2 males, one each from urban and rural areas, and 2 females both from urban areas, consult their spouse. One rural male consults the Maulvi. No male or female had got sterilized earlier. However, one rural male and 3 females, one urban and 2 rural, have shown their preference for sterilization in future.

In the figure 4.3, horizontal axis represents four main questions (Does Islam permits? Do you practice? Do you consult? and Have you get sterilized?) and vertical axis represents numbers and percentages of respondents (*Deobandis'*) reply.




Figure 4.3: *Deobandis'* Attitude towards Family Planning

The above diagram shows some realities about attitude of the *Deobandis* towards the practice of family planning. First, all the *Deobandis* do not fully act according to the theoretical pronouncements of their *Ulema*. Indeed, contrary to these views, 33.4 percent of the *Deobandis* have replied that Islam permits the practice of family planning. But even then their responses are extremely poor towards

the other three variables i.e. practice, consultation and sterilization. It indicates that their cultural worldview, indeed, overshadows their attitude towards the practical acceptability of modern ideas like family planning.

4.1.4 *Imami (Shiahs)*

According to the criterion set in the first chapter, the *Imami Shiahs* are also considered as traditionalists. By virtue of their traditionalism, they also stand amongst staunch opponents of family planning. Their theoretical considerations are as follows:

4.1.4.1 Theoretical Considerations

As far as the theoretical considerations of the *Imami* sect are concerned, they have produced nothing in writing for or against family planning. Basically, they get their ideas from the Iranian *Shiah* clergy. But surprisingly, they are proceeding otherwise in Pakistan in this regard. For instance despite clear approval of family planning by their Iranian counterparts, the Pakistani *Imami* clergy still resists to the family planning.

Two *Imami* religious *Ulema* are interviewed to obtain the *Imami* viewpoint in this regard. One was Agha Murtaza Poya and the other, Syed Riaz Ali Naqvi. Both of these *Ulema* were of the view that not only the idea of family planning and its practice, but even its propagation by the government is also an un-Islamic act. Murtaza Poya approves of family planning, but conditionally, leaving it to individual decision for any reason even economic ones. When asked about the family planning programme, Murtaza Poya replied, "Well in case of a famine, drought or a prolonged war, the *Ulema* may permit it through *Ijtehad*". But this situation is not presently applicable to Pakistan. He further states that the West is, indeed, rigorously trying to impose its western models of economy in the already poor countries like Pakistan. All right, if the West suggests family planning for our welfare, then why does it not opt for an egalitarian globalization of resources? Only such an

egalitarian resource distribution may in reality provide a panacea. Then he emphasized upon the implementation of an Islamic economic system in Pakistan. This system, he said, approves of a high number of children as a human resource. He also approves of early age marriages and large sized families as a cultural need of Pakistani society. Ultimately, he suggests that we should reduce our expenditures by limiting our unnecessary demands to get rid of poverty.

4.1.4.2 Attitude towards Practice

Practically speaking, the attitude of the *Imami* respondents does not look like traditional ones. As contrary to their theoretical considerations they are considerably receptive to all the pre-requisites of family planning. For instance 2 males (25%), both from urban and 7 females (85.7%), comprising 3 urban and 4 rural respondents, are of the view that Islam permits family planning. Only 4 respondents (25%), one female and 3 male think that Islam does not permit it.

Table 4.4: *Imamis'* Attitude towards Family Planning

Respondents	No	Does Islam permit?			Do you practice?			Do you consult?				Have you get sterilized?			
		Yes	No	No comt.	Yes	No	May	Doc.	Spouse	Friend	Maulvi	Yes	No	May	No comt
<u>Male</u>															
Urban	4	2	1	1	2	1	1	0	2	0	0	1	1	2	
Rural	4	0	2	2	1	1	2	0	2	1	0	0	3	1	
Total %age	8	2	3	3	3	2	3	0	4	1	0	1	4	3	
<u>Female</u>															
Urban	4	3	1	0	3	1	0	2	3	2	0	0	2	2	
Rural	4	4	0	0	0	4	0	0	0	0	0	0	3	1	
Total %age	8	7	1	0	3	5	0	2	3	2	0	0	5	3	

In the figure 4.4, horizontal axis stands for four main questions (Does Islam permit? Do you practice? Do you consult? Have you got sterilized?), and the vertical axis corresponds to numbers and percentages of the respondents' (*Imamis*) reply. 6 respondents (37.5%) in all, consisting of 3 females — all from urban areas and the same number of males, comprising 2 urban and one rural respondent, report practicing family planning at present. Three more male respondents indicate their inclination towards practicing family planning in future. Here the response of rural females seems to be highly influenced by their cultural outlook. That is why, in spite of showing a full concurrence with the Islamic permissibility of family planning, none of them is either practicing or intends to practice it in future.

Concerning consultation, no male respondent is consulting a doctor. Four respondents (50%) 2 each from urban and rural regions are consulting with spouses. Only one rural male is consulting with his friend and no one with the *Maulvi*. Among the females, 2 respondents are consulting with the doctor, 3 with the spouse, 2 with their friend and none with the *Maulvi*. All these consulting females are urban residents. Rural females have again shown their ambivalent attitude even in this regard.




Figure 4.4: *Imamis*' Attitude towards Family Planning

With regard to sterilization only one urban male reported of having been already sterilized, 6 additional respondents, 3 each out of males and females have,

however, shown their willingness towards getting sterilized in future.

The above data suggest that quite like the respondents of other sects, *Imami* Muslims are also either indifferent to or do not strictly follow the theoretical instructions of their *Ulema*. Then, although rural females have shown a negative attitude towards family planning, urban females are quite willing to practice it.

4.1.5 *Ismailis (Shiah)*

Although the *Ismailis* look modern in their outlook, but according to the criterion used in this study they are traditionalists. One reason for this is that they still believe in the purely classical religious institution of *Imamat* (an institution of divinely guided spiritual leader i.e. Imam). All the *Ismailis* are bound to follow that 'Imam' i.e. they believe in *taqleed*. So they are reckoned with the traditionalists.

4.1.5.1 Theoretical Considerations

Theoretically speaking, *Ismailis* have produced neither any written material nor have they got any specific edict from their *Imam* in this regard. As a result, the researcher had to rely merely upon a personal interview of their *Muqui* (religious leader). The *Muqui* told the researcher that as far as he knew, *Ismailis* have never tried to deal with this problem. Family planning, in their view, is purely a worldly issue. Thus, it should be dealt with at the worldly level. That is why they have left it to the people themselves to decide in their own interest, what to do.

4.1.5.2 Attitude towards Practice

In spite of having no religious reservations, the attitudes of *Ismailis* are against family planning. The table 4.5 shows that none of the respondents agree with the Islamic permissibility of family planning. No respondent, either male or female reported of practicing it. Only one urban male has shown his willingness of being a practitioner of family planning in future.

Table 4.5: *Ismailis'* Attitude towards Family Planning

Respondents	No	Does Islam permit?			Do you practice?			Do you consult?				Have you get sterilized?				
		Yes	No	No comt.	Yes	No	May	Doc.	Spouse	Friend	Mauli	Yes	No	May	No comt	
<u>Male</u>																
Urban	2	0	1	1	0	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	2	0	0	0
Rural	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Total %age	2	0	1	1	0	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	2	0	0	0
<u>Female</u>																
Urban	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Rural	2	0	1	1	0	2	0	0	0	0	0	0	2	0	0	0
Total %age	2	0	1	1	0	2	0	0	0	0	0	0	2	0	0	0

Not even a single respondent consults with any of the four potential consultants i.e. doctor, spouse, friend or *maulvi* (*Muqui*). Furthermore, none of the respondents has either reported of being presently sterilized, nor did any of them show his or her consent to get sterilized in future.




Figure 4.5: *Ismailis'* Attitude towards Family Planning

In the figure 4.5, horizontal axis symbolizes four main questions (Does Islam permits? Do you practice? Do you consult? Have you got sterilized?) and the vertical axis signifies the numbers and percentages of respondents (*Ismailis'*) reply. This unexpectedly adverse response may be due to the smaller size of the sample. However, another reason for this response can also be that *Ismailis* in Pakistan are indifferent about the population boom. Rather they, being in a minority, believe in increasing their numbers and are, therefore, against family planning in practice notwithstanding their theoretical position which is not against it.

4.2 Revivalists

4.2.1 Jamat-e-Islami

The Jamat-e-Islami, as mentioned earlier, is the representative of revivalists in Pakistan. Its foundations were laid at the residence of Maulana Abul Aa'la Maududi in Lahore, in August 1941 (Jamat-e-Islami Pakistan, 1997: 10-12). Maulana Maududi was critical of the idea of family planning even before the inception of Pakistan. He wrote an

essay in 1935, which appeared as a book in 1943 in Urdu under the title of *Islam Aur Zabtewaladat* (Islam and Birth Control). The book was republished in 1962 to counter Ayub Khan's policy of birth control. Launching a direct attack on the family planning movement initiated by the government, the book upset the protagonists of family planning. It not only declares the movement of family planning un-Islamic, but also declares the practice of birth control to be a grievous sin and an intervention into the domain of God. Not only are the members of the Jamat-e-Islami but also the other sects of Islam equally influenced by the arguments given in this book. Although the book is quite enough to communicate the theoretical viewpoint of the Jamat-e-Islami about family planning, but the interviews by some leading figures are also being presented here to show the contemporary theoretical position.

4.2.1.1 Theoretical Considerations

In pursuance of the objective of knowing the Jamats' present theoretical considerations, two main religious figures were interviewed. The first, named Gul Andaz Abbasi was the *Markazi Ameer-e-Jamat* (Central head of the organization), Islamabad zone. The other, Dr. Muhammad Anees, was an informal sympathizer of the Jamat. He is the brother of Professor Muhammad Khursheed, the Central Chief of the *Jamat-e-Islami*, Pakistan. Dr. Anees introduced himself to be simply a *Sunni* or *Ahli-sunnah*, Muslim.

