

**THE DAWN OF NEW ERA IN KHYBER
PAKHTUNKHWA: ABDUL QAIYUM KHAN
CHIEF MINISTERSHIP
1947-53**

SYED MINHAJ UL HASSAN



**NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF HISTORICAL AND CULTURAL RESEARCH
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**THE DAWN OF NEW ERA IN KHYBER
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Dedicated to

My Parents, Wife and Children

Aitezaz, Sania, and Ahmad

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS USED IN ENDNOTES

FGGEO:	N-W.F.P. Governor-General Extra Ordinary
GOPG:	Government of Pakistan Gazette
LAD:	N-W.F.P. Legislative Assembly Debates, Peshawar
NA:	National Archives Islamabad
NDC:	National Documentation Centre, Islamabad
PA:	North-West Frontier Province Archives, Peshawar
PAGG:	N-W.F.P. Archives, Government Gazette
PGG:	N-W.F.P. Government Gazette
PGGED:	N-W.F.P. Government Gazette, Extra Ordinary

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heartfelt gratitude to my family members, especially my children, Aitezaz, Sania, Ahmad, and my wife for their support, patience, and perseverance. Without them and their encouragement, this work would not have seen the light of day.

PREFACE

The immediate period of the post-partition Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, formerly known as N-WFP, is of paramount importance in being the only province which had the government of the Khudai Khidmatgar, an ally of the All-India National Congress. Its history, nonetheless, revolves around the pre-partition era or the termination of the British Period there—an evasion of sorts that lures students of the history of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa.

Quaid-e-Azam Muhammad Ali Jinnah, the then Governor General of Pakistan, using his constitutional powers vested in him by the Interim Constitution of Pakistan, dismissed the government of the Congress Chief Minister, Dr. Khan Sahib, and appointed the Muslim League Chief Minister, Khan Abdul Qaiyum Khan. The latter did not have majority in the assembly. Many believe that this action set an undemocratic trend in the formative phase of Pakistan, which, some argue, continued in the years to come.

Qaiyum Khan started his political career in the All-India National Congress and later joined All-India Muslim League. He was a person of strong political convictions and as a member of Congress, vociferously advocated the rights of Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa. The actions he took as the Chief Minister of the province show that he continued to cherish the pro-Khyber Pakhtunkhwa views. He ruled the province with an iron hand and believed that his ends justified his means. He has been severely criticized for the treatment of his political opponents whether they were from Muslim League or any other party. On the other hand, Qaiyum Khan has also been generously praised for the infrastructural and socio-economic development that Khyber Pakhtunkhwa witnessed during his term as the Chief Minister.

Writing about the Qaiyum Khan era was indeed very challenging. Qaiyum Khan's admirers and opponents blur the thin line between the person and the administrator. I have tried to be objective without leaning over to either side of the divide. How far I have succeeded is for the critics and students of history to determine. The fact is that Qaiyum Khan left an indelible mark on the history of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa—something that is of immense importance to students of history.

Prof. Syed Minhaj ul Hassan, PhD
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March 16, 2015

FORWARD

ABDUL QAIYUM KHAN (1901-1981) was a controversial politician in the Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa Province (formerly called the North-West Frontier Province) of Pakistan. Khan Qaiyum or Qaiyum Khan, as he was known in the province, lived a binary political life. On both sides of the fence, he always stood larger than life. While his political opponents loved to loath and label him as the 'butcher of Babarah,' thousands of his followers showered him with all sorts of praises for his contributions to the Pakistan movement.

In popular political parlance, Qaiyum Khan was synonymous with political intrigues. Known for his lust for political and administrative powers that served him well against his opponents, he was the St. Patrick of provincial police and state centralism. He could be rightly called anything but dishonest or corrupt. Even his harshest critics, and some quite magnanimously, recognized him for his greatest achievement, giving his province an institution of higher education, the University of Peshawar.

Writing on the life of a political figure like Abdul Qaiyum Khan is like stirring history' hornets' nests both in streets and schools across the Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa Province. Most writers unwittingly betrayed his litmus test for being either with him or against him, which, in simple words, means love him or hate him.

Syed Minhaj ul Hassan will disappoint many lovers and haters of Abdul Qaiyum Khan. When signing on his research project for doctoral dissertation, Dr. Hassan knew full well the pitfalls in his search for sources to reconstruct the political life of Qaiyum Khan. While readers can judge for themselves, I would like to remind them to remain open-minded and non-partisan, the two hallmarks that characterize this book.

I am glad that Dr. Hassan has rejected the extremists' view on both sides: for and against the subject. His meticulous research and the quest for fairness amid a myriad of accounts have produced a balanced view of Abdul Qaiyum Khan.

Like any valuable research product, the book is based on both published and unpublished archival sources in English, Urdu and Pashto languages. The book also has invaluable interviews of several political leaders and socioeconomic experts whose views counterbalance the narrative on both sides of the fence.

I hope and pray that another researcher will continue on the research journey of Dr. Syed Minhaj ul Hassan, and complete the remainder life story of Abdul Qaiyum Khan from 1953 to 1981.

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INTRODUCTION

14 August 1947 was the dawn of a new era for the Muslims of India as they successfully culminated their struggle in the form of creation of Pakistan. North-West Frontier Province (NWFP)¹ played a major role in the struggle for freedom against the British Imperialism. Thus with the creation of Pakistan a new era also started for the people of NWFP. At the time of creation of Pakistan NWFP was ruled by Chief Minister Dr. Khan Sahib, who was an ally of All-India National Congress. However, within fortnight the founder of the nation, Quaid-i-Azam Muhammad Ali Jinnah dismissed Dr. Khan Sahib Government and installed a Muslim League Government led by Abdul Qaiyum Khan.

Born in 1901, Khan Abdul Qaiyum Khan started his political career in 1919 as a member of the Khilafat Committee during the height of the Khilafat Movement. In 1921, he joined the All-India National Congress (AINC) and stayed with it till 1945. From 1935 through 1945, he worked as Deputy Leader of the party in the All-India Legislative Assembly. In 1945 he changed his loyalties, and joined the All-India Muslim League (AIML), which was struggling for the creation of a separate Muslim homeland, Pakistan.

Qaiyum Khan's joining of the Muslim League gave a political boost to the party in India in general and in the NWFP in particular. He was the highest-ranking member of the Congress party to have joined the Muslim League then. He was an

¹ After the 2008 general elections all political parties of Pakistan were feeling the necessity of making amendments to the 1973 Constitution in order to bring it closer to the original 1973 Constitution. For this purpose, an All Parties Special Committee of Parliament was formed in consultation with the Parliamentary Leaders of all Parties in the Parliament. Many amendments including provincial autonomy and renaming of NWFP as Pakhtunkhwa were threadbare discussed. Though the representatives of all political parties agreed on many amendments without much difference, a deadlock occurred over the issue of Pakhtunkhwa between Awami National Party (ANP) and Muslim League (N). Since ANP this time was a major coalition partner and President Zardari was strongly supporting them on the question of Pakhtunkhwa, the deadlock threatened the whole process of constitutional amendments, which Muslim League (N) so eagerly wanted. This ultimately led Muslim League (N) to agree to a revised version of Pakhtunkhwa. ANP after some reluctance agreed to the revised name and thus the word Khyber was prefixed with Pakhtunkhwa making it Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa. As a result the Committee was able to prepare a unanimous draft, which was later presented in the Parliament as 18th Amendment Bill, 2010. On April 19, 2010 the 18th Amendment Bill came into effect and not only the goal of provincial autonomy was achieved but also NWFP was renamed as Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa.

intelligent and shrewd politician, and an energetic and powerful orator. This is why he became popular among the Muslim League circles right from the beginning. He played a key role in the 'Civil-Disobedience Movement' of the Frontier Muslim League in February 1947, which it launched against Dr. Khan Sahib's Congress Ministry. He was in the forefront in the campaign for Pakistan, when referendum was announced for the NWFP. Being an active and important member of the Muslim League, Qaiyum Khan was appointed the Chief Minister of NWFP after the creation of Pakistan; the Interim Constitution of the country was amended for the appointment. The idea was to install the Muslim League governments in all the provinces of Pakistan including the NWFP. The leadership of the Muslim League wanted this change prior to the independence, but the British authorities refused at the pretext of illegality and undemocratic action.

Qaiyum Khan's elevation to power resulted in the division of Frontier Muslim League; he was a new entrant in the League and the old guards of the party, who doubted his sincerity, were not ready to accept him as their leader. They believed that he had joined the League for the realization of his personal ambitious goals and that he joined the League only because he was denied the Congress Party ticket for the 1946 elections. These members of the League claimed that he was a self-serving, unreliable politician. The Muslim League High Command was eager to accept him in its fold as he was a front-ranking Congress leader whose desertion was considered good propaganda tool for the League.

The old guards of the Frontier Muslim League, who had given sacrifices in the achievement of Pakistan, felt hurt when he was elevated to the post of Chief Minister at their expense. The *Pir* of Manki Sharif and Ghulam Mohammad Khan Lundkhwar group had wired telegrams to Quaid-i-Azam Mohammad Ali Jinnah and Liaquat Ali Khan expressing their concerns and apprehensions about the appointment of Qaiyum Khan as Chief Minister of the province. The *Pir* was reconciled to Qaiyum Khan later though he was infuriated with the 'autocratic' policies of Qaiyum Khan in the end, and revolted against them. This ultimately resulted in the formation of the first opposition party by an old Muslim Leaguer in Pakistan, the Jinnah Awami Muslim League. The *Pir* who had played a crucial role in the 1947 referendum in the province and in the achievement of Pakistan, carried a large following. He was thus able to attract a significant number of leaders and workers. However, Qaiyum Khan, who had gained in strength and stature by then, did not allow him or any other group to work against his Ministry.

Though the *Pir* left the League and formed his own political party to fight Qaiyum Khan's autocratic policies, there were still others, led by Yusuf Khattak and Ibrahim Khan Jhagra who opted to stay in the party and fight from within. This provided a platform to the dissidents to express their disagreement and disapproval of his policies. However, once again, Qaiyum Khan reacted to their opposition strongly and used every tactic to crush their voice.

One party that played a very active and important role in opposing Qaiyum Khan was the *Khudai Khidmatgars*, also known as Red Shirts (due to the colour of their uniform which was dark chocolate). After becoming the Chief Minister, Qaiyum Khan particularly targeted the leadership and workers of *Khudai Khidmatgars*. Throughout his tenure, most of the front rank leaders of the party, including Khan Abdul Ghaffar Khan (who was one of the main targets), remained behind bars. To justify his persecution of the party, Qaiyum Khan effectively used the 'threat' of the so-called '*Pakhtunistan*' movement.

The *Pakhtunistan* issue was always highlighted by Qaiyum Khan to prove the disloyalty of the party in general and the Khan brothers (including Dr. Khan Sahib) in particular. He insisted that the pro-*Pakhtunistan* movement elements wanted to dismember the state of Pakistan and were thus disloyal to the country. This, however, was not true as some facts disproved Qaiyum Khan's claim. For example, after the creation of Pakistan, the *Khudai Khidmatgars* and all its affiliated organizations passed a resolution declaring Pakistan as their own state and pledging loyalty to it. Further, during the Pakistan Constituent Assembly session in early 1948, Khan Abdul Ghaffar Khan not only participated, but also took oath of allegiance to the state.

The *Khudai Khidmatgars* movement showed a shift in its stand on the issue of *Pakhtunistan* after partition: instead of an independent *Pakhtunistan* state, the *Khudai Khidmatgars* were now demanding an 'autonomous' unit, *Pakhtunistan*, within Pakistan. Qaiyum Khan, however, never accepted this. Instead, he made sure to project this stand of the *Khudai Khidmatgars* as anti-state/anti-Pakistan.

Some people believe that Qaiyum Khan had played an active role in the mass migration of non-Muslims from the NWFP. His interest in the migration of these people was due to their political affiliations, since almost all of them were pro-Congress (*Khudai Khidmatgars*' ally) which made him feel insecure in their presence. In order to strengthen himself politically, he ensured that all such people migrated to India. This led to an impasse in the financial activities of the province as majority of those people were working in banks and commercial enterprises. Thus, Qaiyum Khan's bid to strengthen his political standing led to the economic instability of the province: initially, the NWFP faced a lot of problems in business and commercial sphere of activities.

In his efforts to silence all kinds of opposition, Qaiyum Khan also tried to gag the press and judiciary in the province. He introduced different laws to curb the criticism of the press and, in some cases even banned the circulation of certain papers in the province. He was particularly critical of the Punjab press, which mostly published the point of view of the opposition or published news which were not to his liking and approval. He also felt threatened from the judiciary. He, therefore, tried to restrain them as well. He asked the Provincial Assembly to pass

an Act empowering him to take any file from the courts and keep it with himself for as long as he wished. Though the Assembly passed the bill, the central government intervened and stopped it from becoming a law.

Qaiyum Khan also meddled in the foreign policy of Pakistan. He played an active role in the Kashmir policy and War. It is believed that his Kashmir policy had two aspects: one, emotional, and, the other, political. Emotionally, he was attached with Kashmir because he was a Kashmiri by descent. Politically, he thought he would rule Kashmir once it was liberated. So when the Kashmir War started, he openly supported the war effort. He encouraged the tribesmen to wage *jihad* against the Indian forces in Kashmir and provided them with all sorts of help including ammunition, weapons, transport and monetary help.

Although politically Qaiyum Khan's role in the provincial affairs was very controversial, as an administrator, he received universal acclaim. Though he faced quite a few problems, the province prospered in all walks of life during his rule. The major difficulty he faced was the scarcity of food in the province, but, he tried his best to overcome the crisis. When we look at the different reforms most of which were for the welfare of the middle and lower middle class (to which he himself belonged), it seems that there was a conscious effort to realize all that he had envisioned in his book, *Gold and Guns on the Pathan Frontier* (1945). For example, he introduced many reforms in the agriculture sector to change the life of the peasants for better. The promulgation of the NWFP Tenancy Act of 1950 was one of his very important steps, which enabled many occupancy tenants to become owners of their lands. Though some people argue that it hardly brought any revolutionary change in the lives of the peasants, many were convinced that it worked for the betterment of the peasants' lives.

Besides the introduction of reforms in agriculture, he also launched many irrigation projects in the province in order to develop the performance of the agriculture sector. These projects helped in the availability of irrigational water to the parched lands turning them into green agricultural tracts. This not only improved the lot of the peasants but also increased the food production in the province. Equally important was Qaiyum Khan's effort to lessen the scarcity of drinking water in the province, particularly in the southern districts of the Frontier, where most of the people did not have access to potable water. He directed the Public Health Department to provide clean drinking water to the people of the province. This is why, in addition to utilizing spring water, the Department dug out many tube-wells during his tenure as Chief Minister.

Qaiyum Khan also tried to abolish the *jagirdari* system in the province by confiscating different kinds of *jagirs*. He made changes in the legal system regarding land transfers and hereditary claims. However, one of the great achievements of his government was the extraordinary development in the

production of electricity, which increased many folds, and making it available to the people on cheap rates. In fact, the NWFP was producing more electricity than it needed as compared to the Punjab which was facing a shortage of it. The result was that the province started supplying electricity to the Punjab so as to help it overcome the power shortage. During his rule, Qaiyum Khan also planned the construction of the Warsak Dam, which is still operative and productive, and continues to generate electricity and provide water to many agricultural lands of the province.

Qaiyum Khan also improved the provision of health facilities in the province. He not only constructed new hospitals, dispensaries and basic health units, but also provided medicines and appointed qualified staff to take care of the patients. He increased the government spending on the health sector and worked for the eradication of epidemics in the province. The introduction of mobile dispensaries in order to extend health facilities to the remotest corners of the province was yet another important action. He provided scholarships to the medical students so that greater number of highly qualified doctors could be made available to the hospitals and the masses in the province.

The wide spread of education in the province, in general, and the establishment of the University of Peshawar in particular, is yet another achievement – perhaps the greatest. The establishment of the University was the dream of many leaders of the Frontier Province. However, the credit goes to Qaiyum Khan who materialized it in spite of many odds. He took keen interest not only in the establishment of the University but also in its subsequent growth and development. It was due to his deep involvement in the University affairs that the University achieved many landmarks in a very short period of time. Besides the University, he also established many schools and colleges throughout the province. Women education had always been one of the main problems of the NWFP. For example, there wasn't a single women college in the entire province until partition. Qaiyum Khan, in addition to many girls' schools, opened two women colleges in the province. He also introduced uniform dress in the schools to eliminate class distinctions among the students. During his time, tuition fees was also abolished up to eighth class. He had plans to waive it all-together upto class ten. He introduced school health care in the educational institutions to take care of the students' health. Then even a proposal was under consideration for the introduction of a light lunch in the schools for the students. He was also well aware of the importance of teachers in the imparting of education. In order to attract best talent for teaching, he enhanced the pay of the teachers in the province.

Another landmark achievement of his government was the introduction of Government Transport Service (GTS) in the province. The idea behind this project was to provide speedy, efficient, and affordable transport service to the common people. The GTS played a major role, for a long time, in the transport sector of the

province. For decades it was the first choice of many people to travel. Further, the service was also provided on very unattractive routes so that the poor people could avail the facility.

Indeed, Qaiyum Khan had a vision about the development of the province. He had realized that, without industrial development, the province would not be able to achieve the required progress. In order to attract the recalcitrant industrialists, he announced and provided many incentives to them. Whenever a project was proposed to him he helped process all the formalities for the establishment of the industry. He provided suitable lands and cheap electricity to the industrialists. Due to his keen interest, many industries were established in the province in a short period. Most important were the Mardan Sugar Mills, Haripur Telephone Factories, Akora Khattak Tobacco plant, etc.

To provide shelter to orphans and to run the system more efficiently, Qaiyum Khan established orphanages in the province and took them under the government custody. He also provided permanent financial support to the *khatibs* and *imams* of the mosques by recruiting them into the government service, and by establishing a separate department of the *auqaf* in order to administer the religious institutions as well as the *khatibs* and *imams*. Since he was keen on developmental activities, for which he needed sound financial support and the province did not have enough finances, Qaiyum Khan also took unpopular step of introducing some taxes in the province.

Qaiyum Khan also wanted to extend the government of NWFP's jurisdictions over other areas adjacent to the province. So, he encouraged the people in the princely states of Dir, Swat, Chitral and Amb to demand the merger of these states into the NWFP. For this purpose, he encouraged the establishment of States Muslim League Party, which held news conferences every now and then and put forward demands for the merger. However, since these states were the subject of the Federal Government, Qaiyum Khan's efforts to annex these states did not succeed as the Federal government did not encourage it at that time. However, some areas of the Amb state were amalgamated in the province. Qaiyum Khan had a similar plan for the tribal areas, but there too, he failed in the merger of major tribal areas. He only succeeded in the amalgamation of Black mountains and Gadoon territories.

Qaiyum Khan enjoyed absolute power over the province during his term of around six years, which made him more ambitious. It is believed that towards the end of his chief ministership he was even striving to become the Prime Minister of Pakistan. In this regard, he established and increased contacts with the politicians of East Bengal. He not only supported the 2nd draft of the Constitutional proposals to the displeasure of the Punjab politicians, who were strongly opposing it, but also invited the Bengali politicians to visit his province. During their visit, they were

given generous hospitality and were welcomed warmly everywhere. Such activities were not in the interest of the centralist politicians, who wanted a strong center. Besides, Qaiyum Khan also picked up controversies with the Punjab on the issue of providing electricity to the latter. So, when in April 1953, Governor-General Ghulam Mohammad dismissed Khwaja Nazimuddin's government and appointed Chaudhri Mohammad Ali as the new Prime Minister of Pakistan, Qaiyum Khan was also inducted in the federal cabinet, much against his wishes. Indeed, he tried his utmost to avoid going to the center, but he was not given any option. In fact, according to some of his close colleagues, he was plainly told either to accept ministry or face dismissal and imprisonment. He preferred the former obviously.

Thus, when one looks at this period closely, he realizes the important role of Qaiyum Khan in the history and politics of NWFP. Though his political role is very controversial, his contribution in the progress of the province in other sectors is unchallengeable. One can find many sources in history, which point to his autocratic nature, but, at the same time, appreciate the positive role he played in the development of the province.

LITERATURE REVIEW

The history of Pakhtuns and the NWFP has always fascinated and attracted historians. However, majority of them have concentrated on the pre-Pakistan period. There are volumes of works available on that period, particularly the period covering the British era. The history of Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa, after the creation of Pakistan, has remained obscure and neglected, in spite of the fact that it was the only province after the establishment of the country where a non-Muslim League government was in power. This led the author to choose a post 1947 period of NWFP for PhD dissertation.

During my research, I found material in three main languages, i.e. Pashto, Urdu and English. Some of the Pashto sources were in poetry as well, but, in general, I could not find much published work on the period under discussion. As for sources in Urdu and English, they have usually discussed the removal of Dr. Khan Sahib's ministry, but that too very briefly. There are some passing references to Dr. Khan Sahib's ministry in some works but they are not in detail. The overall political situation of NWFP of this period has not attracted the attention of many scholars. The books and other materials available are scarce and inadequate in analysis. As far as the socio-economic progress of the province during this period is concerned, there is hardly any significant work. One M.Phil student, Khalid Khan, in his thesis "Politics and Government in North-West Frontier Province (1947-53)" submitted to the National Institute of Pakistan Studies, Quaid-i-Azam University, Islamabad in 1998, has made some brief references, but has not given a detailed account. Therefore, I believe there was sufficient room for improvement and elaborate

analysis. Another student, Waheed Akhtar Khattak has worked on "Khan Abdul Qaiyum Khan: Life and Works", during his Master's thesis and submitted to Pakistan Study Centre, University of Peshawar, in the session of 1987-89. Since Khattak's topic covered an extensive period, he could not concentrate on the period I have covered in my work. A Ph.D. scholar, Fakhr ul Islam, has worked on "Political Developments in NWFP since 1947" submitted to Area Study Centre, University of Peshawar in 1998; this work however, does not concentrate on Qaiyum Khan's government rather covers longer period even beyond Qaiyum Khan era.

Besides the unpublished works, there are some books that have very summarily discussed the events in the NWFP. At best, some of these works have discussed the making of Pakistan and removal of Dr. Khan Sahib ministry but have not taken into account later developments in the province. These include Erland Janson's, *India, Pakistan or Pakhtunistan: The Nationalist Movements in North-West Frontier Province* (Stockholm: Almqvist of Wiksell International, 1981); Stephen Rittenberg's, *Ethnicity, Nationalism, and the Pakhtuns: The Independence Movement in India's North-West Frontier Province*, (Durham, North Carolina: Carolina Academic Press, 1988); and Sayed Waqar Ali Shah's, *Ethnicity, Islam and Nationalism: Muslim Politics in the North-West Frontier Province, 1937-47* (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 1999).

Khan Abdul Wali Khan gives a more detailed account covering pre and post-Pakistan era in his book, *Bacha Khan au Khudai Khidmatgari, vol. i & ii* (Pashto) (Charsadda: Wali Bagh, 1994), but since it is written by a politician and not a professional historian and scholar, and, above all, an avowed opponent of Qaiyum Khan, it tends to be subjective in analysis. Furthermore, books on Khan Abdul Ghaffar Khan, like D.G.Tendulkar's, *Abdul Ghaffar Khan: Faith is a Battle* (New Delhi: Gandhi Peace Foundation, 1967); M.S.Korejo, *The Frontier Gandhi: His Place in History* (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 1994); and, more importantly, his own autobiography, *Zama Zhwand au Jadojehd* (Pashto) (Kabul: Daulat Matba, 1362 A.H.) also provides lot of material on Qaiyum Khan's relations with the *Khudai Khidmatgars*, in particular, and with the politicians, in general, in the province. But then, these too, can be doubted for objectivity and a sense of detachment.

Books written on the history of Pakistan generally give a cursory mention of the developments in NWFP. Most of these books have discussed the removal of Dr. Khan Sahib and the installation of Qaiyum Khan as the Chief Minister of NWFP. However, they have not given in detail the circumstances under which Dr. Khan was removed and Qaiyum Khan was appointed. In this category, we can include the works of M. Rafique Afzal, *Political Parties in Pakistan, 1947-1958* (Islamabad: National Commission on Historical and Cultural Research, 1976); Syed Nur Ahmad, *From Martial Law to Martial Law: Politics in the Punjab, 1919-1958* (Lahore: Vanguard Books Ltd., 1985); K.K.Aziz, *Party Politics in Pakistan*,

1947-1958 (Islamabad: National Commission on Historical and Cultural Research, 1976); Keith Callard, *Pakistan: A Political Study* (London: George Allen and Unwin Ltd., 1968); Zulfiqar Khalid Maluka, *The Myth of Constitutionalism in Pakistan* (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 1995); Ian Talbot, *Provincial Politics and the Pakistan Movement: The Growth of the Muslim League in North-West and North-East India, 1937-47* (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 1988); Allen McGrath, *The Destruction of Pakistan's Democracy*, (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 1996); and Yunus Samad, *A Nation in Turmoil: Nationalism and Ethnicity in Pakistan, 1937-1958* (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 1995).

Some of the books, which focus more on the political situation of NWFP, also have the same problem, that is, too brief an account and too little in analysis. We can mention in this regard works like Riaz Batalvi's, *Leedaran-i-Karam* (Urdu), (Lahore: Al-Tahreer, 1970); Safdar Mahmood's, *Pakistan: Muslim League Ka Daur-i-Hakoomat (1947-1954)* (Urdu), (Lahore: Sang-e-Meel Publications, 1986); Munir Ahmad Munir's, *Siyasee Uthaar Charao* (Urdu), (Lahore: Aatish Fashan Publications, 1989); Kausar Niazi's, *Jinhain Main Ne Daikha* (Urdu), (Lahore: Jang Publishers, 1991); Mushtaq Ahmad's, *Government and Politics in Pakistan* (Karachi: Pakistan Publishing House, 1959); Syed Mujawar Hussain Shah's, *Sardar Abdur Rab Nishtar: A Political Biography* (Lahore: Qadiriya Books, 1985); Hamid Yunus's, *Pakistan in Search of Democracy, 1947-77* (Lahore: Afrasia Publications, 1980); and Lawrence Ziring's, *Pakistan in the Twentieth Century: A Political History* (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 1997). However, there are two other books that give more details on the political developments in NWFP. They are Zahid Chaudhri's, *Pakistan Ki Siyasi Taarikh: vol. viii, Afghanistan Kaa Taarikh Pasmanzar aur Pakhtoon Masla Khud Mukhtari Kaa Aaghaaz* (Urdu) (Lahore: Idara Mutalia Taarikh, 1994); and Mazhar Ali Khan's, *Pakistan: The First Twelve Years* (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 1996). The latter is a collection of the editorials written by him as editor of the leading English newspaper of Pakistan, the *Pakistan Times*, and throws considerable light on the political developments in the province.

Though these published works provide some basic source-material, the extensive data that I collected came from the Archive Section of the main library of the Directorate of Archives and Libraries, Government of NWFP, Peshawar; and the National Archives, Islamabad. The NWFP archives are particularly very rich on this period. There are hundreds of files/reports and publications of different departments available for consultations. During my research, (late) Tariq Mansoor Jalali, Director Archives, NWFP, told me that many files belonging to Qaiyum Khan's Chief Ministership in the province were burnt down by him when he was

the Interior Minister of Pakistan.² Further, he said that Khan Abdul Qaiyum Khan had once told him that he has written his autobiography. However, he did not hand over that document to Jalali. During an interview, I asked Qaiyum Khan's daughter, Dr. Nasim, about this manuscript but she showed her ignorance about it.³

In the National Archives of Pakistan, I found particularly two very rare letters of Quaid-i-Azam Muhammad Ali Jinnah and Liaquat Ali Khan discussing the refusal of Mountbatten to dismiss Dr. Khan Sahib's ministry before the creation of Pakistan. The Punjab Archives, though rich in collection, was not of much use to this author. The National Documentation Centre, Islamabad has collected some rare material. However, I was disappointed to see the notice on some microfilms that the administration had removed the material from the films as per their declaration; in the interest of the state. I found some old and rare magazines in the Diyal Singh Library, Lahore, which proved very beneficial for critical analysis of some of the issues discussed in this work.

2 Tariq Mansoor Jalali, Director, Directorate of Archives and Libraries, Government of NWFP, Peshawar, Interview by author, handwritten, 13 July, 1999.

3 Dr. Nasim, daughter of Khan Abdul Qaiyum Khan, interview by author, handwritten, Islamabad, 28 November, 1999.

CHAPTER 1

EARLY LIFE AND RISE TO POWER

Abdul Qaiyum Khan, whose forefathers had migrated from Kashmir to Peshawar, was born on 16 July 1901 at a village Nagar in Chitral, where his father Abdul Hakim Khan was serving as an Indian Assistant on behalf of the British Government of India.¹ He started his education at the age of 5, when he was admitted in Mission High School, Peshawar and moved from school to school due to his father's transfer to places like Abbottabad, Kohat, Mardan, Dera Ismail Khan and Pasheen (Baluchistan). He passed his matriculation examination, which was conducted by University of Punjab, Lahore, from Mission High School Mardan in 1916. He joined Islamia College Peshawar where he started taking part in political activities. With his efforts, the Khyber Debating Society and the Khyber Union of the College came into existence. He was unanimously elected the first President of the Khyber Union.²

Qaiyum Khan was still in Islamia College when the Khilafat Movement started in India in 1919 and played a leading role in the Khilafat- Non-Cooperation Movement. He also organized students' strike in the College due to which he was expelled from the College. However, some people believe that Qaiyum Khan left the college as part of the Non-Cooperation Movement and joined *Jamia Millia*, Aligarh. In November 1920, when leading members of the Khilafat Committee were arrested in Peshawar, Qaiyum Khan was sent there to help reinforce the Movement. He attended a Khilafat Conference in Rawalpindi along with Khan Abdul Ghaffar Khan in March 1921 and was nominated General Secretary of the new Provincial Khilafat Committee in April the same year. After some time, he realized that he had incurred a great loss by abandoning his education, which is why he decided to go abroad for further education. He went to England in 1922 and joined the London School of Economics. He passed his B.Sc (Hons.) in Economics and Political Science from this institution. In 1926, he passed Bar-at-Law from Lincoln's Inn, returned to Peshawar, and started his legal practice. Soon he became a prominent lawyer of the city.³

Qaiyum Khan started his active political life in 1930 by taking part in the Civil Disobedience Movement. However, he had not yet formally joined the All-India National Congress. In 1932, general elections for the Frontier Legislative Council

1 PA, confidential personal file of Abdul Qaiyum Khan, AA134, bundle no. 3, serial no. 30.

2 Waheed Akhtar Khattak, Khan Abdul Qaiyum Khan: Life and Work (M.A.thesis submitted to Pakistan Study Centre, University of Peshawar, Peshawar, session, 1987-89), p.5.

3 Ibid., pp.4-14.

were held. He contested as an independent candidate, but lost. Soon after, he joined the Congress and started taking active part in the party programmes. In February 1937, he was granted the Congress party ticket for the Frontier Legislative Assembly elections, but lost once again. However, when Dr. Khan Sahib resigned from his Central Legislative Assembly seat, Qaiyum Khan was granted the Congress ticket to represent the NWFP. He won unopposed in July 1937, in the by-election.⁴

Qaiyum Khan secured key positions in the Congress during his close association with the party. He rose to the position of Deputy Leader of the Congress in the Assembly. However, by 1945 he had lost confidence of his party in the Frontier (NWFP), partly due to his personal reasons and partly due to his association with Bhullabai Desai, the Congress leader in Assembly. The latter had lost the party's favour after his negotiations and the so-called 'pact' with Liaquat Ali Khan, stipulating a Congress-League interim Government after the War.⁵ Furthermore, with the passage of time, Qaiyum Khan had lost taste in revolutionary activities, which is why he did not participate in the Quit India Movement. All these factors led to his downfall in the Congress.⁶

However, Qaiyum Khan desperately tried to regain his position in the national politics. Beside other things he also published a highly critical booklet called *Gold and Guns on the Pathan Frontier*. He signed the preface to it as late as 31 March 1945. The work was dedicated to Dr. Khan Sahib. Qaiyum Khan pays glowing tributes to the Khan brothers (Abdul Ghaffar Khan and Dr. Khan Sahib) and the Congress and severely criticizes the Muslim League.⁷ Secretly, however, he had also approached the Muslim League and had expressed willingness to join the party. Thus, when he was denied the Congress ticket for the Central Assembly of India, he readily joined the Muslim League on 16 August 1945, just before the announcement of general elections.⁸

According to Muhammad Ali Khan Hoti, a leading Muslim Leaguer of NWFP, Qaiyum Khan was in Kashmir during the proceedings of the Simla Conference of 1945 and was watching the political developments very keenly. He was a very clever politician and could visualize well the future course of developments in India. He had realized that the Muslims of the Sub-continent were determined to

4 Ibid., pp.24-25 & Qaiyum Khan's personal file..

5 Stephen Rittenberg, *Ethnicity, Nationalism, and the Pakhtuns: The Independence Movement in India's North-West Frontier Province* (Durham, North Carolina: Carolina Academic Press, 1988), pp.190-191.

6 Erland Jansson, *India, Pakistan or Pakhtunistan: The Nationalist Movements in North-West Frontier Province, 1937-47* (Stockholm: Almqvist & Wiksell International, 1981), p.161.

7 Ibid.

8 Rittenberg, pp.190-191.

get Pakistan and, in the end, the Muslims would have little option but to join the Muslim League. On the other hand, one of the reasons for accepting him so willingly in the ranks of Muslim League and subsequently giving him important position were his qualities to organize demonstrations, processions and mobilize mass campaigns.⁹ Fida Muhammad Khan, another stalwart of Frontier Muslim League, had similar explanation to offer. In his opinion, Qaiyum Khan had realized that the Muslims of India, sooner than later, were going to achieve Pakistan. He also knew that he was losing importance amongst the Congress party, especially with its erstwhile leader in the province like Abdul Ghaffar Khan. In such circumstances, he saw it best to join the Muslim League. Indeed, according to Fida Muhammad Khan, this decision of Qaiyum Khan was a "statesman's" decision. He doubted if Qaiyum Khan's joining the League was out of sincerity or honesty of purpose.¹⁰ Similarly, Maulana Syed Fazl-i-Mabood, who remained for decades the Amir of *Jammat-i-Islami* Peshawar city, argued that Qaiyum Khan was willing to join the League for some time. He was convinced that the creation of Pakistan was inevitable. As a shrewd politician Qaiyum Khan was looking for an opportune time to join the party, which opportunity he found after the failure of the Simla Conference.¹¹

According to Sardar Inayat-ur-Rahman Khan Abbasi, Quaid-i-Azam asked Qaiyum Khan to join the Muslim League and he did so. He was promised that he would be given the leadership of the Muslim League in the NWFP.¹² Mian Ziauddin, another stalwart of the Muslim League, writes in his memoirs that the Frontier Muslim League leaders had started negotiations with him to bring him in the League fold, as his joining was considered of great public value. He believes that although Qaiyum Khan, in his opinion, was willing to join, he wanted to keep the negotiations secret. Qaiyum Khan's intention was to get elected on the Congress ticket in the forthcoming election and then join the Muslim League. In fact, he continued with strong criticism of the League leaders in public. However, when the Congress denied him the ticket, he switched over to the Muslim League without any hesitation.¹³

9 Muhammad Ali Khan Hoti, Interview by author, Tape recording, Mardan, 18 June 2001.

10 Fida Muhammad Khan, Interview by author, Tape recording, Peshawar, 14 June 2001.

11 Maulana Syed Fazal-i-Mabood, Interview by author, tape recording, Peshawar, 23 June 2001.

12 Sardar Inayat-ur-Rahman Abbasi, Interview by the author, Tape recording, Shamsabad, Rawalpindi, 28 November 1999.

13 Mian Ziauddin, *Memoirs of a Pakistani Diplomat* (Peshawar: University Book Agency, 1976), p.72.

Qaiyum Khan was a very clever, shrewd and ambitious politician. He wanted prominence, recognition, and power. By 1945, he had realized that Pakistan was becoming a reality. That meant that as a Muslim Congressite, he would have no place in the new country. The decisive factor that pushed him to join the Muslim League, as indicated earlier, was Abdul Ghaffar Khan and the Frontier Congress refusal of giving him ticket for the Central Legislative Assembly for the general election of 1946.¹⁴ Arbab Noor Muhammad Khan, a Muslim League stalwart, also held the same opinion.¹⁵ Qaiyum Khan himself had also stated so many times that he had played an active role in the Congress party and had done it great services as a Deputy Leader in the Assembly. However, he was unfairly treated in the award of ticket, and instead of recognizing his services and rewarding him the party ticket, it was awarded to Abdul Ghani Khan son of Abdul Ghaffar Khan. This led to his differences with Ghaffar Khan, and he quit the party, and joined the Muslim League.¹⁶

There is yet another aspect of Qaiyum Khan's joining the Muslim League. Abdur Rauf Seemab is of the opinion that Qaiyum Khan "never wanted any one to supersede him in politics." Seemab's assertion is substantiated by Qaiyum Khan's own remarks about how he was destined to taste victory. In his own words, "Everything is fair in politics. Whether it was the All-India National Congress or All-India Muslim League, the victory was always destined for me."¹⁷

Qaiyum Khan's entry into the League had quite a significant impact. As Stephen Rittenberg put it: "Although he did not bring a large following with him, he possessed attributes, which immediately propelled him into prominence in the Frontier Muslim League. He was the highest Frontier Congressman to-date to switch parties, and while he had held little real power in the Congress, his position had given him public prominence and extensive experience in legislative politics. In addition, as a newcomer, he was not associated with any faction in the Frontier League."¹⁸ Besides that Afrasayab Khattak believed that "it was easy for Barrister Jinnah to work with Barrister Qaiyum than *Pir Manki* or *Pir Zakori*, etc."¹⁹ Thus, these factors gave him an edge over other Leaguers in the province, which first became apparent when the party geared up its election campaign.²⁰

14 Sher Muhammad Khan, Interview by author, hand writing, Peshawar, 11 July 2001.

15 Arbab Noor Muhammad Khan, Interview by the author, Tape recording, Peshawar, 11 July 2001.

16 Justice (retd.) Mian Burhanuddin, Interview by author, Tape recording, Peshawar, 9 July 2001.

17 Syed Mujawar Hussain Shah, Sardar Abdur Rab Nishtar: A Political Biography (Lahore: Qadiriya Books, 1985), p.114.

18 Rittenberg, pp.190-191.

19 Afrasayab Khattak, Interview by author, Tape recording, Peshawar, 28 June 2001.

20 Rittenberg, pp.190-191.

Although Qaiyum Khan's support to the League was considered a great event and the Muslim League benefited from it immensely, it was Qaiyum Khan also who took full advantage of the switch. He got himself appointed as Chairman of the Frontier Parliamentary Board of the Muslim League for the award of tickets for the forthcoming general elections, and in the process, "saw to it that no old Leaguer who could be a possible rival to him was given a ticket." Sardar Bahadur Khan, Sardar Aurangzeb Khan, Khan Bahadur Saadullah Khan and Mian Ziauddin were "denied tickets", while Sardar Abdur Rab Nishtar got his ticket with "great difficulty".²¹

The 1946 Provincial General Elections were held between 26 January and 14 February 1946. The Frontier Congress emerged as the single largest party in the Assembly by securing 30 seats out of 50. The Muslim League won only 17 seats. Other small groups shared the remaining 3 seats.²² Both

Qaiyum Khan and Sardar Abdur Rab Nishtar contested the Peshawar city dual constituency seats on the Muslim League ticket. However, Nishtar was defeated, and it was alleged that Qaiyum Khan had secured his win by secretly asking his supporters to cast both votes in his favour.²³

Though the Frontier Congress had won an absolute majority in the Legislative Assembly and had formed the third Congress Ministry under the leadership of Dr. Khan Sahib, the Frontier Muslim League was able to convince the British government, through its Civil Disobedience Movement, launched in February 1947 in the NWFP, that a major swing of opinion in their favour had taken place in the province and there was a need of re-establishing the people's opinion. A writer described this at some length:

When independence became imminent, the problem of political alignment arose. Their allegiance was more to Islam and the Pathan pride prevented them from being subservient to any Hindu domination, which, it was apprehended, would be the case after India or Pakistan, there was realignment of political forces. Several Congress leaders defected to the Muslim League. The urge to align with their co-religionists appeared to be stronger at this crucial juncture when the subcontinent was witnessing communal frenzy and the Congress was largely perceived as a Hindu party by the Muslims, in spite of its broad support base. Many favoured joining Pakistan because of opportunist reasons, which were related to the exodus of Hindus from Pakistan. Since the bureaucracy of the Frontier was dominated by the Hindus,

21 Ziauddin, p.72. (However, Abdul Qaiyum Khan manipulated the votes and Nishtar was defeated in the elections)."

22 Khattak, p.45.

23 Ian Talbot, *Provincial Politics and the Pakistan Movement: The Growth of the Muslim League in North-West and North-East India, 1937-47* (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 1988), p.137 & Hoti, Interview.

the Muslim bureaucrats were in an advantageous position and they were all set to fill the vacuum that would be created after the Hindus left for India.²⁴

It was after lengthy and hectic negotiations that the All-India National Congress and the All-India Muslim League accepted the 3rd June Plan of 1947. It was part of the Plan that, in order to determine the future of the NWFP, the people of the province would be directly asked through a referendum whether they wanted to join India or Pakistan. The Frontier Muslim League, which had started Civil Disobedience Movement against the Frontier Congress Ministry, was soon advised by the Quaid-i-Azam to call off their protest movement and instead concentrate on the referendum.²⁵

Though the Congress accepted the referendum in the NWFP, the Frontier Congress and its allied parties rejected the referendum on the question of Pakistan or India. Abdul Ghaffar Khan and his party were of the opinion that they had already won the 1946 elections on the same question. So there was no justification in going to the electorate on the same issue within a year's time. Ghaffar Khan demanded another option in the referendum, i.e. independent *Pakhtunistan*. He and his party's opinion was that if the British wanted to determine the will of the people they should be given a third option as well in the referendum. But the British and the League maintained that since Jawaharlal Nehru, a very important Congress leader and the future Prime Minister of India, himself had rejected any other option for the Indian provinces during the negotiation process, it could not be granted to the NWFP alone. Subsequently, when the Frontier Congress party demand was not accepted, they called a meeting of the Provincial Congress Committee and *Khudai Khidmatgar* leaders in Bannu on 21 and 22 June 1947, and decided to boycott the referendum.²⁶

On the night of 29 June 1947 the *Khudai Khidmatgars* held a mammoth meeting at Chowk Yadgar, Peshawar City where Dr. Khan Sahib and Muhammad Yunas, brother of the then Education Minister, Yahya Jan Khan, were the main speakers. In their speeches, they talked about referendum, post-referendum situation and independent *Pakhtunistan*. In their speeches, both favoured the establishment of independent *Pakhtunistan*. They also informed their audience of their intentions to boycott the referendum. Muhammad Yunas contradicted the rumours of Ministry's resignation in case the people decided in favour of Pakistan. However, Dr. Khan Sahib stated emphatically that if he found out in the

24 Smruti S. Pattanic, "Pakistan's North-West Frontier: Under a New Name", http://www.afghanpolitics.org/Reference/DurandLine/Analysis/NWFP_Why_New_Name.htm, p.6.

25 Sharif al-Mujahid, *Quaid-i-Azam Jinnah: Studies in interpretation* (Karachi: Quaid-i-Azam Academy, 1981), pp.508-509.

26 Rittenberg, pp.234-243.

referendum that he had lost the support of the people, he would be prepared for resignation.²⁷

At a press conference on 7 July 1947, Dr. Khan Sahib reiterated the same point when he stated, "Personally speaking, I am morally bound to tender my resignation as premier of the NWFP if the Muslim League polls 30 per cent or more of the total votes in the referendum..." Explaining this further, he noted that: "In the last general elections about 63 per cent of the total votes were cast—about 380,000 out of some 600,000. Therefore, if the League polls in this referendum more than 50 per cent of the votes cast on the basis of 60 per cent of total electorate voting, I will be morally bound to resign. But this is my personal opinion and that actual decision will depend on the Congress organization here..."²⁸

But, in a press conference after the referendum, Dr. Khan Sahib made his resignation conditional. He stressed that, until clear announcement was not made in respect of fresh general elections, he was not going to resign. When reminded of his earlier declaration that morally he would resign his office if the majority of the total votes polled in the referendum went in favour of Pakistan, he replied, "At that time I expected that the referendum would be conducted essentially in a proper manner. But now it is a different matter altogether. The referendum, I say, has not at all been conducted impartially and honestly and it is the British who are to blame. Apart from Hazara district the referendum has been organized against the Congress, in Kohat and other districts many glaring malpractices have also been indulged into..."²⁹

Thus, the issue of the Congress Ministry's resignation continued and, once again, it was raised at another weekly press conference with the following clarification by Dr. Khan Sahib: "The recent referendum in the NWFP," he argued, "does not affect the Frontier ministry constitutionally or legally; the referendum, was only to decide whether the Frontier Province should be in *Hindustan* or Pakistan. As it was out of question for the NWFP to join *Hindustan*, it has gone to Pakistan." At the same press conference, Dr. Khan Sahib, when asked whether the *Khudai Khidmatgars* were going to declare independent *Pakhtunistan* state on 15 August, stated that he had no knowledge about it. On the question of celebrations, he retorted, "In my opinion, the Red Shirts and the Muslim League in the NWFP both should celebrate the Indian Independence Day together, because it will be a celebration of freedom from foreign domination. I am certain all Pathans will join in the rejoicing..."³⁰

27 PA, CID daily diary no. 144, dated 30.6.1947, bundle no. 3, serial no. 42, p.31.

28 The Civil and Military Gazette (Lahore), 9 July 1947, p. 4.

29 Ibid., 19 July 1947, p. 7.

30 Ibid., 25 July 1947, p. 4.

On 9 August 1947, in a telegraphic message sent to the Viceroy, Lord Mountbatten, the interim Governor of NWFP, R. M. M. Lockhart, opposed the dismissal of Dr. Khan Sahib Ministry on the grounds of expected "serious and widespread disturbances," based on the evidence conveyed by the Area Commander and Inspector-General of Police. He recommended delay and suggested to Mountbatten, "he should ask Jinnah to urge patience on League."³¹ He wrote that:

The Muslim League are aware of all the Congress activities and are reported to be preparing to deal with any action the latter may take. They are as insistent as ever that Dr. Khan Sahib's ministry must go before the 15th August. I, and the officials I have consulted here, would prefer that the Pakistan Government should take the necessary action to do this. I can see the argument against it, i.e., that it would be hard on the Pakistan government to have as its first act to dismiss the present ministry and face the probable ensuing trouble. On the other hand it can be said that it is the Pakistan government, by its insistence on not dissolving the Legislative Assembly, that has led to the present situation, where Dr. Khan Sahib refuses to resign.³²

While Dr. Khan Sahib refused to resign, the Frontier Muslim League continued asking the Governor to dismiss the Congress Ministry and promulgate Governor Rule in the province. The central leaders of Muslim League also asked the Viceroy to dismiss the Ministry and handover powers to either the Muslim League or the Governor and give the Muslim League some advisory status. Justice (Retd.) Mian Burhanuddin, once a leading leader of the Frontier Muslim League, also verified these facts in an interview by stating that after the referendum in NWFP, on the advice of Qaiyum Khan, he, along with two other colleagues, called on the Governor of NWFP twice, and requested him that Dr. Khan Sahib ministry should be dismissed.³³ Though Mountbatten was in favour of giving advisory status to the League, the Governor was strongly opposed to either on the grounds that as long as Dr. Khan Sahib enjoyed the support of the majority in the Assembly, it was unconstitutional to dismiss his ministry. The same was the opinion of the British India office.³⁴

Eventually, on 10 August 1947, Mountbatten wrote a letter to Liaquat Ali Khan, informing him that he had received instructions from the Secretary of State for India not to dismiss Dr. Khan Sahib's Ministry in NWFP as it would be

31 NA, F.46-GG/47, serial no. 10(s).

32 NDC photo state holding no. S-15 (Secret Selections from the Records of Civil Secretariat, NWFP, H.E. Fortnightly Reports, 1946-47, No. GH.151, Govt. House, Peshawar, NWFP, 9 August 1947, R.M.M.Lockhart to Mountbatten, p.148).

33 Burhanuddin, Interview.

34 Jansson, p.228.

unconstitutional in the present circumstances.³⁵ Liaquat Ali Khan wrote a letter to Quaid-i-Azam on 11 August 1947, from Karachi, discussing the refusal of Viceroy to dismiss Dr. Khan Sahib's ministry. These letters show that the Muslim League high command was determined to dismiss Dr. Khan Sahib's ministry even before the establishment of Pakistan. At that time the question of oath of allegiance or saluting the Pakistan flag had not arisen but the Muslim League high command was pressurizing the Viceroy to remove the Congress ministry. Liaquat Ali Khan, while referring to the Viceroy letter, wrote:

Karachi

11.8.47

My dear Quaid-i-Azam,

I am herewith sending a letter which I have received fresh now from the Viceroy together with a copy of the telegram, which he had received from the Governor of NWFP. You will be meeting Sir George Cunningham today or tomorrow. I would suggest your discussing the whole matter with him thoroughly. I feel the viceroy has let us down and has completely played into the hands of the Congress.

Yours Sincerely

Liaquat Ali Khan³⁶

The Governor of the NWFP, George Cunningham, wanted an amicable solution of the deadlock between the Frontier Congress and the Muslim League. Soon, he was able to convince Ghaffar Khan to meet Quaid-i-Azam Muhammad Ali Jinnah to sort out the matter. However, when the latter was informed about the demands³⁷ of the leaders of the Frontier Congress before the meeting, he refused to meet Ghaffar Khan. He pointed out that those demands could only be considered by the Constituent Assembly.³⁸

35 NA, F.46-GG/47, serial no. 10(s).

36 NA, GOP, S.No.10(s) F-46-GG/47.

37 Ghaffar Khan's three demands were: "(i) Complete provincial autonomy for the Province in all matters except defence, external affairs and communications. (ii) The right of any party to move for the secession of the Province from the Dominion, in the same way that a Dominion has the right to secede from a Commonwealth, should it so desire. (iii) That it should be open to areas contiguous to the Province, which are included in the present boundaries of the British India and are inhabited by Pathans, to ask to become part of the NWFP (Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa) and, if they do, be included in it". Mievellé to Jinnah, 20 July 1947, TP, XII, pp. 271-2, quoted in Sayed Waqar Ali Shah, *Ethnicity, Islam and Nationalism: Muslim Politics in the North-West Frontier Province, 1937-47* (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 1999), pp.240-241, foot-note no. 187.

38 Shah, p.228.

Chaudhri Zahid is of the opinion that Qaiyum Khan was a very opportunist person and he also played an important role in persuading Quaid-i-Azam M.A. Jinnah and Liaquat Ali Khan for the dismissal of Dr. Khan Sahib's ministry. He provided them the news that Dr. Khan Sahib was going to declare *Pakhtunistan* on 15 August 1947. A rumour was also floated for this purpose that, after the holy month of *Ramazan*, the *Khudai Khidmatgars* were going to launch a civil disobedience movement against Pakistan. However, there was no truth in these rumours because when Ghaffar Khan got this information, he extensively visited the Hashtnagar villages and towns and informed the workers that they should not heed to these rumours and anyone involved acting on those rumours would not be amongst their ranks. The main objective of such news and rumours was to convince Jinnah and Liaquat Ali Khan about the removal of Dr. Khan's Ministry.³⁹

Meanwhile, as the Independence Day approached closer, the attitude of the *Khudai Khidmatgars* towards the establishment of Pakistan was being discussed in different circles. However, the *Khudai Khidmatgars* position was clarified on 12 August 1947, when in the company of Qazi Attaullah Khan, Isa Jan Khan, Abdul Ghani Khan and Amir Muhammad Khan of Hoti, Abdul Ghaffar Khan visited Swabi. At the bus stand posters were distributed by *Khudai Khidmatgars* saying, "15 of August". This poster, which had been issued by Ghaffar Khan, had given guidelines to his party workers regarding 15 August celebrations, as he had been personally asked by many workers: what should be their response to these celebrations? To this question his answer was that 15 August was the day of celebrations and rejoicing as the British were going to leave India, something for which the *Khudai Khidmatgars* had struggled so long. However, as the day did not bring complete independence for the *Pakhtuns*, they should not celebrate it. But Ghaffar Khan advised them not to interfere with the celebrations of others.⁴⁰

On the other hand, Governor Cunningham went on to assure Mountbatten in a letter of the attitude of Congress Ministry. In his letter of 14 August 1947 to the Viceroy, he wrote, "Dr. Khan has promised that he and other ministers would attend the flag-hoisting ceremony. He would pull down his present Congress flag from his residence and would fly no other flag in its place from the 15th August." Further, he maintained: "As long as he remains minister he will do nothing injurious to the Constitution of Pakistan, and if the final Constitution decided upon by the Constituent Assembly is one that he feels he can not support, he will give

39 Zahid Chaudhri, *Pakistan Ki Siyasi Taarikh*: vol. viii, *Afghanistan Taarikh* Pasmaazar aur Pakhtoon Masla Khud Mukhtari Kaa Aaghaaz (Urdu), Compiled and ed. Hassan Jaffar Zaidi, (Lahore: Idara Mutalia Taarikh, 1994), p.124 & PA, special branch IPS, daily diary no. nil, dated 11 August 1947, bundle no.39, serial no.634, p. 161.

40 PA, special branch, CID daily diary no. 178, 14 August 1947, bundle no. 74, serial no. 1369.

up the ministry by himself. If Jinnah dismisses his ministry they will accept the decision and not give any trouble, and of course, if a Muslim League ministry is installed to replace theirs, then there probably will be trouble.”⁴¹ In another detailed telegraphic letter dated 15 August 1947, Cunningham also went on to assure Jinnah, once again, that Dr. Khan Sahib has reiterated that he was not going to declare ‘Independent *Pakhtunistan*’, and would remain loyal to Pakistan. He also wrote that he had even asked Dr. Khan Sahib to resign, but he was not obliging. Cunningham, therefore, suggested that Dr. Khan Sahib might be allowed to continue, if possible, until the next general elections.⁴²

On 15 August 1947 the Pakistan flag hoisting ceremonies were carried out peacefully without any untoward incident at all government buildings. The *Khudai Khidmatgars* obeyed the orders of their leaders and showed great discipline by not interfering in the ceremonies. The same day, Cunningham took the oath of allegiance. Dr. Khan Sahib was invited but not asked to take the oath of allegiance. He was also invited to the flag hoisting ceremony that followed. Dr. Khan Sahib and his colleagues wanted to attend. However, the Governor warned him of the possible hostile response of the crowd. He also told him that since the arrangements were in the hands of Muslim League National Guards, he could not guarantee their safety. Therefore, Dr. Khan Sahib and his ministers decided not to attend the ceremony. Later, while explaining his position, Dr. Khan Sahib insisted, “We were never asked to take the oath of allegiance, we were simply asked to resign immediately, which we refused to do.”⁴³

He reiterated the same point on 18 August 1947 at a mosque known as “*Kundi Bibi*”. Addressing a congregation of the *Khudai Khidmatgars* assembled there, he declared that he was not going to resign and that his ministry would continue to serve the people.⁴⁴ However, Jinnah, as the Governor-General of Pakistan, could not take any more of this dilly-dallying. He decided to act, but had no power under the Interim Constitution of Pakistan to remove an elected provincial government. During the British period, whenever they felt the necessity of removing a provincial government, they used Section 93 of the Act. But when they were leaving the Indian sub-continent, they deleted Section 93 believing that the new independent states would not need that colonial power. After this, whatever power the Governor had was based on conventions. If he was convinced that a provincial government had lost the majority in the assembly, he could remove it, and ask the other party, who could obtain confidence of the

41 Khattak, p.65.

42 NA, F.46-GG/47, s.no. 10(s), 3.1.

43 D.G. Tendulkar, Abdul Ghaffar Khan: Faith is a battle (New Delhi: Gandhi Peace Foundation, 1967), p.450.

44 PA, special branch IPS, special diary, dated. 22 August 1947, bundle no.16, serial no.251, p.15.

majority in the assembly, to form new government. However, the Governor-General's powers in the provincial matters were limited. He could instruct the Governor only if he believed that he was not carrying out his duties properly.⁴⁵

Though Section 51(5) granted powers to the Governor-General to instruct the Governor, it did not increase the powers of Governor-General or his agent, the Governor. In the absence of Section 93, the Governor-General lacked the powers to remove Dr. Khan Sahib's ministry as long as he enjoyed the support of the majority in the Assembly. According to one analyst, since the incumbent ministry had lost the referendum, and had opposed the creation of Pakistan, therefore, the position of Dr. Khan Sahib's ministry was similar to such a parliamentary party, which had lost elections to the opposition. In this case, the opposition was Muslim League. Therefore, it was legitimate to take power.⁴⁶

To solve this constitutional—political dilemma, the Government decided to re-introduce the defunct Section 93 of Government of India Act, 1935 as Section 92A in the Interim Constitution of Pakistan.⁴⁷ Interestingly, Jinnah himself had objected to these powers of the central Government during the British rule.⁴⁸ When the issue of Jinnah's objection to this clause in the first place and then his insertion of it in the Constitution was raised with some Muslim League leaders, they did not hesitate to rationalize it by saying that it was the need of the hour. Obviously things had changed and had to be dealt with differently in the post-colonial era.⁴⁹

Although the use of Section 92A was designed to control the provinces during the emergency created at independence, the measure continued to be exercised for long under one pretext or another. This seriously hindered the operation of responsible government in the provinces, and made legislative majorities ineffective at times. When the 1956 Constitution was made, Section 92A was introduced in it as Section 93.⁵⁰

Though Section 92A was inserted in the Interim Constitution of Pakistan on the plea of national interest and for coping with ground realities, some vocal sections of the society strongly criticized this amendment in the constitution. Faiz Ahmad Faiz, editor of the *Pakistan Times*, for instance, wrote a very critical editorial on

45 Allan McGrath, *The Destruction of Pakistan's Democracy* (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 1996), p.46.

46 Ibid., p.47.

47 Zarina Salamat, *Pakistan, 1947-1958: An Historical Review* (Islamabad: National Institute of Historical and Cultural Research, 1992), p.68.

48 Khan Abdul Wali Khan, *Bacha Khan Au Khudai Khidmatgari*, vol.ii (Pashto) (Charsadda: Wali Bagh, 1994), p.25.

49 Arbab Noor M. Khan, Interview.

50 Salamat, p.68.

the subject in July 1948. He wrote that, while leaving India, the British rulers dropped Section 93 of the Government of India Act 1935 under the impression that the two newly independent states did not need such a drastic measure that had been unanimously opposed by all the political parties. However, ironically, Jinnah himself inserted this Section, and, thus, the people had to swallow the bitter pill. Faiz argued that it was not in the best interest of democracy in the country.⁵¹

DISMISSAL OF CONGRESS MINISTRY AND APPOINTMENT OF QAIYUM KHAN AS CHIEF MINISTER

Dr. Khan Sahib's ministry was dismissed on 22 August 1947.⁵² The Frontier Congress argued that it was dismissed on the lame excuse that he did not salute the Pakistani flag. They stressed that the right way would have been to charge-sheet Dr. Khan Sahib and provide him a chance to explain his position, which was never done. They further maintained that, in reality, the Muslim League was holding their political meeting in Peshawar city and was planning to raise their own flag. Those were the days when there was a lot of tension between *Khudai Khidmatgars* and the Muslim League. Apparently, Dr. Khan Sahib wanted to attend the meeting, though his friends were against it. They asked him, "why he wanted to attend the Muslim League meeting." Cunningham, the Governor, also asked him not to attend because there was no one to provide him and his friends with security in the meeting and, above all, it was not an official function. It was primarily a Muslim League meeting.⁵³ Arbab Noor Muhammad Khan agrees that the Governor might have advised Dr. Khan Sahib and his ministers not to attend because the Leaguers were hostile to them, and thus they might have insulted them.⁵⁴

Dr. Khan Sahib's assertion that the Governor had told him that he could not provide security to him and his colleagues seems correct in the light of the report of the acting Governor Lockhart, which he sent to Mountbatten on 9 August 1947. He writes: "There is I think little doubt that the League will deal firmly with their opponents and I am concerned as to how one can protect the present ministers from bad treatment."⁵⁵ According to Norval Mitchel, the biographer of Sir George Cunningham, Dr. Khan Sahib and his ministers did not participate in

51 The Pakistan Times (Lahore), 21 July 1948, p.6.

52 K.K. Aziz, *Party Politics in Pakistan, 1947-1958* (Islamabad: National Commission on Historical and Cultural Research, 1976), p.2.

53 Ibid., pp.28-29.

54 Arbab Noor M. Khan, Interview.

55 NDC photo state holding no. S-15 (Secret Selections from the Records of Civil Secretariat, NWFP, H.E. Fortnightly Reports, 1946-47, No. GH.151, Govt. House, Peshawar, NWFP, 9 August 1947, R.M.M.Lockhart to Mount batten, p.148).

the flag hoisting ceremony because the Governor had advised them against it for he suspected some foul play. He further says that Cunningham protested against the undemocratic removal of Dr. Khan Sahib's Ministry but did not react as that might have created problems for the provincial and central governments.⁵⁶ Arbab Hidayatullah, a former Inspector-General of Police (Special Branch) supports Mitchel's assertion and says that the Governor did advise Dr. Khan Sahib not to attend the flag hoisting ceremony because he suspected trouble from the Muslim League and the National Guards, who were the organizers of the ceremony.⁵⁷ Qalandar Mohmand, who claimed to have been eyewitness to these developments, is of the opinion that in the early days of the creation of Pakistan there was no distinction between Police and the Muslim League National Guards; the latter in fact enjoyed more powers as they claimed to be the creators of the newly independent country.⁵⁸

Qaiyum Khan in the budget session of the provincial assembly on 22 March 1948, while talking about the dismissal of Dr. Khan Sahib's ministry, argued that his ministry was dismissed because they had refused to take the oath of allegiance. However, both Dr. Khan Sahib and Qazi Attaullah Khan refuted this claim. Dr. Khan Sahib stated, "Since 15 August when the Governor came here, his words were that it's the Central Government order that you should resign. I asked, under which law? I am the leader of majority party in the House, so I shall not resign. The question of oath of allegiance was never raised. If they might had asked us to take oath of allegiance, we would have never refused but instead they asked us to resign which we refused." Qaiyum Khan argued that there was a difference of opinion on this point.⁵⁹

This brings us to an important question: why was Dr. Khan Sahib's ministry dismissed? There is an opinion amongst certain quarters that Dr. Khan Sahib's removal was part of a bigger British conspiracy. Wali Khan believes that the Muslims of the sub-continent never wanted the British to leave India. The only organization that was anti-British was *Khudai Khidmatgars*. When the British decided to quit, they wanted to leave behind such government in Pakistan, which would help stop the spread of Communism. In this plan, the NWFP had a strategic importance because all the passes, roads and valleys, which connect Russia to India, were in this province. However, in the NWFP, there was a

56 Zahid, p.122.

57 Arbab Hidayatullah, Interview by author, Tape recording, Peshawar, 25 June 2001.

58 Prof. Qalandar Mohmand, Interview by author, Tape recording, Peshawar, 23 June 2001.

59 LAD, 22 March 1948, vol. xv, no. 5, official Report, serial no. 252.

ministry, which was anti-British and enjoyed two-third majority in the Provincial Assembly.⁶⁰

Afrasyab Khattak also supports this contention that Dr. Khan Sahib's removal was part of a deep-rooted conspiracy. He says that the Tories' plan of giving independence to India was different than that of the Labours'. Tories wanted to give independence to Southern India in case British could not sustain pressure from Congress. Their plan was to retain northern India with the purpose to keep military installations against the Communists. Even when northern India was included in the independence plan they wanted to have such a government in power that was friendlier to the British. Since *Khudai Khidmatgars*, right from its inception, was an anti-British party the British could not afford their rule in such a strategically important province.⁶¹

Whatever the correct explanation, the fact of the matter is that the dismissal of Dr. Khan Sahib's ministry has remained a matter of controversy not only among the partisans involved but also among the analysts and writers of later times. Ahmad Salim, for instance, argued that the following reasons perhaps were responsible for the dismissal of Dr. Khan Sahib's ministry:

1. Dr. Khan Sahib's ministry was in favour of a Union with India.
2. It had become unpopular because the electorate in the referendum cast their vote against it, rejecting its stand on joining the Indian union.
3. The ministry did not resign despite its unpopularity.
4. Quaid-i-Azam Muhammad Ali Jinnah had called for the dismissal of this ministry, but Lord Mountbatten, due to his obligations to the Indian Congress, avoided doing so.
5. The ministry showed disrespect to the Pakistan flag by declining to attend its hoisting ceremony.

60 Wali Khan , vol. II, pp.22-27. (Dr. Anwar Khan, a former Vice Chancellor of University of Peshawar, Director, Area Study Centre, Russia, China and Central Asia, University of Peshawar and a historian while concluding a Seminar on Pakistan-Russia relations at the Area Study Centre Hall, on 25 October 2002 stated that when the British were leaving the Indian sub-continent, they handed over all the files of the foreign office concerning Soviet Union to Pakistan. In other words Pakistan inherited anti-Soviet policy from the British).

61 Afrasyab Khattak, Interview.

6. Although the NWFP was opposed to the partition of India before 1947, through a referendum its people decided that since Pakistan was to be created, it would be prudent to join Pakistan rather than India.⁶²

However, Salim does not support these arguments, and observes that, since the people of the province had chosen *Khudai Khidmatgars* over the Muslim League in the elections, so by the logic of the 3rd June Plan, the province should have remained with India while the Muslim League was not ready to accept Pakistan without NWFP. Therefore, referendum was held on the issue of Pakistan and India, not on the Muslim League and *Khudai Khidmatgars*.⁶³

Before the dismissal of Dr. Khan Sahib's ministry and appointment of Qaiyum Khan, some of the leading Muslim Leaguers from the province had shown their concern about the reported appointment of Abdul Qaiyum Khan as Chief Minister of the province. Abdul Ghafoor and Ghulam Muhammad, members of the All-India Muslim League had sent a telegram to Quaid-i-Azam Muhammad Ali Jinnah opposing the possible appointment of Qaiyum Khan as Chief Minister. They had written that Qaiyum Khan was getting the signatures of Members of the Legislative Assembly (MLAs) by telling them that the Quaid-i-Azam and Liaquat Ali Khan had already appointed him as Chief Minister and was thus pressurizing the members and exploiting their names. They pleaded that he might be stopped from doing so because the Pathans would never accept a Kashmiri as their leader. They further stated that the party meeting should be convened under the supervision of the Parliamentary Board and there the leader of the party should be decided in that meeting. In the end, they had pleaded that the Quaid-i-Azam should show his neutrality in the election of party leader as he had done in the case of Sind and Punjab. They further pleaded that if their suggestions were not taken into account and another course was adopted, that would adversely affect the party.⁶⁴

When, finally, Dr. Khan Sahib's ministry was dismissed on 22 August 1947, the following constitutional and democratic options were available with the center:

1. Impose Governor's rule in the province.
2. Order fresh elections to elect new members to the provincial Legislature.
3. Form a new ministry that enjoyed the confidence of the House.

62 Ahmad Salim, *Pakistan of Jinnah: The Hidden Face* (Lahore: Brothers Publishers, 1993), pp.27-28.

63 Ibid., p.28.

64 NA, File no. 10(s), F.46-GG/47.

However, due to a host of factors, the center imposed Abdul Qaiyum Khan on the province, even though he did not enjoy a majority in the Legislature, as the new Chief Minister. Actually, the League High Command wanted to avoid any differences or controversy, and therefore appointed Abdul Qaiyum Khan as the leader of Frontier Muslim League. It was a different matter that this appointment, instead of reconciling the Leaguers, further increased the differences among the leaders of the Frontier League.⁶⁵

Qaiyum Khan had his own explanation as to how he came to form the ministry after the dismissal of Dr. Khan Sahib's government. While concluding his budget speech in the Assembly on 6 March 1951, he said that Quaid-i-Azam told him that he wanted him to form the government in the NWFP. Qaiyum said: "How I could make?" Quaid-i-Azam said, "It's my job, you go and take charge." Qaiyum Khan further said that he was thinking that they were only 17 people, how could they make ministry, and what would be its fate when the Congress had the majority.⁶⁶ In fact, Qaiyum Khan was encouraged by a number of things. After the creation of Pakistan and the migration of non-Muslims from the NWFP, some of the Congress MLAs of the Legislative Assembly started "hob-nobbing" with the Muslim League leaders in general and with Qaiyum Khan in particular. In the process, they also wanted the blessing and support of the Government at centre. So a meeting was arranged for them in Lahore with the Prime Minister of Pakistan, Liaquat Ali Khan, which gave them confidence about their political role in the future. It was also believed that all these developments had the approval of Quaid-i-Azam as well.⁶⁷ Although, one of the Congress MLAs, Qaim Shah, suggested that those who wanted to join the Muslim League should resign first as they had come to the Assembly on the Congress ticket, others did not agree to this because they were afraid that in case of re-election they might lose their seats.⁶⁸

Some critics believe that though the removal of Dr. Khan Sahib Ministry was undemocratic and unconstitutional, worse than that was the appointment of Qaiyum Khan as the Chief Minister because he was representing a minority. They believe that a better and democratic option was holding of fresh elections in the province. Though the results of the referendum might be considered a vote of no-confidence in the Congress ministry, it was not a mandate for the Muslim

65 Zulfikar Khalid Maluka, *The Myth of Constitutionalism in Pakistan* (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 1995), pp.151-152 & Aziz Javed, *Sarhad Ka Aa'inee Irtiqā* (Urdu) (Peshawar: Idara Tahqiq wa Tasneef, 1975), p.308.

66 LAD, official Report, 6 March 1951, vol. xxiii-no. 5, serial no.339, p.67.

67 Abab Noor Muhammad Khan, Interview by Munir Ahmad Munir, in *Aatishfishan* (Urdu), Lahore, May 1991, p.14 & Fida M. Khan, Interview.

68 PA, special branch, IPS daily diary, 8 January 1948, bundle no. 17, serial no. 253, p.157.

League to rule the province. Even if the removal could be justified, the installation of Qaiyum Khan ministry was a very undemocratic and anti-federalist action, which had no justification.⁶⁹ One of the prominent leaders of the Muslim League, Muhammad Yusaf Khattak, also believed that the proper course of action would have been holding fresh elections.⁷⁰

Does this mean there were some solid reasons due to which no democratic and constitutional means were employed to deal with the situation. The Muslim League's point of view was that they had convincingly won the referendum and that there was no need for fresh elections in the province. Further, due to enormous problems faced by the Government of Pakistan in the aftermath of the creation of Pakistan, they were not in a position to call elections in the province. But the critics do not agree with this. They argue that the logical, constitutional, and democratic way was to call the fresh elections in the province. Given that the referendum was a vote of no-confidence in Dr. Khan Sahib's ministry, it was in no way a vote of confidence in Abdul Qaiyum Khan. Further, the Congress ministry of Dr. Khan Sahib had announced the boycott of the referendum, so they did not participate in the referendum. It seems that the Muslim League leadership, in spite of winning the referendum, was not sure about their candidates' success in the elections. Had that not been the case, they might have announced the elections immediately after the dismissal of the Congress ministry. Whatever the case may be, the available constitutional and democratic options were not availed and on 23 August 1947, Qaiyum Khan was sworn in as Chief Minister of the Frontier Province.⁷¹

Constitutional or otherwise, under the circumstances Qaiyum Khan was the best choice and the fittest person for the post: highly educated, well known and an experienced politician. Of all the Muslim League leaders of the Frontier, he was the most prominent and suitable person.⁷²

Though the *Khudai Khidmatgars* were very much annoyed and upset over the dismissal of Dr. Khan Sahib's ministry, they still adopted conciliatory policy towards the government. For this purpose, a meeting of Provincial *Jirga*, Parliamentary Party, the *Zalmai Pakhtun*, the *Khudai Khidmatgars* and the representatives of the tribal areas was called for a joint meeting on 3 and 4 September 1947 at Sardaryab, the *Khudai Khidmatgars* headquarters. In this meeting, they declared:

- a. that they regarded Pakistan as their own country,

69 Maluka, p.152.

70 Munir Ahmad Munir, *Siyasee Uthaar Charao* (Urdu) (Lahore: Aatish Fashan Publications, 1989), p.223.

71 Khattak, p.66.

72 Hidayatullah, Interview.

- b. that dismissal of Dr. Khan Sahib's Ministry was undemocratic, but no protest was to be made,
- c. connections with the Congress were severed, and
- d. Congress tri-colour flag was to be replaced by the original red flag of the *Khudai Khidmatgars*.⁷³

Initially, Qaiyum Khan started his ministry with the help of only one former Congress cabinet minister, Khan Muhammad Abbas Khan. When Quaid-i-Azam Muhammad Ali Jinnah visited the NWFP in April 1948, he demanded expansion in the cabinet. It was also reported that he wanted unity amongst all the leaders irrespective of their party affiliation. He advised the Muslim League leaders to take into confidence suitable *Khudai Khidmatgars*, so that they could collectively work for the development and progress of the province. However, the Muslim League leaders did not seem to like the idea. Quaid-i-Azam tried his best, but in vain. Finally, it was decided to invite another former Congressite, Mian Jaffar Shah, to join Qaiyum Khan's cabinet. Thus, Qaiyum Khan started ruling the province with the help of two ministers, that is Khan M. Abbas Khan (as Revenue Minister) and Mian Jaffar Shah (as Education Minister)⁷⁴

Till November 1947 the numerical strength of different parties in the Frontier Assembly at the time of the nomination of Qaiyum Khan as Chief Minister was as follows: Congress 24, Muslim League 16, and the non-Muslim members 9. Under the circumstances, Qaiyum Khan even toyed with the idea of arresting the opposition members in order to be able to safely sail through the coming budget session.⁷⁵ In spite of his best efforts, Qaiyum Khan could not win over majority in the assembly till December 1947. This fact is evident from his letter of 16 December 1947⁷⁶ to Quaid-i-Azam in which after discussing the party loyalties of different members, he suggested that the assembly should be dissolved after requisite constitutional amendment to ensure his ministry.⁷⁷

Though Abdul Qaiyum Khan did not believe in "arithmetic democracy", as he believed that majority was not necessary to rule,⁷⁸ still to give a democratic and legal status to his ministry, he approached those opposition members whom he thought he could lure or force to change their loyalties. In particular, he approached the Congress MLAs. Those who changed loyalties were the ones

73 M.S. Korejo, *The Frontier Gandhi: His Place in History* (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 1994), p.195.

74 Javed, pp.275-276.

75 *The Civil and Military Gazette* (Lahore), 16 November 1947, front page.

76 See Appendix VI.

77 NA, GOP, File no. 51 (o)F-196/GG/47.

78 Mushtaq Ahmad, *Jinnah and After: A Profile of Leadership* (Karachi: Royal Book Company, 1994), p.120.

known to be die-hard opponents of Pakistan, like Nawabzada Allah Nawaz Khan and his brother, Qaiyum Nawaz Khan, Mian Jaffar Shah and Arbab Abdur Rahman Khan of Guli Gharai. They had even suggested in a meeting of the Provincial Congress Party at Bannu, held just before the establishment of Pakistan, that they should migrate to tribal areas and instigate the people to attack Pakistan and finish it. However, Abdul Ghaffar Khan strongly opposed it. Rather, he stated that their mission was freedom, and that they would accept it in any shape. Although the opponents of Pakistan strongly disagreed with him, Ghaffar Khan was able to pass a moderate resolution, stating that they would wait and see, and would respond at appropriate time. If Pakistan came into existence, they would continue their reformist movement, *Khudai Khidmatgar*, and would not participate in politics.⁷⁹

However, with the appointment of Qaiyum Khan, the situation totally changed. The same Congress leaders changed their loyalties and joined Qaiyum Khan. To change his assembly minority into a majority, Qaiyum Khan allured some members of the Congress party to his side and put the defiant ones to endless persecution.⁸⁰ Initially, he could not break the ranks of Congress. Thus, he had even suggested to Quaid-i-Azam Muhammad Ali Jinnah that the institution of Assembly should be totally abolished and a referendum should be conducted after every three years and the elected person should also be allowed to choose three or four colleagues for running the administration.⁸¹ This suggestion was also acceptable to the Governor Cunningham who thought that due to the special circumstances of the sub-continent the proposed system was more feasible and practical than the parliamentary system. However, Jinnah did not agree with the opinion of Qaiyum Khan and the Governor that the assembly should be dissolved indefinitely.⁸²

Qaiyum Khan had come up with this suggestion because at the time of establishment of Pakistan, the Khan brothers not only had majority in the assembly, they were also very popular amongst the masses. "In recognition of this fact, the carrot and stick were used, unsuccessfully, to win them over. Both were asked privately and publicly to join the Muslim League by the League high command, and Muhammad Ali Jinnah even offered Dr. Khan the governorship of

79 Farigh Bukhari, *Tehrik-i-Azadi aur Bacha Khan* (Urdu) (Lahore: Fiction House, 1991), p.182.

80 Abad Khan, *Abad Khan: The Lost Ring of the Chain*, tran. Into Urdu by Anwar Khan Deewan, trans. Into English by Dr. Sher Zaman Taizi, (Nowshera: The Kamil Pukhto Adabi Jirga, 1998), p.48.

81 Khalid bin Sayeed. *Pakistan: The Formative Phase, 1857-1948*, with a foreword by George Cunningham (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 1998), p.273.

82 *Ibid.*, & Zahid, p.128.

the province if he joined.”⁸³ However, when this did not work, either to placate or win over the Khan brothers, Qaiyum Khan felt himself acquitted from an earlier promise made with Jinnah that he would not use arbitrary powers in running the Frontier Province.⁸⁴

In order to get majority in the Assembly, the Qaiyum Khan government coerced the non-Muslim members to migrate but still the government did not have the required majority. As such the government started working on the Muslim members of legislative assembly and adopted the policy of “carrot and stick”, and especially contacted those who were considered weak.⁸⁵ Amongst the first to switch sides were Congress Speaker of the Assembly, Nawabzada Allah Nawaz Khan and his brother, Qaiyum Nawaz Khan, who announced their joining of the Muslim League on 20 August 1947.⁸⁶ After some time, the government was able to win over the loyalties of two other *Khudai Khidmatgars*, Mian Jaffar Shah and Arbab Abdur Rahman Khan of Guli Gharai, and were assigned the task to bring more friends. They succeeded in breaking away three other *Khudai Khidmatgars* from Kohat, that is, *Pir* Shahinshah of Jangle Khail, Kohat, *Salar* Aslam of Ahmadi Banda, Kohat (now distt. Karak) and General Sahib Gul of Bugarai, Kohat (now disst. Karak).⁸⁷

Prime Minister Liaquat Ali Khan also played his role in winning support for Qaiyum Khan. In January 1948, seven MLAs of NWFP Legislative Assembly, who belonged to the Frontier Congress Party, that is, Khan Muhammad Aslam Khan, Arbab Abdur Rahman Khan, Sardar Asad Jan Khan, *Pir* Shahinshah, Sahib Gul Khan, Abdullah Khan of Potah, and Mian Jaffar Shah, went to Lahore to see Liaquat Ali Khan. After the meeting, they announced their decision to join the Pakistan Muslim League.⁸⁸ Efforts continued to win over more members. It was rumoured that even Quaid-i-Azam was involved in this campaign. Wali Khan writes that their Bannu member *Salar* Yaqub Khan told him that he was taken to Jinnah for a meeting. Jinnah told him, “you people have struggled hard and have sacrificed for the attainment of freedom. We have got freedom, now it’s your country and you should share the benefits. You need to join and sit and share the benefits.”⁸⁹ As one writer put it, Jinnah declared in March 1948, “Every

83 NAUS, Microfilm on Internal Affairs of Pakistan, Roll 1, 845F.00/4-3048, Alling to the Secretary of State, 30 April 1948, referred in, Samad, *Nation in Turmoil*, p.129.

84 Lawrence Ziring, *Pakistan in the Twentieth Century: A Political History* (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 1997), p.86.

85 Wali Khan, p.33.

86 PA, special branch, CID daily diary no. 181, bundle no. 74, serial no. 7369, 20 August 1947.

87 Wali Khan, p.33.

88 *The Pakistan Times* (Lahore), 7 January 1948.

