

Jenkins and the Partition of Punjab 1947



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Cultural Research Centre of Excellence,
Quaid-i-Azam University, Islamabad,
Pakistan**

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In the name of Allah, the Compassionate, the Merciful

DEDICATED TO

MY PARENTS

Anwar Zamani (Mother)

Zulfiqar Ali Khan Baqai (Father)

AND MY CHILDREN

Aiza, Danish and Jamal

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Farah Gul Baqai

August 2018

ABBREVIATIONS

Addl. D. C.	Additional Deputy Commissioner
A.D.C	Aid-de-Camp
A.G	Adjutant-General
A.H.Q	Army Headquarters
AIML	All India Muslim League
B.Os.	British Officers
Ch.	Chaudhury
C-in-C	Commander-in-Chief
C.I.D.	Criminal Investigation Department
D.C.	Deputy Commissioner
D.I.G.	Deputy Inspector General
D.S.P	Deputy Superintendent of Police
G.H.Q	General Head Quarters
G.O.C-in-C	General Officer Commanding-in-Chief
G.S	Governor's Secretary
H.E	His Excellency
H.H	His Highness
HMG	His/Her Majesty's Government
H.S	Home Secretary
I.C.S.	Indian Civil Service

I.G	Inspector General (of Police)
K.C.S.I	Knight Commander (of the Order of the) Star of India
K.C.I.E	Knight Commander (Order of the) Indian Empire
M.L	Muslim League
M.L.A	Member of the Legislative Assembly
MF	Micro Film/s
N.D.C	National Documentation Centre
OUP	Oxford University Press
P.C.S	Punjab Civil Service
PEPSU	Patiala East Punjab States Union
P.S.V	Private Secretary to the Viceroy
S.D.O	Sub-Divisional Officer
S.D.M	Sub Divisional Magistrate
S.P	Superintendent Police
T.O	Treasury Officer
TOP	Transfer of Power (Volumes)
U.N	United Nations
U. P	United Provinces

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PREFACE

This book is an addition to partition studies, pertaining to Punjab—a key province in the scheme of Pakistan formation. Had Punjabis refrained from accepting changes that were occurring internationally and nationally and had refused to ally with Muslim League, Punjab would have had the same fate that was of Kashmir—neither free nor independent. They would continuously be under Hindu dominance. The Hindus were sharp and good in manipulations, in fact some Muslim leaders like Maulana Abul Kalam Azad were partisan in this scenario. No doubt he held a stature in religious learning, he was smart in entangling Punjab Muslims in the snare of Hindus and Sikhs through Unionist Party. Evan Meredith Jenkins, the Governor of Punjab, genuinely believed that Punjabis, without discrimination on communal grounds, should be united and Punjab should be given an independent status.

The objective of this research is to find answers of questions like why was there such mayhem of human lives in 1947? Who was responsible for it? Could it have been avoided? Jenkins, who was the last Governor of United Punjab, how he was tackling the situation? Blaming any one is not the answer; everyone played its part to worsen the situation when things got out of hand. The last days of British Raj show the situation was not controllable, the old masters were leaving, the new had not taken the charge, and there was prevailing a vacuum. This made the things ugly and grotesque. So many things were on the move—British were leaving India and moving back to England; Hindus and Sikhs in areas of Pakistan were vacating their hearth and home and relocating to India; Muslims in troubled Indian areas were moving towards Pakistan leaving all their properties and belongings in India. There was a commotion of worst kind—natives taking possession of the leaving people, their abode and property; kidnapping helpless women, raping, killing or marrying them by force.

The communalism based on religion metamorphosed into beast like existence. Natives of Punjab—the land of Sufis and Saints—had turned into Satan or something beyond it. 1947 was the worst

year in Punjab history, as far as human life, its sanctity and honour was concerned. Each community crossed its limits and desecrated other community's sanctity that words are lost to describe.

Britishers' left India with their families, prudently advising natives to solve their problems amicably by giving space to each other, the well-intended advice held no base as it was given at the time when water had crossed the bridges.

The book consists of five chapters, each chapter helps us in understanding the turmoil through which Punjab was passing in 1947.

Chapter I covers the history of Punjab from 1849 to 1947, the period in which Britishers' established themselves in Punjab. It narrates the areas of Punjab, its population, British administration in Punjab, what changes they brought in Punjab. Its physical features were changed, by introducing Canal colonies in Punjab. The nomad tribes settled down in Canal colonies, population from East Punjab was relocated in Lyallpur (Faisalabad) and Montgomery (Sahiwal). Constitutional changes were enforced in twentieth century by British, which divided the Indian society into communal groups. The communal groups existed earlier too. However, their intensity was magnified by constitutional structured elections and representation in central and provincial legislative assemblies on the basis of communal identities. The Indian population became too conscious of their identities, separate electorates, World War II and specially when British finally decided to leave India, the communal identities triggered and havoc they played on each other, ashamed all the teachings of Sufis, Saints, Jogis and Gurus.

Chapter II covers Jenkins aspect. Evan Meredith Jenkins was Governor of United Punjab. It explores what was his indulgence in this whole episode, how he handled the power struggle between Muslims and non-Muslims. He was a successful administrator of the Punjab province in peace times. However, when communal riots broke out in the province and things got out of control then its ultimate result was partition of Punjab.

Chapter III is about Jenkins correspondence with Mountbatten. His

letters, telephones, fortnightly reports and finally memoranda analyses clearly depict the callous approach of the British towards the Indians.

Chapter IV discusses Jenkins deliberations with Punjab leaders during 1946-47. The main leaders of Punjab were Iftikhar Mamdot (President Punjab Muslim League), Mian Mumtaz Daultana (MLA), Firoz Khan Noon (MLA), Tara Singh (MLA), Giani Kartar Singh (MLA), Sardar Baldev Singh (Defence Minister in 1946-47) and Gopi Chand Bhargava (MLA). This correspondence reveals the extent of trust that existed between Jenkins and provincial leaders.

Revealing the borderline areas that consisted of Punjab in 1947, Chapter V deals with partition of Punjab and what changes occurred in its boundaries by Mountbatten, where they deviated from the actual agreed map. Jenkins was aware of all the gerrymandering of Mountbatten, but as a loyal servant of British crown, he maintained the secrecy, the requirement of his job. The British officers and families were sent home safely and let India suffer and lament the fate. The alien rulers were least concerned about natives' sufferings. British reached their homes and lamented about the loss of their prized possession that was India. A jewel in their crown!

Farah Gul Baqai

August 2018

FOREWORD

The book *Jenkins and the Partition of Punjab: 1947* is a valuable addition to the existing literature concerning partition of Punjab. It depicts the crucial role of Jenkins as the last governor of Punjab who till last moment served to his best the interest of British Government though with heavy loss to the Muslim cause. No doubt, the cost paid by Muslims of South Asia for securing freedom was immense but they eventually succeeded to achieve an independent state against all odds. Now Pakistan has a long way to go; its people must have full comprehension of their past, so that they could value independence and work hard to improve their present circumstances. This book is the reflection of sacrifices, human tragedies, losses and achievements the Muslims of South Asia experienced in the last days of the British Raj.

Surely, nations progress only when they honor the people who took pains and endanger their lives so their fellow countrymen can be secure and prosper. Almost three millions lives were sacrificed at the time of partition on both sides of the border of Punjab. We are indebted to all those who have perished in this struggle for independence, as gratitude it is our duty to teach our children to remember those sacrifices of our forefathers and to respect fellow beings and work hard to make our state strong and prosperous.

Since people on both sides of the border suffered and both had cried and felt an intense pain in this bifurcation of East and West Punjab therefore an objective record of those events such as the current study can help mitigate sorrows of the past and enlighten the future course of relations between the two sides. Respecting each other as close neighbors could help in development of both the states as for the creation of which both have paid heavy prices in the form of human tragedies and material loss.

Dr. Razia Sultana

Vice Chancellor,
Shaheed Benazir Bhutto University,
Peshawar

Chapter I

British in Punjab 1849-1947

Punjab remained a province of British India from 1849-1947. It was one of the last areas of the Indian subcontinent to fall under British rule. In 1947, Punjab's total area was 136,330 sq. miles, with a population of 28,418,819.¹ It comprised present day Pakistani Punjab together with Islamabad Capital territory; present Indian Punjab including the newly formed provinces of Haryana, Himachal Pradesh, Delhi and Chandigarh.

With the end of British rule in 1947, the province was divided between India and Pakistan. According to the 1941 census, the population of Punjab consisted of the following communities:²

Province	Total Population	Hindus	Scheduled Castes	Muslims	Sikhs
Punjab	28,418,819	6,301,737	1,592,320	16,217,742	3,757,401

Though the three religions were fairly well spread over the province, the Muslims majority was in the West and North and the Hindus and Sikhs in the East and South of Punjab.³ The Punjab is situated just below Kashmir and North-West Frontier Province (Khyber Pukhtunkhwa) and in south is Sind and Balochistan on the west. It is traversed by the five rivers—the Indus, and its four tributaries, the Jhelum, the Chenab, the Ravi, and the Sutlej. The Salt Range, a short range of hills running from the Indus to the Jhelum, cuts off the the table land below Attock in the north-west at about 2,000 ft above sea level. The climate is dry and one of extreme heat and cold. The rainfall is insufficient. Wheat is the principal crop. Other crops grown in Punjab are sugarcane, cotton, barley, tobacco etc. In 1937-38, 13 million acres of land were irrigated. Deposits of petroleum and chemicals are found in Attock,

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- 1 Nripendra Nath Mitra, *The Indian Annual Register*, The Annual Register Office (Calcutta), Vol. I (Jan.-June 1947), 3.
 - 2 M. Rafique Afzal (ed.), *The Case for Pakistan* (Islamabad: National Commission on Historical and Cultural Research, 1979), 30.
 - 3 H. M. Close, *Attlee, Wavell, Mountbatten and the Transfer of Power* (Islamabad: National Book Foundation, 1997), 32.

and the Salt Range, which contains the largest known mass of rock salt in the world. In physique, Punjabis are tall and sturdy and their considerable number is employed in army. The spoken languages of Punjab are Punjabi, Hindko, Pushto and Urdu. The number of colleges in the province was 50 in 1939-40 with 20,077 scholars. There were 12,197 schools with 1,207,516 pupils.⁴

Administration

Prior to the amendment of the Government of India Act in 1919 the head of the administration was a Lieutenant-Governor, drawn from the ranks of the Indian Civil. Under the Act of 1919 the province was raised to the status of the Governorship, with an Executive Council and Ministers, the Governor-in-Council being in charge of the Reserved Subjects and the Governor with his ministers of the Transferred Subjects. With the introduction of part-III of the Government of India Act 1935, the Executive Council has been substituted by a Council of Ministers and the Legislative Council by an enlarged Legislative Assembly with wide powers of Government is carried on through the usual Secretariat which consisted of five Secretaries, designated (1) Chief (2) Home (3) Finance (4) Medical and Local Government and (5) Electricity and Industries departments, three Deputy Secretaries, two under secretaries and two Assistant Secretaries in the Public Works Department; there are five Chief Engineers (Secretaries except in the case of Road Branch, one in the Electricity Branch and three in the Irrigation Branch while the legal remembrancer is also the secretary to Government in the Legislative Department. The head of the Police Department is Joint Secretary and of the Education Department a Secretary to Government. The Government stays in Lahore in winter and in Simla during summer from the middle of May to the middle of October. Under the Governor, the province is administered by five commissioners for Ambala, Jullundur, Lahore, Rawalpindi and

4 Tarapada Das Gupta, (ed.), *Nalanda Year-Book &Who's Who in India 1946-47*, (Calcutta, Nalanda Press, 1947), 150-151.

Multan who exercise general control over the 29 Deputy Commissioners—each of whom is incharge of a district.⁵

The principal heads of Department in the Province are the two Financial Commissioners (who are the highest Court of Revenue jurisdiction; and heads of the departments of Land and Separate Revenue and of Agriculture and the Court of Wards) the five Chief Engineers, the Inspector-General of Police, the Director of Public Instruction, the Inspector-General of Prisons, the Inspector General of Civil Hospitals, the Director of Public Health, the Chief Conservator of Forests, the Director of Agriculture and Industries, the Inspector General of Registration, the Registrar of Cooperative Credit Societies and Joint Stock Companies and the Legal Remembrancer.⁶

Punjab Government

Under the Indian Act of 1935 the Punjab is a Governor's Province with a Council of Ministers. The unicameral Punjab Legislative Assembly has altogether 175 seats, of which 42 are General seats, including 8 for Scheduled Castes, 31 for the Sikhs, 84 for Mohammedans, 1 for Anglo-Indians, 1 for Europeans, 2 for Indian Christians, 1 for Commerce, Industry, etc., 5 for landholders, 1 for University, 3 for Labour and four for women.⁷

The Punjab then (before 1947) consisted of 29 districts grouped into five divisions i.e. Lahore, Rawalpindi, Multan, Ambala and Jullundur.⁸