Both the above-mentioned persons declared the idea of family planning completely repugnant to the real essence of the Islamic mode of life. So, family planning, in their opinion, had no place either in Islam or in an *Islamic* society like that of Pakistan. They both have uniformly stated that the phenomenon of overpopulation has no concern with our worsening economic conditions. Dr. Anees attributed it to corruption and maladministration, while Mr. Abbasi, with an uneven distribution of wealth. On the question of the

juristic approval of birth control, both of them refuted it. Mr. Abbasi said, "We act our own way and do not follow any of the classical jurists, in all our matters". Dr. Anees opined that we need more children to develop our agrarian economy and to enhance our defense. Similarly, Mr. Abbasi also opined that both our religion as well as culture admires a higher numbers of children. Concerning the age of marriage, Dr. Anees firmly approved of marriage at an early age, while Mr. Abbbasi did not. He argued that one should not marry until one has a reliable income. Ultimately, both of them emphasized upon the implementation of an Islamic economic system as a panacea for all the existing economic problems. Hence, the Jamat has rejected the idea of family planning because of its anti-Western predisposition.

4.2.1.2 Attitude towards Practice

Only theoretical considerations are not enough to judge the currently prevailing situation in full. It requires a thorough survey of the respondents' prevalent attitude as well.

Table 4.6: *Jamat's* Attitude towards Family Planning

Respondents	No	Does Islam permit?			Do you practice?			Do you consult?				Have you get sterilized?			
		Yes	No	No comt	Yes	No	May	Doc.	Spouse	Friend	Maulvi	Yes	No	May	No comt
<u>Male</u>															
Urban	5	2	2	1	3	2	0	0	3	0	0	1	3	1	
Rural	5	2	3	0	2	3	0	3	3	1	1	1	4	0	
Total %age	10	4	5	1	5	5	0	3	6	1	1	2	7	1	
<u>Female</u>															
Urban	5	3	2	0	3	2	0	4	4	3	2	1	2	2	
Rural	5	4	1	0	0	1	4	3	3	3	0	0	2	3	
Total %age	10	7	3	0	3	3	4	7	7	6	2	1	4	5	

The table 4.6 shows the practical responses of the members of Jamat-e-Islami. It reflects that concerning the Islamic verdict on family planning, 4 out of 10 male respondents (i.e. 40%) comprising 2 respondents each from rural and urban areas reply that Islam permits family planning. Among females, 7 out of 10 respondents (70%) counting 3 urban and 4 rural respondents have replied the same.




Figure 4.6: *Jamat's* Attitude towards Family Planning

The figure 4.6 corresponds to the data on Jamats' attitude towards family planning. Horizontal axis in it represents four main questions (Does Islam permit? Do you practice? Do you consult? Have you got sterilized?) and the vertical axis represents numbers and percentages of the respondents (*Jamat's*) reply. As to the practice of family planning 5 males (50%), comprising 2 urban and 3 rural respondents, report of practicing it. These five respondents are the very same — 4 saying that Islam permits family planning, including one more respondent who excused himself by saying that he does not know about it. On the other side, only 3 urban females (30%) report of presently practicing it. Further 4 rural females (40%) say that they may practice family planning in future. The same 3+4 =7 respondents also substantiate that Islam permits family planning.

Concerning consultation, the male respondents show that 3 of them consult with the doctor; 6 with spouse; and

one each with his friend and the *maulvi* likewise. The figure of 6 males consulting with their wives indicates that an additional respondent is considering about practicing family planning in future. In the case of females, the response is repeatedly the same. The same number of respondents also consults with the doctor the as well as with their wives; six females in this sample report of consulting with there husbands and 2 with *maulvi*.

In favour of sterilization, only two respondents, one each from urban and rural areas, report that they have had it done. Another urban respondent shows his inclination for practicing sterilization in future. Among females only one urban respondent has reported that she has got sterilized. However, 5 more females confirm their willingness to go for it in future.

The above data reveal some ground realities about the prevailing situation. First, that all the members of the Jamat-e-Islami do not concur with all its policies concerning various issues. Secondly, the females from the Jamat-e-Islami are highly receptive towards family planning. Thirdly, the people living in urban areas are comparatively more receptive to the idea of family planning than the villagers. Finally, the females appear highly receptive because all the females surveyed from rural areas were mostly educated, as no illiterate female member of the Jamat-e-Islami was found in the rural areas for this survey. Hence, the response of the educated females is not typical of the other village women.

4.2.2 Ahlihadith

Another revivalist group in Pakistan is that of the *Ahlihadith*. Like the Jamat-e-Islami, they also do not follow any of the classical jurists. Rejecting *taqleed* they practice *ijtehad* but only within the limitations of the *ahadith* (sayings of prophet).

4.2.2.1 Theoretical Considerations

Theoretically speaking, they have produced nothing of their own about family planning. In this regard, they also follow the footprints of Maulana Maududi to reject the practice of family planning.

No written material is available. However, an interview by Maulana Abdul Aziz Hanif, Ameer Markazi Jamat Ahlihadith (Chief of the Central Organization of *Ahlihadith*) Islamabad, is being presented here. Maulana Hanif declares family planning absolutely un-Islamic. However, he agrees that some physical complications or other unavoidable conditions may legalize the practice of *Azl* at the individual level. He points out that family planning movement, being a product of lack of trust in God, is totally un-Islamic. He further states that a higher numbers of children are not only admired by our religion but are also welcomed by our social customs as well. He also admits very openly that the *ulema* always forbid the people to go for family planning but the people pay no heed to them. He attributes this to the government propaganda, which has a monopolistic hold on the whole media. Concerning economic disparity in Pakistan, he opines that it is only due to the bogus policies of our rulers and not because of overpopulation. Ultimately, he says that a positive economic planning is necessary to avoid the negative effects and obscenity caused by erroneous policies like family planning.

4.2.2.2 Attitude towards Practice

A proportionate number of the *Ahlihadith* respondents were surveyed to know their prevalent attitudes towards family planning practices. These responses are given in the table 4.7. Corresponding to the same data the figure 4.7 characterizes the attitude of the adherent of the *Ahlihadith* sect.

In the figure 4.7, horizontal axis embodies four main questions (Does Islam permit? Do you practice? Do you

consult? Have you got sterilized?), and the vertical axis symbolizes the number of respondents (*Ahlihadiths'*) retort. The table 4.7 and the figure 4.7 show that among males only 2 (25%) rural respondents and among females, 3 rural respondents (30%) opine that family planning is permitted in Islam. Concerning practice, the very same 2 rural respondents report of presently practicing, while, another rural male is inclined to plan, his family in future. Among females, only one urban respondent reports of presently practicing, however, another urban and further 4 rural females are ready to plan their families in future.

Table 4.7: *Ahlihadiths'* Attitude towards Family Planning

Respondents	No	Does Islam permit?			Do you practice?			Do you consult?				Have you get sterilized?			
		Yes	No	No comt	Yes	No	May	Doc.	Spouse	Friend	Maulvi	Yes	No	May	No comt
<u>Male</u>															
Urban	2	0	2	0	0	2	0	0	0	0	0	0	2	0	
Rural	6	2	4	0	2	3	1	2	4	0	0	0	6	0	
Total %age	8	2	6	0	2	5	1	2	4	0	0	0	8	0	
<u>Female</u>															
Urban	4	0	4	0	1	2	1	1	0	1	0	1	3	0	
Rural	6	3	3	0	0	2	4	0	1	1	0	0	3	3	
Total %age	10	3	7	0	1	4	5	1	1	2	0	1	6	3	

Furthermore, no urban male consults with any one but the very same 2 rural males who previously approved of family planning and reported of practicing it, consult with the doctor. 4 other rural males consult with their wives, which show their potential to practice family planning in future.




Figure 4.7: *Ahlihadiths'* Attitude towards Family Planning

Among the females, only one urban respondent consults with the doctor and one with a friend, while among rural respondents one consults with the spouse and one with a friend. This hesitation in consultation shows that the *Ahlihadith* are religious, nearly traditional and somewhat restricted people. Concerning sterilization, all the male respondents were found adverse to it. One urban female, however, reports to have been sterilized and 3 more rural females agree to go for it in future.

The aforementioned data suggest that the influence of the *Jamat Ahlihadith* is more effective in urban than in rural areas. In aggregate terms, no gender difference was found in the attitude of the *Ahlihadith*.

4.3 Modernists

According to their operational definition, modernists are neither the members of any specific class nor the followers of any particular sect. Rather, with their broad worldview and a wide exposure to modern education, they consider Islam as an accommodative religion, which can

adopt and adapt to the modern ideas. Such people are found in almost all the sects. Although it looks impossible to chalk-out an explicit criterion of their demarcation, however, the researcher has attempted to do so. Six different questions were phrased for this purpose. These questions are as follows:

Would you like to carry on bearing children until the birth of a male child? **(No)**

Do you listen or read any written material about family planning? **(Yes)**

Does Islam permit family planning? **(Permits)**

Do you think that one has the power to control the number of his/her children? **(Yes)**

Should family planning programme be advertised publicly? **(Yes)**

Do you think that the whole responsibility of upbringing your children is of God? **(No)**

All these questions were put to the respondents to check their level of modernity. The respondents who replied 5 out of 6 questions in a manner considered compatible with modernity were classified as modernists. The criterion for this compatibility is indicated by giving answers as given in the brackets in front of the questions above.

This criterion could bring forth only 9 modernists out of the total sample having no respondent from rural males. So the criterion had to be relaxed for them. The number of determining questions was reduced from 5 to 4. Then too, only one rural male fell among modernists. That respondent is also mentioned in the forthcoming table, constituting $9+1=10$ total modernists. Before noting the attitudes of the modernists, an account of their theoretical considerations is being mentioned here.