89 Wali Khan, pp.33-34.

Mussalman should come under the banner of the Muslim League, which is the custodian of Pakistan, and build it up and make it a great state before we think of parties amongst ourselves which may be formed on sound and healthy lines.”⁹⁰

By February 1948, Qaiyum Khan’s endeavours succeeded in getting the support of majority of MLAs in the Assembly. In a special press conference on 2 February, he disclosed the names of those provincial assembly members who were supporting him. He also announced that the vacancies which had fallen vacant due to the deaths of Raja Haider Zaman Khan, Ali Badshah, Raja Abdur Rahman Khan would be filled along with the one which had become vacant due to the appointment of Habibullah Khan Marwat as Session Judge. The MLAs whose names were mentioned by Qaiyum Khan were as follows:

1. Khan Muhammad Abbas Khan
2. Nawabzada Allah Nawaz Khan
3. Arbab Abdur Rahman Khan
4. Ali Gohar Khan
5. Asadullah Khan
6. Sultan Hassan Ali Khan
7. Jalal ud Din Khan
8. Muhammad Ishaq Khan
9. Muhammad Aslam Khan
10. Khan Muhammad Farid Khan
11. Arbab Muhammad Sharif Khan
12. Muhammad Zaman Khan
13. Muhammad Musharaf Shah
14. Pir Shahinshah
15. Nawab Qutbuddin
16. Captain Zain Muhammad
17. Muhammad Jaffar Shah
18. Sardar Bahadur Khan
19. Khan Abdullah Khan

90 Samad Yunas, *A Nation in Turmoil: Nationalism and Ethnicity in Pakistan, 1937-1958* (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 1995), p.129.

20. Pir Abdul Latif of Zakori

21. Sahib Gul Khan.⁹¹

Indeed, Qaiyum Khan kept his ministry in power through the use of force and allurements. In April 1949, while the total strength of the Assembly members was 39, he had put 7 in jail, and had declared election of the two members illegal. One was made deputy foreign minister, four were sitting on the opposition benches who were joined by 10 other members. That meant that out of 39 MLAs only 14 were with Qaiyum Khan.⁹² The fact about these 14 was that every body out of 14 was an office holder, Minister, parliamentary Secretary, Municipal Committee Administrator or Custodian.⁹³

The portfolios of these members were as follows:

1. Arbab Muhammad Sharif was Chief Parliamentary Secretary, but resigned in March 1949.
2. Muhammad Aslam Khan was a Parliamentary Secretary.
3. Khan Bahadur Muhammad Zaman Khan was a Parliamentary Secretary.
4. Captain Zain Muhammad Khan besides being a Parliamentary Secretary, was also administrator of Nawanshehr Municipality.
5. Mir Dad Khan, a friend of Khan Bahadur Muhammad Zaman Khan, was made the Administrator of Haripur Municipality.
6. Muhammad Farid Khan was appointed a minister.
7. Jalal ud din Khan was Custodian, District Hazara.
8. Pir Shahinshah was Administrator, Kohat District Board.
9. Abdullah Khan of Kotha was Administrator, Dera Ismail Khan District Board.
10. Muhammad Ishaq Khan was Administrator, District Board Mardan and Municipality of Mardan.

91 PA, special branch, daily diary no. nil, 17 February 1948, bundle no. 77, serial no.1401.

92 This was the time when 7 Muslim League MLAs had planned to move a vote of no-confidence in the assembly against Qaiyum Khan. But Qaiyum Khan got the information before hand and arrested some of them. For complete details see Abbottabad Conspiracy Case in Chapter 2).

93 "Ye Hain Khan Abdul Qaiyum Khan", weekly Chattan, Lahore, 4 April 1949, p.10.

11. Nawab Qutbuddin Khan was Administrator Tank Municipality, but he left soon.
12. Arbab Abdur Rahman Khan, Provincial Jail Visitor, who received approximately Rs. 1000 to Rs. 1200 pm as traveling allowance.
13. Muhammad Yaqoob and one of his relatives were initially arrested on the charges that he was a contact person between Khan Abdul Ghaffar Khan and Faqir of Ipi. Later, through Deputy Commissioner Bannu,⁹⁴ he was pressurized in the jail and was asked to support the government. He readily agreed. Later on he was not only released, but made member of the Muslim League Central Committee.⁹⁵
14. Mian Jaffar Shah was Education Minister.⁹⁶

Right from the beginning, Qaiyum Khan used the state machinery for uprooting and hurting his political opponents. In order to torture his political opponents, he did not hesitate to abolish different classes in jails. He finished the distinction between political or non-political prisoners. Since most of the *Khudai Khidmatgars* belonged to the lower socio-economic strata, it was decided that in future classes of A, B, or C, would be given on the basis of one's economic status, thus denying them any political concessions.⁹⁷ Qaiyum Khan also used the boggy of 'anti-state and traitors' against his political rivals. It was quite evident from his speech, which he delivered on 26 November 1949 at Bili Tang, wherein he explicitly stated that those who opposed Muslim League were the enemies of Pakistan and were traitors.⁹⁸

Members of the Assembly, who did not join the Muslim League, were harassed and put behind the bars. Amongst these were General⁹⁹ Yaqub Shah, Qazi Attaullah Khan, *Salar* Yaqub Khan, Munafat Khan of Tor Dher, Abdul Aziz Khan *Kaka* of Zaida and *Salar* Amin Jan Khan. During this crackdown, Wali Khan was also arrested.¹⁰⁰ In spite of all these tactics, Qaiyum Khan was not able to get the required majority in the assembly for a long time. This is why he did not convene the meeting of the assembly in order to avoid embarrassment on the floor of the house. Meanwhile, some of the assembly members either migrated to India or died. Those who migrated to India included:

94 See Appendix VIII.

95 Weekly Chattan, 4 April 1949, pp.10-11 & 14.

96 Javed, p. 276.

97 The Pakistan Times (Lahore), 11 October 1947, front page.

98 Shahbaz (Peshawar), 28 November 1949, front page.

99 Amongst the *Khudai Khidmatgars* there were different ranks of the office bearers and General was one of the party post.

100 Wali Khan, p.38.

1. S. Isher Singh
2. Mehta Madan Lal
3. L. Kewal Ram
4. L. Kanwar Bhan Narang

While those who died included:

1. Raja Haider Zaman Khan
2. S. Ali Badshah
3. Mahesh Shiv Ram (murdered)¹⁰¹

Meanwhile, Qaiyum Khan put all sorts of pressure on the opposition parties, and even denied them the right to work as opposition in the Assembly. In January 1948, in a press conference, Qaiyum Khan stated that he believed in one party rule. His plea was that as the country was faced with many internal and external dangers so multi-party system could not be allowed. Once the situation improved, he argued, multi-party system, having different economic policies, could be allowed.¹⁰²

The first session of the Provincial Assembly, after independence, was held on 15 March 1948 with Speaker of the Assembly, Nawabzada Allah Nawaz Khan, in the Chair. The following members of the Assembly took oath of allegiance:

- | | |
|--------------------------------|---|
| 1. Abdul Aziz Khan | Uthmanama (Muhammadan Rural) |
| 2. Abdullah Khan | Dera Ismail Khan, North-Muhammadan Rural) |
| 3. Abdul Qaiyum Khan | Peshawar City (Muhammadan Urban) |
| 4. Abdul Qaiyum Khan Swati | Upper Pakhli (Muhammadan Rural) |
| 5. Akbar Ali Khan | Bannu West (Muhammadan Rural) |
| 6. Ali Gohar Khan | Lower Pakhli (Muhammadan Rural) |
| 7. Amin Jan Khan | Khalil (Muhammadan Rural) |
| 8. Arbab Abdur Rahman Khan | Doaba Daudzai (Muhammadan Rural) |
| 9. Arbab Muhammad Sharif Khan | Bara Mohmands (Muhammadan Rural) |
| 10. Captain Zain Muhammad Khan | Abbottabad West (Muhammadan Rural) |
| 11. Dr. Khan Sahib | Hashtnagar South (Muhammadan Rural) |

101 LAD, 15 March 1948, vol. Xv-No.1, official Report, serial no. 249.

102 The Pakistan Times (Lahore), 17 January 1948, p.6.

12.	Lala Kutu Ram	Bannu (General Rural)
13.	M. Jalal Din Khan	NWFP Towns
14.	Mian Jaffar Shah	Nowshera South (Muhammadan Rural)
15.	Mian Musharaf Shah	Peshawar Land holders
16.	Mian Qaim Shah	Hashtnagar North (Muhammadan Rural)
17.	Muhammad Abbas Khan	Mansehra (North Muhammadan Rural)
18.	Muhammad Aslam Khan	Teri North (Muhammadan Rural)
19.	Muhammad Farid Khan	Tanawal (Muhammadan Rural)
20.	Muhammad Ishaq Khan	Kamalzai (Muhammadan Rural)
21.	Muhammad Yahya Jan Khan	Peshawar City (Muhammadan Urban)
22.	Muhammad Yaqub Khan	Bannu East (Muhammadan Rural)
23.	Muhammad Zaman Khan	Haripur North (Muhammadan Rural)
24.	Muhammad Zarin Khan	Baizai (Muhammadan Rural)
25.	Munafatullah Khan	Razzar (Muhammadan Rural)
26.	Pir Muhammad Abdul Latif	Lakki West (Muhammadan Rural)
27.	Pir Shahinshah	Kohat (Muhammadan Rural)
28.	Qazi Attaullah Khan,	Amazai (Muhammadan Rural)
29.	Raja Sardar Khan	Abbottabad East (Muhammadan Rural)
30.	Sahib Gul Khan	Teri South (Muhammadan Rural)
31.	Sardar Asadullah Jan Khan	Kulachi (Muhammadan Rural)
32.	Sultan Hassan Ali Khan	NWFP Land holders
33.	Syed Muhammad Yaqub Shah	Nowshera North (Muhammadan Rural). ¹⁰³

As Girdhari Lal Puri, Deputy Speaker of the Assembly, was appointed as the Cultural Relations officer with the Indian Embassy in Afghanistan and remained continuously absent from the proceedings of the Assembly, the Speaker announced election for the post. Though the opposition strongly objected to it, the schedule remained unchanged and only Nawab Qutbuddin filed his papers for the post. He was declared successful, unopposed.¹⁰⁴

103 LAD, official report 15 March 1948, vol. Xv-no. 1, serial no. 249.

104 Ibid., 31 March 1948, vol. xv-no.12, serial no. 271, pp. 609-611.

In January 1949, the Election Tribunal disqualified Muhammad Abbas Khan, Revenue Minister, in an election petition. He was also disqualified from contesting elections for six years. The Tribunal also unseated Ali Gauhar Khan MLA from the Assembly seat.¹⁰⁵ After the decision of the Election Tribunal, Khan Muhammad Abbas Khan resigned from the Council of Ministers and his resignation was accepted on 20 January 1949. In his place, the Governor NWFP appointed Khan Muhammad Farid Khan as minister for Health and local Self-government.¹⁰⁶

Khan Shah Daraz Khan, a Muslim League MLA from Bannu constituency, who won by-election, took oath of his office on 18 March 1949. With these changes, the party position in the assembly stood as follows:

Ruling Party	:	20
Opposition	:	9
Opposition (in jail)	:	7
Independent	:	1
Vacant seats	:	2
Total	:	39¹⁰⁷

In order to please those members of the Assembly who were supporting Qaiyum Khan, the government of NWFP amended the NWFP Legislative Assembly (Removal of Disqualifications) Act, 1937, allowing the appointment of assembly members as the Administrators of the Municipal Committees, Notified Area Committees, and District Boards. Of course, they could continue to be the members of Assembly as well.¹⁰⁸

While, on the one hand, Qaiyum Khan Government was offering rewards to supporters, opponents were openly threatened. For example, on 8 March 1949, Khan Jalaluddin Khan, Muslim League MLA, speaking on the amendment to NWFP Public Safety Act, 1949, declared that if the opposition agreed to say Pakistan *Zindabad* and Muslim League *Zindabad*, there would be no hostility towards them. In a similar view, Qaiyum Khan, giving details of arrests and releases under the aforementioned Act admitted that they had released prisoners on the recommendations of Muslim League presidents who, in turn, had vouched that those people were loyal to Pakistan and the Muslim League.¹⁰⁹

105 The Pakistan Times (Lahore), 21 & 22 January 1949.

106 PGCEO, 12 February 1949, No. 694-c-12th February 1949.

107 The Pakistan Times (Lahore), 18 March 1949, p.12

108 PGCEO, 4 April 1949, No. 1160 – L.D., 1st April 1949.

109 LAD, 8 March 1949, vol. xvii-no.2, Official Report, serial no. 280.

The way Qaiyum Khan was ruling the province could be gauged from the following remarks of Sadiq Kashmiri, a columnist in weekly *Chattan*, who wrote that the real Muslim League leaders were angry with Qaiyum Khan because there was dictatorship in the NWFP and the League organization was actually the slave of his ministry. The Provincial Muslim League President, Hazrat Badshah Gul danced to the tunes of Qaiyum Khan and for this obedience he had been allotted 500 *Jarib* irrigated land of Attar Singh at a nominal lease of Rs. 3.00 per *jarib*, which, Badshah Gul rented out at Rs. 200.00 per *jarib*. Furthermore, Hazrat Badshah Gul was also given two thousand rupees per month from political fund. Another well-known case was that of Arbab Abdur Rahman Khan who was once a prominent member of the Congress and for whose sake Dr. Khan Sahib had dug out a canal from river Kabul to irrigate his village lands and provide water for some 8 to 10 water mills. Qaiyum Khan pressurized him and told him that if he did not join the Muslim League he would be put behind the bars. In February 1948, he joined the Muslim League. In reward, he was allotted a bungalow in Abbottabad at a rent of only one rupee per month, which was later on allotted to Finance Minister's wife.¹¹⁰

Khan Saifullah Khan, a leading member of the NWFP Provincial Muslim League Council in an interview with *Civil & Military Gazette*, Lahore, had also discussed Qaiyum Khan's policy of nepotism, patronage and victimization. In this interview, he charged Qaiyum Khan of maintaining himself in power by 'the unscrupulous use of official patronage'. While crime was on the decrease in the NWFP Province, expenditure on police was on the increase and the number of magistrates was mounting as lawyers who voiced opposition were appointed magistrates. All the former members of the Assembly had been given offices of profit. Junior officers were appointed Deputy Commissioners temporarily. Those who did not fall in line were victimized. He further stated that after the provincial Muslim League presidential election, Aslam Khattak, Director of Public Instructions (brother of Yusaf Khattak), had been removed from his office and appointed a "powerless" advisor to the administration. Mahabat Ali Khan, Honorary Administrator of Kohat Municipality was replaced by a paid Administrator who voted for the Chief Minister in the presidential election. Nasrullah Khan, Administrator, Bannu Municipality was dismissed since the Bannu Councilors had voted against Qaiyum Khan en block. Aurangzeb Khan, Assistant Administrator District Board, Mardan, was also removed. Ghulam Qasim Khan, Administrator, Notified Area, Kulachi (Dera Ismail Khan), was dismissed because his namesake, a Provincial League Councilor, had voted against the Chief Minister.¹¹¹

110 Sadiq Kashmiri, "Ye Hai Khan Abdul Qaiyum Khan", Weekly *Chattan*, Lahore, April 4, 1949, p.10 and Hoti, Interview.

111 The *Civil & Military Gazette* (Lahore), 11 May 1951, p.12.

These highhanded tactics of Qaiyum Khan kept circulating in the political arena of Pakistan for a long time. On 1 March 1954, while writing about the policy of Muslim League in Bengal, the editor of the *Pakistan Times* recalled: "...the people of Pakistan have not forgotten the misdeeds of Messers Qaiyum Khan and Khuro (a political leader of Sindh), nor the cock-and-bull stories of conspiracies and anti-state plans with which these gentlemen sought to justify their fascist methods of retaining power."¹¹²

Thus Qaiyum Khan, throughout his rule in the NWFP, kept himself in power through undemocratic methods. He did not hesitate from using state forces, funds and other coercive means to either allure opposition members to his side or keep his own members within his camp. He was intolerant to opposition whether outside the Muslim League or inside the League. It is evident that he coerced all dissenting Muslim Leaguers to either leave the party or toe his line.

112 Khan Mazhar Ali Khan, *Pakistan: The First Twelve Years*, the *Pakistan Times* Editorials of Mazhar Ali Khan (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 1996), pp.278-279.

CHAPTER 2

POLITICAL SITUATION OF THE PROVINCE: A HISTORIC BACKDROP

Before the creation of Pakistan in 1947, the two major political parties in the province were *Khudai Khidmatgars* and Muslim League. Later on, when some leading members of the Muslim League developed differences with Qaiyum Khan, they formed the Jinnah *Awami* Muslim League. Over all, these three parties played the significant role. Of course, there were other parties too, but neither they had large following nor did they play worth-mentioning role in the provincial politics during this time. Among them, to mention few, were *Jamaat-i-Islami*, *Khaksar* Party, *Majlis-i-Ahrar*, *Najia* Party, *Anjuman-i-ttehad wa Taraqai Sooba Sarhad* or also known as Land Lords Union.¹

The *Khudai Khidmatgars* dominated the political horizon of the province, led by Dr. Khan Sahib, was the ruling party at the time of the creation of Pakistan. The Provincial Muslim League had waged a very strong Civil-Disobedience Movement against Dr. Khan Sahib just before the announcement of the 3rd June Plan. However, after the announcement of the Plan and call for referendum in the Province, the Muslim League called off the Movement. Instead, it started work for the referendum. And after winning the referendum, the League started demand for the removal of Dr. Khan Sahib's ministry. Though the British rulers did not oblige, Quaid-i-Azam Muhammad Ali Jinnah dismissed the ministry and appointed Qaiyum Khan as the Chief Minister of the Province. In spite of the fact that the *Khudai Khidmatgars* had lost power, they enjoyed a vast support not only among the masses but the Assembly members as well. Therefore, they posed a potential threat to the Qaiyum Khan government. No wonder, Qaiyum Khan adopted the policy of suppression and declared them illegal and put behind bars all important leaders of the party. Not only Qaiyum Khan tried to suppress the *Khudai Khidmatgars*, he did not spare other parties as well. He banned all public meetings and processions of *Khaksars*, *Majlis-i-Ahrar* and other parties. The leaders of *Awami* League were arrested and the party was suspended.²

The police, sensing the mood of the government, also started excesses and they did not differentiate between anti-state and anti-Muslim League elements, and started arresting anybody who was perceived to be anti-Muslim League.³ The discord thus sown among different people by Qaiyum Khan, thus, became a

1 For further details please see, M. Rafique Afzal, *Political Parties in Pakistan, 1947-1958* (Islamabad: National Commission on Historical and Cultural Research, 1976) & Dr. Safdar Mahmood, *Pakistan: Muslim League Ka Daur-i-Hakoomat (1947-1954)*(Urdu) (Lahore: Sang-e-Meel Publications, 1986).

2 Bukhari, p.203.

3 PA, special branch, IPS, daily diary no. nil, dated 22 December 1947, bundle no. 17, serial no. 253, p.41.

permanent feature of politics of the NWFP and the province never recovered from this political dis-unity.⁴

In order to achieve his political goals, Qaiyum Khan did not care for his actions as to whether they were democratic or undemocratic. He did not believe in political expediency or tolerance. He had his own style of ruling and that was strong rule for which even he did not hesitate from using coercive measures.⁵ He did not allow political parties' meetings in the province. Thus, he denied a level ground to his opponents. His intolerance towards opposition can be judged from the fact that he banned nearly nineteen other organizations⁶ besides the *Khudai Khidmatgars* in the province.⁷ In September 1948, *Ahrar* Party arranged a Provincial *Majlis-i-Ahrar* Conference in Peshawar but Qaiyum Khan did not allow it. Acknowledging this to the newsmen, he stated: "Those persons who always opposed Pakistan tooth and nail have no possible right to give any lead to Pakistani masses..."⁸

Though he used the stunt of anti-Pakistan elements against *Khudai Khidmatgars*, the fact was that Qaiyum Khan did not spare even stalwart Muslim Leaguers like *Pir* of Manki Sharif and *Pir* Zakori who were harassed and terrorized so much that they spent most of their time outside the NWFP telling the stories of Qaiyum Khan's highhandedness. The same was the story of Khan Ghulam Muhammad Khan Lundkhwar. Badshah Gul, the president of Frontier Muslim League resigned in protest against his policies, Qaiyum Khan found in this an opportunity to further strengthen his position and himself became the President of the Frontier Muslim League. Due to differences, both Jalal Baba and Abbas Khan were removed from the cabinet and disqualified for elections for five years.⁹

Mian Zaiuddin writes in his memoirs that since Qaiyum Khan became the Chief Minister, none of his opponents was safe, whether within the Muslim League or outside. He even did not spare *Pir* of Manki Sharif who had played a major role in the referendum. Due to Qaiyum Khan's highhanded tactics against him, he secretly left the NWFP for Punjab to avoid arrest at his hands.¹⁰ Speaking at a press conference at Lahore in March 1952, he charged that Qaiyum Khan had turned the province into a prison and all voices of opposition were being gagged. He further alleged that "the supporters of the opposition parties in the province

4 Hamid Yusuf, *Pakistan in Search of Democracy, 1947-77* (Lahore: Afrasia Publications, 1980), p.30.

5 Kausar Niazi, *Jinhain Main Ne Daikha* (Urdu) (Lahore: Jang Publishers, 1991), pp.164-165.

6 Salamat, p.110.

7 Afzal, p.70.

8 The Pakistan Times, 3 September 1948, p.3.

9 Khan Abad, p.50.

10 Zaiuddin, p.80 & Arbab Noor M.Khan, Interview.

were being indiscriminately sent behind the bars and were kept in jail without being given any chance of their trial in an open court of law..."¹¹

In order to crush permanently the political activities of the opposition, Qaiyum Khan innovated a novel idea of getting signed "the deed of amnesty" from the political detainees for their release. On his directives, the police started forcing his opponents, particularly the *Khudai Khidmatgars*, to sign the deed, and those who refused to sign were tortured and were made to languish in the prisons. The deed of amnesty was as follows:

1. Never to say *Zinda Bad* for Khan Abdul Ghaffar Khan.
2. Not to oppose Khan Qaiyum Khan in any way.
3. Not to take part in any (anti-government) meeting or procession.
4. Declare estrangement with the *Khudai Khidmatgars* movement.
5. Join the Muslim League.¹²

In a press statement issued on 14 February 1952 the General Secretary of *Jam'at-i-Islami*, Maulana Tufail Muhammad strongly criticized the loyalty pledge (deed of amnesty) being taken by the provincial government from the political detainees in NWFP. He stated that by forcing the detainees the loyalty pledge the government was creating a wrong impression that the detainee was not loyal to Pakistan. He gave the example of one of his party leaders, Khan Sardar Ali Khan. He had further commented that earlier he was asked to give a pledge of loyalty to the government, which he refused but later on he was asked to give a pledge of loyalty to Pakistan, which he readily did because there was no question of disloyalty to Pakistan.¹³ However, Qaiyum Khan had no tolerance towards the followers of *Khudai Khidmatgars*, it is obvious from the fact that he ordered the jail authorities to send Abad Khan, a ring leader of *Khudai Khidmatgars*, who had refused to sign the deed of amnesty to Dera Ismail Khan jail and put him in the "mental ward so that a lunatic might kill" him.¹⁴

QAIYUM KHAN AND KHUDAI KHIDMATGARS

Qaiyum Khan particularly adopted very harsh policy towards *Khudai Khidmatgars*; however, the latter did not follow a confrontational policy. It is obvious from the following resolutions, which were passed in a combined meeting of the Provincial *Jirga*, Parliamentary Party of the Congress, the *Zalmai*

11 The Civil and Military Gazette (Lahore), 6 March 1952, p.5.

12 Khan Abad, pp. 42-44.

13 The Pakistan Times (Lahore), 14 February 1952, p.2.

14 Khan Abad, p.44.

Pakhtun, the *Khudai Khidmatgars* and the representatives of the tribal areas on 3 and 4 September, 1947. (For details see chapter 1, page no. 30).¹⁵

But Qaiyum Khan and other Muslim League leaders never accepted this; they always referred to Abdul Ghaffar Khan's alleged speech in which he had termed Pakistan as a dune of sand that could be demolished any time.¹⁶ However, Dr. Sher Zaman Taizai is of the opinion that, as stated by Syed Attaullah Shah of Lal Kurti, Peshawar, publisher of daily *Islah*, in the Peshawar High Court, it was a cooked up statement against him. According to him, they were called by Qaiyum Khan, and were asked to publish that Ghaffar Khan had stated it in a public speech, which they did. Though this was published, there were no further details available as to where and when he delivered this speech.¹⁷ Further, in a court proceeding subsequently Ghaffar Khan strongly denied having given this statement. Last, but not the least, according to one of his followers, Qalandar Mohmand, it was not the style of Ghaffar Khan to give threatening statements as he always followed the policy of non-violence.¹⁸

In spite of the conciliatory policy adopted by the *Khudai Khidmatgars*, the Muslim League in general and Qaiyum Khan in particular were not ready to make peace with them. Qaiyum Khan used to issue threatening statements against *Khudai Khidmatgars* at various times and indeed announced that all anti-Pakistan activities would be suppressed by force.¹⁹ It is obvious from a statement that he gave with an air of haughtiness: "I have put Ghaffar Khan in such a dark dungeon that you will not see him alive again." Qazi Attaullah died in jail and it was rumoured that Qaiyum Khan had poisoned him.²⁰ The Speaker of the Assembly did not allow even the adjournment motion in respect of his death in the provincial Assembly on technical grounds.²¹ The opposition, including the mover *Pirzada Ahmad Gul*, Khan Samin Jan Khan and *Arbab Asaf Khan* staged a walk out from the day's proceedings as a protest.²²

Qaiyum Khan used the bogey of *Pakhtunistan* against Ghaffar Khan and other *Khudai Khidmatgar* leaders and workers. In reality, there was no connection between Ghaffar Khan, Faqir of Ipi and Afghanistan brand of *Pakhtunistan*, but

15 Korejo, p.195.

16 Hoti, Interview.

17 Dr. Sher Zaman Taizai, Interview by author, hand written, dated 19 June 2001, at the office of the author, Department of History, University of Peshawar, Peshawar.

18 Mohmand, Interview.

19 The Pakistan Times (Lahore), 11 October 1947, front page.

20 Khan Abad, p.43.

21 LAD, 3 March 1952, vol. xxv-No. 1, official report, serial no. 351, pp. 16-17.

22 LAD, 4 March 1952, vol. xxv-No. 2, official report, serial no. 352, pp.42-45.

Qaiyum Khan apparently had no other basis to suppress the *Khudai Khidmatgars*. So, he used the *Pakhtunistan* for this purpose.²³

According to Dr. Sher Zaman Taizai, the *Pakhtunistan* issue was intentionally highlighted by Qaiyum Khan himself. He had sent two tribal *maliks* to Afghanistan in 1948 with the instructions to propagate *Pakhtunistan*. It was after their entry into Afghanistan that *Pakhtunistan* Square was named and the first of September was declared as *Pakhtunistan* Day.²⁴ The result was the resurgence of *Khudai Khidmatgars* and affiliated parties. However, since they were under strict security agencies' surveillance, they started political meetings under the guise of *Maulud Sharif* (gathering for the appreciation of the Holy Prophet) at several places in the Peshawar and Charsadda tehsils. These meetings too were highly suspected by the government.²⁵

In spite of all the difficulties with Qaiyum Khan government, Ghaffar Khan went to Karachi in February 1948 to attend the Constituent Assembly session. While in Karachi, he was invited by Quaid-i-Azam Muhammad Ali Jinnah at his home where they held meeting in a very cordial atmosphere and engaged in lengthy discussions. Jinnah also told him that he must have seen his statement in which he had stated that he was the Governor-General of Pakistan, and, therefore, he did not have links with any particular political party. Rather, he wanted to establish good relations with all the parties.²⁶

Ghaffar Khan invited Jinnah to Sardaryab, the *Khudai Khidmatgars*' headquarters, which Jinnah accepted. He said that he would definitely visit Sardaryab during his next visit to Peshawar. In March 1948, Jinnah's tour schedule came in the newspapers and meeting with Ghaffar Khan was also fixed. After Jinnah's arrival in Peshawar, Ghaffar Khan called on him at the Governor House. When he came out from that meeting, he told Wali Khan that Jinnah had asked him and his friends to join the Muslim League. Ghaffar Khan conveyed the same to his party's Executive Committee members who did not agree with the proposal and, in fact, asked him to inform Jinnah about their decision in writing. Ghaffar Khan wrote to Jinnah: "I discussed your proposal with my friends. However, their unanimous decision was against joining Muslim League. However, they were ready to help construct and develop the country but they reserve the right to criticize the government for her wrong, illegal and unconstitutional policies, if any."²⁷

23 Fida M.Khan, Interview.

24 Taizai, Interview.

25 PA, Monthly report upto 14 October 1947, bundle no. 15, serial no. 233, p.143.

26 PA, special branch, CID daily diary no. 91, dated 6 May 1948, bundle no. 17, serial no. 255, p.45 & Wali Khan, pp.116-17.

27 Ibid.

Ghaffar Khan blamed the English officials, among others, for the failure of his meeting with Jinnah. As he put it:

Sir Ambrose Dundas, previously Agent to the Governor-General for Baluchistan, had succeeded Sir George Cunningham who was taken ill. All important posts—the Chief Secretary, the Chief Engineer, the Revenue Commissioner, the Director of the Intelligence Department, etc.—were held by the English and their henchmen. When they learnt that we had come to an understanding with Jinnah, they took fright. Abdul Qaiyum Khan, the Chief Minister, and his coterie of English supporters felt the ground slipping away from under their feet. Unless they did something now, they said to themselves, their day was over. They all joined hands and conspired to create a rift between us two...²⁸

He further wrote, When Jinnah came to the Frontier Province and the question of holding talks with the *Khudai Khidmatgars* came up, they told him that it would be most unwise to give us a chance. The English officials said that they had given the *Khudai Khidmatgar* movement only four months' respite with the result that they could not control it afterwards. The only way to render us innocuous was to absorb us in the Muslim League. They also told Jinnah that the *Khudai Khidmatgars* were a dangerous lot. If he attended any of their meeting, they would take an undue advantage of it and even assassinate him.²⁹

However, besides the English officials, all the front line leaders of the Frontier Muslim League, including Qaiyum Khan, Arbab Noor Muhammad Khan, Pir of Manki Sharif, and Sardar Abdul Rab Nishtar unanimously opposed Jinnah's visit to Sardaryab. They believed that they were the people who had given sacrifices for Pakistan and had also suffered at the hands of the Frontier Congress. Now if there was a patch up, they would lose power. So, they opposed Jinnah's visit to Sardaryab.³⁰

It is believed that Qaiyum Khan personally worked hard to convince Jinnah not to proceed to Sardaryab. The main reason for his opposition to the visit was his personal fear that if the Muslim League and *Khudai Khidmatgars* rapprochement took place, he would lose not only his importance but also the office of the Chief Minister of the province. So he conspired against this meeting and succeeded in blocking not only the visit but also any understanding between Jinnah and Ghaffar Khan. Another stalwart of the Muslim League, Muhammad Ali Khan of Hoti, has also opined that Qaiyum Khan was foreseeing danger in this meeting, and therefore, he sabotaged it.³¹

28 Tendulkar, p.461.

29 Ibid.

30 Arbab Noor M. Khan and Sher Mohammad Khan Interviews.

31 Fida M. Khan, Interview.

It is even suggested that in order to convince Jinnah, Qaiyum Khan arranged a letter from I.I. Chundrigar, the then Pakistan ambassador in Kabul, divulging *Khudai Khidmatgars'* plan to kill Jinnah during his Sardaryab visit. Qaiyum Khan showed this letter to Jinnah and, thus, he was persuaded to cancel his scheduled visit.³² But Qaiyum Khan himself had a different story about the situation. According to him, "I was the last to meet Quaid-i-Azam (before his departure to Karachi). Quaid-i-Azam told me that he had tried his utmost to convince Khan Abdul Ghaffar Khan to work for the defence and safety of Pakistan but he (Ghaffar Khan) refused to do so. So Quaid-i-Azam told me (Qaiyum Khan) that if Ghaffar Khan and his colleagues continued their activities, deal with them harshly."³³

Some other people are also of the same opinion that actually Jinnah himself also concluded from his meeting with Ghaffar Khan in Peshawar that he and his party did not want to give up the *Pakhtunistan* demand. Supporting this view, Lawrence Ziring writes, "Although Ghaffar Khan did not raise the issue of *Pakhtunistan*, that is, a separate state for the Pathan nation, his reply to Jinnah's queries led the Quaid-i-Azam to conclude that *Pakhtunistan* was indeed the *Khudai Khidmatgars'* principal objective. The Khan brothers, he confided to his closest confidants, were determined to destroy Pakistan and hence must be resisted..."³⁴

Therefore, the central government tried to suppress the *Khudai Khidmatgars* and other regional parties. However the result was that the more the government pressed the opposition parties particularly in Bengal and smaller provinces of West Pakistan, the more these actions created difficulties. But in spite of all this,

32 Mohmand, Interview.

In order to convince Jinnah of the *Khudai Khidmatgars'* uncompromising attitude, the last trick was even more intelligently and convincingly arranged and played by Qaiyum Khan and his supporters. According to Tendulkar, during Jinnah's public address in Peshawar, they placed their men at different places and instructed to interrupt Jinnah's address with intervals, creating disturbance and then walking out. Whenever such group would start it, Qaiyum Khan used to shout from the stage, "you badmash of *Khudai Khidmatgar*, why don't you desist?" The trick worked. Jinnah was convinced that the *Khudai Khidmatgars* were a dangerous lot and were out to kill him. Before he left the Frontier Province, he left instructions that the *Khudai Khidmatgar* organization was to be crushed. Liaquat Ali was given a free hand, including the power to suspend or dismiss at will any Deputy Commissioner or Covenanted officer." Tendulkar, p.462.

33 Muhammad Shafi Sabir, *Tarikh-i-Suba Sarhad* (Peshawar: University Book Agency, n.d), p.1036.

34 Ziring, pp.86-87.

the central government was keen to build and reinforce the Muslim League as the ruling party in the country.³⁵

The first manifestation of this process came with Jinnah's declaration of March 1948: "Every Mussalman should come under the banner of the Muslim League, which is the custodian of Pakistan, and build up and make it a great state before we think of parties amongst ourselves which may be formed on sound and healthy lines."³⁶ But this policy of single-party state was not well received, and indeed proved to be counter-productive. Ghaffar Khan established another opposition party on 6 March 1948, with the name of All-Pakistan People's Party, later renamed as People's Organisation. Many political stalwarts and anti-League leaders like G.M. Syed, Abdul Majeed Sindi, Abdul Samad Khan Achakzai and Sheikh Hesamuddin joined it. Its first convention was also attended by 5 Congress members of the Constituent Assembly from East Bengal. It was generally felt that the party had the potential to become a popular national party. The Muslim League was not happy with this development, and did utmost to suppress it. The problem with the ruling elites in Pakistan was that they equated political opposition with anti-state activities. In their opinion, the People's Organization was the reactivation of 'Indian Congress', which would work as 5th Column. Hence, they selectively targeted the *Khudai Khidmatgars*, the backbone of the fledgling party.³⁷

In order to crush the *Khudai Khidmatgars*, Qaiyum Khan needed the support and help of government officials, who had already developed antipathy towards them during the rule of the Congress ministries in the province. When Qaiyum Khan came into power, he promoted officials liberally, as because of the migration of the non-Muslims many posts were vacant. For example, tehsildars were promoted to the ranks of deputy commissioners and ASIs (Assistant Sub-Inspectors) were promoted to the ranks of SPs (Superintendent of Police). However, in order to use them against the *Khudai Khidmatgars*, they were not confirmed on their new posts. Rather, Qaiyum Khan told them that they would be confirmed only if they work honestly for the government, which meant that they force the *Khudai Khidmatgars* to join Muslim League.³⁸

The question is why Qaiyum Khan was so ardent enemy of the *Khudai Khidmatgars*. In Wali Khan's opinion, one of his major political adversaries and victims, Qaiyum Khan's harsh and inhuman behaviour towards his opponents had a psychological background. He was a Kashmiri but was brought up among the Pakhtuns. He got education in NWFP. During this period, he faced all kind of

35 Samad, pp.128-29.

36 Ibid., p.129.

37 Ibid., pp.129-30.

38 Wali Khan, pp. 46-47.

discrimination that created an inferiority complex in his mind, and thus he became a psychic patient. When he came into power, he had an unbalanced personality. He wanted to take his revenge. Basically, he was a coward but power made him cruel. So he turned against all respected, principled and brave people. He wanted to insult them and satisfy his own shortcomings.³⁹

Ironically when the Frontier government started arresting the *Khudai Khidmatgars* on different charges, none was arrested under the normal law of the country. Instead, they were arrested under 40 FCR (Frontier Crimes Regulations). Thus, they were denied any right to contest their cases in the judicial court, which were termed "the most unfair thing" by Qazi Attaullah Khan on the floor of the NWFP Assembly.⁴⁰

When the government failed either to allure or force Ghaffar Khan to join the Muslim League, the provincial government arrested him alongwith two companions on 15 June 1948 near Bahadur Khel, district Kohat, under 40 FCR while he was on his way to Bannu. He was charged with trying "to create disturbances to synchronize with the expected advance of the Indian Army" towards Pakistan's frontier, and for having "invited people to rise against the lawfully established government of the country" in collaboration with the agents of Faqir of Ipi.⁴¹ The District Magistrate Kohat tried him under 40 FCR and awarded him 3 years rigorous imprisonment, which was the maximum sentence under the aforementioned regulations.⁴²

This was the first arbitrary act in the new state of Pakistan. Ghaffar Khan was neither provided the opportunity to defend himself nor it was considered necessary to present witnesses or statement. The right of appeal to the higher authorities or higher courts was out of question. The main reason for this action was that though Qaiyum Khan had formed his government with the Congress turncoats, and he was always afraid of Ghaffar Khan and felt threatened by his activities. Further, Quaid-i-Azam Muhammad Ali Jinnah had also veildly stated in the public address of 22 April, 1948, that he knew the weaknesses and crimes of government but the people should be patient, as he would definitely take action at appropriate time. This had further frightened Qaiyum Khan. The formation of Peoples Party by Ghaffar Khan at the all-Pakistan level created fear among the ruling class of Pakistan. So, they had also turned against him. Not surprisingly,

39 Ibid., pp. 44-45.

40 LAD, 20 March 1948, vol. xv-No. 4, official report, serial no. 251, p.171.

41 Keesing, Pakistan, p.14, & PA, CID daily diary no. 125, dated 16 June 1948, bundle no. 17, serial no. 257.

42 The Pakistan Times (Lahore), 17 June 1948, front page news.

after few months, the central government extended his imprisonment for indefinite period under Bengal State Prisoners Regulation 111 of India 1818.⁴³

On 28 June 1948 Special Branch of the Police reported that the *Khudai Khidmatgars* would launch agitation from Charsadda on the 6th of July by picketing courts with Holy Quran on their heads. They would ask the people to settle their cases according to the *Shariat*.⁴⁴ Meanwhile, the arrests of the *Khudai Khidmatgars* continued unabated and on the night of 28th/29th June Qazi Attaullah and Amir Muhammad Khan of Hoti were arrested under FCR while Firdos Khan of Manerai a member of the Provincial Working Committee had been arrested on 28 June 1948 under the same laws. On 29 June 1948 Mian Shakirullah of Gojar Garhi was also arrested under the FCR.⁴⁵ In addition, the provincial government in a press conference declared that Qazi Attaullah, former minister and deputy leader of the *Khudai Khidmatgars* in the Assembly and Amir Muhammad Khan of Hoti, president provincial *Khudai Khidmatgar Jirga*, were involved in activities aimed at toppling the government.⁴⁶

To evaluate the crackdown of the government against the *Khudai Khidmatgars* and to counter the government action, a secret meeting was held on 2 July 1948 at Sardaryab. The meeting was attended by Dr. Khan Sahib, Abdul Ghani Khan, Obaidullah Khan, Hidayatullah, Muhammad Aslam Sharar of Amba Dher, Muhammad Azam of Baja Bam Khel, district Mardan beside others. The following important matters were discussed and resolved:

1. The arrest of the Red Shirts was condemned.
2. The presidents of "Tappas" were authorized to fill up the vacancies of the office bearers arising out of their arrests.
3. Persons should be earmarked to fill up the vacancies of rank in place of Red Shirt workers, whose arrest was apprehended.
4. The Red Shirts should in future attend all meetings in uniform.
5. Propaganda in meetings and *hujras* should be conducted on the following points:
 - a. The NWFP Government was meant for the NWFP People and the Punjabis had no right to have any share in it.
 - b. *Shariat* Law to be enforced.

43 Zahid, pp.143-46.

44 PA, special branch, IPS daily diary no. nil, dated 28 June 1948, bundle no. 17, serial no. 256.

45 Ibid., diary no. nil, 1 July 1948.

46 Inqilab (Lahore), 1 July 1948.

- c. The British to be expelled from Pakistan.
- d. Abdul Ghaffar Khan to be released unconditionally.
- e. Ban should be lifted from holding of meetings and taking out processions.
- f. Red Shirt Newspaper publication to be permitted.
- g. All the Red Shirts, who were arrested, to be released.⁴⁷

On 5 July 1948 Abdul Ghani Khan, Obaidullah Khan, Master Abdul Karim, alongwith many other leaders were arrested.⁴⁸ The provincial government arrested, at large scale, the leaders and workers of the *Khudai Khidmatgars*, the followers of Faqir of Ipi and prominent opponents of the Qaiyum Ministry. In order to cope with this situation and have powers to deal effectively with the opponents, the Governor NWFP, Sir Ambrose Dundas, issued an ordinance known as The North-West Frontier Province Public Safety Ordinance, VII of 1948 giving extra ordinary powers to the provincial government on 8 July 1948.⁴⁹ The provincial government's assumption of these extra ordinary powers through the Ordinance was widely criticized. National newspapers wrote strong-worded criticism of the action. The only paper, which welcomed the Ordinance, was the *Shahbaz*, published from Peshawar.⁵⁰

Criticizing the Ordinance, daily *Inqilab*, Lahore, termed it a strange Ordinance through which the provincial government could arrest any person anywhere in Pakistan without warrant whether a person had committed any crime or intended to do the same against the government of Pakistan. Under this Ordinance, the provincial government was authorized to put a person under arrest within the province or to deport a person from the province. Further, under this Ordinance every type of rallies, demonstrations and processions were banned.⁵¹

47 PA, IPS daily diary No. nil, dated 5 July 1948, bundle no. 18, serial no. 1417,

48 Ibid., 7 July 1948.

49 PA, Publication section, Accession no. 6292, serial no. 214, Government Gazette, NWFP. When in October 1948 this Bill was presented in the Provincial Legislative Assembly, the opposition had been reduced only to 4 persons. The rest of them had either been won over to the treasury benches or were put into prisons: Syed Qaim Shah criticizing the Ordinance compared it with the Tranquility Act, which had been promulgated by the British in 1918 in Bengal to crush the terrorists. He alleged that the Public Safety Ordinance has taken its roots from the aforementioned Act. For details of the Ordinance see Appendix no. VII.

50 PA, special branch, fortnightly general note on the Press in NWFP no. 3120, dated 13 July 1948, Peshawar, bundle no. 43, serial no. 692.

51 *Inqilab* (Lahore), 11 & 14 July 1948.

In spite of strong criticism from the national and international press, Qaiyum Khan continued his endeavours to crush every kind of opposition. Towards this end, the provincial government took a further step, and taking its powers from the Public Safety Ordinance, empowered District Magistrates and Sub-Divisional Magistrates to use Sections 3(1), 4 (1) (F) and 7 of the Ordinance.⁵²

Qaiyum Khan's main defense of his Ministry's action against his political rivals was that they were involved in anti-state activities. He was particularly critical of the *Khudai Khidmatgars* who were termed as the agents of Hindus and, thus, traitors. However, Qaiyum Khan was not only arresting *Khudai Khidmatgars* but also his own Muslim League colleagues who dared to criticize his Ministry. Ghulam Muhammad Khan Lund Khwar was arrested at Murree under Section 3 of the Public Safety Ordinance and was brought to Peshawar on 31 July 1948.⁵³ He was sent to D.I.Khan jail and his weapons were confiscated. However, on 4 August 1948, he resorted to hunger strike against the insulting and unbecoming attitude of the Jail authorities. He had been put in "C" class. He had been arrested for his harsh criticism of the Ministry.⁵⁴ In order to protest against the arrest of a Muslim Leaguer, the Provincial Muslim League, under the chairmanship of Samin Jan Khan of Mardan, held a private meeting of the Muslim Leaguers at the Provincial Muslim League office, outside Kabuli Gate, Peshawar city on 9 August 1948, in which more than 250 people participated. The speakers at the meeting strongly criticized the arrest of Ghulam Muhammad Khan Lund Khwar. The speakers also criticized the promulgation of Public Safety Ordinance. Samin Jan Khan stated that the Ordinance had been "enforced without the approval of the Constitution-Making Committee (of the Muslim League) and without the consent of the public." He was of the opinion that, in the presence of present legal system, there was no need of Public Safety Ordinance, as under the system, enough powers were vested with the state functionaries to deal with the anti-state elements. He further stated that since Ghaffar Khan was arrested under 40 FCR, what was the need of the Ordinance? He was of the opinion that the Ordinance was imposed for the Congressites but now it was being used against the Muslim Leaguers too.⁵⁵

In the holy month of *Ramazan* in 1948, the NWFP remained quiet as compared to other months. However, the government agencies were reporting that *Khudai Khidmatgars* were planning for agitation after 'Id'. During the fasting month very

52 NDC, Microfilm, A. no.250, Government of NWFP notification no. 32252. B.1. 13 August 1948.

53 PA, special branch, IPS daily diary no. nil, dated 2 August 1948, bundle no. 78, serial no. 1416.

54 Inqilab (Lahore), 4 August 1948.

55 PA, special branch, IPS daily diary no. nil, dated 10 August 1948, bundle no. 78, serial no. 1416.

few instances were reported, like one in which some unknown person pasted a poster at *tonga adda* in the village of Chamkani, written by hand and bordered with red paper bearing “*Pakistan Barbad*”, “*Quaid-i-Azam Barbad*”, “*Pakhunistan Zindabad*” and “*Abdul Ghaffar Khan Zindabad*.”⁵⁶ Besides that ‘Pathanistan Students Federation’ was also active in pro-*Khudai Khidmatgars*’ propaganda under the leadership of Jehanzeb, a nephew of Abdul Ghaffar Khan. He was touring different villages along with his friends, especially Ashraf of Rajjar, Niaz Muhammad of Rajjar, Ghaniullah of Dildar Garhi, Faizullah, Shamsuddin of Rajjar, Abdul Shakoor, Abdul Razaq of Mirabad, Nasrullah of Wardaga, Muhammad Umar of Palosa, Adnan Khan of Ibad Killi, Shah Nazar of Dargai and Zardad of Gul Abad. They were encouraging people to take active part in the *Khudai Khidmatgars* activities after ‘*Id*’. Jehanzeb had also invited *Pir Jamal* alias *Piri* of Jangal Khel, Kohat to join hands with him in *Khudai Khidmatgars* Movement. However he did not agree to do so.⁵⁷

Meanwhile Dr. Khan Sahib was also arrested by the NWFP government in August 1948 under the Public Safety Ordinance and was put under custody for three months. He was moved to a forest rest house near Thandiani in Hazara.⁵⁸ The official reason for his arrest was said to be his *Khudai Khidmatgars* Organization’s planning to disrupt the Independence Day celebrations. It was also believed that the organization was planning to attack those jails where the workers were detained in order to free them.⁵⁹ Since it was widely believed that the Qaiyum Khan Government was determined to arrest the *Khudai Khidmatgar* workers, many of them went underground. In order to cope with this situation, the government started issuing notices to the local magistrates to proceed against their person and properties under section 3 sub-section (I) of NWFP Public Safety Ordinance.⁶⁰

Though the provincial government charged the leaders and workers of the *Khudai Khidmatgars* with sedition and anti-state activities, Abdul Wali Khan insisted, subsequently, that they were arrested without any reason for they had neither violated a law nor had indulged in a movement. The fact was that the government was arresting anti-government people and was labeling them as “anti-state, anti-Islam and traitors.”⁶¹

56 PA, special branch, CID daily diary no. 154, dated 24 July 1948, bundle no. 17, serial no. 258.

57 PA, special branch, IPS daily diary no. nil, dated 28 July 1948, bundle no. 17, serial no. 258.

58 The Civil and Military Gazette (Lahore), 4 August 1948.

59 Ibid., 8 August 1948.

60 Office order of the Chief Secretary to the government of NWFP, No. 2020-24/BI dated 31 July 1948, NWFP Archives, Bundle no. 43, serial no. 692.

61 Wali Khan, p.124.

The *Khudai Khidmatgars* planned demonstration after 'Id' at Babara in order to press the government for the acceptance of their demand to impose Shariat Law in the country. The government agencies had already sent reports to the authorities in this regard. So, in order to stop the meeting, the government imposed section 144 Cr. P.C. in the Charsadda area. To discourage people from participation, the police, at many places, such as at Peshawar, Mardan, Swabi, Shabqadar, Nowshera, etc., stopped people from going to Charsadda. In spite of that some workers succeeded in reaching Charsadda.⁶²

Zarin Khan, MLA of Mian Isa (Mardan Distt.), Amin Jan, MLA, and *Salar* of Koochian, Bahadur and Fateh of Sheikho, and Sherdil of Charsadda, organized the meeting at Babara.⁶³ According to Wali Khan, the organizer of the meeting was *Salar-e-Azam Khudai Khidmatgars* Amin Jan Khan.⁶⁴ When the procession started its march on 12 August, 1948, they were moving in military formation in the open field carrying red flags and raising the slogans of: "*Inqilab Zindabad*", "*Fakhr-e-Afghan Zindabad*", "*Pakistan Zindabad*" and "*Shariat-i-Quran Zindabad*."⁶⁵ The government was of the view that since section 144 Cr.P.C. was imposed in Prang, Charsadda, and Babara villages for a period of one week, so this demonstration was illegal.⁶⁶ However, the *Khudai Khidmatgar* sources did not agree that Section 144 Cr. P.C. had been imposed. According to Wali Khan, he was told by *Salar* Amin Jan Khan that Hidayatullah Khan of Toru was the Deputy Commissioner of Charsadda at that time and he had categorically told him that he had not imposed Section 144 Cr. P.C. in these areas.⁶⁷

Quoting *Salar* Amin Jan Khan, Wali Khan argued that the organizer of the meeting had told him that on the 12 August 1948, the police and militia had cordoned off all the roads leading to Charsadda and they searched all the people coming to the area. They arrested those whom they suspected, especially those with whom they found red uniform. They were beaten and even some of them were thrown and drowned in the river. In spite of that, thousands of *Khudai Khidmatgars* reached Prang and Babara and they started a procession. They wanted to go to Babara graveyard via Ghazi Gul Baba mosque. When their procession reached the mosque, the police and militia started firing upon them from the rooftops without any warning. The firing was so heavy that hundreds of people got killed and wounded. The firing was so indiscriminate that women got

62 PA, special branch, IPS daily diaries nos. nil, dated 13 August 1948, bundle nos. 17 & 78, serial nos. 258 & 1416, and CID dail diary no. 168, dated 16 August 1948, bundle no. 22, serial no. 297.

63 PA, IPS daily diary no. nil, dated 17 August 1948, bundle no. 22, serial no. 297.

64 Wali Khan, p.125.

65 PA, IPS daily diary no. nil, dated 17 August 1948, bundle no. 22, serial no. 297.

66 The Pakistan Times (Lahore), 18 August 1948.

67 Wali Khan, p.126.

wounded in their own houses sitting on their rooftops. In order to stop firing, women got out of their houses with Holy Qurans on their heads requesting the militia to stop the firing. In this confusion and chaos even Holy Qurans were bulletted and damaged. *Salar* Amin Jan Khan claimed that he had seen those damaged Qurans with his own eyes. So far the dead and wounded were concerned, there was no estimate because most of them were shifted from the scene for the fear of police, as police were arresting even the wounded ones. However, it was estimated that more than 600 persons had died.⁶⁸

The official version of the incident was totally different. They claimed that the Red Shirts wanted to piquet the courts and disrupt their proceedings. So, in order to thwart their efforts, Section 144 Cr.P.C. was imposed on 5 August. In spite of ban on processions and meetings, the Red Shirts gathered in large numbers at an open field at Babara. The procession included men, women and children. There were reports that men in plain clothes were even armed. As the mob was increasing, the Senior Superintendent of Police (SSP) Peshawar was phoned for reinforcement. According to the special branch diary ".... At first instance, it was decided to surround the gathering, but later the party took up position on eastern side of the mob with a view, that in the event of firing, the women sitting on roof should be kept safe. In the meantime, Additional Superintendent Police (ASP) along with Pir Fazal Khaliq, Additional Assistant Commissioner (AAC) Charsadda, arrived on the spot. The Assistant Commissioner (AC) Charsadda asked Pir Fazal Khaliq and Additional Superintendent Police to ring up the Deputy Commissioner and the SSP, to send military assistance as the mob was getting out of control. According to the AC, the gathering was 10,000 in all, but my estimate was approximately 5,000, and, in the meantime, it was suggested to wait till the police gets enforcement." The AC was stoned and some one from the mob even fired upon him when he appealed the mob to disperse peacefully. "....This was the signal for other shots being fired and stones thrown at the police. The crowd then advanced towards the police in a very excited way, and it appeared to the officer in charge that the police force would be overwhelmed if no immediate defensive action was taken. Thereupon, the police were ordered to open fire. The firing was stopped as soon as the crowd began to disperse into the village and the neighbouring jungle. The casualties among the crowd were approximately 15 killed and 50 wounded." When the military and police left the spot then the villagers came and buried the dead ones. They were buried in their own clothes, as they believed that they had died a martyr's death. However, later on, in another diary, police reported 20 killed and 25 wounded.⁶⁹

68 Ibid., pp.125-126.

69 PA, special branch, IPS daily diary no. nil, dated 17 August 1948, bundle no. 22, serial no. 297 & The Civil and Military Gazette (Lahore), 14 August 1948, & Special

Those who got injured were unable to receive immediate treatment with the result that some of them lost their lives eventually. The *Khudai Khidmatgar* sources had even alleged that, in the hospitals, workers of the National Guards threatened doctors to treat the injured badly or face the consequences. The police impounded those vehicles, which carried the injured. Thus, many injured people were denied treatment at the hospitals.⁷⁰

The immediate reaction of the people of the NWFP to Babara firing was generally of disapproval. The people at Peshawar very much criticized the provincial government action. They were heard saying that the government had no reason to resort to firing on the Red Shirts, as their demands were genuine. In spite of the fact that one year had passed since the establishment of Pakistan, Islamic law had not been promulgated. Further, they said that when the Congress party was in power in the NWFP, the Muslim Leaguers were freely holding processions and meetings but now they fired upon the Red Shirts and it was second time that the Red Shirts were fired upon: first was by the British government in 1930 while now it was done by a Muslim government and it did not behove of a Muslim to do so with their brethren Muslims. They also doubted the government's statement regarding the casualties' figure and they believed that casualties were much higher as compared to the government claims.⁷¹ Reports from different sources showed that Hazara was the only district where people approved the action taken by the government at Babara. The people in Hazara appreciated the government for dealing with an iron hand the "anti-state"

diary regarding Babra Incident, Asst. to IGP, CID; NWFP, no. 10147-48, dated 20 August 48, bundle no. 22, serial no. 297.

- 70 PA, special branch, IPS daily diary no. nil, dated 17 August 1948, bundle no. 22, serial no. 297 & IPS daily diary no. nil, dated 16 August 1948, bundle no. 78, serial no. 1416.

Incharge of the force in this operation and personals at his disposal were the following:

Pir Fazal Khaliq	Additional Assistant Commissioner
D.A.R. Platoon under	S.I. Mohammad Alam
St. Force Platoon No. 23}	Under the charge of Sher Azam Khan, D.S.P.
" " " " 21}	"
" " " " 20}	"
Platoon S.A.P.	under S.I. Ghulam Rasul Khan
" F.C. Shabqadar	under Jamadar Awal Khan.

After the firing incident an FIR was lodged by the police against the processionists vide FIR No. 184 dated. 12.08.1948 u/s 147/148/307 I.P.C./Arms Act, at police station Prang. (Ibid.)

- 71 Ibid., dated 13 August 1948.

elements in Charsadda and Mardan, as it was the only remedy for their activities.⁷²

Firing at Babara was big news on the first day of independence of Pakistan. The newspapers published the official communiqué in their coverage of the event putting the death toll at 15 and wounded about 50. However, *Morning News*, Calcutta, in its issue of 19 August 1948, gave a different version. Referring to the *Tribune* Correspondent, it reported that 300 people were killed and 400 to 500 wounded in the police action against the Red Shirts.⁷³

Qaiyum Khan was so harsh towards *Khudai Khidmatgars* that in spite of the fact that the Babara firing was condemned at large, he, on the floor of the Assembly not only defended this gory incident but also declared, without any remorse that: "I had imposed section 144 at Babara. When the people did not disperse, then firing was opened on them. They were lucky that the police had finished ammunition, otherwise not a single soul would have been left alive."⁷⁴

This was one of the gruesome incidents in the history of Indian sub-continent. While talking about the Babara firing, Hussain Shaheed Suhrawardy, Convenor of the Jinnah *Awami* League stated in Lahore, "I characterize the massacre as worse than that of Jallianwalla Bagh, and I maintain that I am right. I consider the incident as step towards that Fascism..."⁷⁵

Babara firing was a serious breach of law and order and the Qaiyum Khan government, in order to avoid a recurrence of this kind, took many precautionary measures. Though they may sound very harsh these days, still, in the aftermath of the firing, they were considered necessary. These decisions were taken in a high level meeting of the provincial government, which took place the day after the Babara incident in the office of Chief Minister. It was decided that a police punitive force consisting upon 3 platoons would be posted at Charsadda to check the activities of Red Shirts, and a rupees fifty thousand fine was also imposed upon the Red Shirts to meet the expenses of the force. All lorry permits of the Red Shirts were cancelled, and issuance of all kind of arms licenses were banned in Charsadda area. In Charsadda, Babara and Prang, people were asked to remain in their houses between 9.30 PM and 5.00 AM until further orders; only doctors, nurses, midwives, *hakims* and compounders were exempted from this order. In Peshawar area, too, carrying of arms were

72 PA, special branch, weekly confidential diary no. 33, dated 14 August 1948, Distt. Hazara, bundle no.22, serial no. 297.

73 *Morning News* (Calcutta), 19 August 1948.

74 Khan Abad, p.49.

75 *The Pakistan Times* (Lahore), 20 November 1951, last page.

restricted and the army was alerted to help the civil administration if they asked for the assistance.⁷⁶

The *Khudai Khidmatgars* were in the dock. Their houses were searched, fine was imposed upon them, their properties were confiscated, they were dishonoured and forced to quit their political movement. Qaiyum Khan, while speaking on the Independence Day at Peshawar City, charged that Ghaffar Khan and Faqir of Ipi were involved in anti-state activities and attacked them severely for their role. He applauded all those who took part in the suppression of the Red Shirts at Babara. He complimented their valour.⁷⁷ He also charged that the *Pir* of Manki Sharif and his agents had also participated in the Babara disturbances in order to pave way for the enforcement of Section 92 of Government of India Act, 1935, as amended by the Pakistan government.⁷⁸

After the Babara firing, the police reacted very harshly and they were particularly very harsh and severe in Charsadda and Swabi. Immediately after 12 August firing, the police started raids on the houses of the *Khudai Khidmatgars*. During these raids, workers of the National Guards also accompanied the police. Houses were looted and inmates were insulted and humiliated.⁷⁹ Because of these high-handed tactics of the police, the morale of the workers dropped to the lowest ebb and, according to official reports, many people left the Red Shirt Movement and joining the Muslim League as was evident from the green flags hoisted on their houses.⁸⁰

Meanwhile, Qaiyum Khan decided to hurt economic interests of the leadership of *Khudai Khidmatgars* in order to compel them to come to terms with the government. So, immediately after the Babara firing, under section 10 of the NWFP Public Safety Ordinance, the government forfeited the properties, except residential houses, of Abdul Ghaffar Khan and his two sons, that is, Abdul Wali Khan and Abdul Ghani Khan.⁸¹ In addition, the government also confiscated the moveable and immovable properties of Qazi Attaullah, Amir Muhammad Khan of Mardan and in Peshawar those of Mr. Sher Dil (Charsadda), Sher Bahadur Shaikh and Nasrullah Khan of (Zarin Abad).⁸²

76 NDC, Micro film, Acc. no. 245, Deputy Commissioner Peshawar, office order no. 3713-23/cc dated 13 August 1948.

77 PA, special branch, Personality sheet of Abdul Qaiyum Khan, bundle no. 3, serial no. 30.

78 The Pakistan Times (Lahore), 2 September 1948, p.3.

79 Wali Khan, pp.127-128.

80 PA, IPS daily diary no. nil, dated 17 August 1948, bundle no. 22, serial no. 297.

81 The Civil and Military Gazette (Lahore), 14 August 1948 & Nawai-e-Waqt, 15 August 1948.

82 Imroze, 14 August 1948.

On 15 September 1948, the *Khudai Khidmatgars* suffered another severe blow when the Governor NWFP declared it and the "*Zalmai Pakhtun*" unlawful under the NWFP Public Safety Ordinance. Also headquarter of the *Khudai Khidmatgars*, along with attached lands at Sardaryab, were confiscated by the same order of the government of NWFP.⁸³ Salar Amin Jan Khan who was the chief organizer of the Babara gathering was also arrested on 17 August 1948 under the same Ordinance.⁸⁴

As the police resorted to inhuman and very insulting behavior, it created unrest among the general population. The CID reported that people did not approve the blackening of the faces of Red Shirts. They noted that people in general and the *Pakhtuns* in particular were very much averse to such treatment of the Muslim brothers. The police was resorting to every kind of humiliation as was evident from the incident at village Prang where "...the staff of Red flag was thrust into the buttocks of Red Shirt who was forced to walk in public in village." It was feared that it would trigger resentment among the people. It was also feared that this would force the Red Shirts to go underground and continue their activities and even indulge in violence and harm those police officers who were involved in such punishments.⁸⁵ As a result of these reports, the SSP Peshawar called a meeting of all Sub-Divisional Police Officers and told them that such incidents should not be repeated in future. He also sent posters to all police officers in vernacular languages to change their attitude.⁸⁶

Since Qaiyum Khan's government was hounding the *Khudai Khidmatgars*, many of them shifted to the tribal areas. The aim was two folds: tribal areas were comparatively a safe place and secondly, to get the support of the tribesmen against the government. For this purpose, teams of *Khudai Khidmatgar* workers were sent to Gul Sahib of Charharmung, Abdur Razaq, the Sahibzada of Barwan, Mohmand, and the Tirah tribal areas, alongwith bulleted Qurans. Generally, the response to these teams was not encouraging, while⁸⁷ the

83 NDC, Microfilm Acc. no. 250, Order of the Chief Secretary NWFP, Peshawar, dated 15 September 1948.

84 The Civil and Military Gazette (Lahore), 18 August 1948.

85 PA, special branch, special diary no. nil, dated 18 August 1948, office of the Assistant to the I.G. of Police, CID, NWFP, no. 10050-51/S.B., Peshawar, dated 19 August 1948, bundle no. 22, serial no. 297.

86 PA, special branch, S.S.P. Peshawar office no. 3726/SB, dated 31 August 1948, bundle no. 22, serial no. 297.

87 NDC, Microfilm Acc. no.245, D.D.I. weekly summary no.34, dated 21 August 1948 & PA, IPS daily diary no. nil, dated 17 August 1948, bundle no. 22, serial no. 297, PA, CID special diary no. 10152-53/SB., Peshawar, dated 20 August 1948, bundle no. 22, serial no. 297 & NDC, Microfilm Acc. no.245, letter of the Chief Secretary to the Govt. of NWFP, no.4010/BI, dated the 20 November 1948.

Tirahwals told them that they would rise against the government only if Afghanistan and others would take the initiative. They would not begin the revolt because they "...had not forgotten the lesson taught to them by the bombardment of the Khajuri plains, the Afridi blockade for one and a half years and the forfeiture of their *Muaajibs* for one and a half years...." This they had done at the behest of the Congress but now they would not do it until started by some body else.⁸⁸ In spite of favourable situation for the government from the Tirah territories, the government of Pakistan sent a letter to the Chief Secretary of NWFP that the government wanted the checking of Congress emissaries from going into the Tirah area.⁸⁹

In order to counter the government excesses and to encourage the workers of *Khudai Khidmatgars* another strategy was devised in a private meeting of some 25 Red Shirts at the house of Muhammad Umar that they would collect the details of damage to the *Khudai Khidmatgars* at the hands of police and would send that to All-India Radio Delhi for publicity.⁹⁰ The government also took certain measures to counter the Red Shirts anti-government propaganda. Though the damaged Qurans were widely propagated by the Red Shirts, the governments did not accept it as a true version. The Area Officer (A.O) Charsadda refuted these charges claiming that there was no verification of the fact that the Holy Quran was damaged in the Babara firing.⁹¹ The government also sought the help of certain *Mullahs*, who spoke to people at different places saying that a revolt against the present Islamic government was unIslamic. On one occasion, Indar *Mullah* of Shabqadar, while addressing the people at lorry adda Shabqadar, declared the anti-Government people as "*Munafiq*". He pronounced that the bodies of the victims of the Babara incident should not be buried in a Muslim cemetery as those people had revolted against an Islamic government. He also declared that saying their "*Janaza*" was unIslamic. Similarly, Kohistani *Mullah*, speaking at the Shabqadar mosque, announced that *Jihad* was more important at that time than the *Shariat* Law as Islam was in danger, and that those who were involved in anti-government activities were traitors.⁹²

88 PA, special branch, CID special diary no. 10499-502/SB., Peshawar, dated 27 August 1948, bundle no. 22, serial no. 297.

89 NDC, Microfilm Acc. no.245, letter of the Secretary to the Govt. of Pakistan, Ministry of States and Frontier Regions, no. D.7583-F/48, Karachi, dated 20 October 1948.

90 PA, special branch, CID daily diary no. 174, dated 23 August 1948, bundle no. 22, serial no. 297.

91 PA, special branch, IPS daily diary no. nil, dated 23 August 1948, bundle no. 22, serial no. 297.

92 PA, special branch, CID daily diary no. 175, dated 24 August 1948, bundle no. 22, serial no. 297

Towards the end of August, the decisions taken in the meeting of 13 August 1948 regarding the punitive fines were also implemented. The selected Red Shirts of Charsadda were fined Rs. 50,000/- each; and the same amount of fine was also imposed upon the Red shirts of Mardan in order to cover the cost of punitive police, which was stationed there for "... inspiring confidence amongst the law abiding citizens."⁹³ Though fines were imposed upon Red Shirts, a fine of twenty-five thousand rupees imposed upon the Muslim Leaguers during the Civil Disobedience Movement of 1947 in NWFP against the Congress ministry was remitted.⁹⁴

Qaiyum Khan, who wanted to eliminate the *Khudai Khidmatgars*, had given instructions to the police to look for the Red Shirts and force them to join Muslim League. For this purpose, state machinery was widely used to get the required results. The conversions of the Red Shirts had started after the promulgation of the NWFP Public Safety Ordinance, 1948. It was widely believed that the Ordinance was aimed at crushing the *Khudai Khidmatgars*. After the promulgation of this Ordinance, newspapers started reporting wide scale conversions of the *Khudai Khidmatgars* into the Muslim League. This is evident from the following letter, which was sent to the Deputy Commissioner, Mardan by the Chief Secretary, NWFP. He wrote: "...The policy laid down is to arrest, so far as it is possible, only those leaders/workers of the organization who are unwilling to come to terms with Govt. and, having arrested them, not to release them too soon even if they make promise of good behaviour."⁹⁵

After the Babara firing the conversions were more pressed upon. The police forced the Red Shirts to seek apologies and join Muslim League. On such occasions, anti-*Khudai Khidmatgars*' propaganda was also carried out. *The Civil and Military Gazette*, for instance, carried a news item on 14 August 1948 to the effect that "600 Afridi Red Shirts join League".⁹⁶

The police reported wide scale apologies and joining of the Muslim League particularly in district Mardan. They reported that the "Police throughout the District of Mardan is busy in crushing the Red Shirt activities. The Red Shirts are pouring in Police stations in Swabi Tehsil for apology..." The same was reported about Charsadda where the DSP returned the licensed arms to the owners after getting assurances from them "...that they have joined the Muslim League and would remain loyal to the Govt. and would never take part in the Red Shirt Organization." Though the government was forcing the Red Shirts to join Muslim

93 The Civil and Military Gazette (Lahore), 28 August 1948.

94 Morning News (Calcutta), 20 August 1948.

95 PA, special branch, Office of the Chief Secretary, NWFP, no. 1858/BI., Peshawar, dated 29 July 1948, bundle no. 43, serial no. 692.

96 The Civil and Military Gazette (Lahore), 14 August 1948.

League, the people in general and the Muslim League workers in particular suspected the loyalty of these converts to the party. It was particularly true about the Peshawar area where people thought that the Red Shirts were joining the Muslim League for the fear of arrest after the promulgation of the Ordinance.⁹⁷

Evidence also supports this kind of attitude on part of these new converts. In this connection it might be appropriate to mention the Red Shirt meeting of 20 August 1948, which took place at the *hujra* of Muhammad Akram Bacha of Garhi Badsha Gul, Mathra. In this meeting about 9-10 leading workers of the area participated. It was decided that in view of the government policy to take arms from Red Shirts, "...the Red Shirts should sign form A and outwardly join the Muslim League party but at the time of general elections they should support their Congress candidates..."⁹⁸

In the district of Mardan, too, the League circles suspected the mass conversions of the Red Shirts due to police coercion. They believed that these new converts would sweep the polls.⁹⁹ Suspicions further increased when some of the former prominent Red Shirts of Marguz in Swabi Tehsil, who had joined the Muslim League, tried to contact new converts in the Muslim League and formed their own block. This spread great concern amongst the old Leaguers and they feared that if the new converts formed their own block they would lose their power.¹⁰⁰

The same view was also supported by a secret report regarding the contact between Azam Sher, the vice president of the Muslim League in district Peshawar and Mughal Khan, *lambardar* of Turakzai area wherein it was stated that a meeting of the Turakzai Red Shirts was going to be held on 28 August 1948, in which the issue of joining Muslim League would be decided. There were also reports that Red Shirts were going to join the Muslim League with the intentions to widen the gulf between the two Leagues, one led by *Pir* of Manki and the other led by Qaiyum Khan.¹⁰¹

However, this was not true about all the converts because there were people who had joined Muslim League with sincerity. It is evident from one of the former Congressites' meeting, which was held on 1 November 1948 at Pakistan Hotel Peshawar City under the presidentship of Arbab Abdur Rehman Khan of Guli

97 PA, special branch, IPS daily diary no. nil, dated 25 August 1948, bundle no. 22, serial no. 297.

98 Ibid.

99 PA, special branch, weekly confidential diary no. 35, dated 25 August 1948, Distt. Mardan, bundle no. 22, serial no. 297.

100 PA, special branch, CID daily diary no. 178, dated 30 August 1948, bundle no. 22, serial no. 297.

101 PA, special branch, AIGP letter no. 10647/SB., dated 01 September 1948, bundle no. 22, serial no. 297.

Gari and attended by Khan Mir Khan Hilali, Chaudhri Umar Bakhsh, Malik Mandu, Zarin Khan, Pir Muhammad, Lal Khan, Manan Gul, Nawaz Khan, Muhammad Afzal, Ibad Khan, Waris Khan Kachkol, Rehmatullah, and Haji Fazal Ahmad besides some 25-30 other former Congressites. Addressing the meeting, Arbab Abdur Rehman Khan stated that propaganda was going on against the new Muslim Leaguers that they had joined the League for getting favours from the government. He claimed that it was wrong. In order to show their sincerity, he suggested that the former Congressites should launch a campaign for the collection of subscription under the instructions of city Muslim League. These subscriptions would be handed over to the Governor-General at his proposed visit and it would be made clear to him that the amount had been collected by the former Congressites.¹⁰²

However, in spite of some suspicions and doubts regarding the new converts the conversion continued unabated. On 1 September 1948, daily *Inqilab* reported that till then around 60,000 Red Shirts had joined the Muslim League.¹⁰³ The major reason, according to the CID reports, was the fear amongst the Red Shirts that their properties would be confiscated. So they appeared willing to come out of their hideouts and surrender themselves voluntarily to the police. However, this fear was not without a foundation. The property of Muhammad Zarin Khan, MLA along with the "*Auqaf*" property was forfeited. Even his arms and car was taken into possession.¹⁰⁴

Due to the claims and counter-claims of loyalty and disloyalty of these converts an environment of doubt and suspicion was created about new Muslim Leaguers. In order to check the doubtful characters in the ranks of the Muslim League, the provincial government decided that in the future the Congressites would not be accepted in the fold of Muslim League until recommended by responsible persons. P.C. Hailey, the Chief Secretary to the Government of NWFP, issued an order on 18 September 1948, stating that "in view of the number of statements now being received from members of the Red Shirt organization in jail apologizing for their past actions and asking that they be released, the Provincial Government have decided that as general rule no such apologies, assurances, etc., will be considered, unless they are endorsed by a responsible person of proved loyalty to the Regime who will in fact act as a guarantor. As a general rule, only the countersignature of the following persons alone should be considered as satisfactory:

102 PA, special branch, IPS daily diary no. nil, dated 3 November 1948, bundle no. 22, serial no. 297.

103 *Inqilab* (Lahore), 1 September 1948.

104 PA, special branch, weekly confidential diary no. 36, dated 3 September 1948, Distt. Mardan, bundle no.22, serial no. 297.

- 1) M.L.As. of the League Assembly Party.
- 2) Civil Gazetted Officers of the District in which the person under detention lives."¹⁰⁵

Though, generally the *Khudai Khidmatgars* remained peaceful, in Tehsil Swabi some of the Muslim Leaguers suspected the involvement of Congressites in certain murder cases. This was the view of some Muslim Leaguers that the workers of Red Shirts were involved in the murders of Khaliq Dad and Rasul Khan of Shewa. In a private meeting held on 12 October 1948 under the presidency of Sohbat Khan at Mardan, many resolutions were passed to counter violence against the Muslim Leaguers. In this meeting they suspected that the Red Shirts were behind the murder of two Muslim Leaguers, Khaliq Dad and Rasul Khan of Shewa. The participants also anticipated more attacks in the future on the life and honour of workers. Therefore, they demanded protection from the government.¹⁰⁶

In spite of such occasional incidents of violence, generally the *Khudai Khidmatgars* remained peaceful. Though, non-violence was their declared policy, one reason for their lesser active role and peaceful posture was the strong and harsh anti-*Khudai Khidmatgars* policy of Qaiyum Khan. Throughout his government Abdul Ghaffar Khan and other important leaders of *Khudai Khidmatgars* remained in jail, and the party stood banned. Therefore, the rank and file of *Khudai Khidmatgars* remained demoralized, and remained underground and less active.

QAIYUM KHAN AND MUSLIM LEAGUE

While on the one hand, Qaiyum Khan was confronted with political adversaries, such as the *Khudai Khidmatgars*, he also had to face discontent and opposition amongst his own Muslim League fellows on the other. Their opposition had started during the pre-partition days, when the rumours of his appointment as Chief Minister of NWFP reached the province. Some old guards of the Frontier Muslim League had sent telegrams to Quaid-i-Azam Muhammad Ali Jinnah and Liaquat Ali Khan against Qaiyum Khan's appointment as the future Chief Minister.¹⁰⁷ However, once appointed; the Muslim Leaguers set aside their differences and rallied round him. Furthermore, in order to chalk out the future programme for the provincial government, a secret meeting of the provincial

105 PA, special branch, Copy of an endorsement No. 37058-63-BI., dated 15 September 1948, by the Chief Secretary to Government, NWFP, bundle no. 22, serial no. 297.

106 PA, special branch, CID daily diary no.207, dated 18 October 1948, bundle no. 22, serial no. 275.

107 NA, File no.10(s), F.46-GG/47.

Muslim League was held on 24 August 1947 under Muhammad Samin Jan Khan. Besides discussing the selection of one or two ministers for the provincial cabinet the participants thoroughly discussed the political situation of the province. The following were the important decisions taken in the meeting:

1. All government arms, which had been distributed to the people, should be withdrawn. Proper action should be taken to recover all unlicensed arms in possession of the *Zalmai Pakhtun* Party. The local Muslim League Committees be issued instructions to help the government in the collection of the arms.
2. All the local officers of the Muslim League should prepare list of *Mujahidins* who have given sacrifices in "*Jang-i-Pakistan*", have assisted in the referendum proceedings; and have helped the Bihar victims. A list may also be prepared of all 'martyrs' and the wounded who have suffered at the hands of the Congress government. Their relations should be granted rewards and medals.
3. All the criminal cases against the League workers started by the Congress government be withdrawn and all the fines which had since been realized be repaid. All pending fines be cancelled especially, the ones imposed on Nandiar Tribe, in connection with Oghi and Battal raids, and on the Afridis of Khyber Pass for their alleged misconduct on the occasion of Pandit Jawaharlal Lal Nehru's visit to the province.
4. A special tribunal be appointed to enquire into the atrocities committed by the Congress Ministers and the *Zalmai Pakhtun* Party on the Muslim League workers.
5. Jobs be given in each district according to the communities proportionate numbers and preference be given to those who are recommended by the local Muslim League.
6. A Committee be appointed to enquire into the atrocities committed against political prisoners in various jails in the province.
7. In connection with the celebrations of 15 August, the sentences of the prisoners in jail for offences involving moral turpitude be reduced.
8. New jail visitors be appointed in place of the previous visitors appointed by the Congress government.
9. All outlaws from the British Territory, who had taken shelter with the Faqir of Ipi, be allowed to enter Pakistani Territory. Their properties

forfeited by the British government be returned. It was expected that the outlaws would also respond positively.¹⁰⁸

It shows that the Muslim Leaguers had become part and parcel of the governmental machinery. However, Qaiyum Khan and old guards of the Muslim League could not go well for a long time with each other, because the former was averse to all sorts of criticism and opposition whether within the party or outside the party. This policy of Qaiyum Khan's resulted into the intra-league disputes and many stalwarts formed an opposition to him. One of them was Khan Saifullah Khan, member of the NWFP Provincial Muslim League Council who strongly criticized Qaiyum Khan's style of politics. In an interview with a Lahore based newspaper, he said: "the silent approval of Khan Abdul Qaiyum Khan's big stick policy will one day lead to political terrorism in the strategic NWFP Province much to the detriment of Pakistan's national interests." He further observed, "the British rulers had followed the same policy for a long time in the Frontier, but even after the dawn of independence, the present Chief Minister was trampling upon constitutional properties and had perpetrated police raj in the province."¹⁰⁹

On 21 February 1950 I.I. Chundrigar was appointed as the Governor of NWFP [Chundrigar was not only a stalwart of the Muslim League, but was also a close associate of the Quaid-i-Azam and Liaquat Ali Khan]. In his speech, he stated that he would try to better the lot of the people. But this was not the most important thing for the province. Commenting on his speech, *The Civil & Military Gazette*, Lahore noted that his announcements regarding prosperity measures were of less importance than his political ones because the NWFP was doing very well already in the field of economic development. The paper suggested that the real challenge to the new Governor was in the field of politics, since Qaiyum Khan had a bad reputation in dealing with his political opponents. He even did not hesitate to persecute those Muslim League veterans who actually had won the province for Pakistan. So Chundrigar would do a favour with the people of the Province if he could bring a change in this direction, because "Frontier is the only province of Pakistan where repression of civil liberties is in full swing. It should be the former concern of the new Governor to remove this blot on the good name of Pakistan and restore normal modes of political life."¹¹⁰

108 PA, special branch, IPS special diary, dated 25 August 1947, bundle no. 46B, serial no. 763, p.227 (Pir of Manki Sharif, Mohammad Ali Khan Hoti, General Secretary of Provincial Muslim League, and Habibullah Khan, MLA from Bannu did not attend this meeting.)