The local rulers of Punjab before the advent of Alexander were Raja Ambhi, Raja Porus and Chandragupta Mauriya. It is usually believed that old or ancient dynasties were autocrat and were very oppressive towards their subjects. The Punjab dynasties were limited to the land between the two rivers in an early time. There is no record of these dynasties and their rulers. However, a few are

5 Francis Low (ed.), *The Indian Year Book 1943-44 Volume XXX*, (Bombay: Bennett Cleman & Co. Ltd., 1944), 129-130.

6 Low (ed.), *The Indian Book 1943-44*.

7 Gupta, *Nalanda Year Book & Who's Who in India*, 151.

8 Massarrat Abid and Qalb-i-Abid, (ed.), *History, Politics and Society: The Punjab*, (Lahore: Pakistan Study Centre, 2009), 309.

recorded in Hindu religious books *Rig-Veda* and *Ramayana Puranas*. While writing about ancient Indian Punjab rulers, it is almost impossible to maintain a chronological order. There are gaps in chronology, as historians do not find any records of ancient period. However, whatever information is available indicates that around 513 B.C. Iranian King Darius I annexed Indus to the empire of the Great Cyrus (Cyrus founded Persia by uniting two original Iranian tribes—the Medes and the Persians). While India remained at the food gathering stage, the more advanced Indus valley gravitated once again towards the markets of the rich slave owning societies of western Asia, Persia and Mesopotamia.⁹

Alexander was the son of King Philip of Macedonia.¹⁰ Alexander entered through Khyber Pass in the north-west, and via Taxila, which lies little north of Rawalpindi. Alexander was fortunate enough to achieve the subjugation of Raja of Ambhi of Taxila without a fight; he got every kind of help and guidance from him as well. Then followed the conquest of Porus territory; Porus was defeated and Alexander appointed him as his appointee. Alexander had actually asked Porus, after defeating him that how he should treat him. Porus was well-built, brave and spontaneous; his famous words were “as a king should be treated”. Alexander was impressed by Porus’ dignified utterance so he gave him back his fiefdom.¹¹ After defeating Porus, Alexander planned to march towards Ganges. However, he did not do so. His soldiers were tired and homesick after conquering great kingdoms like Persia and Asia Minor.

Alexander was born in 365 B.C. The famous Greek philosopher Aristotle was his tutor. Even in his early age, Alexander made object in life to conquer the world. He succeeded to the throne at the age of twenty and in a very short time conquered the territory from Asia Minor to Afghanistan. In 326 A.D., he invaded India.

9 Aitzaz Ahsan, *The Indus Saga and the Making of Pakistan*, (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 1996), 51.

10 Jawaharlal Nehru, *Glimpses of World History*, (Bombay: Asia Publishing House, 1967), 47.

11 Asad Saleem Sheikh, *Hakmaan-i-Punjab Qabal Massiah ta 1947* (Urdu), (Lahore: Izhar Sons, n.d.), 37-38.

He was the first European invader on the India soil. He died at Babylon on the side of river Euphrates in Iraq in 323 B.C at the age of 33.¹²

As soon as news of Alexander's death reached Taxila in 303 B.C., Chandragupta Maurya engaged in action and defeated Seleucus Nikator, the heir to the Eastern part of Alexander's Empire. The Mauryans took Taxila. The treaty of that year brought Seleucus' daughter to the court at Pataliputra in a marriage alliance that recognized the suzerainty of Mauryan power. It was at this time also that Seleucus accredited the Megasthenes, whose correspondence with Greece is a source for contemporary historical events, as ambassador to the Mauryan throne.¹³

Bindusara, Chandragupta's son and Ashoka's father, completed the Mauryan conquest and soon the Mauryan empire extended to the Trans-Indus provinces to cover a large part of Afghanistan. Chandragupta Empire roughly encompassed the whole subcontinent; Ashoka had no need to conquer, his job was only to consolidate the empire. Bindusara, seems to have had reign of twenty-five years.¹⁴

Ashoka died in 232 B.C. His system, much of it, was based on high moral values, survived only 50 years after his death.¹⁵ The Greeks attempted to regain the territory left to them by Alexander but they failed in 305 B.C. In the subsequent peace treaty, it was agreed that the Mauryans would not disturb the Greeks in Afghanistan and that Greeks had to renounce their claim to the northern areas that are now part of Pakistan. The Maurya dynasty managed to survive another 140 years but slowly declined in power and size. For the next thousands of years, the region that is now Pakistan saw minor invasions, with settlers coming in through Iran and Afghanistan.

The next major invasions were those of Bactrian Greeks in around 200 B.C. The Bactrians, like the earlier Greek invaders, were

12 Jawaharlal Nehru, *Glimps of World History*, 50.

13 Nehru, *Glimps of World History*, 50-51

14 Jawaharlal Nehru, *Glimps of World History*, 63-64.

15 Ahsan, *The Indus Saga and the Making of Pakistan*, 63

unable to move into Central India and remained confined to the areas of present-day Pakistan and Afghanistan.¹⁶

In 130 B.C., the Scythians or Sakas came to area of today's Pakistan through Bolan Pass. The Sakas managed to establish their capital at Taxila but were unable to reach Sindh or northern India.¹⁷

The next wave of invaders came through Hindu Kush. The new tribe was known as Kushans. By 170 A.D, they had managed to establish their capital at Taxila. The Kushans controlled the territory that extended from River Indus to Persia. They were converted to Buddhism and tried to emulate earlier rulers. Many of the Buddhist relics found today in Swat and Peshawar belong to this time.¹⁸

The Huns came from Central Asia or Mongolia, a formidable force known as the white Huns. These people were nomads. The Huns are closely related to the later Mongols. By 484 A.D. the Huns occupied most of Persia and began to move into region of India.¹⁹ By the 6th century A.D., they began to move into what was Gupta empire. Skandagupta, fifth of Gupta line, had to face this Huns invasion. He defeated and hurled them back; but dozen of years later, they again came. Gradually they spread all over Gandhara, and greater part of northern India. They tortured the Buddhist and made their life miserable.²⁰ Yet again, the river Indus marked the boundary between the areas ruled by different kingdoms. For the next century, Kashmir, the Punjab and Sindh remained relatively peaceful and free from invasion.

Muslims Contact with India

The first Muslims to contact with the Subcontinent were Arab traders and sailors, although Arab merchants had traded with the inhabitants of the region even before the birth of Islam. The first Muslim expedition to the subcontinent was sent in 644 A.D. Later

16 Ahsan, *The Indus Saga and the Making of Pakistan*, 64-65.

17 Aitzaz Ahsan, *The Indus Saga and the Making of Pakistan*, 66.

18 Aitzaz Ahsan, *The Indus Saga and the Making of Pakistan*, 67.

19 Jawaharlal Nehru, *Glimps of World History*, 141.

20 Jawaharlal Nehru, *Glimps of World History*, 109.

Muslim ruler of Baghdad sent an expedition when pirates attacked a richly laden Arab ship and Arab merchants were detained at a port based in modern day Karachi. A series of expedition were sent to get the merchants released captured by pirates. However, an attempt made by a young commander led by Imadud Din Muhammad bin Qasim succeeded in his mission and was able to get released all the merchants and their wealth. Beside that, Qasim extended his march and was able to capture whole of Sindh and bring it under the suzerainty of Bagdad caliph. However, the Hindu and Buddhist rulers who agreed to pay Jaziya, the Islamic Tax regulated on non-Muslim, were protected and were allowed to live their own way of life.²¹

The people of Indus are good soldiers and unfortunately bad administrators. From time immemorial to present time, they are fighting invaders, marauders such as Aryans, the savage Huns, and the conqueror of the world Alexander, the unrelenting invaders from Ghazni and Afghanistan, the scourge of Taimur, the military wise Mughals and the ferocious Nadir Shah had to face immense resistance in the Indus region.²²

As administrators, Indus man is bereft of rules, for centuries he is obeying commands, and he is tune to obeying, but when he was seated in authority and office of command, he was basking with importance. If he cannot help his friend and dear one to benefit from his position and office, he is no good, and if he desecrates all restrictions and rules, his authority will gain appreciation for shortsighted one. This is what Indus man is made of impress near ones, and put the whole system at stake.²³

Historic Background of Punjab

Sultan Mahmud of Ghazna (971-1030 A.D.) was the first Muslim ruler of Punjab from his descendants its control was wrested by Shaihab-ud-Din Ghauri in 1186. It formed a part of the Delhi Sultanate from 1206 and continued to be a part of the Mughal

21 Shaikh Muhammad Ikram, *Aab-i-Kausar* (Urdu) (Lahore, Idara-i-Saqafat-i-Islamia, 1988), 21-22.

22 Ahsan, *The Indus Saga and the Making of Pakistan*, 347.

23 Ahsan, *The Indus Saga and the Making of Pakistan*, 348.

Empire until the middle of the eighteenth century when Afghans, the Marathas and the Sikhs fought over its possession. The Marathas of Deccan had surrounded, Delhi to dethrone the Mughals but the Afghan General Ahmad Shah Abdali (1722-1773) after a series of engagements crushed their power and ambition in the third battle of Panipat in 1761. On the death of Ahmad Shah Abdali, the Sikhs began to increase their force until Ranjit Singh (1790-1839) turned Punjab into a strong and independent Sikh kingdom. Internal strife after the death of Ranjit Singh destabilized the Sikh state. The British exploited the situation to their advantage and attacked the Sikh state, which after two wars fell under the colonial rule in 1849.²⁴

British Governor John Lawrence in a show of imperial power asked the people of Punjab, “how should they be governed by sword or by the pen”, and had this inscribed on the pedestal of his statue, which is now placed in the Lahore Museum.²⁵ Though authoritarian, as the Lieutenant Governor he was a benevolent ruler who was much concerned with the welfare of his subjects. His deputy John Nicholson rode on horseback from Attock to Peshawar to have first hand knowledge of the condition of the common people. An obelisk in blue grey limestone 230 feet high was erected on top of a hill at Margalla Pass²⁶ to honour John Nicholson’s services.

British in Punjab 1849-1947

The boundaries of the British Punjab stretched from the Afghan frontier to Delhi during 1849-1892. The British tried to tame the tribal belt of frontier region adjacent to Afghanistan but failed to bring it under their control. The territory of NWFP (now Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (KP) was also part of Punjab; the five frontier districts—Peshawar, Kohat, Bannu, Dera Ismail Khan and Hazara—were formerly Punjab, subsequently separated in 1901 to

24 Sachchidananda and Bhattacharya, *A Dictionary of Indian History* (New York, George Braziller, 1967).

25 Dushka Saiyid, *Muslim Women of the British Punjab*, (London: Macmillan Press Ltd., 1998), X.

26 Maud Diver, *The Unsung: A Record of British Services in India* (London: William Blackwood & Sons Ltd., 1945), 68.

form the North West Frontier Province. Delhi district parted from Punjab a decade later when the British Government shifted its capital from Calcutta to Delhi (1911). The people of Punjab were strong and sturdy; their martial heritage was a blend of many fighting races. The majority, though of Rajput descent, were Muslims, and an asset for the armed forces.²⁷ The British realized that the poor peasants of Punjab had no land of their own to cultivate which belonged to big landlords. They were also aware that the Punjab was an old and distinct society which was greatly influenced by its geographical location and its turbulent history. Such a land was suitable for agricultural development and could become a model of prosperity. Towards this end the building of the canal irrigation system was started in 1885. It comprised a network of water supply drawn from the rivers and spread over mostly across the uncultivated plains of western Punjab. The system resulted in bringing a vast area under irrigation that increased manifold from three million acres in 1885 to 14 million acres in 1947.²⁸

To maintain peace in the province, the British capitalized on the communal harmony that generally existed among Hindus, Muslims and Sikhs. Besides, they took up the development work in the sphere of agriculture by constructing a network of canals to channel the river waters for irrigation purposes. As the agriculture was the main source of income for the government so the British created a new supportive network of those feudal landlords who had helped them in the annexation of Punjab during the Second Sikh War and those who provided support during the “War of Independence” of 1857. The British bestowed on them titles and grants in cash and land for their assistance of the government against their relatives. The new elite was helped to gain a position of authority in the new set-up and consequently the colonial power won the crucial support of the so-called Punjab Chiefs it had itself created who set themselves in the service and safeguard of the Raj.