4.3.1 Theoretical Considerations

As far as the theoretical contemplations of the modernists are concerned, they argue that the idea of family planning is not repugnant to Islam. They are of the view that all the basic sources of Islamic law i.e. the *Quran*, the *hadith* and the *fiqha*, have approved of this idea. Rashid Ahmad Jullandhary, one of the prominent modernist *ulema*, has supported the same view. In his article "Islam and Family Planning" (Jullundhary, 1997), he states that the institution of *ijtehad* in Islam, has provided the right to every generation to solve its problems according to its own circumstances. So, today, if the government takes some steps for the prosperity and welfare of the coming generations, it would be justified. Apart from this written reference, an interview by Dr. Khalid Masood, is also being mentioned here.

Dr. Khalid Masood argues that Islam has neither opposed the idea nor forbidden the practice of *Azl* in classical times. Thus he finds nothing wrong in it from the religious point of view. Today the *ulema* who oppose family planning go up against it generally due to its Western orientation. In fact they are unable to distinguish between westernization and modernization. Consequently, they deem it as a western and un-Islamic idea. He further clarifies that this view has evolved due to deficient propaganda in favour of family planning. He emphasizes upon the government to propagate this idea on scientific basis, with more rational arguments. At the same time, he insists upon the *ulema* to try to understand the real spirit of Islam, in the context of the well being of mankind. Concerning the age at marriage he quotes the prophet's verdict that one should not marry until one has a reliable income. Ultimately, he impresses upon an unmet need for every Muslim to realize the intensity of the situation and promote the practice of family planning in the better interest of the nation.

4.3.2 Attitude towards Practice

The attitude of the modernists is found highly receptive towards family planning. Their practical response is given in the table 4.8.

Table 4.8: Modernists' Attitude towards Family Planning

Respondents	No	Does Islam permit?			Do you practice?			Do you consult?				Have you get sterilized?				
		Yes	No	No comt	Yes	No	May	Doc.	Spouse	Friend	Maulvi	Yes	No	May	No comt	
<u>Male</u>																
Urban	3	3	0	0	3	0	0	1	3	0	0	2	0	1		
Rural	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0		
Total %age	4	4	0	0	3	0	0	1	3	0	0	2	0	1		
<u>Female</u>																
Urban	3	3	0	0	3	0	0	3	3	1	0	1	0	2		
Rural	3	3	0	0	2	0	1	2	3	2	0	0	0	3		
Total %age	6	6	0	0	5	0	1	5	6	3	0	1	0	5		

The data tabulated in the table 4.8 is incremented with the figure 4.8. The table 4.8 and the figure 4.8 show that all male and female respondents approve of family planning in Islam. In the figure 4.8, horizontal axis epitomises four main questions regarding family planning (Does Islam permit? Do you practice? Do you consult? Have you got sterilized?), and the vertical axis typifies the numbers and percentages of respondents' (Modernists') response. All the urban males are practicing it while only one rural male does not. Among females, all the urban respondents are practicing family planning but in rural areas 2 out of 3 females are presently practicing and the remaining one respondent intends to practice it in future.




Figure 4.8: Modernists' Attitude towards Family Planning

On the matter of consultation, only one urban male consults with the doctor, all the 3 with the spouse and no one with either the friend or the *maulvi*. However, no rural male is consulting with any of the potential consultants i.e. doctor, spouse, friend or *maulvi*. Among urban females, 3 consult with the doctor; the same numbers with the spouse; and one with a friend while no one with the *maulvi*.

Concerning the issue of sterilization only 2 urban and no rural male reports of being already sterilized. The remaining one rural male, however, says that he may get it done in future. Among females, one urban respondent reports of having been previously sterilized while 2 more respondents may get sterilized in future. No rural female is

presently sterilized. However, all three of them are inclined to get sterilized in future.

The above data show that the number of modernists is considerably less as a whole and next to nil among rural males. Moreover, irrespective of gender, the response of urban modernists is almost 100 percent receptive towards family planning. Even the response of rural females is also highly receptive to modern ideas like family planning. Surprisingly, the acceptability of sterilization is also 100 percent in all the male as well as female respondents.

Overall analyses of the data show that, in aggregate terms, modernists are exceedingly favourable towards the modern ideas like family planning. Among revivalists, however, the *Ahlehadiths* are more critical towards family planning than the followers of the Jamat-e-Islami. Similarly, the *Barelvis* are more critical of this idea among traditionalists. This, in turn, reflects that mostly the agro-traditional worldview of the society influences the attitude of the people more than their religious considerations. The legacy of social sector neglect and the absence of visible political commitment to the education sector add to the unease about serious intent (Weiner & Noman, 1995: 264). Noman (*Ibid.*: 1995), has further emphasized that the social returns to universal primary education in Pakistan are considerable. Such an achievement would contribute directly to the reduction of explosive population growth rate.

Findings and Conclusion

In the context of the current world situation, the problem of overpopulation has acquired a new dimension of being linked with poverty in the developing economies of the world. Consequently, many governments, including Pakistan, have adopted family planning as a matter of high priority. Having an agro-based, largely conservative Muslim society, modern ideas like family planning have to face critical resistance in Pakistan.

For the sake of verifying the hypothesis that the real genesis of the opposition of family planning is derived from the agro-traditional worldview of the society and not from religion, the relevant data pertaining to different sects in Islamabad and surrounding areas has been analyzed and interpreted in the previous chapters. Here only the major findings and conclusions emerging from the previous analysis are given.

It is observed that an outsized number of Muslims in Islamabad are ignorant of the population boom, and consequently indifferent towards family planning. It may be stated that there, indeed, are certain prejudices among the Muslims of this area against family planning, mostly based on their agro-traditional outlook on life and sometimes because of their religion. Religious *ulema* from both traditionalist and revivalist sections are rigorously opposing the idea of family planning. They have declared the practice of family planning a sinful act. Being a part of the same agro-based society as their followers, these *ulema* exploit cultural symbols to plead their viewpoint. Such cultural symbols are integral parts of the local worldview of the society and therefore, attract the Muslim masses.

In the contextual frame of reference with Redfield's conceptual construct of worldview, it can be inferred that the attitudes of all the individuals are overshadowed by the specific worldview of the community. As Redfield (1963:95) has pointed out that: The agro-traditional worldview of the Muslim community has been considered an important dimension affecting the factors of male dominance, son preference, children as a source of prestige and strength etc. These, indeed, are the factors to determine the reproductive behaviour in any community.

The analysis shows that although all the sects are opposed to the idea of family planning in principle, a considerable proportion (43.5%) of their followers is still of the view that Islam permits family planning. This means that a large number of Muslims in the area do not fully agree with all the theoretical positions of their respective sects in principle.

Even, in practice, the Muslims of Islamabad do not strictly follow the verdict of their respective sects: 29 percent respondents confirmed that they practice family planning presently. Another 11 percent respondents also said that they would practice it in future.

This difference in theory and practice reflects that the respondents' worldview concerning the practice of family planning is not influenced by religion alone. As we know, 43.5 percent of them accept that Islam permits family planning, but only 29 percent are practicing it presently, inclusive of 11 percent potential practitioners, i.e. $29+11=40$ percent. Hence, at least $43.5-40=3.5$ percent Muslims are being influenced by their agro-traditional worldview. It further indicates that no sect commands the total allegiance of its followers who tend to tackle their personal problems according to their own requirements.

Then most of the *ulema*, who categorically declare that the idea of family planning is sinful, are usually not well informed about the legal position of the matter in Islam. It shows that most of the *ulema* oppose it just for the sake of

opposition inspired by their cultural worldview. Had they ever studied this idea thoroughly they would have changed their opinion about it.

Further, this study suggests that Islam is not the only factor affecting the reproductive behaviour of the Muslims of Islamabad. Rather, a number of other factors also have their influence in determining the reproductive behaviour of this populace.

Many other scholars also point out most of these factors. The researcher has quoted various references from scholars wherever needed. None of scholars has, however, tried to explore the centrality or commonality of all these factors. The centrality of all these factors is traced out in this study in the dimension of the worldview. All these factors of opposing family planning are commonly based upon the agro-traditional worldview of the society. This very central idea, indeed, is the crux of the whole study.

These factors are as follows:

Irrespective of the sectarian and gender differences, the urban respondents are comparatively more modern in their attitudes, mainly because of having a broader outlook towards life, lying beyond the narrow limits of the agro-traditional worldview.

- i. Irrespective of the sectarian or geographical differences, females are more receptive towards modern ideas like family planning.
- ii. Literacy is another factor in influencing the reproductive behaviour of the society.
- iii. Occupational distribution is also a significant factor in this regard. For instance, the people engaged in the agricultural sector have a higher number of children, as compared to those who are concerned with the services sectors.
- iv. Income and class groups, although not much effective in rural areas, have an influence upon the reproductive behaviour of the urban lower classes.

- v. Urban people, in spite of being more punctual in their religious practices, adopt family planning measures more easily. It means that they are following Islamic rituals, or may be more religious, but are not traditional.
- vi. The current fertility rate in Pakistan is 5.9 but the present study has noted that the desired number of children is 4. It means that people do want to limit the number of their children but are unable to do so, mainly because of the cultural restraints.
- vii. The respondents have shown a very firm desire for a male child. This desire had more intensity in rural areas. For instance, high proportion of 63.05 percent rural respondents said that they wanted a son, as compared to 45.75 percent urban respondents.
- viii. In aggregate terms 27% females and a high proportion of 63 percent males considered their children as a source of respect. This idea is even more firmly held in the rural areas, which again is a cultural phenomenon.

These points indicate that, though the number of children desired is quite high, it is not as high as the actual fertility rate of the area. People who are convinced about the desirability of having fewer children practice family planning despite cultural and religious inhibitions. However, many such people do not have access to family planning devices. Those who do not practice family planning do not do so as much because of cultural reasons as for religious ones.