109 *The Civil & Military Gazette* (Lahore), 11 May 1951, p.12.

110 *Ibid.*, 23 February 1951, editorial on p. 2.

Qaiyum Khan's main rival in the Frontier Muslim League was *Pir* of Manki Sharif. The main cause of friction between Qaiyum Khan and the *Pir* and other old leaguers was the very identity and status of the former. The old Muslim Leaguers never accepted Qaiyum Khan as a true Leaguer. They doubted his sincerity and, thus, when he became the Chief Minister, these Leaguers alleged that the real power had passed on to the turncoat Congressites. Qaiyum Khan's decisions were always influenced by the old Congressites who had joined the Muslim League only after the establishment of Pakistan and had become the real rulers of the province.¹¹¹ Another stalwart of the Muslim League, Yusaf Khattak, shared the same opinion. According to him, Qaiyum Khan, after winning seven Congress MLAs to his side, went totally into their hands. Those 7 converted Congressites had old connections with the Congress people while they had none with the Muslim league. The result was that the League workers were unable to approach these people for the solution of their problems while the Congress people could easily meet with them and get their problems solved. Whenever this kind of perception was brought to the attention of Qaiyum Khan, he pleaded helplessness, and argued that they were MLAs and he could not afford to annoy them. These problems increased day by day which ultimately led to the division of Muslim League.¹¹² However, Justice (retd.) Burhanuddin, an important leader of the League, believed that Qaiyum Khan was a very dynamic and progressive person who wanted to introduce many reforms in the province. The Muslim League old guards were reactionary and could not understand and appreciate his efforts properly, which in why they started opposing him. Another aspect was their personal rivalries and interests that resulted in disputes with the Chief Minister.¹¹³

Sardar Abbasi was of the opinion that the main dispute between *Pir* of Manki and Qaiyum Khan was the latter's decision of keeping the Muslim League presidentship and the chief ministership together. *Pir* Manki wanted that these two posts should be separated and, in reality, he wanted the party leadership for himself. Qaiyum Khan was convinced that if a powerful man like *Pir* Manki got the post of party President, he could create problems for him.¹¹⁴ Yunas Samad, however, believes that the Qaiyum-*Pir* Manki Sharif dispute was indeed because of the former getting the premiership of the NWFP. "When Jinnah offered Qaiyum the premiership, the *Pir* of Manki Sharif was offended at being passed over..." Samad further gives reference to a document dated 11 July 1949, from Wolf to the Secretary of State, which states, "The *Pir* of Manki Sharif, whose crucial role in the plebiscite in 1947 was an acknowledged fact, was at the height

111 Fida M. Khan, Interview.

112 Munir, p.229.

113 Burhanuddin, Interview.

114 Abbasi, Interview.

of his success and felt that he could use his prestige to manipulate the ministry from outside. However, Qaiyum pulled the rug from under him by sending tribal *lashkars* into Kashmir. The *Pir* of Manki Sharif, in his fury, attempted unsuccessfully to halt the flow of tribesmen, egged on by the vision of booty, which greatly undermined his authority."¹¹⁵

Quaid-i-Azam visited Peshawar in April 1948. A delegation of the disgruntled old Muslim Leaguers of the province, including Samin Jan Khan, the provincial president of the Muslim League, *Pir* of Manki Sharif, K.B. Saadullah Khan, Mian Ziauddin called upon him and lodged many complaints against the arbitrary policies of Qaiyum Khan. But the delegation felt that "Quaid-i-Azam was not prepared to listen to any complaints against Abdul Qaiyum Khan, the Chief Minister. He had by then become a favourite of both the Quaid-i-Azam and Liaquat Ali Khan, who gave him a free hand to do as he pleased."¹¹⁶

In 1948, the Frontier Muslim League started the re-organization of the party. The organizing committee, appointed by *Chaudhry* Khaliquzzaman, the president of the party, had the blessings of Qaiyum Khan. Under the Chief Minister's influence, the organizing committee started organizing the Muslim League in such a way that it would ensure the continuing hold of Qaiyum Khan supporters. The supporters of *Pir* of Manki Sharif were denied membership forms on the plea that one person could get only one form. *Pir Sahib* decided to contact the masses, and indeed embarked upon a 15 days tour of the province. But, in order to restrict his contacts with the people, the provincial government imposed Section 144, banning all kinds of public meetings and processions. *Pir Sahib* demanded an enquiry committee from the central command of the League but *Chaudhry* Khaliquzzaman did not agree. The differences between the two groups increased so much that *Pir Sahib* walked out from the League Election Committee in protest against the policies of Qaiyum Khan.¹¹⁷

On 12 August 1948 the NWFP Muslim League organizing committee met, once again, and reorganized the Muslim League in the province. *Hazrat* Badshah Gul was elected president of the provincial Muslim League unanimously. His name was proposed by Sardar Aurangzeb Khan and was seconded by *Pir* of Manki Sharif. Muhammad Yusaf Khattak was elected General Secretary. Mir Dad was elected Treasurer. 19 members out of total of 20 attended the meeting. A rule-framing committee was also appointed. Mian Zai-ud-Din was the most prominent member in this meeting, it was also decided that the President of Pakistan

115 NAUS, Microfilm, Roll 1, 845 F.00/7-1149, RG 59 Box 4145, 790D.00/6-1451, Memo by Bowling on the internal political situation in the NWFP, 14 June 1951, quoted in Samad, *Nation in Turmoil*, foot-note no 114 at p.164.

116 Ziauddin, p.81.

117 Mahmood, p.213.

Muslim League, *Chaudhry* Khaliquzzaman, would be requested to extend the date for enrolment of the League members in NWFP from September to October 30.¹¹⁸

In the opinion of Safdar Mahmood, both Khan Abdul Qaiyum Khan and *Pir Sahib* of Manki Sharif were very popular leaders. *Pir Sahib* wanted to become the president of Frontier Muslim League. However, Qaiyum Khan was not prepared to allow this to happen because, he thought, it would undermine his popularity and could create difficulties for his administration. Instead, he was able to elect his handpicked person, Badshah Gul as Muslim League chief, who had migrated to Pakistan in 1947. Nobody had heard anything of him in the freedom struggle, nor did he has any popular standing or any leadership qualities. In fact, it was due to all these reasons that Qaiyum Khan had him elected.¹¹⁹

After the death of Quaid-i-Azam Muhammad Ali Jinnah, Liaquat Ali Khan was able to minimize differences between Qaiyum Khan and the *Pir* of Manki Sharif. However, soon the two leaders and their groups were on the warpath again. *Pir Sahib* alleged that, taking undue advantage of his official position, Qaiyum Khan had strengthened his position at every level of the Muslim League, with the result that the former had become a stranger in his own party. At this stage, *Chaudhry* Khaliquzzaman's endeavours did not bear fruit, and the differences further increased. Even in 1949, some Assembly members dissociated themselves from the Muslim League Parliamentary Party and dubbed the Chief Minister a communist, terrorist and un-Islamic.¹²⁰ Prominent among them were Mian Musharaf Shah, Sardar Asad Jan Khan, Nawab Qutbuddin Khan, Raja Sardar Khan, Arbab Muhammad Sharif Khan and Abdul Qaiyum Khan Swati. They made a powerful group in the provincial Assembly and wanted to move a vote of no-confidence against Qaiyum Khan. Indeed, they were sure that the resolution would get support by thumping majority.¹²¹ However, before the final act of the drama could have been played, Qaiyum Khan got the clue, just a day before the session of the assembly, and had the government arrested Abdul Qaiyum Khan Swati, Haji Faqira Khan and some other members of the Assembly on the charges of conspiring to murder the Chief Minister.¹²²

On 14 March 1949 the Criminal Investigation Department (CID) claimed unearthing a conspiracy against the interests of Pakistan in connivance with the Indians. This was based on a letter allegedly written by Dass Jai Dev Kapoor from Delhi to *Khan Sahib* Jehandad Khan who was the *Salar* of Red Shirts and a

118 The Civil & Military Gazette (Lahore), 13 August 1948, p.4.

119 Mahmood, pp.210-211.

120 Ibid., p.213.

121 Bukhari, pp.203-204.

122 Ibid.

resident of Kakul, Abbottabad. The report claimed that it had been shown to the Chief Minister, and under the provincial government's instructions, he was arrested and his mail was censored.¹²³ The letter was as follows:

HINDUSTAN ZINDA BAD

My dear Khan Sahib,

Salam. Your written chits have been received through Sant Singh. Thanks. According to your orders, we have written several times to the *Sher-i-Kashmir*, He will comply. We are also complying. We have written you several times. Money was also given (to) you for this that as far as is possible remove your Prime Minister of NWFP. The expenses will be borne by us. Before this we had sent a letter by dak. You people did not come to Wagah. It is hoped you have received the letter. It is not known whether you yourself did not come. We have stopped writing you letters through post office. But I write this today because Sant Singh has gone somewhere towards Kashmir. Haji Faqira Khan, Azad Khan, Qalandar Khan, Hussain Khan, Malik Shah Zaman and all your friends should receive my Salam. All your chits have been sent on to Pandit Sahib. It would be your kindness if you complete this work.

All the property of Chaudhri Jai Krishan including carpets, boxes and luggage of the bungalow is with Isa Khan and should take care to protect it.

Yours

Dass Jai Dev Kapoor

28.1.49 Delhi¹²⁴

In the aftermath of the discovery of the letter, the provincial government arrested the following eight persons:

1. Azad Khan s/o Mir Zaman Khan
2. Haji Faqira Khan s/o Ghulam Khan
3. KS Jahan Dad Khan s/o Jalal Khan
4. Qalandar Khan s/o Karam Khan
5. Qazi Muhammad Sadiq s/o Muhammad Saeed
6. Hussain Khan s/o Tala Khan
7. Malik Shah Zaman s/o Malik Sher Zaman
8. Abdul Qaiyum Khan Swati, MLA

¹²³ PA, special branch, D.O No. 174-NGO, CID, NWFP, Peshawar dated 14 March 1949, bundle no. 25, serial no. 367, p.3

¹²⁴ PA, special branch, bundle no. 25, serial no. 367, p.1.

It was also ordered that these people should be kept separate from each other and the CID branch should be facilitated for interviewing them during investigation.¹²⁵

According to *Pir* of Manki Sharif and *Pir* of Zakori Sharif, Khan Bahadur Jalaluddin Khan disclosed the whole plan of no confidence vote against Qaiyum Khan's government.¹²⁶ Qaiyum Khan got scared. On 13 March 1949, he along with Sheikh Muhammad, Advocate General, Sardar Allah Nawaz Khan, Speaker, and Mirza Shams-ul-Haq, moved to Kund rest house. Qaiyum Khan called for the Deputy Commissioner and Superintendent of Police of Hazara for consultations. The next day, the news of Abdul Qaiyum Khan Swati, Haji Faqira Khan, ex-MPA, Qazi Muhammad Sadiq and Malik Shah Zaman Advocate's arrest were heard. They stated that the real motive behind their arrest was this threat of no-confidence motion and nothing else.¹²⁷

Meanwhile on 15 March 1949, the Speaker of the Assembly gave the following statement on behalf of the six MLAs, who had requested him for the allotment of separate seats on the floor of the house: "It is our honest opinion that the policy chalked out and acted upon by the Chief Minister is communistic, disruptive and un-Islamic in the light of the Objective Resolution—the basis on which our social, religious and economic superstructure is to be raised. It is requested we may be allotted seats in the center. We are Leaguers and we want to mend it." The communication was signed by:

1. Sardar Asadullah Jan Khan.
2. Nawab Qutabuddin.
3. Pir Muhammad Abdul Latif Zakori.
4. Arbab Muhammad Sharif.
5. Sultan Hassan Ali, and
6. Raja Sardar Khan.

The same morning, another Muslim League MLA, *Mian* Musharaf also placed an application before the Speaker for a separate seat in the Assembly. In reply to these requests, the Speaker of the Assembly said that it was his duty to explain to the house the parliamentary and democratic practices adopted all over the

125 PA, special branch Letter no. 814/B1, dated Peshawar 18.3.1949, bundle no. 25, serial no. 367, p.21.

126 In replying the question about Jalaluddin leaking out the plan, Fida Mohammad Khan stated that one could expect such thing from Jalaluddin caliber, as he was initially a driver, so he could not sustain the pressure.

127 Weekly Chattan (Lahore), 4 April 1949.

world in the legislative assemblies. He continued that it's a standard practice everywhere in the assemblies that the largest party formed the government, while the second largest sat on the opposition benches. Since the applicants formed the second largest group, they had to sit on the opposition benches. The present opposition was less than six members anyway.¹²⁸

On this ruling, Sardar Asadullah Jan Khan rose and said that they were Muslim Leaguers and loyal Pakistanis. They wanted only to oppose the anti-Pakistan move of the present government and would support the pro-Pakistan moves of the government. However, the Speaker did not allow them to sit on the government benches. They were advised to sit on the opposition benches. The old opposition, which comprised 3 former members of the defunct Congress party, was asked to sit elsewhere. They went out of Assembly as both parties were not ready to sit on their specified seats. The new opposition also wanted to discuss this new development before they would sit on new seats. After some time the 7 members (6 joint applicants and *Mian Musharaf*, who had given his application separately) came back and wanted to sit on their previous seats (government seats). The Speaker did not allow them to sit there saying, "You have left that party. You cannot sit now on Government Benches."¹²⁹ As a result of the ruling of the Speaker, the seceding MLAs staged a walk out and then held a meeting to review the latest situation. After two hours of long discussions they passed a resolution, reaffirming their loyalty to Muslim League, but strongly criticizing Qaiyum Khan for his anti-Party and anti-Parliamentary attitude. At the end, while referring to the Speaker's ruling they concluded, "His majesty (the Speaker) being final we accept the Opposition benches and will work for the strength and stability of Pakistan."¹³⁰

On 14 April 1949, copies of the written declaration of Jalaluddin Khan and other MLAs, supporting the vote of no-confidence, were found in circulation in Hazara. It was believed that they were circulated by the pro-Manki group, mainly to defame Jalaluddin Khan for his backing out from his promise and to blame Qaiyum Khan Ministry for his handling of the situation in an unconstitutional way.¹³¹

According to Fida Muhammad Khan, besides other reasons, the real motive behind the vote of no-confidence was the old Muslim Leaguers' non-acceptance of Qaiyum Khan as their leader. He was the one who had vehemently opposed the creation of Pakistan as well as the Muslim League leaders and workers till

128 LAD, 15 March 1949, pp. 1-7.

129 Ibid.

130 The Pakistan Times (Lahore), 16 March 1949, front page.

131 PA, special branch, IPS, daily diary no. nil, dated 14 April 1949 bundle no. 78, serial no. 1415. (See Appendixes IV & V).

very late in the day. So the Muslim Leaguers were not very enthusiastic in supporting him as compared to the old guards.¹³²

On 5 May 1949 the NWFP government released six detainees of the Abbottabad Conspiracy Case, including Abdul Qaiyum Khan Swati, MLA, Qazi Muhammad Sadiq, Haji Faqira Khan, Azad Khan, Qalandar Khan and Hussain Khan without giving any reason. One person, Malik Sher Zaman had been released a day before while Jehandad Khan remained behind bars.¹³³

On 10 May 1949, the editor of *The Pakistan Times* wrote that right from the beginning the politically conscious people doubted the whole affair. However, the charges were so serious that it was considered pragmatic to wait for more information and developments. Later on many leaders from the NWFP stated that it was a cheap tactic of Qaiyum Khan in order to “divert public attention from the Qaiyum Ministry’s increasing unpopularity; it was said that the plot to create the murder plan had been necessitated by a perfectly legal and constitutional move to overthrow the Ministry and that by arresting one and threatening other MLAs the Premier had managed to give himself another lease of life...”¹³⁴

Apparently, the unconditional release of conspirators of the murder plot was due to the fear of getting exposed sooner or later. The NWFP Judicial Commissioner, Khan Muhammad Ibrahim Khan, had issued a notice to the provincial government on the *habeas Corpus* petition to produce all the relevant record. Since the government had no solid proof, it was decided to release the detainees before the next hearing.¹³⁵ This assertion was later on also supported by the official report in the case of Jehandad Khan regarding his involvement in the Indian plot of removing Qaiyum Khan from Premiership. The Inspector General of the NWFP Police, in his letter of 7 May 1949, no.319-NGO, Peshawar to the Chief Secretary, the Government of NWFP, stated that all available facts showed that Jehandad was innocent and was wrongly implicated.¹³⁶

Whether real or cooked up, but most probably the latter, Qaiyum Khan secured his government by this plot. And after dealing with the vote of no-confidence move, he turned his attention towards the rebellious Muslim Leaguers. A meeting of the Frontier Muslim League Working Committee was convened under the Presidentship of Sardar Muhammad Aurangzeb Khan. The meeting took up a resolution recommending the removal of those MLAs and Muslim Leaguers from the party who were associated with the no-confidence motion. The majority

132 Fida M.Khan, Interview.

133 PA, special branch, Letter no. 1631/KC Dated. Peshawar 7 May 1949, bundle no. 25, serial no. 367, P.125.

134 Khan Mazhar, p.312.

135 “Maktoob-i-Sarhad”, Weekly Afaq (Lahore), 22 May 1949, p.11.

136 PA, special branch, bundle no. 25, serial no. 367, pp.122-23.

favoured their removal.¹³⁷ Finally, the Committee took strong disciplinary action against eight prominent Muslim Leaguers, including the six seceding MLAs for what it described as 'a grave and flagrant breach' of the Muslim League rules and regulations. The eight members, expelled from the Muslim League for a period of six years, were, Khan Muhammad Samin Jan Khan, former President of the Provincial Muslim League, Arbab Noor Muhammad Khan, and the six seceding MLAs Sardar Asadullah Jan Khan, member of the Pakistan Constituent Assembly, and leader of the opposition party in the NWFP Legislature, Nawab Qutabuddin of Tank, Deputy Speaker of the NWFP Assembly, *Pir Sahib* Abdul Latif of Zakori Sharif, Sultan Hassan Ali of Boi, and Raja Sardar Khan. As regards the seventh MLA, *Mian* Musafar Shah, who seceded from the Muslim League Assembly Party and occupied an independent bench in the Legislative Assembly, the working Committee resolved to give him a last chance for explaining his conduct which would be considered in its next meeting and necessary action taken thereon.¹³⁸

Later, Nawab Qutabuddin of Tank, rejoined the Muslim League Assembly Party after his meeting with Qaiyum Khan in Dera Ismail Khan on 17 October 1949.¹³⁹

Meanwhile, in July 1949, a Muslim League delegation, including Samin Jan Khan, *Pir Sahib* of Manki Sharif, Ghulam Muhammad Khan Lundkhwar, visited Karachi and met Liaquat Ali Khan, the Prime Minister, and lodged complaints against Qaiyum Khan. The complaints were as following:

1. Preference is given to Red Shirt Members of Legislative Assembly than the Muslim League MLAs and its workers.
2. The H.C.M. of the N.W.F.P. has aroused hatred in the masses against the Muslim League, and it is possible that the Red Shirts will come into power in the next election.
3. The H.C.M. has alienated the old Muslim League workers from the Muslim League.
4. The political prisoners should be released immediately.¹⁴⁰

However, Liaquat Ali Khan told the deputation that he will consider their grievances but they should keep quiet for the coming four months due to the impending danger of war with India on the problem of Kashmir.¹⁴¹

137 PA, special branch, IPS daily diary no. nil, dated 20 April 1949, bundle no. 78, serial no. 1415.

138 The Pakistan Times (Lahore), 21 April 1949, p.5.

139 Ibid., 18 October 1949, p.12.

140 PA, special branch, IPS daily diary no. nil. Dated 4 July 1949, Bundle no. 78, serial no.1411.

Initially, Liaquat Ali Khan tried to make conciliation between Qaiyum Khan and *Pir* of Manki Sharif. The latter also tried to follow the path of unity but soon he found out that Qaiyum Khan was not reciprocating, and that he was keener on consolidating his own position and undermining that of the *Pir*. On the other hand, the *Pir* was very apprehensive of Qaiyum Khan's endeavours to dominate the Muslim League organization from top to the bottom. Secondly, *Pir Sahib* was also very critical of the Public Safety Act, which was originally enacted to crush the followers of Khan Abdul Ghaffar Khan but was later used against the opponents of Qaiyum.¹⁴²

Pir Manki Sharif and Qaiyum Khan's differences became widely known in May 1949 when the former presided a rally at Chowk Yadgar in Peshawar City. The rally was organized by the organizing committee of the Frontier Province Muslim League workers' convention and was addressed by *Arbab* Abdul Ghafoor Khan, *Mian* Muhammad Shah, Khan Ghulam Muhammad Khan Lundkhwar, Abdul Qaiyum Swati, *Pir Sahib* Manki Sharif and *Qazi* Muhammad Aslam. At the conclusion, *Pir* of Manki Sharif presented a resolution stating that the people had no confidence in the Qaiyum Khan ministry and therefore, fresh elections should be held; and the center should appoint an investigating committee against the ministry. It further stated that elections should be held after the removal of the administrators of local bodies and committees; cycle tax, *malia*, and 25% increase in *abiana* should be abolished; Public Safety Act should be withdrawn; Control system should be abolished and freedom should be granted to the people.¹⁴³

In spite of the fact that the *Pir* publicly announced his differences with Qaiyum Khan, the Muslim League Central High Command failed to bring a rapprochement between the two. Finally, when *Pir Sahib* Manki Sharif lost all hopes with the leaders of All-Pakistan Muslim League he, along with Ghulam Muhammad Khan Lundkhwar, formed *Awami* Muslim League in September 1949. Later on, *Pir* Abdul Latif Zakori *Sahib* and some other opponents of Qaiyum Khan also joined the group.¹⁴⁴

Though *Pir Sahib* of Manki Sharif quit the Muslim League and formed his own party, this did not stop internal fighting in the Provincial Muslim League. There were still a few other Muslim Leaguers who wanted to oppose and fight Qaiyum Khan's dictatorial policies within the party. Muhammad Yusaf Khattak and

141 Ibid.

142 Syed Nur Ahmad, *From Martial Law to Martial Law: Politics in the Punjab, 1919-1958*. tr. & ed. by Craig Baxter from the Urdu version of Mohammad Ali (Lahore: Vanguard Books Ltd., 1985), p.303.

143 Shahbaz (Peshawar), 18 May 1949, p. 1.

144 Sabir, p.1065 & Mahmood, pp.214-15.

Muhammad Ibrahim Khan Jhaghra led this group. This infighting became so severe that ultimately Liaquat Ali Khan appointed Barrister Qazi Muhammad Isa of Baluchistan, to try for reconciliation between them. He failed to take any disciplinary action against Qaiyum Khan. In the meanwhile, the opposition grew stronger and they decided to dislodge him from the League post through elections. Finally, 3 April 1951 was fixed as Election Day for Muslim League provincial party. Because of the critical situation, Liaquat Ali Khan himself came to Peshawar and presided the meeting of Frontier Muslim League Council.¹⁴⁵ However, he was said to be favourably inclined towards Qaiyum Khan. Initially, he was of the opinion that the party and the executive offices should remain separate from each other. But afterwards, he changed his stand when he met Qaiyum Khan. It is stated that actually Qaiyum Khan assured him of his loyalty and highlighted the danger in case of Ibrahim Khan Jaghra winning the Provincial Presidentship. He told Liaquat Ali Khan that Jaghra would make a powerful group with Mumtaz Daulatana in the Punjab and Ayub Khuro in Sind, who was a strong candidate for Sind Provincial League presidentship. Thus Liaquat Ali Khan got apprehensive because besides being the Prime Minister, he was also the President of Pakistan Muslim League. Therefore, in his personal interest, Liaquat Ali Khan preferred to side with Qaiyum Khan.¹⁴⁶

Liaquat Ali Khan was no doubt an able statesman but he was also aware of the ground realities and this perception is manifested clearly in his handling of the provincial rivalries of the Muslim League. He wanted countrywide support for his government but he also realized that, in the process, he needed to give a chance to the people to express themselves through elections. However, in order to sustain his government at the center and for smooth running of the provinces he relied on the provincial administration. "He compromised with Mr. Khuro against whom the PRODA (Public and Representative Offices Disqualification Act) proceedings were squashed on technical grounds and not because of failure to establish the charges. He alienated the *Nawab* of Mamdot in the Punjab, first by suspending his Ministry and, later, by campaigning for Daulatana's victory in the provincial elections of 1951. He connived at the excesses of the Qaiyum Ministry in the North Western Frontier Province and tolerated the incompetent administration of Nurul Amin in East Bengal. By installing himself as the President of the Muslim League, he gave direct encouragement to the Provincial chief ministers to do likewise, reducing the organization to a handmaid of the government and destroying its popular character."¹⁴⁷

The basic difficulty in Liaquat Ali Khan's case was that he had no ancestral constituency, and, as a politician, he needed one that could support him. This

145 Sabir, p.1063.

146 Mahmood, footnotes 3 & 1 at pp. 217-18.

147 Ahmad, Government, pp.34-35.

was his handicap, and in order to establish himself politically, he supported people like Qaiyum Khan.¹⁴⁸

In the provincial Muslim League elections, the Yusuf Khattak group supported Ibrahim Khan Jaghra. Initially, Yusuf Khattak and Qaiyum Khan were very good friends. Later, Yusuf Khattak, who was the General Secretary of the party, warmly received the old leaguers whom Qaiyum Khan victimized. Quite obviously, this infuriated Qaiyum Khan and aggravated his relations with Yusuf Khattak by 1949. When Ibrahim Khan Jaghra challenged Qaiyum Khan's leadership directly, it worried Liaquat Ali Khan as well. In order to negotiate between them, he personally came to Peshawar. He tried to persuade Ibrahim Khan Jaghra to withdraw his candidature, which he declined to do.¹⁴⁹

Liaquat Ali Khan's support emboldened Qaiyum Khan in his dictatorial attitude towards his opponents whether in or outside Muslim League. Liaquat Ali Khan did so in order to win Qaiyum Khan's sympathy against the rebellious Punjab Muslim League elements.¹⁵⁰ Encouraged with this support, Qaiyum Khan manipulated the election process in the province. Daily *Shahbaz* reported on 23 April 1951 that the Muslim League office record had disappeared from the office. According to the paper, when the Provincial Muslim League President Badshah Gul needed the lists in order to send invitation letters to the Frontier Muslim League Council meeting, he sent Malik Kiyani, Salar Aslam and Khan Amin Jan Khan to the Muslim League office to bring the papers. The cupboard containing the papers was locked but the key was not available, and when they broke open the cupboard, to their astonishment the papers were missing.¹⁵¹

When the meeting for the elections of Muslim League party was finalized, many councilors who were suspected to be supporters of Ibrahim Khan of Jhagra were not informed. As for those who learnt about the meeting and reached the venue of elections were not allowed to cast their votes.¹⁵²

Finally on 29 April 1951 the meeting of 114 Muslim League councilors was held in the Assembly Hall, Peshawar, with Liaquat Ali Khan in the chair. They elected the following office bearers for the NWFP Muslim League:

President:	Khan Abdul Qaiyum Khan
Vice President:	Jalaluddin Khan
General Secretary:	Malik ur Rehman Kiyani

148 Burhanuddin, Interview.

149 Mahmood, pp.216-17.

150 Zahid, p.172.

151 Shahbaz (Peshawar), 23 April 1951, last page.

152 Abbasi, Interview.

Joint Secretaries: 1. Yusaf Shah of Mardan
 2. Amin Jan, Peshawar

Treasurer: Muhammad Ali Khan of Hoti

In the same meeting, members for the All-Pakistan Muslim League Council were also elected and included: Jalaluddin Khan, Abdul Aziz, Khudadad Khan, Muhammad Ayub Khan of Mansehra, *Pir* Abdul Qaiyum Shah, Hakim Abdul Salam of Haripur, Ghulam Jan and Abdul Hamid of Haripur, Faiz Muhammad Khan of Khalabat, Khan Bahadur of Garhi Habibullah, Wali Muhammad of Sherwan, Abdur Rashid, Kiyani, of Abbottabad, Muhammad Rehman of Havellian, Malik ur Rehman Kiyani, *Pir* Qamoos Shah and Watan Badshah of district Kohat, Khan Abdul Qaiyum Khan, Khan Muhammad Ashraf, Syed Mazhar Gilani, Mian Akbar Shah, Maullah Shah, Mian Jaffar Shah, Khan Faqira Muhammad Khan, Khan Inamullah Khan, Syed Sarwar Shah of Charsadda, Saifullah Khan of Peshawar, Yusaf Shah, Muhammad Usman Khan, *Pir* Muhammad Khan, *Salar-i-Sooba* Muhammad Ayub Khan, *Haji* Hamidullah Khan, Maulana Muhammad Shoib, Khan Alam Zobair Khan of Mardan, *Haji* Faizullah Khan, Nawab Nasrullah Khan, Zulfiqar Ali Khan and Khan Shah Din of Dera Ismail Khan.¹⁵³

The important thing about this new Council was that two prominent Muslim League leaders, Yusaf Khattak and Ibrahim Khan Jaghbra's names were missing from the list, even though they were the Central General Secretary and the member of the Muslim League Central Parliamentary Board respectively. The only reason for their omission was their opposition to Qaiyum Khan. Yusaf Khattak's reaction was spontaneous and harsh. In the capacity of Central General Secretary, he dismissed the resolution. However, this time the Provincial Muslim League not only passed the same resolution but also the vote of no-confidence in him. This was done contrary to the League's Constitution; as a provincial League was not empowered to pass a resolution against the Central General Secretary.¹⁵⁴

It is worth-mentioning that, before the elections, Muhammad Ibrahim Khan Jhagra had leveled serious allegations of harassment, pressure, and intimidation against Qaiyum Khan. He had alleged that Qaiyum Khan was using all kind of pressures on the councilors to vote for him. Under the circumstances, he demanded that polling should be done by secret ballot instead of show of hands. At the time of polling when the same question was raised again, 66 against 48

153 PA, special branch, IPS special diary no. 75, dated 1 May 1951 bundle no. 76B, serial no. 1395, p.149.

154 Mahmood, p.220.

councilors supported show of hand. Interestingly, the two candidates, Qaiyum and Jhagra got the same number of votes for the post of the president.¹⁵⁵

Muhammad Ali Khan of Hoti, who himself was elected Treasurer in this election, was of the opinion that Qaiyum Khan was in real danger of losing the Presidentship to Ibrahim Khan Jaghra but was saved by Liaquat Ali Khan. In other words, the Muslim League hierarchy heavily rigged the Provincial Muslim League elections in favour of Qaiyum Khan. He also agreed with the assertion that Liaquat Ali Khan went out of the way for Qaiyum Khan because he needed his support against the strong Punjab lobby. Muhammad Ali Khan of Hoti also believed that the same lobby from Punjab later on conspired the murder of Liaquat Ali Khan.¹⁵⁶

Khan Saifullah Khan, member of the NWFP Provincial Muslim League Council, in an interview in Lahore, criticized Qaiyum Khan's election as Provincial President of Muslim League by saying, "32 of the 39 members of the three Southern Pathan District Councils had voted against him, while the councilors of other three districts- Peshawar, Mardan, and Hazara- were being "shadowed by the District Magistrates and police officials. He had been elected by a majority of 18 votes while nine members of the rival group were not allowed to attend the Council meeting. Had they attended the meeting, the voting would have been 57-57 and if the voting had been by secret ballot, the Chief Minister could not have been elected in any case..."¹⁵⁷

Later, the Jhagra group filed an appeal with the All-Pakistan Muslim League against the Frontier Muslim League elections on the grounds that:

- ____ 10 members who voted for Qaiyum Khan were not entitled for voting.
- ____ The police did not allow Jhagra group councilors to enter the Hall.
- ____ Secret ballot was not adopted which made the election null and void.¹⁵⁸

However, Qaiyum Khan by then had grown very strong and had a strong lobby in the Central Muslim League as well, which is why Ibrahim Khan failed to dislodge him.

After the elections of the Provincial Muslim League, Qaiyum Khan became bolder and, in a threatening tone, once stated that it was his duty as President of the Party to ask the Jhagra group about the accounts of enrolment forms that amounted to 50 or 60 thousand rupees.¹⁵⁹ He also started eliminating his

155 The Pakistan Times (Lahore), 1 May 1951, p.4 & Burhanuddin, Interview.

156 Hoti, Interview.

157 The Civil and Military Gazette (Lahore), 11 May 1951, p.12.

158 The Pakistan Times (Lahore), 27 May 1951, p.11.

159 Dawn (Karachi), 13 May 1951, p.6.

opponents from the Muslim League. On 5 October 1951 four members of the Provincial Muslim League Council, namely Fida Muhammad Khan, Iqbal Shah, Abdur Rahim Ghaznavi, and Muhammad Iqbal were expelled from the organization by the Council of the Provincial Muslim League.¹⁶⁰

Then on 7 and 8 October 1951 the Working Committee of the Provincial Muslim League held meetings at Bannu, under Qaiyum Khan presidentship. In these meetings, Liaquat Ali Khan was requested to select the candidates for the Provincial Assembly elections, as they had no-confidence in Muhammad Yusaf Khan Khattak, and Ibrahim Khan of Jhagra, who were also the members of the Central Parliamentary Board. The meeting, besides suggesting decrease in Muslim League ticket fee from rupees 500 to rupees 200 for the forthcoming elections, recommended the resignation of those local bodies administrators who wanted to contest these elections.¹⁶¹ The Working Committee also considered the report of the Special Tribunal appointed for the investigation of the 600,000 membership forms during the last held Muslim League election. The Committee unanimously accepted the tribunal recommendations, which said:

1. Ibrahim Khan Jhagra, 2. Qazi Gul Muhammad, 3. Malik Damsaz Khan, 4. Abdul Razaq, and 5. Mir Aftab Muhammad, etc, cheated in the forms and disobeyed the provincial Muslim League instructions. Further, they neither returned the undistributed forms nor were they able to provide information about the received money. The Provincial Muslim League Working Committee also observed that these people helped the opponents of the League as they were working in the Muslim League as fifth columnists of the Jinnah *Awami* League. They made hurdles in the smooth working of the Muslim League. Therefore, in the light of these charges, the Working Committee cancelled their membership of the Muslim League for two years.¹⁶²

Though Ibrahim Khan of Jhagra suffered a big blow, he did not sit idle. He decided to fight Qaiyum Khan within the party. He appealed against the decision of the Provincial Muslim League Working Committee to the All-Pakistan Muslim League President, Liaquat Ali Khan, who "telegraphed an order restraining the provincial party from taking any further action. The order was issued on October 16, and Liaquat Ali left for the NWFP the same day; but was assassinated while addressing a meeting at Rawalpindi."¹⁶³

160 PA, special branch, IPS daily diary no. 152, dated 6 September 1951, bundle no. 78, serial no. 1420.

161 PA, special branch, IPS daily diary no. 170, dated, 8 October 1951 bundle no. 78, serial no. 1420.

162 Shahbaz (Peshawar), 10 October 1951, headline news.

163 Afzal, p.71.

After the expulsion of Jhagra and Yusaf Khattak from the Provincial Muslim League, Qaiyum Khan demanded their resignations from their posts as they had lost the trust of the provincial League. He also demanded of the Pakistan Muslim League President to remove them from their posts under the Pakistan Muslim League constitution article 33, as they were no more members of the provincial Council of the Pakistan Muslim League.¹⁶⁴

On 21 October 1951 in a meeting of the Council of the Provincial Muslim League, held under Qaiyum Khan in Abbottabad, the Council formed a ten-member Parliamentary Board consisting of Abdul Qaiyum Khan, Jalaluddin Khan, Malik ur Rehman Kiyani, Saifullah Khan, Arbab Noor Muhammad Khan, Yusaf Shah of Mardan, Qamoos Shah of Kohat, Yaqub Khan of Bannu, Abdullah Khan and Ghulam Hussain. The meeting was attended by 150 members. However, Ibrahim Khan of Jhagra protested as 48 members of his group were not invited and walked out from the meeting.¹⁶⁵

On 10 February 1953 daily *Shahbaz* reported that the brother of *Pir* of Manki Sharif, *Pirzada* Ahmad Gul, MLA submitted his resignation from the NWFP Legislative Assembly to *Pir* of Manki Sharif, the President of Jinnah *Awami* League.¹⁶⁶ Then on 19 February 1953 *Al-Jamiat Sarhad* reported that *Pirzada* Ahmad Gul had made a request for the distribution of their ancestral lands. *Pir* Manki termed it a provincial government conspiracy which had pressurized his brother. Though Ahmad Gul denied *Pir* Manki's assertions, their brother, *Sahibzada* Noor Muhammad, termed Ahmad Gul's charges as baseless saying that the arbitrators had already decided the dispute on 10 May 1952 which Ahmad Gul signed on the same date. The judgment was also recorded in the Registrar's office on 12 May 1952 and Ahmad Gul had signed that one too. Thus, Noor Muhammad supported *Pir Sahib* of Manki Sharif's allegations against the provincial government.¹⁶⁷

By employing these tactics, Qaiyum Khan was able to have a full control of the provincial Muslim League. This not only weakened the Muslim League as a party, it was divided into factions. However, Qaiyum Khan was very keen to have ultimate say not only in the provincial government, but also in the affairs of the provincial Muslim League. This tendency pushed the old guards of the Muslim League, like *Pir* of Manki Sharif, Ghulam Muhammad Khan *Lundkhwar*, etc, to leave the party and establish their own political party.

164 Mahmood, p.220.

165 PA, special branch, IPS daily diary no. 177, dated 22 October 1951 bundle no. 78, serial no. 1420.

166 *Shahbaz* (Peshawar), 10 February 1953, front page.

167 *Al-Jamiat Sarhad* (Peshawar), 19 February 1953, front page.

ELECTIONS 1951

Qaiyum Khan's endeavours to tighten his grip on the Frontier Muslim League and the provincial government received a further boost in the ensuing elections. Early in 1951, the central government had started considering holding general elections in the country. The decision was taken by the Governor General of Pakistan on 19 March 1951, amending the Government of India Act 1935, India Central Government and Provincial Legislative Assembly Act, 1946. This paved the way for the first general elections in Pakistan on universal adult franchise basis.¹⁶⁸ As part of the central government policy, Qaiyum Khan, also made the announcement on the radio on 20 February 1951 that the provincial assembly would be dissolved on 10 March 1951 and fresh elections would be held on the basis of universal adult franchise. He also stated that the provincial government had suggested an increase in provincial assembly seats from 50 to 80 or 85.¹⁶⁹

Qaiyum Khan's decision to hold general elections caused some negative response due to certain reasons. Mazhar Ali Khan, the editor of the leading English daily newspaper, *The Pakistan Times*, wrote an editorial on 28 February 1951 and analyzed the political situation of the province. He wrote that the situation in the NWFP was not conducive for general elections because the province had been ruled very ruthlessly and that the political parties just existed in name. Most of the leaders and workers were either in jails or in exile, and no party was allowed to work freely. He further stated: "An atmosphere of fear—created by the ever-present threat of internment, externment, or arrest—is hardly conducive to the free exercise of the people's right to vote. No election held under these circumstances can be confused with the usual democratic practice, and unless the Frontier Government can be persuaded to reverse its present policies, its title to rule the Province in the name of the people will be as untenable after the elections as it is today..."¹⁷⁰

The Speaker of the Assembly, Allah Nawaz Khan, also opposed the decision of the Chief Minister on technical grounds. His plea was that the tenure of the existing assembly was until 1953. However, Qaiyum Khan did not agree. This disagreement between these two important members of the official party was, however, suspected by the opposition. They believed that it was a cooked-up plan to deceive the electorate by showing that Qaiyum Khan wanted to hold the elections and that he never supported the prorogation of the assembly.¹⁷¹

168 Javed, pp.276, 278 & Dawn (Karachi), 18 March 1951, headline news.

169 PA, special branch, IPS daily diary no. 45, dated 12 March 1951, bundle no. 77, serial no. 1403.

170 Khan Mazhar, p.317.

171 PA, special branch, IPS daily diary no. 38, dated, 3 March 1951, bundle no. 77, serial no. 1404 & Khyber Mail (Peshawar), 22 February 1951.

In March 1951, the Constituent Assembly of Pakistan passed the NWFP General Elections Bill paving the way for general elections on the basis of universal adult franchise. Under this law, the Provincial Assembly was to be dissolved but Qaiyum Khan would be retained as the interim Chief Minister.¹⁷² This Act also enhanced the Assembly seats from 50 to 85, out of which only three seats were kept as reserved.¹⁷³

In pursuance of this Bill, the Governor of NWFP, I.I. Chundrigar, dissolved the NWFP Legislative Assembly on 10 March 1951. Qaiyum Khan's government was allowed to continue as interim government and the elections' date was fixed in November 1951.¹⁷⁴

Jinnah *Awami* Muslim League voiced many apprehensions about Qaiyum Khan's interim government. In order to squash those apprehensions, Hussain Shaheed Suhrawardy, convener of the Jinnah *Awami* League, met the governor of NWFP on 14 March 1951 asking him to dissolve the ministry, appoint a committee for the delimitation of constituencies with a member from Jinnah *Awami* Muslim League and Samin Jan Khan as president of the Committee from the Muslim League. The governor told Suhrawardy that it was not in his powers to remove the ministry and that the delimitation of the constituencies was the work of the President of All Pakistan Muslim League, Liaquat Ali Khan.¹⁷⁵ Later, Suhrawardy in a written statement to the daily *Khyber Mail* demanded that in order to hold free and fair elections in the NWFP, it was imperative to remove the Qaiyum Khan ministry because if they continued to hold their offices, fair elections could not be expected.¹⁷⁶

In March 1951, the weekly *Affaq* wrote that the removal of Qaiyum Khan was necessary because the way he was ruling the province since the formation of his ministry, had raised many questions. His attitude towards his political opponents particularly was highly immoral and non-political. In this situation, if Qaiyum Khan was allowed to continue as the Chief Minister, the impartiality of election machinery as well as provincial administration would be unlikely. As such the provincial administration should be handed over to the Governor.¹⁷⁷ In spite of demands from different circles about Qaiyum Khan's dismissal, he was not

172 Mahmood, p.215.

173 *Khyber Mail* (Peshawar), 18 March 1951, p.4.

174 Shahbaz (Peshawar), 12 March 1951, headlines news & NWFP, GG. Extra Ordinary, 10 March 1951, No. 858(a)- G, 10 March 1951.

175 PA, special branch, IPS daily diary no. 48, dated 15 March 1951, bundle no. 77, serial no. 1404.

176 Ibid.

177 *Weekly Affaq* (Lahore), 18 March 1951, p.1.

The response of the general public towards the announcement of the elections was indifferent. Why the people were not interested in this very important exercise of democracy can be well judged by a commentary of an important newspaper, *The Pakistan Times*. The paper wrote: "This general apathy towards a vital problem of life is understandable when viewed in the context of major political events of the past four years. There is generally a subdued feeling that in the absence of civil liberties, elections would be no more than a farce, that unfair means would certainly be used and that the tussle is not between principles but personalities. The masses who have been greatly disillusioned all along, do not seem to be duped by the promises made by various parties..."¹⁷⁹

In May 1951, the provincial government changed the election schedule for the Provincial Assembly to 20 July 1951.¹⁸⁰ This date was again changed for Kohat and Mardan districts subsequently, fixing new dates as following:

- | | | |
|---|--|-------------------------------------|
| 1. All Muslim Constituencies in the Kohat District | {5 th and 6 th December 1951 | (2 days for males) |
| | {7 th and 8 th December 1951 | (2 days for females) |
| 2. All Muslim Constituencies in the Mardan District | {9 th and 10 th December 1951 | (2 days for males) |
| | {11 th and 12 th December 1951 | (2 days for females) ¹⁸¹ |

The government tried to delimit the constituencies strictly on geographical basis in order to break the traditional constituencies of the notables, which were based on economic or kinship ties.¹⁸² On 1 May 1951 the Government of Pakistan announced a Delimitation Committee for NWFP. The Committee comprised of the following:

Lt. Col. Allah Dad Khan	(Chairman)
<i>Nawabzada</i> Sher Afzal	(Member)
Khan Bahadur Hidayatullah Khan	(Member)
Hassan A. Shaikh	(Secretary)

178 Dawn (Karachi), 26 February 1951.

179 The Pakistan Times (Lahore), 9 July 1951, p.3.

180 PGGEO, 24 May 1951, no. 2.E.O. – 23rd May 1951.

181 PGGeo, 26 November 1951, no. 6/45-H.G.A./E.O. 26 November 1951 & Khyber Mail (Peshawar), 28 November 1951, head line news.

182 James W. Spain, *The Pathan Borderland* (Karachi: Indus Publications, 1985), p.213.

The Committee was asked to submit its preliminary report within sixty (60) days commencing from 1 May 1951. As the total population of NWFP, according to the 1951 census was 3,238,591, the Committee made 82 constituencies on geographical basis giving one seat per 40,000 people. Two seats were reserved for Muslim Women and one for general seat.¹⁸³ The Mardan tribal areas got one seat while the Hazara tribal areas got two. Four seats were reserved to the Hazara mountainous (Kohistani) area. The Frontier tribal areas were not granted seats because they were under the direct administration of Federal government.¹⁸⁴ The seats were distributed on the following lines:

District	Population	No. of Seats
Peshawar:	900,517	23
Hazara:	846,621	21
Mardan:	597,652	15
Kohat:	305,059	8
Bannu:	306,099	8
Dera Ismail Khan:	282,643	7
Women (Muslims):	_____	2
General (non-Muslim):	_____	1
Total:	3,238,591	85 ¹⁸⁵

Out of two women seats one was allotted to Peshawar city and cantonment area while the other was allotted to the towns and cantonments of district headquarters of Dera Ismail Khan, Bannu, Kohat, Mardan and Abbottabad jointly. The women were given the right to cast double vote: one for general Muslim seat and other for women reserved seats. While allotting one seat to general category, for non-Muslims, the Committee recorded that "we have, unfortunately, no figures of the population available of non-Muslims in the Province. It is, however, safely estimated that their population is about 20,000, which is far less than the unit of population for the allotment of a seat. It is indeed a case, not of merely according a legitimate but generous treatment to the minorities."¹⁸⁶

183 PGCEO, 31 May 1951, no. 280–DC 31 May 1951, Govt. of Pakistan Ministry of Law.

184 Javed, p.288.

185 Sabir, p.1064 & NWFP, GG. Extraordinary Ordinance, 31 May 1951, no. 280 – DC 31 May 1951, Govt. of Pakistan Ministry of Law.

186 PGCEO, 31 May 1951, no. 280 – DC 31 May 1951, Govt. of Pakistan Ministry of Law.

For the general elections the allotment of red colour, as election symbol, was banned. Actually, this was the symbolic colour of the Red Shirts (*Khudai Khidmatgars*), which was under ban for the last 4 years. The Jinnah *Awami* Muslim League had requested for the red colour but they were allotted the white instead, which was their second option. The other main parties were allotted the following colours:

Muslim League: Green
 Jama'at-i-Islami: Brown
 Islam League: Yellow¹⁸⁷

On 1 November 1951 full schedule of the election was announced stating that the final result would be possible by 11 December 1951. The schedule of the elections was as follows:

Nomination: 8 November 1951—nomination of candidates.
 9 November 1951—scrutiny of nomination papers.
 14 November 1951—withdrawal of candidature.

Remaining Schedule of the 1951 election:¹⁸⁸

Constituency	Category	Polling Dates	Counting of Votes and Declaration of results
1. (i) All Muslim Constituencies in Hazara district	Males	26-27 November	Within 3 days from 29 November
(ii) -do-	Females	28-29 November	-do-
2. Muslim Women Constit.	Females	30 November	Within 3 days from 30 November
3. General (Non-Mulsim) Constituency	Non-Muslims	30 November	Within 3 days from 30 November
4.(i) All Muslim Constituencies in Kohat & Peshawar districts	Males	1-2 December	Within 3 days from 4 December
(ii) -do-	Females	3-4 December	-do-
5.(i) All Muslim Constituencies in Bannu, Dera Ismail Khan and	Males	5-6 December	Within 3 days from 8 December

187 The Civil & Military Gazette (Lahore), 30 October 1951, p.6.

188 Khyber Mail (Peshawar), 2 November 1951, p.4.

Mardan

(ii) -do-

Females

7-8 December

-do-

In order to hold the elections in the province smoothly, the election commission arranged around 400 polling stations with 2000 presiding officers, polling officers, and polling assistants.¹⁸⁹

Qaiyum Khan's government did not provide equal opportunities to all the parties for their election campaigns. In fact, he used every tactic to disturb the election campaign of the opposition parties. Leader of the Jinnah *Awami* League, Hussain Shaheed Suhrawardy, was banned from entering the limits of NWFP for six months on 7 October 1951. The notice was served on him at the railway station Campbellpur [presently Attock] when he was on his way to Nowshera to attend the party meeting.¹⁹⁰ According to Qaiyum Khan: "After his speech in East Bengal applauding the Red Shirts, how could we take the risk of allowing him in the province and trying to revive a banned organization." He further alleged that the *Awami* League had entered into a pact with Khan Abdul Ghaffar Khan Faction for their support during the elections.¹⁹¹

The Muslim League campaign focussed on and propagated in public what voting for Muslim League would mean:

1. Consolidating the economic, social, religious, and defence strength of Pakistan.
2. Completion of industrial and other projects in NWFP.
3. The end of *Pakhtunistan* Movement and acquisition of Kashmir.
4. During election campaign, Qaiyum Khan categorically termed the election as a fight between *Pakhtunistan* and Pakistan
5. Supremacy of the people and the end of cruel capitalist exploiters.¹⁹²

Qaiyum Khan had complete control over the provincial administration during the 1951 elections and he did not accept all the nominees of the Muslim League Board. He gave tickets to those of his favourites whom the Board hadn't nominated despite his recommendation. Qaiyum Khan did not want anything or anyone to go against his wishes. When prominent Muslim League leaders came to the province to do canvassing for official candidates, he asked them to go

189 Ibid., 27 November 1951, headline news.

190 PA, special branch, IPS daily diary no.170, dated 8 October 1951, bundle no. 78, serial no. 1420.

191 Khyber Mail (Peshawar), 18 November 1951.

192 Shahbaz (Peshawar), 14 November 1951, p.3 & The Civil & Military Gazette (Lahore), 30 November 1951, editorial on p.5.

back. Otherwise, he said, he would arrest them for creating law and order situation.¹⁹³

The *Khudai Khidmatgars* of Charsadda issued a poster titled “*Khudai Khidmatgar au Election*” [*Khudai Khidmatgar* and election], saying that, though some candidates claimed to have the support of *Khudai Khidmatgars*, they wanted to make it quite clear that they did not support any group or any individual in the forthcoming elections.¹⁹⁴ However, an earlier report had suggested that Abdul Ghaffar Khan had asked his party workers to support such a political party, which, in their opinion, would be in the best interest of the country.¹⁹⁵

Pir of Manki Sharif of the Jinnah *Awami* Muslim League, who was the main opposition party leader in the elections, levelled serious charges against Qaiyum Khan in a press conference in Karachi on 27 September 1951. He claimed that Qaiyum Khan was harassing the opposition by instituting baseless cases against them, putting them in the jails, and creating hurdles in the smooth functioning of their party. He also put forward the following demands in order to conduct free and fair elections in the province:

1. The Governor of NWFP should take over administration of the province under Section 92-A during the forthcoming elections, as Qaiyum Khan would not refrain from using his official position and influence when and where it suits him.
2. Integrity of the ballot boxes in the elections be preserved by means of proper sealing of the boxes.
3. Nomination papers should not be rejected on flimsy grounds.
4. No “illegal cases” be instituted against any person during the elections.
5. Polling booths be situated at distances of every three miles and *zanana* (female) polling booth be put in every *bastee* and *qasba*.

He further demanded that if the government could not meet his demands due to any reason, then the elections should be postponed for the time being.¹⁹⁶

However, Qaiyum Khan was not ready to listen to these demands and concede to any political party in the province. This was also evident from a letter written by *Maulana* Maududi to a Lahore-based weekly, *Chattan*. *Maulana* Maududi wrote

¹⁹³ Ahmad, *Martial Law*, 314-315.

¹⁹⁴ PA, special branch, IPS daily diary no. 205, dated 30 November 1951, bundle no. 78, serial no. 1420.

¹⁹⁵ *Ibid.*, diary no. 114, dated 17 July 1951, bundle no. 21, serial no. 285, p.57.

¹⁹⁶ *The Pakistan Times* (Lahore), 28 September 1951, front page.

that Qaiyum Khan had arrested a very important and influential *Jamaat-e-Islami* worker, Sardar Ali Khan, under 40 F.C.R. Besides provincial government was also harassing his other workers during election canvassing. He wrote that he himself also experienced the police hounding during his trip to the province. He demanded that Qaiyum Khan should abstain from harassing his opponents otherwise all the opposition parties would announce boycott of the elections.¹⁹⁷

Before the 1951 elections the NWFP branch of *Jamaat-i-Islami* published a two-page pamphlet titled, "*Suba Sarhad Kai Intikhabaat Kai Qawaid aur Tariqa-i-Kaar main Tarmeem Kaa Mutaaliba*" [Demand for amendments in the NWFP Election rules and regulations]. While commenting on the elections held in the Punjab, the leaflet stated that every kind of illegal method was used in order to get the desired results. This made the election a mockery in the eyes of the people. In order to avoid such repetition in the NWFP elections, it was imperative to make certain changes in the election rules so that fair and peaceful elections could be held. The pamphlet made the following suggestions so fair election could be held:

1. The voters' list should be complete in all aspects, and should have his/her father's name, nationality, education, profession and full address. Further the lists should be prepared *Mohallah* wise.
2. Indelible ink or chemical should be applied to the finger of the voter before casting his/her vote.
3. Section 196 should be eliminated, which is a hurdle in the implementation of Section 9 of Pakistan Penal Code that deals with election offences like use of pressure, purchase of votes and making baseless propaganda. However, it is ineffective due to the introduction of Section 196.
4. All contesting parties and candidates should refrain from negative propaganda against their opponents once the election schedule was announced. Any breach of this conduct should be tried in the court of law, as Pakistan Penal Code's section 17 was not effective enough.
5. A filled sample of nomination paper should be printed in the nomination paper gazette to reduce the possibility of technical error. Further, the candidates should be given a chance to rectify the paper if the returning officer has objection to any part of the nomination paper.
6. Ballot boxes of all the candidates should be of white colour and every box should have the candidate's and the party's names on it. Further

¹⁹⁷ Weekly Chaitan (Lahore), 5 November 1951, p.22.

the candidate's election symbol should also be printed on the box to make it easy for the voter to recognize the box of the candidate of his/her choice.

7. No body should be allowed to establish their polling camps within one-furlong of the polling station. They should also be refrained from canvassing either in favour or in opposition of a candidate.
8. Any government servant on duty, who tries to favour or help any candidate in any form or avoids performing his/her duty, should be made liable to direct petition in the court by the concerned party or voter.
9. Providing transport facility to the voters should also be made a criminal offence.
10. Presiding officer should be given full authority within premises of the polling station to deal with such cases which had been declared illegal in the law.
11. Every box should also be affixed with the candidates' stamps and during the one-hour break the boxes should remain in front of polling agents under the protection of police.
12. The guardian of boxes in the polling booth must be a person from outside and he/she should not be in official uniform.
13. For the hearing of election petitions the tribunal should be headed by a High Court Judge. The decision of the tribunal should be considered as court decision, and should be made within a prescribed time limit.
14. If the government was considered negligent in the performance of her election duties, she should be made liable for petitions in the High court.
15. Special arrangements should be made for female voters. There should be no male staff in female polling booths so that workers could perform their duties freely and the voters could expose their faces to the polling staff.¹⁹⁸

However, neither these nor other suggestions/demands were accepted. The provincial government went ahead with their election schedule as per announcement. During the submission of nomination papers, a total of 266 candidates filed their papers for the 85 provincial assembly seats. The details are as follows:

¹⁹⁸ PA, Jama'at-i-Islami pamphlet, special branch, bundle no. 76, serial no. 1395, pp.835-37.

Kohat:	23
Hazara:	73
Mardan:	52
Peshawar:	68
Bannu:	22
Dera Ismail Khan:	19
General:	6
Women:	3
Total:	266

The numbers of candidates of each political party were as follows:

1. Muslim League	84
2. Jinnah <i>Awami</i> League	46
3. Yusafzai League	5
4. <i>Jamaat-i-Islami</i>	3
5. Islam League	4
6. Other parties (Independents)	98
Total:	240¹⁹⁹

In a pre-election analysis, the special representative of *The Civil and Military Gazette* wrote that though the Muslim League seemed the strongest party in the polls, it faced a formidable task from the opposition, mainly from the Jinnah *Awami* League, which had made an alliance with the banned *Khudai Khidmatgars*. Together, these two parties could put on strong show in the elections. Their strongholds were Bannu and Dera Ismail Khan districts and had some solid pockets in Peshawar and Mardan as well. The editor was of the opinion that if fair elections were allowed, the opposition might get more seats than was expected by circles outside the province.²⁰⁰

Qaiyum Khan was elected unopposed from the constituencies of Peshawar and Hazara. The papers of the two candidates contesting against Qaiyum Khan, Master Khan Gul of Jinnah *Awami* League and Akbar Ali from the constituencies of Peshawar and Hazara respectively, were rejected. Master Khan Gul's supporter (seconder) submitted a written affidavit with the returning officer

199 LAD, official report, 12 March 1952, vol.xxv – no. 7, sno.361, p. 25.

200 *The Civil and Military Gazette* (Lahore), 25 November 1951, p.4.

pleading that his signatures on the nomination papers were taken from him by 'fraud and deception.'²⁰¹ The leading newspaper of Pakistan, *Dawn* wrote in its editorial that the unopposed winning of Qaiyum Khan from two constituencies raised eyebrows. It commented that no doubt Qaiyum Khan might have won against any strong candidate but the way he returned unopposed provided opportunity for the opposition to level charges of rigging and irregularities.²⁰² Master Khan Gul, in a press conference held in Lahore on 14 November 1951, stated that in Frontier Elections 30 nomination papers of candidates were rejected and all of them either belonged to the opposition party or independents. No Muslim League candidate was found ineligible.²⁰³

Giving reference of '*Nawai Waqt*' editorial, titled '*Dhandli*' (fraud/rigging), Zahid Chaudhri writes that Abdul Qaiyum Khan was able to get elected unopposed by using brute force and coercion. In the Hazara constituency, his opponent was arrested and removed from the area. In case of his other opponent in Peshawar, his seconder was kidnapped at night and was forced to give the statement that he had not signed the papers, and that his signatures on the nomination papers were forged.²⁰⁴

Al-Jamiat Sarhad, another paper, reported that Qaiyum Khan managed it through coercion and underhand methods. It wrote that, according to their information, Master Khan Gul, his opponent from the Peshawar constituency, was contesting from two constituencies. He went to Kohat, his second constituency, to file his nomination papers while the Peshawar constituency was left to his supporters. But Qaiyum Khan forcibly took his supporters outside Peshawar and compelled them to sign an affidavit for the withdrawal of Master Khan Gul's papers. The same was done with his opponent from Hazara Constituency.²⁰⁵

In order to return successfully unopposed from the Peshawar constituency, initially, Qaiyum Khan wanted to strike a deal with Master Khan Gul, and for this purpose the good offices of Mian Jaffar Shah were used. Master Khan Gul was told that if he would not contest elections against Qaiyum Khan from Peshawar constituency, Qaiyum Khan would ensure his successful return from his hometown Kohat. Besides that, he was also offered good business deals in his stationary business but he refused to accept that.²⁰⁶ As for as the second home

201 Khyber Mail (Peshawar), 10 November 1951, p.4 & Shahbaz (Peshawar), 11 November 1951, headline news.

202 Dawn (Karachi), 6 December 1951, editorial on p.5.

203 The Pakistan Times (Lahore), 15 November 1951, p.4.

204 Zahid, pp.178-79.

205 Al-Jamiat Sarhad (Peshawar), 26 May, 1953, editorial on p. 2.

206 Mustafa Kamal s/o Master Khan Gul, Interview by author, tape recording, Peshawar, 26 June 2001.

constituency of Master Khan Gul was concerned, it was made sure that he loses that as well. According to Master Khan Gul's son, on the first day of elections, his father was having thousands of votes lead, but the next day, Qaiyum Khan changed the staff from education department who were not prepared to rig the elections, and thus, with the help of new staff, the elections were heavily rigged. So much so that his son said that from one polling station of Dum Kalai full copy of ballot papers was cast in the ballot box even without bothering to remove the stapler pins of the copy.²⁰⁷

After the 1951 elections, there were many allegations against Qaiyum Khan for using illegal methods to win the majority in the Provincial Assembly. He even encouraged aspirants to contest as independents against those Muslim Leaguers who were granted tickets against his recommendations, and made sure that they won the elections. For this purpose, he used every unfair method in order to achieve the desired results.²⁰⁸ This was confirmed by the well-known physician of the Frontier Province, Dr. Alaf Khan, who said that he lived in his ancestral hometown of Tangi, Charsadda, and remembered very vividly that the famous landlord of their area, *Khan Bahadur* Mir Alam Khan, had applied for the Muslim League ticket, but was not granted the ticket as he was not in the good books of Qaiyum Khan. He appealed to the Central Board of All Pakistan Muslim League, which gave him the ticket. Since it was the over-ruling of his decision, Qaiyum Khan asked another landlord of the area, Haji Muhammad Ali Khan, to contest the elections as an independent candidate and openly supported him. He went to Tangi for a public meeting, for which the police brought even the school children. Qaiyum Khan openly threatened the people saying that those who would not vote for Haji Muhammad Ali Khan, would be hanged upside down.²⁰⁹

Muhammad Ali Khan of Hoti was also denied a Muslim League ticket for the Provincial Assembly elections. When he appealed to the Central Parliamentary Board, Miss Fatima Jinnah asked Qaiyum Khan how come a person who had represented Pakistan at the United Nations could not represent his small constituency? Qaiyum Khan could not explain that. The issue was later on discussed between the Governor, Khwaja Shahabuddin and Qaiyum Khan. The Governor told Qaiyum Khan that he should give Hoti the ticket but should make sure that Hoti would not win. Hoti's cousin, Khan Bahadur Hidayatullah Khan of Toru who was secretary to Governor, overheard this conversation and leaked this out to Muhammad Ali Khan of Hoti with the advice not to contest the election

207 Ibid.

208 Abbasi, Interview.

209 Dr. Alaf Khan, Interview by author, Handwritten, Peshawar, 10 June 2001.

otherwise he would be in great trouble. So Muhammad Ali Khan withdrew his application.²¹⁰

Papers of most of the strong candidates were rejected based on flimsy grounds. One such case was that of *Maulana* Minhajuddin. On the day of submission of papers, his supporters along with the seconders, went to the office of the returning officer Hangu at 7.00 AM, but were not called until 1.00 pm. When one of the seconders had to go to the bathroom, the papers were rejected, as the seconder/proposer could not be there at that particular time when the returning officer called for him despite the assurances by other supporters that he would be back in a few minutes. It seems that the returning officer was waiting for such an opportunity because from 7.00 am to 1.00 pm they were not called but once the seconder was found missing, they were immediately called and the papers were rejected.²¹¹

Pir of Manki Sharif, in a press statement, strongly criticized the unfair and unscrupulous methods of Qaiyum Khan in the NWFP elections saying that the unopposed election of Qaiyum Khan and his friends to the assembly was a tragedy in the history of the NWFP. He further stated that three candidates, that is, Nisar Muhammad Khan, Arbab Sarfaraz Khan and Fazl-e-Haq Shaida opposed Shamsul Haq, a close friend of Qaiyum Khan. But the nomination papers of all the three candidates' were rejected which was "a master piece of unfairness and partiality particularly when Mr. Shaida's papers similarly filed in another constituency were accepted."²¹² Ghulam Muhammad Khan of Lundkhwar, an important leader of Jinnah *Awami* League and a key opponent of Qaiyum Khan filed his nomination papers for constituency no 1 and 2 Mardan, however, his papers were rejected on both constituencies on the ground that he had not signed it personally.²¹³

Muhammad Ali Khan Hoti narrated an interesting story about the rigging in the election. He said that, in one of the Mardan Constituencies, Qaiyum Khan supported Ayub Khan, a cousin of Mir Afzal Khan, against Muhammad Ali Khan's cousin Abdur Rahman Khan. Ayub Khan not only abstained from canvassing he was busy hunting in the jungles on the Election Day. When he returned from hunting, he asked from which constituency he had won the elections. He was so ignorant that he did not even know about his constituency. From another Mardan Constituency, Qaiyum Khan successfully had a dismissed police Sergeant elected to the Provincial Legislative Assembly.²¹⁴

210 Hoti, Interview.

211 Fazal-i-Mabood, Interview.

212 The Pakistan Times (Lahore), 17 November 1951, back page.

213 Khyber Mail (Peshawar), 11 November 1951, p.4.

214 Hoti, Interview.

Nawab of Hoti and his group also protested against the interference of the Qaiyum Khan government in the election. They sent telegrams to the Governor-General and the Prime Minister. However, when their protests yielded no results, the *Awami* League, the Azad Muslim League Yousafzai and the independent candidates in Mardan announced their boycott of the 10 December 1951 elections and did not send their agents to the polling stations.²¹⁵

In an interview with an eyewitness, whose father was a police officer in Charsadda, the author was told that one day he accompanied his father to the police station, where he saw the political opponents of Qaiyum Khan in the cell with chains in their hands and feet.²¹⁶

Qaiyum Khan also heavily used the state machinery for achieving the desired results in the election. It was believed that he had the blessing and support of the Centre as well.²¹⁷ This is also obvious from the following facts. In 1951 general elections, Qaiyum Khan and Muhammad Yusaf Khan Khattak were bitter rivals. Therefore the former wanted to make sure that the latter and his group did not return to the Assembly. During the election campaign, and later, on the polling day, he and his brother-in-law, Saifullah Khan, faced many problems in their constituencies in Kohat and Bannu. As a result, they sent telegrams to the Governor-General and Prime Minister on 6 December 1951. On the following day, Yusaf Khattak talked to the Prime Minister, Governor NWFP, and Sardar Abdur Rab Nishtar on the phone about the highhanded methods of Qaiyum Khan against them.²¹⁸

Similar telegrams were sent by other candidates from Kohat, Bannu and Dera Ismail Khan Constituencies. However, no remedial measures were taken either by the central government or the governor. So, in protest, Yusaf Khattak, Muslim League candidate from Constituency No. 4, Kohat, Saifullah Khan, Muslim League candidate from constituency No. 6 Bannu, Atta Muhammad Khan from constituency No. 8 Bannu, Muhammad Daraz Khan and Habib ur Rehman Khan, independent candidates from Constituency No. 1 Bannu, Muhammad Khan and Habibullah Khan from Constituency No. 5 Bannu, and Taj Ali Khan, *Awami* League candidate from Constituency No. 2, Bannu, decided to boycott the elections and withdrew from the contest on 7 December 1951.²¹⁹ The two other

215 PA, special branch, IPS daily diary no. 213, dated 13 December 1951, bundle no. 78, serial no. 1420.

216 Arif Khan Bangash, ex-Governor NWFP, Interview by author, Handwritten, Governor House NWFP, Peshawar, 12 April 1999.

217 Maluka, p. 152.

218 PA, special branch, IPS daily diary no.214 dated 15 December 1951, bundle no. 78, serial no. 1420.

219 Ibid.

candidates, namely, Attaullah Khan of Maddi, Constituency No.5 Dera Ismail Khan and Said Akbar, of Constituency No. 7 Dera Ismail Khan also leveled allegations of rigging against Qaiyum Khan.²²⁰

According to Muhammad Ali Khan Hoti, Qaiyum Khan fielded a peon [Watan Badshah] of Salt mines against Muhammad Yusaf Khattak, who was a stalwart of Muslim League, and had him elected through massive rigging.²²¹ Rigging in Yusaf Khattak constituency is also confirmed by *Maulana* Fazal-i-Mabood who was polling agent of Minhajuddin at Karak. According to him, the first day election was very fair. On the second day rumours were afloat in Karak that Qaiyum Khan had visited the constituency the previous night and had given orders for rigging the elections. During the polling time, when there was a lull in the voting, the presiding officer asked *Maulana* if somebody asked a person to do something against one's conscience, what would be the strategy. He told him that one would follow the conscience instead of the authority. On that particular day, according to their lists, only 32 votes had been polled while at the time of counting and signing the statement from Watan Badshah's box, extra 500 votes were found. He refused to sign the statement and the statement was sent without his signatures.²²²

For the 1951 general elections, Qaiyum Khan had granted tickets to very mediocre people, and he very frankly admitted that he could not afford bright people in the assembly. He wanted people who were rubber stamps and could not oppose his policies. He used to say that educated people should not be given assembly seats because they would always create problems for the executive authority. Under the same notion, he did not allow such people in the assembly and made sure that only incompetent people or his loyalists made it to the assembly who dared not oppose him.²²³

In those days, in all the provinces, Pakistan Muslim League was the ruling party and the chief ministers used to be the provincial Muslim League presidents as well. The ruling party usually adopted undemocratic methods to fail the opposition parties. So much so that some candidates were not allowed to do canvassing and were kidnapped on the polling day. The general impression about these elections was that the ruling party broke the polling boxes, cast bogus votes, and resorted to all sorts of irregularities.²²⁴

In an editorial on the elections of NWFP the editor of weekly *Chattan* Lahore while addressing the Prime Minister of Pakistan, Khwaja Nazimuddin, charged

220 Ibid., diary no. 213, dated 13 December 1951.

221 Hoti, Interview.

222 Fazal-i-Mabood, Interview.

223 Burhanuddin & Hoti, Interviews.

224 Javed, pp.278-79.

Qaiyum Khan with all kinds of irregularities and anti-democratic tactics. It was demanded that Qaiyum Khan should be made accountable for his actions as he had alienated the sincere leaders of Muslim League like *Pir* of Manki Sharif, *Pir* of Zakori and Rahim Bakhsh Ghaznavi—people who had made great sacrifices not only in the achievement of Pakistan but also in the consolidation of Muslim League in the province.²²⁵

Commenting upon the 1951 elections, a well-known author, Rafique Afzal writes that Qaiyum Khan made sure the success of his candidates by all means. During the scrutiny of nomination papers, papers of 31 opposition candidates' were rejected on flimsy grounds. In protest, 112 opposition candidates, including president of the main opposition party, Jinnah League, *Pir* of Manki Sharif, withdrew their nomination papers. Besides that Public Safety Act was widely used against opponents including Ibrahim Khan of Jhagra who was restrained from going to Karachi to present his case before the Muslim League High Command.²²⁶

After the election, the NWFP Provincial Council of the Jinnah *Awami* Muslim League held a special meeting in Nowshera on 18 December 1951 and declared the new Legislative Assembly of the Province unconstitutional and demanded fresh elections under the control and supervision of a judge. The party also levelled various charges of malpractices in the elections against Qaiyum Khan and his group, and demanded that a tribunal of High Court judges be appointed to hold an inquiry into the "illegal methods" adopted during the elections. A resolution was passed condemning the alleged illegal methods adopted in the elections in the Frontier Province. They enumerated the following malpractices:

1. Thirty per cent of the votes polled by opposition voters were rejected without cause.
2. Polling officers polled 40 per cent bogus votes for candidates who had obtained League tickets.
3. Members of the police and polling officers snatched away ballot papers from voters and put them into League candidates' box. This was done on a large scale.
4. Ministers and polling officers polled bogus votes for Qaiyum Khan's candidates.

225 Editorial, "Khawaja Nazimuddin Ki Khidmat main aik Maktoob", weekly *Chattan* (Lahore), 3 December 1951, p.1.

226 Afzal, p.72.

5. Government officials, including police officers, intimidated voters not intending to vote for Qaiyum Khan's candidates and forced them to vote for them.
6. The police cordoned off and batoned voters intending to vote for opposition candidates in order to prevent them from casting their votes.
7. The police kept under custody polling agents of opposition parties and polled bogus votes during their absence from polling stations.
8. Women groups were organized to poll bogus votes for women in Peshawar.
9. The nomination papers of 31 opposition nominees, who were sure of their success, were rejected without any valid reason.²²⁷

Beside these charges, it was also alleged that in some polling stations, the ballot boxes of opposition candidates were either put upside down or a very thin cloth was pasted at the entry hole from inside to deny them the polling of votes. The voters were also told that if they would cast their votes to opposition candidates that would be noted, as the staff was watching them.²²⁸

There was a general consensus amongst all politically conscious people that the provincial assembly elections were heavily rigged. *The Pakistan Times* editorial of 30 December 1951 called it "Hitlerian elections", and demanded from the central government to take some remedial measures.²²⁹ The prominent leader of the *Awami* League, Suharwardy, had also alleged mass rigging in the Assembly elections. He stated that the provincial elections in Sind and NWFP were heavily rigged in favour of the Muslim League party, resulting in no change in the complexion of the legislatures. The only change was in the NWFP Legislature because Qaiyum Khan who himself belonged to a middle class made the success of illiterate candidates possible, so that nobody could challenge his authority.²³⁰

On 11 December 1951 Ghulam Muhammad Khan Lundkhwar issued a press statement from Campbellpur [Attock] charging the NWFP provincial government of massively rigging the elections. He leveled 11 charges of different kinds including: Rejection of 40% opposition votes on flimsy grounds; casting 60% bogus votes in favour of Muslim League candidates in connivance with polling

227 The Civil and Military Gazette (Lahore), 20 December 1951, p.4.

228 Zahid, pp,181-82.

229 Khan Mazhar, pp.319-321.

230 McGrath, p.251 at footnote no.67, taken from Suharwardy, p.83.

officers; and paralyzing and destroying the opposition canvassing machinery by arresting 250 leaders and workers.²³¹

In a press conference in Karachi on 8 January 1952 *Pir* of Zakori charged Qaiyum Khan with gross irregularities and highhandedness in the election process. He charged that Qaiyum Khan did not allow opposition parties to smoothly run their election campaign. Rather Section 144 was imposed wherever the opposition wanted to hold rallies. On the Election Day, opposition voters were *lathi* charged, armed guards patrolled the polling areas and opposition workers were jailed. He demanded that a judicial commission should be appointed with judges from the Punjab to investigate the charges.²³²

The elections of 1951 were so heavily rigged that a nickname of “*Jhurloo* elections” was given to it. *Jhurloo* is basically a stick used by the jugglers to send the ball during demonstration from one place to another meaning Qaiyum Khan did the same thing with the votes, wherever he desired he put the votes in the boxes.²³³ Of course, Qaiyum Khan spurned all these allegations in a press conference. He stated that his government had neither used official pressure nor had opposed those Muslim League candidates whom the Central Parliamentary Board had awarded tickets.²³⁴

Since there was a general agreement amongst the opposition parties that the elections were heavily rigged and manipulated. In order to strengthen their opposition, all the leading parties in the province rallied together and formed All-Parties Constitutional Rights Defense Committee (APCRDC) on 23 December 1951. They chose Fida Muhammad Khan, an old Muslim Leaguer, to be the Convener of this committee. After the first meeting, he issued a statement to the press saying that a representative meeting of the leaders of Muslim League, *Awami* League, *Jammat-i-Islami*, *Azad Muslim League* *Yussafzai* and independent candidates was held in the Jinnah *Awami* League office at Nowshera on 23 December 1951. Prominent amongst the participants were *Pir Sahib* of Manki Sharif, Khan Samin Jan Khan, MLA, Dr. Abdur Rahim, *Maulana* Khanmir Hilali, Dost Muhammad Khan Kami and Abdur Rauf Khan. The meeting thoroughly discussed the elections in the province and formed a Committee named, All-Parties Constitutional Rights Defense Committee of 30 members. This Committee was given the task to find ways and means to get the NWFP elections null and void and to arrange fresh elections after the enforcement of Section 92 A in the province.²³⁵

231 Khyber Mail (Peshawar), 12 December 1951, p.4.

232 Dawn (Karachi), 9 January 1952, p.4.

233 Mohmand, Interview.

234 Khyber Mail (Peshawar), 14 December 1951, head line news.

235 Ibid., 28 December 1951, front page.

The Qaiyum Khan government reacted strongly against these activities and interned Fida Muhammad Khan along with many other political workers. *Pir* of Manki Sharif's movements were also restricted to the Nowshera police station and hundreds of other political workers were served with restrictive notices.²³⁶

On 27 February 1952 another meeting of the APCRDC was held at the house of Qazi Muhammad Aslam, Advocate in Peshawar, under the presidentship of *Pir* of Manki Sharif. The meeting took stock of the grave situation of the shortage of food items. The *Pir* of Manki informed the participants that he wanted to see the Governor-General in order to inform him about the dictatorial policies of Qaiyum Khan. However, if he failed to see him, then he would call upon the Governor of NWFP for the same purpose. The meeting strongly condemned the inhuman attitude of the provincial government towards political detainees and condoled the death of Qazi Attaullah and termed it as a political murder. They also showed great concern over the ill-health of Abdul Ghaffar Khan, who was in jail and demanded that he and other political detainees should be released. They also demanded the release of all political detainees. The meeting strongly condemned the provincial government's policy towards the press and the cancellation of the declaration of the '*Naujawan-e-Sarhad*' Haripur and '*Sang-e-Meel*' Peshawar.²³⁷

The Pakistan Times reported on 26 November 1951, that in the Frontier Provincial Assembly elections, the official machinery was heavily involved on the side of Abdul Qaiyum Khan. They were even publicly holding meetings telling the people to vote for Muslim League candidates. In some villages armed police guards accompanied workers of the Muslim League. All this went on in spite of the NWFP Chief Minister's pledge that the provincial administration would fully remain neutral in the elections.²³⁸

In the 1951 elections, nine Muslim League candidates were elected unopposed. For the rest of eighty-five seats about 660,000 voters, that is 49% of those eligible, used their right of vote. Qaiyum Khan's faction won overwhelming majority of seats while his opponents, led by Yusuf Khattak and Ibrahim Khan Jhagra, within the Muslim League, were defeated. When the Assembly met, Qaiyum Khan had a solid support of sixty-seven assembly members, including the two seats reserved for women. Independents were thirteen and Jinnah *Awami* League, the main opposition, had four seats.²³⁹

236 Khan Mazhar, pp.319-321.

237 PA, special branch, IPS daily diary no. 35, dated 29 February 1952, bundle no. 80, serial no. 1444, pp. 399,401.

238 *The Pakistan Times* (Lahore), 28 November 1951, p.3. (According to Dawn (Karachi), 21 December 1951, 55% voters used their right of vote).

239 Spain, Borderland, 213.

By-elections in the Muslim Constituencies of Hazara were held on 11 November 1951, in Dera Ismail Khan on 6 November 1951 and in Peshawar on 7 November 1951. Qaiyum Khan, who had won elections from two constituencies, vacated the seat on Peshawar 1. Muhammad Dawood Khan, a Muslim Leaguer was elected unopposed on this seat. From Dera Ismail Khan 7, Sardar Abdur Rashid was elected unopposed. Pirzada Ahmad Gul resigned from Peshawar 7. Another Muslim Leaguer, Col. Mir Haider, won this seat.²⁴⁰

The Muslim League Parliamentary Party held a meeting on 14 December 1951 at the Assembly chambers, all 67 MLAs including two women attended the meeting. They unanimously chose Qaiyum Khan as their party leader. After the election, Qaiyum Khan's interim government tendered their resignations to the Governor, Khwaja Shahabuddin. As leader of the newly elected provincial Assembly, the Governor asked him to form new government.²⁴¹

Qaiyum Khan announced his cabinet on 17 December 1951 taking five ministers. Muhammad Farid Khan, who was a minister in the first ministry of Qaiyum Khan was dropped. The new ministers along with portfolios were as under:

1	Chief Minister: Qaiyum Khan)	Finance, Law and Order (Political and Police), Public (Khan Abdul Works, Industries and companies, Electricity, Legislative Department, Judicial and Firearms.
2	Education Minister: (Mian Jaffar Shah)	Education, Agriculture, Forests, Guzaras, Civil Supplies, Historical Research, Archeology, Geological Survey, Census and Gazetteers and Auqaf.
3	Local Self-Government (Jalaluddin Khan)	Local self-government, Rehabilitation Minister and Resettlement of Refugees, Veterinary and Marketing, Stationary and Printing, National Savings Scheme and Resettlement of Demobilized persons.
4	Health Minister:	Hospitals and Public Health, Information, Jails, Elections, Civil Estates and Awards

240 Ibid.

241 Khyber Mail (Peshawar), 15-16 December 1951, pp.4 & front page.

(M.R.Kiyani) of Gallantry.