27 Darshan Singh Tatla and Ian Talbot, *Punjab: A Bibliography* (Karachi: Books and Books, 1996), XVII.

28 Saiyid, *Muslim Women of the British Punjab*, 4.

The recruits in the army included Hindu Dogras, Sikh Jats and Muslim Rajputs. They served the British at Flanders, in the deserts of Arabia and in the bush land of East Africa.²⁹ The Muslim soldiers fought with the British on most fronts and even confronted the Turks on the battlefield.³⁰ They won over two thousand medals and awards, including three Victoria Cross.³¹ The First World War brought a significant change in the governing structure of the province. The peacetime soldiers were not enough to feed the war so the province became a nursery to raise the required soldiery. The entire bureaucratic structure in the province was militarized, its activities were geared towards the provision of men and material for the war fronts. This process laid the foundation of a militarized bureaucracy in the Punjab. The provincial administration and military were able to penetrate every level of society and provide the British masters with men and funds required for the war.³²

Punjab Demography

Punjab was one of the two largest (Punjab and Bengal) and, most important of the Muslim majority provinces in India. Punjab witnessed rapid development in the late Nineteenth century due to canal colonies.³³ The British developed nine canal colonies and it included Sidhnai, Sohag Para, Chunian, Chenab, Jhelum, Lower Bari Doab, Upper Chenab, Upper Jhelum, Nili Bar.³⁴

“Punjab figured prominently in the history of Pakistan Movement, and it depicted the changes that were occurring in the Muslims politics. Stretching from Delhi to the Indus, British Punjab was

29 Farooq Ahmad Dar, *Communal Riots in the Punjab 1947* (Islamabad: NIHCR, 2003), 1-2.

30 Ian Bryant Wells, *Ambassador of Hindu-Muslim Unity* (New Delhi: Permanent Black, 2005), 112.

31 Dar, *Communal Riots in the Punjab 1947*, 3.

32 Tan Tai Young, *The Garrison State: The Military, Government and Society in Colonial Punjab, 1849-1947* (Lahore: Vanguard, 2005), 305-306.

33 Imran Ali, *The Punjab under Imperialism 1885-1947*, (Delhi, OUP, 1988). 3.

34 Ali, *The Punjab under Imperialism 1885-1947*, 9.

unique by religious and geographical diversity. The census of 1931 showed that Muslims in Punjab comprised 56 percent of the population, concentrated in the western part of the province. Sikhs were an important minority both within the predominantly Hindu Jullundur division and within the predominantly Muslims Lahore in the center of the province. In general, the population of Hindus was concentrated in the East and of Muslims in the West. Muslims comprised over 80 percent of the population in the far western Punjab districts bordering the Jhelum and Indus rivers”.³⁵

The West side of the Punjab had been known for farming animals; the land between the rivers called doaba was used for grazing the animals. “In the late nineteenth and early twentieth century a great part of southwestern Punjab had come under canal irrigation—leading both to the settling of pastoralists and to the migration of settlers from central Punjab. This led to the implantation of an important rural Sikh minority in some areas, and to the growth of Hindu-dominated market towns. But, in the canal colonies, as elsewhere in western Punjab, the great majority of the population remained Muslim and rural. The urban population also, with its ties to the Mughal past”³⁶, (as Emperor Shah Jahan had great attachment with Lahore, the heart of Punjab) retained a distinct Muslim bearing with the number of majestic buildings that the Mughals had built in Lahore, some of the Mughal high officials even used Lahore for long sojourn and had permanently settled there.

The introduction of the canal system of irrigation by the British changed the entire ecology of the area. The pastoral people who only used to rear livestock began to settle down, creating two groups the urban and the rural. Then by imposing different taxes on these groups, the British created a cleavage between them. The rural people thought that they were the ones who were burdened with taxes and the urban dwellers were free from this liability.³⁷

35 David Gilmartin, *Empire and Islam: Punjab and the Making of Pakistan* (London: I. B. Tauris & Co. Ltd., 1988), 6.

36 Gilmartin, *Empire and Islam: Punjab and the Making of Pakistan*, 8.

37 Imran Ali, *The Punjab*, 8-11.

Punjab under the British showed attempts of the Raj to build an indigenous hierarchical state authority by appealing directly to the political primacy of local Punjabi identities. The political role of Islam in British Punjab was due to the distinctive cultural relationship that the British had established between the state and Punjabi society.³⁸

Constitutional Development and Classification of Separate Identities: Beginning of Self-Government in India

The initiative taken toward self-government in British India in the late 19th century with the appointment of British counselors to advise British viceroys and the establishment of Provincial Councils with Indian members; subsequently widened local participation in legislative councils by the Indian Councils Act of 1892. Municipal corporations and district boards created for local administration included elected Indian members.

The Minto-Morley Reforms in 1909 added 44 more seats to the 16 in the Viceroy's Legislative Council. Of these 60 members, 27 were to be elected indirectly. The Provincial Legislative Councils' membership was also increased. Separate representation was granted to Muslims in the provinces.³⁹ Lord Morley, Secretary of State for India from 1905 to 1910, on the demand of Muslims of India for separate electorate, said, "let us not forget that the difference between Mohammedan and Hindus is not mere difference of articles of religious faith and dogmas. It is difference of life, tradition, history, social habits, as well as articles of believes (sic) that constitute a community. Do not let us forget what makes it interesting and even exciting. Do not let us forget that in talking of Hinduism and Islam, we are dealing with and are brought face to face with [the] mightiest [of] forces that through all the centuries and ages have moulded the fortunes of great states and the destinies of countless millions of mankind."⁴⁰

38 Ali, *The Punjab*, 8-9.

39 J. Hussain, *A History of the Peoples of Pakistan* (Karachi, OUP, 2006), 396.

40 G. Allana (compiled and ed.), *Pakistan Movement: Historic Documents*, (Karachi: Paradise Subscription Agency, 1968), 24.

Indians had previously been appointed to legislative councils but after the reforms, some were also elected as well to these councils. At the centre, the majority of council members continued to be government appointed officials, and the viceroy was in no way responsible to the legislature. At the provincial level, the elected members together with unofficial appointees, outnumbered the appointed officials, but responsibility of the governor to the legislature was not contemplated. Morley made it clear in introducing the Indian legislature to the British Parliament that the parliamentary self-government was not the goal of the British government.

The Minto-Morley Reforms were a milestone in the process of introducing gradually the election principle for membership of the Indian legislative councils. The 'franchise' was very limited. Lord Minto kept his promise to the Muslims by guaranteeing them the right of separate electorate. The Councils were essentially advisory, with no control over the executive so as a result the demand for self-government grew.⁴¹ Later, the communal status of electorates was extended to other communities also giving a fillip to the tendency among Indians for identification through religion and making religion a factor in politics. However, following the principle of separate electorate both in the provinces and at the Centre the Muslims were to have their own representatives. Besides, the passing of a bill affecting a particular community could be nullified if three-fourths of the representatives of that community opposed it.⁴² The Muslims were given 50 per cent of the Indian elective seats in the Punjab though their population was more than that in the province. In the United Provinces, they were given 30 per cent seats, in Bengal 40 per cent; 25 per cent in Bihar; 15 per cent in the Central Provinces; 15 per cent in Madras and 33.3 per cent in Bombay.

41 Richard Symonds, *The Making of Pakistan*, (London: Faber and Faber, 1949), 44. John Morley was the Secretary of State from 1905-10 and Gilbert Elliot, the fourth Earl of Minto was Viceroy; their reforms allowed Indians to be elected to Legislative Council.

42 Symonds, *The Making of Pakistan*, 45.

Elections under the Montagu-Chelmsford Reforms were held in 1921. From that time onwards, each election in the Subcontinent split political leaders into two groups—those who called for participation in the electoral process and subsequent government, and those who instructed their followers to abandon the polls and take to the streets. Through the new reforms, the British attempted to shift attention from the central government (where they still retained almost total power) to the provinces and from the cities (with their trouble-making, westernized educated middle classes) to the countryside (where they still enjoyed gratitude and loyalty from both the landed gentry and the peasantry).

The educated middle class of India played the same role that the bourgeoisie did during the French Revolution. Throughout their stay in India, the British faced resistance from the local population. The natives demanded nothing less than self-rule in India. The implication of spread of western political ideas to India was that, some of the leaders of the Muslim community became more knowledgeable. As early as 1909, if not earlier, they had foreseen that the development of representative institutions would eventually lead to the introduction of full-fledged parliamentary system based on the British model. Their alarm at the prospect was due to the perception that the system would be governed by ministers responsible to the elected representatives of the majority; which in the Indian conditions would mean majority rule, in effect the rule of the Hindu majority, with the Muslim minority in perpetual subordination.

Under the Minto-Morley Reforms of 1909, the Muslims got separate electorate and obtained safeguards to protect their political rights in this form under which they alone, would elect representatives to seats reserved for them. Although in democracy the majority rules, however, this complementary principle of the minorities assured fair treatment at the hand of majority.⁴³ Interestingly this concession to Muslims augured Hindu-Muslim

43 E. W. R. Lumby, *The Transfer of Power in India 1945-47* (London: George Allen & Unwin Ltd., 1954), 10-12.

confrontation, which the indigenous and foreigner historians termed as religious tussle.⁴⁴

The Montagu-Chelmsford Reforms of 1919 increased the number of voters and the provincial administration was delegated with additional subjects, which hastened the process towards self-government. During these provincial administrative reforms, the British decided to form an organized political party in the Punjab, which could safeguard the interests of the Raj. In this connection their time-tested rural elite proved to be their saviour. That, in fact, paved the way for the creation of the Unionist Party. The Unionist Party's successes depended on a careful balance of the interest of its Muslim and non-Muslim sections of the society.⁴⁵

Mian Fazl-i-Hussain, a famous lawyer was in forefront in the activities of both the Punjab Congress and the Muslim League, was sure that the Punjab political arithmetic necessitated inter-communal co-operation as no single community could command an absolute majority (under the terms of the Lucknow Pact, the Muslims had sacrificed their majority position in the Punjab Legislature to secure weightage for the Muslim minority areas). In 1923, Fazl-i-Hussain founded the Unionist Party consisting of leaders from Muslim, Hindu and Sikh communities. Until 1946, the Unionists, with the help of the British, dominated the politics of the Punjab. It functioned more as a loose coalition of Muslim, Hindu and Sikh landowners for the protection of their interests than as a political party in the modern sense. The party had a dominance of Muslim property owners but some rural Hindus and Sikhs also played an important role in its development. Chaudhary Chhotu Ram's oratory provided a populist appeal for the party's platform. He was revered by Muslims as well as his own community; his oratory was appreciated by all as he could command the attention of crowds for hours without the use of a microphone.⁴⁶

44 Lumby, *The Transfer of Power in India 1945-47*, 12-13.

45 Dar, *Communal Riots in the Punjab*, 5.

46 Dar, *Communal Riots in the Punjab 1947*, 5.

Indian Army

The annual cost of the army was very high, borne entirely on Indian revenues, in the 1880s. For example it amounted to the sum of some fifty crores of rupees absorbing about one-third of the Government budget. The London Government regarded the Indian army as forming an imperial reserve, using it to enforce British policy in campaigns in Egypt, Sudan, South Africa, China and even more extensively, during the First and Second World Wars.⁴⁷

World War-I and Indian Struggle for Self-Government

In 1914, when the First World War broke out, the British Indian army had 100,000 Punjabi soldiers serving in India. During the war, the British enlisted many more Punjabis in the service. Those Punjabi soldiers rendered regular service in defending the British Empire against the Central powers.* Punjab also actively supported the British war-effort by extending loans; and each of its districts provided men and material to the British.⁴⁸ The First World War proved to be a watershed in the imperial relationship between Britain and India. As many as 1.4 million Indian and British soldiers of the British Indian Army took part in the war and their participation had wide cultural fallout. In this war, 653 British and 944 Indian soldiers belonging to Meerut and Lahore divisions were killed. Moreover, 2,000 British and 6,182 Indians were wounded or gone missing. The Indians served in three main theatres of war: 138,000 went to France, 144,000 to Egypt and Palestine and 675,000 to Mesopotamia (Iraq). By the end of the war, more than a million (1,096,013) Indians had served abroad in one capacity or the other.⁴⁹

47 C. H. Philips, *The Evolution of India and Pakistan 1858-1947, Select Documents*, (London, OUP, 1965), 505.

48 Iftikhar Haider Malik, *Sikandar Hayat Khan: A Political Biography* (Islamabad: NIHCR, 1985), 19.

49 M. Yaqub Mirza, *The Golden Jubilee Celebrations of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan* (Islamabad, National Book Foundation, 1999), 19-20.

* The Central Alliance WW I included Germany Empire, Austro-Hungarian Empire, Ottoman Empire, Kingdom of Bulgaria war

In 1916, in the face of new strength demonstrated by the moderate nationalists with the signing of the Lucknow Pact and the founding of the Home Rule League, and the realization after the disaster in the Mesopotamian campaign and that the war could last longer, the new Viceroy, Lord Chelmsford, cautioned that the government of India needed to be more responsive to Indian opinion. In August 1917, the Secretary of State for India, Edwin Montagu, made a Declaration in the House of Commons that aroused high hopes in Indian Nationalist circles. He declared that, the British intended to give more authority and association to the Indians in every branch of the administration. He emphasized the gradual development of self-governing institutions towards progressive realization of responsible government in India as an integral part of the British Empire.⁵⁰ The plan envisioned limited powers for self-governance in the provinces. For a part of the British Empire that India essentially was, it represented the first proposal, for any form of representative government in a non-white colony.⁵¹

Communal Award 1932

The communal award announced by the British Government in April 1932 gave separate electorates and reserved seats in this process to Muslims, Europeans, Sikhs, Indian-Christians and Anglo-Indians and other minorities. Thus, in Bombay, where the Muslims were less than 10 per cent of the population, had 30 reserved seats in the Assembly out of 175, a proportion of 17 per cent; whereas in the Punjab, where they were 56 percent of the population, they were awarded only 86 out of 175 seats, too fewer than a majority. The Centre-related communal award, announced in November 1932, gave Muslims one-third share in the central legislature though they were only quarter of British India's population. It was on the basis of this numerical arrangement that the communities and parties in India could not agree among

against European powers, i.e. Britain and France on the Western Front and against Russian on the Eastern Front.