Finally, the study finds out that the opinions of most of the *ulema* are influenced by their agro-traditional worldviews. Most of the *ulema that were* interviewed asserted that more children are not only admired by religion but are also a part of Pakistan's social custom.

In the conceptual backdrop of the problem under study, an attempt is made to document the attitudes, theoretical considerations and practices of the Muslims of Islamabad vis-à-vis family planning.

To recapitulate, it is concluded that the attitudes of Islamabad's Muslim residents are determined sometimes by objective factors but mostly by subjective ones. These subjective feelings are deeply embedded in the agro-traditional worldview of the society. Such subjective stance has a considerable influence on behaviour of these people. Religious *ulema* too declare family planning unlawful in Islam because of the influence of this agro-traditional worldview. Muslim masses that are already unable to escape or depart from their cultural based subjective ideas get more bound to observe religious injunctions mediated through the cultural symbols. So the idea of family planning faces strong resistance in the society.

Although this study is only about Islamabad, it can be extended to swathe the whole of Pakistani society in general terms. Even though no claims are made that these results are applicable to all areas of the country, the possibility of deriving some general insights into the attitudes of the Muslims of other areas of Pakistan may be tentatively assumed. These will provide the basis of further studies along similar lines in other areas of Pakistan. This is one use of the present work. Other uses may be that it can prove to be of value to the planners, policy makers, social workers and reformers to develop useful guidelines and strategies to be employed in the promotion and endorsement of family planning programme in the country.

Appendix-I

Introductory Notes on Sects

The Ahlisunnah (Ahlisunnah in Urdu)

Ahlisunnah literally means the followers of *sunnah* or traditions of Prophet Muhammad (PBUH). They are named so because they adhere to the *sunnah* of the Prophet (PBUH), including his sayings, acts or their tacit approval and also the example of his *Sahabah* (RA). The Sunnis, indeed, arrogate to themselves the title of *Najiyah*, or those who are being saved. They remain faithful to all the companions (*Sahabah*) as well as the decedents (*Ahl-e-bayt*) of the Prophet (PBUH). Nevertheless, unlike the *Shiahs* they neither renounce nor uphold the doctrine of *Imamism* exclusively. Broadly speaking they are divided into two streams i.e. *Muqallids* (followers) and *Ghair-Muqallida* (non-followers). *Muqallids* are further crystallized into four orthodox sects or schools of interpretation like *Hanafi*, *Shafi*, *Maliki* and *Hambuli*. Ghair *Muqallids* are consisting predominantly of *Ahl-e-hadith* or *Wahabis* including the members of *Jamat-e-Islamai*.

1 The Bareliah (Barelvi in Urdu)

The *Barelvis* are named for their Imam Ahmad Raza Barelvi. He was born on 14th of June 1856 AD, 10 Shawal 1272 A.H. at Braili (A city in India – Rohail Khand). Being the resident of Braili, Ahmad Raza Khan is known as *Barelvi*. *Barelvis* are the followers of Imam Abu Hanifa so claim to be *Hanafi*, *Ahlisunnah*. They differ from the other *Ahlisunnah* group — *Deobandis* in some of the mystic and philosophical doctrines.

The Deobandiah (Deobandi in Urdu)

The Deobandis are named for their main religious institution named *Darul-Uloom Deoband*. It was

established on 30th of May 1866 at Deoband (India). The founder of this institution is named as Maulana Muhammad Qasim Nanotvi, who was born in 1832 A.D. at Nanota (India). Being the followers of Imam Abu Hanifa, *Deobandis*, are known as *Hanafi Ahlisunnah*.

The Hanbuliyah (Hanbali in Urdu)

Imam Abu Abdullah Ahmad Ibn Muhammad Ibn Hanbal, who was born at Baghdad A.D. 780 (A.H.164), founded the *Hanbuliyah* school of thought. Unlike his predecessor, jurists who upheld juristic preference, he adhered strictly to the *Quran* and the *Sunnah* resultantly, the *Hanbali* school proved to be more strict than the others. His followers are found in Eastern Arabia and in some parts of Africa, but it is the least popular of the four schools of interaction. They have no Mufti (Jurist) at Makkah, while the other three sects are represented there. The *Wahabis* rose from this sect.

The Hanafiah (Hanafi in Urdu)

The *Hanafis* are named so after their founder Imam Abu *Hanifa*, who was born at *Al-Kufah*, the capital of Al-Iraq in 702 AD or 80 A.H. Being a great oracle of Islamic jurisprudence he has been called as *Al-Imam-al-Azam* (Great Imam). With the assistance of his two pupils —Abu Yousaf (d.798 AD) and Muhammad Al Shybbani (d.805 AD), he drew the code of Islamic law, so stood the founder of Hanafiyah school of jurisprudence. The followers of *Hanafiyah* school are mainly founded in Turkey, Central Asia, North India and Pakistan. This school is further divided into two sects *Barelvis* and *Deobandis*.

The Imamiah (Imami in Urdu: Shiah)

In its literal meaning *Shiah* means a follower or a supporter. The followers of Hazrat Ali (R.A.), the first cousin of Prophet Muhammad (PBUH), and the husband of his daughter Hazrat Fatima (R.A.), denote themselves as *Shiahs*. They maintain that Hazrat Ali (R.A.) was the first

Imam or *Khalifa* (Caliph) or successor of the Prophet (PBUH) and therefore reject the first three *Khulafa* (Caliphs) of the Sunni Muslims as usurpers. They are also called *Imamyahs*, because they believe the Muslim religion insists in the Imam or rightful leaders of the faithful. Also the *Athna Ashriyah* or the Twelvers (as followers of the twelve Imams). The *Shiahs* strongly maintain that they are the 'orthodox' Muslims and arrogate to themselves the title of *al-Mumineen* or the "True Believers".

The Ismailiah (Ismaili in Urdu: Shiah)

The *Ismailiah* or *Ismaili*, like the Twelvers, make possession of loyal attachment to the cause of Hazrat Ali (R.A.). His cousin was occasioned by the dispute regarding the succession of Imamat on the death of 6th Imam of Twelvers, Imam Jafar Ibn Sadiq (R.A.). Jafar had four sons the eldest of whom was Ismail. He, however, was one day seen in a state of inebriety and his father disinherited him and appointed his son Musa as Imam. The greater number of *Shiahs* accepted this decision, but a smaller number, who regarded the drunkenness of the Imam as evidence that he accepted the hidden meaning and not the legal precepts of Islam, remained attached to Ismail. They say from the time of Ali to the death of Muhammad i.e. the son of Ismail, the Imams were visible, but from his death, commenced the succession of concealed Imams. They believe that their last Imam i.e. Muhammad did not die but was concealed and will reappear in the form of Imam Mehdi. At the matter of the deputation of this concealed Imam they got divided into two groups i.e. Agha Khani and Ismaili. Agha Khanis follow the descendents of Agha Khan as their vice-Imam.

The Malakiyah (Maliki in Urdu)

The followers of Imam Malik Ibn Ans who was born at Al-Madinah A.D. 714 (A.H. 95) are called *Maliki*. He enjoyed the personal acquaintance of Abu Hanifa and he viewed the Madina from Muhammad to the companions and their successors (*tabieen*). He was considered the most learned

person of his time. He composed a comprehensive collection of rules and *ahadith* called *Al-Mawatta*. Followers of the *Maliki* School have spread to Egypt, Hijaz, North Africa, Andalus and are presently dominantly in West Africa and West Sudan.

The Shafiah (Shafi in Urdu)

Named for their Imam Muhammad Ibn Idris al-Shafi, who was born in Asqalon in Palestine A.D. 767 or A.H 150 and raised in Makkah. He is, in fact, a descendent of Muttalib, the brother of Hashim, who is the grandfather of the Prophet Muhammad (PBUH). He had been a personal student of Imam Malik and also studied the concepts of Abu Hanifa, his disciples and those of the *ulema* in Syria. Al-Shafi formulated his initial concepts in Iraq. Later on, he moved to Egypt, where he evolved his final *fiqh*. His followers are mainly found in Egypt, Iraq, Africa, Sudan and parts of the South Asia.

Appendix-II**Questionnaire for Male Respondents****1. Personal Data**

- i. Name: _____
- ii. Age: _____
- iii. Education: _____
- iv. Occupation: _____
- v. Monthly income: _____
- vi. Area of residence: _____

2. Possessions**A. Do you have?**

- | | | |
|------------------------------------|---|---|
| i) Radio: | Y | N |
| ii) Television: | Y | N |
| iii) Refrigerator: | Y | N |
| iv) Video Cassette Recorder (VCR): | Y | N |
| v) Air Conditioner (AC): | Y | N |
| vi) Satellite Receiver: | Y | N |
| vii) Conveyance of: | | |
| a) Bicycle: | Y | N |
| b) Motorbike: | Y | N |
| c) Car: | Y | N |

- B How many rooms you have in your house? _____

3. Marriage:

- i) Age at marriage: _____
- ii) Ideal age at marriage: _____

4. Children:

- i) Number of children you have?
Male _____ Female _____
- ii) Ideal number of children one should have?
Male _____ Female _____
- iii) Do you consider your children as a:
- | | | |
|-----------------------------|---|---|
| a) Source of income: | Y | N |
| b) Source of burden: | Y | N |
| c) Source of respect: | Y | N |
| d) Source of social status: | Y | N |
- iv) Do you think that one has the power to control the number of one's children?
Y N
- v) Do you think that the total responsibility of upbringing your children lie in God?
Y N
- vi) Would you like to carry on producing children till the birth of a male child?
Y N
- vii) Do you think that over population cause economic disparity?
Y N
- viii) Do you think that lesser number of children can be fed more adequately:
Y N

5. Attitude Towards Religion:

- i) Number of prayers you generally offer in a day?
- ii) Do you offer Jumma prayers regularly?
Y N
- iii) Do you also attend Khutba (sermon) as an obligation?
Y N
- iv) Do you think that Islam permits family planning?
Y N

6. Attitude Towards Advertisement:

- i) Should family planning be advertised Publicly?
Y N

If yes, show your preferences in advertisement grade wise?