- 5 Revenue Minister: Revenue, Cooperative Societies, Civil
(Muhammad Ayub Khan) Defense, Motor Transport, Excise and
Taxation.

The government also announced the appointment of the following members as parliamentary secretaries:

1. Muhammad Aslam Khan Chief Parliamentary Secretary to work with Minister for Education.
2. Shams-ul-Haq Khan Parliamentary Secretary to work with the Chief Minister
3. Muhammad Yaqoob Khan Parliamentary Secretary to work with the Minister for Local Self-Government.
4. Raja Sardar Khan Parliamentary Secretary to work with the Minister for Health.
5. Nawab Qutbuddin Khan Parliamentary Secretary to work with the Minister for Revenue.²⁴²

Besides these parliamentarians, some other MLAs were also given responsibilities to run different committees of local bodies, which was obviously done to keep their allegiance intact to Qaiyum Khan. On 15 November 1952 Muhammad Jalaluddin Khan, Minister for Local Government presented the following list of MLAs who were serving as Administrators of different local bodies and drawing certain amount of money under different heads:

1. Muhammad Ashraf Khan, MLA Administrator Municipal Committee, Peshawar. (Rs. 500/- P.M., 100 C.A.[Conveyance allowance] and 70/- D.A. [Dearness allowance].
2. Abdul Hayee Lodhi, MLA, Joint Administrator, Municipal Committee, Haripur. (Rs. 200/- P.M. fixed).
3. M. Shah Muhammad Khan, MLA, Administrator, District Board, Hazara. (Rs.400+65 D.A.).
4. Pir Shahinshah, MLA, Administrator, District Board, Kohat. (Rs. 200/- P.M. fixed).

242 Ibid., 22 December 1951, p.4 & PGGEO, Peshawar, dated 17 December 1951, Legislative Assembly Notification, dated 15 December, 1951, vide no. 1161/9/8-LA-II.

5. *Haji Abdullah Khan*, Potah, MLA, Administrator, District Board, Dera Ismail Khan. (Rs. 200/- P.M. fixed).
6. *Mian Akbar Shah*, MLA, Administrator, Notified Area Committee, Nowshera Kalan. (Rs. 100/- P.M. fixed).
7. *Khan Bahadur Khan* MLA, Joint Administrator, Municipal Committee, Mansehra. (Rs. 200/- P.M. fixed).
8. *Captain Adam Khan*, MLA, Joint Administrator, Notified Area Committee, Baffa; (Rs. 200/- P.M. fixed).²⁴³

After the conclusion of the elections, a total of 9 election petitions were lodged against different successful candidates. Five of them belonged to the ruling Muslim League, three were independents and one belonged to Jinnah *Awami* League.²⁴⁴

On 1 January 1952, the first day of the Assembly after the NWFP provincial assembly elections, Nawabzada Allah Nawaz Khan and Muhammad Farid Khan were elected unanimously as Speaker and Deputy Speaker of the Assembly, and the newly elected members took oath as members of the assembly.²⁴⁵

Thus, Qaiyum Khan was able to form his second ministry through these controversial elections. However, these elections not only gave him legitimacy but also made him more powerful. Now he started giving more attention to the administrative problems of the province, which he had been facing right from the day of his taking over as the chief executive of the province.

²⁴³ LAD, official report 15 November 1952, vol. xxvi-no.2, serial no. 371, pp. 16-20.

²⁴⁴ LAD, official report, 19 November 1952, vol. xxvi – no. 6, serial no. 379, p. 29.

²⁴⁵ PA, special branch, IPS daily diary no. 5, dated 10 January 1952, bundle no. 80, serial no. 1444 & LAD, 10 January 1952, vol. xxiv No. 1, Official Report, pp. 4-5.

CHAPTER 3

ADMINISTRATION AND ADMINISTRATIVE PROBLEMS

When Qaiyum Khan took over the charge of the office of the Chief Minister on 23 August 1947, the state of affairs was far from satisfactory; there was shortage of experienced staff at every level of administration. The province was particularly affected due to the large-scale migration of non-Muslims to India. In this situation, the government had to depend heavily upon the British. The first governor of the province, after independence, was an experienced British, Sir George Cunningham, who not only knew the tribes well, but could also speak Pashto fluently. Another expert in NWFP Administration, Sir Ambrose Dundas followed Cunningham. Besides that, initially the British officers also held other important posts like that of Chief Secretary, Inspector General of Police, and Revenue Commissioner. Even the two leading educational institutions of the province, that is Islamia College and Edwardes College, were led by the British.¹

The administrative problems had become acute because the colonial system had broken down and the new system was not yet in position to tackle a host of demands and expectations in the new situation. The non-Muslims had left, leaving behind struggling educational institutions, banks and bazaars. Food was short and there was no worth-mentioning industry in the province. Economically, the NWFP was in deficit; the center would give crores of rupees to overcome this deficit. For example, the income of the province in 1946 was 2 crore 67 lacs and 49 thousand while the expenditure was 2 crore 89 lacs and 73 thousand. Under such circumstances, it was an uphill task to put the province on the path of normalcy and development.²

The impact of the migration of the non-Muslims from the NWFP was enormous. The province faced numerous problems in the business and economic sectors, most of which were dominantly run and managed by the Hindus and Sikhs.³ Mian Ziauddin's statement substantiates the sorry state of affairs of banks, which were totally dependent on the non-Muslims. He says, "At the Imperial Bank of India where I kept my account only the British Manager was on duty as all the clerks and accountants who were Hindus, had gone. He was good enough to cash my cheque and of those people whom he knew personally, but for other purposes the Bank was practically closed. The other Banks, which were also run by Hindus were closed down. Business was at a standstill. The Hindus and Sikh

1 Richard Symond, *Making of Pakistan* (Islamabad: National Committee for Birth Centenary Celebrations of Quaid-i-Azam Mohammad Ali Jinnah, Ministry of Education, Government of Pakistan, 1977), pp.129-130.

2 Sabir, p.1049.

3 *The First Year, Pakistan: 14 August 1947-14 August 1948* (Karachi: Pakistan Publications, n.d.), p.134.

shops were all closed. The Hindus had been in virtual control of the economic life of our Province and with their exit, all business and finance stopped functioning..."⁴ However, soon the people of the Province stood up to the challenge, took control of the business, banks, and motor transport and started running all these activities on their own.⁵

Besides these problems Qaiyum Khan also faced many other difficulties like threats from some of the small businessmen who tried to disrupt the smooth business activities in the province in general and in Peshawar in particular. Towards the end of August 1947, one Muhammad Yunas, a butcher, and another Ghulam Muhammad alias Gama of Peshawar, city, tried to instigate the local *nanbais* (bakers), milkmen, sweetmeat sellers and butchers to raise their voice against scarcity of sugar and meat etc. The planning was such that if they succeeded in the first phase, they would ask the people to go on strike against the scarcity of commodities and thus would defame the ministry.⁶ However, immediately after the creation of Pakistan the greatest challenge and difficulty that Qaiyum Khan faced was the law and order situation.

COMMUNAL VIOLENCE AND LAW AND ORDER SITUATION

On the eve of partition, communal violence had started in the province, and daily reports were pouring in about the deteriorating communal situation. The violence had started as a result of stories of communal bloodshed reaching from Lahore and Amritsar. The result was that there was reaction and reprisals, and reports of killings of non-Muslims from different parts of the province.⁷

VIOLENCE IN HAZARA: The first incident of communal violence took place in Hazara when, on 22 August 1947, some Sikhs were stabbed in Abbottabad, followed by riots in Dhamtaur with five Hindus, including a woman, dead and injured. Due to serious communal situation, curfew was imposed in Abbottabad and section 144 was imposed in Haripur, Havellian, Kot Najibullah, Mansehra, Baffa and Shinkiari. Security at Haripur was particularly tightened, as the town was considered prone to communal violence.⁸ However, in spite of strong precautionary measures communal disturbances broke out on 26 August 1947 at Haripur, and shots were exchanged between Muslims and non-Muslims leaving 14 Hindus and Sikhs, and one Muslim dead. A very large number of shops in the main bazaar were burnt. Later, the fire also spread to other areas in the city. It was estimated that about one fourth of the city was burnt down. Just a night

4 Ziauddin, p. 80.

5 Pakistan First Year, p.134.

6 PA, IPS daily diary no. nil, dated 29 August 1947, bundle no. 3, serial no. 42, p.87.

7 PA, special branch, CID dialy diary no.182, dated 21 August 1947, bundle no. 74, serial no. 1369.

8 Ibid., diary no. 185, dated 25 August 1947.

before the Haripur riots, communal disturbances had broken out near police station Lora on 25 August. As a result, 65 houses and one Gurdwara were burnt down, and two women, one Hindu and one Sikh were reported missing.⁹ The total number of casualties in the riots at Haripur were believed to be as following:

Killed:	Hindus and Sikhs	29
	Muslims	1
Wounded:	Hindus and Sikhs	6
	Muslims	3 ¹⁰

The intelligence agencies report that communal violence at Haripur appeared "premeditated, and was the work of a gang from villages near Torbela and Jagal including some tribesmen from Kaya Khabbal, who infiltrated into the bazaars, and at a given moment attacked Hindus in the main trading centers."¹¹ Later, Hindus from Haripur, Serai Saleh, Khalabat and Tapla villages were shifted to the refugee camp at Kakul, where the refugees' population reached to about 2000. Some Hindus were also evacuated to Kashmir state. In the communal violence at village Lalogali, one Hindu was killed and about 60 Hindus embraced Islam while on the night of 26 August, 10 to 15 houses were burnt down in village Tarbella.¹²

KOHAT: In a Muslim League meeting held on 19 August 1947 at Kohat, a resolution was presented by Abdul Karim Asaf, advocate, which stated that the meeting strongly condemned the premeditated general massacre of Muslims in Eastern Punjab and other areas. The participants of the meeting requested the Governor-General to interfere and stop the massacre; otherwise the free tribes of NWFP would rise and avenge the killings of their Muslim brothers, and the responsibility would lay upon the Governor-General and Hindu-Sikh leaders.¹³ However, the trouble started in the wee hours of 1 September when people from Usterzai and Raisan, who had gathered around the railway track, opened fire on the train erroneously believing that it was carrying non-Muslims. As a result of the attack the following casualties were inflicted:

Non-Muslims:	Killed	5
	Wounded	55 (Some of these were Muslims)
Muslims:	Killed	2

9 Ibid., diary no. 187, dated 27 August 1947.

10 Ibid., diary no. 189, dated 29 August 1947.

11 Ibid.

12 Ibid.

13 Ibid., diary no. 186, dated 26 August 1947.

Muslims were killed in this incident as the attackers did not know that there were Muslims traveling by the train as well.¹⁴

The situation in Kohat city remained under control for quite some time. However, on 8 March 1948 fire was put to the house of a Sikh sweet-maker. Many people were arrested for this incident, which also included 10 Muslim National Guards.¹⁵

TAKHTBAI: Communal violence started in Takhtbai at midday on 31 August 1947. Though apparently the disturbance started abruptly, it seemed that it was pre-planned. A group of about 30-40 Muslims attacked Hindu and Sikh inhabitants of the village and killed 18 non-Muslims, including a Sikh who was burnt to death, and 7 others were injured. It was believed to be the result of some irresponsible remarks passed by one Krishan Lal, who had allegedly boasted that he had killed Muslims while in Ambala. The police and military were immediately called and the situation was brought under control. After this incident, the non-Muslims from Takhtbai, Lund Khwar and Hathian were evacuated to safer places. However on 1 September, once again, the situation deteriorated at Hathian when a large number of villagers came from surrounding villages. Though the law enforcing agencies tried to control the situation, a Hindu was attacked and wounded with a sharp weapon. However the situation went out of control in Takhtbai where the mob attacked and looted the houses and shops of non-Muslims in *Mohallah* Boota Mal, the house of Chaman Lal and *Mandi* Jagan Nath.¹⁶ The same day, *Mandi* Bhawani Dass was also put on fire and, after the departure of the Deputy Commissioner and Superintendent of Additional Police, some houses of non-Muslims in Lund Khwar and Hathian were also looted.¹⁷

PESHAWAR: On 7 September 1947 serious communal riots broke out in Peshawar in which at least 87 people lost their lives, and 17 non-Muslim girls were kidnapped. During an attack on the Railway Station Saddar (Cantonment) Bazaar and Clerks' quarters, a platoon of the 17th Federal Company fought the attackers; a few villagers were killed.¹⁸ On 8 September Hindu and Sikh shops on the Peshawar Mall were looted. However, when Additional Police under (Deputy Inspector General) DIG arrived and opened fire on the armed raiders, the latter made good their escape. Looting also took place in the city.¹⁹

14 Ibid., diary no. 192, dated 2 October 1947.

15 PA, special branch, IPS daily diary no. nil, dated 9 March 1948, bundle no. 79, serial no. 1432.

16 PA, special branch, CID daily diary no. 191, dated 1 September 1947, bundle no. 74, serial no. 1369.

17 Ibid., diary no. 192, dated 2 September 1947.

18 Ibid., diary no. 198, dated 9 September 1947.

19 Ibid.

On 9 September 1947 more incidents of arson and looting occurred in Peshawar city. Even some Muslim *Mohallahs* were also damaged, which caused strong resentment amongst the Muslim population of the city. People were heard saying that those incidents were carried out by the Red Shirts, and particularly pointed out the notorious, Multanai, who was supposedly the right hand man of Qazi Attaullah. In order to avert such incidents Mohallah committees were organized to keep the looters away. Though the number of casualties could never be ascertained, it was roughly estimated that around 150 non-Muslims and 6 Muslims lost their lives.²⁰

NOWSHERA: On 9 September 1947 a large number of armed Muslim villagers from the Pirpai and Manki areas made their way into the Nowshera cantonment in the morning, and resorted to looting, arson, and killing of non-Muslims throughout the day. Later on, other villagers from the surrounding areas also joined in. While the army tried taking some non-Muslims to safer areas in the cantonment, even their lorries/buses were attacked which resulted in more casualties.²¹ It was believed that around 122 people were killed²² and 6 women were kidnapped in the Nowshera rioting. The non-Muslim refugees in the camps later on blamed the Muslim leaders, the army and the police for the massacre of non-Muslims. They expressed their hatred for the Muslims and their leaders and were even heard saying that they would take revenge when they reached India.²³

DERA ISMAIL KHAN: The communal violence broke out in the city bazaar on the evening of 15 September 1947. Though originally the dispute started between a Muslim and a non-Muslim over a property in Chagalia area, later on it turned into communal riots and spread to Bhatia and Bharati bazaars. During the violence, 7 non-Muslims were killed and four wounded, while 3 Muslims also received injuries.²⁴

BANNU: On 27 September 1947, while non-Muslims were being brought to Bannu from Lakki in busses escorted by the Frontier Constabulary and two armoured cars, they were attacked by a mob of around 500 people near Lakki. 30 persons were killed, including 4 Muslims while 28 persons received fatal injuries. During the chaos and confusion, 60 to 70 Hindus were able to safely escape to Lakki where they took refuge in the police station. Of these, 20 to 25 embraced Islam. Around 40 to 50 Hindus were reported missing, probably

20 Ibid., diary no. 199, dated 10 September 1947.

21 Ibid., diary no. 200, dated 11 September 1947.

22 Ibid., diary no. 203, dated 15 September 1947.

23 Ibid., diary no. 212, dated 25 September 1947.

24 Ibid., diary no. 204, dated 16 September 1947 & diary no. 205, dated 17 September 1947.

kidnapped. The next day, a group of 240 non-Muslims from Lakki were brought to Bannu for their safety.

On 28 September a few tongas, carrying Hindus from Naurang to Bannu, were attacked near Ghorī Wala; five were killed, including one Muslim, who was shot accidentally, a few received injuries. Another Hindu, called Chan Ram, was shot dead near the Kurram Bridge in Bannu on 28 September. During the disturbances, vehicles travelling from Bannu to Dera Ismail Khan and vice versa were searched by Marwat mobs for Hindus and Sikhs, but without any result. Similarly, at Pezu, a train was searched for the same purpose, but without any serious consequences.²⁵

The situation in Bannu once again turned serious on 30 September when a large number of local Muslim tribesmen gathered outside city with the intentions of attacking the non-Muslims in the city. In order to avert any untoward incident, the provincial government imposed a 24-hour curfew. In spite of these precautionary measures, shops, outside the Parade and Qasaban gates, were looted. Later in the night, Imperial Hotel was put on fire, but without any serious damage, while the canteen of Selig Ram and bungalow of Kishan Chand were looted.²⁶ Qaiyum Khan personally rushed to Bannu along with the Inspector General of Police to bring the situation under control. While proceeding to Bannu, he saw armed villagers at different places with charged sentiments. They were angry due to the reported largescale massacre of Muslims in the East Punjab. However, he advised them to remain peaceful and maintain law and order. At Serai Naurang, he personally entered into a mob and succeeded in dispersing them and in evacuating the non-Muslims to Bannu. The situation in Bannu turned dangerous when the Hindus started firing from their rooftops at the crowds. However, Qaiyum Khan personally went out in the streets, and with the help of the police, the Frontier Constabulary and the Military, he was able to disperse the crowds from the streets.²⁷ Qaiyum Khan also put into operation "City Defence Scheme", which proved very beneficial, and greatly minimized the damage.²⁸

Due to the serious communal tension in the province, the Provincial Muslim League President issued a poster in Peshawar city, titled, "Message to the Muslim Community", advising them to desist from loot and arson.²⁹ *Pir Sahib* of Manki Sharif had also issued similar instructions. He was also trying to persuade

25 Ibid., diary no. 215, dated 29 September 1947.

26 Ibid., diary no. 217, dated 1 October 1947.

27 The Pakistan Times (Lahore), 3 October 1947. back page.

28 Ibid.

29 PA, special branch, CID daily diary no. 201, dated 13 September 1947, bundle no. 74, s.no. 1369.

the villagers to return the non-Muslim girls whom they had kidnapped during the rioting.³⁰

Opposition to the Qaiyum Khan government and particularly the *Khudai Khidmatgars*/Red Shirts had their own assessment of the communal situation in the province. At a meeting held at Guli Garhi on 18 September 1947 Abdul Ghaffar Khan stated, "Actually Muslim League volunteers have taken greater part in the looting as compared with Red Shirts, and the Muslim League was trying to bring the Red Shirt organization into a disrepute by making false propaganda against it in this behalf. Lists were being prepared by the Congress giving names of those persons who had taken part in the loot. This would show which party played a leading part in this connection."³¹

In such a situation, the non-Muslims in the NWFP were very concerned about their future. To discuss their problems, a meeting of local non-Muslims was held in the refugee camp Khalsa Primary School, Bannu, on 24 November 1947, under the presidentship of Master Kewal Ram, (Member of Legislative Assembly) MLA. The meeting considered the statement of Master Kotu Ram, MLA, broadcasted over the radio, expressing confidence in the government of Pakistan, as far as the protection of the minorities was concerned. The meeting unanimously disapproved the statement, and removed Master Kotu Ram from the presidentship of the management committee of refugees. The meeting also declared that Master Kotu Ram was not authorized to represent them any more, and that the statement did not bind them. They expressed their determination not to stay in Pakistan even if peace was restored. The meeting finally decided to form a deputation to call upon the Governor of NWFP on 27 November in order to request him to expedite their early evacuation.³²

PARACHINAR: Communal violence broke out in Parachinar, Kurram Agency on 23 January 1948 when some Afghans, attacked a non-Muslim refugee camp killed around 180 refugees, wounded 50 and kidnapped yet another 50. In retaliation, the Kurram Militia took action against the raiders and killed over 100 of them, which brought the situation under control. This incident frightened the remaining non-Muslims and about 1,500 Hindus from Parachinar migrated to India.³³

The gravity of the communal rioting in the NWFP could be well judged from the statement of a migrant, Dewan Shivsaran Lal, former Deputy Commissioner, Dera Ismail Khan, who reached Delhi on 2 October 1947, and told the United Press of India, "It would be inhuman, insane of Indian Government not to

30 Ibid., diary no. 204, dated 16 September 1947.

31 Ibid., diary no. 207, dated 19 September 1947.

32 Ibid., diary no. 265, dated 29 November 1947.

33 Khan Khalid, Politics, p.74.

mobilize transport to rescue unfortunate Hindus and Sikhs now counting their days in the Frontier Province like goats in a slaughter house. Evacuees in camps and Hindus and Sikhs are starving as they cannot come out into open streets for purchase and thus face armed Pathans, who have slaughtered many non-Muslims particularly in Nowshera and Peshawar. Ninety percent of non-Muslims have been killed. He further counted the number of non-Muslims (waiting for immigration to India) – 30,000 in Peshawar, 20,000 in Mardan and 30,000 in Bannu.”³⁴

One of the peculiar aspects of the communal rioting in the NWFP was the conversion of non-Muslims to Islam by force. This is evident from different reports of government agencies. One such report, for example, stated that “On 26th August, Kanwar Bhan Narang, M.L.A., accompanied by a police guard, proceeded to Paniala village, Dera Ismail Khan district, and returned with five Hindus who were forcibly converted to Islam during the recent disturbances...”³⁵

Another such incident was reported on 18 September from *Basti Pundan Wali*, Dera Ismail Khan where 24 non-Muslims embraced Islam on 12 September in the Chaugalia mosque. Later on, the new converts were marched in a procession, consisting of about 400 persons, through the main bazaars.³⁶ Similarly on 1 October it was reported from Bannu that 150 Hindus accepted Islam in Kakhi area.³⁷

Another incident of forced conversion was reported in Urmar Miana village when it was attacked by a mob at midday on 10 September 1947. 17 non-Muslims were killed, 3 were forced to convert to Islam.³⁸ In Phandu village some Hindus were forcibly converted to Islam. Though these forced conversions were taking place, there were still some good souls among the locals who helped these helpless people. For example, one local Muslim from Saddar area gave protection to a Hindu man, a woman and a boy who had been forced to accept Islam and later on handed them over into the custody of Police.³⁹

Though religion in itself does not permit coercion, some fanatics were involved in such un-Islamic acts in the name of religion. Further, these conversions were not permanent, because they converted due to the fear for their lives and whenever they felt safe, these converts reverted back to their original religion. For example, it happened at Wanda Shahab Khel (Lakki Marwat), Police Station Daddi Wala,

34 Ibid., pp.73-74.

35 PA, special branch, CID daily diary no. 192, dated 2 September 1947, bundle no. 74, serial no. 1369.

36 Ibid., diary no. 205, dated 18 September 1947.

37 Ibid., diary no. 217, dated 1 October 1947.

38 Ibid., diary no. 199, dated 10 September 1947.

39 Ibid., diary no. 201, dated 13 September 1947.

when 13 converted Muslims reverted back to their original religion and were then sent to the non-Muslims' refugee camp in Bannu.⁴⁰

For the safety of their lives and properties, the non-Muslims also readily acquiesced into this development: accept Islam for the time being, sell their property in Pakistan, and then migrate to India along with the money. This was evident in the case of Sheikh Shakirullah (previously Shankar Dass), who converted to Islam, sold his house in January 1951 to the wife of Wahab Din at the price of 20,000 rupees. After the sale, the people were heard saying that his next step was to migrate to India, and revert back to Hinduism.⁴¹

The fact of the matter, however, is that the migration of non-Muslims had started much earlier from NWFP. In order to ensure their smooth migration the Refugee Commissioner of India, C.N. Chandra arrived in the province on 27 July 1947. Mr. Chandra was deputed in July 1947 by Sardar Vallabhai Patel, Home Minister in the Indian Cabinet, to gain first hand knowledge of the intricate refugee problem in NWFP and the West Punjab and to hold preliminary survey of their condition and study intricate refugee problems from close quarters. The Refugee Commissioner studied the peculiar problems of the NWFP minorities and was informed that about 100,000 people had already left the province. He held prolonged discussions with prominent representatives of the minorities, and the officials of Central Relief Committee to ascertain the true position.⁴²

Though many non-Muslims might have migrated on their own, there were also allegations that Qaiyum Khan conspired to force them out. In this regard, Iskandar Mirza writes in his Memoirs, "the exodus of the Hindus from the North-West Frontier Province was neither desired by the Hindu inhabitants nor by the vast majority of Pathans. It was brought about by the Kashmiri Chief Minister of the NWFP, Abdul Qaiyum Khan."⁴³ Though some people do not agree with this assertion, it seems that Iskandar Mirza's remarks were partly true because in a meeting of the non-Muslims with the Muslim Leaguers in Kohat, they had shown their desire to live in the province. This meeting took place on 21 August 1947. Their leaders met Haji Said Shah, Mohabat Ali Khan, Syed Masum Shah, Qazi Shafiuddin, Pir Mir Alam Shah and other prominent Muslim League leaders, and informed them that Hindus and Sikhs of Kohat, who had not migrated, wished to

40 PA, special branch, IPS daily diary no. nil, dated 9 March 1948, bundle no. 79, serial no. 1432.

41 PA, special branch, IPS daily diary no. 11, dated 19 January 1951, bundle no. 77, serial no. 1404.

42 Khalid Khan, *Politics and Government in the North-West Frontier Province, (1947-53)* (M.Phil thesis submitted to the National Institute of Pakistan Studies, Quaid-i-Azam University Islamabad, 1998), p.70.

43 Ahmad Salim, *Iskandar Mirza: Rise and Fall of a President* (Lahore: Gora Publishers, 1997), p. 92.

live as their '*Hamsayas*' in Kohat, and promised to be loyal to Pakistan. They condemned the atrocities committed in the Punjab, and expressed their sympathy with the Muslims of the Eastern Punjab. The Muslim League leaders assured them that no harm would come to them, as long as they remained loyal to the Pakistan government and did not work as 'Fifth Columnist'. The non-Muslims promised to send telegrams to Master Tara Singh, Pandit Jawaharlal Lal Nehru and the Premier of the Eastern Punjab asking them to restore peace. Otherwise, they warned, events in the Eastern Punjab would have a bad effect on the future relations of Hindus and Sikhs in this province.⁴⁴

There is also evidence to suggest that the non-Muslims continued to live peacefully in *Pakhtun* areas outside the jurisdiction of the provincial government. One such example was that of the Swat State where they decided to stay in their ancestral homes. In a joint statement made by them, they stated: "We, Hindus and Sikhs in Swat state, are leading a very peaceful life. All people in the state are living like brothers, undisturbed by any communal bias. There is no religious differentiation of any kind, and all persons, irrespective of caste and creed are treated on equal footings by state authorities. We are willingly staying here without any compulsion..."⁴⁵

Those who believe in Qaiyum Khan's involvement in the non-Muslims' migration argue that Qaiyum Khan had a vested interest in their mass exodus, in large part due to their political affiliations. Most of the non-Muslims were the supporters of *Khudai Khidmatgars*, the Congress ally, and Qaiyum Khan felt threatened from their presence. As a shrewd politician, he foresaw the danger and nipped the possible threat in the bud, and thus played an important role in making them migrate to India.⁴⁶ But, according to Muhammad Ali Khan Hoti, it was the central government's decision that the non-Muslims from NWFP and Punjab should migrate to India. He stated that so far as the NWFP was concerned he even personally had collected weapons and posted people at Takht Bhai for the protection of the Hindus. However, he insisted that though Qaiyum Khan had no role in the migration of non-Muslims, he did play a role in creating hurdles in the settlement of refugees in NWFP.⁴⁷

There were also some meetings arranged by the NWFP government officials and the Governor in which they had tried to build confidence among the non-Muslims to encourage them to stay in the province. However, there was a general chaos

44 PA, special branch, CID daily diary no. 185, dated 25 August 1947, bundle no. 74, serial no. 1369.

45 The Pakistan Times (Lahore), 16 November 1948, p.9.

46 Fida M.Khan, Interview.

47 Hoti, Interview.

and disorder in both Pakistan and India; the minorities were feeling unsafe on either side of the border and they wished to migrate.⁴⁸

Some people also believe that the migration of non-Muslims, most of whom belonged to the economic sector, was part of an Indian conspiracy so as to cripple Pakistan economically. It was evident from the fact that in Dera Ismail Khan the party of D. Bhanju Ram Gandhi was carrying on secret propaganda asking the non-Muslims to leave Pakistan.⁴⁹ Yet another such group of Hindus and Sikhs was busy in Peshawar cantonments propagating amongst sweepers⁵⁰ that no one would be allowed to leave Pakistan after the last batch of Hindus had left the NWFP. This had caused considerable consternation amongst the sweepers and other domestic servants, who were weighing their option of migrating to India. The idea behind the move was to place difficulties in the way of the administration, and to paralyze sanitary arrangements.⁵¹

This kind of planning is also evident from a newspaper analysis that wrote: "The mass exodus of non-Muslims from the NWFP started in the middle of September 1947, under a planned scheme and about 269,000 non-Muslims, who were holding key positions in the economic life, left the Province all of a sudden and it was feared that the Economic equilibrium of the Province will be put out of gear."⁵²

In spite of different arguments the fact remains that a large number of non-Muslims migrated from the province because there was a general breakdown of the law and order situation. However, it is worth-mentioning that due to the Communal Violence in the province, travel by train was unsafe for evacuating non-Muslims. The members of Muslim League National Guards had spread terror amongst the non-Muslims, for they were conducting searches of Hindus and Sikhs for arms, which were allegedly carried by them. The *Zalmai Pakhtun* posted some of its workers to resist such searches but it further increased the tension.⁵³ In this situation, the rich non-Muslims started evacuating by air.

48 PA, special branch, CID daily diary no. 267, dated 2 December 1947, bundle no. 74, serial no. 1369, CID daily diary no. 268, dated 3 December 1947, bundle no. 74, serial no. 1369 & CID daily diary no. 269, dated 4 December 1947, bundle no. 74, serial no. 1369.

49 PA, special branch, CID daily diary NO. 267, dated 2 December 1947, bundle no. 74, serial no. 1369.

50 Overwhelming majority of sweepers are the low-caste non-Muslims in Pakistan, and are predominantly engaged in jobs like cleaning of streets, buildings and toilets etc.

51 Ibid., diary no. 238, 27 October 1947.

52 Khyber Mail (Peshawar), 25 September, 1952, p.2.

53 PA, special branch, Confidential diary no. 130-131/c, dated 28.5.1947, DSP Railway police, Peshawar, bundle no. 42, serial no. 671

Peshawar, Dera Ismail Khan and Bannu were the major airports for their airlifting.⁵⁴

It also needs to be stressed that during the communal riots many incidents of abductions took place mostly of non-Muslim girls/young women. After some time, however, when the situation became normal, some were recovered but the exact number of abductions is still a mystery. In 1953, on the floor of the Provincial Legislative Assembly, it was stated that, in all 147 non-Muslim women and 10 children were released from captivity in different parts of the province as per following detail:

Peshawar	88
Bannu	24
Dera Ismail Khan	2
Mardan	1
Kohat	1
Hazara	29 ⁵⁵

During those days, a case of a non-Muslim woman, in which two powerful groups were involved, became famous. It was feared that the case might lead to a large-scale bloodshed. The dispute started between Suleman Khel *Pawindas* [*Pawindas* are a tribe of Afghanistan] and the Mahsud chieftains in Dera Ismail Khan. A Suleman Khel *Pawinda*, during the communal disturbances, had brought with himself a non-Muslim woman named Rattan Kaur alias Lachmi Bai from Gujrat, aged 30 years, and the woman was taken away from Sarkai *Pawinda* by *Pir* Muhammad Yusaf alias Baghdadi *Pir*, or the *Pir* of Wana, who was held in great esteem by the *Pawindas*. Sarkai later on came to Dera Ismail Khan with his men and asked for the woman who was present with the *Pir* of Wana, who declined to return her. The matter was taken to the Deputy Commissioner, Dera Ismail Khan, who ordered the arrest of Sarkai *Pawinda* on 13 December 1950 under section 40 FCR; the woman was to be produced before him for final adjudication. Later, the woman was sent to jail until the issue was resolved. However, the woman declared that she was not willing to go back to Sarkai *Pawinda*.⁵⁶

54 PA, special branch, IPS daily diary no. nil, dated 25 March 1948, bundle no. 79, serial no. 1432.

55 LAD, 19 November 1953, Vol. xxviii, No. 9, official report, serial no. 415, p.62.

56 PA, special branch, IPS daily diary no. nil, dated 8 January 1951, bundle no. 77, serial no. 1403.

The dispute aggravated the relation between the parties. During one of the hearings before the Deputy Commissioner, on 11 January 1951 to be precise, the *Pir* of Wana and some *Pawindas* exchanged hot words during deliberations, but the intervention of police averted a possible clash. It was also said that the *Pawindas* had even communicated the incident to *Pawindas* in Afghanistan.⁵⁷

Meanwhile, Lachmi Bai requested the Deputy Commissioner to permit her to live with the *Pir* of Wana as she was fed up with the jail life. To press her demand, she started hunger strike in the jail but was tactfully persuaded to take her meals.⁵⁸ The high-tension drama ended on 9 February 1951 with her sending to Lahore under the order of the provincial government. Most probably, later on, she was sent out to India.⁵⁹

The non-Muslims migrated from the province in bulk. The refugees from India could not immediately replace the outgoing non-Muslims as the former reached the province rather later. Meanwhile, the local people not only had maintained the economic equilibrium by occupying their business activities, but also had occupied large number of evacuee houses and shops. When the refugees arrived from India, there was scarcity of residential houses and business areas. The refugees who arrived in this province belonged to the following four categories:

- a. big and middle class businessmen;
- b. petty shopkeepers, artisans, craftsmen etc;
- c. cultivators and peasants/landlords; and
- d. government servants.⁶⁰

In order to rehabilitate these refugees, different kind of jobs were created/offered to them. Special loans were given to encourage them to start their own businesses. They were also adjusted in different industrial establishments, like weaving factory, shoe factory, carpet factory, Kashmir industry, charkha centers, etc. Besides, sewing machines were also provided to tailors, widows, and to some government servants whose pay was less than Rs 200/- per month.⁶¹

The refugee boys were given special technical training, and monthly stipends to lessen the burden on their families. The provincial government provided education facilities to the children of refugees, free of cost, and allowed them a

57 Ibid., diary no. 9, dated 10 January 1951.

58 PA, special branch, IPS daily diary no. 22, dated 26 January 1951, bundle no. 77, serial no. 1404.

59 Ibid., diary no. 25, dated 14 February 1950.

60 Khyber Mail (Peshawar), 25 September 1952, p.2.

61 Ibid.

cash grant to help them meet their expenses. In addition to all this, the Central Government also provided Rs 35,000/- to the refugees' children.⁶²

The details of property left behind by the non-Muslims in NWFP are as follows: 24209 houses, 14584 shops, 101 commercial establishments and 395172 acres of agricultural land, of which the locals occupied 10982 houses, 7 commercial establishments and 41586 Acres of agricultural land.⁶³ The provincial government also took possession of 180 lorries and cars of the non-Muslims who migrated from this Province.⁶⁴

The provincial government issued ordinance no. vi of 1948, called The NWFP Protection of Evacuees Property and Rehabilitation of Refugees Ordinance, 1948, on 10 March. Under the said Ordinance, the provincial government was authorized to appoint a Custodian and an Additional Custodian along with other staff. Under this Ordinance the Provincial Government assumed temporarily the charge of evacuee property and thus through the Custodian Office started transferring the same to the people under certain terms and conditions.⁶⁵ However, the refugees and the public did not express satisfaction with the working of the Custodian's office. They were particularly annoyed with the rather high rents of the houses and shops, which was the work of two officers both of whom mostly favoured their friends.⁶⁶

To show their anger and dissatisfaction with the Custodian's office, the refugees in Peshawar cantonment and Peshawar city observed a "Black-out" on 11 April 1950 for a couple of hours and closed their shops till noon the following day. They were protesting against the non-fulfillment of their demands, namely stopping of eviction notices against refugees and remission of rents of premises in their possession.⁶⁷

To show his solidarity with the refugees in the NWFP, Shah Rahman Ansari, President of the All Pakistan Mohajir League, visited NWFP and addressed a press conference on 12 April 1950 in Peshawar. During this press conference, he strongly criticized Sheikh Abdul Hamid, Secretary Rehabilitation. Ansari alleged that, until that time 55,000 refugees had arrived in NWFP but only 8,000 were settled and the rest were forced to leave the province due to the Secretary Rehabilitation. Further, he stated that while elsewhere in the country, refugees

62 Ibid.

63 LAD, dated 15 November 1952, vol. xxvi-No. 2, official report, p.45.

64 LAD, 20 October 1948, Vol. xvi, No. 1-4(3), official report, serial no. 277, p.148.

65 PAGG, Peshawar, 10 March 1948, no. 437-LD.

66 PA, special branch, IPS daily diary no. nil, dated 24 June 1948, bundle no. 78, serial no. 1423.

67 PA, special branch, IPS daily diary no. nil, dated 13 April 1950, bundle no. 77, serial no. 1403.

were granted commercial places on preferential basis, in the NWFP same were given on competitive basis, which in effect, meant helping the rich at the cost of depriving the refugees.⁶⁸

On 23 April 1950 a private meeting of the working committee of Provincial *Mohajir* League was held in Peshawar city, under the presidentship of *Maulana* Najmul Hassan, which was attended by about 24 others. It was resolved in the meeting that the officials of the resettlement department were dis-honest and inefficient. However, they showed their satisfaction over the steps taken by the provincial government.⁶⁹

In December 1950, the provincial government announced that all claims in respect of registration of lands from the refugees of the NWFP who had left their property in the province of East Punjab, East Punjab States and States of Alwar and Bharat Pur should be registered with the Settlement Commission Officers (Deputy Commissioners) and Assistant Settlement Commission Officers (Revenue Extra-Assistant Commissioners and Assistant Custodians) in the NWFP under the NWFP Refugees (Registration of Land claims) Act, 1949. The date of registration of claims commenced from 15 December 1950 for a period of four months and it was made clear that no claims would be entertained on or after 15 April 1951. The registration forms, which were in Urdu, and other relevant information were made available in the offices of the Deputy Commissioners all over the province.⁷⁰

On 15 November 1952 *Malik* Amir Alam Khan Awan asked the Minister for Local Government, Muhammad Jalaluddin Khan to elaborate the status of Indian refugees in the province. While responding to his query, the minister gave the following details:

Number of refugees in the province was 65,809.

a. District-wise numbers of refugees were as follows:

Peshawar	32,203
Hazara	11,355
Dera Ismail Khan	10,504
Bannu	5,619
Mardan	4,360
Kohat	1,568

68 Ibid.

69 Ibid., diary no. nil, dated 24 April 1950.

70 Khyber Mail (Peshawar), 20 December 1950, p.4.

- b. (i) Number of refugees in urban areas 53,019
- (ii) Number of refugees in rural areas 2,790
- c. (i) Number of refugees who had been
allotted agricultural land 47,625
- (ii) Number of refugees to whom
commercial establishments had been
allotted 3,382
- (iii) 389 refugees were without allotments of either kind.
- d. Three times land revenue was charged from the allottees of land and 50 per cent of the assessed rent was charged for the building. The lease money of the bigger industrial concerns was fixed by the Rehabilitation Board.
- e. (i) The number of refugees provided with residential houses, 62,259 refugees.
- (ii) The number of refugees who had been allotted shops—6,050
- f. Total monetary aid was rupees 409,653 for 18,946 refugees. This number did not include the refugees in Dera Ismail Khan and Mardan as the information had not been received from those two districts.⁷¹

Wide scale misappropriation reports were in circulation about the evacuee property at that time. Sher Muhammad Khan, the Personal Secretary of Qaiyum Khan, the Chief Minister, believed that, at that time, the Muslim Leaguers considered the evacuee property as "*Maal-e-Ghanimat*", and believed themselves the right people to own it. So every body that got an opportunity, played his role in misappropriating it.⁷² This is also evident from the following report of *The Civil and Military Gazette*, Lahore published on 11 October 1947: "The active players of the plunder and loot of the evacuees property remained the "National Guards Volunteers" of the Frontier Muslim League. Because the Deputy Commissioner, Peshawar, advised the president, city Muslim League to stop National Guards Volunteers from interfering with evacuees property and taking unlawful possession of houses, shops at business premises and preventing law abiding Hindus and Sikhs from carrying on their normal activities."⁷³ For example, in the Kohat city bazaar shops of higher value were

71 LAD, dated 15 November 1952, vol. xxvi-No. 2, official report, pp.42-43.

72 Sher M. Khan, Interview.

73 Khan Khalid, p.74.

allotted to the son and nephew of *Haji Saeed Shah*, President of the District Muslim League Kohat. This was strongly criticized by the public, who while showing their resentment against their leaders criticized the Government for backing the capitalists.⁷⁴

Not surprisingly when the issue of the misappropriation of the evacuee property was brought on the floor of Provincial Assembly by some MLAs, *Qaiyum Khan*, the Chief Minister, affirmed it by saying, "I think the public had a good go in the beginning and the officials started later. First of all the people looted the property to their hearts' content, and then came the officials. In the beginning we did not have a proper machinery to deal with this situation. It was a windfall. Now matter has improved."⁷⁵ However, the Assembly constituted two committees viz. Evacuee Property Misappropriation Committee and Anti-Corruption and anti-Bribery Committee to examine the whole issue. The objectives were that the former would make investigation and fix responsibilities while the later would prosecute. By 10 February 1949 the former presented 22 reports, charging many with corruption. However, most of these people were the supporters or favourites of *Qaiyum Khan*. When *Qaiyum Khan* learnt about all this, he disbanded the Committee and arrested some members of the Committee while the witnesses, who had been assured of complete secrecy and safety, were tortured and terrorized.⁷⁶

In spite of the fact that he did establish these investigation committees to unearth the misappropriation of the evacuee properties, *Qaiyum Khan* was not enthusiastic about their findings. Perhaps, he knew that his supporters were involved in these illegal activities, but he could not do much. He could not fight on two fronts, that is, with the *Khudai Khidmatgars* or generally his political opponents and the dissident Muslim Leaguers who had not accepted him as a true Muslim Leaguer, and the corrupt elements in his government. So he decided to fight the former and leave the latter.⁷⁷

Qaiyum Khan also used evacuee property to increase his support in the province. There were many instances where he personally offered people the evacuee property, and those who accepted the offers soon joined the Pakistan Muslim League. One of the known cases of such political bribery was the case of *Gul family* of Peshawar.⁷⁸ *Qalandar Mohmand* who had also served in the

74 PA, special branch, IPS daily diary no. nil, dated 13 March 1948, bundle no. 79, serial no. 1432.

75 LAD, 27 March 1948, Vol. xv, No. 9, official report, serial no. 265, pp. 406-407.

76 Sadiq Kashmiri, 'Aayiye Hum Aap Ko Suba Sarhad Lai Chalin', weekly *Chattan* (Lahore), 4 April 1949, pp.10-11 & 14.

77 Fida M.Khan, Interview.

78 Fazal-i-Mabood, Interview.

Accountant General (AG) office stated in an interview with the author that during his service in the AG office he was given the responsibility of auditing the evacuee property, but he could not do it as there was no record available. It is believed that Qaiyum Khan intentionally did not keep the record of the evacuee property.⁷⁹

SHORTAGE OF ESSENTIAL COMMODITIES

Another problem of equally greater magnitude that Qaiyum Khan faced was the shortage of essential commodities in the province. Though it started in the beginning of 1948, it remained a permanent feature for most of Qaiyum Khan's rule and surfaced from time to time at different places of the province. The people suffered a lot, as there was almost no food or clothes. Situation at different places of the province can be well weighed from the following accounts of different places.

KOHAT: The reports started pouring in February 1948 of food and cloth shortages. At Kot and Bilitang two persons died due to want of food. The general impression amongst the people regarding the food shortage was that the hoarders and black marketers were involved in it.⁸⁰

The situation of the availability of cloth was also very serious. In certain villages of Kohat, women did not come out of their houses because they did not have sufficient clothes to cover their bodies.⁸¹ Khair Muhammad, Secretary of the Muslim League and President of the Food Committee, Bahadur Khel, in a statement, insisted: "While the people are dying in the villages of Kohat district from starvation, hoarders are selling food grains in the black market at Rs. 50 per maund. They want to extort even higher price."⁸²

Khair Muhammad further alleged that in order to plunder the poor people some profiteers had put on the League label. Their tactics were that they would donate 80 or 100 rupees to the Quaid-i-Azam Fund and then advanced 26 seers grain to the Kisans on condition of getting double the quantity at the time of harvest. Thus, they were planning to stage another famine during the coming harvest. Forced by such coercive methods, the people of all points of view united and set up Food Committees in villages. Leaguers, Red Shirts and Communists and

79 Mohmand, Interview.

80 PA, special branch, IPS daily diary no. nil, dated 3 February 1948, bundle no. 77, serial no. 1401 & IPS daily diary no. nil, dated 8 March 1948, bundle no. 79, serial no. 1432.

81 PA, special branch, IPS daily diary no. nil, dated 21 August 1948, bundle no. 78, serial no. 1416.

82 The Pakistan Times (Lahore), 25 March 1948. p.3.

others worked shoulder to shoulder against their common enemy—the hoarders of food grains.⁸³

The provincial government tried to control the shortage but was unable to do so. Rationing of food was introduced and every person was entitled to get 4 'chitanks' per head per day.⁸⁴ However, there was uncertainty, disbelief, and fear amongst the people and they were trying to stock up commodities for rainy days. This created yet another problem. The rise in the demand, led to the rise in prices: grain shot up to Rs. 35-38 per maund. Further, as the government was confiscating extra grains from the landlords, it also generated fear. The villagers believed that the urban people would be safe as they could get ration from the depots while the people living in villages would have nothing to eat.⁸⁵

DERA ISMAIL KHAN: The people faced the same problems as those of the people in the rest of the province. However, here the tea prices registered a sharp increase as well, almost 50 per cent higher than the usual prices. This worsened the situation, as food was already short.⁸⁶

In a letter, the Deputy Commissioner, Dera Ismail Khan, very vividly explained the condition of the people, saying, "Famine conditions are prevailing in almost the entire rural area of the D.I.KHAN District. In some villages, people go without a meal for two or three days continuously. In most of the villages, people eat boiled oil seed plants, boiled carrots, oil seed cakes and cakes made of ground melon seeds. Oil seed cake has a very bitter taste and generally only cattle eat it."⁸⁷

The price of gram, which previously was 4½ rupees per maund in Dera Ismail Khan, shot up to 11 rupees per maund in July 1950. It was believed that the reason for the gradual increase in the price of gram was its smuggling to India via Lahore.⁸⁸

On 12 June 1951 a meeting of the District Chamber of Commerce was held at Dera Ismail Khan under the presidentship of *Haji* Muhammad Rahim. Resolutions were passed demanding reduction in the rates of octroi in the area

83 Ibid.

84 PA, special branch, IPS daily diary no. 107, dated 17 July 1952, bundle no. 76A, serial no. 1394, p.52.

85 PA, special branch, IPS daily diary no. nil, dated 25 June 1948, bundle no. 78, serial no. 1423.

86 PA, special branch, CID daily diary no. 242, dated 31 October 1947, bundle no. 74, serial no. 1369.

87 NA, F-47-3/GG/47, s.no. 15(c), Abdul Qaiyum Khan, Premier, NWFP letter dated 3 March 1948 to the Governor-General of Pakistan, etc.

88 PA, special branch, IPS daily diary no. nil, dated 26 July 1950, bundle no. 77, serial no. 1407.

of Dera Ismail Khan and lifting of import restrictions of wheat from the Punjab into the NWFP, particularly when the cost of wheat in D.I.Khan was 10 rupees per maund as against 6 in the Punjab.⁸⁹

BANNU: The scarcity of food items occurred in Bannu during August 1952 and led to the increase of the prices of wheat, which was sold at the rate of 24 to 25 rupees per maund.⁹⁰ The people of Bannu strongly criticized the alleged export of food grains from their District to Hazara.⁹¹

On 10 November 1952, about 25 women from Fatima Khel in Bannu city took out a peaceful procession and approached the Deputy Commissioner with a request that food ration should be enforced in Bannu. They were given assurance that it would be done, and they dispersed peacefully.⁹² The shortage of food commodities also resulted in the adulteration of food grains. It was even reported that sand and dust was being mixed up with wheat.⁹³

MARDAN: The situation in the Mardan district became precarious in January 1950. High prices were reported from Charsadda, Mardan and Shabqadar. The price of maize increased from 7 to 11.8 rupees and of wheat from 14 to 16 rupees per maund in the Charsadda area.⁹⁴ In the Shabqadar area, when the government imposed grain control, the wheat market went completely empty in February 1952; no body brought wheat to the markets. The *Nanbais* (bakers) also reduced the weight of bread and as such the masses faced great difficulties.⁹⁵

In the month of August 1952, the wheat prices in Charsadda reached 30 rupees per *pucca* maund. This particularly affected the government servants who had fixed salaries, and thus could not adequately fulfill their needs.⁹⁶ The situation

89 PA, special branch, IPS daily diary no. 99, dated 18 June 1951, bundle no. 76, serial no. 1395, p.401.

90 PA, special branch, IPS daily diary no. 126, dated 25 August 1952, bundle no. 76A, serial no. 1394.

91 PA, special branch, IPS daily diary no. 45, dated 2 April 1952, bundle no. 76, serial no. 1398.

92 PA, special branch, IPS daily diary no. 133, dated 12 September 1952, bundle no. 76A, serial no. 1394.

93 PA, Supplementary Commentary, Peshawar, Bundle No. 98, serial no. 2472.

94 PA, special branch, IPS daily diary no. nil, dated 19 January 1950, bundle no. 76, serial no. 1398.

95 PA, special branch, IPS daily diary no. 29, dated 18 February 1952, bundle no. 80, serial no. 1444.

96 PA, special branch, IPS daily diary no. 126, dated 25 August 1952, bundle no. 76A, serial no. 1394.

was very acute in Mardan. Wheat flour was sold at 22 rupees per maund in July 1952.⁹⁷

PESHAWAR: The People of Peshawar city started facing difficulty in obtaining the essential commodities in the second half of October 1947. The shortage started with the bread followed by soap, tea, ghee, cigarettes, etc, which disappeared from the market.⁹⁸ To reduce the difficulties of the people, the government increased the flour quota to the people but without any positive result. On the contrary, with the arrival of *Eid*, cloth and sugar disappeared from the market altogether.⁹⁹ The situation further deteriorated when on 7 February 1948 the bakers observed strike in the city for they were not given flour from the government depots.¹⁰⁰

In Nowshera, coupled with shortage of food commodities, thefts and robberies increased. There was a rumour afloat that after the death of M.K. Gandhi there would be a war between India and Pakistan. Due to such rumours businessmen lost interest in the business, which created a big slump in the market.¹⁰¹

On 13 April 1948 Quaid-i-Azam Muhammad Ali Jinnah was accorded a rousing reception during his visit to Nowshera sub-division. Before his departure, the Area Officer noticed two refugees, one of whom had an application in his hand. On enquiry, he said that he would give it to the Quaid-i-Azam as they had been without food for the last 3 to 4 days. However, the officer managed to take that application from them and, in the meantime, the Quaid-i-Azam went away.¹⁰² The same was the situation in Peshawar city. During Quaid-i-Azam and Miss Fatima Jinnah's visit to the city on 17 April 1948, among thousands of people welcoming them, there were "some women from the *illaqa* carrying pieces of bread ... to demonstrate against the scarcity of food grain but were persuaded and did not stage any demonstration."¹⁰³

In the summer of 1948, the ice supply in Peshawar created difficulties for the people. The government announced that ice would be made available at the rate of 3 rupees per maund, but the dealers flagrantly flouted the orders and

97 Ibid., diary no. 115, dated 28 July 1952.

98 PA, special branch, CID daily diary no. 231, dated 17 October 1947, bundle no. 74, serial no. 1369 & Ibid., diary no. 261, dated 25 November 1947.

99 Ibid., diary no. 234, dated 21 October 1947.

100 PA, special branch, IPS daily diary no. Supplementary, dated 7 February 1948, bundle no. 77, serial no. 1401.

101 Ibid., diary no. nil, dated 3 February 1948.

102 PA, special branch, IPS daily diary no. nil, dated 16 April 1948, bundle no. 79, serial no. 1434.

103 Ibid., diary no. nil, dated 19 April 1948.

continued to sell ice at higher rates. It created not only difficulties to the people but also increased resentment against the government.¹⁰⁴

On 21 May 1949, large number of people gathered at the office of Assistant Commissioner Nowshera to discuss the quality and the inflated prices of food grains. The people showed their resentment against the restrictions of importing food grains in the notified rationed area. The Assistant Commissioner told them that since the government had purchased large stocks of grains for the welfare of the people, it could not afford to give permission for free imports. At the end of the meeting, it was decided that limited quantity of food grains would be allowed to be imported and would be mixed up with the rationed flour which would not only reduce the price but would also improve the quality.¹⁰⁵

The people of Peshawar also had complaints about the quality and scarcity of wheat flour particularly about the depots, which were selling sub-standard flour.¹⁰⁶ In order to redress the problem, the government abolished the rationing of wheat in Peshawar from 3 August 1950. Though the people were happy over the abolition of rationing, the increase in prices, once again made them resentful.¹⁰⁷ The people of Peshawar faced another problem when the milk sellers went on strike over the fixation of milk price at 15 rupees per *pucca* maund against 20 to 22 rupees starting from 29 April 1948. They were complaining that the government fixed the price without taking into consideration the fodder prices.¹⁰⁸

HAZARA: In December 1947, scarcity of food and rise in prices also hit Hazara division. In order to lower the prices, the Tehsildar in Abbottabad fixed the controlled rates for wheat, but the wheat sellers protested and went on strike against the decision.¹⁰⁹

To protest against the scarcity of food in the district, the Muslim League arranged a public meeting at Havellian on 1 February 1948. At the end of the meeting, the following resolution was passed: "This meeting demands from the Government of NWFP and the Deputy Commissioner Hazara, to withdraw restrictions over the

104 PA, special branch, IPS daily diary no. nil, dated 13 July 1948, bundle no. 78, serial no. 1417.

105 PA, special branch, IPS daily diary no. nil, dated 21 May 1949, bundle no. 78, serial no. 1413.

106 PA, special branch, IPS daily diary no. nil, dated 11 April 1950, bundle no. 77, serial no. 1401.

107 Dawn (Karachi), 3 August 1950, p.4.

108 PA, special branch, IPS daily diary no. nil, dated 29 April 1950, bundle no. 77, serial no. 1403.

109 PA, special branch, CID daily diary no. 267, dated 2 December 1947, bundle no. 74, serial no. 1369.

import of food grains from the Punjab to Hazara in view of the scarcity of food stuff in Hazara. The people of Havellian Station and villages should also be given their quota of sugar on the same scale."¹¹⁰

In order to regulate the prices, the government fixed the following prices in Abbottabad on 1 February 1948.

Maize flour	4 seers per rupee
Wheat flour	3 seers per rupee

As soon as the above announcement was made, the people who would bring these items from Havellian stopped bringing them. As a result, people could not get food grains and the shopkeepers disappeared after closing their shops. They were heard saying that when they were purchasing maize at the rate of 20 rupees per maund and wheat at 26 rupees per maund, how could they sell it on the prescribed rates? They refused to cooperate.¹¹¹

The shortage of food commodities resurfaced once again in Hazara in the month of July 1952. Wheat was sold at 23 to 24 rupees per maund against the government depots' rates of 15 rupees per maund.¹¹²

On 15 September 1952 a large public meeting was held in Khand Kanwali Mosque, in Kot Najibullah under the presidentship of *Haji* Ghulam Muhammad and the high cost of food grains and its non-availability was discussed. In the end, it was demanded that government ration depots should be opened. On the same day, about 150/200 children, some of whom had besmeared their faces with dust, took out a procession through the streets in Kot Najibullah and shouted "*Hai Ata*", "*Hai Ata*", in intervals.¹¹³

One of the reasons of the shortage of food grains in the province in the year of 1952 was the decision of the government of the Punjab to ban the movement of food grains to the NWFP. This also created strong resentment against the Punjab in the hearts of the people of the province. In June 1952, it was reported from the Galiyat Area of Hazara that there were rumours afloat that the people were thinking of cutting down the supply of water from Dunga Gali to Murree in

110 PA, special branch, IPS daily diary no. supplementary, dated 7 February 1948, bundle no. 77, serial no. 1401.

111 Ibid.

112 PA, special branch, IPS daily diary no. 119, dated 5 August 1952, bundle no. 76A, serial no. 1394.

113 Ibid., diary no. 138, dated 23 September 1952.

order to compel the Punjab Government to lift ban on the movement of food grains to Hazara areas.¹¹⁴

Shortages in NWFP was also due to Daulatana's introduction of flawed agrarian reforms in the autumn of 1952 in the Punjab, which led to the dissatisfaction and resentment of the landlords and peasants and to the drastic fall in the cultivation area. The result was shortage not only in the Punjab but also in NWFP.¹¹⁵

To overcome the food shortages in the province, the Qaiyum Khan government tried its best to acquire food commodities from different quarters, including the central government. Sardar Bahadur Khan gave the details while reading an extract from the statement of Federal Minister for Food and Agriculture and Health, Pirzada Abdul Satar, in the Provincial Legislative Assembly regarding food grains supply to NWFP. Till March 1948, the following items were received from the central government:

September	2,625 tons of wheat.
October	3,000 tons of wheat
November	3,000 tons plus 200 tons of barley, which was extra help.
December	3,365 tons, to make up for the difference in September as 365 tons less were given to them. Then, in addition, an extra 1,000 tons of gram and 200 tons of maize and 1,520 tons of millets.
January 1948	3,244 tons of wheat and 1,000 tons of gram and 1,600 tons of rice in addition to which they were entitled to get.
February	3,000 tons of wheat, 500 tons of barley and 5,000 tons of rice.
March	3,000 tons of wheat, 1,000 tons of gram and 6,000 tons of rice. These 7,000 tons of grams and rice were extra that the central government had given to NWFP.

Sardar Khan Bahadur Khan further stated that by 31 March 1948 the total wheat due was 21,230 tons, which the central government had already provided. In the case of gram, the central government would provide 1,000 tons plus 100 tons of barley. In case of rice 9,800 tons more would be provided to complete the promised stock of 12,500 tons.¹¹⁶

114 PA, special branch, IPS daily diary no. 84, dated 3 June 1952 Bundle No. 76, serial no. 1399, p.583,.

115 Samad, p.145.

116 LAD, 22 March 1948, Vol. xv, No. 5, official report, serial no. 252.

The Provincial Minister for Revenue, Khan Muhammad Abbas Khan, while talking about the shortage and supply of food-grains from the central government gave a much different picture. He also stated that the food grains supply from the central government was not regular. According to him, the NWFP received the supply in the following manner:

Months	Food-Grains	Allotments (tons)	Receipts (tons)
September	Wheat	3,000	3,000
October	Wheat	3,000	3,000
November	Wheat	3,000	3,000
	Maize	120	Nil
	Jawar	200	Nil
	Bajra	20	Nil
	Rice (for whole year)	3,000	Nil
December	Wheat (monthly quota)	3,000	3,000
	Wheat (advanced quota for January)	3,000	1,000
January (1948)	Wheat	3,000	4,000
	Wheat	3,000	4,000
February	Rice	Nil	1,500
	Maize	Nil	120
	Jawar	Nil	200
	Bajra	Nil	20
	Wheat	3,000	In transit
March	Rice	9,500	by
	Grain	4,500	Special Train
	Total	41,340	22,840¹¹⁷

117 Ibid.

The provincial government distributed the food grain in the rural areas of the Province as per following details:

Rural area allotments (all in tons)

Area	Rice	Gram	Gram-dal	Barley
Peshawar	1,600	450	300	100
Nowshera	200	200	100	-----
Kohat	500	200	100	100
Bannu	400	200	100	100
Dera Ismail Khan	900	300	100	100
Hazara	800	350	200	100
Mardan	200	200	100	Nil
South Waziristan	200	100	100	Nil
North Waziristan	200	100	100	Nil
Khyber	100	100	100	Nil
Total	5,100	2,200	1,300	500¹¹⁸

The provincial government, in order to overcome the shortage, passed the NWFP Procurement of Food Grains Act, 1948. This Act gave the powers of search and seizure of unauthorized grain stocks to the provincial government officials. According to this Act, the government could confiscate any private holding of food grain above 10 maunds limit. The authorized government officials were also empowered to search any suspected place for this purpose.¹¹⁹

The provincial government made hectic efforts in 1951, with the help of the central government to use its influence on the Punjab to lift the ban on bringing the wheat from that province. Though the Government failed in getting the ban lifted, the central and Punjab governments agreed that flour would be sent to NWFP according to the province's needs from the Punjab flourmills. But this promise was never fulfilled and the province continued to face the shortage of flour.¹²⁰

In order to control the scarcity of food grains in 1950s, the provincial government once again imposed the food grain control order on 6 February 1952.

¹¹⁸ Ibid.

¹¹⁹ PGGEO, 22 November 1948, no. 3751-LD, dated 15 November 1948.

¹²⁰ Shahbaz (Peshawar), 23 August 1951, p. 3.

Accordingly, any body holding more than 10 maunds of food grains were required to inform the District Magistrate. Transfer and selling over and above the fixed amount, was banned.¹²¹ This order was called the North-West Frontier Province Food-Grains Control Order, 1952.¹²² After the imposition of this Order, the food grains disappeared from the Peshawar markets. It was widely believed that the hoarders had stocked them and were selling secretly to the people. The food grains were available in the black market at the rate of 44 rupees per bag of wheat and 47 rupees per bag of flour. The prices of maize had also inflated and it was now available at the rate of 20 rupees per maund. The people in general complained about the ineffective measures of the government because, in spite of the fact that the big dealers had stocked thousands of maunds of wheat, neither hoarders had been arrested nor the concealed stocks recovered.¹²³

In order to discuss the shortage of food grain, a food conference was held at the Government House, Nathia Gali on 29 May 1952 under the presidentship of the Governor, NWFP. Chief Minister, Qaiyum Khan, provincial ministers as well as the Central Food Minister, Pirzada Abdus Sattar Khan attended the meeting.¹²⁴

Later, at a public meeting held on 15 July 1952 at Abbottabad, Qaiyum Khan stated that the food situation in the NWFP would improve as the provincial government had imported substantial amount of wheat from the USA, and Canada costing the government at the rate of 21 rupees per maund in Pakistan. The provincial government had fixed the rate at 15 rupees per standard maund. He further stated that out of 40,000 tons of food grain that would be received shortly, 14,000 tons would be distributed in Hazara district's deficit pockets and 8,000 tons would be distributed in Kohat district. He also warned the black marketer and remarked that the punishment for black-marketing was shooting to death.¹²⁵

In order to check lavish food parties in the province, the provincial government also passed two orders on 28 March 1953; they were called the NWFP Economy of Food (Control) Order, 1953 and the NWFP Meals Establishment (Control) Order, 1953. While the former banned serving of food at one meal to 25 or more people, the latter banned serving of more than three courses of food at one meal. For checking purposes, the government empowered the authorities concerned

121 Ibid., 7 February 1952, front page.

122 PGEO, 5 February 1952, Food and Civil Supplied No. 1617-F.G.-286 - 4 February 1952.

123 Shahbaz (Peshawar), 11 February 1952, front page.

124 PA, special branch, IPS daily diary no. 81, dated 29 May 1952, bundle no. 76, serial no. 1399, p.555.

125 PA, special branch, IPS daily diary no. 109, dated 19 July 1952, bundle no. 76A, serial no. 1394, p.177.

like the Director Civil Supplies, any Magistrate of the 1st Class grade, any Gazetted Officer of the Police or Food Department or any other Officer duly authorized in writing by the government to conduct searches and ask questions regarding a meal party.¹²⁶

As to the shortage of cloth in the province, Revenue Minister, Abbas Khan, stated on the floor of the Assembly that, in, the beginning of December 1947, they had received a message from India that the NWFP cloth and yarn worth 2 crore and 30 lac rupees was lying with them and if they would not take it by 31 December, it would be distributed to other provinces. He struggled hard to arrange a loan and was able to do so with the cooperation of I.I. Chundrigar from Amritsar Bank amounting to 2 crore rupees. However, he could not collect the expected 70 lac rupees from NWFP and instead acquired 30 lac. Then there were other bottlenecks. However, finally, he was asked to take the Bombay Stock by 31 December, with extension for carrying up to one month. The problem now was that the stock was worth 60 lac rupees while he had 30 lac rupees cash. At this juncture, Abbas Khan was able to get a loan from Imperial Bank Bombay, courtesy an English friend, and paid for entire Bombay stock along with around 6 lac of yarn as well. However, they could not get this cloth because of Indo-Pakistan trade disputes. The government had hoped, however, that very soon they would be able to get the cloth and overcome the shortage in the province.¹²⁷

During his term of office as Chief Minister of the NWFP, Qaiyum Khan also faced some other problems that carried national and international significance. These included *Pakhtunistan* Movement, Kashmir War and the anti-Ahmadiya Movement.

The PAKHTUNISTAN MOVEMENT

Although the '*Pakhtunistan*' Movement surfaced and became well-known in the last days of the British rule in India, history dates back to much earlier period when it was expressed in different ways, like '*Pathanistan*', '*Pushtaniya*', etc.¹²⁸ According to *Maulana* Ghulam Rasool Mehr, during the First World War, the German and Turkish armies were engaged against the Allies. The envoy of Turkish Sultan, Muhammad Kazim Bay, had prepared *Jihad* edicts (*Fitwas*) for different people. These were approved and signed by the caliph's representative, Muhammad Kazim, and the Sheikh's attorney in India, *Maulvi* Barkatullah. One of the important edicts, which was handed over to him by *Maulana* Bashir at

126 PGCEO, Peshawar, 28 March 1953, No. 5549-FG/83, 27 March 1953 & PGCEO, Peshawar, 28 March 1953, No. 5550-FG/83.

127 LAD, 22 March 1948, Vol. xv, No. 5, official report, serial no. 252.

128 Afzal, p.32.

Kabul in 1934, was related to the *Pakhtuns* and their territory, known as Yaghistan as well, at that time.¹²⁹

In this edict, which was issued on 1 October 1917, the territory between Afghanistan and river Indus was called Pathanistan (*Pakhtunistan*).¹³⁰ This edict also emphasized the struggle of the Muslims of this area irrespective of their sectarian followings, such as Shias, Sunnis, or Wahabis, etc, as all are the followers of the Holy Quran. The result of the Muslims' infighting was the rule of Christians all over the world.¹³¹

Qaiyum Khan, in his book *Gold and Guns on the Pathan Frontier*, has also discussed the question of *Pakhtun* territories and their future. While discussing the scheme of Pakistan, he had raised few questions regarding the future of the *Pakhtuns*. He wrote:

What about the nationalities or units inside Pakistan—the Pathans, the Punjabis, Sindhis, Baluchis, and Kashmiris? Would the Pathan homelands of the NWFP and the Tribal Belt have the right to decide their own future? Would they have the right to join Hindustan, Pakistan or Afghanistan or even to form a State of their own if they so wished? Would this Province be asked to vote with the rest of Pakistan only to find itself submerged by an over-helming non-Pathan electorate? Again, perhaps few realize (or they try to overlook) the fact that the Pathans in the Frontier Province, the Tribal Belt, parts of Baluchistan and Afghanistan constitute one people, speaking the same language, Pashto, zealously following the same faith, Islam, and having the same culture... The aim, therefore, should be the unification of the Pathan homelands—the NWFP, the Tribal Belt and Baluchistan...¹³²

This is how we find clues about the *Pakhtunistan* issue in the historical works. However, it was never expounded 'zealously'. The *Pakhtunistan* Movement surfaced more emphatically during the last decade of the British rule in India. When Mountbatten was sent to India, he was given special instructions to convince Indian leaders to accept the Cabinet Mission Plan. However, when he held negotiations with the Indian leaders, he was convinced that Cabinet Mission Plan could not work. So he started work on a new plan of independence for India. Meanwhile, in the NWFP, the Congress Ministry was in power. Although the province was a Muslim-majority province, the Muslim League did not have the required majority in the Assembly to overthrow the Ministry. So the Leaguers

129 Ghulam Rasool Mehr, *Sargozasht-e-Mujahideen* (Urdu) (Lahore: Sheikh Ghulam Ali and Sons, n.d.), p.496.

130 Ibid., pp.497,499-500.

131 Ibid., p.507.

132 Abdul Qaiyum, *Gold and Guns on the Pathan Frontier* (Bombay: Hind Kitab Publishers, 1945), pp.69-71.

decided to topple the Ministry through the power of streets, and thus they launched a 'Civil Disobedience Movement' in February 1947. During the Movement, Communal riots broke out at different places, and many non-Muslims were killed in the disturbances. This scared the non-Muslims, and many started migrating to other towns as well as India. The main object of the Movement was to tarnish the image of Congress Ministry in the eyes of the British and to show that the Congress Party had lost the popular support. This objective was achieved, when Mountbatten floated the idea of fresh elections in the NWFP in his staff meeting to which Nehru was also invited. Nehru strongly opposed the idea of fresh elections in the province. However, he accepted, after a great deal of reservation and discussion, the idea of Referendum instead.¹³³

Zahid Chaudhri has a different view about *Pakhtun* nationalism. He writes that Olaf Cairo, the Governor of NWFP, had asked the Khan Brothers to protect their future through *Pakhtun* nationalism. However, at that time not only they rejected the idea but were annoyed. At that time, they were the champions of 'Indian Nationalism'. After the announcement of the Partition Plan, they started pleading the case of *Pakhtunistan*. Zahid Chaudhri supports his claim by referring to Olaf Caroe's letter, which he had written to the Acting Viceroy, Colville on 22 May 1947. According to the same author, another great supporter of the idea of *Pakhtunistan* was M.K. Gandhi.¹³⁴

In an interview with the representative of the *Nawai Waqt* on 1 March 1954, Abdul Ghaffar Khan claimed that it was first in 1947 that Abdul Qaiyum Khan had himself projected a proposal for complete provincial autonomy for the NWFP, but it could not be materialized because Quaid-i-Azam Muhammad Ali Jinnah did not agree with it. He said that they demanded that the name of the province should be *Pakhtunistan* so that it would indicate that the Pakhtuns inhabited the area. Abdul Ghaffar Khan further said that the allegation against him that he was aiming to undo Pakistan at the instigation of a foreign power, and that he was proceeding to Bannu to meet the *Faqir* of Ipi with the same objective, were baseless. He even asked for an inquiry by a special tribunal to judge if he and his followers were traitors. He added that Qaiyum Khan had brought about his arrest because their activities were a challenge to the political fortunes of the Muslim League party as it was in minority in the Provincial Assembly. To the charge levelled by Qaiyum Khan that he was the originator of *Pakhtunistan*, which meant the separation of the NWFP and other Pashto speaking areas from Pakistan, Abdul Ghaffar Khan replied that Abdul Qaiyum Khan himself desired this type of *Pakhtunistan*. He added that in 1947, when Qaiyum Khan and Samin Jan were in Jail during the Muslim League agitation, both of them sent a written message to

133 Zahid, pp.66-77.

134 Ibid., pp.78-79.

him [Abdul Ghaffar Khan through Sheikh Taimoor, the then Principal of the Islamia College, Peshawar] in which they said that they agreed with the demand that the NWFP should be given the status of a sovereign state. He added that it was on the basis of this message that Qaiyum Khan and Samin Jan were released, and he accompanied them to Delhi where he met Mahatma Gandhi, and, they met Jinnah, who snubbed them after which they did not meet him.¹³⁵

This version can be supported by the fact that Qaiyum Khan himself was a staunch follower of the *Khudai Khidmatgars*/Red Shirts before joining the Muslim League. And he was the one who used to say: "We resent the fact that we have been cut up into the NWFP, the Tribal Belt and Baluchistan. Why cannot we be just one unit?"¹³⁶ In an interview with Riaz Batalvi, Abdul Wali Khan also claimed that Qaiyum Khan presented the idea of *Pakhtunistan* for the first time in his famous book, "*Gold and Guns on the Pathan Frontier*".¹³⁷

When the 3rd June Plan was announced, the popular party in the NWFP, *Khudai Khidmatgars* found themselves in a predicament because the location of the province was such that there was no chance of it going to India. Above all, over 90% of the population was Muslim. As such it was very much obvious that the people would surely vote for Pakistan during the Referendum. In these circumstances, the leader of *Khudai Khidmatgars*, Abdul Ghaffar Khan, backed by Gandhi, came up with the idea of independent *Pakhtunistan* state. He and his party demanded that in the referendum, instead of two options, there should be a third option as well. This was neither accepted by the Muslim League nor by the British authorities.¹³⁸ Dr. Khan Sahib, the NWFP Chief Minister, in one of his meetings with Lord Mountbatten on 5 June, 1947 also discussed the *Pakhtunistan* option with him. Mountbatten replied that in the original Partition Plan he had kept the third option for all the provinces of India. However, it was after the strong reaction of Nehru that the option was removed. Now the same could not be granted only to NWFP.¹³⁹

As for the referendum, Dr. Khan Sahib had been left in office, but his ministry was not allowed any role in the referendum process. It was wholly entrusted to the British army officers, working under Referendum Commissioner, J.B. Booth, with the support of 17,000 soldiers. The help of the civilians was sought only at the lower level. Thus, the British government tried to conduct the referendum impartially. The result of the referendum was declared on 20 July 1947. "Only

135 PA, Sardar Abdur Rashid Collection, File of Abdul Ghaffar Khan, bundle no. 4, serial no. 92, p. 73.

136 Qaiyum, p.74.

137 Riaz Batalvi, *Leederan-i-Karam* (Urdu) (Lahore: Al-Tahreer, 1970), pp.220-21.

138 Afzal, p.32.

139 Zahid, p.83.

50.99 percent of the 572,798 eligible voters cast ballots. Pakistan received 289,244 votes, or 50.49 percent of the electorate, while 2,874 voted for India."¹⁴⁰

After the Referendum, there was a persistent demand from the leaders of Frontier Muslim League, supported by the leaders of All-India Muslim League, to dismiss Dr. Khan Sahib Ministry and install a Muslim League ministry instead. However, Lord Mountbatten refused to do so on the plea that it was unconstitutional. After the creation of Pakistan, through article 92A, which had been inserted in the Interim Constitution of Pakistan, Dr. Khan Sahib's ministry was removed and a Muslim League ministry under Qaiyum Khan was installed.¹⁴¹

The news of the dismissal of the Dr. Khan Sahib Ministry on 22 August 1947 was a surprise to majority of the parties.¹⁴² Though there was not a general agitation by the *Khudai Khidmatgars* against the removal of Dr. Khan Sahib, still at some places, some processions were taken out and pro-*Pakhtunistan* slogans were raised and flags were hoisted on some buildings. One such procession was taken out at Pabbi on 23 August 1947.¹⁴³ While on 24 August, the Red Shirts wanted to hoist *Pakhtunistan* flag on the Afghan Building in Qissa Khwani Bazaar on the occasion of Afghan Independence Day; the Afghan representative did not permit it.¹⁴⁴

The events after Qaiyum Khan's installation as Chief Minister of the NWFP show that, the *Khudai Khidmatgars* did not follow a confrontational policy towards the provincial government. However, Qaiyum Khan always felt threatened, since they had the majority in the Assembly. Therefore, to keep them under constant pressure throughout his tenure as Chief Minister, Qaiyum Khan made sure to use the bogey of *Pakhtunistan* against them. The idea was not only to tarnish their image, but also to deny them a political role in the provincial politics. Qaiyum Khan did not change his confrontational policy towards *Khudai Khidmatgars* in spite of the fact that after the creation of Pakistan, Abdul Ghaffar Khan not only took oath of allegiance to the country when he attended the session of the Pakistan Constituent Assembly at Karachi, he also clarified what he meant by *Pakhtunistan*. On the floor of the assembly on 5 March 1948 he stated:

What does our Pathanistan mean, I will tell you just now? You see, that the people inhabiting this Province are called Sindhis and the name of their country is Sind. Similarly, the Punjab or Bengal is the land of the Punjabees or

140 Rittenberg, pp.243-44.

141 Erland Jansson, p.228 & Salamat, p.68.

142 PA, Monthly appreciation report of organizations ending 14 September 1947, bundle no. 15, serial no. 233, p.151.

143 Ibid.

144 Ibid.

Bengalees. In the same way there is the North-West Frontier Province. We are one people and ours is a land. Within Pakistan we also want that the mere mentioning of the name of the country should convey to the people that it is the land of Pakhtun. Is it a sin under the tenets of Islam?

He further argued, Pathan is the name of the community and we will name the country as *Pakhtunistan*. I may also explain that the people of India used to call us Pathans and we are called Afghans by the Persians. Our real name is Pakhtun. We want *Pakhtunistan*, and want to see all the Pathans on this side of the Durand Line joined and united together in *Pakhtunistan*. You help us in this. If you think it un-Islamic, then I would say that it is just Islam. If you argue, that Pakistan can never become weak by the creation of a separate political unit. On the other hand, it would become stronger. Most of the difficulties are begotten by lack of confidence, but when there is confidence the difficulties are resolved. Governments are run on good faith and not on mistrust.¹⁴⁵

Though Abdul Ghaffar Khan's concept of *Pakhtunistan* relied on changing name of the province of the NWFP, the *Faqir* of Ipi, who also supported the *Pakhtunistan* cause, had a different approach. He wanted a free and independent country of Pakhtuns having no connection with the state of Pakistan. Though Qaiyum Khan believed that there was a close association between Abdul Ghaffar Khan and *Faqir* of Ipi, later events showed that they had divergent views on the issue of *Pakhtunistan*. The *Faqir* of Ipi had revolted against the British in 1930s, and did not accept Pakistan after its establishment and kept opposing it. He even took up the banner of Independent State of *Pakhtunistan*. In early 1950s, the *Faqir* of Ipi group formed their own provisional parliament for *Pakhtunistan* at Tirah and another branch at Gorwekht, Waziristan. They also chose and hoisted their own flag and a declaration was issued by the *Pakhtunistan* parliament. It was addressed to all the Pakhtuns in and outside, entire Muslim world, particularly Afghanistan and the United Nations Organization seeking their assistance in the establishment and strengthening of *Pakhtunistan*.¹⁴⁶

For years, *Faqir* of Ipi worked as the President of this Independent State of *Pakhtunistan*. Ipi claimed to have authority over 5,000 square miles of territory centering on Gorwekht, which in fact he could actually claim authority over less than 500 square miles.¹⁴⁷

145 PA, special branch, bundle no. 15, serial no.233, Constituent Assembly (Legislature), dated 5 March 1948, p.241.

146 Rahman Pazhwak, *Pakhtunistan: The Khyber Pass as the focus of the New State of Pakhtunistan* (London: Afghan Information Bureau, n.d.), pp.124-29.