50 Symond, *The Making of Pakistan*, 45.

51 Symond, *The Making of Pakistan*.

themselves. This set pattern of representation, especially in the provinces was later used for the partition of India.⁵²

Government of India Act 1935

The deliberations of the Round Table Conferences spread over three years from autumn of 1930 to winter of 1932-1933. On the basis of those discussions British Parliament published the White Paper in 1933 which resulted in the Government of India Act 1935, which provided for a “federation of India”. The act diluted the government monopoly of power and amounted to giving up some part of imperial authority voluntarily to the Indians. The power so delegated not only empowered the Indians but also made their cooperation obligatory for the government to obtain proper administration of the Raj.⁵³ Although departments like defense, foreign affairs, criminal law, communications and income-tax were retained by the Viceroy and the central government in New Delhi, other departments like public health, education, land-revenue and local self-government were transferred to the provinces. The core of the Act was the establishment of autonomy, with a representative parliamentary system of government, for eleven British Indian provinces, within the defined sphere of provincial powers.⁵⁴

In clearing the way for this constitutional system, however, three other important decisions were embodied in the Act of 1935. First, Burma and Aden were separated from India, which had previously been governed under one Governor-General; and Sind (previously part of Bombay) and Orissa (previously joined to Bihar) were made separate provinces; secondly, the authority of the Crown was removed from Government of India. The Viceroy wore two hats, one for British-India and one for the States. Thirdly, it was decided

52 Symond, *The Making of Pakistan*, 48-49. See also Chaudri Muhammad Ali, *The Emergence of Pakistan*, 26.

53 Ali, *The Emergence of Pakistan*, 27.

54 H. V. Hodson, *The Great Divide: Britain-India-Pakistan* (Karachi: OUP, 1997), 48.

to give communal representation in the new provincial legislatures.⁵⁵

The idea of separate Muslim state within or without India was not a new idea though it got some prominence in the Muslim League annual session at Allahabad held in December 1930. The Muslim League at that time was not prominent for its activities at party level, however, this session was unusual because it was presided over by a poet-philosopher Muhammad Iqbal who delivered a unique address. In his presidential speech, Iqbal analyzed the political scene and illuminated it with philosophical insight. In striking words, he indicated the goal toward which the conscious and unconscious striving of the Muslim community was taking them. In the conclusion of his speech he said;

I would like to see the Punjab, North West Frontier Province, Sind and Baluchistan amalgamated into a single state. Self-government within the British Empire or without the British Empire, the formation of a consolidated North-West Indian Muslim State appears to me to be the final destiny of the Muslims, at least of North-West India.⁵⁶

Since, the proposal of separate Muslim State was not a new idea, Muhammad Abdul Qadir Bilgrami in 1920 had advocated “the division of the Subcontinent between the Hindus and Muslims. He gave the outline districts fundamentally not too different from the present boundaries of East and West Pakistan (i.e Bangladesh and today's Pakistan).” Three years later (in 1923), in his evidence before the Frontier Enquiry Committee, Sardar Gul Muhammad Khan of Dera Ismail Khan put forward the partition of India plan by which the Muslims were to get the area from Peshawar to Agra. In 1924, Lala Lajpat Rai, one of the founders of the Hindu Mahasabha, had suggested the partition of India between Hindus and Muslims. However, those tentative proposals did not receive any attention. When, Dr. Muhammad Allama Iqbal, a person of high intellectual stature and prestige, explained the scheme for the establishment of a Muslim state from an authoritative platform

55 Hodson, *The Great Divide: Britain-India-Pakistan*, 48-49.

56 Chaudri Muhammad Ali, *The Emergence of Pakistan* (Lahore: Service Book Club, 1988), 25.

Muslims of India were exposed to a new angle of vision in their political outlook that had transformed the overall picture of the future of India. Instead of looking upon themselves as a minority, desperately seeking safeguards for their cultural, economic and political interests, Muslims saw themselves as a nation entitled to build a just social order on the basis of Islam with a homeland of their own.⁵⁷ Jinnah was a political strategist with a perfect sense of timing. In Muslim League session at Patna, he said in December 1938, 'one has to play his game as on a chess board.' Without fully organizing the Muslim League and making it a power to reckon with such a demand [like Pakistan] was likely to backfire.⁵⁸

The political conflict after 1936 was that Sikander Hayat Khan in Punjab led the Unionist Party, though his party had comfortable majority but Congress leaders treated them harshly as in over-all India scenario Congress was in majority. The Congress held the sway in eight provinces out of eleven; the Muslims felt the Congress wrath which latter led directly to the creation of Pakistan.

Rural Muslims' interests dominated Punjabi politics under the banner of the Unionists party which controlled the votes of rural Muslims of selected section of society. Faced with increasing conflict within the structure of imperial power, Muslim leaders sought in the concept of Pakistan a new symbolic Islamic foundation for the political order. The demand for Pakistan reflected both an ideology of Muslim "national" solidarity rooted in the new institutions of urban public life and a response to long standing tensions in Muslim politics.⁵⁹

Sikander-Jinnah Pact

The Muslim League had failed to get any significant number of seats in the provincial election of 1937; it looked like the demise of Muslim League in the politics of Punjab. Jinnah called a conference of the Muslim League in Lucknow on 15-18 October,

57 Ali, *The Emergence of Pakistan*, 25.

58 Waheed-uz-Zaman, *Quaid-i-Azam Mohammad Ali Jinnah: Myth and Reality* (Islamabad: NIHCR, 1985), 24.

59 Waheed-uz-Zaman, *Quaid-i-Azam Mohammad Ali Jinnah: Myth and Reality*, 9.

1937, to which Sikander Hayat and newly elected Muslim members of his Unionist Party were invited as well. Sikander Hayat accepted the invitation, went to Lucknow, admitted the supremacy of Jinnah and signed agreement which was called the Sikander-Jinnah Pact. One clause of its many clauses was that, 'all Muslim members of Unionist Party to be advised to become the members of Muslim League'. This clause in the Jinnah-Sikander Pact changed the political scenario of Punjab⁶⁰ and gave the Muslim League a new lease of life in Punjab politics.

On 14th September, 1939 the Congress issued a call for total independence, which was ignored by the British. Then a month later on 18th October 1939 Viceroy Linlithgow assured Muslims that "full weight would be given to their views and interests." He reiterated the offer of dominion status for India somewhere in the unspecified future. At the same time he blamed Indian politicians for failure to achieve progress in the constitutional process. The British at the center (Delhi) envisaged the Congress high command had no option but to ask its eight provincial ministries to resign; they did so on 10th November 1939 and the Governors took charge of their administration under Section 93.⁶¹

British Policy 1937-1947

Even in 1939, as in 1914, the British Government did not take the Indian leadership into confidence before pushing Indians into the Second World War. The Congress leaders felt insulted and resigned from ministries. The growing division of opinion between the Congress and the Muslim League created a deadlock that remained unresolved throughout the war. In successive British efforts, notably the Cripps Plan of 1942 and the three-tiered Cabinet Mission Plan of 1946 proposing three units of India, the British Government had been placing its emphasis on responsible rather than strictly representative government, and on the maintenance of the unity of India. It, therefore, failed to carry the Congress and Muslim League with it. The Congress leadership was

60 K. C. Yadav, *India Divided 1947: Who did it? Why? How? and What Now?* (New Delhi: Hope India, n.d.), 211.

61 Aysa Jalal, *The Sole Spokesman*, Lahore (Sang-e-Meel Publication, 1992), 48.

more concerned with the struggle for achieving effective power, and while the Muslim League was battling the implications for them of a representative government.⁶²

On May 10th 1940, Prime Minister Churchill took office. Churchill's reactionary stance on India was so extreme that it depressed everyone, even committed imperialists like his Secretary for India, Leo Amery. Churchill described Hindu-Muslim antagonism as the 'bulwark of British Rule in India', and noted that "were it be resolved, their concord would result in 'the united communities jointly showing us the door'".⁶³ The divide and rule policy of the British had worked exceptionally well. Hindus and Muslims hated each other more than they hated the British.⁶⁴

From Viceroy Lord Linlithgow, the Indian Viceroyalty was handed over to Lord Wavell. He served India for three and a half years, from October 1943 to March 1947, probably the most difficult and momentous period in office any viceroy had had to face.⁶⁵ From the day of his appointment as Viceroy of India he was concerned with the political problems of India and during his last two years in office these problems came to dominate all else. At the very outset he confronted the Bengal famine and thereafter, right until the end, amid all his other duties he had to meet repeated threats of drought and chronic shortage of food, cloth, coal and other essentials. As soon as the war ended, there was, as he had foreseen, a renewal of political agitation and popular discontent, which was followed by strikes, outbreaks of disorder, both anti-government agitation and communal strife, taking the country to the brink of civil war and widespread upheaval.⁶⁶

62 C. H. Philips, *The Evolution of India and Pakistan 1858-1947: Select Documents* (London: OUP, 1965), 337.

63 Alex Von Tunzelmann, *Indian Summer: The Secret History of the End of an Empire* (London, Simon and Schuster, 2007), 109.

64 Tunzelmann, *Indian Summer: The Secret History of the End of an Empire*.

65 Penderel Moon (ed.), *Wavell: The Viceroy's Journal* (Karachi: OUP, 1974), xi.

66 *Wavell: The Viceroy's Journal*, xiii.

On 31st January 1947 Lord Wavell was informed by a letter of C.R. Attlee, the Prime Minister of Britain, about his removal from duty mainly due to his disagreement with the policy of Her Majesty's Government. It was further added that his was a wartime appointment. Wavell was not happy with this forced removal and he replied to Attlee on 5th February that:

You are causing me to be removed because of what you term a wide divergence of policy. The divergence, as I see it, is between my wanting a definite policy for the interim period and HMG refusing to give it to me one. I will not at this time enter into further argument on this. I do not of course question your decision to make a change. I have no desire except to serve the state to the best of my ability; obviously I cannot continue to do so if I have not the confidence of the Government in power.⁶⁷

Lord Wavell's successor was Lord Mountbatten who finalized the terms of transfer of power. Wavell's role seemed waning as compared to Mountbatten, for without any logic whatsoever, neither the British prime minister nor the Indian leaders trusted him (Wavell). In fact, Wavell's clean background made him unsuitable for the office of viceroy. He was straightforward and upright. He was clear in his mind that whatever went on in India as viceroy of India it was his responsibility to find the best solution for it. He was a caretaker who refused to act like one. He concluded, that no reasonable person could deny that he was right, that 'he had a double purpose to carry out to protect British interests and to deliver on other desires of Indian. Even thinking that they would loose a lot by leaving India at that point in time, and that feeling was undoubtedly widespread there.' Unfortunately, the time was not reasonable, nor was there any precedent for the events in which he had become involved; no great empire had ever negotiated ceding control over a subject territory after emerging victorious from a major war. Wavell was naïve enough to think that everyone should be as honest as he was and that India's leaders should be thinking of India and not of themselves. Wavell's greatness was too much over-shadowed by the reputation of the man who took his place.

67 *Wavell: The Viceroy's Journal*, 498.