- a) Personal communications: (clinics, hospitals, home visits etc.) 1, 2, 3
- b) Public communications: (Newspapers, radio, T.V, films, printed materials, public meetings, education etc.) 1, 2, 3
- c) Miscellaneous communication: (all means, approximate means, religious means) 1, 2, 3
- ii. Do you ever listen or study any material about family planning? Y N
- iii. What sort of material do you listen or study?
- a. Government: Y N
- b. Medical: Y N
- c. Religious: Y N

7. Sectarian Affiliation:

- i) Which sect do you follow?
- ii) Have you ever been affiliated with any religious organization? Y N
- If yes, name the organization: _____

8. Practice of Family Planning

- i) Have you ever practiced family planning?
Y N
- If yes, after how many children did you practice? _____
- If no, would you practice it in future?
Y N

If yes, after how many children
would you practice? _____

9. Attitude towards Consultation:

- | | | |
|-------------------------------------------------------------------|---|---|
| i) Have you ever consulted with any
one about family planning? | Y | N |
| if yes, point out all your consultants | | |
| a) Doctor: | Y | N |
| b) Friend: | Y | N |
| c) Wife: | Y | N |
| d) Maulvi: | Y | N |
| If no, would you consult any of these in future? | Y | N |

10. Sterilization:

- | | | |
|----------------------------------------|---|---|
| i) Can you opt for sterilization? | Y | N |
| If yes, have you get it done? | Y | N |
| If no, will you practice it in future? | Y | N |

Appendix-III**Questionnaire for Female Respondents****1. Personal Data:**

- i. Name: _____
- ii. Age: _____
- iii. Education: _____
- iv. Occupation: _____
- v. Monthly Income: _____
- vi. Area of Residence: _____

2. Possessions:

- A. Do you have?
- | | | |
|------------------------------------|---|---|
| i) Radio: | Y | N |
| ii) Television: | Y | N |
| iii) Refrigerator: | Y | N |
| iv) Video Cassette Recorder (VCR): | Y | N |
| v) Air Conditioner (AC): | Y | N |
| vi) Satellite Receiver : | Y | N |
| vii) Conveyance of: | | |
| a) Bicycle : | Y | N |
| b) Motorbike: | Y | N |
| c) Car: | Y | N |
- B. How many rooms you have in your house: _____

3. Marriage:

- i) Age at marriage: _____
- ii) Ideal age at marriage: _____

4. Children:

- i) Number of children you have?

- Male ____ Female ____
- ii) Ideal number of children one should have?
 Male ____ Female ____
- iii) Do you consider your children as a:
- | | | |
|-----------------------------|---|---|
| a) Source of income: | Y | N |
| b) Source of burden: | Y | N |
| c) Source of respect: | Y | N |
| d) Source of social status: | Y | N |
- iv) Do you think that one has the power to control the number of one's children? Y N
- v) Do you think that the mother of lesser children especially less sons faces:
- | | | |
|---------------------------------------------|---|---|
| a) Less respect: | Y | N |
| b) Less status: | Y | N |
| c) All the same as the mother of more sons: | Y | N |
- vi) Do you think that the responsibility of upbringing your children lie in God? Y N
- vii) Would you like to continue bearing children till the birth of a male child? Y N
- viii) Do you think that overpopulation cause economic disparity? Y N
- ix) Do you think that lesser number of children can be fed more adequately? Y N

5. Attitude Towards Religion:

- i) Number of prayers you generally offer in a day? _____
- ii) Does your husband offer his *Juma* prayers regularly? Y N
- iii) Does he also attend *Khutba* (sermon) as an obligation? Y N

- iv) Do you think that Islam permits family planning? Y N

6. Advertisement:

- i) Should family planning programme be advertised publicly? Y N

If yes mark the grades of your preferences in advertisements:

- a) Personal communications: (clinics, hospitals, home visits etc.) 1, 2, 3
- b) Public communications: (Newspapers, radio, T.V., films, printed materials, public meetings, education etc.) 1, 2, 3
- c) Miscellaneous communication: (all means, approximate means, religious means) 1, 2, 3
- ii) Do you ever listen or study any material about family planning? : Y N
- iii) What sort of material do you listen or study:
- a) Government: Y N
- b) Medical: Y N
- c) Religious: Y N

7. Sectarian Affiliation:

- i) Which sect do you follow? _____
- ii) Do you have or had affiliation with any religious organization: Y N
- If yes, name of the organization: _____

8. Practice of Family Planning:

- i) Have you ever practiced family planning? Y N
- If yes, after how many children did you practice? _____
- If no, would you practice it in future? Y N

Again if yes, after how many children, would you practice? _____

9. Decision Making and Family Obligations:

- | | | |
|------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|---|---|
| i) Can you make your decisions independently? | Y | N |
| ii) Can you practice family planning by your choice? | Y | N |
| iii) Does your husband or your in-laws ever expect/insist you to bear more number of children? | Y | N |
| If not yet, do you expect so in future? | Y | N |

10. Consultation:

- | | | |
|---------------------------------------------------------------|---|---|
| i) Have you ever consulted with anyone about family planning? | Y | N |
| if yes, point out all your consultants: | | |
| a) Doctor | Y | N |
| b) Friend | Y | N |
| c) Husband | Y | N |
| d) Maulvi | Y | N |
| If no, would you consult any of these in future? | Y | N |

11. Sterilization:

- | | | |
|----------------------------------------|---|----|
| i) Can you opt for sterilization? | Y | N |
| If yes, have you got it done? | Y | N/ |
| If no, will you get it done in future? | Y | N |

APPENDIX IV

URBAN MALE (UM)

Q#1				2	3	4														5														
1ii	1iii	1iV	10		30	10	4M	4u	4um	4UF	4m	4MC	4MD	4iv	4v	4Vi	4Vii	SR	Sri	Siri	Siv	6i	6i-	6ii	6iii	6iiia	6iiib	7i/ii	8i	8i-	9i	9i-	9ic	10
25	X	SERVICE	2500	L	21	E	2	1	2	1	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	2	Y	X	-	Y	ALL	X	X	X	Y	SHIA	Y	3	X	X	Y	Y
85	X	SHOPKEEPER	2500	L	30	E	4	1	3	3	Y	Y	Y	Y	X	Y	X	5	Y	Y	X	x	X	X	Y	Y	AHL-E-SUNNAT	X	X	X	X	X	X	
50	X	SERVICE	2500	L	21	O	5	0	2	2	Y	X	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	5	Y	Y	X	Y	PROPER	X	X	X	Y	JI	Y	4	X	X	Y	Y
48	X	SERVICE	2500	L	30	E	1	0	GOD DESIRE		Y	X	X	Y	Y	.	X	5	Y	X	X	X	X	X	X	Y	X	JI	X	X	X	X	X	X
40	FA	SERVICE	7000	CM	26	E	0	0	2	2	Y	X	X	X	X	X	Y	4	Y	Y	Y	X	AT HOME	X	X	X	Y	DEOBANDI	X	X	X	X	Y	X
30	X	SHOPKEEPER	8000	CM	22	E	4	0	10	1	X	X	X	Y	X	Y	Y	0	X	X	X	Y	PROPER	X	X	X	Y	AHL-E-SUNNAT	X	X	X	X	X	X
60	X	BUSINESS	2500	L	21	O	3	4	3	2	Y	X	X	X	Y	Y	Y	0	X	X	X	Y	AT HOME	X	X	X	x	AHL-E-SUNNAT	X	X	X	X	X	X
30	M	SERVICE	4000	LM	23	O	3	2	3	2	X	X	X	Y	X	X	Y	5	Y	Y	-	Y	PROPER	X	X	X	X	AHL-E-SUNNAT	X-Y	6	X	X	Y	X
39	X	LABOUR	2000	L	25	O	1	2	PROPER		X	Y	X	Y	X	Y	X	0	X	X	X	Y	PROPER	Y	G	Y	Y	DEOBANDI	X	X	X	X	X	X
31	FA	TEACHING	6000	CM	30	O	0	0	3	2	X	Y	X	X	Y	Y	Y	5	Y	Y	X	X	X	Y	R	Y	X	BRALVI	X	X	X	X	X	X
35	FA	TEACHING	5000	LM	25	O	3	2	2	1	X	X	X	Y	Y	X	Y	5	Y	Y	Y	X	WRITTEN	Y	G	X	Y	BRALVI	Y	5	X	X	Y	X
35	M	SERVICE	3000	LM	25	O	3	2	2	1	X	X	Y	Y	Y	X	Y	5	Y	Y	X	Y	ALL	Y	M	X	Y	BRALVI	X	X	X	X	X	X