147 Spain, Borderland, p.237.

The leaders of this kind of *Pakhtunistan* Movement were all outlawed in Pakistan. Most of them lived for the most part in Kabul where they were the responsibility of the *Kabaile*, the Afghan Ministry of Tribal Affairs. But even when they were in the Pakistani territories, they received support from local Afghan officials. Most of the *Pakhtunistan* leaders enjoyed great influence in their own tribes. Notable among the *Pakhtunistan Malik*s in 1954 were Wali Khan, formerly leading *Malik* of the Kukikhel Afridis; Said Ahmad of the Zakka Khel Afridis; Mira Jan (Sial), a Mohmand poet and Warrior; Amin Jan, another Mohmand; Aurangzeb Khan, a Mahsud; Ayub Khan, an Achakzai Chief from Baluchistan; *Mullah* Jangri Sher Ali, a Mahsud lieutenant of the *Faqir* of Ipi from the early days; Muhammad Arbab Khan, an exile from Swabi; and Shahzada Khan, brother of the Adam Khel Afridi, Ajab Khan, who became well known due to his kidnapping of Mollie Ellis from Kohat.¹⁴⁸

The Kabul Brand of *Pakhtunistan* was different. Kabul claimed that the entire area between rivers Amu and Jhelum belonged to the Pakhtuns, which once upon a time formed part of the Afghan Kingdom. The Afghans, therefore, demanded that the area on the Pakistan side of the Durand Line should be given an option whether they would like to merge themselves with Afghanistan or would like to remain a part of Pakistan. This, they called the right of self-determination for the Pakhtuns on the issue of *Pakhtunistan*.¹⁴⁹

The tribesmen on the eastern side of the Durand Line very shrewdly used the *Pakhtunistan* card. They were not interested in Afghanistan or *Faqir* of Ipi brand of *Pakhtunistan*; they used this bogey in order to get maximum benefits from the two governments on either side of the Durand Line. Most of them remained loyal to Pakistan and preferred Pakistan money to Afghanistan. However, sometimes mishandling of the situation created problems for Pakistan too. Such mishandlings resulted in the *Lashkars'* invasions on Pakistani territory occasionally during 1950-54 in order to muster support by planting the "Pakhtun flag." Probably the most noted of these was a gathering of 5,000 tribesmen, mainly Afridis and Shinwaris, near Fort Jamrud early in 1952, and a *lashkar* of about the same size which tried to cut the Peshawar-Kohat road in December 1952. They proclaimed to plant the flag on the banks of the river Indus. Both were under the leadership of *Malik* Wali Khan. The latter incident took place when *Malik* Wali Khan Kukikhel was mishandled by the then Political Agent. The result was that Wali Khan Kuki Khel collected a large *lashkar* and, with the obvious instigation and help of the Afghan government, marched through Tirah with the clear intention of reaching the bank of the Indus and planting the *Pakhtunistan* flag there. His route was believed to be through the Khajuri plain

148 Ibid., p.238.

149 PA, special branch, bundle no. 15, serial no. 234, p.187.

and Dara Adam Khel. It was feared that during his march his *lashkar* would gain further strength. The Afridis of Dara Adam Khel were alerted and they wholeheartedly cooperated with the government of Pakistan and held day and night picquets to prevent the *lashkar* from passing through their territory. During the crisis, the government of Pakistan received information that the *lashkar* was going to hold a meeting at a certain place in the tribal area to form their strategy. Khwaja Shahabuddin, the then Governor of the NWFP, asked permission of the central government to the use of air force against the *lashkar*, which was promptly granted. The government did not have to take a prolonged or serious action. Group Captain Raza sent two Pakistan Air Force aircrafts, which hit the targets so perfectly that the *lashkar* immediately dispersed and the plan was given up. This was followed by the Air Force taking aerial photograph of the village of Wali Khan Kuki Khel in which his house was identified. This house was razed to the ground by the Air Force. The accuracy with which the house was destroyed was commendable as the adjoining mosque and other houses did not suffer in the least on account of the air action. The timely action and the accuracy of the Air Force terrorized those who hoped that by such methods they could achieve their goals. It might be pointed out that not only did Wali Khan remain quiet afterwards; he later surrendered to the government and became once again a loyal *Malik*.¹⁵⁰

Thus, the timely and efficient handling of the situation by the provincial government of Qaiyum Khan, with the help of the Governor, this type of *Pakhtunistan* Movement was suppressed.

THE KASHMIR WAR

Like the use of *Pakhtunistan* issue to crush the *Khudai Khidmatgars* in the NWFP, it is generally believed that Qaiyum Khan also exploited the Kashmir issue for political ends. When the problem of Kashmir emerged on the eve of independence in 1947, after the *Maharaja* of the state used force to crush the revolt, Qaiyum Khan became one of the strongest proponents of the tribesmen going there to help their Muslim Kashmiri brothers. Actually, the princely State of Kashmir emerged as a bone of contention between Pakistan and India soon after the partition. Pakistan was convinced that Kashmir, which was a predominantly Muslim state, would join Pakistan.¹⁵¹ The subsequent developments in Kashmir were also in favour of Pakistan. For instance, on 17 July 1947 the All-Jammu and Kashmir Muslim Conference (AJKMC) held a convention in Srinagar, at the residence of Sardar Muhammad Ibrahim Khan, Founder-President of the Azad Kashmir Government, wherein majority of the participants decided "in favour of an unqualified accession of the State to Pakistan". However, there was also a

150 Spain, Borderland, p.240 & Rashid, Frontier, pp.146-47.

151 Salim, Iskander Mirza, p.102.

group, led by Chaudhri Hamidullah Khan, the then acting President of AJKMC, which was in favour of remaining independent of both India and Pakistan.¹⁵²

At that time, the situation in Srinagar was very volatile and uncertain, and was rapidly changing. In August 1947, the then Prime Minister of Jammu and Kashmir State, Pandit Ram Chand Kak, visited Delhi, and met the Viceroy, the Congress leaders and Quaid-i-Azam Muhammad Ali Jinnah. When he came back to Srinagar, he advised the *Maharaja*: "to remain neutral for the moment and sign a standstill agreement both with India and Pakistan. Pandit Kak also advised him to let Pakistan operate the Postal and Telegraph services. He then went on to advise the *Maharaja* to ultimately find out the wishes of his Muslim population on the issue of accession. If the Muslim population, being in majority in the State, wished to accede to Pakistan, he should then accede to Pakistan."¹⁵³ However, the *Maharaja* did not agree and he asked his prime minister to resign, and appointed General Janak Sing as prime minister. After that the *Maharaja* started receiving top leaders of All-India National Congress, including Mahatma Gandhi and Kirpalani.¹⁵⁴

Though the *Maharaja* of Kashmir was trying hard to keep the situation under control, it was becoming increasingly difficult. The first sign of this loss of control showed up in Poonch some time in June 1947, when the people of the area refused to pay taxes, which had been imposed on the Muslims while the Hindus and Sikhs were exempted. These taxes had created strong resentment among the Muslim population because: there was a tax on every hearth and every window. Every, cow, buffalo and sheep was taxed and even every wife. Finally the Zaildari tax was introduced to pay for the cost of taxation, and Dogra [Hindu] troops were billeted on the [Muslim] Poonchis to enforce collection.¹⁵⁵

Initially, the revolt was confined to the Bagh district of Poonch, but by the time of the transfer of power, it had spread to different parts of the State. The revolt coincided with "special 'Kashmir Day", which had been commemorated in British India since the Srinagar crisis of 1931 when the *Maharaja*'s men had fired into a crowd and killed a score of protestors." This time, Srinagar saw greater number of display of Pakistani flags with increased public excitement. The State

152 Sardar M. Ibrahim Khan, *The Kashmir Saga* (Mir Pur (Azad Kashmir): Verinag Publishers, 1990), p.41 & A. H. Suharwardy, *Tragedy in Kashmir* (Lahore: Wajidalis Ltd., 1983), p.103.

153 Ibrahim, pp.43-44. The *Maharaja* suggested Standstill Agreement to both India and Pakistan. Though, India objected to this, "Pakistan accepted the offer and the Standstill Agreement with Pakistan came into force on the 15th of August 1947." Ibid., p.48.

154 Ibid., pp.43-44.

155 Alastair, Lamb, *Incomplete Partition: The Genesis of the Kashmir Dispute, 1947-1948* (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 2002), p.121.

government responded by excessive use of police force, resulting in many casualties.¹⁵⁶ Soon, the revolt started spreading far and wide. Meetings and processions were held at different places. One such meeting was held on 26 August 1947 at Bagh on which the State police opened fire; the participants paid back in the same coin. After this incident, the leading figure of the revolt, Sardar Abdul Qaiyum Khan, along with some friends, went into hiding in the nearby forest and sent messages to different people saying that the "open conflict had now started between the Muslims of Poonch and the *Maharaja*..."¹⁵⁷

With the spread of the protests/insurgence, the situation went out of the *Maharaja's* control. In spite of the fact that the *Maharaja* of Patiala, a fellow Sikh ruler of Patiala State, had sent his state army to Kashmir to help the *Maharaja* and his troops. These forces had arrived in Kashmir much before the arrival of Pathan tribesmen.¹⁵⁸

The Government of India also sent a serving Indian Military Officer, Lt. Colonel Kashmir Singh Katoch, to Kashmir in response to Jammu and Kashmir government's request of 13 September 1947. The officer, besides being a serving Indian Army officer, was the son of Jammu and Kashmir Prime Minister, Major-General Janak Singh. Kashmir Singh played a significant role in the subsequent developments. Thus from the month of September onwards, Indian military and political involvement had increased manifold.¹⁵⁹

The *Maharaja*, now feeling stronger with the support of Indians, let loose the State forces in collusion with Patiala State forces, Hindu extremist party, *Rashtrya Sevak Sang* (RSS) workers and other gangs to spread terror by resorting to loot, rape and torture Muslim Kashmiris in the Poonch area. The result was a widespread rebellion by the people of Poonch on 6 October 1947.¹⁶⁰ The *Maharaja's* troops tried to control the rebellion with utmost severity and force. This further deteriorated the situation. The tales of cruelties reached the NWFP and the tribal areas. The result was a strong resentment amongst the *Pakhtuns*. Qaiyum Khan, the Chief Minister of the province, did not hesitate to support and encourage them to go to the Kashmir and wage *Jihad* against the oppressors who were following a policy of Muslim genocide in Kashmir. Thus, the tribesmen started infiltrating into Kashmir.¹⁶¹

When the Governor of NWFP, Sir George Cunningham, received the news, he informed Sir Robert Lockhart, the then Commander-in-Chief of Indian Army,

156 Ibid., pp.121-122.

157 Ibid., pp.122-123.

158 Ibid., p.91.

159 Ibid., pp.129-130.

160 Ibrahim, pp.49-51.

161 Salim, Iskandar Mirza, p.102.

about the intended invasion of Kashmir by tribesmen and expressed his inability to stop them.¹⁶² The *Maharaja* soon found himself unable to resist the onslaught of the tribals and Azad Kashmir forces. He called for direct Indian help, which they were more than happy to receive, and hastened to move their troops into Kashmir.¹⁶³

To seek Indian intervention, R.L. Batra, the Deputy Prime Minister of Jammu and Kashmir, was sent to Delhi. He carried *Maharaja* and the Prime Minister's letters. Though the *Maharaja's* letter had some reference of Kashmir's accession to India, it was not without conditions. On Batra's handing over of letters to the Government of India, the Defence Committee of Indian Government met on 25 October 1947, under the Chairmanship of Lord Mountbatten to discuss the possibility of extending military support to the *Maharaja*. The Committee readily decided to send Indian army troops. However, Mountbatten raised two key points: "First: accession had to come before intervention. Second: such accession would require subsequent ratification by the people of the State of Jammu and Kashmir; pending which it could only be considered as provisional."¹⁶⁴

The Indian troops landed in Srinagar on 27 October 1947. The Indian Government claimed that this was done after the *Maharaja* signed the Instrument of Accession on 26 October 1947. This, however does not seem to be true as the person (V.P.Menon), who claimed to have got the signature of the *Maharaja* on the Instrument, was in Delhi on 26 October and had a meeting with Alexander Symon, the British Deputy High Commissioner there. Alexander Symon confirms that V.P. Menon was scheduled to go to Srinagar, but could not. Thus, the most probable date of *Maharaja* signing the Instrument of Accession, (if he ever signed it), was 27 October 1947, when the Indian troops had already landed in Srinagar. Even the *Maharaja's* signing of the Instrument is very much doubted by the British historian, Alastair Lamb. He writes, "...the published exchange of *Maharaja*-Mountbatten letters relating to Accession is fundamentally flawed..."¹⁶⁵

When the Indian troops landed in Kashmir, the Prime Minister of Pakistan convened a meeting to discuss the Kashmir situation in the changed circumstances on 27 October 1947. This meeting was attended by Iskander Mirza (then Defense Secretary, later to be Governor-General), Chaudhri Muhammad Ali (then Secretary-General, later to be Prime Minister), Nawab of

162 The Pakistan Times (Lahore), 8 August 1948, p.5.

163 Ex-Maj. Gen. Akbar Khan, *Raiders in Kashmir* (Islamabad: National Book Foundation, 1975), p.27.

164 Lamb, pp.144-148.

165 Ibid., pp.156-57 & 167.

Mamdot, Chief Minister of the Punjab, Brigadier Sher Khan, Maj. General Akbar Khan and Qaiyum Khan, Chief Minister of the NWFP.¹⁶⁶

During the course of discussions, General Akbar Khan proposed action in Jammu as the war in Kashmir had broken out and the tribesmen had penetrated Kashmir for around 80 miles. However, as the Government of Pakistan was not involved directly in the uprising, and was careful not to provoke India into a war, all except Qaiyum Khan and the Nawab of Mamdot opposed this proposal.¹⁶⁷ However, unofficially, later on, Qaiyum Khan used all his influence to help the *Mujahidin* who wanted to go to the war front and take part in the Kashmir War. According to some, Qaiyum Khan also had the backing of Quaid-i-Azam and Liaquat Ali Khan in his Kashmir War policy.¹⁶⁸

Actually Qaiyum Khan himself was a Kashmiri whose father, due to government service, had left his ancestral land, Kashmir, to settle down in the NWFP. But Qaiyum Khan had an emotional attachment with Kashmir. He was of the opinion that without the tribals' intervention Kashmir could not be rescued. Qaiyum Khan had also an ambition to rule his ancestral land.¹⁶⁹ Besides having Kashmiri patriotic feelings, there were other reasons too for Qaiyum Khan's interest in Kashmir. He was also afraid of the tribesmen's involvement in the NWFP politics. Which is why, Qaiyum Khan wanted to engage them in Kashmir before they could divert their attention to the Frontier politics, and he very shrewdly and successfully did it.¹⁷⁰

Once the tribal invasion started, more and more people were attracted towards the war in Kashmir. Tales of Muslims' taking different parts of the State were alluring, and thus numerous people of tribal territory, Swat, Bajaur, Chitral, Dir, etc., started moving towards Kashmir, fully armed and ready to fight.¹⁷¹ Tribesmen, both from settled and tribal areas, held meetings at different places, and made preparations for going to the warfront. Those who wanted to go were provided free arms, ammunition, transport, and ration at Peshawar.¹⁷²

In November 1947, appeals for more and more volunteers also appeared on the walls of the city through posters and through the advertisements in newspapers. One such poster "*Quaid-i-Kashmir ki Appeal*", was published by weekly '*Shorah*'

166 Akbar, p.27.

167 Ibid., pp.28-29.

168 Abbasi, Interview.

169 Wali Khan, pp.80-81 & Hoti, Interview.

170 Afrasayab, Interview.

171 PA, special branch, IPS daily diary no. nil, dated 15 October 1947, bundle no. 50, serial no. 816.

172 Ibid., dated 16 October 1947, & Special branch, W. Confidential Diary no. 40, dated 17 October 1947, Dera Ismail Khan, bundle no. 50, s.no. 816.

at Peshawar. In this poster, Sardar Muhammad Ibrahim Khan had appealed to the people to join the Free Kashmir Army.¹⁷³ Then, on 10 November 1947 an article entitled, “*Inshallah* victory is surely ours” was published in “*Mazloom Duniya*”. The article was written by its editor, Abdur Rehman Raya and highlighted the atrocities of non-Muslims over Muslims in India and Kashmir and the Muslims were urged to join the Holy War against the infidels.¹⁷⁴

The Manchester Guardian, on the authority of an Indian source, estimated that about 75,000 tribesmen were involved in the Kashmir War, of whom around 25,000 were active participants. According to this report: “They are armed with .303 rifles, Bren and Sten guns and medium machine-guns. They used infantry tactics resembling the German methods of World War 1 and paid heavily for the departure from their tradition. In one engagement, it was believed 2,000 were killed.”¹⁷⁵

The most active religio-political party in the Kashmir war in Pakistan was the *Najia* Party of *Maulvi* Muhammad Amin. In order to enable him to send people to the warfront, Qaiyum Khan had issued special instructions to the police stations saying that those who carried a chit from *Maulvi* Muhammad Amin should be allowed to carry weapons and should not be asked about permit or license. In March 1948, it was reported that he, while preaching *Jihad*, issued chits to such members of the party who volunteered to go to the Kashmir front on payment of two rupees four *annas* as subscription. It was understood that the bearer of the chit could carry arms with a license. He issued 140 chits in all.¹⁷⁶

Maulvi Muhammad Amin also visited Karachi in October 1948, and during this visit, the Governor-General of Pakistan, Khwaja Nazimuddin, sanctioned to him the purchase of 2000 rifles of 303 caliber for the purpose of *Jihad* to be used in Kashmir. To arrange the funds for such purchase, he, again, started subscriptions. However, according to the reports, the rifles were either sold to the followers on cost or were issued to those who intended to go for *Jihad* in Kashmir from the ‘*Baitul Mal*’ of the party.¹⁷⁷

The NWFP Government was apparently involved directly in arming and sending the tribesmen. This was claimed by Arbab Hidayatullah, ex-Deputy Inspector-General of Police (Special Branch), in an interview, saying that during the Governorship of Qurban Ali (1954-55), he was specially deputed by the Governor

173 PA, special branch, CID daily diary no. 244, dated 3 November 1947, bundle no. 50, serial no. 816.

174 Ibid., dated 11 November 1947.

175 Khan Khalid, p.80.

176 PA, special branch, dated May 1952, Bundle no. 16, s.no. 250, pp. 289-90.

177 PA, special branch, IPS daily diary no. nil, dated 20 October 1948, bundle no. 22, serial no. 297, p.291.

to verify all the rifles, etc of the levies. The Governor had been told or had the suspicion that, after the Kashmir War, the tribesmen, while returning the weapons, had replaced the original parts of the rifles with the local made parts. This showed that the provincial government had issued those weapons to the tribesmen going to the Front.¹⁷⁸

Major Khurshid, the commander of the Muslim League National Guards, played an important role in organizing the tribesmen for the Kashmir War. According to Muhammad Ali Khan of Hoti, one day he came to his house and handed him over a briefcase with 30,000 rupees in it and told him to keep it at a safe place because that was the money for organizing tribesmen for the Kashmir War. Subsequently, Muhammad Ali Khan Hoti, Major Khurshid, *Pir Manki* and other leaders went into tribal areas and other parts of the province and prepared people for *Jihad* and thus people started going to Kashmir front.¹⁷⁹

When the War in Kashmir broke out, the Muslims in Pakistan in general, and the tribal people in particular, were very much sympathetic towards the Kashmiris and were anxious about their fate. Ian Stephen, the editor of *Statesman*, Calcutta, writes that when the Muslims of Poonch went to the tribal areas to purchase weapons, they narrated stories of cruelty and barbarism of the Dogra army to the tribesmen, which greatly disturbed them. This aroused sympathy among tribesmen for their Muslim brethren in Kashmir. Many *mullahs* also gave calls for *Jihad*, and thus the tribals were motivated for the war against *Maharaja* of Kashmir.¹⁸⁰ According to some historians, the tribesmen were also told that they could plunder the conquered villages and collect war booty.¹⁸¹ But, more importantly, the policy of the Government of NWFP was to encourage the tribesmen to go to Kashmir. Qaiyum Khan, the Chief Minister, not only allowed the tribal *lashkars'* march to Kashmir but also facilitated the march of thousands of Afghan *Pawindas* to Kashmir for a *Jihad*.¹⁸²

Those who were heading towards *Jihad* in Kashmir were full of enthusiasm and vigour. They used to sing a song, which was mixture of Pashto and hindko:

Jang La zam rawan yama (I am going to War)

Jang la zam pakhpala (I am going to the War on my own)

Naukar mai sa la zee (Why should my servant go)

178 Hidayatullah, Interview.

179 Hoti, Interview.

180 Suhrawardy, pp.113-114.

181 Salim, Iskander Mirza, p.103.

182 Abdul Rashid, *Civil Service on the Frontier* (Peshawar: Khyber Printers, 1977), pp.127-28.

Hees parwah mai neeshta (I don't care)

Chai spahee da Pakistan yama (As I am the soldier of Pakistan)

Lasee mangai teri maan (Your mother asks for sour milk)

Atta goondai meri maan (My mother kneads flour)

Jang la zam rawan yama (I am going to the War)¹⁸³

It is believed that, while Qaiyum Khan organized tribal raids, the National Guards' leader, Major Khurshid Anwar and his friends, were given the task of attacking the State forces and police around Mirpur and surrounding areas. In this manner, they wanted to divert the attention of the forces from the main attack.¹⁸⁴ However, unfortunately, when the two groups closed in on Srinagar, differences surfaced between them as to who would lead the triumphant entry into Srinagar. Both wanted to lead the march into the city. The dispute dragged on, and it was decided that, until the issue was settled, they would not attack Srinagar. Thus, precious time was wasted, which was obviously utilized by the *Maharaja* and Indians to their advantage.¹⁸⁵

Fida Muhammad Khan, the leading Muslim Leaguer and ex-Governor of NWFP, who himself participated in the Kashmir War, claimed that he was on the Srinagar front, and it was just within their reach. But Qaiyum Khan and Major Khurshid fought among themselves and the tribesmen were kept waiting. Later on, they were called back, and thus was lost Srinagar.¹⁸⁶ Muhammad Ali Khan of Hoti was of the opinion that Qaiyum Khan was planning on presenting Srinagar as an *Eid* gift to Quaid-i-Azam. His strategy was to capture the city through the NWFP Police instead of doing it through the tribesmen because, in that situation, the credit would have gone to Major Khurshid. For the realization of this goal, he sent Khushdil Khan, a Superintendent of Police, hailing from Bannu, to the tribesmen, and recalled them from the front, and in this way Qaiyum Khan lost Srinagar.¹⁸⁷

When the Indian forces reached Srinagar, and they started attacking the tribesmen, the latter were unable to fight the regular army, especially in the open fields. The result was that the tribesmen started retreating. When the news reached Qaiyum Khan, he rushed to Abbottabad along with other notables and tried to convince the tribesmen not to give up the fight but, to no avail. The tribesmen could not carry on any more. In a desperate move, he, along with

183 Dr.M.M.Soofi, Interview by author, handwritten, Lahore, 18 November 1999.

184 Wali Khan, pp.97-98.

185 Ibid., pp.101-102, Hoti and Fida M. Khan, Interviews.

186 Fida M.Khan, Interview.

187 Hoti, Interview.

Nawab of Mamdot, contacted Maj. Gen. Akbar Khan and asked him to take the command of the fighting forces, though unofficially.¹⁸⁸

Though the Government of Pakistan apparently maintained a neutral policy towards the War in Kashmir, it could not be indifferent to the situation. Qaiyum Khan and his provincial government were actively involved and helped the tribesmen. During the War, Mountbatten and Ismay went to Lahore for a meeting with Quaid-i-Azam Muhammad Ali Jinnah and discussed the Kashmir War. Ismay recalls the meeting in these words: "Jinnah did at least admit some responsibility for their (tribesmen) activities when he said that, if the Indian troops were removed, he would pull out the Pathans."¹⁸⁹

Indeed, Qaiyum Khan never minced his words while talking about his involvement in the Kashmir War in later years. In a series of statements during 1950-51, he openly criticized India and the United Nations for their role in Kashmir. He criticized the UN for its inaction in Kashmir. He also blamed the Indians for not holding plebiscite in the State. Qaiyum Khan even demanded practical help from the Muslim countries in Kashmiris' fight against India. Qaiyum Khan also criticized the British Commonwealth for her appeasement policy towards India, and he even suggested to the government of Pakistan to break away from that organization if it failed to solve the Kashmir problem during January 1951 London Commonwealth Conference.¹⁹⁰

The *Khudai Khidmatgars* and *Zalmai Pakhtuns* were against the War in Kashmir. They actively propagated against the War throughout the province.¹⁹¹ Similarly, the *Ahrars* were also against the *Jihad* in Kashmir. *Maulana* Ghulam Ghaus of Baffa was of the opinion that, from religious point of view, *Jihad* in Palestine should be given preference over *Jihad* in Kashmir.¹⁹²

During the War in Kashmir, some tribesmen were involved in loot, plunder and kidnapping of young girls in Kashmir.¹⁹³ Even the *Ghiljis* were reported to have plundered people in Pakistani Punjab.¹⁹⁴ Some *Mujahideens* were accused of highway robberies. One such incident was reported at Burhan, District

188 Khan Akbar, p. 46.

189 Philip Zeigler, Mountbatten: The Official Biography (London: Collins, 1985), P.448.

190 The Pakistan Times (Lahore), 2 November 1947, Dawn (Karachi), 3 September 1950 – 14 January 1951 & Khyber Mail (Peshawar), 11-12 January 1951.

191 PA, special branch, IPS daily diary no. 16, serial no. 252.

192 PA, special branch, IPS daily diary no. nil, dated 19 July 1948, bundle no. 78, serial no. 1417.

193 PA, special branch, IPS extract from CID, Ext. diary no. 6, dated 8 March 1949, bundle no. 22, serial no. 294, p.81.

194 PA, special branch, IPS daily diary no. nil, dated 21 February 1948, bundle no. 77, serial no. 1401.

Campbellpur (presently Attock), when a Rawalpindi bound bus from Nowshera was stopped by them and the passengers were robbed of their belongings. The same report further stated that massive plundering was carried out by the *Mujahideen* in Gujrat district.¹⁹⁵ Qaiyum Khan, during a discussion on the Kashmir War, confessed on the floor of the Provincial Assembly, that dacoities had taken place in the garb of Kashmir *Jihad*.¹⁹⁶

During the War the bringing of ammunition and tea from Kashmir also went on unabated.¹⁹⁷ Some of the tribesmen from Mahsuds and Wazir clans were also involved in smuggling arms to the Punjab under the guise of Kashmir *Jihad*; they used to carry arms in the batches of 2 or 3 persons pretending that they were going to Kashmir front but, in reality, they were selling arms in the Punjab.¹⁹⁸

In order to acknowledge the services of the tribesmen in general and those of the Mahsuds in particular during the Kashmir War, Qaiyum Khan also announced the construction of a housing colony for Mahsuds in his budget speech of 1949-50. While announcing this reward for their services, he stated: "the fact that in our greatest hour of danger the Mahsuds responded to our call by rushing to the rescue of the oppressed Muslims of Jammu and Kashmir state, without any remuneration, and purely out of their sense of duty to protect the weak and oppressed... The scheme of Mahsud colonization (sic.) is but a humble token of appreciation of their wonderful services."¹⁹⁹

There is also a little known aspect of the Kashmir issue that needs some attention. Wali Khan writes that at the time when the plan to attack Kashmir was prepared, *Khan Bahadur* Quli Khan came to Ghaffar Khan to seek his and the *Khudai Khidmatgars'* help in the Kashmir War. However, Ghaffar Khan proposed that he should be given a chance to try the accession of Kashmir with Pakistan peacefully. He was of the opinion that the key to accession was in the hands of Sheikh Abdullah. And that he would work on him and convince him to side with Pakistan. He believed that though Sheikh Abdullah belonged to the National Conference, he was not happy with the *Maharaja*. In addition to this, he was a great votary of the Indian Muslim cause, which meant he would never agree with the *Maharaja* for the accession of Kashmir to India. Ghaffar Khan said that he knew Sheikh Abdullah personally, and that he had lengthy discussions with him

195 PA, special branch, IPS daily diary no. nil, dated 6 March 1948, bundle no. 79, serial no. 1432.

196 LAD, 17 March 1949, vol. xvii-no.7, official report, serial no.290, p.24.

197 PA, special branch, extract from IPS daily diary no. nil, dated 8 April 1948, bundle no. 79, serial no. 1434.

198 PA, special branch, IPS daily diary no. nil, dated 21 October 1948, bundle no. 79, serial no. 1430.

199 Symonds, p.126.

on the Kashmir issue, and that he would agree to join Pakistan. However, Ghaffar Khan stressed that he would need certain assurances as Sheikh Abdullah belonged to a 'nationalist' organization, like *Khudai Khidmatgar*, and that his organization was also a political rival of the Muslim League. Sheikh Abdullah would definitely have fears and suspicions because the Muslim League was in power, and what the Muslim League did to the *Khudai Khidmatgars* in the NWFP, must have left deep impact on his mind. He, therefore, demanded certain assurances to be given by Jinnah, which included that the status of all the provinces in Pakistan would be that of federating units and all the provinces would have equal status. The center would grant complete provincial autonomy. Ghaffar Khan said that once Sheikh Abdullah had those assurances, he would not hesitate to seek Kashmir's accession to Pakistan. Quli Khan replied that this was a good proposal but it would need some time. He needed immediate action because if that did not happen, and once India got the upper hand, it would not be possible to gain Kashmir. However, Quli Khan assured Ghaffar Khan that he would inform the higher authorities.²⁰⁰

Sardar Muhammad Ibrahim Khan, in his memoirs, has also discussed Ghaffar Khan's claim that Sheikh Abdullah could be persuaded to accede Kashmir to Pakistan. He writes: "It was doubtful whether Sheikh Abdullah would wholeheartedly support India, because his party followers would not have backed any decision on the accession issue made in a hurry. After meeting some of the Nationalist leaders in Srinagar, the writer was of the view that the best of the Nationalist were not necessarily anti-Pakistanis."²⁰¹

There is no doubt that Qaiyum Khan played an important role in the Kashmir War. However, unfortunately, his personal interest and goals severely damaged the prospects of ultimate victory. Had he and Major Khurshid worked in concert, most probably, today, the State of Kashmir might have been part of Pakistan and the people of Kashmir might have been living a peaceful life. However, whatever the fate of the Kashmir issue in the years ahead might be, as far as Qaiyum Khan was concerned, he benefited from the conflict, and, was able to divert the attention of the people of the NWFP towards Kashmir, and away from the problems of their own province.

THE ANTI-AHMADIA MOVEMENT

Ahmadis or *Qadianis* are a 19th century development when *Mirza Ghulam Ahmad* (d.1908), hailing from Qadian, declared himself a 'prophet'. He announced that God revealed to him His eternal message. Those who believed in his message came to be known as *Ahmadis* or *Qadianis*. This declaration was

200 Wali Khan, p.82.

201 Ibrahim, p.43.

a contradiction of the fundamental Islamic belief that the Holy Prophet Muhammad (Peace be upon him) was the last prophet of God and that there would be no prophet after him. Mirza Ghulam Ahmad's declaration hurt and infuriated the orthodox Muslims, and they strongly condemned his assertions. All the leading *Ulema* condemned the declaration but *Ahrars*²⁰² were the staunchest opponents of all.²⁰³ Anti-Ahmadiya Movement started in the country right from the establishment of Pakistan. However, since 1948, it took a clear pattern: "Religious leaders would describe Zafrullah (the Foreign Minister of Pakistan) as an apostate and a traitor and often justify the killing of *Ahmadis*."²⁰⁴ They had been demanding from the government of Pakistan that the *Ahmadis* be declared non-Muslims and people like Sir Zafarullah Khan removed from the cabinet since the creation of Pakistan.²⁰⁵

The immediate cause of the agitation in 1952 was Sir Zafrullah Khan's speech before the *Anjuman-i-Ahmadiya* at Karachi, on 18 May: "The speech, entitled *Islam zinda mazhab hai* (Islam is a live religion), did not contain anything obviously objectionable, but it was delivered at an inappropriate time."²⁰⁶ This, once again revived the *Ahmadi* issue, and in order to discuss it, the *Ulema*'s convened an all-Muslim parties' convention at Lahore in July. This convention demanded from the government, that: "(i) Ahmadis be declared a non-Muslim minority; (ii) Zafar Allah Khan be dismissed; and (iii) other Ahmadis be removed from key posts."²⁰⁷

To press the government for the acceptance of their demands, they also launched a movement in the Punjab, supported by at least a dozen religious parties. The movement passed through various stages of intensity. However, it turned violent on 27 February 1953. This anti-Ahmadiya movement also spread to other provinces of Pakistan but Punjab was the most affected.²⁰⁸ Its impact was also felt in NWFP. However, Qaiyum Khan very tactfully handled it, and did not allow it to disturb the peace of the province. The anti-Ahmadiya Movement in

202 Ahrars were an ally of the Congress in the pre-partition days and did not support Pakistan. After the creation of Pakistan, however their leaders hastened to get some credibility among the masses. As Keith Callard put it: "Being discredited by partition, these men apparently hoped to return to popular favour by leading a campaign of hatred against a distrusted minority. As the movement progressed it won the support of many of the more reputable ulama." Source: Keith Callard, *Pakistan: A Political Study* (London: George Allen and Unwin Ltd., 1968), p.204.

203 Ziring, pp.137-142.

204 Khalid b. Sayeed, *The Political System of Pakistan* (Lahore; National Book Service, 1990), p.179.

205 Ziring, pp.137-142.

206 Afzal, p.152.

207 Ibid.

208 Ziring, pp.137-142.

NWFP was mostly restricted to Hazara district. Towards the end of June 1952, at a public gathering, the speakers delivered anti-*Ahmadiya* speeches. One such meeting was held on 26 June 1952 at *Eid Gah*, Abbottabad, which was also addressed by a provincial minister, Jalaluddin Khan and *Maulvi* Muhammad Ishaq. While the latter mainly spoke about *Shariat* and against *Ahmadis*, the former demanded the removal of *Ahmadi* foreign minister, Sir Zafarullah Khan.²⁰⁹

From 21 to 22 August 1952, a two-day anti-*Ahmadiya* Conference was held at Shinkiari under the presidentship of *Maulana* Ghulam Ghaus of Baffa. Prominent speakers from all over the country, including Khan Ahmad Sujabandi, *Maulana* Abdul Hanan and Syed Attaullah Shah Bukhari of *Ahrars*, addressed the meetings. On the last day, the following resolutions, among others, were passed:

- Declaration of *Ahmadis* as a minority community;
- Removal of Chaudhri Sir Zafrullah Khan from his post of foreign ministership;
- Removal of *Ahmadis* from key posts;
- Restrictions against pro-*Ahmadi* literature;
- Early enforcement of the *Shariat*;
- Legislation of by-laws by the Central and subordinate Muslim Leagues, disallowing *Ahmadis* to become members of the Muslim League;
- Permission to Muslims to settle in Rabwa;
- Boycott of *Ahmadi* pleaders, doctors, and shopkeepers.²¹⁰

The Conference spread fear and apprehension amongst the *Ahmadis* of Hazara district particularly in Mansehra. To counter the anti-*Ahmadiya* Movement, the local *Ahmadis* of Mansehra held a meeting on 24 August 1952 at the house of Ghulam Rabbani Khan advocate, and discussed the possibility of holding an *Ahmadi* Conference. The intelligence agencies also reported that after the anti-*Ahmadiya* Conference, the local *Ahmadis* were carrying arms for self-protection.²¹¹

Besides Hazara district, the people of NWFP showed no interest in the anti-*Ahmadiya* Movement. This is evident from the following resolution of the NWFP

209 PA, special branch, IPS daily diary no. 95, dated 26 June 1952, bundle no. 76, serial no. 1399, pp.693-94.

210 PA, special branch, IPS daily diary no. 127, dated 26 August 1952, bundle no. 76A, serial no. 1394.

211 Ibid., diary no. 128, dated 28 August 1952.

Legislative Assembly, which was presented by the speaker of the Assembly, Allah Nawaz Khan, and was adopted by the Assembly: "This Assembly places on record its deep sense of gratitude to the people of the North-West Frontier Province for maintaining peace, goodwill and harmony in the Province during the recent trouble in some other parts of the country with a view to secure and strengthen the solidarity of Pakistan. This Assembly hopes and trusts that they will preserve the peace of the land in the larger interests of the country and extends to the people of the North-West Frontier Province its greetings and congratulations."²¹²

The Government of NWFP was strongly opposed to the anti-*Ahmadiya* Movement. In order to counter their activities, Qaiyum Khan visited Hazara district himself and addressed many public meetings. He was accompanied by Jalaluddin Khan who now spoke against anti-*Ahmadiya* Movement publicly.²¹³ Qaiyum Khan started his tour from Abbottabad on 14 March 1953 and addressed a large public meeting followed by meetings at Mansehra and Bala Kot the same day. In his public speeches, he "warned the audience against the mischievous activities of the so-called champions of the '*Anjuman-e-Tahafuz-e-Khatm-e-Nabouwat*' who were out to create lawlessness and disturbances to meet their own political ends. He severely criticized the activities of those who mislead the innocent masses by exploiting their religious sentiments."²¹⁴

While speaking at Abbottabad and Oghi on 16 and 25 March 1953, respectively, he stated that, "the Anti-*Ahmadiya* Movement should be opposed from the political platform by the party in power and left entirely to be dealt with by the administration."²¹⁵ He further maintained that the "people who were disturbing the peace in the country would be sternly dealt with by the Government and the Government would not hesitate even in confiscating their properties. He said that the Provincial Government did not want to use force un-necessarily, but at the same time would not tolerate the enemies of the people to take advantage of their ignorance and create chaos in the country..."²¹⁶ While referring to the *Khatm-e-Nabuwat* (finality of prophethood) issue, Qaiyum Khan said "there could be no difference of opinion on this question, because anybody who had no faith

212 LAD, 7 March 1953, Vol. xxvii, No. 3, Official Report, serial no. 391, pp.3-15.

213 It would be interesting to note that Jalaluddin Khan had initially publicly spoken in Abbottabad against the Ahmadis and had extended support to the anti-*Ahmadiya* Movement.

214 PA, special branch, CID daily diary no. 38, dated. 16 March 1953, bundle no. 74, serial no. 1371, p.207.

215 Khyber Mail (Peshawar), 17 March 1953, p.2.

216 Ibid., 26 March 1953, p.4.

in *Khatm-e-Nabuwat* was not a Muslim. The Movement launched by some people was in fact political in nature and had nothing to do with religion.”²¹⁷

During the anti-*Ahmadiya* Movement, Qaiyum Khan used all his political skills to control the demonstrations. Whenever he would get information about the demonstration, he would immediately take hold of a minister (in case of Hazara, Jalal Baba (Jalaluddin Khan), in case of Pakhtun areas, Mian Jaffar Shah), and reach the spot and join the procession and would start raising the same slogans as the protestors would. And, at the end of procession, he would address them and thus would get their sympathies and turn them towards his own side.²¹⁸ In this way, Qaiyum Khan eventually succeeded in keeping his province out of the agitational politics and subsequent difficulties faced elsewhere by his counterparts, especially in the Punjab.

QAIYUM KHAN AS ADMINISTRATOR

Qaiyum Khan found himself, right from the beginning confronted with a host of problems, including insufficient and inefficient bureaucrats in the province to deal with. Actually, after the creation of Pakistan the people had great expectations from the government. With the passage of time, they were disillusioned, particularly from the Judiciary. It was believed that the magistrates had started taking bribes, and for this purpose, they were delaying the hearings so that they could compel people to pay them gratifications.²¹⁹ One of the possible reasons could be the reduction in their pay that was announced in the 1948 budget and was strongly resented by the public servants.²²⁰

The government was aware of this menace and, in order to curb the corruption, the Government of the NWFP introduced The North-West Frontier Province Special Tribunal Bill, 1948 in the Assembly. The purpose of this bill was to empower the provincial government to appoint a tribunal that could put on trial the suspects and the decision of the Tribunal was final as no authority could be appealed against its decision. The bill's objects and aims were specified as following: “Corruption was rampant and the present laws were ineffective to deal with the corrupt. Experienced Judges would deal with these cases. Final order will be revised by Honourable the Judicial Commissioners, in their revisional Jurisdiction.”²²¹

217 Ibid.

218 Soofi, Interview.

219 PA, special branch, IPS daily diary, dated 21 June 1948, bundle no. 78, serial no. 1423.

220 PA, special branch IPS daily diary, dated 20 March 1948, bundle no. 79, serial no. 1432.

221 PGG, Peshawar, Wednesday, 29 September 1948, No. 3084- LD., 28 September.

Besides this, the provincial government also appointed a Committee known as Frontier Anti-Corruption Committee (FACC) to enquire into the cases of corruption. The Committee comprised the following members:

1. Chief Secretary to Government, NWFP, President of the Committee.
2. Home Secretary to Government, NWFP, Secretary of the Committee.
3. Revenue and Divisional Commissioner, NWFP, member, and Inspector-General of Police, NWFP, members associated the Anti-Corruption Committee.
4. Three Members of Legislative Assembly.²²²

The first two worked as President and Secretary General of the Committee respectively while the Committee's frame of reference and functions were as following:

1. Under the Committee, an investigation Agency, comprising of Superintendent of Police and junior staff, was appointed at the district level. The FACC and the Agency had to deal with all cases of corruption, nepotism and other irregularities in which the government servants were involved. Both these bodies were empowered to take action on complaints made to them.
2. The FACC had also the powers to take *Suo Moto* action on information received through its own Agency or by individual members, directly or indirectly, on the basis of general reputation or what appeared in the press.
3. The FACC took action only when it would morally be convinced that the allegations made or information received had some foundation and was worth enquiring into.²²³

Though Qaiyum Khan appointed committees to curb corruption and improve honesty and efficiency, there was slackness on part of the government too, which led to some deterioration of the performance of bureaucracy. This is evident from a former bureaucrat's statement who wrote that with the passage of time the ministers engaged the bureaucrats in their receptions and political rallies that not only politicized the bureaucracy but also kept them away from their desks to do their prescribed jobs. If any officer did not comply the orders of the ministers, they were victimized. However, for the honest officers things were still not completely hopeless as the Governor used to support the bureaucrat if any

²²² LAD, 18 October 1948, vol. xvi-nos.1-4, official report, no. 1, serial no. 277, p.12.

²²³ Fakhr-ul Islam, Political Developments in NWFP since 1947 (Ph. D. thesis submitted to Area Study Centre, University of Peshawar, Peshawar, session 1998), pp.212-13.

one dared not to accept the undue demands of the minister while the Chief Minister was more tactful. Abdul Rashid, a former bureaucrat, writes that "if he had his favourites among the officers and had promoted their interests at the cost of the interests of the less fortunate ones and if the officer adversely affected complained to him, he would receive him kindly, give him a cup of tea, but would laugh his complaint away or give an answer having no relation, whatsoever, to the point at issue."²²⁴

Generally, Qaiyum Khan was a strong and efficient administrator, and he did not allow any laxity in the performance of duty by the officials as well as other people. He used to set targets for the finalization of a scheme or project and then made sure that it was completed in time. If it was not done in time, he made people accountable for it and punished them for their negligence or laxity. He was also very strict about the officials' duty towards the public. One such incident, illustrated by M. Raziuddin Siddiqui who was an eyewitness, would make it abundantly clear. He writes that once he was present with Qaiyum Khan in his office discussing some official business when his Secretary, Sher Khan, entered the office and told him that a gentleman was insisting upon meeting him. Qaiyum Khan asked the Secretary to let the said person in. When he came, Qaiyum Khan asked about his problem. He complained that he was not receiving the electricity bill in time and it accumulated to a large amount of money, with the result that the department cut off his electricity supply. In order to restore his connection, he had to pay extra amount, and thus faced lot of difficulties. He requested that the only thing he wanted was regular sending of the bill. On hearing this, Qaiyum Khan asked his Secretary to call the Electricity Department officials and the concerned minister. When they arrived, Qaiyum Khan asked the complainant to repeat his complaint. After that, he asked the Executive Engineer (XEN) to tell whether it was true or false. When the XEN started giving justifications, Qaiyum Khan interrupted and told him to answer in yes or no, whether the complaint was true or false. On that, he said, it was true. Hearing this, Qaiyum Khan suspended the XEN and ordered an inquiry into the whole matter. Later, he also warned the Chief Engineer (C.E.) and then talked to the minister, Kiyani, about the government's obligations to the public who had cast their votes to them for better administration.²²⁵

Qaiyum Khan jealously guarded and fought for the interests of his province. A case in point was the boundary dispute with the Punjab. In 1951 a ten-year old boundary dispute surfaced between the governments of NWFP and the Punjab. The bone of contention was 2000 acres of coal mine situated on the boundary line of the districts of Mianwali (Punjab) and Kohat (NWFP). The Punjab

²²⁴ Rashid, p.131.

²²⁵ Mohammad Raziuddin Siddiqui, *Development of Science and Education in Pakistan* (Islamabad: PASTIC National Centre, 1992), pp.13-14.

government claimed that, during the British time, the coal had been granted to them while the NWFP government believed that, in 1911, through an award the coal mine was entrusted to them. In order to settle the dispute, the central government proposed a three-member Commission, headed by Judge of the East Bengal High Court, with two members, one each from the NWFP and the Punjab, with an officer of the Pakistan Survey Department as the Secretary of the Commission. Though the Punjab Government accepted it, the NWFP rejected the Commission.²²⁶ Afterwards these mines were forcibly occupied by Qaiyum Khan through Police action and were leased out to his Parliamentary Secretary, Salar Aslam Khan, from Kohat.²²⁷

In spite of being a good administrator, Qaiyum Khan had some weaknesses as well. Though most of the people agreed that Qaiyum Khan was personally not involved in moneymaking, he did allow others to make their fortunes. Rather, sometimes he kind of encouraged people to do so because he wanted to corrupt them and prepare the list of their corruptions and then exploit them for his own political purposes. According to Arbab Hidayatullah, Qaiyum Khan believed in Machiavellian politics, and could change his position and stand according to the need and demand of situation. He was flexible and ruthless; his political philosophy was that there was no permanent friend or foe in politics.²²⁸

For keeping his ministry afloat and strong, he showered favours on his ministers and members of the Assembly. In January 1950, the provincial government passed an Act known as The NWFP Ministers' Salaries (Amendment) Act No. viii of 1950. This Act provided free furnished accommodation to the ministers at Peshawar at the expense of the public exchequer. The minister could also be provided a free furnished residence or actual house rent at any other place, which the Government of NWFP temporarily declared as provincial government headquarters.²²⁹ In October 1950, the provincial government passed another Act that entitled the members of the Legislative Assembly for Daily Allowance if the Assembly session was held at a place other than Peshawar.²³⁰

During the 1951 election rallies, Fida Muhammad Khan, a leading Muslim Leaguer and ex-Governor of NWFP, charged that Qaiyum Khan was a dictator and went on to highlight a number of cases of nepotism. For example, he noted that one of Qaiyum Khan's relatives, Abdul Latif Khan was appointed as successor to Abdul Ghafoor Khan (who was a member of the Federal Public Service Commission), that Muhammad Ishaq Khan, who was also Qaiyum's

226 The Pakistan Times (Lahore), 9 January 1951, front page.

227 Hoti, Interview.

228 Hidayatullah, Interview.

229 PGCEO, 20 January 1950, No. 197, LD. 12 January 1950.

230 PGCEO, 11 October 1950, No. 3991- L.D. 9 October 1950.

relative, was reinstated as custodian of the Evacuees Property, after his superannuation, and that *Mirza Shamsul Haq*, who was originally drawing 20 rupees salary per month was elevated to a much higher position, that of a minister, which belied the claim that the Chief Minister had not done any favour to his relations.²³¹

In spite of the fact that Abdul Qaiyum Khan did not accumulate money personally, his colleagues and MLAs were deeply involved in financial corruption, and Qaiyum Khan, for political expediency, kept his eyes shut. One such prominent case was that of *Mirza Shamsul Haq* who was just a *Munshi* of Qaiyum Khan but during the latter's tenure as Chief Minister, he was able to accumulate large property and money.²³²

Mirza Shamsul Haq's relations started with Qaiyum Khan when the latter was in prison at the time of the Civil Dis-obedience Movement in the NWFP. He was deputed to serve him in jail. Qaiyum Khan started liking him and, when he became the Chief Minister, he appointed him as a minister in his cabinet. In Qaiyum Khan's ministry, he became the most powerful minister and used his influence for all kinds of corruption. His relatives prospered and his brothers even started picking up quarrels with the police.²³³ Shamsul Haq used his influence to the fullest. After the 1951 elections and during the selection of ministers even he played a key role and made his fortunes. He took 50,000 rupees from *Salar Ayub Khan* to award him the ministry.²³⁴

Qaiyum Khan was a very shrewd and capable administrator. Though he succeeded in breaking away from Congress some MLAs, he never trusted them. He was also suspicious of Old guard Muslim Leaguers. In order to keep them under control they were given open field. However, he also set Criminal Investigation Department (CID) personnel on each one of them with the instructions to prepare complete details of their corruptions. The corruption of these people had no limits and they were even involved in misappropriating the distribution of wheat. In this way, he prepared well-documented details of corruption and kept them under thumb by exploiting them for his own purposes.²³⁵ However, it seems that until Quaid-i-Azam was alive Khan Abdul Qaiyum Khan was very careful which is why the Governor of NWFP, in one of his confidential reports dated 8 May 1948, had stated that Qaiyum Khan was an efficient and honest administrator. The report says, "Abdul Qaiyum Khan has

231 PA, special branch, IPS daily diary no. 197, dated 20 November 1951, bundle no. 78, serial no. 1420.

232 Fida M.Khan, Interview.

233 Fazal-i-Mabood, Interview.

234 Arbab Noor M. Khan, Interview.

235 Hoti, Interview.

done very well as a Chief Minister, he is disinterested and honest, a hard worker. Those who criticize him do so from personal motives, mostly of jealousy."²³⁶

²²⁵ Islam, p.215.

CHAPTER 4

REFORMS AND PROGRESS

Though Qaiyum Khan's tenure as Chief Minister of the province is known for political and administrative authoritarianism, he launched many reforms as well, which put the province on the path of development and progress. It is generally believed that the progress the province made during Qaiyum Khan's period was unprecedented. Even after the passage of more than half a century no other chief minister could claim as many achievements. Qaiyum Khan had a vision for the progress of his province even before his coming into power. Once he got the opportunity, he tried his best to realize it in concrete terms, and, to a great extent, was successful in this endeavour. In the following pages, an effort has been made to identify some of the major reforms in various sectors, including administrative, political, legislative, educational, and socio-economic.

ADMINISTRATIVE REFORMS

As discussed earlier, Qaiyum Khan started his political career from the platform of Indian National Congress and was particularly impressed with nationalist, socialist, anti-bourgeoisie, and anti-imperialist reforms of the Khan brothers. Qaiyum Khan himself had expressed them in a booklet titled, *Gold and Guns on the Pathan Frontier*. Interestingly, when he assumed power, he banned his own book. But, it seems, that he did not take long in implementing those ideas practically. This could be well-judged from the following comment of Yunas Samad: "He [Qaiyum Khan] introduced a slimmed-down version of the *Khudai Khidmatgars'* reforms programme, pushed ahead with the available funds, and implemented projects on an *ad hoc* basis."¹

Qaiyum Khan established many institutions and introduced many reforms for the welfare of the people. His government, in its cabinet meeting held on 11 November 1948 decided to introduce the Civil Defence Organization in order to provide help to the people in times of crisis. The Commandant of Frontier Constabulary headed the Organization and the Superintendents of police were appointed as the District Civil Defence Officers. This responsibility was in addition to their routine duties. Each town with a population of 10,000 was supposed to have a Civil Defence Organization. The objective for the establishment of this organization was to help in fire-fighting, rescue and first aid work, etc.²

Further, in order to provide job opportunities to the people of the NWFP in general and the Pakhtuns in particular, he persuaded the government of Pakistan in June 1949 to establish a 'Pathan Regiment' in the Pakistan Army.

1 Samad, p.147.

2 The Pakistan Times (Lahore), 12 November, 1948, p.3.

After the establishment of this Regiment, he appealed to the wealthy people to make it a success by giving generous donations. In the early years, the Regiment had to rely on donations. He said that the Frontier Regiment and Frontier Force Rifles, out of which Pathan Regiment had been formed, had given as much as they could, but it was not nearly enough.³

Though Qaiyum Khan himself was not a Pakhtun, he was sympathetic towards the Pakhtuns. An instance in this regard would make it clearer. Once he was sitting in a gathering with J.W.Spain (a well-known author of Pakhtun history) in Karachi. During the course of discussion, the *Pawindhas'* seasonal migration to NWFP and its impact on the province came under discussion. One of the NWFP officials stated that their coming greatly affected the province because the province had to procure extra food for them and provide for them medical facilities. Further, they also cut the local trees and damage the crops, which provoke local reaction. In addition, they also carried diseases. Thus, the NWFP government had to spend lacs of rupees on the *Pawindhas*. J.W.Spain remarked: "Well, why don't you stop them from coming? or at least, don't give them anything when they do." To this Qaiyum Khan answered:

"What else can we do but help them? They are our own people."⁴

To ameliorate the lot of the people, he established the Department of *Auqaf* in 1949 in the province to run and supervise welfare institutions, and mosques, and hire *imams*. Interestingly he had initially opposed the idea of appointing government-paid Imams in the mosques when Muhammad Jalaluddin Khan had presented a resolution to this effect in the Legislative Assembly in March 1948. After lengthy discussion, the Chief Minister and the Revenue Minister had asked the mover to withdraw the resolution, which he did accordingly.⁵ However, in 1949, the NWFP Government took the charge of all welfare organizations/institutions in its own hands and appointed an administrator for its management. A separate Department was established under the supervision of Administrator; and welfare institutions were handed over to it. According to the government sources, earlier the caretakers/in-charge of those institutions were using the income of these for personal benefits. With the enactment of this law, the monopoly of caretakers came to its end and the affairs of these institutions were streamlined. The provincial government named this Department as *Auqaf* Department. The government prepared a plan for the establishment of orphanages, welfare institutions and hospitals from this income. Major beneficiaries of this law were the religious leaders, as the *Imams* and *Khatibs* of

3 Ibid., 2 June 1949, p.5.

4 James W. Spain, *The Way of the Pathans* (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 1972), p.128.

5 LAD, 23 March 1948, vol. xv-No. 6, official report, serial no. 254, pp. 292, 308-309.

the mosques were now given salaries, and thus they were free of any financial worries. A special cell of "*Mazhabiat*" was established in the *Auqaf* to appoint *Imams* and *Khatibs* of mosques, fix their salaries, and encourage Islamic principles among the Muslims.⁶ Under the NWFP Charitable Institutions Act of 1949, the *Khatibs* were appointed as government servants. Being public servants, they were required not to take part in any political activity and their duties were strictly confined to religious teachings and instructions with the aim to raise "the moral tone of Muslim Society."⁷ Those appointed first were: *Maulvi Muhammad Ishaq, Khatib, Jammia Masjid, Cantt., Abbottabad (Hazara); Maulvi Muhammad Shouaib, General Secretary, Jamiat-ul-Ulema-i-Islam Sarhad, Mardan; and Pir Alam Shah Banori of Kohat.* Their salary was fixed at the scale of Rs. 100-10-150.⁸

Qaiyum Khan took into government control the Islamic educational institutions as well. It was believed that, with the help of government, these schools could be run in a better way and the teachers would be granted all possible facilities.⁹ During his second tenure, Qaiyum Khan's government also decided to sanction the creation of 28 posts of theology teachers for teaching theology in Government High Schools in the province, on permanent basis. Their scale of pay was Rs. 40-2-90, in addition, they were given Rs. 25/- as Dearness Allowance.¹⁰

On 10 January 1951 the provincial government implemented the NWFP Orphanages (Amendment) Act, 1951, which empowered the government to take charge of the existing orphanages if, in the opinion of the government, they were not functioning according to the laws of the province. This Act also empowered the provincial government to establish new orphanages.¹¹

Qaiyum Khan also wanted to provide better environment to the jail inmates. For this purpose in 1951 his government introduced the following reforms in jails with a view to turn jails into centers of reformations instead of only being centers of punishments. Working hours in jails in the province were arranged in such a manner that sufficient time was made available to convicts, both adults and

6 Javed, p.399.

7 Dawn (Karachi), 22 July 1950, p.6. It would be interesting to note that in the neighbouring Muslim country, Iran, the same move was initiated by King Reza Shah in 1920s but was strongly resisted by the Ulemas and they refused to get any money from the government. They believed that it would restrict their liberty and their opposition to the government's un-Islamic policies. Mohamed Heikel, *The Return of the Ayatollah* (London: Andre Deutsch, 1981), p.84.

8 Khyber Mail (Peshawar), 11 June 1950, front page.

9 Javed, p.395.

10 Khyber Mail (Peshawar) 12 December 1952, p.4.

11 PGCEO, 13 January 1951, No. 217 L.D. 13 January 1951.

juvenile, for their secular and religious education. Qualified teachers were appointed in all the central and district jails to impart education to the prisoners. Scouting and sports were encouraged in order to keep the inmates physically fit.¹² Quilts were replaced with blankets, as quilts could not be easily disinfected. The quality of food and clothing was also improved. The Jail libraries were re-organized and books and magazines on various subjects were made available. The jail libraries subscribed to important English, Urdu, and Pashto newspapers of the country in order to keep the prisoners well informed of events outside.¹³ In the Haripur jail, arrangements were also made for imparting training in arts and crafts at the Adult Training Centre and Reformatory School in order to enable them to earn their living after their release.¹⁴

Qaiyum Khan was particularly concerned about law and order in the province. In September 1951 he established the *Qaumi Razakars* whose job was to help maintain law and order, ensure peace, and work for national reconstruction and internal defence of the country. The District Magistrates were empowered to enlist anyone in the *Qaumi Razakars* who was fit and willing to work. The *Qaumi Razakars* had full protection of the law and no suit or other legal proceedings could be initiated against them for what they did during the performance of their duties, except with the prior permission of District Magistrate. The *Qaumi Razakars* were provided with special uniform, and if they failed to perform their duties as per instructions of the officer incharge, they could be punished (on conviction by a competent court) with one month imprisonment or fined upto Rs. 50.00, or both. If any unauthorized person wore the *Qaumi Razakars*' uniform, he could be sentenced to six months imprisonment and fined Rs. 100.00.¹⁵ The NWFP *Qaumi Razakars* Ordinance 1951 was repealed when in January 1952 the Government of NWFP promulgated Act No. V of 1952, also called the NWFP *Qaumi Razakars* Act, 1952. Through this new Act, the functions and constitution of the *Qaumi Razakars* were further elaborated.¹⁶

Qaiyum Khan was also very interested in initiating new developmental projects in the province. However, due to paucity of funds it was very difficult to launch any major project right away. The financial position of the province was such in those days that once the budget was prepared; funds were not available for different heads. In order to support the budget, the provincial government formed a Committee headed by the then Secretary Development, (later on President of Pakistan), Ghulam Ishaq Khan. This Committee would cut different allocations in

12 Khyber Mail (Peshawar), 6 July 1951, headline news.

13 Ibid.

14 Dawn (Karachi), 30 June 1952, p.6.

15 The Pakistan Times (Lahore), 2 September 1951 & Khyber Mail (Peshawar), 2 September 1951, p.4.

16 PGCEO, No. 483-L.D, 21 January 1952.

the budget. Arbab Ahmad Ali Jan, the then deputy Commissioner of Peshawar, nicknamed the committee as "*Hajam* (barbar) Party."¹⁷

In order to provide a sound financial basis to the province and to provide more facilities to the people, the provincial government imposed different taxes from time to time. It was part of this policy that the government levied cloth tax, which was revised from time to time, on all imported cloth through the NWFP Cloth Sales Tax Act, 1948.¹⁸

On 9 October 1948 the NWFP Urban Immovable Property Tax Bill, 1948 was introduced in the Assembly and became an Act on 2 November 1948 as Act No. xviii of 1948. This Act introduced annual tax on buildings and lands located in the rating area shown in the Act at the rate of 20% of the annual value of such buildings and lands. However, certain exemptions were allowed. The exempted properties were as under:

1. Central and provincial government buildings.
2. Buildings, one or more which belonged to one person, whose total income was less than Rs. 180/- per annum. However, if such building (s) belonged to one person, all would be calculated combinedly.
3. Buildings used for educational purposes.
4. Public parks and grounds.
5. Buildings of religious importance and charity.
6. Government could exempt any building or land.¹⁹

The imposition of this tax was strongly resented by the people, particularly by those who lived in rented properties. They feared that the tax would be reflected in the rent they had to pay.²⁰ The property tax issue came into sharp focus in August 1950. The people in Peshawar held protest meetings and resolutions were passed against the imposition of property tax. On 16 August 1950 a complete strike was observed in the city. Though it was certainly a strike against the property tax, rumours had also spread that the strike was observed against the imposition of Sales Tax.²¹ The government, however, did not withdraw the property tax. Later on 3 March 1952, during his budget speech, Qaiyum Khan

¹⁷ Hoti, Interview.

¹⁸ PGCEO, No. 1142 LD, 15 May 1948.

¹⁹ PGCEO, No. 325 I/L. D. 12 October 1948, & no. 3751-LD, 15 November 1948.

²⁰ PA, special branch, IPS daily diary no. nil, dated 23 October 1948 bundle no. 79, serial no. 1430.

²¹ PA, special branch, IPS Daily Diaries nos. nil, dated 12, 16 & 18 August 1950, bundle no. 79, serial no. 1427, Khyber Mail (Peshawar), 17 August 1950, p.4 and LAD, dated 3 March 1952, official report, p.20.

announced some concession in Urban Immovable Property Tax by exempting a person who owned only one residential house.²²

In July 1948, the government announced one rupees' stamp on the applications to be submitted to the governor or ministers.²³ Then, in 1949, an educational tax of annas two per rupee on octroi duty; a tax of Rs. 3 per annum on bicycles used in the urban area; and a tax of Rs. 6 per annum on each *tonga* was announced.²⁴ However, due to the public outcry the governor, through an ordinance, cancelled the Bicycle and *Tonga* Tax.²⁵

The District Board Peshawar also introduced a tax known as the professional tax that netted all the officials working in the Board territories in May 1950. Those included were: Assistant Commissioners and Extra Assistant Commissioners; Sub-Judges; Directors of Agriculture; Assistant Registrars, Co-operative; District Inspectors and Assistant Inspectors of Schools and Tehsildars besides many other cadres of high officials of the province. The order was issued with the prior sanction of the government. The Tax was levied as per following scheme:

The officials at the highest ladder were assessed at Rs. 40, the Tehsildars and others of equivalent status at Rs. 30, Naib Tehsildars, etc. at Rs. 20; and clerks and *muharirs* at Rs. 8 per annum. However, amongst the police officials, only the head-constable was included in this schedule. This tax was imposed for the construction of roads, hospitals, etc., in the rural areas.²⁶

In December 1950, the provincial government enhanced the rates of Entertainment Duty and tax on cinemas as per following rates:

Where the payment excluding the amount of duty did not exceed 4 annas...- /2/6.²⁷

Exceeds 4 annas but does not exceed 8 annas...-/5/-

Exceeds 8 annas but does not exceed 1 rupee...-/10/-

Exceeds 1 rupee but does not exceed 2 rupees...1/3/-

Exceeds 2 rupees but does not exceed 3 rupees...1/13/-

Exceeds 3 rupees but does not exceeds 4 rupees...2/6/-

22 LAD dated 3 March 1952, Official Report, p.20.

23 PA, special branch, IPS daily diary no. nil, dated 13 July 1948 bundle no. 78, serial no. 1417.

24 The PakistanTimes (Lahore), 8 March 1949, p.4.

25 Shahbaz (Peshawar), 7 November 1949, front page.

26 The Pakistan Times (Lahore), 3 May 1951, p.2.

27 These figures are in three sections, first shows rupee, second anna, and third paisa, so this figure means 0 rupees, 2 annas and 6 paisas.

Exceeds 4 rupees but does not exceeds 5 rupees...3/8/-

Exceeds 5 rupees but does not exceed 7 rupees 8 annas...4/12/-

Exceeds 7 rupees 8 annas but does not exceed 10 rupees...6/-/-

For every 5 rupees or part thereof in excess of the first 10 rupees, in addition to the payment on the first 10 rupees...4/12/-

b. The Tax on the Cinemas was payable by the owners or management thereof, at the following rates:-

1. In the case of a Cinema classed as a first class cinema Rs. 1000/-

2. In the case of a Cinema classed as a second-class cinemaRs. 500/-

3. In the case of a Cinema classed as a third lass cinema Rs. 100²⁸

In order to inculcate the habit of savings among the masses, the provincial government launched a "Saving Fortnight" from 15 October 1951. This was considered necessary in order to combat inflation and build up national wealth needed for the defence of the country.²⁹ In 1952, the government decided to raise funds in order to finance the developmental works in the province. This was done through raising a new loan scheme, which carried 3.50% interest per annum. The loan was for a period of 12 years. At the time of announcing the new loan scheme, the total debt liabilities of NWFP stood at Rs. 43,997,200.³⁰

Though the provincial government was able to generate more funds, they were promptly spent on developmental activities. Therefore, the NWFP did not have surplus budget. However, the extent of development carried out in the province was unprecedented. The following table would further clarify the financial position of NWFP:

Figures in thousand of rupees³¹

	Revenue receipts	Revenue Expenditure	Deficit - Surplus +	Closing Balance
1946-47	32,423	35,977	-3,554	+6,543
1947-48	32,389	37,047	-4,654	+1,889

28 Khyber Mail (Peshawar), 6 December 1950, p.3.

29 The Civil and Military Gazette (Lahore), 9 October 1951, p.6.

30 Khyber Mail (Peshawar), 22 August 1952, p.4.

31 Ibid., 24 March 1951, p.3.

1948-49	36,060	37,901	-1,841	+48
1949-50	33,060	37,684	-4,624	-1,410
1950-51	45,764	44,979	+785	-625
1951-52	45,608	46,274	-666	-1,291

In the above table, the central government's subvention of one crore of rupees were also included. Even leaving aside this subvention, there were deficits throughout. As a result, the closing balance that stood at Rs. 6,543,000 in 1946 vanished altogether. The result was a minus closing balance. This clearly showed a weak spot in the financial position of NWFP. However, for a clear understanding of the over-all position, it is imperative to take into account the expenditure on industries and other items under the capital account as well. The following table would make it further clear:

('000 omitted)³²

	1951-52	1950-1951	1949-50	1946-47
Irrigation Works	2865	1131	373	_____
Industrial Development	500	_____	_____	_____
Civil Works	685	_____	_____	_____
Electricity Works	19793	12678	7540	1408
Other Provincial Works	2200	1319	364	49
Provincial Scheme of State Trading	-5454	-3389	+4199	-3039
Total:	20589	11739	12476	-1584

During Qaiyum Khan's tenure an award was also announced by the Federal Government that allocated funds for the provinces. For this purpose, in early 1950s, Sir Jeremy Raisman, was assigned the task to recommend the allocation of funds between the center, the provinces and different units of the country for the Six-Year National Development Plan. When, in 1952, the Award was

32 Ismail Sethi, "Budgetary Trends in NWFP", Khyber Mail (Peshawar), 24 March 1951, p.3.

announced, the centre and the federating units accepted his recommendations for the year 1952-53 and onwards. As per his recommendations, for 1952-53, the East Bengal was granted the highest sum of Rs. 324 lakhs — out of the total revenue transferred from the center to the provinces, which were estimated at Rs. 677 lakhs, the Punjab was given Rs. 158 lakhs, the NWFP Rs. 80 lakhs, Sind Rs. 60 lakhs, Bahawalpur State Rs. 20 lakhs and others Rs. 35 lakhs. His other recommendations were:

- i. Since partition, it had been agreed that an allocation of Income Tax proceeds would not be made to the provinces. It was recommended that 50% of the net proceeds of taxes on income, except those proceeds which were granted to the capital of the federation or federal emoluments, should be allocated to the provinces according to the following percentages:

East Bengal	45%
Punjab	27%
Sind	12%
NWFP	8%
Bahawalpur	4%
Remainder	4%
Total:	100%

- ii. The administration of Sales Tax was centralized in Pakistan by agreement with the provinces subject to the allocation of roughly fifty percent of the proceeds to the units. This arrangement was due to expire on the 31 March 1952. Sir Jeremy Raisman further recommended that the arrangement for the administration of Sales Tax should be given permanent effect.
- iii. Compensation to the provinces for the share acquired by the centre in the proceeds of Sales Tax. It was recommended that sums equivalent to one half of the net proceed of the Federal duties of excise on tobacco, betel-nuts and tea be paid out of the revenues of the federation to the units. The distribution was to be in accordance with the percentage recommended and a larger allocation of jute duties to East Bengal by way of providing further financial assistance to that province.
- iv. It was recommended that the annual grant of money in aid of rupees one crore payable to NWFP should be increased to rupees 125 lakhs.³³

33 Khyber Mail (Peshawar), 5 January 1952, p.4.

MERGER OF FRONTIER PRINCELY STATES/TRIBAL AREAS

It was widely understood that Qaiyum Khan did not like the independent status of princely states of the NWFP. He wanted to restrict them one way or the other. For this purpose, initially, he encouraged the formation of Pakistan States Muslim League Council. Not surprisingly on 11 November 1948, the Council Secretaries of Dir, Chitral and Amb held a press conference in Karachi, and leveled various allegations against the rulers of the states saying that they were perpetuating inhuman cruelties upon the poor masses of the states. They demanded that the rulers should be checked or Pakistan would face another serious refugee problem as ultimately people would flee from the states and would settle in the mainland Pakistan.³⁴

On 28 January 1952 a delegation, under the leadership of Behrawar Saeed of Dir, called upon the governor at the Government House, Peshawar. The delegation put forward the following demands:

- i. Dir State should be merged with the NWFP or a full responsible government should be installed in the State because the attitude of the *Nawab* with his subject was intolerable.
- ii. The Government of Pakistan should establish schools, hospitals and post offices in the State.
- iii. The Government of Pakistan should control the income and expenditure of the State.³⁵

Then on 9 February 1951 the Vice President of the Frontier States Muslim League Council demanded, through a press statement, the merger of Dir state with the NWFP. After leveling various charges against the ruler of Dir, he also demanded from the government of Pakistan that democracy should be introduced in the state. He further stated that the task of democratization should be entrusted to the NWFP Chief Minister Qaiyum Khan who, in his words, had put the NWFP on the path of development and progress.³⁶

In the early 1950s, Qaiyum Khan also made an attempt to merge the Swat state with the NWFP. But the ruler, *Wali* of Swat, Mian Gul Jehanzeb successfully fought off the move.³⁷ However, in 1951 when the *Wali* of Swat made some changes in the feudal system of Swat, particularly abandoning the old system,

34 The Pakistan Times (Lahore), 12 November 1948, front page.

35 PA, special branch, IPS daily diary no. nil, dated 29 January 1952 bundle no. 80, serial no. 1444.

36 Dawn (Karachi), 9 February 1951, p.6.

37 James W. Spain, *Pathans of the Latter Day* (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 1995), p.95.

according to which *Khans* used to entertain their guests and retainers at the expense of the whole population of their ward and village, some of the *Khans* revolted against this move because they thought that this would lead them to losing power, and they sought the help and support of Qaiyum Khan, demanding that the Swat state should be merged with Pakistan. This group, which comprised many powerful *Khans*, included: Afzal Khan and brothers, the sons of Darmai Khan; there were several of the big *Khans* from Nipkikhel—Behram Khan; Qalandar Malik Aligrama; Sherzada Khan; Abdur Rashid Khan of Odigram; Abdur Rashid Khan of Derai, etc;³⁸

With the help of his father, Mian Gul Jehanzeb very shrewdly prepared a plan in order to crush the local *Khans*' power, and trap them all. In those days one of his half brother was getting married. His father invited all of them to Peshawar to attend the marriage while Mian Gul Jehanzeb stayed back as he had gone through a surgery. When all these rebellious *Khans* were in Peshawar, he sacked them all and elevated their rivals to the positions of *maliks*. On their return, when they found out the new positions of their rivals, they ran away from the state and met the Malakand Political Agent in order to seek his help, but in vain.³⁹ "They were also disappointed in their attempt to obtain support from Abdul Qaiyum Khan. The Central Government got annoyed with his head strongness in the Province, so they moved him to Centre and made him minister there, where he was more or less rendered harmless. And it was not the Central Government's policy at the time to assimilate the States; it had been a scheme of Abdul Qaiyum Khan's only; so when he left, there was no further danger;" Later, the *Khans* apologized for their behaviours and the *Wali* of Swat allowed them to come back to their homes.⁴⁰

Qaiyum Khan not only wanted the merger of NWFP princely states, he also wanted to amalgamate the tribal areas with the province. Under this policy, he was able to merge the lower Black Mountain [Kaala Dhaka] tribes, numbering about 43,000, with Hazara district in 1952. Most of the Amb State (about 48,000 out of approximately 53,000 population) was incorporated about the same time. The Gadoon tribes (totaling about 35,000), who live between the Swat and the Indus Rivers, joined Mardan in 1953. A part of Indus-Kohistan, with a mixed population of about 150,000, was added to Hazara in July 1954. The government assumed responsibility for law and order and certain welfare programmes. In order to make the transition as smooth as possible, it did not introduce taxation.⁴¹

38 Fredrik Barth, *The Last Wali of Swat: An Autobiography as told to Fredrick Barth* (Bangkok: White Orchid Press, 1995), pp.12 & 107.

39 Ibid., pp. 107-108.

40 Ibid. p.108.

41 Spain, *Borderland*, p.222.

On 8 April 1949, President of the Muslim League Phulera (State) wrote an appeal addressed to the Deputy Commissioner, Hazara, Abbottabad and Political Agent for Amb and Phulera States, the copy of which were also sent to (a) Governor-General of Pakistan, (b) Prime Minister of Pakistan, (c) The Governor of NWFP, (d) Political Resident NWFP, Peshawar, (e) The Chief Minister of NWFP, and (f) Chaudhri Khaliquzzaman, President Pakistan Muslim League, Karachi. He charged the ruler of Phulera of immoral character, oppression and cruelty, anti-people activities and exploitation. He demanded that reforms like freedom of speech and association, more rights at par with the areas of Pakistan, right of ownership of land, and freedom from any kind of *begaar* or payment of cesses or other charges be given to people of the State. Or the state should be merged with the Hazara district of the NWFP.⁴²

In December 1951, in a public meeting at Oghi, Hazara, Qaiyum Khan expressed the desire to take charge of the Amb and Phulera States' forests, and appoint magistrates for the trial of criminal cases in these states. This announcement was not very welcomed, particularly by the rulers. They sent delegations to the Chief Minister to reverse his decision.⁴³ In this connection, 6 MLAs including two Parliamentary Secretaries from Hazara district, met Qaiyum Khan, and opposed reforms in these states. However, Qaiyum Khan told them that the final decision would be taken in the Muslim League Parliamentary Party and that the decision of the majority of the party would be final.⁴⁴

Though the rulers and their allies opposed mergers, there were certain people in the states who supported the idea. For instance, after Qaiyum Khan's announcement, two delegations of people from Amb State called upon the Chief Minister and assured him of their support for his plan of annexation of the excluded areas of Upper Tanawal.⁴⁵ In May 1951, the governor of NWFP, under Section 4 of the NWFP (Upper Tanawal, Excluded Area) Laws Regulation, 1951 issued the order to extend 43 laws of the settled areas of the province.⁴⁶

Finally, in April 1952 the Government of Pakistan accepted the request of the people living in the areas lying beyond the western border of Hazara district for merger of their territory with the province. Thus, through Governor-General Order no. 1 of 1952, the NWFP (Enlargement of the Area and Alteration of Boundary) Order, 1952 the merger of the 182.69 sq. miles territory took place. In this merger, were included the villages of Naror, Syed Jalalis of Bhatian Garang, Tor

42 PA, special branch, copy of the appeal of the President of the Muslim League, Phulera, dated 8 April 1949, bundle no 78, serial no. 1415.

43 Khyber Mail (Peshawar), 1 December 1950, front page.

44 Ibid.

45 Ibid., 3 December 1950, p.4.

46 PGCEO, 1 June 1951, No. 2046-st.-31 May 1951, Home Department.

Khanan, Deshi, Pir Khel, Deshi Tor Khel, Syed Jalai of Maidan, Panjkirals, Panjghol, Uthmanzai, Prehari Syeds, Biland Kot, Ashlor Khanans including Jamal Khan, Ashlor Tribe, Dharian Area Tor Khanan, Ashlor, Malkal, Dodal, Uthmanzai Astanadars, Pitao Amazai and Syeds of Sithana.⁴⁷ All these areas formed part of Hazara district and all expenditure incurred on their administration became the responsibility of the NWFP, while Federal Government would bear the expenses of the Frontier Constabulary posted there. The public revenues of the added areas were also given to the government of NWFP.⁴⁸

With these new mergers, the NWFP boundaries stood as following: On the west, the boundary of Hazara district ran with the tribal territories of Kohistan Allai Madda Khel, Khan Khel, Akhund Khel and the Black Mountains. It then marched across the river Indus enclosing the territory of Pitao Amazai. To the north and west, were tribal territory of the Madda Khel, Mandanr Yusafzai and the Gadoons, to the east, the Amb state and to the south, Mardan district. It then ran along the river Indus that formed the boundary further south between the districts of Mardan and Hazara.⁴⁹

Towards the end of 1952, under the leadership of Superintendent Police Hazara, Mian Bashir Ahmad, three police platoons entered Amb via Haripur. Another one entered via Mansehra and Thaker Maira. State Secretary welcomed the police force and camped them in *RaisKhana*. Jan Muhammad Khan was appointed as Magistrate at Sher Garh, and a police force, comprising a Sub-inspector, a Head Constable, and 16 soldiers were posted at Sher Garh police station. The State ruler *Nawab* Sir Muhammad Farid Khan met the governor NWFP and signed the merger agreement.⁵⁰

A question may arise as to why the Qaiyum Khan government was keen on annexing the states, but did not show any interest in merging the tribal belt. The issue of the tribal areas has always been and still is, very sensitive. J.W.Spain has pointed out an important aspect of these mergers. He says, "It is significant that those [mergers] which took place earlier were all on the eastern fringes of the Pathan area where the tribal structure is weaker than in the area along the Durand Line, and that none of them abutted on the international boundary itself. The latter fact is probably the reason why such relatively well-developed areas as Kurram and Swat state retain their special status. They are simply too

47 GOPG, 4 April 1952, Government of Pakistan, Ministry of States and Frontier Regions, No. F-3 (67)-F/49-7th February 1952, Karachi.