Lord Mountbatten's advantage over Wavell was considerable. He was extrovert, handsome, and had a natural charm. Indians somehow have had this odd fascination for royalty and their demure. Mountbatten, a relative of the King Emperor, had brought to India some of that mysterious glamour of royalty that impresses the Indian psyches.⁶⁸ On 20th February Prime Minister Attlee made an announcement in the House of Commons about transferring of power to Indian hands by a date which would not be later than June 1948.⁶⁹

Britain's Condition in 1947

The most important factor for an empire relenting power was its resources. Britain itself was in turmoil after Second World War; its economy lay shattered, and everything there was rationed from food items to clothes. Alex Von Tunzelmann states that: The British government was in the centre of its economic crisis since the Great Depression. There was not much understanding about what was going on in Punjab, and even less interest shown. The Britain had been active in Second World War; it had recently come out from these six years of war. Hundreds of thousands had been killed, and millions were wounded. Their industry had been destroyed, their towns ruined, their families broken up. They suffered from strict rules of rationing, which were getting tighter. To the proletariat, the Empire was an artificial setup. Edie Rutherford, a forty-three years old housewife from Sheffield, had an indifferent reaction to the mass of press coverage about the effective end of her nation's empire and the independence of 400 million of her fellow subjects. 'I swear most fellow couldn't care less,' she wrote in her diary on 16th August 1947. 'And I resent the inference that we had enslaved them up till now'. Churchill's warnings about indignant Britons awakening sharply to defend their empire came to nothing. Later, he changed his mind and said, 'I do not think we shall lose very much leaving India at the present

68 Michael Edwardes, *The Last Years of British India* (London: Cassel, 1963), 94-95,

69 Mitra, *The Indian Annual Register*, 142-143.

time, and that feeling is undoubtedly widespread here,' he had contemplated in an unsent letter to Jinnah.⁷⁰

British Economy in 1947

On 8th May, the Chancellor of the Exchequer had announced that Britain would freeze further payments on all its war debt until the creditors agreed to reductions. The exchequer was more than three billion pounds in the red, thanks to the war; it owed Egypt 450 million pounds, Ireland 250 million pounds, Australia and New Zealand 200 million pounds each and further enormous sums to Argentina, Norway and Brazil. But the largest creditor of all, with a billion and quarter pounds owed, was India.⁷¹ The British government had made it clear that they would send no troops or resources to India. Britain's balance of trade with India was in red by over 50 million pounds. The Chancellor of the Exchequer, Hugh Dalton, had announced that imports of tobacco, newsprint, petrol and some food items were to be reduced drastically. There was nothing to spare for India. All Mountbatten could propose was the setting up of multi-faith secular committee, which sat in Delhi and resolve that things would be better if everyone stopped killing each other.⁷²

On 18th July 1947, the King signed the India Independence Act in London, and the Mountbattens celebrated their silver wedding anniversary in Delhi. Edwina was touched by the message from Gandhi, he wrote—"Dear Sister" —, and—"I hope that your joint careers were blossoming"_. However they were not doing so well jointly. Dickie would come up to Edwina's room every night to kiss her goodnight before returning to work. Every night, there would be a row.⁷³

Personal Factor

A few months before Mountbatten went to India, their marriage was in one of its healthier phases. Photographs of the time show them smiling, affectionate and relaxed, and their letters revealed a

70 Alex Von Tunzelmann, *Indian Summer*, 256.

71 Tunzelmann, *Indian Summer*, 192.

72 Tunzelmann, *Indian Summer*, 206.

73 Tunzelmann, *Indian Summer*, 212

matching picture. A few weeks afterwards, they reached a nadir, and by the beginning of June were constantly fighting. It is hard to believe that this turbulence did not have an effect on Mountbatten professionally-especially as he had to work closely with Nehru and Gandhi, two men whose company his wife plainly preferred to his own. Initially Edwina had not wanted to be in India, and in the first few weeks she coaxed her husband to make certain that they would be on their way back to Britain as soon as possible. Dickie had always striven to impress her with his achievements at work. Perhaps, if he could carry out the transfer of power swiftly and efficiently enough, he might still save his marriage.⁷⁴

It was left to Edwina to charm the Mahatma, which she did; and he charmed her. 'Dear sister', was how he called her back. From this point on cordial relations between the Viceroy's house and Gandhi were almost exclusively maintained by Edwina, who regularly visited Gandhi's hut in the polluted Bhangi Colony, home to many of Delhi's untouchables. Dickie never went.⁷⁵ Abul Kalam Azad wrote in his book *India Wins Freedom* that he wondered 'how Nehru was influenced to agree on India's partition'. He was a man of principle but he was also amenable and impulsive to personal influence. Lady Mountbatten was highly intelligent, attractive and had a friendly temperament. She admired her husband's position greatly, was conscious of delicacy and sensitivity of his task. She took over many cases that Mountbatten found hard to put across to his counterpart, Edwina came to his rescue and tried to interpret his thoughts to those [probably Nehru] who would not at first agree with him.⁷⁶ Probably her influence made Nehru to change his stance and he reluctantly agreed on partition of India.

In 1946, Mountbatten was serving in the British Navy as Supreme Commander. He was hesitant to accept the colossal task of becoming India's viceroy and that too at that critical juncture. Fear gripped him, 'What if he fails?' However, after much persuasion his naval superiors relented that 'he would be allowed to return

74 Tunzelmann, *Indian Summer*, 202

75 Tunzelmann, *Indian Summer*, 186.

76 Maulana Abul Kalam Azad, *India Wins Freedom* (Lahore: Vanguard, 1989), 198.

after his two years' leave as Supreme Commander.⁷⁷ Listowel argued that Mountbatten could influence India to stay in the Commonwealth and to negotiate defense arrangements that would be beneficial for Britain.⁷⁸

Bertrand Glancy and Evan Meredith Jenkins

In the 1940s the Governor of Punjab was Bertrand Glancy who assumed the office on 7 April, 1941 and vacated on the same date in 1946.⁷⁹ He had full control of Punjab. There was a coalition government, led by Chief Minister Sikander Hayat (1892-1942).⁸⁰ In December 1942, Sikandar Hayat suddenly died and after his death Sir Khizr Hayat Khan Tiwana took over charge of Punjab Government in 1942. Khizr Hayat Tiwana had premonition from the very beginning that the opposition to his ministry would come from the Muslim League and its pro-Pakistan camp in Punjab. However, he managed to survive with the help of members in the Punjab Assembly that included Hindus, Sikhs and his own party's Muslim members; he had full support of the Punjab Governor Bertrand Glancy. In the election of 1945-46, Glancy did not want to have Muslim League in the saddle as it was bound to increase communal tension. Bertrand Glancy preferred the Unionists who supported British rule and helped recruitments in the British Indian forces⁸¹ and as opposed to Muslim League were ever ready to serve British interests in India.

Evan Jenkins became Governor of Punjab on 8th April, 1946. He had served Punjab since the start of his career in 1920. He cared for the people of Punjab, but as Governor he could not prove himself of much help in bringing people out of the communal vortex. It seemed he too was involved in that tussle, as he showed undue favour to Sikhs and openly rebuked Muslims, a biased behavior that he could not justify. Had he remained impartial in his

77 Philip Zeigler, *Mountbatten: The Official Biography* (London: Guild Publishing, 1985), 354.

78 Tunzelmann, *Indian Summer*, 256.

79 K. K. Aziz, *Historical Handbook of Muslim India 1700-1947*, Vol. I, (Islamabad, Vanguard, 1995) 214.

80 Haider Malik, *Sikandar Hayat Khan: A Political Biography*.

81 Dar, *Communal Riots in the Punjab*, 14.

views, sentiments and actions, no governor could have matched his rule. One is reminded here of the British policy of “Divide and Rule”. This trend went against the prospects of keeping India united.

Jenkins was born on 2nd February 1896 at Darjeeling, India.⁸² Son of the late John Lewis Jenkins KSCI, he was member of Viceroy, Lord Hardinge’s Council. Lewis died suddenly at the climax of his career in 1912 at Calcutta.⁸³ Evan had two siblings, David and Owain. David was a member of the House of Lords; the younger Owain was a successful businessperson.⁸⁴ Evan Jenkins received education from Rugby Balliol College, Oxford.⁸⁵ He stood first in the ICS examination in 1920. Evan Jenkins came to India just after 1st World War and was appointed as a district officer in Punjab. A Welshman, Jenkins had dedicated his full attention to Punjab with a passion comparable only to Olaf Kirkpatrick Caroe’s (ICS; Secretary, External Affairs Dept. 1939-45; Governor NWFP March 1946-7) passion for the Frontier. He was intensely involved with Punjab and was often teased by his friends that he was married to Punjab.⁸⁶ Sir Jenkins remained a bachelor all his life. He was a man of simple habits, diligent and strict with a cool mind. His favorite means of transport was a bi-cycle. He had worked as District officer in Punjab.⁸⁷ He was appointed Deputy Commissioner of Gurdaspur,⁸⁸ Hoshiarpur District, in 1920s

82 Waheed Ahmad (ed.), *The Punjab Story 1940-1947: The Muslim League and the Unionists—Towards Partition and Pakistan* (Islamabad: National Documentation Wing, Cabinet Division, 2009), 531.

83 Owain Jenkins, *Merchant Prince: Memories of India 1929-1958* (Hampshire, Michael Russel, 1989), 4.

84 *Merchant Prince: Memories of India 1929-1958*, 225-226.

85 *Who’s Who 1946: An Annual Biographical Dictionary*, Ninety eight year Issue (London: Adam and Charles Black, 1946), 1438.

86 Larry Collins and Dominique Lapierre, *Freedom at Midnight* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1975), 127.

87 Owain Jenkins, *Merchant Prince Memories of India 1929-1958* (Hampshire, Michael Russell, 1989), 1.

88 *Merchant Prince: Memories of India 1929-1958*, 42.

(according to his brother Owain Jenkins),⁸⁹ of Lyallpur (now Faisalabad) (1928-1932), Rawalpindi (1932-1937) and as a Commissioner of Delhi from 1937-1940, before taking over as Principal Private Secretary to Governor-General and Viceroy of India Linlithgow and later to Viceroy Wavell (1941-1946). He became Governor of Punjab on April 8, 1946 and remained so till partition.⁹⁰

Punjab Elections 1945-46

The elections of 1945-46 were the litmus test for both Muslims and non-Muslims whether they wanted independence from British rule or not? Muslims of India were eager for independence from the British as well as Hindu dominance. For people like Nehru it was not easy to accept Pakistan. During his election campaign at Lucknow he said “The cry of Pakistan is an imaginary slogan. The Hindus and Sikhs of Punjab and minorities of Bengal are deadly against it, and no one can force it upon them.”⁹¹ Other Indian leaders like Pandit Pant said in unequivocal terms in Lucknow during the election campaign that Congress had called a halt to the

89 Merchant Prince: *Memories of India 1929-1958*, 151.

90 Dates of the Viceroy's tenure are taken from K. K. Aziz, *The British in India* (Islamabad: NIHCR), 1975, 450. Also see K. K. Aziz, *Historical Handbook of Muslim India 1700-1947*, Vol. I (Islamabad: Vanguard, 1995), 203 (after retirement Jenkins went to serve on the Board of the Eastern Bank, an important British overseas exchange bank which dates back to 1890. Jenkins was a director of the Bank between 1947 and 1967 and was its Chairman between 1950 and 1967. The Eastern Bank merged with the Chartered Bank (now Standard Chartered) in 1959 while keeping its individual identity for a number of years. No doubt Jenkins played an important part in the merger negotiations. Lionel Carter writes that he missed the opportunity of meeting Jenkins at a reception which was held in the 1970s. But a colleague who did meet him told him [Lionel Carter] that in a discussion Jenkins made the point that he always refused to talk about his time as Governor of the Punjab. His attitude was, of course, in marked contrast to the one which Mountbatten adopted towards his Viceroyalty. Lionel Carter, *Punjab Politics 1 June-14 August 1947 Tragedy, Governors' Fortnightly Reports and other Key Documents*, Vol. V (New Delhi: Manohar, 2007), 12 (f.n. 5.).

91 *Dawn*, New Delhi, 7th October 1945.

policy of appeasement of the Muslim League on the question of Pakistan. He said that the historic 'Quit India' resolution still formed part of the Congress programme for achieving independence and that the Congress had emerged stronger many times over "after these three years of ruthless repression by the Government."⁹² He said that the League's cry of 'Islam in danger' was not at all justified. Religion had nothing to do with the fight for freedom. The Jamiat-ul-Ulema-e-Hind, the premier religious institution of the Muslims was with the Congress. Pundit Pant declared that the Muslim League had no foundation. Muslims living in villages had not even heard of the name of Muslim League or its leader, Mr. Jinnah.

Lord Wavell wrote to Lord Pethick Lawrence in a letter dated 9th October, about the Congress election campaign and their bitterness towards the British Government and Muslim League; however he was concerned about the war cries that were significant. He wrote "we do not know what Vallabhbai Patel really meant when he said in some of his Bombay speeches that he promises of complete independence within a few years"⁹³.

Muhammad Ali Jinnah on 7th December, 1945 said in Bombay, as reported by daily *Dawn*, Delhi, that the Labour Government was still in dark as to the crux of India's constitutional problem and were trying to seek light through the circuitous method of sending out a British Parliamentary delegation under the auspices of the Empire Parliamentary Association. Mr. Jinnah suggested that the British Government should apply their mind definitely to the division of India and the establishment of Pakistan and Hindustan which meant freedom for Hindus and Musalmans.⁹⁴

In London, debates were then in progress, about India's intended elections in 1945 which would lay the foundation of a new future for India. In one of the 'House of Commons' debates, Mr. Wyatt, member of British Parliament, made the following observation

92 A number of Congress leaders were in jail during Second World War 1942-45. *Hindustan Times*, New Delhi, 6th October 1945.

93 For detail see extracts from private & secret letters from Lord Wavell to Lord Pethick Lawrence, dated 9th October, 1945.

94 *Dawn*, Delhi, Dec. 7, 1945.

about the Indian elections. He said that he had to refer to an important point that was about the 'conduction of elections'. He quoted Prime Minister Attlee's statement that the election in India would be free and fair. Wyatt thought it was a tribute to government officials in India, both British and Indian. He observed that there was no general complaint about any official partiality. Everyone appreciated their devotion to duties. Wyatt told the House that a number of Indians themselves had approached him and appreciated the impartiality of officials towards contending parties.