Q#1				2	3	4											5																	
40	X	LABOUR	2000	L	25	O	5	1	2	1	Y	X	X	X	Y	Y	Y	5	Y	Y	X	Y	ALL	Y	M	Y	Y	AHL-E-SUNNAT	X	X	X	X	X	X
40	E	SERVICE	4000	LM	21	O	1	2	2	2	Y	X	X	X	Y	X	Y	5	Y	X	X	X	AT HOME	Y	G	Y	Y	AHL-E-HADITH	X	X	X	X	X	X
30	LLB	TEACHING	3000	LM	24	O	5	0	3	3	X	X	X	X	Y	X	X	4	Y	Y	X	Y	ISLAMIC	X	X	Y	X	SHIA	X	X	X	X	X	X
45	X	CARPENTER	5000	LM	21	O	7	0	2	2	Y	Y	Y	X	Y	Y	Y	5	Y	Y	-	Y	ALL	Y	GMR	X	Y	JI	Y	7	X	X	Y	Y
40	X	AGRICULTURE	7500	LM	22	O	5	0	2	2	Y	X	X	Y	X	Y	Y	-	Y	Y	Y	Y	PROPER	X	X	X	Y	JI	X	X	X	X	X	X
55	PHD	SERVICE	200000	CM	16	O	6	4	2	1	X	X	X	Y	X	Y	Y	5	Y	Y	Y	Y	FILMS	Y	M	X	X	BRALVI	Y	4	X	X	Y	X
66	X	AGRICULTURE	5000	CM	18	E	6	3	2	1	Y	X	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	5	X	X	Y	Y	PROPER	Y	M	Y	Y	SHIA	Y	1	X	X	X	-
24	FA	TEACHING	3200	CM	21	O	0	0	2	1	X	X	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	5	Y	Y	Y	X	WRITTEN	Y	G	Y	X	SHIA	X-Y	3	X	X	Y	Y
50	X	SERVICE	8745	CM	31	E	1	3	2	2	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	5	Y	X	Y	Y	ALL	X	X	Y	Y	BRALVI	X	X	X	X	Y	Y
30	FA	AGRICULTURE	500000	U	18	O	6	0	PROPER		X	X	X	Y	Y	Y	X	2	X	X	-	Y	PROPER	X	X	X	X	ISMAILI	X.Y	6	X	X	X	X
30	X	AGRICULTURE	3000	LM	16	E	3	2	1	1	Y	X	Y	X	Y	X	X	5	Y	Y	X	N	.	Y	M	X	Y	AHL-E-SUNNAT	Y	2	Y	D	Y	X
35	MSC	SERVICE	30000	U	28	O	2	2	2	2	Y	X	X	Y	Y	Y	Y	5	Y	Y	Y	Y	PROPER	Y	GMR	X	X	SUNNI	Y	4	Y	DM	Y	Y
44	BSC	SERVICE	30000	U	26	O	3	1	3	1	Y	X	X	X	Y	X	Y	4	Y	Y	X	Y	ACADEMIC	Y	M	X	Y	SUNNI	Y	4	Y	D	Y	X
38	BSC	SERVICE	20000	UM	26	O	3	1	2	2	Y	X	X	Y	X	X	Y	5	Y	Y	Y	Y	ALL	Y	R	X	Y	AHL-E-SUNNAT	Y	I	Y	D	Y	X
32	DIP	SERVICE	20000	UM	26	O	2	2	2	2	Y	X	X	Y	Y	Y	Y	5	Y	Y	Y	Y	AT HOME	Y	RM	X	Y	JI	Y	4	X	X	Y	X
34	BSC	SERVICE	25000	UM	26	E	4	0	-	-	X	X	X	X	Y	.	Y	4	Y	-	X	X	AT HOME	X	.	X	X	BRALVI	X	X	X	X	X	X
51	BSC	SERVICE	15000	CM	25	O	10	2	AS GOD DESIRES		X	X	Y	X	Y	Y	Y	5	Y	Y	N	X	.	X	.	Y	X	BRALVI	X	X	X	X	X	X
35	BSC	SERVICE	5000	CM	27	E	1	3	2	2	Y	X	X	Y	Y	Y	Y	1	Y	Y	Y	Y	ALL	Y	M	X	X	SUNNI	Y	4	X	X	Y	Y

Q#1				2	3			4										5																
23	MB	SERVICE	2500	L	18	O	3	O	2	1	Y	X	Y	X	X	Y	Y	-	Y	X	Y	Y	ACADEMIC	X	M	Y	Y	SUNNI	Y	3	Y	D	Y	Y
24	X	SHOPEKEEPER	3000	L	19	O	1	2	3	3	X	X	X	X	Y	Y	Y	5	Y	Y	X	X	X	.	X	Y	AHL-E-SUNNAT	X	X	X	X	X	X	X
18	X	LABOUR	2000	L	17	O	0	0	2	2	Y	X	X	X	Y	Y	X	3	Y	Y	X	X	.	X	X	Y	Y	ISMAILI	X	X	X	X	X	X
19	X	SHOPKEEPER	2000	L	17	E	1	0	1	1	Y	X	Y	Y	X	Y	Y	5	Y	Y	X	Y	AT HOME	Y	GM	X	Y	AHL-E-SUNNAT	X	X	X	X	X	X
21	X	LABOUR	1500	L	19	E	1	0	2	2	Y	Y	Y	N	Y	Y	Y	3	Y	Y	N	Y	AT HOME	Y	GM	X	Y	AHL-E-HADITH	X	X	X	X	X	X

APPENDIX V

RURAL MALE (RM)

1ii	1iii	1v	1iv	3i	2	4i			5			4ii	4vii	4iii				4vie	6i	6i			6ii	6iii	7i	5iv	4iv	4v	4ii		8i	8ia	9i	9ic	10i
						M	Total	F	i	ii	iii			a	b	c	d			a-b-c	M	F													
25	1	3000	GARDENER	25	L	X	0	X	X			E	Y	N	Y	N	N	N	N	HOME	N	-	JAMAAT-E-ISLAMI	Y	Y	N	2	1	N	-	D	Y	Y		
40	2	2000	AGRICUL-TURE	20	L	3	5	2	X		x	E	N	Y	N	Y	N	Y	N	-	N	-	SUNNI	N	N	Y	3	2	N	-	-	N	N		
30	3	2000	-DO-	21	L	3	4	1	X	x	x	O	Y	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	RADIO	Y	G	AHL-E-SUNNAT	Y	Y	N	2	2	N	-	-	Y	N		
60	4	2500	-DO-	23	L	4	5	1	X	x	x	O	Y	Y	N	Y	N	N	Y	DO	N	G	-DO-	N	N	Y	3	2	Y	5	D	Y	N		
25	5	2700	CLERK	20	L	2	4	2	3			O	N	Y	Y	Y	N	Y	N	TV	N	-	-DO-	N	N	Y	4	3	N	-	-	N	N		
35	6	1000	BUSINESS	22	L	1	5	0	5			E	Y	N	Y	Y	N	Y	Y	RADIO	Y	G	SUNNI	N	Y	Y	2	1	Y	5	D	Y	Y		
25	7	1500	AGRI	23	L	0	2	1	5			E	Y	Y	N	Y	N	Y	Y	DO	N	-	-DO-	-	N	Y	2	2	N	-	-	Y	N		
20	8	2000	DRIVER	18	L	0	2	0	5			E	N	N	N	Y	N	Y	Y	DO	Y	G	-DO-	Y	Y	Y	2	2	Y	4	MD	Y	Y		
20	9	1500	SERVICE	18	L	2	2	0	3			E	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	REP	N	-	-DO-	N	N	Y	-	-	N	-	M	Y	Y		
20	10	1500	BUSINESS	16	L	1	2	1	X			O	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	-	N	-	-DO-	N	Y	Y	3	1	N	-	-	N	N		
45	11	2000	AGRI	22	L	4	4	X	2	x	x	O	Y	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	ALL	Y	G	AHL-E-SUNNAT	Y	Y	N	2	2	N	-	-	Y	N		
40	12	2000	-DO-	24	L	0	0	0	3			O	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	-	N	-	DEOBANDI	N	Y	Y	3	3	N	-	M	N	N		
25	13	1740	ARMY	23	L	0	0	0	5			O	Y	N	Y	Y	N	Y	N	-	N	R	SUNNI	N	N	N	3	2	N	-	-	N	N		
40	14	3000	BUSNIESS	19	L	6	8	2	0	x	x	O	Y	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	ALL	Y	G	AHL-E-SUNNAT	Y	Y	N	2	1	N	-	-	Y	Y		
35	15	2000	AGRL	20	L	4	6	2	5	x	x	O	Y	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	DO	Y	G	-DO-	Y	Y	N	2	2	-Y	-4	-	Y	N		
30	16	3000	BUSNESS	18	LM	5	7	2	0	x	x	O	Y	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	DO	Y	G	-DO-	-Y	Y	N	2	1	N	-	-	Y	N		
40	17	2000	AGRI	22	L	5	6	1	0	x	x	O	Y	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	DO	Y	G	-DO-	Y	Y	N	2	2	-Y	-5	-	Y	N		
35	18	2500	-DO-	19	LM	4	6	2	5			O	Y	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	DO	Y	G	-DO-	Y	Y	-	2	2	N	-	-	Y	N		