48 The Civil and Military Gazette (Lahore), 9 February 1952, front page.

49 Ibid.

50 Sabir, pp.1073-74.

strategically located for the central government to be willing to relinquish entirely its direct control over them.”⁵¹

In March 1952, a *Jirga* of Gadoon tribes saw Qaiyum Khan at Gonati in Mardan District. The *Jirga* stated that they had presented an application to the federal government for the merger of the Gadoon territory with the settled district.⁵² Again on 16 December 1952 during a welcome address to the Governor NWFP, Khwaja Shahabuddin who was visiting Gadoon, the Gadoon tribesmen stated that their request to the government for the merger of their area with the Swabi Tehsil should be considered sympathetically. The governor told them that he had forwarded their application to the government for approval and a decision was expected shortly.⁵³

However, the then Deputy Commissioner of Mardan, Abdur Rashid, who himself was directly involved in this whole process of merger, had a different story to tell. He says that when he was transferred from Dera Ismail Khan to Mardan as Deputy Commissioner, the Superintendent of Police told him that there were some 250 outlaws in the Gadoon Areas, who were involved in numerous crimes. As Deputy Commissioner, he tried to have the outlaws arrested with the help of the Gadoon *jirgas*, but it did not work. He decided to take strong action, and got the government approval for levying fine on them. For this purpose, however, he had to arrest few Gadoons from Topi as hostages, after which the fine was collected. But the merger took place because of another incident. The Deputy Commissioner though was able to convince some elders of the Gadoon area to merge their territories with the Mardan district; the merger of whole of Gadoon areas took place because of a clash between the *astanadars* and the Gadoon people. *Astanadars* were the tenants of Gadoons, but had taken protection (from the excesses of Gadoons who used to insult them and their women folk) with the district authorities of Hazara by requesting the merger of their territories with Hazara. When the Gadoons found out, they got alarmed. They apprehended losing their proprietorship. So a small party came to assert their ownership. Initially, they were well received and provided traditional hospitality, but later when they were returning well-satisfied, some hot headed amongst *astanadars* fired upon the leader and wounded him. This followed the clash and when the news reached Gadoon areas *lashkar* was organized to teach them a lesson. However, since the latter were under the protection of Frontier Constabulary, fighting started between the *lashkar* and the Constabulary. The clashes widened, more *lashkars* were sent and the government also sent more forces. Finally, the government was able to disperse the *lashkars*, make new arrangements

51 Spain, Borderland, p.222.

52 Khyber Mail (Peshawar), 22 March 1952, headline news.

53 Ibid., 17 December 1952, headline news.

between *astanadars* and Gadoons and merged the latter territory with the district of Mardan.⁵⁴

LEGISLATIVE REFORMS

The Qaiyum Khan's government also introduced a number of laws in the province. A brief summary of some of the more important laws is provided here. In March 1948, his government abolished the undemocratic division of electorate and constituencies into agriculturists and non-agriculturists.⁵⁵ Then in order to provide protection to the wild life in the province, he passed Wild Life Protection Act and established sancuaries for them.⁵⁶ Amendments were also made in the criminal procedure codes. Adultery, alluring a married woman, and kidnapping were declared serious offences. In the cases of kidnapping, the minor's ages were increased and for kidnapping grave penalties were introduced.⁵⁷

In 1935, the Assembly passed *Shariat* Act, but was not properly implemented. There was a flaw in this law regarding the rights of widows and sons. So, in 1950, an amendment was introduced to remove the flaw, and due rights of widows and children, according to the Islamic Law, were accepted.⁵⁸

Pir Muhammad Abdul Latif Zakori presented a resolution in the Provincial Assembly for abolition of the sale of liquor in the province, which was passed in March 1948.⁵⁹ Prior to this during the Dr. Khan Sahib's Ministry, Muhammad Abbas Khan had also moved a resolution to abolish liquor. However, his move was rejected by majority votes in the Assembly. Later Muhammad Abbas Khan, who had joined Pakistan Muslim League, was the Revenue Minister in the Qaiyum Khan cabinet explained it: "The policy followed by the previous government was to introduce prohibition by gradual stages. The Dera Ismail Khan district was selected for this purpose in 1938, Bannu in 1947 and this Government has decided that Kohat should go dry with effect from the 1 April 1948. The fact that it is proposed that complete prohibition should be introduced throughout the Province with effect from the 1 October 1948, has already been announced in the Budget speech on the 17 April 1948"⁶⁰

However, the use of liquor was allowed to the non-Muslims and the habitual drinkers; the latter could use liquor only upon the certification of a medical doctor that the stoppage of liquor could cause harm to their health. Jalaluddin Khan

54 Rashid, pp.140-144.

55 Pakistan First Year, p.135.

56 Javed, p.401.

57 Ibid.

58 Ibid., pp.399-400.

59 LAD, 23 March, 1948, vol.xv-no.6, official report, serial no.254, pp.288-292.

60 LAD, 27 March, 1948, vol.xv-no.9, official report, serial no. 265, p. 412.

objected to it on the floor of the house during March 1949 Assembly session on the ground that some people would pay a doctor's fee, purchase alcohol on the rationed rates, and would later sell it at a much higher price in the black market. The sale/purchase of alcohol wasn't, however, completely banned. But in spite of his strong pleas, he could not succeed in banning the alcohol altogether.⁶¹

The provincial government was very concerned about the cleanliness of towns and cities. It promulgated a Municipality Act that gave powers to Municipal Committees to launch new schemes for the improvement of cleanliness of towns and cities.⁶² As part of this programme, the government passed another act known as NWFP Control of Bill Sticking Act, 1949. Under this Act, all kind of advertisements, whether placards or papers, were banned except at specified places. The violation was declared punishable with 3 years imprisonment or fine or both.⁶³

In January 1951, the provincial government passed the NWFP Opium Smoking Act No. III, 1950, for the control and regulation of opium smoking. This Act replaced the then existing Punjab Opium Act, 1923. Under the new Act, all opium smokers were required to register themselves with the government. The objective was to check the spread of the addiction of opium smoking by making it illegal except for those who were already addicted. Heavy penalties were laid down for violating any of the provisions.⁶⁴

In June 1952 the Governor-General of Pakistan enacted The NWFP Tenants (Rural Housing) Protection Act, which was passed by the provincial Assembly in its January session. This Act gave the right of protection to agricultural tenants and rural artisans having no houses of their own in village 'abadis' from house eviction. Though it was enforced as an Ordinance before the 1951 general elections it was valid for two years due to the pressure of the landlords who were in a majority in the Assembly. Therefore, the governor referred the matter to the Governor General. Under the Act, owner of a mortgaged house who contravened a provision of the Act or an order passed by a revenue officer under it, was liable to punishment with imprisonment for a term which might extend to six months or with fine up to rupees 500 or with both.⁶⁵

A remarkable development in 1952 was the introduction and establishment of a Women Police Force, consisting of one Assistant Sub-Inspector, one Head Constable and four Foot Constables, dealing with women offenders in Peshawar

61 LAD, 17 March 1949, vol. xvii-no.7, official report, serial no. 290, pp.30-32.

62 Javed, p.402.

63 Khyber Mail (Peshawar), 23 December 1949, p.2

64 Ibid., 7 November 1950, editorial & PGCEO, 30 January 1951, No. 443-L.D. 30 Jan, 1951.

65 The Pakistan Times (Lahore), 28 June 1952, p.2.

district.⁶⁶ Later on nothing was heard of it, so most probably it could not develop into a full fledged force.

In 1951, the Qaiyum Khan government introduced Weights and Measures Act, 1951, which quelled the confusion regarding weights and measures, whose main victims were farmers; the businessmen very shrewdly cheated them resulting into economic losses for them. In order to put an end to this exploitation, Qaiyum Khan announced on 1 March 1951 during his budget speech that measures had been taken to implement it and funds were allocated in order to appoint staff for enforcing this Act. Besides enforcing uniform scales of weight and measurement, the staff was also required to safeguard the interests of people employed in commercial undertakings.⁶⁷

In June 1950, the provincial government passed Press and Registration of Books Amendment Act, which sought to regularize the publication of newspapers and journals in the NWFP Province. Under this Act, the provincial government cancelled the declaration of thirty-three newspapers and periodicals. The Act authorized the Provincial Government to debar daily newspapers from reappearing if they became defunct for a period of ten consecutive days. In the case of weeklies, it provided that if such paper was not printed or published for five consecutive weeks it would cease its printing or publication.⁶⁸

However, Abdul Qaiyum Khan did not seem to be satisfied with the press and publication sector. He wanted to further strengthen his control and supervision over the operation of printing presses and newspapers. This is why the provincial government framed new rules with far-reaching consequences. According to these rules, every person intending to make a declaration under section 4 or 5 of the Press and Registration of Books Act, 1867, as the keeper of a printing press or the publisher of a newspaper, was required to give a two-month notice of his intention on a prescribed form to the District Magistrate before the day on which the declaration was to be made. On receipt of this notice, the District Magistrate would seek from local police details about the educational qualifications, financial position, occupation and previous conviction, if any, of the applicant. In the case of newspaper, experience in journalism, policy of the paper, the ability to run the paper independently or as a dummy and the likely use of the paper for blackmailing or subversive purpose was also taken into consideration. The District Magistrate would then send the application with the full report of the police to the Secretary, Information Department who would return it with the advice whether an initial security was called for or not, provided the applicant was personally known to the Secretary. In the case of persons not known, the

66 PA, Annual Police Administration Report for the year 1952, serial no. 973, p.ii.

67 LAD, 1 March, 1951, vol. xxiii-No.1, Official Report, serial no.333. p. 9.S

68 The Civil and Military Gazette (Lahore), 29 June 1950, p.12.

matter was to be referred to the CID. After the CID report, the District Magistrate would call upon the applicant to appear on a particular date before him. He would finally dispose off the application by passing orders about the deposits or otherwise of security under Section 3 (1) or 7 (1) of the Pakistan Emergency Powers Act of 1931 as the case might be.⁶⁹

Qaiyum Khan was strongly averse to the press criticism. He tried his best to curtail the freedom of the press inside as well as outside the province. He strongly condemned the press, particularly the Lahore press, which continued with its criticism of the Qaiyum Khan government. The result was that in August 1949, the Qaiyum Khan government banned the circulation of the Lahore daily, *'Inqilab'*, in NWFP for a period of three months.⁷⁰ Later the same year, in December the editor of the daily, *Sarhad*, Peshawar, Mr. Rahim Bakhsh Ghaznavi was arrested by the provincial government under the Public Safety Act, for committing pre-judicial acts. He was arrested for publishing two news items in his paper dated 7 and 8 December, 1949 to the effect that Qaiyum Khan would tender resignation of his cabinet in order to reshuffle and enlarge it. The second news item was that Liaquat Ali Khan, the Prime Minister of Pakistan during his visit to NWFP would meet Abdul Ghani Khan s/o Abdul Ghaffar Khan. In the opinion of the government the news items were intended to create fear and alarm amongst the people.⁷¹ As such, he was arrested, tried and later convicted to one month of rigorous imprisonment.⁷² However, he lodged an appeal against the conviction in the Court of Session Judge Peshawar who ordered his release on the bail money of Rs. 2000/-.⁷³

Qaiyum Khan not only wanted to gag the press and political opponents, but also the judiciary. In this regard, his ministry introduced the NWFP Contempt of Courts (Amendment) Bill 1949 in the Assembly. According to the Bill, the Courts were not to take cognizance of any contempt, whether in respect of itself or any court subordinate thereto, alleged to have been committed by any minister or any person for the time being holding the post of Chief or Home Secretary NWFP Government, without previous sanction of the Governor-General of Pakistan. To a remark by Asadullah Jan Khan, Leader of the Opposition, that the Bill was the death-knell of the dignity of the court, Qaiyum Khan retorted that the dignity of the House was much greater than the dignity of the court. He said: "We are law

69 The Pakistan Times (Lahore), 20 July 1951, p.2.

70 Ibid., 25 August 1949, p.2.

71 Dawn (Karachi), 20 Jan 1950.

72 The Civil and Military Gazette (Lahore), 8 February 1950, front page.

73 Dawn (Karachi), 14 February 1950.

givers, while the court is only an interpreter of laws which we pass.” The Assembly passed the Bill in spite of the opposition’s strong criticism.⁷⁴

Then another attempt was made even to make the courts sub-ordinate to the wishes of Qaiyum Khan. Through this Act he wanted to get the power of taking into custody any file of the court and keep it as long as he wished. Weekly *Afaq* commenting on the bill, in its issue dated 10 April 1949, wrote that Qaiyum Khan Government in the NWFP passed from the provincial Legislative Assembly a bill, which empowered the Chief Minister to take the record or any case from the office of the Judicial Commissioners and keep the record as long as he desired. The Weekly strongly criticized the move, and stated that earlier the Qaiyum Khan Government had many times come up with strange unbelievable news alleging the opposition with anti-state and anti-Qaiyum Khan conspiracies. However, this move of Qaiyum Khan, the weekly stated even broke records of the absolutism and dictatorship of “*Nadershahi*”⁷⁵. The Weekly strongly criticized the Bill because the courts were the last hope of justice and democratic rule in the province. The Judicial Commissioner of NWFP had the same status, according to the Frontier Regulations as those of High Courts in other provinces of Pakistan. However, according to this law, the Chief Minister now intended to get the absolute power of taking any file from Provincial Courts and to keep them as long as he desired, which would mean turning the courts into his private secretary office. The leading political leaders of the province, including those of the Muslim League, strongly appealed to the Governor-General of Pakistan not to give his assent to the bill, which they believed would be used for victimization by Qaiyum Khan.⁷⁶ The Bill was finally killed by the central government by instructing the governor of the province to withhold his assent to the Bill. Thus Qaiyum Khan’s efforts to gag the judiciary were quashed.⁷⁷

In March 1952, the provincial government, through the NWFP Courts Bill, 1952, sought to raise the status of the Judicial Commissioner’s court to that of a Chief Court. Further, under the Bill, the existing Judges carried on the work, but provision was made therein whereby the strength of the Judges could be increased.⁷⁸ The provincial Assembly passed the bill on 13 March 1952 and then through Act X of 1952, which is called The NWFP Courts Act, 1952, the government established the Chief Court in the province replacing the Judicial

74 Ibid., 20 March 1949, p.17.

75 Nader Shah, the King of Persia and Afghanistan, and conqueror of India in 18th Century A.D. During his conquest of Delhi he ordered the killing of thousands of people. Since it was done just by his order without any trial, thence onward Nadershahi became synonym to absolutism and dictatorship.

76 Weekly *Afaq* (Lahore), 10 April 1949, p.4.

77 The Pakistan Times (Lahore), 8 April 1949, p.12.

78 Khyber Mail (Peshawar), 12 March 1952.

Commissioner's Court. The Court comprised a Chief Judge and one or more judges.⁷⁹

During Qaiyum Khan's tenure the provincial Assembly also adopted Urdu as the assembly language. This decision was announced by the Speaker of the assembly during 1952 Assembly session⁸⁰ but was implemented for the first time from 5 March 1953.⁸¹

SOCIO-ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT

All said and done, Qaiyum Khan was a very progressive-minded person. For the amelioration of the people's lot, he continued working on the Five Year Plan, started by the Congress Ministry of Dr. Khan Sahib,⁸² he also initiated many new projects. The following details would substantiate the point.

HEALTH FACILITIES: The large-scale migration of non-Muslim Medical staff to India from the NWFP and the non-availability of local staff created problems for the provincial government. The result was that Basic Health Units, dispensaries, and hospitals were given in the charge of dispensers. The number of dispensaries dropped from 199 to 189 and the patients' ratio dropped from 2,808,017 in 1946 to 2,524,149 in 1947. The mortality rate for the same year increased among those patients who were treated in the hospitals from 2.23% to 2.85%.⁸³

Though there was a general problem of infant-illness and mortality, the main threat to health in the province was malaria. This disease flourished in the irrigated areas despite efforts to stamp it out through mosquito control. Malaria was endemic in every district and agency, but a test area was the Kohat—Hangu valley, where the problem was quite severe since 1949. Due to the policies and programmes of the government, these areas were soon almost entirely rid of the disease.⁸⁴ Typhus was another major problem, especially in those areas through which the nomad—and frequently lice-ridden-*pawindas* and their animals regularly passed. Other fatal diseases were pneumonia and tuberculosis, frequently the result of lowered resistance caused by malaria that accounted for about twenty-five percent of the annual deaths in the province.⁸⁵

79 PGCEO, No. 1733-L.D.- 27 March 1952.

80 LAD 15 November 1952, vol.xxvi-no.2, official report, serial no. 371, pp.64-65.

81 LAD, 5 March 1953, vol.xxvii-no.1, official report, p.2.

82 LAD, 23 March 1948, vol. xv-no. 6, Official Report no. 6, serial no. 254.

83 Government of the NWFP, Annual Report on Hospitals and Dispensaries in the NWFP for the year 1947 (Peshawar: Manager Government Stationary and printing, NWFP, 1949), n.p.

84 Spain, Borderland, p.219.

85 Ibid.

In the villages Muhammadzai, Nasrat Khel, Kaghazai of Kohat smallpox epidemic broke out in June 1948, resulting in the death of many children.⁸⁶ In March 1950, the same disease was reported in Charsadda. However, in spite of demands by the local people for vaccination, the government was unable to provide it to the larger section of the society.⁸⁷ Then, in June 1951, the epidemic spread with alarming proportion and many children died of small pox. The general impression was that the government did not provide vaccination at the right time, which is why the disease spread and caused many deaths.⁸⁸

To overcome diseases and to provide healthcare to most of the people of the province, the Qaiyum Khan government opened many hospitals/dispensaries for this purpose. A Government Maternity Hospital, with 20 beds, was opened in the building of Tarachand Maternity Hospital, Peshawar, in 1950. In the Lady Reading Hospital Peshawar, the operation theatre was modernized and more land was purchased adjacent to the Hospital in order to construct a bigger and larger modern tuberculosis wing.⁸⁹ Similarly in Kohat, Abdul Qaiyum Khan laid down the foundation stone on 3 December 1950 of a new building for the 75-bedded Civil Hospital. The Kohat municipality donated land and a sum of rupees one lakh for the construction of the hospital.⁹⁰

In 1951, various social uplift schemes were started in the province, which were financed by a grant from the central government. Besides that several other improvements also took place in the field of health care. For instance, in Kohat the Governor-General opened a completely new modern Hospital in 1951, containing 80 beds while the old Civil Hospital was converted into a female Hospital. A modern T.B. Clinic and T.B. Ward containing 80 beds were constructed at the Lady Reading Hospital, Peshawar, and a Class One T.B. Specialist placed in charge; the old T.B. Wards were converted into female wards. At the Dadar Sanitarium, which ranked as the premier institution of its

86 PA, special branch, IPS daily diary no. nil, dated 26 June 1948, bundle no.78, serial no. 1423.

87 PA, special branch, IPS daily diary no. 29, dated 29 March 1950, bundle no.77, serial no. 1405.

88 PA, special branch, IPS daily diary no. 18, dated 31 January 1951, bundle no. 77, serial no. 1404.

89 Government of the NWFP, Annual Report on Hospitals and Dispensaries in the NWFP for the year 1950 (Peshawar: Manager Government Stationary and printing, NWFP, 1953), n.p. (Governor Review).

90 Dawn (Karachi), 4 December 1950, p.6.

kind in Pakistan, 16-bed ward and 2 cottages were constructed during 1951, and additional land was purchased for the construction of more wards.⁹¹

Thus throughout Qaiyum Khan's tenure work continued on the improvement of health facilities. In 1952, the following works were completed from the Social Uplift grant:

1. A new 100-bed Civil Hospital (Government Liaquat Memorial Hospital), Kohat.
2. A T.B. clinic and ward at Civil Hospital, Dera Ismail Khan.
3. A 28-bed ward in Civil Hospital, Dera Ismail Khan.
4. A T.B. Clinic and Ward at Mardan.
5. A 20-bed Ward at Civil Hospital, Tank.
6. An 8-bed hospital at Lora.
7. Modernization of the Civil Hospital at Darband.
8. An 8-bed Hospital at Balakot.
9. An 8-bed Hospital at Kaghan.
10. An 8-bed Hospital at Pabbi.
11. A 50-bed Zanana Hospital at Mardan.
12. A T.B. Clinic at Government Liaquat Memorial Hospital, Kohat.

With the construction of these new buildings, the number of dispensaries and hospitals rose from 189 in 1947 to 233 in 1952.⁹² In addition to these, on 1 July 1952 Qaiyum Khan also laid the foundation stone of a modern Civil Hospital at Abbottabad.⁹³

In order to overcome the shortage of hospitals and dispensaries, and to provide medical facilities to those people who did not have direct access to such necessities, the Qaiyum Khan government also started mobile dispensaries in the province. By January 1951, these mobile dispensaries had treated 20,000 patients, who otherwise did not have access to hospitals. These dispensaries

91 Government of the NWFP, Annual Report on Hospitals and Dispensaries in the NWFP for the year 1951 (Peshawar: Manager Government Stationary and printing, NWFP, 1953), n.p. (Governor Review).

92 Government of the NWFP, Annual Report on Hospitals and Dispensaries in the NWFP for the year 1952 (Peshawar: Manager Government Stationary and printing, NWFP, 1954), pp.1-2.

93 Shahbaz (Peshawar), 3 July 1952, front page.

worked so efficiently that they not only catered to the needs of their own people but were also sent for the help of flood-affected people in the Punjab.⁹⁴

Qaiyum Khan's government allocated large amount of money to the health sector. The following table provides a better view of the health budget before and during Qaiyum Khan period:

Year	Reciepts including (government and Local bodies grants, charitable collections and miscellaneous)	Expenses including (Staff salaries, medicines, diet charge, buildings, apparatus etc.
1946	Rs. 1,453,091	Rs. 1,450,976 ⁹⁵
1947	1,480,150	1,480,150
1949	1,595,231	1,595,231
1950	1,844,297	1,844,297 ⁹⁶
1951	2,315,994	2,315,994 ⁹⁷
1952	2,655,003	2,655,003 ⁹⁸

The other details related to the patients' treatment and beds' availability were as following for different years:

94 Dawn (Karachi), 3 January 1951, p.8.

95 Government of the NWFP, Annual Report on Hospitals and Dispensaries in the NWFP for the year 1947 (Peshawar: Manager Government Stationary and printing, NWFP, 1949), p.3.

96 Government of the NWFP, Annual Report on Hospitals and Dispensaries in the NWFP for the year 1950 (Peshawar: Manager Government Stationary and printing, NWFP, 1953), n.p, (Inspector General of Civil Hospital Report).

97 Government of the NWFP, Annual Report on Hospitals and Dispensaries in the NWFP for the year 1951 (Peshawar: Manager Government Stationary and printing, NWFP, 1953), p.6.

98 Government of the NWFP, Annual Report on Hospitals and Dispensaries in the NWFP for the year 1952 (Peshawar: Manager Government Stationary and printing, NWFP, 1954), p.5.

HOSPITALS AND DISPENSARIES ANNUAL REPORT, 1947-52⁹⁹

Description	1946	1947	1949	1950	1951	1952
No of in-patients treated	33,538	31,531	30,949	31,145	32,536	35,190
No of out-patients treated	2,358,083	2,243,150	2,507,738	2,685,553	2,740,429	3,090,581
Total no of patients treated	2,391,621	2,274,681	2,538,687	2,716,698	2,772,965	3,125,771
No of beds available---	1,924	1,924	1,909 ¹⁰⁰	1,947	2,072	2,340
Daily average attendance of patients:						
In-door:	1,428	1,630	1,479	1,352 11,127	1,488	1,411
Out-door-	10,867	9,652	13,571		11,674	12,683
Total no of patients treated in women's hospitals	101,517	88,918	181,895	146,557	165,261	161,161
Number of cures	24,932	23,631	23,138	23,381	32,536	26,139
Number of deaths (among in-door patients only)	750	899	731	607	707	684
Percentage ratio of deaths to total treated	2.23	2.85	2.36	1.95	2.16	1.94

⁹⁹ Government of the NWFP, Annual Reports on Hospitals and Dispensaries in the NWFP for the years 1947, 1951 & 1952 (Peshawar: Manager Government Stationary and printing, NWFP, 1949, 1953 & 1954.

In the early years, some hospitals and dispensaries in the province were managed and run by the provincial government while others by the Local Bodies. With the passage of time, it was realized that the conditions of those hospitals and dispensaries, which were run by the Local Bodies, were not satisfactory. Therefore, the provincial government decided to take over the 21 hospitals and dispensaries run by the District Boards in 1950. After this decision, 16 hospitals still remained with the Municipal and Notified areas committees in the urban areas.¹⁰¹ However, from 1 April 1952, all the hospitals managed by local bodies were taken over by the provincial government. To improve the Medical and health facilities in the province many other steps were also taken in the same year, such as:

1. Sanctioning the posts of Resident Surgeon and Physician in the P.C.M.S. Class 1 for the Lady Reading Hospital.
2. Construction of a Modern 80-bed T.B. Ward and Clinic, including 30-bed female Ward at the Lady Reading Hospital, Peshawar, at a cost of Rs. 555,000.
3. Construction of a new Civil Hospital in Kohat at a cost of Rs. 900,000.
4. Upgrading of the post of Health Officer, Peshawar City, to P.C.M.S. Class 1.
5. Opening of a Health School at Peshawar for the training of Health visitors.
6. Provision of an additional Mobile Dispensary for Kaghan Valley.
7. Appointment of 12 midwives for rural areas.
8. Appointment of two Malaria Inspectors and 6 Malaria workers with necessary equipment for control of Malaria epidemic in Hangu and Kohat Valley.
9. Appointment of 37 Vaccinators and 3 Superintendents Vaccinators in connection with mass vaccination campaign launched throughout the Province.
10. Appointment of 9 (8 male and one female) new Assistant Surgeons.

100 Instead of 1936, given in previous years report erroneously counting for 22 beds in Civil Hospital Teri, 4 in Civil Hospital Karak, against Nil and one extra bed in Civil Hospital, Abbottabad.

101 Government of the NWFP, Annual Report on Hospitals and Dispensaries in the NWFP for the year 1950 (Peshawar: Manager Government Stationary and printing, NWFP, 1953), n.p. (Governor Review).

11. Upgrading the post of 27 Assistant Medical Officers to those of Assistant Surgeons with a view to fill up the existing vacancies.¹⁰²

In addition to the medical facilities, the public health facilities provided by the provincial government also improved the health of the people. The budget of the department was raised from Rs. 9,895 in 1948-49 to Rs. 19,000 in 1953-54.¹⁰³

Drinking water, which is an important component of healthy civic life, was yet another problem that the Qaiyum Khan government focused on. The province in general and the Southern districts in particular were facing acute shortage of drinking water. People had to fetch water from long distances and then store it in unhygienic non-cemented (*Kucha*) ponds, from where human beings and cattle drank water alike. To lessen these hardships, Qaiyum Khan's government launched various schemes. They were as follows:¹⁰⁴

DERA ISMAIL KHAN:

	Rupees
1. Uplift of existing wells at Gul Imam, Abizar, Khaibers and Dharaki	3,600
2. Uplift of existing storage tanks at Wandah Dost Muhammad Khan and Giloti	3,800
3. Construction of a new well at Mangal Ustaran	18,100
4. Construction of a new well at Garah Nahar	12,300
5. Construction of a new well at Sara Garah	12,500
6. Construction of a new well at Shero Kohna	14,000
7. Construction of a new well at Paroa	4,000
8. Construction of a new well at Khona	5,818
9. Construction of a new well at Buchari	5,400
10. Construction of a new well at Juma	8,224
11. Uplift of the Chunda Village drinking water supply	6,500
12. Construction of infiltration gallery in the Paniala <i>nullah</i> and providing a piped water supply to Karim Banda, Mirali Banda, Giloti and Yarik	12,468
13. Construction of infiltration gallery in Subaili <i>Nullah</i> near Ama Khel	

102 LAD, dated 3 March 1952, vol. xxv-No. 1, official report, p.30.

103 PA, supplementary Commentary, Peshawar, bundle no. 105, serial no. 2530, pp.5,9,29. (For details see Appendix no. X).

104 Department of Frontier Information, North-West Frontier Province, History, People and their Custom: Four Years of Pakistan (Peshawar: Frontier Information Department, 1951), p.43.

and providing a piped water supply to Takwar	2,500
14. Experimental trial boring for further wells proposed for construction in 1951-52	5,000
15. Remodeling Dera Watercourse from Renewal to Chahikan including construction of a new branch from Manjhi Khel to Takwara and Provision of 10 storage tanks	15,000

Of these, the first ten schemes were completed by the end of 1951.¹⁰⁵

KOHAT:

In Kohat District the problem of the dry Thall area was partially solved on completion of Thatti Nasratti scheme but there still remained vast area that could not be covered from there as the quantity of water available was inadequate. New sources were looked for and finally the Public Health department succeeded in finding springs at Tor Dhand, about 6 miles north of Thatti Nasratti; the water was good for drinking and plenty in quantity to fulfil the needs of the people. Tor Dhand system was supposed to serve the area north of Lawaghar Algada, affording drinking water to more than 10,000 people and 12,000 animals while the Thatti Nasratti System could serve the area south of Lawaghar Algada catering to the need of more than 20,000 people and 23,000 animals. The estimated cost for these schemes was Rs. 659,000.¹⁰⁶

BANNU:

The following drinking water supply schemes were sanctioned for this District:

	Rupees
1. Deepening and lining well at Adamzai	9,800
2. Deepening and lining well at Nizam Khan Malik Shahi	8,900
3. Renewal of existing tube-well at Begu Khel	9,800
4. Renewal of existing tube-well at Achu Khel	9,800
5. Renewal of existing tube-well at Isa Khel	2,000
6. Drinking water supply scheme for Ghazni Khel Village	10,500
7. Uplift of the Pezu Village Drinking Water Supply	5,000
8. Special repairs of the existing wells at Tittar Khel and adjacent villages	2,500

¹⁰⁵ Ibid.

¹⁰⁶ Ibid., p.44.

9. Construction of a new well at Shamoni Khattak

15,000¹⁰⁷

HAZARA:

1. A drinking water supply scheme for dry areas in south of Hazara district (Khoi Nara Water Supply Scheme) was sanctioned at a total cost of Rs. 2,82,000. The Scheme was expected to feed the following villages:
 - (i) Vijiran (ii) Kumbaran (iii) Surajgali (iv) Chamba (v) Chuhuchh (vi) Raniwah (vii) Pindgojra (viii) Kainalpur (ix) Shadi (x) Hattar.
 - (ii) The Schemes were to provide water to 11,000 humans and 8,000 animals.
2. Two tanks on Haripur-Khanpur Road were reconstructed at a cost of Rs. 5000. These tanks were used to store rainwater for drinking purpose for the villages of Surajgali and Hattar, etc.¹⁰⁸

Similarly for the village, Dag Ismail Khel in Peshawar district, a Drinking Water Supply Scheme was sanctioned with an allocation of Rs. 44,900 in the 1951-52 budget.¹⁰⁹

ANIMAL HUSBANDRY DEVELOPMENT: After the establishment of Pakistan, not only most non-Muslim veterinarians migrated to India, the post- World War developments in the province also hit the Animal Husbandry Department. Schemes were either held in abeyance or altogether abandoned due to general retrenchment and lack of funds. As a result, the following posts were abolished:

1. Special Commodity Officer (Milk).
2. Special Commodity Officer (Hides and Skins).
3. Personal Assistant.
4. One Assistant Director of Animal Husbandry.¹¹⁰

In 1948-49, the Animal Husbandry department launched a small scale poultry farm scheme in Peshawar, Abbottabad, Kohat, Bannu and Dera Ismail Khan, stocking them with Rhode Island, Red and White Leghorn variety of poultry. 3,189 eggs were also sold to local farmers for hatching purposes. Another project was the starting of two apiaries in Haripur and Peshawar, introducing bee

¹⁰⁷ Ibid., pp.44-45.

¹⁰⁸ Ibid., p.45.

¹⁰⁹ LAD, dated 3 March 1952, vol. xxv-No. 1, official report, p.25.

¹¹⁰ Government of the NWFP, Annual Administration Report of the Animal Husbandry in the North-West Frontier Province for the year 1947-48 (Peshawar: Manager Printing and Stationary, North-West Frontier Province, 1950), p.2.

keeping for the first time in the province on systematic and economic lines. At these apiaries, theoretical and practical training was also imparted to a large number of people. In the first year, 328 pounds of honey and 20 pounds of bees-wax were extracted. Another landmark was the establishment of the Government of Pakistan Animal Husbandry Research Institute at Peshawar.¹¹¹

The Qaiyum Khan ministry took a revolutionary step on 1 April 1950 when the Animal Husbandry Department was made a provincial subject. Though its overall impact was encouraging, one disappointing result was the closure of 18 veterinary dispensaries. However, the department soon opened 3 more dispensaries at Kaghan, a Veterinary Hospital at Miranshah and a dispensary at Mirali, North Waziristan.¹¹²

In March 1953, *Begum Zari Sarfaraz* presented a resolution in the Provincial Assembly recommending to the provincial government to impose a ban of one day per week on the slaughtering of milk-giving animals, as she feared that such animals were rapidly extinguishing. After a lengthy debate, words 'milk giving' was dropped from the resolution, and the following amended resolution was unanimously passed, "This Assembly recommends to the Provincial Government that the shortage of animals which is occurring very fast. In order to stop it throughout the Province a legal ban for one day per week should be imposed."¹¹³

THE LAUNCHING OF GOVERNMENT TRANSPORT SERVICE

The Qaiyum Khan government took another revolutionary step towards the end of 1947 by establishing the Government Transport Department, with the object to provide better and cheap travel facilities to the public. In March 1951, Road Transport Act was enacted by virtue of which the government acquired all roads in the province and formed the Road Transport Board to control the Government Transport Service (GTS).¹¹⁴

Though, generally the introduction of GTS was appreciated by the common people, the bus owners criticized its introduction. For example, the president of Union Goods Transport, NWFP, issued an Urdu poster with the heading, "*Loyal subjects of Pakistan and the Frontier Ministry*" in June 1948 which criticized the

111 Government of the NWFP, Annual Administration Report of the Animal Husbandry in the North-West Frontier Province for the year 1948-49, Review by Ghulam Ishaq Khan, Secretary, Development Department, North-West Frontier Province (Peshawar: Manager Printing and Stationary, North-West Frontier Province, 1950), n.p.

112 Government of the NWFP, Annual Administration Report of the Animal Husbandry in the North-West Frontier Province for the year 1950-51 (Peshawar: Manager Printing and Stationary, North-West Frontier Province, 1952), pp.1-2.

113 LAD, 12 March 1953, vol. xxvii-no. 6, Official Report, serial no. 396, pp.71-78.

114 PGCEO, 5 March 1951, No. 1158-LD, 3 March 1951 & Khattak, pp. 94-95.

government's introduction of the Government Transport Service in spite of the loyal services of these *lorry* owners during the referendum and Kashmir *Jihad*, etc. It accused the Chief Minister of NWFP giving the contract of making GTS bus bodies for rupees five thousand each, while the same could be done in the market for rupees two thousand. It also stated that in addition to gratifying his favourites, the Chief Minister misappropriated funds. The dual charge of A.I.G. Traffic and Manager Government Transport Service was also criticized.¹¹⁵

However, when the appeals and demands did not work, the transporters resorted to direct action. In Charsadda, the taxi owners started charging less fare on the Charsadda-Mardan route, and would load passengers from the stands just before the arrival of GTS bus. To compensate for their loss due to less fare, they would overload the wagons with passengers.¹¹⁶ These efforts, however, did not succeed in getting the GTS buses off the roads. As a last resort, the private lorry owners went on strike in different cities in June 1951. However, the provincial government intervened and warned them of cancellation of their route permits if they did not end the strike. This warning helped in breaking the strike.¹¹⁷

INDUSTRIALIZATION

When Pakistan came into being, there was only one factory worth- mentioning in the province. However, the Qaiyum Khan government took great interest in the establishment of industries in the province.¹¹⁸ The industrial development of the province started with the announcement of National Industrial Policy in 1948.¹¹⁹ Another important fact to be noted for the same period is that, in 1948, there was no disparity in the industrial bases of various regions of Pakistan. The country as a whole was in the pre-industrial stage. There were 35 factories in all. No city or town had more than a few isolated mills producing simple consumer goods like vegetable oil, sugar, cigarettes and textiles, etc. The cities were pre-dominantly centers of trade and administration. The total value of industrial production both in the small and large-scale industrial units in 1948 amounted to rupees 1,302 millions.¹²⁰

115 PA, special branch, IPS daily diary no. nil, dated 21 June 1948, bundle no. 78, serial no. 1423 & Poster taken from IPS diary no. nil, dated 21 June 1948.

116 PA, special branch, IPS daily diary no. nil, dated 23 February 1950 bundle no. 76 A, serial no. 1393.

117 PA, special branch, IPS daily diaries nos. 100, 101 & 102, dated 20,22 & 26 June 1952 bundle no. 76, serial no. 1395.

118 Khan Khalid, p.89.

119 Abdul Matin, *Industrialization of NWFP* (Peshawar: Board of Economic Enquiry, NWF Peshawar University (West Pakistan, 1970), pp. 39-40.

120 Ibid.

In the beginning, the government struggled hard against various constraints, but because of its interest and commitment, the private sector was attracted towards many projects. The Pakistan Industrial Development Corporation, which was the chief agency for funneling public money into the industrial field, also helped in laying the foundation for enduring industrial progress. As a result of these joint efforts, some 41 industrial units were set up between 1948-49 to 1955. This period was the dawn of industrialization and modernization. The buzzword of industrialization ran supreme. Any project initiated in the province was given special attention, and approvals were given promptly. Bureaucratic hurdles were to the minimum; the files moved to the top ladder in no time. Once they reached the decision-making authorities, files moved even faster, and the decisions were taken without any delay whatever the nature of complexities might have been. The authorities also took keen interest in the establishment, development and completion of the industries according to their stated goals.¹²¹

Although the tempo of growth in Karachi and Punjab was faster than in the NWFP, still the industrial progress in the province was considered quite satisfactory. Those were the years of self-reliance. Foreign aid, both technical and financial, had not yet reached Pakistan. Under those circumstances, in a remote and financially poor place like the NWFP, such kind of industrial progress was considered impressive. The enthusiasm shown by the sanctioning authorities and by the private entrepreneurs generated great expectations. It was hoped that in the coming years more advancement would follow. However, this euphoria did not last long. In the opinion of a noted economist, Dr. Abdul Matin, the optimistic environment for industrialization in NWFP did not attract large investments in the later years. In spite of the fact that the government of Pakistan introduced economic planning and inducted more funds, manpower, and material from abroad, they never trickled down to the province. He further opined that in the NWFP "the spatial dimension of growth was overlooked. Not even a simple survey or a reconnaissance investigation was conducted to discover potential projects and to chart the broad path of progress in the N.W.F.P. Industries continued to bunch up in or around the Metropolis (Karachi) and a few key cities in the Punjab."¹²²

However, the Provincial government continued trying to attract more and more investors. In August 1949, the NWFP Government decided to declare the province as an industrial trading estate, where prospective industrialists were offered electric power and other facilities for opening new factories. The decision

121 Ibid., pp.40-41.

122 Ibid., pp.41-43.

had come in the wake of complaints that new enterprisers were experiencing difficulties in finding sites, electric power and other things for their factories.¹²³

In the Nowshera area, sheep hides and skins were available plentifully. In order to tap it fully, a tannery was established in the area in 1949, which was capable of processing most of the hides and could dry upto 250 hides daily.¹²⁴

Frontier Chemical Works was established in 1948. It produced different kinds of tinctures, spirits, and chemical syrups. Coal production started at Bughi, district Kohat and in the mountains of Cherat. From the former mine, 1500 ton coal was expected in every three months.

For the development of Cottage Industry, a special Board was established to recommend plans to the Government.¹²⁵

The biggest achievement of Qaiyum Khan's government was the establishment of Premier Sugar Mills, Mardan. The construction work on the Mills started in November 1947¹²⁶ and was completed in 1950. In April trial production started that continued for two months,¹²⁷ and finally Khwaja Nazimuddin inaugurated the Mills on 19 December 1950. The total capital incurred on the construction of the Mills was rupees One Crore and Eighty Lacs. It was believed to be the biggest sugar mills in Asia, which could produce 50,000 ton sugar annually.¹²⁸ Another sugar mill was established in Peshawar that could crush about 250 maund of sugar cane.¹²⁹

In 1950, the provincial government sanctioned an amount of rupees One million for the development of wool industry in the province. It was decided to import, especially, Marino Sheep and ewes from abroad and breed them at the planned Sheep Farm in Kaghan Valley for improving the quality of wool in the province.¹³⁰

Another note worthy industry was Pakistan Tobacco Company that had brought under cultivation 500 acres of land in Mardan and Swabi for Virginia Tobacco by 1950 and was going to extend that to 5,000 acres. The Company also decided to establish a drying plant for tobacco at Akora Khattak that could dry 25,000

123 Dawn (Karachi), 18 August 1949, p.3.

124 Symonds, p.128.

125 "Naye Azaayem: NWFP Pakistan kai teesrai saal main" Shahbaz (Peshawar), Special issue titled "Pakistan Number", 14 August 1950, p.11. (henceforth cited as Naye Azaayem).

126 Khattak, p.86.

127 Naye Azaayem.

128 Shahbaz (Peshawar), 21 December 1950.

129 Naye Azaayem.

130 Dawn (Karachi), 25 February 1950, p.6.

pounds of tobacco.¹³¹ Qaiyum Khan inaugurated the plant on 11 July 1951. The plant, built at an approximate cost of ten lakh rupees, was one of the biggest tobacco-curing plants in Pakistan. Situated on the main Grand Trunk Road at Akora Khattak, about 32 miles east of Peshawar, the plant was capable of handling about 5,000 pounds of Virginia tobacco to be used in the manufacture of high class cigarettes with about two thousand labours.¹³²

To fulfill the flour needs of the province, M/S Pakistan Flour and General Mills established a flourmill with an estimated cost of rupees 15 lakh in Peshawar. The Mills was capable of grinding 4,000 maunds of wheat daily. Besides flour, the Mills also produced *sooji*, starch and bran.¹³³

Another great achievement of the government was the foundation stone of Haripur Phone Factory which the Governor-General, Ghulam Muhammad, laid on 2 October 1952.¹³⁴ Messers Seamens and Hebkey provided technical assistance and cooperation. It also provided employment to about 2,000 people.¹³⁵

Another area where Qaiyum Khan's government took steps for improvement was the fruit and vegetables sector. The NWFP produced surplus fruits and vegetables, which got wasted due to their perishable nature, and thus could not reach outside markets. The cultivators were unable to get money for their hard and toiling labour. In order to provide an opportunity to the cultivators to prolong the freshness and life of their products, the provincial government started work on the construction of a Cold Storage with a capacity of storing about 8,000 maunds. Negotiations were also held with the railway authorities to provide them refrigerated compartments for the transportation of their products.¹³⁶ The Cold Storage was made operational in the summer of 1951 and thus a great facility was made available to the growers and suppliers.¹³⁷

Once the fruit and vegetable season was prolonged by the provision of Cold Storage, the provincial government turned its attention towards the canning of fruit and vegetable products. Though there was a Government Fruit Canning Factory at Nasserpur since the partition days, however, due to wrong management, it was not very productive. Qaiyum Khan's government transferred the management of the factory to the Fruit Growers Association of the province who started taking more interest in the factory and very soon positive results

131 Ibid.

132 Khybe Mail (Peshawar), 12 July 1951, headline news.

133 NWFP Four Years in Pakistan, p.58.

134 The Pakistan Times (Lahore), 3 October 1952.

135 Shahbaz (Peshawar), 4 October 1952, headline news.

136 NWFP Four Years in Pakistan, p.58.

137 LAD, dated 3 March 1947, vol. xxv-No. 1, official report, p.22.

were shown. The association was able to boost the production and supply of canned vegetables and fruit products like juices, jams, jellies, etc.¹³⁸ A commercial market for grapes, on the principle of co-operative society, was also established at the village of Shaikh Muhammadi, district Peshawar, for the development of famous Shaikh Muhammadi grapes.¹³⁹

Highlighting details of the industries established so far in NWFP in the provincial Assembly on 18 November 1952, Qaiyum Khan gave the following details:¹⁴⁰

	Names of factories and places where installed	Authorized capital
1.	Messers Frontier Sugar Mills and Distillery Limited, Takht Bhai	Rs. 2,000,000 (Public Limited with Government shares of Rs. 200,000).
2.	Messers, Premier Sugar Mills and Distillery Limited, Mardan	Rs. 20,000,000 (Public Limited concern 98 lacs subscribed capital and rest by loan).
3.	Messers, N.-W. Frontier Industries Ltd., Nowshera	Rs. 2,500,000 (Public Limited, concern)
4.	Messers, Pakistan Tobacco Limited Akora Khattak)	Rs. 2,500,000 (Public Company), (Amount earmarked for Akora Factory).
5.	Messers. Oajustab Refrigeration Limited, Dalazak Road, Peshawar.	Rs. 1,000,000 (Private Limited concern).
6.	Pakistan Flour Mills, G.T. Road, Peshawar.	Rs. 2,000,000 (Private Limited concern).
7.	Nasserpur Canning Factory, Nasserpur.	Rs. 1,000,000 (Government investment and (Rs 5 lacs factory working capital of the fruit growers Association).

138 NWFP Four Years in Pakistan, pp.58-59.

139 Naye Azaayem.

140 LAD, dated 18 November, 1952, vol. xxvi-No. 5, official report, p.33.

8.	K.K. and Company Limited, Limited Peshawar.	Rs. 500,000 (Private Limited concern) (subscribed)
9.	Frontier Chemical Works, Peshawar Cantonment.	Rs. 100,000 (Public Limited concern) (subscribed).
10.	Amangar Paper Board, Mill, Limited Nowshera.	Rs. 9,800,000 (Public concern sponsored by the Industrial Development Corporation, Government of Pakistan).
11.	Nowshera Chemical Caustic Soda Factory, Nowshera.	Rs. 2,500,000 (Public Limited concern).
12.	Messers. Woolen Textile Mills Limited, Nowshera.	Rs. 5,000,000 (Public Limited concern).
13.	Zeb Corn Products Limited. (Starch-Factory), Peshawar.	Rs. 1,000,000 (Private Limited concern).
14.	Bannu Woolen Mills, Bannu.	Rs.5,000,000 (Public Limited, concern sponsored by the Industrial Development Corporation, Government of Pakistan).
15.	Government Telephone Instruments manufacturing Factory, Haripur.	Rs. 6,000,000 (In partnership with Government by Public Limited, concern in the ratio of 3:1).
16.	Resin and Turpentine Factory, Haripur.	Rs. 500,000 (Government investment).
17.	Frontier Cold Storage, Peshawar.	Rs. 1,000,000 (Private Limited concern).
18.	Cotton Textile Mills.	Rs. 10,000,000 (Proposal under consideration).
19.	Shah Textile Mills Limited, Charsadda.	Rs. 200,000 (Private Limited, concern).

EDUCATIONAL DEVELOPMENTS

In the history of the NWFP education, the names of two Qaiyums are very important. One was Sahibzada Abdul Qaiyum Khan, who established Islamia College and for his educational services earned the name of 'Sir Syed of Frontier'; the other is that of Qaiyum Khan who not only made true the dream of Sahibzada Abdul Qaiyum Khan, to develop Islamia College into a University, but also launched several other educational facilities in the province as well. His services in the spreading of education during the post-partition period could be judged from the fact that he raised the education budget from 43 ½ lakhs in 1947 to 60 ½ lakhs in 1951.¹⁴¹

SCHOOLS AND COLLEGES: *Mian Jaffer Shah*, Minister for Revenue and Education, Government of NWFP, unveiled on 15 March 1949 an education programme of the government in the Provincial Legislative Assembly. Elaborating the programme, he stated that the government had formulated an educational programme which would provide the establishment of a degree college for women, with F.Sc Medical and Non-Medical classes; opening of a high school at Nowshera, raising of 4 primary schools to middle schools; 18 primary schools to lower middle schools; 6 lower middle schools to middle schools; 3 middle schools to high schools; and the opening of 90 new primary schools, 30 for girls and 60 for boys. The programme also provided for the revision of the existing rates of pay for the teachers.¹⁴²

In order to raise funds for this ambitious programme, the provincial government enhanced the tuition fee. In the month of April 1949, the provincial government raised the monthly tuition fee for students of class 8 to 11 rupees 4 annas and for the students of higher classes to 12 rupees 8 annas. This created problems for the poor people and the general public resented this move.¹⁴³

In the month of October 1949, weekly *Afaq* published a critical note of Dilshad Hazarvi in the column titled '*Maktoob-e-Hazara*' regarding the 25% increase of educational fees announced by the government. In the opinion of the author, the government's announcement that there would be no difference between '*Kashtkar*' [farmer] and '*ghair-kashkar*' [non-farmer] school fee in the future, automatically increased the burden on *Kashtkars* because earlier they were paying less than the *Ghair-Kashtkar*. Besides that, an increase of 25% was also levied on the current fees. Earlier the fees of a class 8 child was on the following

141 Sheikh Abdul Hamid, *Census of Pakistan, 1951*, vol. iv, North-West Frontier Province (Karachi: Manager of Publications, Government of Pakistan, n.d.), p.54. (For details see Appendix no. XII).

142 LAD, 15 March 1947, vol. xvii-no. 6, official report serial no. 288.

143 PA, special branch, IPS daily diary no. nil, dated 11 April 1949 bundle no. 78, serial no. 1415.

pattern: *Kashtkar*: rupees 1 and 12 annas while *Ghair-Kashtkar*: rupees 3. Further before the enhancement, the situation was such that there were only 5 per cent *Ghair Kashtkar* while 95 per cent *Kashtkar*. When this announcement was made, demonstrations of students took place in Abbottabad and Mansehra and students insulted the ministers. The result was the withdrawal of 25 per cent increase. But, in reality, the students still suffered because of this new order. For example, if there was a group of 100 students in class 8, With 25% increase, 5 *Ghair-Kashtkars*' fee was rupees 15 and 95 *Kashtkars*' fees was rupees 168, totaling rupees 183. While with the increased fees the amount payable would be to the tune of rupees 375, which meant 103 per cent increase in fees. So, it was not correct that an increase of 25 per cent was made. After withdrawing the so-called 25 per cent increase, the payable amount remained was rupees 300 that meant 62 per cent increase.¹⁴⁴

In June 1950, the provincial government took a revolutionary step by giving instruction to all the schools in the province not to refuse admission to any one on the ground of shortage of space. It was ordered that all children interested in school should be given admission. To make this drive successful, the government promised to provide extra facilities to those schools where the number of students exceeded than permissible under the available facilities.¹⁴⁵

In 1951, the central government launched a 6-year Educational Scheme all over Pakistan. The provincial government submitted a very ambitious programme for the purpose. The programme was estimated to cost about 4 crore and 54 lakhs of rupees. It included the opening of 221 primary schools (132 for boys and 89 for girls) in the next 6 years at the estimated cost of Rs. 8,300,000/-. This was part of a more ambitious programme of making primary education compulsory in the next 20 years. Besides this, the government also planned to open 12 High Schools and 39 Middle Schools in the next 6 years, and provide free medical check up to the school children. Estimated cost for this project was Rs. 2,000,000/-. Though this programme was already working in some primary institutions, the Qaiyum Khan government wanted to extend it to other areas as well. Medical officers were supposed to be appointed in each district to conduct the check ups. This project was expected to cost Rs. 300,000/-. There was also a programme of establishing a training school for women in the province and a scheme to open adult education centers. These programmes were expected to cost Rs. 600,000/-.¹⁴⁶

The Muslim League Working Committee, in its meeting in Bannu on 8 October 1951, recommended free education upto class 8; the meeting was chaired by

144 Dilshad Hazarvi, "Maktoob Hazara", weekly Afaq (Lahore), 2 October 1949, p.16.

145 Khyber Mail (Peshawar), 4 June 1950, p.4.

146 Ibid., 4 October 1951, headline news & Dawn (Karachi), 4 October 1951, p.6.

Qaiyum Khan. The meeting also recommended that theology teachers in schools be given government pay instead of subscription from the students.¹⁴⁷

Addressing the Provincial Assembly on 10 January 1952, Qaiyum Khan elaborated at length the progress the province had made in the field of Education. During the course of discussion, he also made the announcement that the government would not charge any tuition fee from students up to class 8 with effect from 1 February 1952. This, he said, was a landmark day as no province in Pakistan and India had this kind of facility.¹⁴⁸ This was subsequently raised to Matric for the girls during 1953-54 budget.¹⁴⁹

In August 1952, the Provincial Education Secretary, Abdul Hamid, stated in an interview in Karachi that the provincial government intended to start double shifts in the schools in order to fulfill the demand of the rising strength of the students after the creation of Pakistan. He further stated that the government would not allow shortage of accommodation to hinder the acquisition of knowledge. He said that the government had constructed many schools and would continue to do the same.¹⁵⁰

In September 1952, the provincial government completely banned the use of cosmetics by the female teachers and students in the schools and colleges. The government also introduced, in the same month, uniform dress for the female teachers and students, which consisted of clothes made of very ordinary material. This action was taken in order to create the habits of simple living among the female students and teachers.¹⁵¹ Later, uniform dress was also adopted for the male students, i.e. "Shalwar Kameez of Militia cloth"¹⁵², which was cheap and even poor people could afford it for their children. This brought uniformity among all the government school-going children.¹⁵³ From 1 December 1952 the Government of NWFP announced a complete ban on smoking of cigarettes and *Chillum* by the students and teachers in the premises of the schools and colleges.¹⁵⁴

147 PA, special branch, IPS daily diary no. 170, dated 8 October 1952, bundle no. 78, serial no. 1420.

148 PA, special branch, IPS daily diary no. 5, dated 10 January 1952, bundle no. 80, serial no. 1444, p.1 & LAD, 12 March 1952, vol. xxv-no. 7, official report serial no. 361, p.30.

149 Al-Jamiat Sarhad (Peshawar), 21 March 1953, p.4.

150 Dawn (Karachi), 29 August 1952, p.6.

151 Khyber Mail (Peshawar), 5 September 1952, front page.

152 A low cost black cloth.

153 Khattak, pp.93-94.

154 Shahbaz (Peshawar), 7 November 1952, p. 1.

The provincial government also increased, in fact doubled the salaries of primary school teachers. The numbers of primary schools in the settled as well as tribal areas of the province were increased by 15 per cent. A college of Islamiyat/Islamic Studies was also established and their graduates were required to organize adult literacy classes besides their own religious duties, for which the government paid them an extra amount.¹⁵⁵

On 10 January 1952 Qaiyum Khan pointed out that, before the creation of Pakistan, there were 702 primary schools for boys and 137 for girls, 224 secondary schools for boys and 19 for girls, while there were 3 colleges for boys and none for girls. During his tenure, the number had risen to 872 primary schools for boys and 145 for girls, 282 secondary schools for boys and 26 for girls, and 5 colleges for boys and 1 for girls.¹⁵⁶

Qaiyum Khan's government was well aware of the teachers' role in the improvement of education. With increase in the number of educational institutions, a corresponding increase was also made in the number of teachers both in schools and colleges. The number of male and female teachers in 1947-48 stood at 2,361 and 325 as against 4,065 and 606 in 1953. Of the total number of male teachers in 1947-48 there were 1,591 trained and 771 untrained while on the female side there were 210 trained and 115 untrained teachers. This ratio increased among the male teachers in 1953 to 2,609 trained and 1,456 untrained while among females it stood at 504 trained and 102 untrained. These figures show a steady reduction in the number of untrained teachers. In order to further expedite the training of teachers, a training school at Haripur was opened in 1953. Before the establishment of Pakistan, there was one training school for boys and one for girls with a total enrolment of 189. By 1953, the numbers rose to 3 training institutions (two for boys and one for girls) with an enrolment of 477, which showed an increase of over 150 per cent.

Before the establishment of Pakistan, the literacy rate in the province was 6.2 per cent. It rose to 8.5 per cent by 1953, which showed 2.3 per cent increase. This was made possible due to the extra interest taken by the government in the spread of education, which was evident from the fact that the provincial government was allocating a higher per capita income that stood at 3 per cent at that time which was the highest in Pakistan.¹⁵⁷

155 Symonds, p. 129.

156 Khyber Mail (Peshawar), 13 January 1952, p.3.

157 Hamid, "Progress of Education in NWFP", Khyber Mail (Peshawar), 7 February 1953.

Qaiyum Khan made another important announcement on 6 February 1953 that his government intended to provide free books to both boys and girls upto class 5.¹⁵⁸

The provincial government was not only taking care of the students' educational development, it was also taking steps to improve their personal hygiene and environment. For this purpose, the government launched School Health Services in February 1950. Under this programme, all the school children, sick or well, were to be checked within the schools by the medical staff. If any disease was detected, this was to be referred to the appropriate agency best qualified to deal with the ailment. It was also decided to establish a small school clinic in each school that would work as a diagnostic and treatment center for common diseases. In addition to checking the sanitation, the School Health Service was also responsible for watching any adverse effects of the facilities provided to students; for example, of desks and benches on their back and limbs, of lighting on their eye sight, and in case of girls, of sewing on their health in general. In addition, daily Health parade was also part of the programme, which was aimed at enabling the teachers to impart the habits of personal cleanliness to students. Health syllabus was required to create awareness about hygiene habits, food, and drinks.¹⁵⁹

Thus, the Health Education Programme was geared to not only impart knowledge and training; it was also designed to give healthy eating and living habits to students to ensure their physical and mental well being. Students were educated about the causes of diseases, and their transmission, and about the possible prevention and cure of those diseases. This programme also included physical drill, athletics, swimming, dances, and some indigenous sports.¹⁶⁰

Qaiyum Khan also established a sports stadium for the general public in Peshawar. For this purpose, a spacious and modern stadium was planned in the provincial Capital, Peshawar. On 19 January 1952 a meeting of Olympic Stadium Committee was held under the presidentship of Qaiyum Khan to discuss the construction of a Stadium in Peshawar. The meeting was attended by a large number of civil and military officers. Secretary of the committee, Adil Khan, presented the 1949-51 report. It was proposed that the Stadium should be renamed as Qaiyum Stadium. It was unanimously accepted in spite of Qaiyum Khan's opposition to the proposal. Qaiyum Khan assured his full co-operation in the construction of the Stadium.

Stadium Committee also chose new office bearers for the Stadium Committee. They were as following:

158 Khyber Mail (Peshawar), 7 February 1953, p.4

159 Ibid., 26 February 1950, pp.5-6.

160 Ibid.

Khwaja Shahabuddin (Governor)	Patron in chief
The Ruler of Swat,	}
General Officer Commanding, Peshawar and	} all three as patrons
Group Commander, Pakistan Air Force	}
Khan Abdul Qaiyum Khan	President
Chief Secretary NWFP and Revenue and	
Divisional Commissioner	Vice President
Adil Khan	Honorary Secretary
Muhammad Ayub	Joint Secretary
Finance Secretary	Finance Secretary,
	Government of NWFP

Furthermore, an Administrative Committee, and various other sub-committees were also constituted.¹⁶¹

UNIVERSITY OF PESHAWAR: Though the Congress Ministry had initiated a bill for the establishment of a university in Peshawar, it could not start work on it. Qaiyum Khan, who can be rightly called the founder of the University of Peshawar, had shown a desire to establish a university in Peshawar long before his chief ministership. It was in 1938, as a Congress representative of the province in the Central Legislative Assembly that he had moved a Bill for the establishment of a University, which was unanimously adopted.¹⁶² It said, "This Assembly recommends to the Governor-General in Council that a University subsidized by the Federal Government be at once set up at Peshawar for the settled districts and the Tribal Areas of the North-West Frontier Province."¹⁶³

Later, in his book, *Gold and Guns on the Pathan Frontier*, Qaiyum Khan strongly argued for the establishment of a university in NWFP. He wrote: "It is the ardent wish of the Pathans to transform this College into a great Pathan University, which, besides spreading the light of learning in the Province and the Tribal area, will also help the development and growth of the Pashto language and Pathan culture which they all have so much at heart."¹⁶⁴

An important move for the establishment of the University of Peshawar was made during the Congress Ministry on 21 March 1947 by the then Education

161 Shahbaz (Peshawar), 11 January 1952, front page.

162 Islam, p.193.

163 Khattak, p.89.

164 Qaiyum, p.23.

Minister, Yahya Jan Khan, by introducing the Peshawar University Bill in the Provincial Assembly. The Bill was well-received, well-debated, and eventually passed. It was based on a Committee's recommendations appointed by Yahya Jan Khan, which comprised *Khan Bahadur* Muhammad Ibrahim Khan, Mir *Waliullah* Khan, Qazi Muhammad Aslam, Malik Khuda Bakhsh, Advocate-General of the NWFP. The Principal of Edwards College Peshawar, A.M. Dalayas worked as Secretary of the Committee.

After the approval of the Bill, it was referred to a Select Committee for chalking out further details. Qaiyum Khan, who was then sitting on the opposition benches in the Assembly, was one of the members of the Committee.¹⁶⁵ The Select Committee consisted of the following members: the Chief Minister, the Revenue Minister, the Finance Minister, K.S. Sardar Asadullah Jan Khan, Lala Madan Lal Mehta, S. Qaim Shah, Abdul Qaiyum Khan Swati, Sardar Isher Singh, Khan Abdul Qaiyum Khan, Khan Habibullah Khan, Khan Sardar Bahadur Khan, *Nawab* Qutbuddin Khan, the Deputy Speaker, the Minister of Education, and the Advocate General of NWFP. The committee was asked to prepare their report for the next session, and, in the light of the Committee's recommendations, the provincial government took up the case with the central government.¹⁶⁶

After the establishment of Pakistan, Quaid-i-Azam Muhammad Ali Jinnah visited the NWFP, and in a speech on 12 April 1948 at Islamia College Peshawar, declared: "Let me tell you that nothing is dearer to my heart than to have a University in the North-West Frontier Province from where rays of learning and culture will spread throughout Central Asia; and provided you go out the right way you will get your University sooner than you can imagine."¹⁶⁷

Qaiyum Khan, by then the Chief Minister of the province, who was an ardent supporter of a university in Peshawar, immediately appointed a committee under the chairmanship of *Mian* Jaffar Shah, the then Education Minister, with the following members:

1. M. Ahmad—Chief Secretary to the Government of NWFP.
2. Muhammad Aslam Khan Khattak, Director Public Instructions.
3. Ghulam Ishaq Khan, Secretary Development Department of the NWFP Province.
4. Chaudhry Muhammad Ali, Advocate-General.
5. Shaikh Abdul Jalil, Finance Secretary.

165 Dr. Ghulam Taqi Bangash, *History of Khyber Medical College and its Related Institutions* (Peshawar: Department of History, University of Peshawar, 1993), p.10.

166 LAD, 10-22 March 1947, vol. xiv-no. (1-10), serial no. 248, p.321 & Bangash, p.10.

167 Ibid., pp.10-11.

6. *Khan Bahadur* Shah Aslam Khan, retired Director Public Instructions.
7. A.C.T. Brotherton, Principal, Islamia College, Peshawar.
8. Canon R.H. Noble, Principal, Edwards College Peshawar.
9. Abdul Hashim Khan worked as the secretary of the Committee.

When this Committee met the central Minister for Education, and argued its case, he was not impressed. He believed that the proposed university would not have enough students for registration.¹⁶⁸ However, the first important meeting of the Committee was held in Nathiagali on 26 July 1949, and was attended by Qaiyum Khan, the Chief Minister as well. The committee prepared a five-year plan and decided that the proposed university should be residential, teaching, and an affiliating one and that the following teaching departments for post-graduate classes might be opened:

- | | | |
|--|----------------------|----------------|
| 1. English | 2. Economics | 3. Mathematics |
| 4. History | 5. Political Science | 6. Urdu |
| 7. Physics | 8. Chemistry | 9. Botany |
| 10. Zoology | 11. Education | 12. Law |
| 13. Engineering (initially Electrical and Mechanical only) | | |
| 14. Agriculture with special emphasis on fruit technology and sugar-cane. ¹⁶⁹ | | |

In spite of difficulties and lack of facilities, the University Advisory Committee worked hard, and finally came up with a draft Bill to the provincial government in September 1949.¹⁷⁰ *Mian Jaffar Shah*, who was holding the portfolio of Education and Revenue ministries, introduced the Peshawar University Bill, 1950. He also recommended that the Bill might be referred to a Select Committee comprising the following members:

M. Jalaluddin Khan, MLA, Malik-ur-Rahman Khan Kiyani, MLA, Khan Muhammad Aslam Khan, MLA, Khan Muhammad Yaqub Khan, MLA, Khan Abdullah Khan, MLA, Captain Zain Muhammad Khan, Lala Kotu Ram, MLA, *Mian Qaim Shah*, MLA and the Chief Minister. The Committee was asked to prepare their report by 15 February 1950.¹⁷¹ It suggested many changes, but the most noteworthy was the suggestion that instead of the Governor NWFP, the Chief Minister, Khan Abdul Qaiyum Khan, should be the 1st Chancellor of the

¹⁶⁸ Ibid., p.11.

¹⁶⁹ Yousaf Ali Khan, *Academic Versus Activists: A History of the University of Peshawar* (Peshawar: Khyber Printers, 1990), p.22.

¹⁷⁰ Khattak, pp.91-92.

¹⁷¹ LAD, 7 January 1950, vol. xviii-no. 3, official report, serial no. 300, p.17.

University. In the original Bill the relevant clause said, "The Governor of the NWFP, for the time being, shall be the Chancellor. He shall by virtue of his office, be the Head of the University and the President of the Senate and shall preside at the meetings of the Senate and at any convocation of the University when present."¹⁷² The proposed change said, "The first Chancellor for the time being shall be the Honourable Khan Abdul Qaiyum Khan, Chief Minister, North-West Frontier Province." It would be pertinent to note that Abdul Qaiyum Khan was one of the members of the Select Committee, which suggested this change.¹⁷³ Finally, the Bill was presented and passed on 4 March 1950.¹⁷⁴ The Governor approved the Bill on 16 March 1950.¹⁷⁵

In May 1950 in a press communiqué, the provincial government announced that the University of Peshawar would begin its academic session from September 1950 and would hold the 1951 examinations. It would be worth-mentioning here that, before the establishment of the University of Peshawar, all educational institutions of the province were affiliated with the University of the Punjab. Once the Provincial Legislative Assembly passed the University of Peshawar establishment Bill, Qaiyum Khan ordered the dis-affiliation of provincial educational institutions from the University of the Punjab. It was announced that all examinations of 1951 would be conducted by the University of Peshawar in the same courses as earlier offered by the University of the Punjab. The order also stated that the University of Peshawar would commence its post-graduate teachings in History, Economics, English, Mathematics, Botany and Chemistry, while Law and Teachers Training Colleges would offer bachelor degree. The Teachers Training College was also instructed to start B.T. (Bachelor of Teaching) courses for female students under *purdah* arrangements.¹⁷⁶ Qaiyum Khan became the Chancellor of the University while Shaikh Muhammad Taimur was appointed as the first Vice Chancellor.¹⁷⁷

Right from the beginning, Qaiyum Khan took extraordinary personal interest in the development and progress of the University of Peshawar. His devotion could be well judged from Prof. Raziuddin Siddiqui's narration.¹⁷⁸ During 1951 Siddiqui had ordered many scientific equipments for the University of Karachi and Peshawar. Though Karachi University had no problem of funds, the University of Peshawar had almost no funds. He says, "When I mentioned this to Khan

172 PGCEO, 6 January 1950, no. 4748-LD, 29 December 1949.

173 PGCEO, 28 February 1950, no. 517-LA, 18 February 1950.

174 LAD, 4 March 1950, vol. xix-no. 3, official report serial no. 300, p.17.

175 Khattak, pp.91-92.

176 Dawn (Karachi), 19 May 1950, front page.

177 Khattak, p.92.

178 He was the first official to be appointed, even before the appointment of the vice chancellor, in May 1950.

Qaiyum, he assured me that there would be sufficient funds available by the time the payment became due. And sure enough, he went to Karachi in few days later, and brought Rs. 75 million under the Social Uplift Scheme, a major portion of which he gave to the University. This illustrates the importance Khan Qaiyum Khan attached to the education sector, in general and to Higher Education and the Peshawar University, in particular.”¹⁷⁹

Finally, Liaquat Ali Khan, the Prime Minister of Pakistan, inaugurated the University of Peshawar on 30 October 1950.¹⁸⁰ Initially, the University was established in the High School Building [now Agriculture Training Institute] located on the Jamrud Road opposite Islamia College, Peshawar, until the construction of the new buildings for the university.¹⁸¹ For the construction of the university premises, the provincial government created a University Building Division in 1950 and M/S Somji Architect of Lahore was appointed to plan the new campus. Soon, the construction of Engineering College, post-Graduate Arts and Science Departments and residential houses for the teachers and staff were started.¹⁸²

Initially, when the University started work, there was no Vice Chancellor or Registrar appointed. All the file work routinely went to the Chancellor, Qaiyum Khan. He took utmost care in studying the minutest details. One such instance would suffice here: “When the draft Admission Form for the M.A./M.Sc was submitted to the Chancellor for approval; he made a query on one of its columns, “caste”, in these words, ‘Are we going to introduce caste system?’ The University Administration deleted that column and thanked the Chancellor for his observation.”¹⁸³

UNIVERSITY AND ISLAMIA COLLEGE PESHAWAR

Sir Sahibzada Abdul Qaiyum Khan founded Islamia College as an independent academic institution in 1913.¹⁸⁴ However, on 9 February 1949 the provincial government announced that the government had decided to take control of all the Islamia schools in the province, which is why the Islamia High School Dera Ismail Khan was nationalized. The government also showed intentions to nationalize the biggest educational institution of the province, Islamia College Peshawar, with effect from 1 April 1949.¹⁸⁵ And, thus, on 19 March 1949, through Act no. 1 of 1949 titled as “The NWFP *Darul-Ulum-i-Islamia-i-Sarhad* Act, 1949”

179 Siddiqi, p. 16.

180 Khyber Mail (Peshawar), 31 October 1950, front page.

181 Siddiqi, p. 8.

182 Khan Yousaf, p.24.

183 Ibid.

184 Ibid., p.16.

185 The Pakistan Times (Lahore), 10 February 1949, p.5.

the Governor decided to give Islamia College, Peshawar, and all its property to the Provincial Education Department. Further, the Act declared punishable any act on part of any person that hindered the transfer of the College to the provincial government.¹⁸⁶

When the University of Peshawar was constituted in 1950, it was proposed that the Islamia College, Peshawar should, in the fitness of things, be raised to the status of a post-graduate institution and made the nucleus of the University. This, however, could not materialize due to the provincialization of the College.¹⁸⁷ However, once again, in 1954, the Provincial Assembly approved an Act, which helped the government to transfer the control of the College to the University. The notification, vide no. 2542, dated 6 February 1954, from the Secretary Education, Government of NWFP, read:

“The Governor NWFP is pleased to direct that:

- a. The teaching side of the Government Islamia College Peshawar shall be entrusted to the University of Peshawar with immediate effect.
- b. The Government Islamia College, Peshawar shall be transferred to the University of Peshawar for administration, management and control with effect from the 1st April 1954.
- c. The assets of the Government Islamia College, Peshawar consisting of buildings, roads, drains, installations, playgrounds and lawns etc as also fixtures, furniture, equipments, stores and materials, tools and plants, stationary and other articles pertaining thereto shall be transferred to the University of Peshawar from 1st April 1954.”¹⁸⁸

Qaiyum Khan laid the foundation stone of the Engineering College, University of Peshawar on 7 May 1952. The Government sanctioned a sum of Rs. 1,700,000 for the construction of the College building, which was initially planned for 200 students.¹⁸⁹

To further boost the development of medical services in the province, Qaiyum Khan also initiated Medical Scholarship Scheme in 1950. In the provincial cabinet meeting, held in Nathiagali on 3 June 1950, under the chairmanship of the Governor NWFP, it was decided to grant rupees 50/- per month scholarship to those 30 students who were studying in different medical colleges of Pakistan on the signing of a bond to the effect that, after the completion of their studies

186 PGCEO, 22 March 1949, No. 1000-LD, 22 March 1949.

187 Khan Yousaf, p.16.

188 Ibid., p.17.

189 PA, special branch, IPS daily diary no. 65, dated 10 May 1952, bundle no. 76, serial no. 1399, p.293.

they would serve the province for ten years. In addition, the provincial government also granted 10 more scholarships from its own resources and, out of which 4 were reserved for female students.¹⁹⁰

Amongst the institutions established in NWFP during Qaiyum Khan's period, perhaps one of the most notable was the Pakistan Military Academy Kakul, which was inaugurated by Khwaja Nazimuddin, the Governor-General of Pakistan, on 25th November 1948 at Kakul, Abbottabad.¹⁹¹

PUBLIC WORKS DEPARTMENT (PWD)

The Qaiyum Khan government made phenomenal progress in the development of infrastructure in the province with the help of Public Works Department (PWD). It could be analyzed by the fact that its' budget on the expenditure side, both central and provincial in 1946-47 stood at Rs. 16,801,376 while it rose to Rs. 43,557,605 in 1952-53, i.e., 159.25 per cent increase. The total P.W.D. budget on the receipt side was Rs. 4,019,718 in 1946-47, and Rs. 10,050,382 in 1952-53, that is it registered an increase of 150.03 per cent. The P.W.D. Engineering Establishment consisted of 108 persons in 1946-47 as against 199 in 1952-53. The percentage increase was 86. The P.W.D. clerical Establishment consisted of 182 persons in 1946-47 as against 354 in 1952-53. The percentage increase was 89.¹⁹²

It may not be inappropriate to go into details about the performance of the PWD. Following is a districtwise break up of major works and funds spend on them during 1946-47.

ROADS:

Peshawar:

Construction of a road from Zardad:	Mile 259 G.T. road to Dheri	Rs.16,009.
Widening of G.T. road	Miles 267-272 National High way:	Rs.186,973.

Kohat:

Construction of Kohat-Dhoda Shadi Khel-Shakardara Road:	Rs.152,585.
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Bannu:

Construction of Lakki-Isa Khel-Adam Khel-Shahbaz Khel Road:	Rs.140,606.
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Dera Ismail Khan:

Construction of Dera Ismail Khan-Dera Ghazi Khan Road:	Rs.37,206.
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190 The Civil and Military Gazette (Lahore), 4 June 1950, p.5 & Khyber Mail (Peshawar), 18 June 1950, p.4.

191 Pakistan Times (Lahore), November 26, 1948, headline news.

192 LAD, 6 March 1953, vol. xxvii- No. 2, official report, serial no. 389, p.31.

Improvement to Draban-Drazinda Moghul Kot Road:	Rs.267,400.
Strengthening Boat Bridge at Dera Ismail Khan:	Rs.680,000.

Mardan:

Construction of Abazai-Takht Bhai Road:	Rs. 152,585.
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Hazara:

Construction of Lora-Ghora Gali Road:	Rs.241,864.
Construction of Haripur-GodWalian Road:	Rs.66,568.
Improvement of Dunga Gali-Barian portion of Abbottabad-Murree Road:	Rs.387,180. ¹⁹³
Roads constructed or improved in 1949-50 in different districts of the Province:	

Peshawar:

Constructing submersible bridge over Bara Nullah near Jhagra Village:	Rs.30,000.
Improvement of Takht Bhai Rajjar Road: 4 Miles,	Rs.168,870.
Improvement of Takht Bhai Rajjar Road: Mile 5 & 6,	Rs.88,350.
Improvement of Takht Bhai Rajjar Road: Mile 7 to 13 ½,	Rs.271,000.

Dera Ismail Khan:

Purchase of one New launch Boat from Navy for Plying in the river	
Indus at D.I.Khan :	Rs.54,377.
Improvement of D.I.Khan, Dera Ghazi Khan road:	Rs.154,240.

Mardan:

Improvement of Takht Bhai-Abazai road:	Rs.152,586.
Soling, metalling, surfacing Mardan-Katlang road in Mardan Division:	Rs. 80,000.

Hazara:

Construction of Oghi Ahl Road:	Rs.105,054.
Bridging Kahl Nullah on H.T. Road:	Rs.160,600.
Providing Bridge across Seran River near Bir:	Rs.9,000.
Constructing Haripur GodWalian Road:	Rs.83,361.
Constructing Haripur Talakar Road:	Rs.77,170.

Works financed out of Regional Development Fund (Provincial Share).

Construction of a Road from Gul Imam to Pezu;	Rs.112,500. ¹⁹⁴
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¹⁹³ Government of NWFP, Administration Report of the NWFP Public Works Department, Buildings and Roads Branch for the year 1946-47 (Peshawar: Printed by the Manager, Government Printing and Stationary, NWFP, 1950), pp. vi-vii.

Roads constructed or improved in 1950-51 in different districts of the Province:

Peshawar:

Construction of submersible bridge over Bara river between G.T. road and

Akbar Pura village: Rs.50,000.

Bannu:

Construction of Lakki-Isa Khel Shahbaz Khel road: Rs.140,034.

Dera Ismail Khan:

Improvement of Tank Kaur road upto Bolton Abad: Rs.50,000.

Construction of bridge in Mile 8/4-5 Dera Mirain road: Rs.19,000.

Purchasing 2 second hand launch boats for plying in the River Indus: Rs.19,549.

Mardan:

Metalling Takht Bhai Rajjar road: Rs.324,500.

Soiling metalling surfacing Mardan Katlung road
(portion in Mardan Division): Rs.123,500.

Soling metalling surfacing Mardan Katlung road
(portion in Malakand Division): Rs.333,600.

Improvement of Takht Bhai Abazai road, Mile 14-18: Rs.271,000.

Metalling road along Nisatta branch: Rs.144,800.

Improvement of Takht Bhai Abazai road Mile 1-6
(portion in Mardan Division): Rs.152,583.

Concreting link road Mile 2 Mardan Charsadda road to Mile 13 N.C.C.
road: Rs.714,000.

Concreting 12 Mile I Takht Bhai Abazai road: Rs.69,978.

Concreting 12 Mile I Takht Bhai Rajjar road: Rs.72,768.

Hazara:

Construction of a bridge over Panian *Nullah* District Hazara: (estimated cost Rs.108,300.

Construction of Abbottabad Sherwan road: Rs.857,200.

Bridging Kahl *Nullah* on H.T. road: Rs. 60,600.

Construction of a bridge over Siran River near Bir: Rs.17,540.

Construction of a bridge near Darwesh *Nullah* on H.T. road: Rs.103,245.

194 Government of NWFP, Administration Report of the NWFP Public Works Department, Buildings and Roads Branch for the year 1949-50 (Peshawar: Printed by the Manager, Government Printing and Stationary, NWFP, 1955), p. vi.

Construction of Oghi Ahal road:

Rs. 105,034.¹⁹⁵

As part of the provincial government road-construction programme, Lala Kotu Ram (Bannu) presented a resolution on 4 January 1951 in the Provincial Assembly for the construction of a tunnel in Kohat Pass. The relevant resolution ran as following: "That this Assembly recommends to the Provincial Government to approach the Government of Pakistan to undertake, after an appropriate survey, the construction of a tunnel through the mountains of Kohat Pass to facilitate traffic and avoid danger to human life at that point of the Kohat-Peshawar road." The Assembly passed the motion.¹⁹⁶ However, Qaiyum Khan had reservations about it largely because it was a provincial subject and ultimately it would come to the province, which did not have the required finances, and the technical expertise. However, he agreed to the widening of the road at an estimated cost of rupees 180,000.¹⁹⁷

Roads constructed or improved in 1951-52 in different districts of the Province:

Peshawar:

Metalling the road from G.T. road to Akbar Pura:	Rs. 120,000.
Metalling and tarring Chigri-Mitti road:	Rs. 298,947.
Soling, Metalling and Tarring the side road parallel to G.T. road from K.R.C. to Cunningham Park now Jinnah Park, Peshawar:	Rs. 50,045.
Metalling and Tarring Peshawar Landi road:	Rs. 54,273.
Improving the North city road from Edward Gate to Jail over Bridge:	Rs. 84,000.
Metalling road along Nisatta Branch:	Rs. 144,800.
Improvement of Takht Bhai-Abazai road, Mile 1-6 (portion in Mardan, Division):	Rs. 152,585.
Constructing a new concrete road from Mardan Charsadda road to link with Takht Bhai road, Katlung road Swabi road:	Rs. 475,000.
Metalling the road from Peshawar-Charsadda road to Prang village:	Rs. 32,085.
Re-aligning the washed away portion of Nowshera-Charsadda road:	Rs. 56,800.

Dera Ismail Khan:

Metalling and surfacing 6 Miles of Pezu Gul Imam road:	Rs. 120,000.
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¹⁹⁵ Government of NWFP, Administration Report of the NWFP Public Works Department, Buildings and Roads Branch for the year 1950-51 (Peshawar: Printed by the Manager, Government Printing and Stationary, NWFP, 1957), p.x.

¹⁹⁶ LAD, 4 January 1951, vol. xxii-No. 3, official report, serial no. 331, pp. 17-23.

¹⁹⁷ Khyber Mail (Peshawar), 6 January 1951, p.4.

Mardan:

Construction of Takht Bhai-Rajjar road Mile 7-14:	Rs.324,500.
Soling, Metalling the remaining Portion of Takht Bhai Abazai road (Mile 0-13) and of the Munde link road:	Rs.464,000.
Soling, Metalling, surfacing Mardan-Katlung road (portion in Malakand Division):	Rs. 334,218.
Soling, Metalling Mardan Katlung road (portion in Mardan Division):	Rs. 123,500.
Constructing a New Concrete road 40 feet wide from Mile 13 N.C.C., road past Premier Sugar Mills, Mardan to join Mardan-Charsadda road:	Rs. 774,916.
Improving Ambar-Topi road:	Rs. 30,000.

Hazara:

Construction of Jeepable road from Kakki to Phulra:	Rs. 120,660.
Metalling and surfacing Shinkari Daradar road:	Rs. 108,125.
Construction of a Jeepable road from Dora near Khalabat:	Rs. 83,700.
Construction of Bridge over Darwesh <i>Nullah</i> on H.T. road:	Rs. 103,245.
Construction of Abbottabad-Sherwan road:	Rs. 1,072,000. ¹⁹⁸

Roads constructed or improved in 1952-53 in different districts of the Province:

Peshawar:

Soling, metalling and terring Chighi Mitti Road:	Rs. 298,947.
Improvement of G.T. Road from Railway Bridge near Fort upto perimeter gate near Peshawar Jail:	Rs. 51,200.
Soiling, metalling Patrol road along Nisatta Branch R.D.23, 325 to R.D. 89,500:	Rs. 109,000.
Soling, metalling road along Disty No. 4 from Charsadda Tangi road to Abazai Takht-Bhai road:	Rs. 258,200.
Re-aligning the washed away portion of Nowshera-Charsadda Road:	Rs. 56,800.