However, he was alarmed when it was reported that government officials were taking sides in Punjab elections. He elaborated that in Punjab the government was headed by Unionists. The Unionist Party was known for its pro-British stance. Wyatt pondered that perhaps the Unionist was the only party in India that was against nationalism and had a desire that British should rule India. The British administration reciprocated and it was convenient for the administration to reinstate the Unionist government in Punjab. But the Unionist comeback was not convincing (due to few seats) which resulted in political instability in the province.⁹⁵

According to Quaid-i-Azam Muhammad Ali Jinnah, Punjab was the cornerstone of the Pakistan scheme.⁹⁶ Had the Punjabi Muslims not supported the League's separatist demands, Pakistan could not have come into existence.⁹⁷

This shows that the Muslims of Punjab had to work very hard against the entire official machinery of the province which was against the creation of Pakistan. The Parliamentarians in London also realized this factor and they pointed out the fact that Britain's

95 *House of Commons Official Report*, Column 2658, OIOC, Cat No. L/P&J/8/470, dated 6th December 1945.

96 Syed Sharifuddin Pirzada, *Foundations of Pakistan: All India Muslim League Documents 1906-1947*, Vol. II (Islamabad: NIHCR, 2007), 376. Also see Kaniz F. Yusuf and others (ed.), *Pakistan Resolution Revisited* (Islamabad, NIHCR, 1990), 161.

97 Ian A. Talbot, "The Growth of the Muslim League in the Punjab, 1937-46", in Mushirul Hasan, *India's Partition: Process, Strategy and Mobilization* (New Delhi: OUP, 2001), 235.

Number of Sikh Seats	31
Number of Muhammadan Seats	84

The balance is made up of seats of minorities, special interests and women.

Party Position after Elections

Party	Number of Seats
Congress	51
Unionists	21
Muslim League	75
Panthic (Akali) Sikhs	23
Independents	5
Total	175 ¹⁰⁰

After the elections, the Punjab government made every effort to keep Muslim League away from power corridors. The Governor of the province demanded Mamdot to approach the Sikhs and Hindus for support as he thought he (Mamdot) would not be able to rule the province without their support.

By 1947, British found it difficult to go on with the Indian burden. In Punjab, the British headed by Governor Jenkins used all sorts of tactics to keep Muslim League on the sidelines; Jenkins succeeded by not handing over power to the majority party of the province even after Unionist leader Khizr Hayat resigned. But events at that time made it clear that the honour and impartiality of the British

100 Singh (ed.), *Jinnah and Punjab*.

were at stake. They should hand over power to Indian leaders according to their respective wishes. The British accepted the verdict of the electorate reluctantly. The abrupt flight they chose had affected the whole region of South Asia. The year of 1947 would live in the minds of millions as the time during which the British policy fulfilled the dreadful prophecy made by Rabindra Nath Tagore: "The wheels of fate will some day compel the English to give up their Indian Empire. But what kind of India will they leave behind, what a stark misery! When the streams of their centuries of 'administration run dry at last, what a waste of mud and filth will they leave behind them!" Perhaps, it was a cruel verdict when it was uttered in 1941. But 1947 proved the axiom.¹⁰¹ Now, after more than sixty years, the seeds of distrust sown by the British arbitrator have grown into nuclear laced rockets ready to annihilate two countries that are Pakistan and India, suspicious of each other's motives.

101 Mitra, *The Indian Annual Register*, 96.

Chapter II

Jenkins Role in the Partition of Punjab (1947)

Evan Meredith Jenkins (1896-1985) was the last Governor of the United Punjab (April 1946-August 1947). Jenkins though believed in the unity of the province, he could not obstruct the inexorable process of break-up of the province, when communal riots broke-out. Hindus and Sikhs both pitted against the Muslims. Obviously, Jenkins was helpless in breaking up these groupings. He was devoted to Punjab and sought ways to adjust the population of Punjab on their respective sides—Muslims in the West Punjab and Hindus and Sikhs on the East Punjab. In 1947, after the break-up of riots the population in millions was moving to their respective areas, the Hindus and Sikhs in West moving to East and similarly Muslim in East Punjab moved toward West. This cross movement of the population provoked clashes and unleashed a frenzy of killing, arson and looting of properties. The scale of mayhem paralyzed the Punjab administration, which utterly failed in controlling the riots. The mass massacre on both sides of the border spoke volumes on the apathy of Punjab's administration and its failure to arrange smooth and peaceful transfer of power.

Jenkins had succeeded Sir Bertrand Glancy as Governor of the Punjab, a crucial position in 1946. Sir Bertrand Glancy ruled Punjab with the cooperation of Khizr Tiwana (1942-47), a leader of Unionist Party, who fully cooperated with British and British reciprocated this mutual beneficial camaraderie.

Political changes were occurring all over India; the international scenario also changed after Second World War as a result of which British had to leave India. The Indian politicians had been struggling for self-determination for more than half a century. A new power has emerged on the world stage. It was the United States of America, which favoured Britain's exit from the colonies. The leaders of India could feel the pulse of the time. Muslims felt that in independent India they would be subservient to Hindu rule, as democracy meant majority rule. It was easy for the majority to manipulate and the Hindu majority had been manipulating things wherever it suited them. The Muslims could not stand Hindus

dominance. In Punjab, Sikhs saw themselves as a minority and they were not ready to be under a Muslim majority. They demanded a separate Sikh state. This led to communal violence as no one was ready to give space to other. By the time, leaders realized their mistakes; much blood had been shed on both sides and reconciliation had become impossible.

Sir Edward Penderel Moon wrote in his book, *Wavell's Journal* that Lord Wavell appreciated the guidance of Sir Evan Jenkins, renowned for his ability among other highly competent civil servants. Wavell testified that he leaned quite heavily on Jenkins during his first two years in office.¹ Jenkins knew that Wavell was honest to India and was preparing ground for India's independence but Churchill's Government, as a whole, was not sincere to fulfill its promises made to Indians for their support during the war. Both Lord Linlithgow and Lord Wavell observed that the main problem of Indian politics was the dishonesty of the British.² During a cabinet farewell dinner, Jenkins had an interesting talk with Wavell. He told him that in politics there could be no long-term planning or 'grand strategy' saying the political art was empirical and in a sense dishonest.³ He had been working with Lord Wavell for the division of India since the end of the Second World War and he knew that the division of India was inevitable. The pros and cons of Punjab and Bengal divisions were also deliberated.⁴ The division of Punjab and Bengal became inevitable when communal riots broke out in those areas. In 1947, it became a war of succession that whosoever ousted the other communal group would get hold of its land and property. It was a horrifying story as far as Punjab was concerned. Jenkins tried to control the ferocity, but he failed completely as the situation had gone out of control and mass frenzy ruled the towns and streets. Thus, Muslims and Sikhs both suffered at the hands of each other. Jenkins admitted it was difficult to handle widespread riots, he said:

1 Penderel Moon (ed.), *Wavell: The Viceroy's Journal* (Karachi: OUP, 1974), 448.

2 Moon (ed.), *Wavell: The Viceroy's Journal*, 451-452.

3 Moon (ed.), *Wavell: The Viceroy's Journal*, 453.

4 Nicholas Mansergh (ed.), *The Transfer of Power 1942-7*, Vol. VI (London: Her Majesty's Stationery Office, 1976, doc.428), 964-967.

Although most of us knew a great deal about the suppression of communal disturbances in the cities, we had had a little experience of dealing with such disturbances in a large rural area with bad communications. I thought we should have to develop our techniques as we gained experience.⁵

Jenkins' strength was his knowledge of Punjab. He knew Punjab inside out. He made no secret of the fact that he did not believe in the partition of India, particularly partition of Punjab. The exercise he was doing for partition with Lord Wavell was part of his official duty though he was not in favour of partition. He repeatedly pointed out to the politicians of all the different communities that the division of Punjab would lessen its importance in the scheme of things. He pointed out that Punjab was a viable state; it could produce its own food-supply, it had its own industries, exportable products etc. He tried to convince Delhi, of Punjab's cohesion but to no avail, the vernacular press vilified him.⁶

According to Claude Markovits article "Partition of India", the division of India occurred because Congress leaders like Nehru and Patel were not ready to share power with Jinnah and his cohorts. They preferred truncated India in spite of Gandhi's opposition to the very idea of partition.⁷ Richard Symonds in his book, *In the Margins of Independence* narrates Sir Francis Mudie's opinion about Jenkins. Francis thought Jenkins was a failure as a Governor because he would not meet people, and that this, rather than administration should be a Governor's function. Similarly, he maintained that when Jenkins had previously been Secretary to the Viceroy, he had then also not done enough to encourage Wavell to meet people.⁸

5 Madhav Godbole, *The Holocaust of Indian Partition: An Inquest* (New Delhi: Rupa Co., 2006). 62.

6 Leonard Mosley, *The Last Days of British Raj* (London: Weidenfeld and Nicholson, 1962), 204.

7 Ghislaine Glasson Deschaumes and Rada Ivekovic (ed.), *Divided Countries, Separated Cities*; Claude Markovits, "Partition of India" (New Delhi: OUP, 2001), 51.

8 Richard Symonds, *In the Margins of Independence* (Karachi: OUP, 2001), 49-50. Sir Francis Mudie was Governor of West Punjab 1947-49.

The importance of Punjab could not be overemphasized because not only was it the granary of India but also provided the best soldiers who were ready to serve in any part of the world in spite of the fact that the common Hindu consider it a sin to leave his homeland. Mosley mentions in his book *The Last Days of British Raj* that 65 percent of the soldiers in the Indian Army were Muslims. Those who fought in North Africa, Italy, Malaya and Burma were all Muslims, which meant that there were as many as nine Muslims to every seven non-Muslims in the armed forces though population wise there were nine Muslims to every twenty-four non-Muslims in India. So many British officials, especially after 1942, were pro-Muslim.⁹ During the Second World War Punjab Government proclaimed full support to the British in their war effort. Sikander Hayat Khan, the Chief Minister announced stern action against those elements who opposed the war. The Punjab Congressmen alleged that a reign of terror was let loose and those who were arrested had to face the wrath of the Unionist Government and the press was suppressed.¹⁰

The Punjab in 1947

The position of Punjab could not be fathomed without going into the background of Punjab politics. From 1920 to 1942, Sir Sikander Hayat Khan was active in Punjab politics as a member of Unionist Party representing Hindus, Muslims and Sikhs. After his death, the Muslim wing of the Unionist Party disintegrated and the Muslim League with its demand for Pakistan started to gain popularity. The failure of the League to form a ministry after general elections in 1946 was mainly due to its purely communal outlook and its lack of flexibility to accommodate Hindus and Sikhs. The Sikhs in particular felt that Muslim League was not making any promises for their safe and secure future, despite their desire to keep Punjab united. The Sikhs thought that the Muslims considered them as an inferior people, unworthy for making an alliance. The Muslim League was not happy with the rule of Unionists. Henceforth they concentrated all their energies on

9 Symonds, *In the Margins of Independence*, 6.

10 Amit Kumar Gupta (ed.), *Myth and Reality: The Struggle for Freedom in India, 1945-47* (New Delhi: Manohar, 1987), 267.

overthrowing the Coalition government headed by Khizr Hayat Khan. The Muslim League agitation created great apprehension in the minds of the Sikhs and Hindus. Master Tara Singh, a Sikh leader, asked his followers to get ready to fight the Muslims, as Muslim League's designs were to dominate the whole of Punjab. Consequently, both Hindus and Sikhs realized that their safety laid in a separate province for themselves. The fall of the Khizr Ministry was hastened because he, on 24th January 1947, banned the Muslim League Guards and Rashtriya Swayam Sewak Sangh (RSSS).¹¹

At that critical juncture of political developments, Evan Jenkins tried to create some sense in the minds of the Muslims and Sikhs to reconcile and not to insist on the division of Punjab. He repeatedly reminded the League leaders that Punjab could only progress as a powerful state if Muslims because of their numerical majority assumed their leadership role and took the non-Muslim with them not as inferior or subordinates but as partners since no party alone could rule Punjab by itself. However, his reconciliation efforts were fruitless. In Jenkins view, the partition of the Punjab with a boundary cutting across agricultural land irrigated by rivers and would not be practicable as it would create an artificial frontier for which geographically, economically, linguistically and socially there was no justification. "Partition," he said "solves no problem and in effect does not really make sense."¹² Attlee's Government had drawn up a plan of withdrawal, along with Wavell and two governors of Bengal and Punjab whom withdrawal would affect most. They appealed to Attlee not to announce the final date that would provoke the warring communities to action. Attlee paid no

11 Tahir Kamran, "The Unfolding Crisis in Punjab, March-August 1947: Key Turning Points and British Responses", *Journal of Punjab Studies* (University of California), Vol. 14, No. 2 (Fall 2007), 189.