45	19	2500	-DO-	22	L	2	5	3	2			O	Y	Y	N	N	N	N	Y	DO	N	G	AHL-E-HADITH	N	N	Y	3	2	Y	5	D	Y	N
45	20	2700	BUSNISS	18	L	2	8	6	2			E	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	HOME	N	-	SHIAH	N	N	Y	2	1	N	-	-	Y	N
35	21	5500	TEACHING	25	L	2	2	0	5			E	Y	Y	N	Y	N	Y	N	-	N	GM	JAMAAT-E-ISLAM	N	N	Y	-	-	N	-	-	N	N
30	22	4000	SERVICE	24	LM	1	4	3	3			O	Y	Y	N	Y	Y	Y	N	WRITTEN	N	G	-DO-	Y	N	Y	12	3	Y	5	D	Y	Y
25	23	3000	AGRI	23	L	0	0	0	4			O	Y	N	N	Y	N	Y	Y	ALL	N	-	DEUBANDI	N	N	Y	2	1	-Y	8	-	Y	Y
50	24	2000	DO	21	L	7	9	2	5	x	x	O	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	DO	Y	G	AHL-E-SUNNAT	Y	Y	N	2	2	N	-	-	Y	N
50	25	2500	DO	24	L	3	5	2	4	x	x	O	N	Y	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	DO	N	G	-DO-	N	N	Y	3	2	Y	5	D	Y	N
40	26	2500	BUSINEES	17	L	3	6	3	5			O	Y	N	Y	Y	N	Y	Y	DO	Y	G	BARELVI	N	N	Y	3	0	N	-	-	N	Y
20	27	4000	SHOPKEEPER	19	LM	0	0	0	5			E	N	N	N	Y	Y	Y	N	RELIGIOUS	N	-	AHL-E-SUNNAT	N	N	Y	2	1	N	-	-	N	N
55	28	2000	AGRI	20	L	5	7	2	3			O	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	ALL	Y	G	-DO-	Y	Y	N	2	2	N	-	-	Y	Y
45	29	2500	AGRI	23	LM	6	7	1	0	x	x	O	Y	N	N	Y	N	N	Y	DO	Y	G	-DO-	N	N	Y	3	2	Y	5	D	Y	N
50	30	3000	RRADE	19	LM	4	10	6	5			O	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	DO	Y	G	-DO-	Y	Y	N	2	1	N	-	-	Y	N
50	31	2000	AGRI	22	L	3	5	2	0			O	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	DO	Y	G	AHL-E-HADITH	Y	Y	N	2	2	-Y	9	-	Y	N
40	32	2500	DO	22	LM	5	5	0	5			O	Y	N	N	Y	N	N	Y	DO	N	G	-DO-	N	N	Y	3	2	Y	6	D	Y	N
50	33	2000	DO	22	L	5	8	4	0	x	x	O	Y	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	DO	Y	G	-DO-	Y	Y	N	2	2	N	-	-	Y	N
30	34	3000	DO	16	CM	3	5	2	5			E	Y	N	Y	Y	N	N	N	-	Y	M	SUNNI	N	N	Y	1	1	Y	7	D	Y	N
50	35	3000	TRADE	19	LM	5	9	4	0	x	x	O	Y	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	ALL	Y	G	AHL-E-SUNNAT	Y	Y	N	2	1	N	-	-	Y	N
62	36	2000	AGRI	21	L	1	5	4	5	x	x	O	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	DO	Y	G	-DO-	Y	Y	N	2	2	N	-	-	Y	N
50	37	2500	DO	25	L	5	9	4	1			O	Y	Y	N	Y	N	N	Y	DO	N	G	-DO-	N	N	Y	3	2	Y	5	D	Y	N
50	38	3000	DO	23	LM	4	6	2	5			O	Y	Y	Y	N	Y	Y	Y	DO	Y	GM	-DO-	Y	Y	Y	3	2	Y	2	D	Y	Y
35	39	3000	BUSINESS	22	LM	3	4	1	3			E	N	N	Y	Y	N	Y	N	-	N	-	-DO-	Y	N	Y	3	2	-Y	5	-	Y	NC
35	40	3514	SERVICE	18	LM	2	5	3	5			O	Y	N	Y	N	N	Y	N	HOME	N	G	-DO-	N	Y	Y	3	2	N	-	-	Y	N
35	41	4000	DO	29	CM	0	1	1	2			O	Y	Y	Y	N	N	Y	Y	DO	N	-	SHIAH	-	Y	Y	1	1	N	-	-	N	N
25	42	4000	DO	23	CM	0	0	0	0			O	Y	N	Y	Y	N	Y	Y	ALL	N	M	SUNNI	Y	Y	Y	2	1	N	-	D	Y	N
45	43	5000	AGRI	20	CM	2	2	0	5			O	Y	Y	N	Y	N	Y	N	-	N	-	JAMAAT-E-ISLAM	N	N	Y	-	-	N	-	-	N	N
30	44	4000	SERVICE	26	CM	1	3	2	5			E	Y	Y	N	Y	N	N	N	-	N	-	BARELVI	N	N	Y	4	4	N	-	-	N	N

25	45	15000	BUSINESS	23	CM	1	2	1	0			O	Y	Y	Y	N	Y	N	N	-	N	-	-DO-	N	N	N	1	1	N	-	-	N	N
25	46	17000	DO	21	CM	2	3	1	0			E	Y	N	Y	N	N	Y	N	-	N	-	-DO-	N	N	Y	2	2	N	-	-	N	N
25	47	2500	AGRI	20	LM	3	4	1	3			O	Y	Y	Y	N	N	N	N	-	N	G	-DO-	N	N	Y	1	1	N	-	-	N	N
40	48	4000	SERVICE	21	CM	2	4	2	5			O	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	N	N	HOME	Y	G	SUNNI	N	N	Y	2	2	N	-	-	Y	N
45	49	14000	DO	24	CM	4	6	2	4			O	Y	N	N	Y	N	N	Y	ALL	N	G	AHL-E-SUNNAT	N	N	Y	3	2	Y	6	D	Y	N
30	50	20000	BUSINESS	21	UM	3	4	1	3			E	N	Y	Y	N	N	Y	N	WRITTEN	Y	GM	JAMAAT-E-ISLAMI	N	Y	Y	2	1	Y	4	DR	Y	Y?
54	51	20000	DO	35	UM	1	2	1	3			E	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	N	N	-	N	R	SUNNI	N	N	Y	2	1	N	-	-	Y	Y
52	52	4000	AGRI	25	CM	4	7	3	5			O	Y	Y	N	Y	N	N	Y	ALL	N	G	AHL-E-SUNNAT	N	N	Y	3	2	Y	7	D	Y	N
25	53	4000	SERVICE	23	CM	1	2	1	0		x	O	Y	N	Y	Y	N	Y	Y	DO	N	-	SUNNI	N	N	Y	3	3	N	-	-	N	Y
35	54	14500	BUSINEESS	25	UM	2	2	0	2			E	Y	N	Y	N	Y	Y	Y	DO	Y	GM	-DO-	N	N	Y	1	1	Y	3	D	Y	Y
40	55	5000	SERVICE	30	CM	3	5	2	3			O	Y	N	Y	N	N	N	N	WRITTEN	Y	M	-DO-	N	N	Y	2	1	-Y	-5	-	Y	Y
55	56	7000	DO	28	CM	5	7	2	5			O	Y	N	Y	N	N	N	N	-	Y	G	-DO-	N	N	Y	2	2	N	-	-	N	N
40	57	16000	DO	30	UM	2	3	1	5			O	Y	N	Y	N	N	N	N	-	Y	G	-DO-	N	N	Y	2	1	N	-	-	N	Y
55	58	16000	BUSINESS	23	UM	3	5	2	5			O	Y	N	Y	N	N	N	N	-	N	G	-DO-	N	N	Y	2	2	N	-	-	N	N
35	59	10000	SERVICE	25	UM	1	3	2	3			O	N	N	Y	Y	N	N	Y	FILM	N	-	BARELVI	Y	Y	Y	2	1	N	-	-	N	N
40	60	12000	BUSINESS	21	UM	2	4	2	4			O	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	Y	N	-	N	-	SHIAH	N	Y	Y	2	2	Y	4	F	Y	N
67	61	20000	DO	20	UP	2	5	3	5		x	E	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	APPROPRIATE	N	-	BARELVI	N	N	Y	4	3	N	-	-	N	N
30	62	28000	AGRI	19	UP	2	2	0	3		x	E	N	Y	N	Y	Y	Y	N	-	N	-	AHL-E-HADITH	N	N	Y	4	2	N	-	-	N	N
30	63	30000	LAWYER	22	UP	2	2	0	0		x	x	E	N	Y	Y	Y	N	Y	HOME	N	-	SHIAH	-	N	Y	3	1	N	-	-	N	N
45	64	50000	AGRI	18	UP	4	7	3	0		x	x	E	N	Y	N	Y	Y	N	-	N	-	SUNNI	N	N	Y	4	0	N	-	-	N	N
35	65	35000	DO	21	UP	4	4	0	0		x	E	N	Y	N	Y	Y	Y	N	-	N	-	AHL-E-HADITH	N	N	Y	3	1	N	-	-	N	N

APPENDIX VI

URBAN FEMALE (UF)