Kohat:

Constructing bridge in Mile 51-55 Kohat-Bannu Road:	Rs. 50,000.
Improvement of road leading to Darsamand Village:	cost not available.

198 Government of NWFP, Administration Report of the NWFP Public Works Department, Buildings and Roads Branch for the year 1951-52 (Peshawar: Printed by the Manager, Government Printing and Stationary, NWFP, 1957), pp. x-xii.

Dera Ismail Khan:

Metalling and surfacing the remaining Miles 7-13 of Pezu Gul Imam Road:	Rs. 139,853.
Improvement of Tank Kaur Road Bolton Abad:	Rs. 50,000.
Providing a diversion at Mile 23-25 Dera Tank Road to avoid Sandy reaches:	Rs. 100,000.
Metalling and surfacing of 6 Miles of Pezu Gul Imam Road:	Rs. 154,412.

Mardan:

Construction of road from Shahbaz Garhi via Garhi Kapura Kandar, Ghumbat, Dhobian to meet the existing Adina Lahore road near Yar Hussain:	Rs.117,500.
Construction of a bridge in Mile 13/2 Mardan Swabi Road:	Rs. 20,000.
Concreting 16 feet wide Mile 4 Mardan Charsadda Road:	Rs.100,000.
Soling, metalling road along Khan Mahi Branch from R.D. 27,000 to Dosehra Rest House 1 ¾ Mile:	Rs. 50,000.
Metalling Takht Bhai Rajjar road Mile 7-14:	Rs. 324,500.
Improvement of Takht Bhai Abazai road Mile 1-6 (portion in Mardan Division:	Rs. 152,585.
Construction of a new concrete road 40 feet wide from Mile 13 N.C.C. road Past Premier Sugar Mills, Mardan to join Mardan-Charsadda road:	Rs. 774,916.
Soling, metalling the remaining portion of Takht-Bhai Abazai road, Mile 0-13 and Mond link road:	Rs. 464,085.
Constructing a new concrete road from Mardan-Charsadda road to link with Takht-Bhai road, Katlung road, Swabi road to give access to Premier Sugar Mills, Mardan:	Rs. 475,311.
Soling, metalling Umarzai-Dhaki-Harichand road (Malakand Division):	Rs. 210,294.

Hazara:

Metalling and surfacing Shinkari Dadar road:	Rs. 108,125.
Construction of Abbottabad Sherwan road:	Rs.1,072,000.
Providing bridge over Darwesh <i>Nullah</i> on H.T. road:	Rs. 103,245. ¹⁹⁹

1. In the pre-Partition era the roads under the different District Boards in the Province were as following:

Peshawar:	257.12 Miles
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199 Government of NWFP, Administration Report of the NWFP Public Works Department, Buildings and Roads Branch for the year 1952-53 (Peshawar: Printed by the Manager, Government Printing and Stationary, NWFP, 1957), pp. viii-x.

- | | |
|-------------------|--|
| Kohat: | 280 Miles unmettled roads + <i>pucca</i> |
| Bannu: | 70 Miles before Pakistan |
| | 63 Miles after Pakistan |
| Dera Ismail Khan: | 144 Miles 6 Furlong |
| Mardan: | 116 ½ Miles |
| Hazara: | 536 Miles |
2. The roads handed over to P.W.D. by the District Boards for repair till March 1953:
- | | |
|--|----------------|
| Peshawar: From G.T. road to Chamkani: | 1 Mile |
| Taru- Akbar Pura Road: | 3 Miles |
| Nowshera-Ziarat Kaka Sahib road: | 6 Miles |
| G.T. road to Dheri Khel: | 2 ½ Miles |
| From Dheri Khel road to Rajjar Takht Bhairroad | |
| near Uthmanzai- Dargai road: | 2 ¼ Miles |
| From Bhana Maari to Landi Yarghajo: | 1 ½ Mile |
| Kohat: | Nil |
| Bannu: | Nil |
| Dera Ismail Khan: | 2 ½ Miles |
| Mardan: | Hoti-Turu Road |
| Hazara: Unmettaled road: | 10 Miles |
| Sacha to Battal: | 12 Miles |
| Dadar-Sacha: | 10 Miles |
| Bhattal Mandi to Battal village: | 2 Furlong |
3. After the creation of Pakistan, unmetalled roads were metalled or new roads were constructed till March 1953:
- | | |
|---|-----------|
| Peshawar, Kohat, Dera Ismail Khan and Hazara: | Nil |
| Bannu: Ahmad Khan road in Bannu bazaar was re-metalled. | |
| Mardan: Babuzai road: | 3 Miles |
| Nisatta: | 2 ½ Miles |
| Shada Khan: | 3 Miles |
| Khudara: | ½ Mile |
| Faqir road: | 1 Mile |
| Ghari Kapura road: | 2 Miles |
| Swabi Adda: | ½ Mile |

Generally, the District Boards roads in the Province were in pathetic condition.²⁰⁰

BRIDGES:

The following new bridges were constructed during 1948-51:

S. No.	Name of Bridge	Expenditure
		Rupees
1.	Bridge on Kahl <i>Nullah</i> on H.T. Road (Hazara District)	161,041
2.	Bridge over Bara River near village Jhagra (Peshawar District)	31,578
3.	Bridge over Siran River near Bir	19,245
4.	Bridge over Panian <i>Nullah</i> (Hazara District)	108,300
5.	Submersible Bridge over Bara River between G.T. Road and Akbarpura village	50,000
6.	Bridge over Darwesh <i>Nullah</i> on H.T. Road (Will be completed during 1951-52)	103,245 ²⁰¹

From 1947 upto 19 November 1953, total 7 bridges were constructed in the Province.²⁰²

While presenting the 1952-53 budget on 3 March 1952, Qaiyum Khan gave a comparison of roads before and after the partition. He said: "whereas in the four years preceding partition only 33.6 miles of metalled roads and 73 miles of unmetalled roads were constructed at a cost of about Rs. 1,544,000, 102 miles of metalled roads, 61 miles of unmetalled roads and 110 miles of jeep roads have been constructed during the four years following partition at a cost of about Rs. 6,992,000. At the time of partition the total road mileage consisted of 953 miles of metalled and 1,150 miles of unmetalled roads. This has now risen to 1,055 miles of metalled roads, 1,211 miles of unmetalled roads as also 110 miles of jeep road."²⁰³

AGRICULTURE AND HYDRO-ELECTRIC DEVELOPMENTS

Though Qaiyum Khan was keenly interested in the development of industries in the province, he could not ignore the agriculture sector as the economy rested more on agriculture than anything else. This fact is evident from the following 1952 data:

Percentage of population involved in agricultural activities: 82 per cent

District wise arable land in possession of Agriculturists:

200 LAD, 12 March 1953, vol. xxvii- No. 6, official report, serial no. 396, pp.4-8.

201 NWFP Four Years in Pakistan, p.35.

202 LAD, 19 November 1953, vol. xxviii- No. 9, official report, serial no. 415, p.103.

203 LAD, dated 3 March 1952, vol. xxv-No. 1, official report, p.27.

Peshawar:	442,114	acres
Kohat:	327,874	"
Bannu:	757,185	"
Dera Ismail Khan:	967,506	"
Mardan:	461,080	"
Hazara:	434,224	" ²⁰⁴

To bring positive changes in the agriculture sector, the Qaiyum Khan government passed a law in 1948 abolishing the discrimination between an agriculturist and non-agriculturist. Before this act, the non-agriculturists could not buy a piece of land. This Act provided that a non-agriculturist had the same rights which were available to agriculturists. With the promulgation of this law, many non-agriculturists bought lands on which either they constructed houses, or started cultivation.²⁰⁵

In 1948, the Provincial Assembly passed The NWFP Agricultural Income Tax Bill introducing Agricultural Income Tax in the province. Under this Act, all those owners who were assessed to land-revenue to the extent of Rs. 250/- or more were required to submit their particulars of all such lands for the purpose of the tax. The main reason for the introduction of Agricultural Income Tax was the shortage in the provincial income. Till that time, Sales Tax was the subject of the provinces, but since the central government was in greater need of finances, proceeds from this tax went to the center. To fill that gap, the provincial government enacted the Agricultural Income Tax on agricultural income as well as immovable properties. However, the NWFP was not the first in Pakistan to introduce Agricultural Income Tax. Punjab had already introduced this kind of tax.²⁰⁶

In September 1948, the provincial government enacted the NWFP Sugar-cane (Additional Land Revenue) Bill, 1948 repealing the former Act known as The NWFP Sugarcane Cess Act No. IX of 1948. This Act empowered the provincial government to levy additional taxes on the land under sugar-cane cultivation from time to time. This tax was payable by the landlords as well as peasants according to the rates the government fixed for them.²⁰⁷

The provincial government also established a Sugar-cane Control Board in October 1951, consisting of seven members. The Provincial Sugar-cane

204 LAD, 18 November 1952, vol. xxvi-no.5, official report, serial no. 377, p.27.

205 Javed, Irtiq, pp.398-399.

206 PGG, Peshawar, 21 September 1948, No. 3006-L.D.

207 Ibid. & Khyber Mail (Peshawar), 27 January 1950, p.8.

Commissioner was appointed as Chairman of the Board. The Director of Industries and the Assistant Commissioner, Charsadda represented the provincial government on the Board while there were also two representatives of Sugar-cane growers and a representative each from the two sugar mills in the Mardan district. The Premier Sugar Mills at Mardan was represented by its General Manager, while the Frontier Sugar Mill at Takht Bhai, by its Superintendent. Muhammad Umar Khan of Peshawar district and Khan Muhammad Ishaq Khan of Mardan district represented the Sugar-cane growers. The objectives of the Sugar-cane Control Board were to ensure a regular supply of sugar cane to the factories at reasonable prices, as well as equitable distribution among the growers of the supply, so that all growers might proportionately benefit from it.²⁰⁸

The Sugarcane Commissioner had powers of Collector, under the Punjab Land Revenue Act of 1887 and the Punjab Tenancy Act of the same year as applicable to the NWFP Province. The Sugar Factories Control Act, passed by NWFP Assembly in 1950 under which the Board was established, also empowered the Commissioner to issue an order, after consulting the Control Board, declaring any area in the Province to be a reserved area for purposes of supplying sugar cane to a particular factory during a particular crushing season. The Act also empowered him to alter the boundaries of an area so reserved.²⁰⁹

One of the biggest achievements of the Qaiyum Khan government was the promulgation of the NWFP Tenancy Act passed in July 1950. Under the Act, all those occupancy tenants who, at the time of the enactment of this Act, were not paying any rent to the landlord except land revenue to the government were made owners of their lands. However, those who were paying rent to the landlords but were occupancy tenants were entitled to pay the landlord a fixed rent/amount within a stipulated time period, which was ten times the rent, and could get the ownership of the land after the payment. The Act also abolished all kinds of forced labour and cesses exacted by the landlord from the occupancy and non-occupancy tenants.²¹⁰ The important aspect of this Act was the establishment of principles, which determined the ownership of land. Thus, in the final disposal of the land, the actual tiller of land was given priority over those of the landlord. For this reason, mere nominal titles to land were abolished. For example, the occupancy tenant who paid no rent to the landlord became full-fledged owner. Other occupancy tenants who paid rent were given the right to acquire land in payment of a certain specified compensation to the landlord.²¹¹

208 The Civil and Military Gazette (Lahore), 25 October 1951, p.5.

209 Ibid.

210 PGGEO, 3 July 1950, No. 2953-LD- 1 July 1950.

211 Khyber Mail (Peshawar), 20 January 1950, editorial.

The Act also conferred some measure of security of tenure on non-occupancy tenants. Under the old law, a non-occupancy tenant could be evacuated at any time, but under the new Act, he could not be evicted for three years nor could his rent be enhanced during this period. It was also expected that the Act would eliminate long litigation with regard to the division of produce between landlords and tenants as it introduced a speedy system of on-the-spot division for which there was no parallel in revenue or tenancy law. If a landlord removed the produce by force without meeting the legitimate demand of his tenant (occupancy or non-occupancy), he could be sentenced to imprisonment and fine.²¹²

When the Tenancy Act was promulgated, there were 188,940 occupancy tenants in the province. 32,919 of whom were those tenants who were paying no rent. Therefore, they were granted ownerships immediately. However, the number rose to 131,034 by October 1950, including 98,115 of those who paid 10 times the rent they were paying to the landlord and got ownership of land. Thus overall 70 per cent of occupancy tenants got the ownership.²¹³ Those tenants who were unable to pay in cash were required to file an application with the revenue officer to adjust half of the land against its price while the rest being allotted to them permanently.²¹⁴

Though by and large it was appreciated, there were some people who criticized the Act, particularly in Hazara. Their argument was that the landlords in Hazara had resorted to getting decrees from the courts with the objective to evacuate their tenants from the lands under the cover of old laws. Further, they would not take their share from their tenants so that they could find an excuse for the eviction of their tenants.²¹⁵ Another objection was that the Qaiyum Khan government had done no good to the tenants because those who were in need of help were not provided and those who did not need it were compelled to ask for it. According to them, there were two kinds of tenants before the Act, that is, *Dakhail Kaar* (Occupancy Tenants) and *Ghair Dakhail Kaar* (non-Occupancy Tenants). Due to this Act, *Dakhail Kaar* who were around one thousand in number and who were paying at the maximum One-lakh revenue annually, could become permanent owners of the land by paying compensation money to the landlords. However, in reality they were already the owners of the land, and according to the prevailing laws, they could not be evicted by the landlords from their properties. The Act, instead of accepting them owners of the land, made them tenants; meaning if they could not pay the compensation they could be evicted from the lands. Thus instead of helping the tenants, the Qaiyum Khan

212 The Civil and Military Gazette (Lahore), 1 February 1950, p.9.

213 Khyber Mail (Peshawar), 5 October 1950, front page.

214 Burhanuddin, Interview.

215 Khyber Mail (Peshawar), 2 August 1950, editorial.

government increased their problems. On the other hand, the *Ghair Dakhail Kaar* who really needed help and who paid revenue of lakhs of rupees annually were totally ignored.²¹⁶ But Muhammad Ali Khan of Hoti was of the opinion that there was no such provision in the Tenancy Act that if an occupancy tenant could not pay the compensation he could be dislodged.²¹⁷

Feroz-ud-Din Mansur, Secretary of the West Pakistan *Kisan* Committee also criticized the Frontier Tenancy Act because the Act established complete proprietary control of the landlords over 278,630 acres of land held by the occupancy tenants of the province and forced them to join the ranks either of unemployed agricultural labourers or of ordinary tenants-at-will. The occupancy tenants, according to the Act, would be regarded as full-fledged owners of the land that they had been tilling for generations provided they paid the landlords compensation fixed by the government within the prescribed period. It was provided in the Act that if an occupancy tenant failed to pay the prescribed amount of compensation within the prescribed period to the landlord, his land would automatically revert to the latter. The provincial government, in his opinion, was an executive organ of a most reactionary landlord class. It would fix a high scale of compensation and prescribe a short period for its payment. The tenants, with their small and un-economic holdings would naturally fail to pay the prescribed compensation within specified period and would consequently lose their occupancy rights. In the case of tenants-at-will and agricultural labourers security against eviction had been provided for three years on the condition that the tenant should not collect the produce before paying the landlord his rent on the threshing floor. Violators could be punished with imprisonment, fine and house search. In short, Feroz-ud-Din Mansur concluded that the provincial government was reducing the occupancy tenants to the status of ordinary tenants-at-will instead of making them peasant proprietors, and that it had placed the entire administration and repressive machinery of the state at the disposal of the landlords.²¹⁸

According to another analysis, total cultivated area in the province was 2,525,713 acres. Out of this, 1,198,560 acres or 47 per cent belonged to the big landlords, which was cultivated by the peasants, while 1,048,523 acres or 42 per cent belonged to the peasant proprietors. The remaining area, which came to 278,630 acres or 11 per cent, was in the hands of occupancy tenants. Thus, the Act dealt only with the last portion of the peasants, which formed a fraction of the peasant class. They were 2,000 in number and paid only 2 lakh of rupees as rent while as per 1938-39 revenue record, the total revenue of NWFP (excluding cess) was Rs. 2,772,455. Therefore, when the Bill was presented in the Assembly, big

216 Weekly Afaaq (Lahore), 15 January 1950, pp. 3-4.

217 Hoti, Interview.

218 The Pakistan Times (Lahore), 15 January 1950, p.12.

landlords did not react strongly because of its lesser affect. Another aspect of the problem was that a large number of peasant proprietors, 42 per cent, held uneconomic tiny land holdings, which were slowly and gradually passing into the hands of absentee landlords through the sale and purchase of land. Thus, with the passage of time the number of peasant proprietors was dwindling. That meant, even if all the 11 per cent occupancy tenants got the ownership, the number of peasant proprietors would decrease. The real problem was that of the tenants-at-will, who cultivated 47 per cent of the total area and constituted the bulk of the peasant class. But the Tenancy Act had nothing to offer them. In reality, "from the point of view of tenants (as different from occupancy tenants) the legislation which has been fraudulently eulogized as the 'harbinger of peace and prosperity for the tillers of the soil' was more backward in content than the Tenancy Acts passed in this sub-continent even as early as 1859. The Bengal Rent Act of 1859 stipulated that those tenants who had held lands for 12 years were to become occupancy tenants. The Bengal Tenancy Act of 1885 extended the right of occupancy to a large section of tenants. The Bihar Tenancy Amendment Acts of 1937 and 1938 conferred occupancy rights on "under-ryots". In 1920, the distinction between occupancy and ordinary tenants was abolished in the Central Province (C.P.). The C.P. Amendment Act of 1939 provided for the sub-tenant becoming an occupancy tenant if the land under his cultivation was sub-let. Many more rights have been conferred through legislation in Madras, Bombay and the U.P. through the past decades."²¹⁹

And, last but not the least, the clauses related to forced labour, eviction or equitable share in the produce were not the innovation of Qaiyum Khan's government, as forced labour had already been declared illegal in the Province by Dr. Khan Sahib's Congress Ministry. The problem, however, was never the formulation of laws. Though forced labour was abolished by law throughout the Indo-Pak sub-continent, the law was never enforced except in those areas where peasants were united and resisted forced labour.²²⁰

According to Hakim Muhammad Abdus Salam, a member of the Frontier Muslim League Working Committee, the Act was "a piece of legislation motivated more by the concern to appease the landlords than the desire to help the tenants."²²¹ While talking about the impact of Agricultural reforms on the lot of peasants, the famous physician of the province, Dr. Alaf Khan, himself the son of a peasant, said that there was no impact at all on the overall lives of peasants because when these reforms were announced the peasants were greatly pleased and when they cut the harvest, they took collectively all the crops to their homes. But

219 Staff correspondent, "Frontier land-reform analyzed", *The Pakistan Times* (Lahore), 21 January 1950, p.4.

220 Ibid.

221 *The Pakistan Times* (Lahore), 23 January 1950, p.3.

when next season came the landlords not only took their share of the present harvest but they also took the last year share from the peasants as well. Thus the situation remained the same as before the agricultural reforms.²²²

However, the provincial government was convinced that it was a great step in the right direction. To support their claim, the following data was presented in the Provincial Assembly on 5 March 1953:

District	No of Tenants	Areas of Land In Acres	No of Landlords	Total Compensatio n	In Rupees No of tenants Who have paid the compensation No of Tenants who have Not paid the Compensatio n
Peshawar	9963	9143	10734	72810	5523 4340
Kohat	698	1623	1222	1730	814 65
Bannu	533	1217	610	2381	89 154
Dera- Ismail- Khan	1671	1071	764	345	1652 19
Mardan	11727	21125	3959	53064	9014 2713
Hazara	194759	182977	Not avail- able	918495	172977 21782
Total	219362	217156	17289	1048825	190169 29584

In October 1950, the provincial government passed the NWFP Restitution of Mortgaged Lands Act, 1950. This Act abolished all mortgaged contracts effected prior to 1 January 1920 without any payment of mortgaged money. However, if the mortgager had made any improvements, he was entitled to receive the cost incurred on it. There was another clause as well in the Act that stated that in

222 Dr. Alaf Khan, Interview.

certain cases, if 15 years had not passed on the mortgage deed, the mortgager could keep it until the period expired.²²³

At the time of its enactment it was estimated that an area of about 371,306 acres mortgaged for rupees 15,107,107 would be restituted without any compensation or payment to the mortgagers.²²⁴ By September 1951, the number of people who benefited from the implementation of the Act stood at 10,407. The area redeemed without any compensation was 16,356 acres.²²⁵

The provincial government also gave relief to the sugar-cane growers during 1950 due to the slump in the prices of the product. *Mian Jaffar Shah*, the Revenue Minister, while announcing relief to the sugar-cane producers stated in the Assembly that the provincial government had decided to give remission of additional land revenue on sugar cane to the extent of $33\frac{1}{3}$ per cent. He further stated that the additional land revenue was being assessed at the rate of Rs. 11/4/- per acre. And any body who paid the demand on account of the additional land revenue on sugarcane, a rebate of $33\frac{1}{3}$ per cent would be given to him by the revenue authorities.²²⁶

In June 1952, the provincial government passed The NWFP Tenants (Rural Housing) Protection Act, 1952. This Act was passed in order to stop the eviction of tenants from their houses and to restore possession to those who had already been evicted. This Act was enforced for two years and it gave protection to the tenants from eviction under the guise of any decree whatsoever.²²⁷

ABOLITION OF JAGIRS, 1949: On 22 April 1949 the provincial government abolished all *jagirs*, which were either assignments of land revenue or grants of proprietary right in lieu of assignment. However, two kinds of *jagirs* were exempted from this order, that is:

1. The Mohmand "*jagir*" in the Panjpao villages near Shabqadar; and
2. grants for personal military services rendered on active service by the recipient or by his immediate predecessor.

The total amount spent on *jagirs* in the province was between rupees 1,000,000 and rupees 1,500,000 per annum and the total number of *jagirdars* were 254.²²⁸ Most of these *jagirs* were granted after the 'War of Independence' of 1857, and

223 PGCEO, 18 October 1950, No. 4144-LD- 14 October 1950.

224 Khyber Mail (Peshawar), 24 February 1951, p.3.

225 Dawn (Karachi), 24 November 1952, p.8.

226 LAD, 9 January 1950, vol. xviii-no.4, official report, serial no. 302, p.18.

227 PGCEO, 21 June 1952, No. 3170-LD- 19 June 1952.

228 Pakistan News, vol. 3, no.16, Karachi: Press Information Department, Government of Pakistan, 1 May 1949, p. 256 & LAD, 9 January 1950, vol. xviii-No. 4, official report serial no. 302, p.4.

later on for services rendered to the British Government, or help to them in various campaigns of Frontiers.²²⁹

In March 1952, the NWFP Abolition of *Jagirs* Act was promulgated. This Act confiscated all *Jagirs* conferred upon the people at any time except the military *jagirs*. This Act also put an end to any new *Jagirs*. It was announced that no compensation would be paid in return of the confiscation of a *Jagir*, and no court would entertain a suit against the confiscation.²³⁰ The daily *Khyber Mail* further reported that besides military *jagirs*, the Mohmand *jagirs* in the Panjpao villages were also excluded from confiscation.²³¹

However, provincial government was unable to implement the *jagir* abolition laws. Another law was promulgated for the abolition of *jagirs* in April 1953. This time, too, it was almost the same, except, that now it had announced consideration of compensation to some *jagirdars* on the recommendations of the Deputy Commissioner of the respective area.²³²

A remarkable change brought by the Qaiyum Khan government in the civilian laws was the *Shufa* (Preemption) Law, which was in practice in the NWFP and Punjab under the *Rawaj* (Customs). The provincial government cancelled that law and a new law of '*Shufa*' was introduced which was according to the Islamic Law. This law decreased the litigations in the province. Under the new law, the right of '*Shufa*' was granted to the holders of *Malkiyat* (ownership) lands or adjacent property upon the "*ghair manqula*" lands.²³³

Though Qaiyum Khan introduced many reforms for the betterment of peasants, it seems that they were not properly implemented. Unrest prevailed in the Hashtnagar area due to the eviction of thousands of farmers from their lands by the police and militia during his tenure.²³⁴ In the spring of 1948, the police and militia were ordered by the provincial government to take action against the peasants.²³⁵ Unrest also prevailed in the district of Hazara, as over 70,000 peasants refused to pay landlords their share in their campaign to abolish landlordism. They also demanded proprietary rights. A similar demand was made in a conference of over 30,000 peasants of Peshawar district, which was also attended by Muslim League, Red Shirts and Communist workers. After holding the conference the peasants marched through the rural areas in processions

229 *Khyber Mail* (Peshawar), 25 March 1949, p.11.

230 PGCEO, 24 March 1952, No. 1611-LD- 22 March 1952.

231 *Khyber Mail* (Peshawar), 14 March 1952, p.4.

232 *Ibid.*, 22 April 1953, p.9.

233 Javed, p.400.

234 Khan Abad, Lost Ring, p.48.

235 Samad, p.130.

demanding proprietary rights for tenants, reduction of landlords' share of $\frac{1}{4}$ of the product and control over contract rates.²³⁶

The unrest among the peasants/tenants in Charsadda and Hazara showed that they were not satisfied with the agricultural reforms. It was believed by the tenants that they were, in reality, the owners of the lands. This was evident from a letter written by the Hazara tenants to Qaiyum Khan. They said that the ancestors of tenants and landlords acquired those lands much before the Sikh rule and thus established the villages jointly, and that they were living on their own lands and in their own houses. The landlords and the tenants were even paying revenue to the government independently. Thus, when the British rule started, the landlords had no claim on their lands. However, during the First permanent settlement they cheated their ancestors and registered all lands in their own names. So, they believed that as this was done fraudulently, they could not accept their ownership. Therefore, they were not ready to pay compensation to the landlords. However, the government supported the landlords and used police and militia to evict the tenants from the lands, which created widespread unrest amongst the tenants.²³⁷

From 1949 to 1952 the following cases of tenants' ejectment were recorded:²³⁸

Districts	Year	No of tenants ejected	No of ejectment cases instituted	No of cases in which the order of ejectment had not been executed by November 1953
Peshawar	1949	65	38	Nil
	1950	44	28	Nil
	1951	117	141	Nil
	1952	132	86	16
Kohat	1949	51	35	17
	1950	28	16	8
	1951	24	24	5
	1952	11	14	2

236 The Pakistan Times (Lahore), 2 March 1948, p.3.

237 Abbasi, Interview.

238 LAD, 12 November 1953, vol. xxviii-no.1, official report, serial no. 407, p.11.

Bannu:	1949	5	4	Nil
i. Lakki	1950	5	1	Nil
	1951	Nil	Nil	Nil
	1952	Nil	Nil	Nil
ii. Bannu	1949-1952	Nil	Nil	Nil
Dera Ismail Khan	1949	19	Nil	14
	1950	35	Nil	20
	1951	20	Nil	12
	1952	6	Nil	10
Mardan	1049	426	176	Nil
	1950	397	81	Nil
	1951	181	61	Nil
	1952	74	47	14
Hazara	1949	39	166	22
	1950	72	155	58
	1951	121	168	28
	1952	64	150	40

AGRICULTURE PERFORMANCE: The following facts help us see the overall impact of agricultural reforms on the performance of the agriculture sector. During the *Kharif* season of 1947, the total cultivated area of the province amounted to 885,663 acres, irrigated 483,426 and unirrigated 402,237, as against 906,526 acres, irrigated 485,079 and unirrigated 421,447, in 1946. That meant a decrease of 20,863 acres, which was shared by all districts except Hazara and North Waziristan Agency. Amongst the cultivated area 99,703 acres or 11.2 per cent failed to mature as compared to 100,511 acres or 11 per cent in 1946.²³⁹

The following table shows how much each district was affected in 1946-47 respect of the failed area:²⁴⁰

239 Government of the NWFP, Summary of Remarks on the Kharif Crop of the NWFP for 1947 (Peshawar: Manager, Government Printing and Stationary NWFP, 1947).

240 Ibid.

District/Agency	Area failed in acres for <i>Kharif</i> , 1947	Per centage to the sown	Corresponding period for <i>Kharif</i> , 1946
Peshawar	1,841	9	4
Kohat	29,090	34	18
Bannu	9,332	11	27
Dera Ismail Khan	33,575	49	62
Mardan	3,195	1.8	6
Hazara	21,388	8	7
N-Waziristan	935	16	16
Kurram	347	11	8
Total:	99,703	---	---

In the same year, the Agriculture department introduced a new variety of Sugarcane, called Co 451. The new variety in the experimental stages had given 3 per cent higher sucrose than the old improved cane of Co 290 besides being superior in other qualities. It gave at least 2.5 per cent more recoverable sugar which meant a net income of about 3-4 lakhs of rupees to the Takht Bhai Factory and ten to twenty times more to the Premier Sugar Mill of Mardan. Then, in 1948-49 season the department introduced another variety of seed called Co 622. This new variety was expected to give nearly 11 per cent more recoverable sugar against 8.5-9 per cent of Co 290 with significantly superior sugarcane tonnage. Besides the new seed of sugarcane, a new variety of improved maize was also discovered by crossing the Oklahoma and Swabi seeds of maize; the new variety gave at least 33 per cent of higher yield.²⁴¹

The total cultivated area sown in *Kharif* 1949 season was 998,515 acres, irrigated 502,256, and unirrigated 496,259 as against 979,590 acres, irrigated 502,021 and unirrigated 477,569 in 1948. That is, an increase of 18,925 acres. The increase was recorded in Hazara, Peshawar and Dera Ismail Khan districts and Kurram Agency. However, some of the cultivated area failed to mature that amounted to 181,774 acres or 18.2 per cent of the total area sown, as compared with 150,308 acres or 16.3 per cent.

241 Khan Sahib Mohammad Ibrahim Shah, Annual Report of the Agricultural Department, North-West Frontier Province for the years, 1947-48 & 1948-49, part I-II (Peshawar: Government Printing and Stationary, Peshawar, 1951), pp.1-2.

The following table shows how much each district was affected during 1948-49 in respect of the failed area:²⁴²

District/Agency	Area failed in acres For <i>Kharif</i> 1949	Per centage to that sown	Per centage for corresponding Period 1948
Peshawar	2,792	1.3	1
Kohat	32,445	30.6	34
Bannu	30,533	32.1	37.6
Dera Ismail Khan	87,098	61.5	51
Mardan	1,941	1.1	2
Hazara	35,723	13.0	7
N-Waziristan	1,228	19.2	26.78
Kurram	14	1	1.77
Total:	181,774	---	---

During 1950 *Kharif* season, the total cultivated area was 916,646 acres, irrigated 467,256 and unirrigated 449,390, as against 998,515 acres, irrigated 502,256 and unirrigated 496,259, in 1949 that is a decrease of 81,869 acres, which was recorded in all the Districts except Peshawar District and Kurram and North-Waziristan Agencies. Out of the total cultivated area 116,309 acres or 12.13 per cent failed to mature as compared with 181,774 acres or 18.2 per cent in 1949.

The following table shows how much each district was affected during 1949-50 in respect of failed area:²⁴³

District/Agency	Area failed in acres for <i>Kharif</i> 1950	Per centage to that sown	Per centage for corresponding period 1949
Peshawar	2,735	1.3	1.3

242 Government of the NWFP, Statements of the Kharif crops Report in the NWFP for the year, 1949 (Peshawar: Manager, Government Printing and Stationary, NWFP, 1950), p.1.

243 Government of the NWFP, Summary of Remarks on the Kharif Crops Report in the NWFP for the year 1950 (Peshawar: Manager, Government Printing and Stationary NWFP, 1951), pp.1-2.

Kohat	25,058	30.0	30.6
Bannu	9,745	18.17	32.25
Dera Ismail Khan	53,144	53.2	20.53
Mardan	1,071	1.0	1.1
Hazara	24,119	9.0	13.0
Kurram	403	1.2	.1
North Waziristan	34	1	19.2
Total:	116,309	---	---

The total cultivated area during 1951 *Kharif* season, was 929,551 acres as against 916,646 acres in 1950, i.e., an increase of 12,905 acres. The increase was recorded in Peshawar and Mardan districts and North Waziristan Agency.

Out of the total area, which did not mature was 148,295 acres or 15.95 per cent of the total cultivated, as compared to 116,309 acres of 12.13 per cent in 1950.

The following table shows how much each district was affected during 1950-51 in respect of failed area:²⁴⁴

District/Agency	Area failed in acres for <i>Kharif</i> 1951	Per centage to that sown	Per centage for corresponding period of 1950
Peshawar	1,703	.78	1.3
Kohat	34,118	36.25	30.0
Bannu	6,448	13.12	18.17
Dera Ismail Khan	46,966	60.57	53.2
Mardan	2,302	1.34	1.0
Hazara	52,384	18.93	9.0
N-Waziristan	1,745	15.32	1.2
Kurram	2,629	8.52	0.1
Total:	148,295	---	---

244 Government of the NWFP, Summary of Remarks on the Kharif Crops Report in the NWFP for the year 1951 (Peshawar: Manager, Government Printing and Stationary NWFP, 1952), pp.1-2.

The total cultivated area in the *Kharif* season, of 1952 was 1,008,743 acres as against 929,551 acres of 1951. The increase was recorded in Mardan, Kohat, Bannu and Dera Ismail Khan districts and Kurram Agency.

Out of the total area, which failed to mature was 185,811 acres or 18.21 per cent of the total cultivated as compared to 148,295 acres or 15.95 per cent in 1951.

The following table shows how much each district was affected during 1951-52 in respect of failed area:²⁴⁵

District/Agency	Area failed in Acres for <i>Kharif</i> 1952	Percentage to The sown	Percentage for Corresponding period 1951
Hazara	40052	14.58	18.93
Peshawar	3159	1.52	.78
Mardan	2323	1.3	1.34
Kohat	38034	34.92	36.25
Bannu	18919	28.8	13.12
Dera Ismail Khan	81662	59.9	60.57
North Waziristan	408	6.0	15.32
Kurram Agency	1256	4.0	8.52
Total:	185811	---	---

²⁴⁵ Government of the NWFP, Summary of Remarks on the Kharif Crops of the NWFP for 1952 (Peshawar: Manager, Government Printing and Stationary NWFP, 1954).

In August 1952, the NWFP government announced the launching of Village Agricultural Industrial Development Programme with the technical and financial assistance of United States of America. The US government had agreed to provide \$ 575,000 against Rs. 875,000. The object of the scheme was to enhance the efficiency of agricultural production, improve health and sanitary conditions and develop cottage industry in the villages. Under the scheme, one Agricultural Industrial Development Institute was to be established which was intended to provide training to 120 village agents who were supposed to educate and motivate people for agriculture and home improvement, village improvement, village industry and co-operative organizations.²⁴⁶

COOPERATIVE SOCIETIES AND BANKS IN THE PROVINCE: Cooperative Societies and Banks play an important role in the development of agriculture. However, in the NWFP they faced a great setback as a result of the partition of India. Almost all the non-Muslim bankers migrated from the province, leaving behind a big vacuum. So the Frontier Co-operative Bank was forced to undertake the financing of commercial and industrial enterprises in the province. The department was also compelled to place a number of its senior and experienced officers on deputation. And they were also forced to devote much of their attention to banking and marketing institutions, as a result they lost concentration on their own field and resultantly the growth and progress of their own department suffered.²⁴⁷

Though the Co-operative Societies kept on growing numerically, their performance was not satisfactory. From 1,119 in 1947, their number reached to 1,476 in 1952-53. Similarly, the membership in 1952-53 also reached to 58,055 with a total capital of 2.68 crores of rupees. Their performance, however, was not good. In the words of their own Secretary, Ghulam Ishaq Khan: "In quality however the Movement [Co-operative Societies]... has remained static. Majority of the Credit Societies have been stagnant. Not more than 3 per cent of their own affairs independently of the help and close supervision of the Department. Of the non-credit societies, quite a number of them, with impressive names, have remained moribund and little appears to have been done either to revitalize them or put an end to their agony... Quality of service apart the Movement

246 Dawn (Karachi), 21 August 1952, front page and 8.

247 Government of the NWFP, Annual Report on the Working of Co-operative Societies in the North-West Frontier Province for the year ending 31st July, 1951 (Peshawar: Manager Government printing and stationary, 1953), p.1.

unfortunately during its over 30 years of existence does not touch even 1 per cent of total population."²⁴⁸

As far as the number of societies and banks were concerned, the following figures would give a clearer picture:

Total registered societies in the Province under the Cooperative Societies Act on 31 January 1948: 1,130

Number of *Zamindara* (Co-operative) Banks opened: 8

Record of registered Cooperative Societies in the Province from 31 July 1926 through 31 January 1948.²⁴⁹

1926 -----	16	1938 -----	753
1927 -----	34	1939 -----	822
1928 -----	60	1940 -----	869
1929 -----	101	1941 -----	944
1930 -----	166	1942 -----	998
1931 -----	257	1943 -----	1017
1932 -----	305	1944 -----	1037
1933 -----	382	1945 -----	1057
1934 -----	451	1946 -----	1085
1935 -----	529	1947 -----	1119
1936 -----	622	January 31 st , 1948 -----	1130
1937 -----	692		

COOPERATIVE BANKS: Following were the 8 cooperative banks, with their branches, at various places of the province:

NAME OF BANK

BRANCHES

1. Frontier Cooperative Bank.

i. Peshawar city.

ii. Peshawar Cantt.

²⁴⁸ Government of the NWFP, Annual Report on the Working of Co-operative Societies in the North-West Frontier Province for the year ending 31st July, 1953 (Peshawar: Manager Government printing and stationery, 1955), pp.1-2.

²⁴⁹ LAD, 23 March 1948, vol. xv-no.6, official report, serial no. 254, p.267.

- | | |
|------------------------------|--------------------------|
| | iii. Dera Ismail Khan |
| | iv. Bannu |
| | v. Kohat |
| 2. Mardan Cooperative Bank. | i. Mardan |
| 3. Hazara Co-operative Bank. | i. Abbottabad |
| 4. Banking Union. | i. Hangu. ²⁵⁰ |

FORESTS: Forests play an important role in the environment and eco system of the planet earth. As compared to other parts of the country, the NWFP is blessed with comparatively better forest resources. However, the Qaiyum Khan government took some steps for the improvement of forests as well. The province was the first to initiate the tree plantation campaign among the people in February 1949. Tree Plantation Day was observed with great enthusiasm and about six lakh new trees were planted. In addition to plantation, effective measures were also taken against indiscriminate destruction, which was destroying the forests of the Province. A separate Hazara Division was established in 1950, at the annual cost of Rs. 60,000 to look after the forests in the Hazara area where massive deforestation was badly affecting the forest there. An anti-erosion division was also set up in the Hazara district. It was empowered to evolve plans for the preservation and plantation of forests.²⁵¹

IRRIGATION SCHEMES

Qaiyum Khan launched many irrigation schemes in the province. Some of the more important ones are as follows:

JAUZARA BAND: A scheme called "Band Jauzara" was prepared around 1948 to irrigate the lands in Kohat District. However, the scheme could not be implemented because of the geologists' opinion which stressed "the hills on each side of the proposed dam site were too porous to stand up to the proposed water pressure apart from which the scheme would have involved the submersion of a long length of main road and railway line and also of a number of grave yards and shrines, and could never have been financially sound." As such the scheme was abandoned.²⁵²

KURRAM GARHI PROJECT: Kurram Garhi Dam Project was launched around 1949-50.²⁵³ Under the Plan, weirs were to be constructed between Kurram Garhi and the local *nulla* by converting the intervening area into a large lake, storing

²⁵⁰ Ibid.

²⁵¹ Dawn (Karachi), 13 August 1950, p.6.

²⁵² LAD, 19 October 1948, vol. xvi-nos.1-4(2), official report, serial no. 277, p.37.

²⁵³ Khyber Mail (Peshawar), February 1950, p.9.

3,000 millions of cubic feet of water in three square miles of area. Two hydroelectric stations with a generating capacity of 3,600 kilowatts, considered sufficient for the requirements of Bannu and Dera Ismail Khan, were also included in the project.²⁵⁴

It was a multi-purpose project which, in addition to ensuring regular supply of water to the existing canals by harnessing floodwater, was also to bring under irrigation 160,000 acres of additional lands fetching about 40,000 tons of food-grains, besides providing drinking water to a large number of areas where there was acute shortage. Initially it was estimated to cost rupees 15,000,000.²⁵⁵ The central government had also agreed to share fifty per cent of the expenses.²⁵⁶

GARHI ISMAIL ZAI LIFT IRRIGATION SCHEME: The Garhi Ismail Zai Lift Irrigation Scheme was launched in 1949-50 at an estimated cost of Rs. 112,600.²⁵⁷ The scheme was to lift the water from the Kalam river to the canal, which would bring under cultivation at least 2,000 acres of barren land, expected to yield approximately 600 tons of crops annually.²⁵⁸

RECLAMATION OF WATER LOGGED AREA IN MARDAN DISTRICT: Another important scheme launched in 1949-50 was the reclamation of waterlogged areas in the Mardan district at the total estimated cost of rupees 854,600. The provincial government, out of the loan advanced by the central government, met half the expenditure and the remaining half was contributed by the Central Government for the implementation of the scheme.²⁵⁹

KHESHKI LIFT IRRIGATION SCHEME: The foundation stone of the Khesghi Lift Irrigation Scheme was laid on 7 May 1952 at Dheri Zardad, near Nowshera. This Scheme was one of the biggest of its kinds in the province, that could irrigate an area of about 13,000 acres of land lying barren above the level of Kabul river between Risalpur and, Nowshera Kalan and Nisata. The estimated cost of the project was Rs. 2,100,000/-. The scheme was to lift the river water by electric power and store it in a reservoir from where two canals carried water for irrigation purposes. It was expected to produce 4000 tons of extra food-grains.²⁶⁰

BADRAI NULLA LIFT IRRIGATION SCHEME: The Badrai *Nulla* Lift Irrigation System in Tehsil Swabi of Mardan district was inaugurated on 17 December

254 Dawn (Karachi), 6 November 1950, p.6.

255 Ibid.

256 Comptroller NWFP, Report, Government of the NWFP Public Works Department Irrigation Branch Administration Report up to the year, 1950-51 (Peshawar: Manager, Government Stationary and printing, NWFP, 1955), p.2.

257 Ibid.

258 Dawn (Karachi), 12 December 1950, p.8.

259 Comptroller 1950-51 Report.

260 Khyber Mail (Peshawar), 8 May 1952, headline news.

1952. The Scheme cost the provincial government about Rs. 90,000. It was expected to bring 5,000 acres of barren land of Swabi Tehsil under cultivation.²⁶¹

REGI MAIRA PUMPING SCHEME, PESHAWAR DISTRICT: The dry tract of Regi Maira in Peshawar had no means of irrigation for many years. The Scheme was therefore planned to pump water from the Kabul River Canal for this fertile but dry area and was finally completed at a cost of Rs. 146,767, in 1949-50 and started irrigating about 1,500 acres of land yielding an extra produce of 500 tons of food-grains annually.²⁶²

REMODELING BARA CANAL HEAD WORKS AND REMODELING SANGU AND SHEIKHAN CHANNELS, PESHAWAR DISTRICT: The plan was to open up the head tunnels and remodel the upper reaches of the two main channels of the Bara canals. Previously, water passed through tunnels into the two channels, which would block due to silt and shingle and could not provide sufficient supply. Under this Scheme, the tunnels were opened up and the Sangu and Sheikhan branches were remodeled to take 300 cusecs each instead of 100 cusecs, which they used to carry previously. This not only helped continue irrigation during floods, the farmers could also make maximum use of floodwater as well. The Scheme was completed at the cost of Rs. 466,120 and resulted in great improvement of irrigation in the Tappa Khalil and Mohmand areas, causing an additional production of approximately 2,667 tons of extra food-grains annually.²⁶³

IRRIGATION TUBE WELL SCHEME IN QASBA BEGRAM AREA PESHAWAR CITY: In the early 1950s the normal water supply in the Bara river was not sufficient to irrigate the most fertile land lying to the south of Peshawar city where there used to be large gardens and orchards which were then drying up due to scarcity of water. Therefore, a scheme of digging three tube wells to irrigate about 1,000 acres of land in this area was initiated at an estimated cost of Rs. 105,660. The scheme was expected to increase production of food-grains by more than 300 tons.²⁶⁴ This Scheme was also financed from the loan extended by the central government.²⁶⁵

KAG VILLAGE IRRIGATION SCHEME IN HAZARA DISTRICT: The Scheme was completed in early 1950 at the cost of Rs. 10,000, which was expected to fetch an extra 1600 tons of grains. It was constructed on a flood-water *nulla* in

261 Ibid., 18 December 1952, front page.

262 NWFP Four years in Pakistan, p.31.

263 Ibid.

264 Ibid.

265 Comptroller NWFP Report, Public Works Department Irrigation Branch Administration Report upto the year 1948-49 (Peshawar: Manager Government Stationary and Printing, NWFP, 1952), p.1.

Haripur Tehsil. The Scheme included raising the level of the water by means of a weir for irrigating the area of village Kag.²⁶⁶

REMODELING TAKARWAH DISTRIBUTARY OF PAHARPUR CANAL IN DERA ISMAIL KHAN DISTRICT: The distributary ran along the bank of the Indus. There were no falls on it and due to steep gradient, the channel scours badly. In places, river had eroded into the banks. The Scheme consisted of remodeling the distributary, providing falls to cover extra area, improve irrigation, and construct a spur to protect the distributary from the floodwater of the Indus. The work was completed at a cost of Rs. 11,281, which brought about 2,660 additional acres of land under irrigation.²⁶⁷

LIFT IRRIGATION SCHEME FROM MAQAM NULLA IN MARDAN DISTRICT: The water of Muqam *Nulla* generally ran to waste. It was therefore proposed to pump water out of the *nulla* to irrigate a fertile area of about 200 acres near Garhi Ismail Zai, which had no other means of irrigation. The work was completed in 1950-51 at a cost of Rs. 64,400 and was expected to increase the yield by an additional 600 to 700 tons of food-grains annually.²⁶⁸

KATHA JANG IRRIGATION SCHEME, KOHAT DISTRICT: This scheme aimed at taking water from the Kohat Toi to irrigate the area along Khushalgarh Road, which was barren and depended on rains for crops. The project was completed at a cost of Rs. 74,245 and raised the yield of the area by about 600 tons per annum.²⁶⁹

TOLAND FLOOD IRRIGATION SCHEME, KOHAT DISTRICT: The water from the Toland *Nulla* was channelized for irrigation at a cost of Rs. 11,880. This scheme was expected to help produce an extra 135 tons of food-grains annually.²⁷⁰

KIRRI SHEIKHAN IRRIGATION SCHEME, KOHAT DISTRICT: This scheme was meant to lift the floodwater from the adjacent *nulla* for irrigation purposes and was completed at a cost of Rs. 6,800.²⁷¹

TUBE WELL IRRIGATION SCHEMES IN KOHAT DISTRICT: Various schemes were launched to irrigate around 12,000 acres of otherwise fertile land in Kohat and Doaba plains in Kohat District by means of irrigation tube-wells. The proposal was to sink 10 inches dia tube wells fitted with electricity driven bore-hooking pumps to give 1-½ cusecs discharge and to irrigate approximately 400

266 NWFP Four years in Pakistan, p.31.

267 Ibid.

268 Ibid., p.32.

269 Ibid.

270 Ibid.

271 Ibid.

acres each. Thirty electricity-driven borehole pumps were installed. It was expected that the total output of food-grains from the area would not be less than about 7,000 tons annually. The estimated cost of the scheme was Rs. 1,000,000.²⁷²

EXTENSION OF MAMA JADID CANAL IN BANNU DISTRICT: The extension of this canal was planned in order to provide sufficient supply of water from the Kurram River to feed the Kachkot canal too in order to make up for the shortage of irrigation water, and to extend irrigation to the last end of the canal. The scheme was completed in July 1950 at a cost of Rs. 124,100 and resulted in the production of more than 1600 tons of extra food grains.²⁷³

REMODELING BAKKA KHEL CHANNEL IN BANNU DISTRICT: Bakka Khel was an old irrigational channel and was remodeled according to the latest scientific irrigation principles of equitable distribution and economic use of water. The work cost Rs. 35,000 and helped get an extra yield of 600 tons of food grains.²⁷⁴

REMODELING JANI KHEL CHANNEL IN BANNU DISTRICT: This channel was restructured on the pattern of the Bakka Khel channel at a cost of Rs. 75,000 and was expected to produce 1,000 tons of additional food grains.²⁷⁵

FRONTIER IRRIGATION PROJECTS ACT, 1950: Due to the provincial government's extensive irrigation projects, launched in different districts of the province, some land speculators jumped in the process of buying lands from the poor peasants at throw away prices, or forced them to sell their lands on lower rates. In order to save the poor people from such fraudulent deals, the government passed the NWFP New Irrigation Projects (Control and Prevention of Speculation in Land) Act, 1950.²⁷⁶

The Act conferred on the provincial government powers to scrutinize sales of land made after 15 August 1947. If the government found any proof of inadequate price or if the deal was of speculative nature, the government could declare the transaction null and void.²⁷⁷

During his 1952-53 budget speech, Qaiyum Khan gave a comprehensive report on different irrigation schemes launched either by the provincial government independently or with the help of central government. The following schemes were executed by the provincial government:

272 Ibid.

273 Ibid.

274 Ibid.

275 Ibid.

276 Khyber Mail (Peshawar), 25 May 1950, p.3.

277 Ibid.

Barga Nathu-Kam-Chashma Irrigation Scheme of the Bannu District, which was completed in 1952 at a cost of Rs. 80,781. This provided irrigation to additional 500 acres of land. Nine more schemes which Qaiyum Khan enumerated were as following:

1. Remodeling and Lining the Warsak Lift Irrigation Channel including provision of one extra pumping set,
2. Remodeling Kabul River Canal R.D. 72000 to Tail,
3. Constructing Drainage crossing at R.D. 14000 Paharpur Canal,
4. Badrai *Nulla* Lift Irrigation Scheme
5. Improvement to Daur System of Irrigation,
6. Construction of a Bund in Tor Zanda near Alizai in Kohat District,
7. Construction of Aza Khel Pir Pai Drainage Scheme in Peshawar District,
8. Constructing a village Road Bridge at R.D. 6,000 Chilla Drains in Peshawar District, and
9. Providing Lift Irrigation for Mahsud Colonization at Gishkori in Dera Ismail Khan District, were taken in hand during 1950-51. the estimated cost of these schemes were Rs. 38,767, Rs. 24,000, Rs. 30,000, Rs. 80,500, Rs. 33,791, Rs. 12,000, Rs. 18,000, Rs. 11,000 and Rs. 1,93,125, respectively. It was estimated that on completion schemes Nos. (i), (iv), (vii) and (ix) 1,560 acres, 2,000 acres, 600 acres and 5,000 acres, respectively of cultivable land would be brought under irrigation. Schemes Nos. (ii), (iii), (v), and (vi), were to ensure proper supply of irrigation water and Scheme No. (viii) was more beneficial to the neighbouring villages who were cut off from the surrounding villages when the drain was in flood.

In addition to this, Qaiyum Khan stated that a sum of Rs. 55,000 had also been provided in the next year's budget for remodeling Kot Hafiz and providing 3 bays in Bilot Division with Karries, etc.²⁷⁸

HYDROELECTRIC DEVELOPMENT

During the pre-partition days, electricity was distributed by the Peshawar Electric Supply Co. After the migration of their owners, it went into the charge of the

278 LAD, 3 March 1952, vol. xxv-No. 1, official report, p.24.

Evacuee Property Board. In October 1949, Qaiyum Khan's government decided to take over its control with the objective to run it more efficiently.²⁷⁹

MALAKAND HYDEL EXTENSION: The possibility of generating electricity at Malakand was first explored in 1914 by irrigation engineers, who proposed the digging of a tunnel under the Malakand pass to take the water of the river Swat into a canal for irrigating the Mardan valley. When the tunnel was completed, it was realized that a natural fall of some 250 feet height could be developed for the production of electricity if, the tunnel was extended by another half a mile. Thus, the Malakand Hydel Scheme was sanctioned in 1934. The project was completed in four years at a cost of Rs. 11,487,602/-, and was inaugurated by the former Viceroy of India, Lord Linlithgow on 23 April 1938. The designers left space for three more generating sets for future development as well.²⁸⁰ The Qaiyum Khan's government decided to exploit the developmental capacity to the full, and installed two more generators at the site. On 25 April 1951 the Prime Minister of Pakistan, Mr. Liaquat Ali Khan performed the switching-on ceremony of the two new generators which could together produce an additional electricity of 10,000 K.W., raising the capacity of the power station from 9,600 K.W. to 19,600 K.W.²⁸¹ On 18 January 1952 Qaiyum Khan performed the inaugural ceremony of the completion and putting into service of the Dargai Power Station.²⁸²

WARSAK DAM SCHEME: The Warsak Hydro-Electric Project planned on the Kabul River, a few miles upstream of Warsak Head and approximately 15 miles from the Afghan border, was the most important scheme launched by the Qaiyum Khan Ministry. The preliminary investigations for the site were initiated during February 1949 and different sites were considered, but finally the Warsak site was selected for the dam. The project comprised of a dam of a maximum height of about 235 feet with flood and bottom outlets, a power station located on the right bank of the river, and an outdoor switching station.²⁸³ The installed capacity of the project was fixed at 180,000 K.W. in the beginning and the average head utilized 130 feet. Besides the generation of electricity, the following subsidiary schemes were also part of the project:

A high level canal to be taken off upstream of the dam on the right bank to irrigate approximately 60,000 acres of barren land lying to the west and south of Peshawar. It was expected that it would make the province self-sufficient in food-

279 The Pakistan Times (Lahore), 27 October 1949, p.3.

280 "The Story of Malakand Hydro-Electric Scheme", The Pakistan Times (Lahore), 7 December 1949.

281 Khyber Mail (Peshawar), 26 April 1951, headline news.

282 Ibid., 19 January 1952, p.2 and January 22, 1952 editorial.

283 NWFP Four Years in Pakistan, p.51.

grains. The province would not need to import food grains from outside. In addition, it would help in the settlement of Mullagori and Afridi tribesmen.²⁸⁴

A second high-level canal was planned upstream of the dam on the left bank, which could irrigate about 5,000 acres belonging to the Mohmand tribesmen. It was expected that it would make afforestation possible on the slopes of the hills in the vicinity of Warsak, which would solve the problem of the fuel wood in Peshawar and would provide employment to tribesmen. In addition, the Bara river water, then used for the irrigation of Peshawar, could be used for the irrigation of the Tribal Areas further upstream, including a good part of the Khajuri plain. The Mullagori marble quarries, about 4 miles from the dam, which were closed at the time owing to the high cost of working, were expected to be reopened with the help of cheap electric power, thus re-establishing an important tribal industry. It was also planned that the dam would make the river navigable as far as the Afghan border, developing an alternative trade route besides the historic Khyber Pass.²⁸⁵

The Pakistan Economic Council approved the Warsak Dam Project when it met in Karachi on 6 September 1952 under the chairmanship of Khwaja Nazimuddin, Prime Minister of Pakistan.²⁸⁶

ELECTRIFICATION: Another area, which got a boost during Qaiyum Khan's government, was the extension of supply lines of electricity to different villages and towns of the province. Following are the details:

Town/Villages	Date of getting electricity current
1. Haripur and surrounding villages	December 1949 ²⁸⁷
2. Kohat, put on 33 K.V. line (formerly M.E.S power station was supplying Electricity only to the cantonment area)	November 1949
3. Swabi, connected through 33 K.V. line, (alongwith Swabi 40 other big/small villages given the electric current).	16 March 1950 ²⁸⁸

²⁸⁴ Ibid.

²⁸⁵ Ibid., pp.51-53.

²⁸⁶ Dawn (Karachi), 7 September 1952, headline news.

²⁸⁷ Ibid., 2 January 1950, p.5.

²⁸⁸ The Pakistan Times, Supplementary (Lahore), 14 August 1950.

4. Abbottabad	6 April 1950 ²⁸⁹
5. Mansehra	17 August 1950 ²⁹⁰
6. Shabqadar	7 November 1950 ²⁹¹
7. Hangu and Sherkot	7 April 1951 ²⁹²

In order to have a better understanding of the expansion and development of electricity network, it would be appropriate to look into the overall use of electricity in the province before and after partition which was as following:

Before Partition	After Partition/Upto1953	
1) Transmission Lines		
i. 66 KV double circuit lines	29 miles	29 miles
ii. 66 KV single circuit lines	79 miles	152 miles
iii. 33 KV line	Nil	156 miles
iv. 11 KV line	228 miles	383 miles
2) Number of towns electrified	4	15
3) Number of villages electrified	74	185
4) Number of Consumers	9,800	36,000
5) Gross Revenue	1,396,000	4,180,000

In addition to the High Tension lines, an extensive network of distribution lines was also constructed in the villages.²⁹³

During the 1953-54 budget speech, Qaiyum Khan stated that the NWFP was supplying electricity to the Punjab Government at Hatti Sub-Station to the extent of 1500 K.V.A. for distribution to important factories, towns and villages like Campbellpur (Attock), Hazro, Lawrencepur and a large number of villages in the area. He further stated that there was a proposal to give supply to Rawalpindi from the Wah Sub-Station before the completion of Dargai Power Station."²⁹⁴

An important aspect of the hydroelectric development schemes was the creation of new jobs in the province. Qaiyum Khan had made provincial domicile

289 Dawn (Karachi), 7 April 1950, front page.

290 Khyber Mail (Peshawar), 18 August 1950, front page.

291 Dawn (Karachi), 8 November 1950, p.5.

292 Khyber Mail (Peshawar), 8 April 1951, p.4.

293 NWFP Four Years in Pakistan, p.56 & LAD, 10 March 1953, vol. xxvii-No. 5, official report, p.34.

294 Ibid., & LAD, 10 March 1953, vol. xxvii-No. 5, official report, p.34.

prerequisite for employment in the hydroelectric schemes of the NWFP. He firmly believed that the people of the area, where the projects were launched had the first right to get jobs in them.²⁹⁵

These socio-economic projects changed the life of the people of the province, and NWFP, which was a backward province in the pre-partition India became one of the most developing provinces of Pakistan during Qaiyum Khan's tenure as Chief Minister. Though the political situation in the province was suffocating, it did not affect the common man who was more interested in his socio-economic uplift and developments rather than politics. It is due to these varied and useful developments that Qaiyum Khan is still remembered as a Chief Minister of the poor.

295 Abbasi, Interview.

CHAPTER 5

DECLINE AND REMOVAL FROM CHIEF MINISTERSHIP

When Qaiyum Khan took over the charge of the government in the NWFP, he was considered a champion of Pakistani nationalism and Muslim League as opposed to Pakhtun nationalism in general and *Pakhtunistan* in particular. Most of the politicians and the press supported his authoritarian acts and policies. When he arrested Abdul Ghaffar Khan for the first time on 15 June 1948, among others, the act was appreciated by the daily *Nawai Waqt*, which lamented the belated act. However, with the passage of time Qaiyum Khan started losing support in the country, especially in the Punjab, whose press once appreciated him for the arrest of Ghaffar Khan started demanding Ghaffar Khan's trial in the court if the government had any proof of his wrong-doing. The Punjabi politicians were not comfortable particularly with Qaiyum Khan's alliance with the Bengalis. In fact, they did not hesitate to raise the bogey of "threat to Islam and Pakistan".¹ Eventually, Qaiyum Khan was rendered ineffective and he lost the office of the Chief Minister. As Mushtaq Ahmad commented on the situation, "Qaiyum Khan's authority was unquestioned so long as he was the Chief Minister of the Province. Whether his exit from provincial politics was an act of self-abdication and induction into central politics, a fiat from the new forces of autocracy, is anybody's guess. Whatever the reason, it was not consistent with his personality and principles. The object of the powers that be, was to neutralize his power, for it was then widely rumoured that the politicians of East Pakistan had agreed with their compatriots in the West on a formula under which Qaiyum Khan was tipped for the Premiership of the country and with Khwaja Nazimuddin once again as the Head of the State. Wherever the truth lay, Qaiyum Khan's influence was on the decline."²

Several reasons contributed to the decline of Qaiyum Khan. One was the denial of supply of electricity to the Punjab at cheap rates. In those days electricity was a provincial subject. Due to vast natural hydal resources and its active exploitation, in a few years, the NWFP was able to produce surplus electricity. On the other hand, the Punjab, which was deficit in electricity wanted to import it from the NWFP. Initially there was a strong disagreement on the power rate. During those days, news spread that on the instigation of Punjab, the central government wanted to centralize the electricity. The news appeared in a report in the daily *Pakistan Times* on 20 January 1951. It noted that the Punjab would remain deficit in electricity for the coming few years, no matter how hard it tried to expand its resources. At that time, the Punjab was getting 14,000 KWTS electricity from Jogindar Nagar, India, under an agreement, which was going to

1 Zahid, p.184.

2 Ahmad, Jinnah, pp.124-25.

expire on 31 March 1951. The East Punjab (India) was threatening to reduce the supply and its attitude on the expiry of the agreement was stated to be quite uncertain. The total increase in resources effected during 1950 in the Punjab amounted to 2,500 KWTS though it was expected that another 2,000 to 3,000 KWTS might be added by April 1951. Even after the expected increase, the province of Punjab was expected to continue to be far short of its actual energy requirements. The report further opined that the chances of obtaining electricity from the NWFP, which had a large surplus of energy produced at Malakand, were not very bright as it was demanding exorbitant rates for their supply. As for the central government, it could not help with this issue. To overcome the situation created due to the refusal of the NWFP government to come to reasonable terms with the Punjab, the central government was considering the proposal of taking over the generation and distribution of electricity from the provinces. An enactment like the Indian Electricity Act of 1948 was expected to be presented in the Parliament and a draft proposal had been circulated to all the provincial governments for eliciting their views.³

The report came under discussion in the NWFP Provincial Legislative Assembly on 5 January 1951. The government's spokesman refuted the reporter's claim that the NWFP had surplus electricity. It was stated that whenever surplus electricity would be available, it would be offered to the rest of the countrymen.⁴ Syed Qaim Shah, Leader of the opposition, presented a bill opposing the central government policy pursued by the Ministry of Industries of the central government to take control of electricity in their own hands. He pointed out that there was a proposal to take control of the fast completing Warsak Dam Project. Members from opposition and government benches all spoke in support of the resolution. Leader of the House, Qaiyum Khan, also spoke in favour of the resolution, and stated that the provincial government was in full control of the province while in Punjab factionalism was rife. He stated that the Assembly was disciplined and united and the situation of the province was very favourable. In these circumstances, he would not allow any minister of the central government to interfere in the affairs of the province. He also stated that the people of NWFP could relinquish their rights in an emergency situation but, under normal circumstances, they would protect them. He further said that the NWFP representatives would play their due role in the Constituent Assembly if any Bill related to electricity was presented there. He highlighted his achievements, and claimed that nowhere in Pakistan the development had taken place at the same pace as it had in the NWFP during his tenure as the Chief Minister. He strongly supported the resolution, which the Provincial Assembly passed unanimously. It said, "this Assembly is of the opinion that the present policy pursued by the

3 The Pakistan Times (Lahore), 20 January 1951, back page.

4 Khyber Mail (Peshawar), 23 January 1951, p.4.

Ministry of Industries of the Central Government is not conducive to the expeditious industrial development of the North-West Frontier Province and appeals to the Hon'ble the Prime Minister of Pakistan to examine the whole position personally."⁵

Meanwhile, the negotiations also continued between the NWFP and the Punjab governments for the supply of electricity. Finally, an agreement was signed between the representatives of the two governments in April 1952. The agreement was for 10 years from the date of its coming into effect, which was expected to be sometime early in 1953. According to the agreement, the NWFP would supply, from Malakand, 11,000 Kilowatts of electricity in 1953. This figure was to be decreased gradually to 8,000 Kilowatts in 1957 and thereafter will remain at this level till the end of the agreement. During off-peak periods, at night, the supply was to go up to 20,000 K.W. in 1953 and be reduced to 17,000 K.W., in 1957. The rate of supply was to vary from 7 ½ pie [paisa] to 11 pie per unit depending on the load factor. Although the agreement was to be enforced from 1953, the provincial government agreed to the supply of electricity, once the transmission lines from Wah to Rawalpindi were completed.⁶

It was also argued that, later on, the One Unit Plan was prepared having one of the objectives to take control of the provincial resources in general and the NWFP electricity in particular. As such One Unit was promulgated; the Central Distribution System for electricity was established at Lahore, which is there to this day.⁷

Another reason for Qaiyum Khan's decline in provincial politics was his alienation of the centre by interfering in the Frontier Princely States and Tribal areas. It was during the war in Kashmir that Qaiyum Khan was able to boost his popularity among the tribesmen and people in the settled districts of the province. He wanted to cash on that fame, which is why he planned the annexation of tribal areas and the Frontier Princely States. Though partially successful, he faced tough opposition from the central government, the Governor of NWFP, bureaucracy and the army generals, considering this as meddling in the sensitive areas.⁸

In influencing the provincial Muslim League politics, by opposing the Jaghra-Khattak faction, Qaiyum Khan also offended the League High Command and got away with it for a while. Khalil ur Rahman, General Secretary of the Punjab Muslim League, summed up the centre's feelings in these words, "the province was far too sensitive an area bordering Afghanistan and Kashmir for Karachi [the

5 LAD, 5 January 1951, vol. xxii-no.4, official report, serial no. 332, pp.2-20.

6 Dawn (Karachi), 1 May 1952, p.6.

7 Fida M. Khan, Interview.

8 Samad, p.148.

then capital of the country] to take strong action against Qaiyum and risk losing control of the province. Qaiyum, emboldened by his success, allied himself with others who wanted to control the center. The Prime Minister, Khwaja Nazimuddin, gave Qaiyum a free hand at home so as to fashion the Peshawar-Dacca axis against the Punjabi cohorts at the center.”⁹

Another issue, which caused Qaiyum Khan dearly in the province was the issue of provincial autonomy. Qaiyum Khan was a strong supporter of provincial autonomy. Indeed, speaking at a public rally in Abbottabad on 31 December 1952 Qaiyum Khan praised the East Bengalis for accepting less seats in the Parliament in spite of the fact that they deserved more seats according to their population. He eulogized this spirit of sacrifice while accepting the report of the Basic Principle Committee.¹⁰ Further he said that: “As the Chief Minister of the NWFP, as the President of the Provincial Muslim League and as a member of the Basic Principle Committee and a signatory to its report, I re-affirm that the people of the province will never agree to a unitary form of government. This cry has been raised by persons who want East Pakistan to go out of Pakistan...”¹¹

However, the ensuing constitutional proposals became a bone of contention between East Bengal and Punjab in particular and Punjab and other smaller units in general. At that time, even there was discussion about the suitability of Confederal, Federal, or Unitary form of government. Some favoured confederation, others federation, and yet some others unitary form of government. Amongst the supporters of unitary form of government, Mumtaz Daulatana, from the Punjab, was in the forefront. He believed that federalism was not suitable for Pakistan. However, Qaiyum Khan was the strongest supporter of federalism. When parity was proposed in the second Draft of the Constitutional proposals, Qaiyum Khan strongly supported it, as the NWFP benefited from the formula. The Punjab, however, vehemently opposed it. Qaiyum Khan had the blessings of the NWFP governor, Khwaja Shahabuddin as well. Politicians from the Punjab did not like it. So they put up a stiff resistance during his visit to the Punjab for the support of the Punjab Muslim League. No wonder, it was decided to put off the report for a while until an agreement was reached between the two factions of the Muslim League, i.e., East Bengal and Punjab.¹²

9 Ibid., pp. 149-50.

10 Dawn (Karachi), 1 January 1953.

11 Ibid.

12 Samad, pp. 137-38, Khyber Mail (Peshawar), 16 January 1953, p.4 & G.W.Choudhry, Constitutional Development in Pakistan (London: Longman Group Ltd., 1969), pp. 73-74.

Addressing the students of Islamia College, Peshawar, on 6 February 1953 Qaiyum Khan strongly “reiterated that the Pathans of the NWFP were not prepared to forego their right of Provincial Autonomy at any cost. He said that a Federative status for Pakistan was laid down not only in the 1940 Lahore Resolution of the Muslim League but was also affirmed by the Objective Resolution of the Constituent Assembly of Pakistan...”¹³

Qaiyum Khan also alienated the Punjabi politicians by increasing his contacts with the Bengalis. During January 1953, a Bengali good-will mission, under the leadership of Shah Azizur Rahman, Joint Secretary of East Bengal Muslim League, visited the province. The mission was given a warm reception. After the conclusion of their tour, they talked of greater understanding between East Bengal and the NWFP. Qaiyum Khan personally accompanied them to the railway station to see them off, and at that time the people and the good-will mission jointly raised the following slogans: “*Sarhad Zindabad*”, “*East Pakistan Zindabad*”, and “*Hamara Ittehad Zindabad*”.¹⁴

It seems that, towards the end of 1952, the Qaiyum Khan government had lost its popularity not only with the powerful lobbies in the center and the Punjab but also with some people in the province. It was evident from the response of the people on occasion of a public meeting held on 14 August 1952 at Chauk Yadgar, Peshawar city on the occasion of Independence Day. The audience present showed no enthusiasm in response to the slogans raised from the stage from time to time. The intelligence agency reported this fact in these words: “Surprisingly enough the huge gathering would not respond to the slogans raised by persons from the stage when they shouted ‘Pakistan..., Quaid-i-Azam..., Muslim League...’ the only time the people shouted in response to some slogans was when the H.C.M. [Qaiyum Khan] specifically wished that a loud response should come from them...”¹⁵

During the Anti-Ahmadiya Movement in Punjab, propaganda in favour of Abdul Ghaffar Khan and against Qaiyum Khan also continued. This movement resulted in the dismissal of the government of Mumtaz Daulatana on 17 March 1953.¹⁶

After the dismissal of Khwaja Nazimuddin as Prime Minister, Qaiyum Khan was inducted into the central cabinet of Muhammad Ali Bogra as Federal Minister for Food and Industries; he was forced to accept the job.¹⁷ It is believed that actually this was part of the planning of the Governor-General, Ghulam Muhammad,

13 Khyber Mail (Peshawar), 7 February 1953, headline news.

14 Dawn (Karachi), 22 January 1953, p.6.

15 PA, special branch, IPS daily diary no. 124, dated 15 August 1952, bundle No. 76A, serial no. 1394.

16 Zahid, p. 185 & Khyber Mail (Peshawar), 19 April 1953, headline news.

17 Mahmood, footnote on p.235.

against the provincial governments. Qaiyum Khan's reforms, political and administrative qualities had earned him the name of "*Shair-e-Sarhad*" or the "Frontier Lion", but his assertive tendencies and attitude did not auger well with the Centre. The Governor-General, Ghulam Muhammad did not like him, due to Qaiyum Khan's close ties with Khwaja Nazimuddin, who was the President of the Pakistan Muslim League. He feared that Qaiyum Khan might create problems for him. As a precaution, he forced him to join the central cabinet. Qaiyum Khan understood well the motives and therefore, was not too keen on accepting the offer. But he was threatened with dismissal and imprisonment, and, was thus coerced into its acceptance. Qaiyum Khan was also afraid that in case of his removal he would be instantly put on trial for the misuse of power. Thus, according to one analyst, the "*Shair-e-Sarhad*" [lion of Frontier] had no option but to become a "*Bheeghe Bilee*" [wet-cat, which is synonymous to coward].¹⁸

The immediate context of his removal from the office of the Chief Minister was a visit by a federal Minister, Chaudhri Nazir Ahmad. According to Sardar Inayat-ur-Rahman Khan Abbasi, Chaudhri Nazir Ahmad, the Federal Minister for Power, visited the Jaban Power station, and during his visit, issued orders that except for the lower employees, all other staff should be recruited from outside the province. When the information reached Qaiyum Khan, he was furious. He ordered the police to bring Chaudhri Nazir Ahmad back to Peshawar. He was brought back from Attock bridge.¹⁹ Fida Muhammad Khan, who was an eyewitness to the incident, stated that hot words were exchanged between Qaiyum Khan and Chaudhri Nazir Ahmad, but, in the end, Qaiyum Khan was able to compel him to withdraw his orders.²⁰

This incident, according to some, became an immediate cause for Qaiyum Khan's removal, and as part of a pre-planned scheme, he was called for a meeting to Karachi. On his way back, he was informed at the Lahore Railway Station that he had two options: either accept ministership at the centre or resign and go to jail. He accepted the first option, and was thus inducted into the central cabinet.²¹

Later, while commenting on his removal from the Chief Minister's office, Qaiyum Khan admitted that, "he did not know of the change in the Pakistan Cabinet till he reached Lahore on his way to Peshawar from Karachi. He was asked on the telephone by the new Prime Minister, Mr. Muhammad Ali, to join his cabinet in the larger interests of the country."²²

18 Ibid., foot note on p.226

19 Abbasi, Interview.

20 Fida M. Khan, Interview.

21 Abbasi, Interview.

22 Khyber Mail (Peshawar), 22 April 1953, headline news.

Though he had been removed from the chief ministership of the province, Qaiyum Khan tried his utmost to save the situation. He called a meeting of the Muslim League Working Committee, Assembly Party and the Councilors at Peshawar on 22 April 1953 and helped it adopt a number of resolutions requesting the central government to reconsider its decision. It was argued that he was indispensable to the province, and he must stay as Chief Minister. Strangely enough, the meeting demanded that, in case that was not possible any more, he should be empowered to select his successor as leader of the Muslim League Assembly Party. It was also decided that Qaiyum Khan would continue as the President of the Frontier Muslim League.²³ Another resolution was moved by the Speaker of the Provincial Legislative Assembly, Nawabzada Allah Nawaz Khan to the effect that Qaiyum Khan might be appointed as resident Minister on the plea that the NWFP was a peculiar unit of the country where lawlessness had always been a problem, which Qaiyum Khan had so efficiently checked and controlled. His removal could once again, encourage the subversive elements to raise their heads. If that was allowed to happen, it might threaten the integrity of Pakistan. As such he suggested that the central government should appoint Qaiyum Khan as a central cabinet minister resident in the NWFP.²⁴

The Frontier Muslim League resented the removal of Qaiyum Khan, obviously with his encouragement and support. But, in reality, the party itself was divided in extending support to him. There was a group within the Frontier Muslim League, led by Arbab Noor Muhammad Khan, who did not want his retention in the province. But, some office-bearers of the League and ministers, like *Mian* Jaffer Shah, Khan Jalaluddin Khan, M.R. Kiyani, *Salar* Muhammad Ayub Khan, issued press statements demanding his retention in the province.²⁵

The opposition parties in general and the All-Parties Constitutional Rights Defence Committee (APCRDC) in particular were jubilant over Qaiyum Khan's removal from the province, and hailed the central government's decision. They held a public meeting at Chowk Yadgar, Peshawar city on 21 April 1953, and many front ranking leaders of the APCRDC including Fida Muhammad Khan delivered scathing speeches against Qaiyum Khan. They also welcomed the removal of Prime Minister Khwaja Nazimuddin, who did not take any action against the excesses of Qaiyum Khan and against his anti-people, anti-democratic and illegal actions.²⁶ On the following day, the supporters of Qaiyum Khan also held a public meeting in Peshawar city. Prominent speakers like *Mian*

23 PA, special branch, CID daily diary no. 51, dated 27 April 1953, bundle No. 74, serial no. 1371, p.239.

24 Khyber Mail (Peshawar), 23 April 1953, headline news.

25 Ibid., 19 April 1953, p.3.

26 PA, special branch, CID daily diary no. 50, dated 22 April 1953, bundle No. 74, serial no. 1371.

Jaffer Shah, Jalaluddin Khan and Muhammad Ayub Khan greatly eulogized the services of Qaiyum Khan, which he had rendered to the province during his chief Ministership. Qaiyum Khan himself was also present in the meeting.²⁷

Ultimately, though Qaiyum Khan failed to retain himself in the province, he succeeded in getting the authority from the central government to choose his successor. After a thorough discussion, the central cabinet decided to delegate Qaiyum Khan the power to nominate any honest and independent man from the services who was not a politician.²⁸ However, Arbab Noor Muhammad Khan insisted that Qaiyum Khan was neither instructed nor given the power to choose a person outside the Muslim League Party.²⁹

Qaiyum Khan considered two names, that of Ghulam Ishaq Khan, a prominent member of Provincial Civil Service [later, President of Pakistan], and Sardar Abdur Rashid Khan, a member of Provincial Police Service.³⁰ Finally, Qaiyum Khan chose Sardar Abdur Rashid Khan, Inspector-General of Police, whose resignation from the Police Service was obtained from the central government on telephone. Now, Qaiyum Khan observed, he would "leave the province with satisfaction."³¹ Actually, Qaiyum Khan's first preference for the chief ministership was Ghulam Ishaq Khan but he excused himself from accepting the post. Thus, after his refusal, Sardar Abdur Rashid was selected,³² and he formed the government on 23 April 1953 with a cabinet of five ministers.³³ They were:

- | | |
|------------------------------|--|
| 1. Sardar Abdur Rashid Khan: | Chief Minister, Law and Order (Political and Police), Public Works, Industries and Companies, Electricity, Firearms and Mercy Petitions. |
| 2. Mian Jaffar Shah: | Education, Civil Supplies, Auqaf, Historical Research, Archeology, Geological Surveys and Census and Gazettes. |
| 3. Muhammad Jalaluddin Khan: | Local Government, Rehabilitation and resettlement of Refugees, Veterinary and Marketing, Stationary and Printing, |

²⁷ Ibid., diary no. 51, dated 27 April 1953.

²⁸ Mian Jaffar Shah's testimony before the West Pakistan Elective Bodies Disqualification Tribunal, Pakistan Times, February 23, 1961 quoted in Aziz, Politics, p.233, at footnote no. 1.

²⁹ Arbab Noor M. Khan, Interview.

³⁰ Aziz, p.233, at footnote no. 1.

³¹ Afzal, p. 73.

³² Islam, 227 & Burhannuddin, Interview.

³³ PGCEO, 24 April 1953, No. 1018-G- 23 April 1953.

- | | |
|-----------------------------|--|
| | National Savings Scheme, Resettlement of demobilized Personnel, Labour. |
| 4. Malik ur Rahman Kiyani: | Finance, Legislative, Judicial (Except Mercy Petitions), Forests, Guzaras and Elections. |
| 5. Khan Muhammad Ayub Khan: | Revenue, Cooperative Societies, Civil Defense, Motor Transport, Exercise and Taxation and Civil Estates. |
| 6. Shamsul Haq Khan: | Hospitals and Public Health, Jails, Information and Awards for Gallantry. ³⁴ |

When one considers Qaiyum Khan's preference of bureaucrats over politicians for the selection of chief ministership, it becomes obvious that by appointing a bureaucrat, who did not have any political base, Qaiyum Khan hoped that he would always look towards him for political support, and thus would be able to control the province indirectly. In fact, many people have argued that Qaiyum Khan's preference for a bureaucrat as his successor was for the simple reason: he did not want to take chances with a politician. He could lose his support in the province, which he did not want. As such he chose an in-service man who had no political background and group to back him up so that he would always look upto Qaiyum Khan for support.³⁵

The selection of Sardar Abdur Rashid Khan as Chief Minister of the Province was strongly criticized by some sections of the society. The editor of *Al-Jamiat Sarhad*, Peshawar, wrote that it was very damaging for the cause of democratic institutions. Qaiyum Khan had ignored all the democratically elected members of the Assembly and had instead nominated the Inspector-General of Police who had remained even subordinate to some of the ministers in his cabinet. Further, the Muslim League Council had not given the powers to Qaiyum Khan to nominate a person outside the Muslim League Assembly.³⁶

Sardar Abdur Rashid Khan held his first meeting with the members of Muslim League Assembly Party on his first working day, that is, on 24 April 1953. The meeting was attended by about 60 of the 81 members of the Party. The rest were out of town.³⁷

In the very first meeting of the cabinet, Arbab Noor Muhammad Khan, the Chief Parliamentary Secretary, strongly criticized Shams-ul-Haq's induction in the

34 Khyber Mail (Peshawar), 25 April 1953, p.3.

35 Afrasayab & Hoti, Interview.

36 *Al-Jamiat Sarhad* (Peshawar), 2 May 1953, editorial on p. 2.