12 Nicholas Mansergh (ed.), *Transfer of Power*, Vol. IX, Doc. 501 (London: Her Majesty's Stationery Office, 1980), 878-881; Amit Kumar Gupta (ed.), *Myth and Reality: The Struggle for Freedom in India, 1945-47* (New Delhi: Manohar, 1987), 281.

heed to this appeal.¹³ The British officers realizing the imminence of transfer of power in India, lost interest in the administration. According to Jenkins, they were thoroughly disgusted with all parties including the Muslim League, and wanted to be relieved of their duties as soon as possible.¹⁴ Jenkins mentioned that to Lord Pethick Lawrence on 25th February 1947 that the position had radically changed by the announcement of 20th February. The prime minister was against repressive measures, as that would hamper smooth transfer in the stipulated time. Jenkins own position in exercise of his special responsibilities was impaired though he still had some personal influence over party leaders who knew his constitutional authority as governor was soon to end.¹⁵ Khizr Hayat neither could oblige the Muslim League nor offend Hindus or Sikhs. Ultimately, he felt that he had no alternative but to resign, which he did on 2nd March 1947. The reason given by him for his resignation was that His Majesty's Government statement of 20th February had required that the Unionists should also incorporate Muslim League members in its coalition government, as that was essential for communal harmony in Punjab. In the same statement, it was emphasized that if Punjabis desired that they should remain one and united, they would have to accommodate each other. As the Muslim League was a communal party, so it was not ready to negotiate with Hindus and Sikhs who were in minority in Punjab. Similarly, Sikhs were not ready to accept Muslims as a dominant political entity in Punjab. That non-acceptance of each other's status led to communal violence and resulted in the ultimate division of Punjab. The Muslim Unionists worked as a buffer between the Muslim community and the minorities. Khizr Hayat's resignation came as a surprise even to

13 Salesh Kumar Bandopadya, *Quaid-i-Azam Muhammad Ali Jinnah and the Creation of Pakistan* (New Delhi: Sterling Publishers (Pvt.) Limited, 1991), 308.

14 Bandopadya, *Quaid-i-Azam Muhammad Ali Jinnah and the Creation of Pakistan*, 281.

15 Mansegh (ed.), *Transfer of Power*, Vol. IX, 815.

his colleagues. The Muslim League was happy on his resignation.¹⁶

Jenkins had forewarned the Viceroy that Muslim League would not be able to form a ministry and that during the next 16 months for the maintenance of law and order in the Punjab it would be necessary to form a coalition ministry or use force under section 93. Nevertheless, he adopted the constitutional procedure of calling upon Iftikhar Hussain Khan Mamdot, leader of the provincial Muslim League, to form a ministry. As expected both Hindus and Sikhs refused to co-operate forcing the Governor on 5th March to take over the administration under Section 93.¹⁷

Powers of Governor under the Government of India Act 1935, Section 93:

XCIII-(1) If at any time the Governor of a province is satisfied that a situation has arisen in which the government of the Province cannot be carried on in accordance with the provisions of this Act, he may by proclamation-

- a) To declare that his functions shall, to such extent as may be specified in the Proclamation, be exercised by him in his discretion;
- b) To assume to him all or any of the powers vested in or exercisable by any Provincial body or authority; and any such Proclamation may contain such incidental and consequential provisions as may appear to him to be necessary or desirable for giving effect to the objects of the Proclamation, including provision for suspending in whole or in part the operation of any provisions of this Act relating to any Provincial body or authority:

Provided that nothing in this subsection shall authorize the Governor to assume to himself any of the powers vested in or exercisable by a High Court, or to suspend, either in whole or in

16 V. P. Menon, *The Transfer of Power* (New Delhi: Sangam Books, 1979), 344-345.

17 Menon, *The Transfer of Power*.

part, the operation of any provision of the Act relating to High Court.¹⁸

This was done on March 5th; it was all the more necessary because on that day savage street fighting had broken out in Lahore between Muslims determined to dominate Punjab for Pakistan, and both Sikh and Hindus determined to resist that domination at all cost. Due to the vigorous measures of the Governor of Punjab and his colleagues, killing and destruction was quelled. The leaders of all communities were gathered and a Peace Committee was formed. Meanwhile, the frenzy had spread, to other towns, especially Multan, Amritsar and Rawalpindi. There fierce battles suddenly broke out and streets were set on fire by arsonists. The disturbances spread to the countryside, especially the north-west where there was a large majority of Muslims.

In England, Winston Churchill, the Leader of the Opposition, opening the second day's debate on India in the House of Commons on 6th March, 1947, suggested that the problem of India should be handed over to the UNO for solution. Declaring that the Indian political parties did not represent the great masses, Churchill said, "in handing over the government to so called political classes, you are handing them to men of straw, of whom few years later no trace will remain". The government in England moved a motion asking the House to approve its policy and carried it without a division. Attlee, while replying at the end of the debate, in his speech said, "We believe we have done great work in India. We believe the time has come when Indians must shoulder their responsibilities. We can help, but we cannot bear the burden by ourselves."¹⁹ The Opposition introduced an amendment declining to accept the Government policy of transferring power by June 1948.

By March 23rd, things were returning to normal; over 18,000 Indian and 2,000 British troops were being used to help the civil authorities to bring peace to the affected districts of the Province.

18 C. H. Philips, *The Evolution of India and Pakistan 1858-1947: Select Documents* (London, OUP, 1962), 329.

19 Nripendra Nath Mitra (ed.), *The Indian Annual Register*, Jan.-June 1947, Volume I (Calcutta: The Annual Register Office, 1947), 43.

In cities and towns, they had largely succeeded, but in far-flung villages communal crimes were being committed without check. Over 2,000 lives, even many more had been lost. The communal tussle distorted the face of Punjab and left across ugly stains of massacre.²⁰

There seemed no alternative to a continuance of this state of affairs until it was decided how transfer of power in the province was to be carried out. That was evidently the view of Jenkins when he took the portfolio of Governor of the province. He, at the first possible opportunity, sent an urgent telegram to the British Government seeking guidance on their long-term policy for Punjab. Long before February 20th, the fundamental question in Indian politics had been to *whom* the British would hand over the power. They were not concerned with *when* the British would shed power. Thus, the Indian politicians missed an important part that was the timeframe.²¹

It was during the first reaction of horror to the killing and destruction in Lahore, Amritsar and Multan that the Congress Working Committee met to consider the partition related statement. Their main resolution was the assertion that if any part of a province accepted the constitution, to be framed by the Constituent Assembly, and desired to join the Union, it could not be prevented from doing so. By way of giving practical application to this principle, the Committee recommended, in a further resolution, the division of Punjab into two provinces so that the predominantly Muslim part separated from the non-Muslim part.

Jenkins Role in the Partition of Punjab

By the time Lord Mountbatten had arrived in New Delhi, the communal situation in the Punjab had taken a turn for the worse following an outbreak of violence between Hindus and Sikhs on the one side and Muslims on the other. Penderel Moon who had joined Indian Civil Service in 1929, and in 1970s and 1980s edited *The Transfer of Power* volumes, wrote in his book *The British*

20 E. W. R. Lumby, *The Transfer of Power in India 1945-47* (London: George Allen & Unwin Ltd., 1954), 149.

21 Lumby, *The Transfer of Power in India 1945-47*.

Conquest and Dominion of India that Mountbatten before he left England for India was instructed to work for a unitary form of government based on the Cabinet Mission's plan. He was instructed that if by October 1st he considered that there was no prospect of reaching a settlement on that basis, he was supposed to report alternative steps that he thought necessary should be taken for handing over the power on a due date.

Mountbatten, after his arrival at New Delhi, soon grasped that unitary form of government would not work out for India. The communal cleavage had taken deep roots. The frequent eruption of violence and killing of thousands of Indians on communal basis had destroyed the basic fabric of Indian unity. The Congress leaders, with the exception of Gandhi, were already reconciled to the fact that a truncated Pakistan offered the only prospect for an agreed settlement. As early as November, even M. A. Jinnah told Wavell that the British should give the Muslims their bit of country, however, small it might be. Though he was disdainful of a truncated Pakistan and in one of his early interviews with Mountbatten emphatically said, "I do not care how little you give me, so long as you give me completely." He appealed not to break Bengal and the Punjab and let him have a Pakistan of six provinces. However, he knew that he was not in a position to take these by force.²² Khizr Hayat Khan Tiwana's coalition ministry of Muslims, Hindus and Sikhs collapsed on 2nd March,²³ due to intense agitation by the Muslim League for which the Governor Jenkins was to be blamed, as he was not dealing with the Muslim League on the same footing as he had been dealing with the Unionist Party. The Unionists had only few seats in the Assembly and Muslim League, the majority party in Punjab, had been marginalized due to the British governor's support to the Unionists.²⁴ With Tiwana's resignation, there seemed no alternative except Governor's intervention and the imposition of direct rule, which was duly undertaken by Governor Jenkins. A series of communal riots then broke out in the cities of Lahore, Amritsar, Multan, Rawalpindi

22 Penderel Moon, *The British Conquest and Dominion of India, Part II: 1848-1947* (New Delhi: India Research Press, 1999), 1170.

23 Ian Talbot, *Khizr Tiwana* (London: OUP, 1996), 211-212.

24 Mansergh (ed.), *Transfer of Power 1942-47*, Vol. X. 160, 281.

and elsewhere, and it was only by the extensive use of the military that law and order could be restored. It did not take long to control the violence. Sir Evan Jenkins' calculations were that some 3,500 persons had been killed which seemed awful at that time but was nothing when compared to the massacre in Punjab in August 1947.²⁵

Punjab had suffered irreparably in 1947 from March onwards but this reality was kept secret from the man who was to perform the surgery and separate Punjab into two entities. Barrister Cyril Radcliffe, reputed for his sincerity and unbiased judgment, was preferred for this job as it was presumed he knew nothing about India. The belief that the Barrister during his six weeks' stay in India from July 1947 was kept in tight seclusion, isolated entirely from any social contact and far removed from political machination of the closing days of British rule was also untrue. During his brief stay, he dined with Auchinleck (Commander in Chief of Indian Army), Mountbatten, the Chief Justice Sir Patrick Spens, his old friend Sir Walter Monckton, the Governor of Punjab Sir Evan Jenkins and several other figures of influence within the British Indian Society. While in Lahore, he even interacted with the Indian society. He even attempted to stay with Jenkins at the Governor House, though he had to be dissuaded from such intermingling on the ground that such a move could be "misinterpreted".²⁶

Evan Jenkins had repeatedly warned Lord Mountbatten in the face of the lurking danger that if proper precautions were not taken prior to partition, its credibility would be endangered. The administration was fully aware that in rushing to transfer power would definitely result in widespread bloodshed. However, Mountbatten paid no heed to those warnings and apprehensions. He was a man whose paramount interest was self-aggrandizement whereas Jenkins loved Punjab and wanted minimum bloodshed and destruction. He repeatedly asked Mountbatten for information

25 Alastair Lamb, *Incomplete Partition: The Genesis of Kashmir Dispute* (Lahore, Services Book Club, 1999), 30.

26 Patrick French, *Liberty or Death: India's Journey to Independence and Division* (London: Harper Collins Publishers, 1997), 322.

about the Punjab Boundary Award in order to make security arrangements in the troubled areas at least a week before 15th August 1947 to ensure the orderly transfer of power in Punjab. It appears from *The Transfer of Power* documents that at first Mountbatten had agreed on the early publication and announcement of the Boundary Award. Jenkins had sent him 47 telegrams and letters between March 22nd and August 15th 1947, informing him in detail about the Punjab situation²⁷ and even made one telephonic call to Mountbatten informing him of imminent communal riots and had urged for more security personnel.²⁸ The volatile situation was obvious from the statement of Master Tara Singh, the seventy-two years old Sikh leader, who threatened to travel to Britain and “highlight the Sikh case before the British public” in the belief that he would attract greater support. His fiery speeches had led him to become a dominant figure in Sikh politics. He was known given the honorific title of “master” because he had at one time been a school teacher in Lyallpur (now Faisalabad). Jenkins described the situation as “lamentable”, the Punjab politics being in the hands of an old eccentric man.²⁹

At the Governors conference of 15th April, where Jenkins felt bound to draw the attention of the participants to the seriousness of situation in Punjab, he reiterated that there was a real peril that they would soon be handling chaos and the grave danger of civil war that he had been busy pointing out for so long. Serious warnings from responsible officials were directed to Delhi for months in this regard. Even before Mountbatten’s arrival in India, the Chief Secretary of Punjab Government had reported that “large scale rioting is taking place everywhere and will continue to do so in the near future”. Jenkins had been informing of communal disturbances in the province, but we do not note any serious attempt undertaken by Jenkins administration before the

27 For details of the letters and telegrams, see Mansergh (ed.), *Transfer of Power 1942-47*, Vol. X, XI, XII.

28 Symond, *In the Margin of Independence*, 138. Mountbatten in his final Personal Report to the British Government was explicit in explaining that the postponement was in favor of British interests at the expense of those in Punjab.

29 French, *Liberty or Death*, 331.

imposition of Section 93 of the Government of India Act in Punjab or after to severely punish or handle the culprits of violence with an iron hand. This lack of action from provincial government aggravated the situation and violence spread in the districts of Lahore, Multan, Amritsar, Rawalpindi and Jullundur, all of which had British civilians as Deputy Commissioners.³⁰

Had the Punjab boundary been announced as soon as Radcliffe had it ready on 9th August, the movement of populations could have been undertaken under British authority, with British troops and officials enjoying full power to act. For the Punjab inhabitants, who after independence were terrified at the thought of being caught in the wrong country, early announcement of the boundary would have made the transfer calmer. It was the atmosphere of anarchy and terror, which caused much bloodshed that could have been avoided if a bit of planning being considered at an early stage.