Q#1				2	3		4											5				6			7	8	9				10		11			
ii	iii	iv	v	class	i	ii	MiF	MiiF	iiia	iiib	iiic	iv	va	vi	vii	viii	ix	i	ii	iii	iv	6i	6ii	6iii	6iv	i/ii	i	iA	i	ii	iii	I	i-	Ic	i	
19	X	LABOUR	1500	L	18	X	-	-	2	2	X	Y	X	Y	Y	X	Y	Y	3	Y	Y	Y	Y	ALL	Y	G	AHL-E-SUNNAT	Y	4	X	X	X	Y	D	Y	Y
58	X	HOUSEHOLD	2000	L	15	X	3	-	2	2	X	Y	X	X	X	X	Y	Y	2	Y	Y	X	Y	ALL ELECTRONICS	Y	GM	SUNNI	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X
50	X	LABOUR	1200	L	15	Y	2	3	2	2	X	Y	Y	X	X	Y	Y	Y	5	LATE	LATE	Y	X	HOUSE	X	R	SUNNI	X	X	Y	X	X	X	X	X	X
30	X	ALLMESTIC	1500	L	19	Y	1	3	2	2	X	Y	X	X	X	Y	X	Y	5	Y	Y	Y	Y	RADIO	Y	R	SUNNI	X	X	X	X	X	Y	F	Y	Y
35	F.SC	ALLMESTIC	2000	LX	23	Y	1	2	2	2	X	Y	X	X	X	Y	X	Y	4	Y	Y	Y	Y	RADIO	X	-	SUNNI	Y	3	X	Y	X	Y	D	Y	X
32	MD	ALLMESTIC	5000	LM	25	X	1	2	AFFORD		X	Y	X	X	X	Y	X	Y	4	Y	X	X	Y	RADIO	Y	GMR	SUNNI	Y	3	Y	X	X	Y	F	Y	Y
23	X	LABOUR	1500	LX	16	Y	1	3	2	2	X	Y	X	Y	Y	X	Y	Y	3	Y	Y	Y	Y	ALL	Y	TV	BRALVI	X	4	Y	Y	X	Y	D	Y	Y
27	FA	GOVT.SERVANT	2500	LM	22	X	1	-	1	1	X	Y	X	X	X	Y	X	Y	3	Y	Y	Y	Y	ALL	Y	G	BRALVI	Y	1	X	X	X	Y	D	Y	Y
37	BA	TEACHING	6000	LM	28	X	2	-	1	1	X	Y	X	X	X	Y	X	Y	3	Y	Y	X	Y	HOSIPTAL	Y	M	AHL-E-SUNNAT	Y	2	Y	Y	Y	Y	DF	X	Y
58	FA	SERVICE	3000	LM	21	X	2	-	1	1	Y	Y	Y	X	Y	Y	X	Y	5	Y	X	X	Y	ACCORDING TO ISLAM	X	-	JAMAT-E-ISLAM	X	X	X	X	Y	Y	DFM	Y	X
17	X	HOUSEHOLD	3500	LM	16	Y	-	-	1	1	Y	Y	X	X	X	Y	X	Y	5	X	X	X	Y	ACCORDING TO ISLAM	Y	GMR	JAMAT-E-ISLAM	Y	X	Y	Y	X	X	X	X	X
25	X	HOUSEHOLD	3000	LM	25	X	-	-	2	2	X	Y	X	X	X	X	Y	Y	3	Y	X	X	X	HOUSE	X	-	JAMAT-E-ISLAM	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X
29	X	HOUSEHOLD	10000	CM	22	X	1	2	1	1	X	Y	X	Y	X	Y	X	Y	4	Y	X	Y	Y	RADIO	X	X	SUNNI/ HANFI	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	Y	X
45	MA	HOUSE HOLD	14000	CM	24	X	2	1	1	1	X	Y	X	X	X	Y	X	Y	4	Y	Y	X	Y	CENTERS	Y	R	SUNNI/ HANFI	Y	2	X	X	X	Y	M	Y	?
37	MBBS	ALLCTOR	10000	CM	25	Y	X	4	3	2	Y	X	Y	X	X	Y	X	Y	4	Y	Y	Y	X	NEWSPAPER	Y	M	X	Y	2	X	X	X	Y	D	Y	X
25	MBBS	HOUSEJOB	-	CM	24	X	X	1	3	1	Y	Y	Y	X	Y	X	Y	Y	5	Y	Y	Y	Y	BROUCHERS	Y	GMR	JAMAT-E-ISLAM	Y	2	X	X	X	Y	DFM	Y	Y
35	MA	TEACHING	2500	LM	28	X	2	1	2	1	X	Y	X	X	X	X	Y	X	4	Y	Y	Y	Y	SUITABLE	Y	M	SUNNI/ HANFI	Y	3	Y	X	X	Y	D	Y	-

APPENDIX VII

RURAL FEMALE (RF)

1				2	3	4											5				6			7	8	9			10			11				
ii	iii	iv	v		i	ii	i	i	ii	ii	iii	ii	ii	iv	v	vi	vii	viii	i	ii	iii	iv	i	ii	iii	iv	i/ii	i	ii	iii	i	ii	ic	i		
23	MD	H.WIFE	2000	L	22	X	X	X	1	1	Y	Y	Y	X	X	Y	X	Y	2	Y	Y	Y	X	ISLAMIC	G	Y	SHIA	X	X	Y	X	Y	X	X	X	X
22	FA	-DO-	2000	L	20	X	X	1	1	1	Y	Y	X	X	X	Y	X	Y	5	Y	Y	Y	Y	.DO.	G	Y	SUNNI	Y	1	Y	Y	X	Y	D	Y	Y
32	MD	.DO-	2000	L	18	X	2	2	1	1	X	Y	X	X	X	Y	X	Y	5	Y	Y	Y	Y	.DO.	D	Y	-DO-	Y	1	Y	Y	X	Y	D	Y	Y
28	X	.DO-	2000	L	16	X	3	2	2	2	Y	Y	X	X	X	Y	Y	X	-	Y	Y	Y	X	-	X	X	-DO-	X	X	X	X	-	-	-	-	-
30	X	.DO-	2000	L	15	X	2	2	-	-	X	X	X	X	X	Y	X	X	-	Y	X	X	X	-	X	X	-DO-	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X
33	X	.DO-	2800	L	15	X	1	3	2	2	Y	X	X	X	X	Y	Y	X	½	Y	Y	Y	X	HOUSE	X	X	SHIA	X	X	Y	X	Y	X	X	X	X
16	X	.DO-	2000	L	12	X	2	0	1	2	X	Y	X	X	-	Y	-	Y	-	Y	-	X	Y	-	-	-	SUNNI	X	X	X	X	Y	X	X	X	X
45	X	.DO-	2000	L	12	X	1	2	2	2	X	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	X	Y	Y	X	X	HOUSE	X	X	-DO-	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X
25	X	.DO-	2000	L	15	X	1	4	2	2	X	Y	Y	X	Y	Y	Y	X	X	X	X	XX	-	X	X	-DO-	X	5	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X
36	X	.DO-	1500	L	20	Y	5	0	1	3	X	Y	X	Y	Y	Y	XY	X	5	Y	Y	Y	Y	TV	X	X	AHL-E-SUNNAT	Y	5	Y	X	X	Y	X	Y	Y
19	X	.DO-	1000	L	18	Y	X	X	1	1	X	Y	X	Y	Y	X	X	Y	5	Y	Y	Y	Y	TV	X	X	JAMAT-E- ISLAMI	Y	3	X	X	X	X	D	Y	Y
35	P	.DO-	2000	L	20	X	3	3	1	3	X	Y	X	X	X	Y	X	Y	X	X	X	X	X	MARRIED HOME	X	X	AHL-E-SUNNAT	X	X	X	X	X	X	M	Y	X
18	X	.DO-	2000	L	16	X	1	1	1	2	X	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	2	Y	Y	Y	Y	TV	X	X	SUNNI	X	X	Y	X	X	X	X	X	X

GLOSSARY

<i>A.H.</i>	<i>Al-Hijra</i> [Arabic]): Used for the Islamic year which dates from the migration (<i>Hijra</i>) of the Prophet of Islam from Makkah to Medina in 622 A.D.
<i>Ahadith</i>	Plural of <i>Hadith</i> i.e., sayings of the Prophet (PBUH)
<i>Ahlihadith</i>	A sect of Muslims which adheres to only the <i>Quran</i> and the <i>Sunnah</i> and rejects the <i>fiqh</i>
<i>Al-Azhr</i>	Muslim university in Egypt
<i>Al-azl/Azl</i>	Coitus Interruptus
<i>Al-Masalih-al-mursain</i>	Public welfare
<i>Al-walad-al-sou</i>	Delinquent children
<i>Ameer-e-Jamat</i>	Head of an organization
<i>Arkan-e-Islam</i>	Basic tenets of Islam
<i>Aslaf</i>	The pious companions and family of the Prophet (PBUH)
<i>Athna Ashari</i>	A sect of the <i>Shiah</i> community which follows the twelve imams)
<i>Dar-ul-Uloom</i>	A religious institution of traditional Muslims
<i>Dhoks</i>	Small rural settlements
<i>Dinar</i>	A coin
<i>Facad-Al-Zaman</i>	Bad times

<i>Fatwa(s)/Fatawa</i>	Sentence delivered by a Muslim judge (Qazi)
<i>Fiqh</i>	Jurisprudence
<i>Faraiz</i>	Religious duties
<i>Hadith</i>	Saying of Prophet (PBUH)
<i>Haj</i>	Pilgrimage
<i>Ijma</i>	Consensus of <i>ulema</i>
<i>Ijtehad</i>	Individual interpretation
<i>Imam</i>	Spiritual or religious leader of Muslims
<i>Imamat</i>	An institution of divinely guided spiritual leader
<i>Imami/Jafari</i>	A follower of Imam Jafar
<i>Istihsan</i>	Juristic preference
<i>Istishab</i>	The rule of concomitance
<i>Jamat-e-Islami</i>	Islamic organization; a political party established by Maulana Maududi in 1941
<i>Jihad</i>	Religious war
<i>Jumhour</i>	Majority
<i>Juma</i>	Weekly gathering of Muslims on Friday
<i>Karaha Tan-Ziheyya</i>	Being less than impeccable
<i>Khutba</i>	Oration of <i>Juma</i>
<i>Kurram Agency</i>	One of the tribal areas in Pakistan controlled by an official political agent
<i>Mazahab</i>	Religions
<i>Madrasa</i>	Religions Seminary
<i>Markazi</i>	Central
<i>Mehdi</i>	Led to the right direction; awaited <i>Imam</i> of the Muslims

<i>Mufti</i>	An expounder of Islamic law
<i>Mujtahid</i>	Those who derive laws through <i>Ijtihad</i>
<i>Muqallids</i>	Followers of classical jurist
<i>Muqoi</i>	Religious leader of <i>Ismailis</i>
<i>Naqshbandia</i>	A mystic school following Khawaja Baha-ud-Din Naqshbandi
<i>Pirs</i>	Spiritual leaders
<i>Pushtoon(s)</i>	A Pushto-speaking person
<i>Qadiriah</i>	A mystic school, following Shaikh Abdul Qadir Jilani
<i>Qayas</i>	Analogy
<i>Salat</i>	Prayer
<i>Saum</i>	Fasting
<i>Shariat/Shariah</i>	Principles of religion: Revealed law
<i>Sufi(s)</i>	Mystics of Islam
<i>Sunnah/Sunnat</i>	Traditions of the Holy Prophet Muhammad (PBUH)
<i>Taqleed</i>	Imitation of any classical jurist
<i>Tauheed</i>	Oneness of God
<i>Turis</i>	A <i>Pushtoon</i> tribe in <i>Kurram</i> agency
<i>Ulema(s)</i>	Religious scholars
<i>Ummah/Ummat</i>	Followers of Prophet Muhammad (PBUH)
<i>Usf</i>	Prevailing customs
<i>Yukary</i>	Disliked
<i>Zabt-e-waladat</i>	Birth control
<i>Zaidi(s)</i>	A follower of Imam Zaid
<i>Zikri</i>	A sect in Baluchistan

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