37 Khyber Mail (Peshawar), 25 April 1953, headline news.

cabinet. He told Sardar Rashid Khan that his induction would make the ministry a bed of thorns. Later, Arbab Noor Muhammad Khan, who was strongly opposed to Qaiyum Khan's policies and politics organised an anti-Qaiyum Khan demonstration at the Peshawar railway station at the time of his arrival from Karachi, chanting slogans, "Go back", "Go back".³⁸

Since Sardar Abdur Rashid Khan, the Chief Minister, was not an elected member of the assembly, he decided to contest elections for the Provincial Assembly seat from Dera Ismail Khan, Muslim Constituency No. 6 on 1 August 1953, which he won. Thus, he became, for the first time, since his elevation to the post of Chief Ministership of the Province, a public representative through the elections.³⁹ He took the oath of allegiance to Pakistan in the Assembly on 12 November 1953.⁴⁰

Sardar Rashid was initially very loyal to Qaiyum Khan, but later on, beside other things, Ghulam Muhammad, the Governor-General's instigation and encouragement made him change his attitude. It is stated that once Ghulam Muhammad asked Sardar Rashid "When will you grow adult?." That was indirectly instigating him to come out of the influence of Qaiyum Khan.⁴¹ Once firmly entrenched in his position, Sardar Abdur Rashid started taking steps to uproot Qaiyum Khan from the provincial politics. He encouraged Arbab Noor Muhammad Khan to move a resolution in the Frontier Muslim League Working Committee to the effect that he should relinquish the Party Presidentship and should hand it over to the Chief Minister. During a meeting in M.R Kayani's house, Arbab Sahib asked Qaiyum Khan to resign, and threatened that he would move a resolution in the party meeting for this purpose if he did not oblige.⁴² In August 1953, the Frontier Muslim League Working Committee made it mandatory for a person desirous of being the president of the Frontier Muslim League to be a permanent resident of the province. Qaiyum Khan still tried to rally support in his favour, but failed, and finally resigned from the Presidentship of the Frontier Muslim League on 29 October 1953. A week later, the Working Committee of Muslim League elected Sardar Abdur Rashid Khan as the new President.⁴³

Another step taken to stamp out his influence from the province was the removal of his name from Chancellorship of the University of Peshawar. After his removal from the office of the Chief Minister, on 12 November 1953, the Education Minister moved the Peshawar University (Amendment) Bill, 1953, to appoint a

38 Arbab Noor M. Khan, Interview.

39 Khyber Mail (Peshawar), 2 August 1953, headline news.

40 LAD, 12 November 1953, vol. xxviii-No. 1, official report, serial no. 407, p.3.

41 Hoti, Interview.

42 Arbab Noor M. Khan, Interview.

43 Afzal, pp. 73-74.

pro-Chancellor in the absence of Qaiyum Khan. It stated: "The present Chancellor of the University of Peshawar now ordinarily resides at Karachi. It is, therefore, desirable that some person who may act in his absence on the spot may be appointed. The creation of the office of Pro-Chancellor is proposed accordingly. It is intended that the Pro-Chancellor shall preside at the Convocations and shall do all such acts as are assigned to the Chancellor in the latter's absence from the University."⁴⁴

However, during the course of discussion on the bill, Arbab Muhammad Asaf, Deputy Leader of the opposition, moved an amendment in the Bill, proposing that instead of pro-Chancellor every Chief Minister should hold the Chancellor's office during his term. Thus, it removed the name of Qaiyum Khan from the Life Chancellorship of the University. Speaking on the amendment, Arbab Asaf said, "it was a generally accepted rule that the Governor becomes the Chancellor of the University of the Province but Khan Abdul Qaiyum Khan, who claimed to have abolished all *Jagirs* in the Province, created a *Jagir* for himself by getting an Act passed in the Assembly which made him Life Chancellor of the Peshawar University. He did not do so in the interests of the public but for the sake of establishing his own name. We want to remove even his shadow, which the people say is still lurking in the Province, by removing his name from the University." The Bill was finally passed on 18 November 1953 and Qaiyum Khan's name was removed from the Chancellorship of the University.⁴⁵

Sardar Abdur Rashid also abandoned his predecessor's policy of political vendetta and victimization. During his two tenures, Qaiyum Khan had ruled the province with an iron hand, putting behind bars all those who did not agree with him or his policies or if he felt threatened from them. After his removal, the central government and the provincial government decided to release all political prisoners, most of whom were not detained for their anti-State activities, but primarily for anti-Qaiyum Khan activities. The editor of a leading daily, *Pakistan Times*, wrote on this decision: "The pall of gloom under which the Frontier Province was placed at the initiative of Khan Abdul Qaiyum Khan, has at long last been lifted and the freedom-loving Pathans have been restored their self-respect and civil liberties..."⁴⁶

After his removal from the provincial authority, Qaiyum Khan not only saw the reversal of his autocratic policies but also his own humiliation at the hands of his erstwhile friends and colleagues. He became an untouchable for the Muslim Leaguers in the NWFP. He was even insulted by those whom he made political

44 PGCEO, 12 November 1953, No. 5371-L.D.- 12 November 1953.

45 Khyber Mail (Peshawar), 19 November 1953, headline news & LAD, 18 November 1953, vol. xxviii-no. 5, official report serial no. 413, pp.101-103.

46 Khan Mazhar, pp. 325-26.

giants. It is evident from the fact that once he entered a function in Peshawar and no body shook hands with him even though he was a federal minister.⁴⁷ Later, he was compelled to withdraw one of his nominees from the provincial cabinet, and was also stopped from paying occasional visits to the province.⁴⁸

Qaiyum Khan's stay in the central cabinet was also short-lived because, with the dissolution of the Assembly in October 1954, he lost his ministership, and subsequently, in 1955, also left the Muslim League. In 1957, he rejoined the Muslim League. In 1958, he became its President, and arranged strong anti-government demonstrations. However, soon Martial Law was proclaimed in the country in October 1958, and he was arrested on the charges of corruption.⁴⁹ The Martial Law authorities had actually opened an old case that was filed by some of his political opponents, that is, Sultan Muhammad Khan, Fida Muhammad Khan, Sikandar Khan, Agha Khan Baba Khan, Abdur Rahim and Arbab Muhammad Asaf Khan on 11 April 1952 with the Governor-General of Pakistan, Ghulam Muhammad, requesting disqualification of Qaiyum Khan under the PRODA Act of 1949. Amongst 14 different corruption charges, the more important ones were:

— the Chief Minister had illegally issued the arrest orders of Abdul Qaiyum Swati in order to terrorize the Assembly members so as to restrain them from supporting the vote of no confidence against him, which was under consideration.

— the Chief Minister conducted a bogus by-election in Bannu-West (Muslim rural)-constituency no. 2. He gave very limited time for the submission of the nomination papers and did not notify the same properly.

— the Chief Minister took no step for three years for holding by-elections in the constituencies of District Mansehra against the seats of late Khan Muhammad Abbas Khan and Ali Gohar Khan.

At that time, the Governor-General did not approve the charges, and, in December 1952, turned down their application. Their guarantee money of 5,000 rupees was also forfeited. Indeed, there were reports that the government was thinking of initiating legal action against the applicants.⁵⁰

However, Qaiyum Khan was arrested, on 26 September 1960 at Peshawar on the basis of those old charges. He was put on trial in October 1960 in Lahore by a military court under Martial Law Regulations 20 and 24 and was found guilty

47 Burhanuddin, Interview.

48 Afzal, p. 74.

49 Ahmad, Martial Law, footnote no. 17 on p. 329 and PA, Personal sheet of Qaiyum Khan, AA 134, bundle no. 3, serial no. 30, pp. 7-12.

50 Shahbaz (Peshawar), 15 December 1952, headline news.

and sentenced to three years imprisonment.⁵¹ In May 1961, under the Elective Bodies Disqualification Ordinance (EBDO), he was debarred from taking part in politics for six years that is upto, 31 December 1966.⁵² He was arrested again in July 1962 for his anti-government activities. However, this time, he tendered an apology to President Ayub Khan and pleaded his release on the ground of ill-health, and promised not to take part in the politics again.⁵³

The removal of Qaiyum Khan from the chief ministership of the province was quite abrupt and unexpected. When he was removed from the office, he was considered to be in full control of the province. In spite of the fact that there was a greater unrest in the province due to his authoritarian rule, no one was able to challenge his authority. The resentment against his authoritarian rule came into the open only after his removal from the office. It showed that he was ruling the bodies of the people, but not the hearts and minds, particularly of the politically conscious individuals. The disdain and resentment against his authoritarian rule was so intense, that not only efforts were made to uproot him from the province politically, but even physically, as he was not welcomed in the province any more for quite some time.

51 Khattak, pp. 108-109.

52 Ibid., p. 109.

53 Ahmad, Martial Law, footnote no. 17 on p. 329 and PA, Personal sheet of Qaiyum Khan, AA 134, bundle no. 3, serial no. 30, pp. 7-12.

CONCLUSION

Abdul Qaiyum Khan's rise to power in the NWFP was more of a long-cherished dream comes true for the Muslim League even though it had earlier formed government in the province for a brief period in 1943. The Muslim League and Qaiyum Khan both tried tooth and nail to muster support in the Legislative Assembly where they never had the required majority. They ousted Dr. Khan Sahib from the government after the creation of Pakistan on a petty pretext which Dr. Khan Sahib and his colleagues never accepted.

In connivance with the central leaders of his party Qaiyum Khan did every thing to earn himself majority in the NWFP Legislative Assembly. He went to the extent of delaying the assembly session for seven long months during which time he won over some of the Congress members through lucre and intimidation. He even had some members kidnapped whom he forced to defect their party. In this game of numbers he had the blessings and support of the key Pakistan Muslim League leaders. Both these evils, of the centre's involvement in forming governments of its choice in the provinces, and of "horse-trading," i.e., tempting members of other parties, were the brainchild of Qaiyum Khan and the Pakistan Muslim League. Their shadows still loom large in the political history of Pakistan, and have never allowed democratic institutions to flourish.

Some historical events also favoured Qaiyum Khan and the Muslim League. For example, the Non-Cooperation Movement of the All-India National Congress during World War II paved the way for the Muslim League to influence the politics of the pre-partition NWFP. Dr. Khan Sahib resigned from the government in 1939 in accordance with the Congress decision. The Governor asked the Muslim League assembly member, Sardar Aurangzeb Khan, to form the government, which he could not due to lack of majority. Though Mohammad Ali Jinnah also wanted the Muslim League to form the government in the province at any cost, Aurangzeb Khan could generate the support of only 21 members out of the house of 50. Therefor Governor's Rule was proclaimed under Section 93 of the then Constitution. The British government badly needed the support of political forces in the province. Once again, they asked Aurangzeb Khan to form the ministry, which he did this time as the Congress MLAs were in jail as part of their Civil Dis-obedience Movement. His government, however, did not last long. In 1945, when the Congress MLAs were released, Dr. Khan *Sahib* moved vote of no confidence against Sardar Aurangzeb Khan and toppled his ministry without any difficulty.

By the end of 1946, the Frontier Muslim League had garnered considerable support among the masses, but not good enough to earn them majority in the assembly. The Muslim League decided to launch a Civil Disobedience Movement against Dr. Khan Sahib's ministry. By December 1946, there was a

shortage of food commodities for which the blame was put on the Hindus and Sikhs. This obviously created unrest amongst the masses which continued until the announcement of the 3rd June Plan and of the Referendum in the province.

After the referendum, the Muslim League found an opportunity in the flag hoisting ceremony. Dr. Khan *Sahib* and his colleagues were blamed for not saluting the flag of Pakistan. Ironically, their claim was that they were never invited to either take the oath of allegiance to Pakistan or to attend the ceremony. Dr. Khan *Sahib* was removed; Qaiyum Khan became the first Pakistan Muslim League Chief Minister in the post-partition NWFP despite the fact that he did not have the required majority.

It merits a mention here that the Interim Constitution of Pakistan was amended in order to facilitate the removal of Dr. Khan *Sahib* and of bringing Qaiyum Khan into power. Interestingly Mohammad Ali Jinnah approved of the amendment though he had initially objected to the inclusion of that clause in the original Act of 1935. The undemocratic appointment of Qaiyum Khan had long lasting effect on both him as a leader and on the people of the province, particularly on his political rivals. As a representative of a minority, he always felt threatened from the political opposition in the province. In order to thwart the opposition, he used every trick in the book to keep himself in power and crush his rivals. He did not hesitate to hatch conspiracies against his political rivals even though they were the members of his own party. He believed in Machiavellian politics; for him the end always justified the means. This was evident from the fact that he manipulated not only the provincial Muslim League elections in his own favour but also heavily rigged the 1951 general elections. The opposition candidates were harassed, terrorized and even kidnapped. And when all these tactics did not work to his satisfaction, Qaiyum Khan unscrupulously rigged the elections in favour of his candidates. He never trusted his political colleagues. So, in order to keep them under check, he allowed many stalwarts of the Muslim League to indulge in corrupt practices, but asked the secret agencies to prepare files of their misdeeds. Whenever any such person wanted to create problems for him, he would blackmail and exploit them by showing them their misdeeds. So much so that he faked his own "Murder Plot" in order to get hold of some of his own dissident Leaguers.

Qaiyum Khan was extremely intolerant towards any potential threat in the shape of a competent and efficient leader within his own party. It was his strong belief that educated and competent people created problems for the executive head, which was why he always sidelined such potential leaders. It seems that it was this threat that turned him against *Pir* of Manki Sharif, Ibrahim Khan of Jhagra, Yusuf Khattak, Ghulam Mohammad Khan Lundkhwar, etc. However, his intolerant attitude created cracks within the Muslim League party. Qaiyum Khan also believed that the worst enemy in politics could be your former best friend.

Perhaps this was why he had turned a diehard enemy of the *Khudai Khidmatgars*, once his mentors in politics. He termed them traitors and anti-state elements and used the *Pakhtunistan* card very effectively against them. With the help of the law enforcing agencies Qaiyum Khan tortured, humiliated, and even killed his political rivals and their supporters.

Qaiyum Khan was an extremely ambitious and greedy ruler who would do anything for self-aggrandizement. Perhaps the Kashmir issue would have been resolved long ago had he not used it for his personal image and interest. Instead of working sincerely for the settlement of the issue during the Kashmir battle and working with sincere fighters for the cause he used this issue of national interest and integrity for his personal gains. He wanted to score points with the masses in the NWFP to win popularity and perhaps because as a Kashmiri he wanted to rule Kashmir if it was won. It was due to this weakness that he could never develop rapport with most of the governors during his term. He had the habit of browbeating them. He wanted them to be his puppets whom he could use according to his wishes. This is why he could not develop cordial relations with I.I. Chundrigar either.

Though Qaiyum Khan was intolerant in politics, analysts regard him as the best administrator this province ever had. During his time, the official work moved swiftly, smoothly, and efficiently. He was not only particular about his subordinates' work, he himself worked very hard. The routine red-tapism of bureaucracy was to the utmost minimum. There were many instances of his efficiency and prompt executions of socio-economic projects. It was known about him that he used to fix targets for the completion of different projects, and then, on the fixed time, personally visited them to ascertain their completion. If the target was not achieved, the official responsible were made accountable.

Qaiyum Khan was indeed a dynamic person. He wanted to develop the province in a short span of time. Though the province never had sufficient revenues or grants, he always worked out the means for different developmental projects. It was precisely due to such efforts that Qaiyum Khan was able to achieve landmark developments during his reign.

Like most of other parts of the country, NWFP also heavily relied on agricultural economy. Qaiyum Khan was of the strong opinion that, without industrialization, neither the country nor the province could develop significantly. So, he tried his best to explore many avenues for the industrialization of the province. He not only encouraged the private entrepreneurs to install industries in the province, he also launched some projects in the public sector. He provided cheap electricity, land, and other facilities for the execution of industrial projects. He never allowed bureaucratic snags to hamper industrialization. Thus, in short time this encouragement on part of the chief executive of the province resulted into the

installation of 19 different kinds of industries ranging from big projects like Mardan Sugar Mills to small projects like Frontier Cold Storage.

Qaiyum Khan also laid great stress on the developments of communication facilities in the province. He believed that without proper communication infrastructure, the pace of progress could not be swift. He always allocated greater amounts in the annual budgets for prompt and successful completion of different projects. Most of the areas previously not connected to the rest of the country through roads and bridges were made accessible. Qaiyum Khan not only started, he also successfully completed different roads, bridges, and other such projects for effective and efficient communication.

Qaiyum Khan was fully aware of the potential for hydropower projects in the province. He wanted to utilize the natural water resources of the province to the maximum. He expanded the Malakand Hydro Project and enhanced its power capacity from 9,600 KW to 19,600 KW. He also started the Dargai Power Station which was estimated to generate 20,000 KW of electricity. Another big project that he planned was the Warsak Hydro Electric Project. He not only enhanced power production but also extended the electricity facility to a large number of towns and villages in the province.

Qaiyum Khan also launched many projects for the development of agriculture in the province. Since the province was deficit in food production in spite of large tracts of arable lands, Qaiyum Khan initiated dozens of projects to ensure the supply of irrigation water to those areas where water was scarce. He also took care of bringing positive changes in the lives of the peasants. For this purpose, he introduced many reforms, including the Land Tenancy Act. Though all the people were not satisfied with these reforms, still they provided some relief to many peasants.

Due to Qaiyum Khan's encouragement of the agricultural sector, the agriculture department was able to introduce many varieties of maize, wheat and sugarcane, which were immune to most of the common diseases and gave a higher yield. He encouraged Cooperative Societies and banks to provide loans, financial and technical assistance to peasants and landlords. Though they did not perform very well, they still put in some efforts for the welfare of the agriculturists.

Qaiyum Khan not only concentrated on the development of infrastructure, he also wanted to improve the standard of living of the people. For this purpose, he spread the network of hospitals, dispensaries and basic health units. The capacity and staff of most of the hospitals was increased. Basic Health Units were established in far flung areas to provide basic medical facilities to the people. He also focused on curbing most of the common contagious diseases threatening the lives of the people.

During his period of rule, education facilities were extended to every nook and corner of the province. When Pakistan came into being, there were 702 boys and 137 girls' primary schools in the province which were raised to 872 and 145, respectively, by 1952. The number of secondary schools for boys and girls before partition were 224 and 19, respectively. They were raised to 282 and 26. There were only 3 colleges for boys before partition and none for the girls. By 1952, their number was raised to 5 and 2, respectively. The literacy rate, which was 6.2% before partition, was raised to 8.5% by 1953, which was considered a great achievement at that time. However, the biggest achievement of Qaiyum Khan in the field of education was the establishment of the University of Peshawar. Though he was not the originator of the project, still he deserves to be called the founder of the University of Peshawar. It was only because of his relentless efforts that a long awaited demand and dream of the people of this province was eventually realized. He took keen interest not only in the establishment of the University but also in its subsequent development. He minutely observed and assessed the different aspects of the development of the University and suggested suitable modifications and changes.

Qaiyum Khan indeed did lots of things for the development of the province as its Chief Minister. At times, he did not hesitate to confront the center and the powerful province of the Punjab for the interest of the NWFP. In the coalmine dispute with the Punjab, he took possession of the mines facilities through the Frontier Police. He took on the Punjab over the issue of centralization of the electricity. Since Punjab was deficient in power production, it wanted cheap electricity from the NWFP, to which Qaiyum Khan did not agree. His opinion was that since the provincial government had spent a lot of its resources on the development of this sector, the province had the sole right to reap its benefits. He had even made the domicile of the province compulsory for taking jobs in the electricity projects.

Qaiyum Khan was also a diehard supporter of the provincial autonomy. He believed that, in matters of internal administration, all the provinces should be given maximum freedom. As part of this belief, Qaiyum Khan supported the 2nd Draft of the Constitutional Proposals. He was of the opinion that the 2nd Draft was in the interests of the smaller provinces of Pakistan. This also brought him into direct confrontation with the powerful Punjabi politicians. Further, Qaiyum Khan, in the later years, had increased contacts with the East Bengal politicians against the wishes of the establishment and the Punjab. It is said that actually Qaiyum Khan was thinking of becoming the Prime Minister of the country. So, he increased relations with the densely populated province of the country in order to get their support in that endeavour. However, Qaiyum Khan's efforts did not pay dividends, as the Punjab's powerful lobby turned against him and finally uprooted him from the province in spite of his strong resistance.

It is generally said about Qaiyum Khan that he himself was not corrupt. Of course, no body disagreed as far as monetary aspect was concerned. However, the question is: is corruption only the name of monetary corruption? If the answer is in the negative, then Qaiyum Khan was certainly corrupt because he corrupted every department of the province. He never cared about the rules. He ruined the democratic institutions and ruled over the province like a medieval autocratic king. As such he left behind a legacy of corruption in every walk of life. He helped his favourites to amass huge wealth.

Qaiyum Khan was a very ambitious ruler: there is no second opinion about that. Even though he was removed from power, he wanted to rule in absentia, which is why he insisted on nominating his successor Chief Minister for the NWFP. Even though he exited from the mainstream politics of the province he started and left behind an undemocratic practice of autocracy and absolutism.

Qaiyum Khan's rule as Chief Minister of the province was diverse. He did many things for the development of the province in a variety of sectors of the state and society. As an administrator, he proved to be very efficient and tried to solve many problems of the people of the province. He was very sensitive to the plight of the poor people and did a lot for their betterment. As a politician, however, he was an authoritarian ruler. He did not tolerate opposition whether within the Muslim League or outside. He was convinced that every thing was fair in politics if the end was good. Law for him was a housemaid meant to serve his purpose and prolong his rule. For his rivals, he was ruthless; for the masses, a benign ruler. Qaiyum Khan would have made history had he preferred national interest and integrity to personal gains. Perhaps he was a little too ambitious to do that. Though Qaiyum Khan remained active in politics until his death on 22 October 1981, its study, analysis and the final judgment on his political life and career is beyond the scope of this study.

APPENDICES

APPENDIX I

The Viceroy's House

New Delhi.

10th August 1947.

Dear Mr. Liaquat Ali Khan,

1. You will remember that we discussed in Executive Council the problem of the North-West Frontier Province Ministry, and my Pakistan colleagues advised me to direct the Governor to ask the Ministry to resign and if it refused to dismiss it. Secondly, if the first course was considered unconstitutional, I was advised to direct the Governor to go into section 93 so that the new Governor could appoint a new Ministry on the 15th August. I undertook to accept this advice provided I was assured that it would be constitutional for me to do so, about which I had grave doubts, and informed you I was referring the matter to the Secretary of State.
2. The Secretary of State has now sent me instructions that both of these courses of action would in the present circumstances be unconstitutional and it is, therefore, impossible for me to accept the advice tendered, since in this case I have to act in my discretion, which means taking the advice of the Secretary of State and not the Executive Council.
3. What action should be taken by Sir George Cunningham on or after the 15th August is a matter which I expect you or Mr. Jinnah will wish to discuss with him when he comes through Karachi.
4. I am sending this letter by the hand of Ian Scott, who is joining the office of the U.K. High Commissioner, Pakistan. He will be in Karachi from the 11th August, and will be in touch with Birnie about the arrangements for my visit. If you should wish to ask him any question he will be at your service.

Yours Sincerely

Mountbatten of Burma

The Hon'ble Mr. Liaquat Ali Khan.

P.S. I have just received a telegram from Lockhart. I enclose a copy as you will want to have the latest view of the situation in the N-W.F.P.

(Source: National Archives, Islamabad, F.46-GG/47, s.no. 10(s))

APPENDIX II

Cypher Telegram

Secret

2910-S

From – Governor NWFP.

To - Viceroy.

No. CA167, dated the 9th August 1947 (Too-123-TOR1930).

Most Immediate.

Addressed Viceroy repeated Secretary of State.

I have had further communication with Area Commander and Inspector-General of Police with reference to your recent telegrams.

They are both gravely perturbed at prospect of dismissal at this particular juncture and foresee very serious and widespread disturbances. Area Commander is emphatic that owing to partition of troops movements of forces at his disposal are inadequate and some of doubtful temper.

Both consider that we shall be in better position in two months time when Cunningham will have had chance to exert his influence. We are going ahead with preparations to act at once but in the circumstances I feel compelled to recommend delay and that you should ask Jinnah to urge patience on League.

My information is that any League repercussions to temporary retention of present Ministry would be less dangerous.

Dissolution might still save situation.

(Source: National Archives, Islamabad, F.46-GG/47, s.no. 10 (s).

APPENDEX III

Telegram (Code)

Immediate

Peshawar – 15.8.47

Governor-General, Pakistan, Karachi.

3-G Personal for Qaid-i-Azam Muhammad Ali Jinnah

1. I have had several long talks with Dr. Khan Sahib. Result briefly summarized is –
 - a. He has assured me solemnly that as long as he is a minister, he will work loyally under Pakistan and will do nothing injurious to its constitution.
 - b. He will not make any declaration about an independent Pathanistan.
 - c. If final constitution decided upon by the Constituent Assembly is one that he feels he cannot support, he will resign and go into constitutional opposition.
 - d. I have urged him to resign forthwith, but so far he has not responded.
2. I trust De. Khan Sahib's word and, if you felt it possible to leave him in power until the next general election under the new constitution, I personally would be very glad. For I believe that broadest interests of the province for co-operation of both parties in constitutional activities and dismissal of ministry at the present stage will make this unlikely for some time to come.
3. But I appreciate the difficulties you feel in this matter and, if you decided to direct me to dismiss the ministry, I shall fully understand. Decision of ministers this morning at the very last moment not to agree to the flag hoisting ceremony weakens their position. Khan Sahib's reason was genuine anxiety that ministers might suffer some indignity from the crowd. Qazi Attaullah probably inspired by Abdul Ghaffar Khan seemed to think their attendance would be derogatory to the ministry.
4. I have been urging Khan Sahib and through him Abdul Ghaffar Khan not to stultify themselves by allowing any violence. I think I have made some headway. Abdul Qayum with whom I have had full discussion and whose judgment I trust thinks that we can control situation if we have

troops on the spot in three or four bad areas. For this reason I would be happier if I do not have to change the ministry before August 19th, as troop movements will be much easier after Id. This slight delay will not, I think, be any embarrassment to the provincial League leaders who are in excellent fettle. I have full confidence in the loyalty of the police and the provincial services.

Governor N.W.F.P.

No. 2309

Sind Government House,

Karachi, 16th August 1947

Cypher Assistant

Sind Government House, Karachi.

(Source: National Archives, Islamabad, F.46-GG/47, s.no. 10(s))

APPENDIX IV

JOINT RESIGNATION OF 7 MEMBERS

We accepted Abdul Qayyum Khan as leader of the party with a view to make the country prosperous. But later it has been established that his every act is heading towards communism and partisanship. Consequently, we have no confidence in him and we do not recognize him as our leader.

2. Jalal Din.
3. Abdul Latif.
4. Asad ullah.
5. Qutab Din.
6. Mushraf Shah.
7. Hassan Ali Khan.
8. Raja Sardar Khan.
9. Muhammad Sharif Arbab.

No. 1 resiled from his words and did not move to the opposition benches.

(Source: NWFP Archives, special branch, bundle no. 25, serial no. 367, p.65).

APPENDIX V

Individual pledge documents.

I, Jalal ud Din, son of Ghulam Muhammad, resident of Abbottabad, do hereby solemnly declare that the nation elected me to the assembly as their representative so that I may try to end bribery, jobbery and brutalities. But the present Premier who had my confidence is not paying any attention to chekmate the increasing corruption, jobbery but due to his interitia (sic.), dishonesty, partisanship and other evils have begun to increase every day. I, therefore think it my bounden duty from the national, cultural and Islamic point of view that I along with other members would place a vote of no-confidence against him. If I declined to do so or if I stood by him, it would amount to my dishonesty and traitorous and I would not be like one who could be relied upon individually or collectively.

Muhammad Jalal ud Din

4.3.49

(Source: NWFP Archives, special branch, bundle no. 25, serial no. 367, p.65).

APPENDEX VI
QAIYUM KHAN LETTER TO QUAID-I-AZAM

“Respected Quaid-e-Azam (sic.)

I wanted to see you, but in view of your delicate health, I refrained from doing so.

In Lahore you were pleased to late (sic.) me that the fate of our assembly will be settled sometime in the 1st week of February 1948. This I am afraid is a bit too late. Personally I would prefer an early decision.

Total strength of the assembly is 50-12 Hindus+Sikhs+38 Moslems. The present position is this.

12 Hindus+Sikhs – one has been killed, rest have left us.

1 – Congress Muslim M.L.A. died a few days ago.

1 – Muslim League M.L.A. has become a session judge.

2 – Bye-elections pending in seats in Hazara where 2 League MLAs died some time ago.

4 – Congress Muslim M.L.As have promised to join us.

1 – Congress Moslem M.L.A. viz. the speaker has joined us.

15 – Moslem League M.L.As.

14 – Congress Muslim M.L.As.

There are 16 Muslim League M.L.As. 4 Congress Moslem M.L.As have promised to join us – 4 bye-elections are pending. This is the present picture:

If we wash away the 12 Hindus+Sikhs, and win the 4 bye-elections, we will have a strength of 24 (as 4 Congress Moslem M.L.As are crossing over) as against 14 Moslem Congress M.L.As.

If the assembly is called we will be faced with following dangers

- a. risk and turmoil of bye-elections.
- b. Danger of defection on *the pesh*. (*not clear*) of uncertain areas, if they do not get there pond of flesh.
- c. M.L.As will demand their price, which if paid, will make us highly unpopular in the transition period.

- d. We will have to face intrigues and expansion of the ministry- which in the transition period is highly undesirable.

Our ministry of 2 is very popular at present. The *saclin where (not clear)* us is our great victory in the recent referendum.

My considered opinion is that till such time that the new constitution is framed, we *should (not clear)* do warrant any assembly in N.W.F.P. If we put in good work for a year or 2, we will have enhanced the prestige of Muslim League. What the Frontier needs is an honest and efficient government. People are with us and are not bothered about the assembly.

I therefore request that the present assembly be dissolved and the ministry be allowed to carry on. A new statute will be required to regularize it.

Let me add, sir, that if my being in the ministry is an obstacle, I am prepared to go out.

I am flying back to Peshawar on the morning of the 18th.

Yours sincerely

Abdul Qaiyum"

(Source: National Archives, GOP, File No. 51 (0)F-196/GG/47).

APPENDEX VII
GOVERNMENT GAZETTE
NORTH-WEST FRONTIER PROVINCE
Extraordinary

Published by Authority

PESHAWAR, Thursday, THE 8TH JULY, 1948

LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT

NOTIFICATION

Dated Peshawar, the 8th July 1948

No. 2723/L.D.____ The following Ordinance promulgated by His Excellency the Governor, of the North-West Frontier Province under Section 88 of the Government of India Act, 1935, is hereby published for general information:-

THE NORTH-WEST FRONTIER PROVINCE

PUBLIC SAFETY ORDINANCE, 1948.

ORDINANCE No. VII OF 1948.

AN

ORDINANCE

to empower the Provincial Government to take action against certain persons and organisations in the interest of public safety in the

North-West Frontier Province.

Preamble____ WHEREAS the Governor, North-West Frontier Province is satisfied that circumstances exist which render it necessary for him to take immediate action against persons and organisations in the interest of public safety in the North-West Frontier Province;

AND WHEREAS the Legislature of the North-West Frontier Province is not in session;

NOW, THEREFORE, in exercise of the powers conferred on him by Section 88 of the Government of India Act, 1935, as adapted by the Pakistan (Provisional Constitution, Order, 1947, and in pursuance of the instructions received from the Governor General of Pakistan, the Governor, North-West Frontier Province is hereby pleased to make and promulgate the following Ordinance:-

Short title, extent, and commencement____

1. (1) This Ordinance may be cited as the "North-West Frontier Province Public Safety Ordinance, 1948".
- (2) It shall extend to the whole of the North-West Frontier Province.
- (3) It shall come into force at once.

Definitions__

2. In this Ordinance, unless there is anything repugnant in the subject or context, the following expressions have the meanings hereby respectively assigned to them, that is to say :-
 - a. "Property" shall mean movable as well as immovable property;
 - b. "Tribal Areas" shall mean the areas along the borders of the North-West Frontier Province and within the North-West Frontier of Pakistan, not forming a part of the said Province or any State or any foreign territory, which areas before the 15th August, 1947, were administered by and were under the political charge of the Governor the said Province acting as the Agent to the Governor-General and have since been declared by the accredited representatives thereof to be a part of Pakistan.
 - c. "Prejudicial Act" shall include any act which is intended or is likely:-
 - i. to prejudice the relations of the Government of Pakistan or Provincial Government with any State, foreign power or tribal area, adjacent to the North-West Frontier Province, or the maintenance of peaceful conditions in any tribal area;
 - ii. to endanger public safety or the maintenance of public order;
 - iii. to bring into hatred or contempt, or to excite disaffection towards the Government established by law;

- iv. to promote feelings of enmity and hatred between different classes of people in the North-West Frontier Province or Tribal Areas;
- v. to cause fear or alarm to the public or to any section of the public;
- vi. to disrupt the integrity of Pakistan as by law established;
- vii. to associate itself with any movement prejudicial to the interests of Pakistan.

Explanations.___ Having in one's possession, or making, rearing, carrying or displaying any uniform, flag, banner, emblem or badge, associated with any Organisation declared by the Government to be harmful to the interests of Pakistan shall be presumed to be an act of the nature described in the preceding clause (c).

- (e) "Offence" shall mean any act or omission made punishable under this Ordinance.

Power to arrest and detain certain persons___

3. (1) The Provincial Government, on being satisfied that any person has committed any prejudicial act or that with a view to prevent him from committing any prejudicial act, it is necessary so to do, may order the arrest without warrant of such person, and in effecting such arrest all means necessary for the purpose may be used.
- (2) The Provincial Government, may, commit any person arrested under the last preceding sub-section to such custody in such part of Pakistan and for such length of time, as the Provincial Government may, from time to time, order in that behalf.
- (3) The Provincial Government may, by general or special order, determine the conditions as to the maintenance, discipline and punishment of offences and breach of discipline which shall be applicable in the case of persons committed to custody as aforesaid.

Power to restrict the movement or actions of certain person___

4. (1) The Provincial Government, on being satisfied with respect to any person that he has committed or is likely to commit any prejudicial act, may make an order:-
 - a. directing such person to remove himself from the North-West Frontier Province in such manner, by such time and by such route as may be specified in the order and also prohibiting his

return to the Province for such period as the Provincial Government deems fit;

- b. directing that, except in so far as he may be so permitted by the terms of the order, or by such authority or person as may be specified therein, he shall not be in any such area or place within the North-West Frontier Province as may be specified in the order;
- c. requiring him to reside or remain in such place or within such area in the North-West Frontier Province as may be specified in the order, and, if he be not already there, to proceed to that place or area within such time as may be specified in the order;
- d. requiring him to notify his movements or to report himself, or both to notify his movements and report himself, in such manner, at such time and to such authority or person as may be specified in the order;
- e. imposing upon him such restrictions as may be specified in the order in respect of his employment or business, his association or communication with other persons, his activities in relation to the dissemination of news or propagation of opinion and in respect of his connection with any organization;
- f. prohibiting or restricting the possession or use by him of any such article or articles (Sic.) as may be specified in the order;
- g. otherwise regulating his conduct in any such particulars as may be specified in the order.

(2) An order made under sub-section (1) may require the person in respect of whom it is made to enter into a bond with or without sureties, for the due performance of, or as an alternative to the enforcement of such restrictions or conditions specified in the order.

(3) If any person is found in any area or place in contravention of any order made under the provisions of the Section or fails to leave any area or place in accordance with the requirements of such an order, then, without prejudice to the other provisions of this Ordinance with regard to punishment etc, he may be removed from such area or place by any police officer or by any person acting on behalf of the Government, to a place specified in the order.

Control and winding up of certain organizations.____

5. (1) The Provincial Government may declare any organization, by whatever name it has been or may be, from time to time known or called, as unlawful, if it is satisfied with regard to such organization:-
 - a. that it is subject to foreign influence or control; or
 - b. that the members thereof or persons actively interested in or helping such organization have or have had association with the Government of any foreign State, or its agents, or with persons engaged in hostile activities in the tribal areas, and such association, in the opinion of the Provincial Government, was or is against the interests of the Government established by law in the North-West Frontier Province; or
 - c. that it is organized, trained or equipped (Sic.) for the purpose of usurping the functions of the military or police or for the use or display of force in the North-West Frontier Province; or
 - d. that its aim or object is to incite people to commit any prejudicial act.
- (2) No person shall :-
 - a. join or continue to be a member of any such organizations;
 - b. manage or assist in managing any such organisation;
 - c. promote or convene or assist in promoting or convening a meeting of any members of any such organization or attend any such meeting in any capacity except on official duty;
 - d. write, publish or display any hand-bill, notice or advertisement relating to any meeting; or
 - e. otherwise assist in any manner the operations or activities of any such organization.

Power to control educational or other institutions.____

6. The Provincial Government, on being satisfied that any educational or other institution is being conducted in a manner prejudicial to the public safety, maintenance of public order or the relations of the Government of Pakistan or the Provincial Government with any State, foreign power or tribal area adjacent to the North-West Frontier Province, it may :-
 - a. close such institution, and possession of any land or building occupied by or utilised for such institution, together with any property therein or thereon, or

- b. remove from the managing body of such institution any member thereof, or require the managing body or any person in control thereof to dismiss any teacher or other employee or expel any student; or
- c. withhold any grant made to such institution by Government or prohibit the payment to such institution of any grant made to it by any local authority.

Control of procession, meeting, etc._____

- 7. (1) The Provincial Government may, by general or special order, prohibit, restrict or impose conditions upon the holding of or taking part in public processions, meetings or assemblies.
- (2) For the purposes of sub-section (1), any procession, meeting or assembly, which is open to the public or to any class or portion of the public, whether held in a public or a private place and whether admission thereto be restricted by the issue of tickets or otherwise, shall be deemed to be a public procession, meeting or assembly as the case may be.
- (3) Any police or military officer may take such steps and use such force as may be reasonably necessary for securing compliance with any order made under the Ordinance.

Power to issue search warrant._____

- 8. The power to issue search warrants conferred by Section 98 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898, shall be deemed to include the power to issue warrants for:-
 - a. the search of any place in which any Magistrate, mentioned in that section, has reason to believe that any prejudicial act has been, is being or is about to be committed, or that preparation for the commission of any such act is being made;
 - b. the seizure in or on any place searched under clause (a) of anything which the officer executing the warrant has reason to believe is being used or is intended to be used for any purpose mentioned in that section; and the provisions of the Code shall, so far as may be, apply to searches made under the authority of any warrant issued and to the disposal of any property seized under this section.

General power of search.____

9. Any Magistrate or Police Officer not below the rank of a Head Constable may enter and search any place, if he has reason to believe that such search is necessary for the purpose of;-
 - a. ascertaining whether it is necessary or expedient to exercise such power; or
 - b. ascertaining whether any order given, direction made, or condition prescribed in the exercise of such power has been duly complied with; or
 - c. generally giving effect to such power or securing compliance with or giving effect to, any order given, direction made or condition prescribed in the exercise of such power; Provided that a Head Constable shall not enter and search any place unless so authorised in writing by the Superintendent of Police of the District within which such place is situated.

Power to order forfeiture of the property.____

10. (1) Without prejudice to the other provisions of this Ordinance, the Provincial Government may, in the case of any person against whom an order U/S 3 or a direction (Sic.) U/S. 4, is made or who has contravened any provision of this Ordinance or in the case of an organization against which an order U/S. 5 is made, may, in addition to any other penalty provided for by this Ordinance shall be forfeited to Government.
- (2) No sale, alienation or other disposition of such property, made at any time within one year before the date of the order of forfeiture or subsequent to the commission of the offence or at any time not herein provided for, with the fraudulent intention of preventing such forfeiture, shall have any effect against the right of the Government to effect such forfeiture.
- (3) All immovable property of such person, alienated or otherwise disposed of against the provisions of sub-section (2) shall be forfeited in the same manner as if no such alienation or disposal had been made; unless such alienation or disposal was made in good faith and for valuable consideration and was registered more than one year before the commission of the offence, in case such registration is compulsory under law.
- (4) In any proceeding concerning any property alleged to have been forfeited, the order or conviction passed by the Provincial Government shall be conclusive evidence of the fact that such person has committed

any prejudicial act or that such organization has been declared unlawful U/S.5 of the Ordinance.

(5) After the order of forfeiture is made the Collector or any other officer appointed by the Provincial Government in that behalf may seize and take possession of the forfeited property.

Explanation:-___ Order under this Section may be made against any person who ordinarily resides or has nay property in the North-West Frontier Province.

Disclosure of the grounds of the order of detention or declaration.___

11. Any person against whom an order under Section 3, sub-section (1) or under Section 4, sub-section (1) is made or who is affected by any order made under Section 5, or whose property is forfeited under Section 10, shall be entitled to resceive (Sic.) intimation only in respect of those grounds on which such order or declarations made, which in the opinion of the Provincial Government would not be against the public interest to disclose.

Savings as to orders.___

12. (1) No order under this Ordinance shall be called in question in any court and no court shall have power to make any order under Section 491 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898, in respect of any order made under this Ordinance or in respect of any person against whom such an order has been made.
- (2) Where an order purports to have been made by any authority in exercise of any power conferred by or under this Ordinance, the Court shall, within the meaning of the Indian evidence Act, 1872, presume that such order was so made by that authority.

Punishment for absconding or concealing.___

13. If the Provincial Government has reason to believe that a person in respect of whom an order under Section 3, sub-section (1) or under Section 4, has been made, has absconded or is concealing himself so that such order cannot be executed, the Government may ___
 - a. make a report in writing of the fact to any Magistrate of the 1st Class having jurisdiction in the place where such person ordinarily or has any property, and thereupon the provisions of Section 87,88 and 89 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898, shall apply in respect of such person and his property, as if the order directing him to be detained or any order made under Section 4, were a warrant issued by a Magistrate;

- b. by order notified in the official gazette direct such person to appear before such officer, at such place and within such period as may be specified in the order; and if such person fails to comply with such direction, he shall, unless he proves that his absconding or concealment was not willful, inasmuch as it was not possible for him to comply therewith and that within the period specified in the order he had informed the officer concerned of the reason which rendered compliance therewith impossible be punished with imprisonment for term which may extend to 5 years or with fine or with both.
 - c. Punishment for disobeying directions given or orders made under Section 4, of the Ordinance.
- 14. If any person contravenes any order made U/S. 4. He shall be punished with imprisonment for a term which may extend to 5 years or with fine or with both, and if such person has entered into a bond in pursuance of the provisions of sub-section (2) of Section 4, such bond shall be forfeited, and any person bound thereby shall pay the penalty thereof, or show cause to the satisfaction of the convicting court why such penalty should not be paid. Dissemination of rumours, etc.
- 15. Whoever__
 - a. makes any speech, or
 - b. by words whether spoken or written or by signs or by visible or audible representation or otherwise publishes any statement, rumour or report, shall be punished with imprisonment which may extend to three years or with fine or with both if such speech, statement, rumour or report.
 - i. causes or is likely to cause fear or alarm to the public or to any section of the public;
 - ii. (ii) defames or is likely to defame Government or any servant of the Crown;
 - iii. (iii) furthers or is likely to further any prejudicial act.

Obstructing lawful authorities__

- 16. If any person voluntarily obstructs, or offers any resistance to, or impedes or otherwise interferes with,__
 - a. any authority, officer or person exercising any power, or performing any duty, conferred or imposed upon it or him by

or in pursuance of this Ordinance, or otherwise discharging any lawful function under this Ordinance; or

- b. any person who is carrying out the orders of any such authority, officer or person as aforesaid or who is otherwise acting in accordance with his duty in pursuance of this Ordinance___he shall be punished with imprisonment for a term which may extend to 5 years or with fine or with both.

Punishment.____

17. Any person who commits any prejudicial act or attempts to commit or abets or attempts to abet or does any act preparatory to the committing of any prejudicial act shall be punished, in addition to any other action which the Provincial Government may deem necessary to take against him under this Ordinance, with imprisonment for a term which may extend to seven years or with fine or with both.

Punishment in General.____

18. Whoever contravenes any provision of this Ordinance or disobeys or neglects to comply with any order made or direction given in accordance with its provisions shall, where no express provision is made by this Ordinance for the punishment of such contravention, disobedience or negligence, be punished in addition to any other action which the Provincial Government may take against him for such contravention, disobedience or negligence, with imprisonment which may extend to five years or with fine or with both.

Evasion of provisions for the taking of possession of the property.____

19. Where any person authorised by or under this Ordinance has in pursuance of powers conferred by or under this Ordinance given notice that he or some other person duly authorized by him has taken or intends to take possession of any property, any person having control of such property, who alienates, removes or secretes the same or any part thereof or otherwise disposes of the same in contravention of any directions issued to him for its disposal, shall be punished with imprisonment which may extend to five years or with fine or with both.

Attempts etc. to contravene the provisions of this Ordinance____

20. Any person, who attempts to contravene, or abets, or attempts to abet or does any act preparatory to the contravention of any of the provisions of this Ordinance or of any order made there under, shall be deemed to have contravened that provision, or, as the case may be, such order.

Power to give effect to rules and orders etc.____

21. Any authority, officer or person who is empowered by or in pursuance of any provisions of this Ordinance to make any order or to exercise any other power may, in addition to any other action prescribed by or under this Ordinance, take or cause to be taken, such steps and use, or cause to be used, such force as may, in the opinion of such authority, officer or person, be reasonably necessary for securing compliance with or for preventing or rectifying any contravention of such order, or for the effective exercise of such power. Saving for acts done in good faith under this Ordinance.
22. No suit, prosecution or other legal proceeding shall lie against any person for anything in good faith done or intended to be done in pursuance of this Ordinance.

Application of other laws not barred.____

23. The provisions of this Ordinance shall be in addition to, and not in derogation of the provisions of any other Act, Ordinance or Regulation for the time being in force.

Power to direct payment by parent or guardian of fine impose on a minor person.____

24. (1). Where any person under the age of sixteen years convicted by any court of an offence under this Ordinance and such person is sentenced to fine, the Court may order that the fine shall be paid by the parent or guardian of such person as if such fine had been imposed upon the parent or guardian.

(2) In any such case the Court may by its order direct that in default of payment of fine by the parent or guardian, the parent or guardian shall suffer imprisonment as if such parent or guardian had himself been convicted of the offence for which such person is convicted.

Offences committed by corporation or association.____

25. Where the person committing any offence punishable under the Ordinance is a corporation, company, bank or association of persons, any secretary, director or other officer, member or person concerned with the management thereof shall be punished with the punishment provided for the offence.

Offences under this Ordinance to be cognizable and non-bailable.____

26. Notwithstanding anything contained in the Criminal Procedure Code, 1898, any offence punishable under this Ordinance shall be cognizable and non-bailable.

Effect of orders, etc, inconsistent with other enactment.____

27. Every order made and every action taken under this Ordinance shall have effect notwithstanding anything inconsistent therewith contained in any enactment or any instrument having effect by virtue of any such enactment, other than this Ordinance.

Delegation of Powers.____

28. The Provincial Government may by order direct that any power or duty which is conferred or imposed under this Ordinance on the Provincial Government shall, in such circumstances and under such conditions as it may specify, be exercised or discharged by any officer or authority subordinate to the Provincial Government.

A. D. F. DUNDAS,

Governor,

Dated Peshawar,

North-West Frontier Province

the 4th July 1948.

SHEIKH MUHAMMAD SHAFI,

Secretary to Government,

North-West Frontier Province,

(Source: NWFP Archives, Publication Section, Accession no. 6292, Serial no. 214, Government Gazette, NWFP).

APPENDEX VIII

From – The Deputy Commissioner, Bannu.

To – The Chief Secretary to Government,

N.W.F.P., Peshawar.

No.882/St D/-27/9/1948.

Memo.

Malik Akber Ali Khan, M.L.A. (Congress), Mohd Ayub Khan , President of Bannu district Congress Committee, Qazir (Sic.) Habib-u-Rehman, M.Azad Khan, Haji Mohd Aslam Khan and Sardar Ali Khan have abjured all connexion with the Khudai Khidmatgar Organisation, and offered their whole-hearted services to Government in the cause of Islam and the Islamic State of Pakistan.

Their written declaration addressed to the Hon'ble the Chief Minister is attached herewith.

Malik Akbar Ali Khan, M.L.A., further requests that his seat in the Provincial Legislative Assembly be transferred from the opposition benches to an Independent seat. His written request to this effect which is addressed to H.E. the Governor and Hon'ble the Speaker is enclosed herewith.

I take this opportunity of bringing to notice the laudable service rendered by the Superintendent of Police, Bannu, in the conversion of these gentlemen.

I believe that Mohd Yaqub Khan, M.L.A. (Congress) of Bannu, who is now in Haripur Jail, would also abjure all connexion with the Redshirt Organisation if he could be transferred to Bannu Jail, where it would be easier for us to gain contact with him. His elder brother, Haji Mohd Alsam (Sic.) Khan mentioned above has already done so.

Sd/-

MOHD JAN KHAN.

Deputy Commissioner, Bannu.

Copies to :-

1. Hon'ble the Chief Minister, N.W.F.P., Peshawar.
2. Inspector General of Police, N.W.F.P., Peshawar.

Sd/-

Deputy Commissioner, Bannu.

(Source: NWFP Archives, special branch, bundle no. 22, serial no. 297, p.225).

APPENDEX IX

Aims and Objects of The All Pakistan Awami Muslim League:-

1. To safeguard the sovereignty, integrity, dignity, stability and welfare of Pakistan.
2. To ensure that the constitution and laws of Pakistan, its moral, social, political and economic order, and the policies of the State are founded on the eternal principles of Islam.
3. To safeguard and promote the religious, cultural, social, educational, and political interests of the Muslims of Pakistan, as well as all similar legitimate interests of the other citizens of Pakistan irrespective of creed or religion.
4. To improve the lot of the masses, the Haris, the Mizariein, the cultivators, labourers and low-paid employees to raise their standard of living and to revive the dignity of labour.
5. To ensure that basic necessities of life for all residents of Pakistan in fulfillment of the responsibility of the State as ordained by Islam viz. food, shelter, clothes, education, medical aid and opportunity to earn an honest and honourable competence.
6. To protect civil liberties such as individual and collective freedom of belief, expression, association and organization.
7. To do all that lies in the power of Pakistan to defend the safety, liberty, honour, and the religious, cultural and economic interest of the Muslims living in India.
8. To organize all branches of social service through co-operation and mutual help to relieve suffering, propagate knowledge, promote equity and justice, banish oppression and corruption, raise moral and material standards and living conditions, and advance the cause of the poor and downtrodden in the rural areas as well as in the cities.
9. To spread the knowledge of Islam and its high moral and religious principles.
10. To work for the ultimate elimination of the political and national divisions of humanity with a view to establishing the Islamic World Order.
11. To promote peace in international Affairs, and a just and fair deal to the smaller States of the world.

12. To advance the interests of the Muslims of all over the world and strengthen fraternal relations between Pakistan and other Muslim States, and assist Muslim States to achieve independence.
13. For promoting the above aims and objects to assist, advise and supervise over the activities of Governments at the center and in the provinces of Pakistan in their capacity as trustees of the people.

To do, from time to time all that is necessary or expedient in the furtherance of these aims.

(Source: Provincial Archives, special branch, April 1950, bundle no.77, serial no.1403).

APPENDIX X

ELECTION RESULTS, 1951

Constituency	Candidates names	Successful candidate
Peshawar 1, Tangi	Abdullah Khan (Ind.), Haji Mohammad Ali Khan (Ind.)	Haji Mohammad Ali (Ind.)
Pesh.2 Shabqadar	Fazal ur Rahman Khan (ML),	Fazal ur Rahman Khan
Fazal Ilahi (Ind.),	Mukkaram Khan	(ML)
Pesh. 3 Rashakai	Arbab Attaullah Khan (JAL),	Arbab Attaullah Khan
	Abdur Rahman (ML)	(JAL)
Pesh. 4 Mathra	Babu Noor Mohammad Khan (ML)	Arbab Asaf Khan (JAL)
	Arbab Asaf Khan (JAL)	
Pesh. 5 Pishtakhara	Mohammad Aslam Khan (ML), Arbab	Mohammad Aslam Khan
	Sikandar Khan (JAL)	(ML)
Pesh. 6 Landi	Noor Mohammad Khan (ML), Sanobar Khan (Ind.)	Noor Mohammad Khan (ML)
Pesh. 7 Mattani	Pirzada Ahmad Gul (JAL), Arbab Mohammad Ilyas (ML)	Pirzada Ahmad Gul (JAL)
Pesh. 8 Ziarat Kaka	Mian Jaffar Shah (ML), Mian Musharaf Sahib Shah (JAL)	Mian Jaffar Shah (ML)
Pesh. 9 Khair Abad	Mohammad Abdul Haq (ML), Bismillah Shah (JAL), Mohammad Nawaz Khan (Ind.)	Mohammad Abdul Haq (ML)
Pesh. 10 Badreshi	Mian Akbar Shah (ML), Taj Mohammad Khan (JAL)	Mian Akbar Shah (ML)
Pesh. 11 Nowshera	Mohammad Shamaz Khan (ML), Sarwar Shah (JAL)	Mohammad Shamaz Khan (ML)
Pesh. 12 Pabbi	Mohammad Umar Khan (ML), Ghulam Mahboob Khan (JAL), Qeemat Shah (Ind.)	Mohammad Umar Khan (ML)
	Abdul Wahid (Ind.)	
Pesh. 13 Khan Mahi	Akbar Shah Khan (ML), Fazl-e-Haq Shaida (JAL), Taj ul Maluk (JI)	Akbar Shah Khan (ML)
Pesh. 14 Maira Tur-	Abdul Karim Khan (ML), Qaim Shah Angzai (Ind.)	Abdul Karim Khan (ML)

Pesh. 15. Sherpao	Dost Mohammad Khan (ML), Sher Afzal Khan (Ind.), Sahibzada Obaidullah (Ind.)	Dost Mohammad Khan (ML)
Pesh. 16 Nisatta	Syed Abdullah Jan (ML), Mohammad Tahir (JAL), Arbab Mohammad Saeed (JI)	Syed Abdullah Jan (ML)
Pesh. 17 Prang	Shams ul Haq Khan (ML)	
Pesh. 18 Tamab	Mohammad Ibrahim Khan (ML), Musa Khan (JAL), Arbab Sher Afzal Khan (Ind.)	Arbab Sher Afzal Khan (Ind)
Pesh. 19	Khan Abdul Qaiyum Khan	Elected unopposed
Pesh. 20 Pesh. City	Mohammad Ashraf Khan (ML), Fida Mohammad Khan (Ind.), Mirza Ashiq Hussain (Islam League)	Mohammad Ashraf Khan (ML)
Pesh. 21 Pesh City	Mirza Ashiq Hussain (IL), Fida Mohammad Khan (Ind.), Safiullah Khan (ML)	Safiullah Khan (ML)
Pesh. 22 Pesh City	Bashir Khan (Ind.), Rahim Bakhsh (Ind.), Qazi Misbahuddin (IL), Malik Taj Mohammad Khan (ML)	Malik Taj Mohammad Khan (ML)
Pesh. 23 Urmur	Samin Jan Khan (JAL), Umara Khan (ML), Lt. Col. Mir Haider Khan (Ind.)	Samin Jan Khan (JAL)
Mardan 1 Banzai	Abdul Ghani Khan (ML), Mohammad Kharqai, Gujar Khan (JAL), Mohammad Akbar Khan (Azad Muslim League Yusufzai Party)	Abdul Ghani Khan (ML)
Mar. 2 Katlang	Amir Sultan (ML), Ajar Badshah (JAL), Akbar Khan (AMYP), Gul Mohammad Khan (Ind.)	Amir Sultan (ML)
Mar. 3 Afzal Abad	Abdul Sattar Khan (ML), Farid Khan (JAL), Mohammad Hussain (Ind.)	Abdul Sattar Khan (ML)
Mar. 4 Manga	Ghulam Sarwar Khan (ML), Mohammad Ayub Khan (Azad Muslim League), Shamsuddin (Ind.)	Ghulam Sarwar Khan (ML)
Mar. 5 Turu	Azizullah Khan (JAL), Noor Mohammad Khan (ML)	Noor Mohammad Khan (ML)
Mar. 6 Daagai	Mohammad Ayub Khan (ML), Mehraban Shah (JAL)	Mohammad Ayub Khan (ML)
Mar 7 Bakhshalai	Wali Mohammad Khan (ML), Amir Zada	Wali Mohammad Khan

	Khan (JAL), Mohammad Ghufra Khan (Azad Muslim League)	(ML)
Mar 8 Rustam	Abdullah Khan (ML), Jamshaid Ahmad Khan (Ind.), Rahmat Shah (JAL), Shah Pasand Khan (Azad Muslim League), Syed Kamal Shah (Ind.)	Abdullah Khan (ML)
Mar 9 Shaiwa	Bakht Jamal (Ind.), Pir Mohammad (Ind.), Sultan Mohammad (ML), Umar Jang (Ind.)	Pir Mohammad (Ind.)
Mar 10 Adeena	Nasrullah Jan (Ind.), Rahmat Khan (Ind.), Saifur Khan (ML), Taj Mohammad (JAL)	Saifur Khan (ML)
Mar 11 Jalbai	Fazal Hanan Bacha (Ind.), Hikmat Khan (ML), Sardarullah (JAL), Mohammad Yusuf Khan (Ind.)	Mohammad Yusuf Khan (Ind.)
Mar 12 Tor Dher	Abdul Rauf Khan (Ind.), Gul Mohammad Khan (ML), Sherin Khan (Ind.)	Sherin Khan (Ind.)
Mar 13 Daara	Sohbat Khan (ML), Sher Afzal Khan (Ind.), Mir Ghazan Khan (JAL), Abdul Shakoor (Ind.)	Sher Afzal Khan (Ind.)
Mar 14 Topi	Mohammad Umar Khan (ML), Abdul Hameed (Ind.) Mohammad Hayat (JAL) Khan	Mohammad Umar Khan (ML)
Mar 15	Mohammad Ishaq Khan (ML), Moham mad Umar Khan (Azad Muslim League)	Mohammad Ishaq Khan (ML)
Kohat 1 Usterzai	M R Kiyani	Elected Unopposed
Kohat 2 Tall	Asmar Din (ML)	Elected Unopposed
Kohat 3 Teri	Mohammad Aslam Khan (ML)	Elected Unopposed
Kohat 4 Latambar	Mohammad Yusuf Khattak (ML), Watan Badshah (Ind.), Minhaj ud Din (JI), Mohammad Afzal (JAL), Baz Mohammad Khan (Ind.)	Watan Badshah (Ind.)
Kohat 5 Siraj Khel	Sahib Gul (ML), Master Khan Gul (JAL), Mohammad Zar Khan (Ind.), Sher Azam Khan (Ind.)	Sahib Gul (ML)
Kohat 6 Shakar Dara	Dr. Khitab Gul (ML), Abdul Tawab (JAL), Pir Masoom Shan (Ind.)	Pir Masoom Shah (Ind.)
Kohat 7 Shaikhani	Pir Shahinshah (ML), Qazi Shafiuddin (JAL), Malik Ghulam Habib (Ind.),	Pir Shahinshah (ML)

	Bahadur Sher Khan (Ind.)	
Kohat 8 Kohat	Mohabat Ali Khan (ML), Fazal Karim Asaf (JAL)	Mohabat Ali Khan (ML)
Bannu 1 Ghoriwala	Haji Mohammad Nazeef (ML), M. Daraz Khan (Ind.), M. Habib-ur-Rahman (Ind.)	Haji Mohammad Nazeef (ML)
Bannu 2 Hamesh	M. Shah Daraz Khan (ML), M. Taj Ali Khan (JAL)	M. Shah Daraz Khan (ML)
Bannu 3 City	Mohammad Yaqoob Khan (ML)	Elected Unopposed
Bannu 4 Mama Khel	M. Wali Khan (ML), M. Hamidullah Khan (Ind.)	M. Hamidullah Khan (Ind.)
Bannu 5 Jani Khel	M. Sakhi Jan (ML), M. Mohammad Khan (Ind.), Habibullah (JAL)	M. Sakhi Jan (ML)
Bannu 6 Ghazni Khel	Mohammad Akbar Khan (Ind.), Saifullah Khan (ML)	Mohammad Akbar Khan (Ind.)
Bannu 7 Pezu	Mashal Khan (ML)	Elected Unopposed
Bannu 8 Norang	Haya Jan (ML), Atta Mohammad (Ind.)	Haya Jan (ML)
Dera 1 Panialla	Mohammad Akbar Khan (ML), Rab Nawaz Khan (JAL)	Mohammad Akbar Khan (ML)
Dera 2 Tank	Inayatullah Khan Sardar (JAL), Mohammad Hassan Hazrat (Ind.), Qutbuddin Khan Nawab of Tank (ML)	Qutbuddin Khan (ML)
Dera 3 Kulachi	Sardar Attaullah Khan (JAL), Sardar Abdul Qaiyum Khan (Ind.), Haji Attaullah Khan (Ind.)	Haji Attaullah Khan (Ind.)
Dera 4 Pruha	Nawabzada Allah Nawaz Khan (ML), Mohammad Abdul Latif Sahib (JAL)	Nawabzada Allah Nawaz Khan (ML)
Dera 5 Band Kurai	Haji Abdullah Khan (ML), Sardar Attaullah Khan (JAL), Syed Akbar Khan (Ind.)	Haji Abdullah Khan (JAL)
Dera 6	Mahmood Ali Qadri (ML), Mohammad Abdul Latif (JAL), Qaiyum Nawaz Khan (ML)	Mahmood Ali Qadri (Ind.)
Dera 7 Pahar Pur	Nawab Mohammad Nasrullah Khan (ML), Ghulam Rabani Khan (JAL), Said Akbar Khan (Ind.)	Nawab Nasrullah Khan (ML)
Hazara 1 Kaghan	Syed Mahmood Shah (ML), Ghulam Hussain Khan (Ind.)	Syed Mahmood Shah (ML)

Hazara 2 Balakot	Khan Bahadur Khan (ML), Mohammad Naseem Khan (Ind.), Mufti Mohammad Idris (JAL)	Khan Bahadur Khan (ML)
Hazara 3 Buyee	Abdul Ghani (Ind.), Sufi Ghulam Hussain (Ind.), Mohammad Aqiqullah (ML), Sultan Hussain Ali Khan (Ind.)	M. Aqiqullah (ML)
Hazara 4 Lora	Ghulam Safdar (Ind.), Sardar Khan (ML)	Sardar Khan (ML)
Hazara 5 Khanpur	Raja Ruknuzzaman Khan (ML), Maj. Fairoz Khan (Ind.), Abdur Rahman (Ind.)	Raja Ruknuzzaman Khan (ML)
Hazara 6 Kot Naj-	Subedar Mir Dad Khan (ML), Sultan ibullah Mohammad Khan (Ind.), Sultan Mohammad Khan Raihana (JAL), Abdul Majid (Ind.), Mahboob Ilahi (Ind.)	Subedar Mir Dad Khan (ML)
Hazara 7 Haripur	Khwaja Mohammad Khan (Ind.), Hakim Abdul Salam (ML), Mohammad Aslam Khan (Ind.), Gohar-o-Rahman (Ind.)	Khwaja Mohammad Khan (Ind.)
Hazara 8 Kala Batt	Khan Bahadur Mohammad Zaman Khan (ML), Raja Mohammad Ayub Khan (Ind.), Mohammad Zaman, Maj. Ghazi Mohammad Yusuf (Ind.), Mohammad Khan (ML) Nawaz Khan (Ind.), Syed Safdar, Zaman Shah (Ind.), Dr. Mohammad Hussain (Ind.), Raja Ahmad Khan (Ind.)	Khan Bahadur, Mohammad Zaman Khan (ML)
Hazara 9 Ghazi	Mohammad Aslam Khan (Ind.), Ghulam Jan Khan (ML), Mohammad Zaman Khan (Ind.), Mehdi Zaman Khan (JAL)	Mohammad Aslam Khan (Ind.)
Hazara 10 Lalu Gali	Abdul Hai Lodhi (ML), Mohammad Farid Khan (Ind.)	Abdul Hai Lodhi (ML)
Hazara 11 Darband Khan	Abdul Qaiyum Khan (ML)	Elected Unopposed
Hazara 12 Oghi	Captain Adam Khan (ML), Faqir Khan (JAL), Ghulam Rabani Khan (Ind.)	Capt. Adam Khan (ML)
Hazara 13 Baffa	Shad Mohammad Khan (ML), Abdul Qaiyum Khan (JAL)	Shad Mohammad Khan (ML)
Hazara 14 Shinkiri	Khuda Dad Khan (ML), Mohammad Haroon Khan (JAL), Mohammad Umar (Ind.)	Khuda Dad Khan (ML)

Hazara 15 Mansehra	Amir Alam Awan (ML), Mohammad Hanif Khan (JAL), Mohammad Afzal Khan (Ind.), Mohammad Ayub Khan (Ind.)	Amir Alam Awan (ML)
Hazara 16 Ber	Aziz Mohammad Khan (Ind.), Mohammad Farid Khan (ML)	Mohammad Farid Khan (ML)
Hazara 17 Mansehra	Abdul Hai (ML), Shah Ismail (Ind.), Pir Mohammad Kamran (Ind.), Mohammad Sarwar Khan (Ind.)	Abdul Hai (ML)
Hazara 18 Nabgan	Mohammad Aslam Khan (ML), Mohammad Saifur Khan (Ind.), Taj Mohammad Khan (Ind.)	Mohammad Aslam Khan (ML)
Hazara 19 Bagh	Abdul Aziz Khan (Ind.), Dadan Khan (Ind.), Jehandad Khan (Ind.), Mohammad Sharif Khan (Ind.), Samandar Khan (Ind.), Sikandar Shah (JAL), Wali Mohammad Khan (ML)	Wali Mohammad Khan (ML)
Hazara 20 Diameter	Faqira Khan (Ind.), Gohar Rahman Khan (ML), Shaikh Farid (Ind.), Sarwar Shah (Ind.)	Faqira Khan (Ind.)
Hazara 21 Abbott-	Abdul Aziz Hashmi (Ind.), Abdul Qaiyum Abad Khan (Ind.), Haji Ahmad (Ind.), Mohammad Jalal ud din Khan (ML)	Abdul Aziz Hashmi (Ind.)
Pesh. 1 Pesh. City	Mumtaz Jamal (ML), Sherin Wahab (Ind.) & Cantt., Islam Akhtar (Islam League)	Mumtaz Jamal (ML)
Pesh. 2 Municipal	Zari Sarfaraz Non-Muslims, G.S. Goodwin (Ind.), Begum E.P. Goodwin James C Paul (Ind.) (General) (Ind.), James C Paul (Ind.), Jandaz (Ind.), J Maigi Khan (Ind.), S.P. Phillips (Ind.)	Elected Unopposed Area James C. Paul (Ind.)

(Source: Aziz Javed. *Sarhad Ka A'ini Irtiqa*. Peshawar: Idara Tahqiq wa Tasneef, 1975. pp.279-287).

APPENDIX: XI

The Public Health estimated budgets for various years were as following:

HEAD OF DEPARTMENT— INSPECTOR GENERAL OF CIVIL HOSPITALS, NWFP: PUBLIC HEALTH BUDGET

Head	Budget Estimate 1952-53	Revised Estimate 1951-52	Budget Estimate 1951-52	Accounts 1950-51	Accounts 1949-50	Accounts 1948-49	Actuals Of previous Year for Last(6) months	Actual of current Year(6) Months Rs.	Revised Estimate By head of Department	New Budget Proposed By head of Department
1)Sale of proceeds of Sera and Vaccines etc.	_____	Rs. 7	_____	Rs. 545	Rs.2217	Rs. 852	} } } } }	} } } } }	Rs. 7	_____
2) Contri- butions	6535	6535	6535	2916	7765	5156	} }Rs.7340 } } }	} }Rs.8151 } } }	6535	6535
3)Income from endowments	_____	_____	4440	_____	_____	_____	} } } } }	} } } } }	_____	_____

4)Recoveries	_____	_____	_____	_____	_____	_____	}		
of voer-						6		2040	1300
payments.									
5)Collection for									
payments for	1300	2040	741	361	680	706		-----	-----
services									
rendered									
6)Miscellaneous									
I Prov.LabRec.									
ii. Sale proceed	8000	8000	8000	6197	7497	3175		8000	8000
of unservice-	_____		_____		_____	_____			_____
able articles		392		8758				392	
7)Rounding									
	+165	+26	-276	----	----	----		-----	----
Gross Total	16,000	17,000	15,000	23,217	18,159	9,895	7340	8151	16974
									15835

(Source: PA, supplementary commentary, Peshawar, bundle no. 105, serial no. 2530, pp.5,9,29).

PUBLIC HEALTH BUDGET, 1953-1954

Heads	Actuals 1951-52	Estimate, 1952-53 no.budget revised	Estimate, 1953-54 no.budget revised
Sale Proceeds of Sera Vaccine	—	—	—
Contributions	6,685	6,535 — 6,535	6,535
Collection of Payments for services rendered	1,816	1,300 — 1,500	1,500
	8,776	8,000 — 12,000	12,000
Miscellaneous Prov. Lab. Receipts	—	— —	—
Sale proceeds of unserviceable articles		+165	
Rounding			
Total:		16,000 — 20,035	20,035

Note: The revised budget for 1953-54 came to 19,000.

(Source: PA, supplementary commentary, Peshawar, bundle no. 105, serial no. 2530, pp.5,9,29).

APPENDIX: XI

Statement 1-B

Number of Institutions and pupils in N.W.F.P Districts, Census 1951

Institutions	1941				1951			
	Girls		Boys		Girls		Boys	
	No of institutions	No of Students	No of institutions	No of Students	No of institutions	No of Students	No of institutions	No of Students
Colleges	—	—	4	158	2	155	4	1,265
High Schools	4	1,034	41	19,260	9	2,217	47	20,535
Middle Schools	31	7,402	224	30,537	16	3,065	232	44,325
Primary Schools	158	11,177	748	43,090	143	10,851	863	70,711
Special Schools	1	55	1	129	2	89	1	153
Total:	194	19,668	1,018	94,054	172	16,377	1,147	136,989

(Source: Sheikh Abdul Hamid. *Census of Pakistan, 1951, vol. iv, North-West Frontier Province*. Karachi: Manager of Publications, Government of Pakistan, n.d. p.56).

APPENDIX: XIII

STATEMENT (1) SHOWING THE NUMBER OF INSTITUTIONS OF VARIOUS TYPES BEFORE AND AFTER PARTITION AS OF 10TH JANUARY 1952:

	Primary	Secondary	Colleges
	Boys——Girls	Boys——Girls	Boys——Girls
Before Partition	702——137	224——19	3———
After Partition (1951-52)	872——145	282——26	5———1

STATEMENT (2) SHOWING ALLOCATION OF MONEY EARMARKED FOR PURCHASE OF FURNITURE, SCIENCE APPARATUS ETC. (APPROXIMATE) FOR EDUCATIONAL INSTITUTIONS IN NWFP BEFORE AND AFTER THE PARTITION:

	Secondary	Primary	Colleges	Total
Before Partition (1946-47)	25,451	62	3,247	28,760
After Partition 1947-48	26,872	12	3,455	30,339

1948-49	27,420	12	4,525	31,957
1949-50	39,451	25,218	68,429	1,33,098
1950-51	30,418	26,110	60,981	1,17,509
1951-52	186,319	28,619	137,919	352,857
Grand Total:				665,760

STATEMENT (3) SHOWING EXPENDITURE ON BUILDINGS BEFORE AND AFTER PARTITION:

Before Partition 1946-47	Rs. 42,054
After Partition 1947-48	46,392
1948-49	43,576
1949-50	346,286
1950-51	281,667
1951-52	349,059
Grand Total:	1,066,980

STATEMENT (4) SHOWING EXPENDITURE ON SCHOLARSHIPS BEFORE AND AFTER PARTITION:

Before Partition, 1946-47	Rs. 74,000
After Partition, 1947-48	70,200
1948-49	70,200
1949-50	66,780
1950-51	74,580
1951-52	90,000

(Source: *Khyber Mail* (Peshawar), 13 January 1952, p.3).

APPENDIX: XIV

THE I.G.P. NWFP LETTER TO THE CHIEF SECRETARY, NWFP IN THE CASE OF JEHANDAD (Abbottabad Conspiracy Case)

“The following points appear to support the contention of Jehandad that the letters were sent by some enemy in order to get him into trouble with the authorities and were not the genuine products of the pen of Jai Dev Kapoor, the alleged writer.

- a. The Handwriting Expert Flt. Lt. Khalil having compared the handwriting on the letters under discussion with a post card written on 14th March, 1946, to Qalandar Khan Chishti of Nawanshehr and recovered from the latter's house by the A.S.I. Nawanshehr on 14.3.49 has given his opinion that the letters now under discussion and the authentic post card written in 1946 by Jai Dev Kapoor are not in the same hand.
- b. It is not to be expected that a conspirator writing from Delhi treasonable matter such as was contained in these letters would have addressed the envelopes in such a way that they would attract the attention of Postal and other officials in Pakistan. The addresses on the envelopes contained the words “Mohtarim Janab Khan Sahib Jehandad Khan Salar-i-Khudai Khidmatgaran Kakul”. A seasoned politician like Jai Dev Kapoor whilst communicating treasonable matter of such a high international importance would not have addressed the letters as to attract attention.
- c. Jehandad in the past was normally addressed as Sadar of the Congress Committee. This is apparent from letters recovered from his house-search. Jai Dev who had lived in Abbottabad so near to Kakul and worked in the Congress in collaboration with Jehandad would surely have known the right designation of Jehandad. Had Jai Dev been so foolish as to refer on the envelop to Jehandad in his official position with the old Khudai Khidmatgars would have addressed him as Sadar and not as Salar.
- d. Indian postal stamps are available in Pakistan and the Gandhi memorial stamp that was used on one of the letters is in possession of many stamp collectors. To use a large stamp bearing Gandhi's portrait would surely attract unnecessary attention to the envelope.

- e. The letters contain a repetition of information alleged to have been supplied by Jehandad from Pakistan. The repetition of this information served no useful purpose and it was unnatural for conspirators to repeat such a highly dangerous information in a letter which was liable to interception in the post and which would later on render the addressee liable to be charged with high treason.
- f. People involved in a conspiracy of such a serious nature as the removal of the Premier and making references to advice alleged to have been tendered by Jehandad to Sher-i-Kashmir would never run the risk of sending such letters by post and marking the addressee as Salar Khudai Khidmatgaran.
- g. According to the contents of the letters Jai Dev Kapoor had paid money to Jehandad for the removal of the Frontier Premier. The gratification for such an important job would surely be a large sum of money but the house search of Jehandad at the time of his arrest showed marked signs of poverty only.
- h. The Post Master Kakul who has held his job for the last three years, has never detected any money order being remitted to any member of Jehandad's party from the Indian Dominion during the course of his posting.
- i. After the receipt of the first letter, according to which the addressee and his colleagues were invited to come to the Wagah border by November 15th, 1948, a strict surveillance was maintained by the Supdt. of Police, Hazara, over the persons named in the letter, including the addressee. The surveillance showed that they never attempted to contact each other and no reply to the letter was noticed in the post. Ordinarily, at least a meeting between these persons was expected to deliberate about the proposed visit to Wagah.
- j. Jehandad and his colleagues had openly dissociated themselves from the Congress on 28.10.48 and had joined the Muslim League after purchasing usual two anna membership ticket. Not a single letter was recovered from the house searches of any of the accused which indicated any fresh interest in the Congress or suggested any activities against the Pakistan Govt. In fact from Jehandad house 14 Muslim League enlistments two anna tickets were recovered which would support his claim that after joining the Muslim League, he was working actively in its support.
- k. General enquiries made from the lambardars of Kakul, Mirpur and Nawanshehr showed that Malik Shah Zaman never visited these

villages nor was he known there. No financial change in the position of any accused had been noticed by any one. On the contrary after their conversion to the Muslim League, most people were impressed with their general loyalty towards Pakistan. Hussain Khan who is a detenu in this case is generally not accepted as having any political views or indulging in any politics.

Finally, it may be noted that the second letter was originally dated 18.1.49. The date was changed to 28.1.49 by an over-writing in a different ink. The ink used in the over-writing was also used for addressing the envelope of the second letter.”

(Source: PA Special branch, bundle no. 25, serial no. 367, pp.122-23).

APPENDIX: XIV

CRIME SITUATION AND POLICE FORCE IN NWFP:

1. Crime situation of NWFP for the period 1943 to 1953.

Year	Murders	Attempts at murder and culpable homicide	Dacoities	Robberies	House breaking	Thefts including cattles thefts	Total crime under P.P.C Class I-V
1943	639	857	89	295	1,392	2,376	8,457
1944	595	843	67	222	1,317	2,321	8,022
1945	604	887	39	237	1,180	2,000	7,407
1946	706	1140	70	240	1,457	2,068	8,622
1947	1116	1378	304	501	2,408	2,633	11,367
1948	1082	1199	181	452	2,083	2,481	10,374
1949	813	1144	59	280	1,218	1,882	7,956
1950	711	941	36	164	814	1,502	6,513
1951	628	968	22	133	942	1,491	6,857
1952	605	770	23	91	868	1,158	5,888
1953	653	876	12	115	932	1,581	6,970
10 years average 1943- 1952	750	1013	89	261	1368	1,991	8,146

(SOURCE: Government of the NWFP. *Report on Police Administration in the North-West Frontier Province for the year 1953*. NWFP: Manager Government Printing and Stationary, 1955, p.1.)

2. PROPORTION OF POLICE TO AREA, POPULATION AND COGNIZABLE CRIME INVESTIGATED:

District	Sanctioned strength	Proportion of police to area	Proportion of police to population	Proportion of police to cognizable crime investigated
Peshawar	2,431	1 to .63	1 to 371	1 to 3.77
Kohat	816	1 to 3.30	1 to 368	1 to 1.84
Bannu	807	1 to 2.10	1 to 380	1 to 1.92
Dera Ismail Khan	759	1 to 4.60	1 to 383	1 to 1.31
Mardan	607	1 to 1.81	1 to 970	1 to 8.86
Hazara	840	1 to 3.60	1 to 1,019	1 to 3.87
Railway Police North-West Frontier Province	169	1 to 1.86	—	1 to 1.23
North-West Frontier Province including C.P.O., C.I.D., P.T.S., Hangu but excluding Additional Police	6,641	1 to 2.08	1 to 489	1 to 3.29

In addition to the above permanent staff the following were employed in the Traffic Section of Police on temporary basis:

D.S.P	Inspector	Sub-Inspector	Assistant Inspector	Sub-Head Constable	Foot Constable
1	1	3	—	2	4

(Source: Government of the NWFP. *Report on Police Administration in the North-West Frontier Province for the year 1953*. NWFP: Manager Government Printing and Stationary, 1955, p.36).

APPENDIX: XVI

STATEMENT SHOWING VARIOUS CLASSES OF FORESTS ADMINISTERED BY THE FOREST, CIVIL AND DEFENSE DEPARTMENTS UNDER THE HAZARA FOREST ACT, INDIAN FOREST ACT, ETC.

Class of Forests	Area on the 1 st April, 1948 Acres—Sq. Miles	Area on the 31 st March 1949 Acres—Sq. Miles	Area on the 31 st March 1950 Acres—Sq. Miles
Departmental reserved Forests	190,883—298.25	190,883 298.25	190,483 297.63
Departmental unclassified Forest	— — —	— — —	— — —
Military Reserved Forests	4,469—6.98	4,469—6.98	4,469—6.98
Military unclassified Forests			
Civil Reserved Forests	7,064—11.04	7,064—11.04	7,064—11.04
Civil unclassified Forests			
Guzara Forests (Protected Waste)	2,239—3.50	2,239—3.50	2,239—3.50
	89,486—139.82	89,486—139.82	88,886—138.89
	85,364—133.38	85,364—133.38	85,364—133.38
Total:	379,505—592.97	379,505—592.97	378,505—591.42

(Source: Government of NWFP. Progress Report on Forest Administration in the NWFP, for the year ending 31st March 1949. Peshawar: Manager Government Printing and Stationary, NWFP, 1951 & Government of Pakistan. Progress Report on Forest Administration in the NWFP, for the year ending 31st March 1950. Peshawar: Manager Government Printing and Stationary, NWFP, 1952).

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