Mountbatten delayed the Award announcement, though he was well aware of the tense communal situation and had been advised early about the award from the men on the spot, such as Jenkins, who believed that there would be administrative advantages from its publication while the British still ruled India. Mountbatten did this entirely for reasons of his own prestige. He deliberately ensured that the Award was made public on the second day after independence on the 17th August so that the killings, which inevitably followed, were technically the responsibility of the incoming Dominion governments, rather than the British government. On 9th August 1947, at the Viceroy's staff meeting, "it was stated that Sir Cyril Radcliffe would be ready that evening to announce the Award of the Punjab Boundary Commission." With exceptional frankness, the Viceroy had then said, "It was now for consideration whether it would in fact be desirable to publish it straight away? Without question the earlier it was published, the more the British would have to bear the responsibility for the disturbances which would undoubtedly result." He then "emphasised the necessity for maintaining secrecy, not only on the terms of the Award, but also on the fact that it would be ready that

30 Ajeet Javed, *Left Politics in Punjab* (Delhi: Durga Publications, 1988), 230-231.

day.” He did not want his Viceroyalty to end in a tidal wave of blood, preferring instead that his Governor Generalship should open with his being called upon to deal with a problem apparently not of his making. Making the excuses that “the printer operators were going on holiday, we were leaving for Karachi”, the Award was not circulated as soon as it was received from Mountbatten. “It could be on the day itself,” Mountbatten told Lapierre and Collins, “it might have been a day or two earlier. If it had been five days earlier or week earlier, it might have helped. A day or two couldn’t make any difference.” Yet, as Mountbatten knew well, the Punjab part of the Award was ready exactly five days earlier.³¹

Mountbatten was piqued when the Muslim League as Pakistan’s first Governor General nominated the Quaid-i-Azam on July 2,³² which was in fact a refusal to have the King’s cousin as joint Governor-General of Pakistan and India.

Pamela Mountbatten narrated in her book, *India Remembered* that Muslim League wanted the UN to carve the division of the Punjab and Bengal but Nehru would not agree.³³ According to an article in weekly *The Time Magazine*, the UN declined to play any role in the demarcation of boundaries between the two emerging states.³⁴

Andrew Roberts in his book, *Eminent Churchillians* states what he calls a great revelation that Christopher Beaumont made in February 1992 about Mountbatten’s gerrymandering of the Award in favour of India in the last few days before partition. Beaumont had been Secretary to the Radcliffe Commission and revealed the information to his grandson who had chosen *The Transfer of Power in India* as his special subject for Cambridge History tripos.³⁵

31 Andrew Roberts, *Eminent Churchillians* (London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1994), 110-111.

32 Muhammad Ali Chiragh, *Tarikh-i-Pakistan* (Lahore: Sang-i-Meel Publications, 1987), 489.

33 Pamela Mountbatten, *India Remembered* (London: Pavilion Roli Books, 2007), 120.

34 Tim McGirk, “Making the Final Cut.” *Time*, Special Issue, Dated 11 August 1997.

35 Roberts, *Eminent Churchillians*, 93.

When it became imminently clear that the Boundary Commission's Award would be available around 9th August, Sir Evan Jenkins asked Delhi for prior information about the Commission's plan for the Punjab so that he could deploy police and troops in areas where violence could break out due to dislocation of populations. Jenkins learned about the Punjab boundary from George Abell, the Viceroy's Private Secretary, while work on partitioning of Punjab was in process. On August 8th, 1947 Abell sent a sketch map to Jenkins which showed the Tehsils (sub districts) of Ferozpur and Zira in Pakistan as both had a Muslim majority and were contiguous areas of what was to be Pakistani Punjab, lying in a salient East of the Sutlej River. On August 11, Jenkins received a telegram from Abell, which read: *Eliminate Salient*. That meant that the Sutlej salient, in which Zira and Ferozpur were located, had later been allotted to India.

Sir Francis Mudie, a former governor of Sind, had spent 24 years in the Indian Civil Service. He was Jenkins' successor as Governor of Pakistan's Punjab after independence. He was with Jenkins when Abell's telegram reached him. Mudie commented in an unpublished memoir, quoted by Andrew Roberts that Ferozpur had a big army arsenal and its bestowal on India deprived the Pakistan Army of most of its weapons. Mudie believed that that was done under pressure put on Radcliffe by Mountbatten. Roberts wrote:

The loss of Ferozpur arsenal was a crippling blow to Pakistan which suffered badly in the subsequent division of stores and military equipment when the Indian army was divided.³⁶

Andrew Roberts added, "He (Beaumont) has alleged that Mountbatten, under pressure from Nehru and the Maharajah of Bikaner-whose state bordered on Ferozpur persuaded Radcliffe to alter the Award to place Ferozpur on Indian side. Because the Maharajah, an old friend of Mountbatten, feared if Bikaner headworks were allocated to Pakistan, Jinnah would in effect control his state agriculture. However, the matter still remains

36 Roberts, *Eminent Churchillians*, 93-94.

ambiguous how had Nehru, Mountbatten and the Maharajah discovered what was in Radcliffe's supposedly secret Award?"³⁷

It seems that Patel's assistant and Mountbatten's confidant, V. P. Menon, had got a Hindu officer, Rao Sahib V. D. Ayer, planted as Assistant Secretary under Beaumont in the Radcliffe Boundary Commission. He leaked the Award to Mountbatten. Then Nehru spoke against the allotting of Chittagong Hill Tracts to Pakistan. How did Nehru become aware of this when the award was to be most confidential to be announced only under Mountbatten's authorization?³⁸ is a question still unanswered. Major General Shahid Hamid's entry of August 9th, 1947 in his diary *The Disastrous Twilight*, states that Radcliffe and his Secretary Beaumont had made it clear that Muslim majority Tehsils of Ferozpur which include canal headworks of Zira and Moga would form part of Pakistan. The Hindus and Sikhs were against this arrangement. Radcliffe had told Mountbatten that he would require one or two years to establish the boundary line but Mountbatten had over-ruled him. Mountbatten's Secretary Abell sent a copy of the Award, to Jenkins but Mountbatten was not aware of that. However, a number of people interested in the Award were well aware of it. It was common knowledge that Mountbatten was busy changing it, giving India a corridor to Kashmir through Gurdaspur as well as the Ferozpur Headworks, and that the Muslims were very nervous about it.³⁹

Beaumont narrated in his book that when he met Radcliffe face to face in London later on and asked him as to what had actually happened, he did not deny what he had done. In a report to Prime Minister Attlee, his Minister Noel Baker, who had been asked to probe Sir Zafarullah's allegation in the UN Security Council about

37 Roberts, *Eminent Churchillians*, 94. Also see, Kirpal Singh (ed.), *Select Documents on Partition of Punjab 1947* (Delhi: National Book Shop, 1991), 734.

38 Roberts, *Eminent Churchillians*, 95.

39 Shahid Hamid, *Disastrous Twilight* (London: Leo Cooper, 1986), 222. Shahid Hamid was Private Secretary to Field Marshal Sir Claude Auchinleck 1946-47. He was eye-witness of many political developments that were taking place in 1947.

the changing of the Boundary Award for Punjab, said that Radcliffe admitted that he had showed the first draft of the boundary partition to the authorities in New Delhi but on further consideration he changed the Award in terms which departed from the first draft. Beaumont believes that Radcliffe could not resist the influence of Mountbatten and followed his dictates. Mountbatten, of course, denied the allegation that he put pressure on Radcliffe to change the award in favour of India. In a letter addressed to Lord Ismay on 2nd April, 1948, Mountbatten admitted that he had met Radcliffe, the Boundary Commissioner, at Ismay's house. The conclusion reached by Roberts after sifting through heaps of incriminating evidence against Mountbatten's role in this episode, was:

Seen in the wider context of his visceral bias against Jinnah and Pakistan and in favour of stronger, larger and more powerful commonwealth country of which he was about to become Governor-General, Mountbatten action over Ferozapore fall into place. This was however, a dereliction of duty. Inherent in his orders from Attlee, his Vice-regal oath and his 3rd of June plan was a duty of strict impartiality as representative of the British *Raj*. Mountbatten betrayed that trust...⁴⁰

By maneuvering the award to give three out of four Tehsils (sub-districts) of the Gurdaspur district to India, Mountbatten provided India the land link it needed to grab Kashmir. Although Kashmir was, and is, a Muslim majority state, Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru was very sentimental about it being a Kashmiri himself. It is said he used his friendship with Edwina to influence Mountbatten to secure Kashmir by hook or crook for India.⁴¹ To Nehru it was

40 Roberts, *Eminent Churchillians*, 101.

41 Mountbatten, *India Remembered*, 18. Pamela Mountbatten shed light on this aspect of relation with these words "My father trusted her decisions implicitly. For instance, when we met at breakfast table, he would simply ask her, "What decision did you make?" "Who did you see?" And of course, her special relations with Pandit Nehru were very useful for him—even the pragmatist—because there were moments towards the end of our time in India when the Kashmir problem was extremely difficult. Pandit Nehru was a Kashmiri himself so he was emotional about the problem. If things were

obvious that due to geographical contiguity Kashmir would naturally go to Pakistan. Gurdaspur which gave India the passage to Kashmir was a Muslim majority area and in no way could be allotted to India but overlooking all these factors the Award was amended to benefit India.⁴² Andrew Roberts thus comments in his book:

If the gerrymandering took place in the case of Ferozpur, it is not too hard to believe that Mountbatten has pressurized Radcliffe to ensure that Gurdaspur wound up in India. The essential access for India along the road was made possible by the award of the three Tehsils to India despite their Muslims majorities.⁴³

Mountbatten was prudent enough not to announce Award before 14th August, he desired that two governments should be established, and afterwards when the Award announcement is made and communal animosity strike again each other, he would not be blamed for the outburst.

Mountbatten shared this with Sir Claude Auchinleck, the Commander-in-Chief of India in 1947 that he did the right thing in not announcing the award on 9th August. Mountbatten denies that he altered the award, but everyone realizes that that was a parting kick to Pakistan.⁴⁴

According to Lucy P. Chester in her thesis on Radcliffe Boundary Commission, the partition process was deeply political, disordered

particularly tricky my father would say to my mother. ‘Do try to get Jawaharlal to see that it is terribly important.’

42 Alastair Lamb, *Kashmir: A Disputed Legacy* (London, OUP, 1991), 103-22.

43 Roberts, *Eminent Churchillians*, 105. For more details, see Larry Collins and Dominique Lapierre, *Mountbatten and Independent India* (New Delhi: Vikas Publishing House (Pvt.) Ltd., 1994), 62. In an interview Mountbatten said, ‘my own opinion is that if this had happened, we should have accepted, of course. It is terrible thing to say it, but it might have been a solution. I mean Radcliffe let us in for an awful lot of trouble by making it possible for them to accede to India. If he hadn’t made that award, the Maharaja would really have had no option but to join Pakistan.

44 Hamid, *Disastrous Twilight*, 235.

and inadequate.⁽⁴⁴⁾ She mentions about O.H.K. Spate, an Australian geographer who was in Karachi for the Pakistan Independence celebration. He wrote in his diary dated 15th August 1947 that he encountered an unnamed aide to Punjab Governor Evan Jenkins, who explained that the Award was altered, “it has been changed at least once: he would not tell him in which direction, but later elaborated that first it would annoy Sikhs, then Sikhs and Muslims both. And this folly would further increase its horizon.”⁴⁵

The Radcliffe Award in respect of the Punjab, especially the demarcation of Ferozpur, Gurdaspur and Zira to India, shocked Jinnah. But being a constitutionalist, he agreed to abide by the Radcliffe verdict, having given his word before hand that he would accept the Radcliffe Boundary decision under the 3rd June plan. He was not aware of the illegal and unbecoming pressure Mountbatten had exercised on Radcliffe to benefit India. Given the fact of it, Mountbatten must take some of the blame for the 63 years old feud between India and Pakistan over Kashmir. It has cost the two countries billions of rupees whose best use would have been for the alleviation of mass poverty in the two neighbouring countries.

Jinnah was unhappy with the Radcliffe Award and the injustice done to Pakistan in the partition of Punjab under it. However, the statesman and man of honour that he was, he said:

The division of India is now finally and irrevocably effected. No doubt we feel that in the carving out of this great independent Muslim state it has suffered injustices. We have been squeezed as much as it was possible and the latest blow that we have received was the Award of the Boundary Commission. It is an unjust, incomprehensible and even a perverse award. It may be wrong, unjust and perverse; but we have agreed to abide by it and it is binding upon us. As honourable people we must abide by it. It may be our misfortune but we must bear up to this one more blow with fortitude, courage and hope.⁴⁶

45 Chester, *Borders and Conflict*, 100-101.

46 Qutubuddin Aziz, *Quaid-i-Azam Jinnah and the Battle for Pakistan* (Karachi: The Islamic Media Corporation, 1997), 129.

Mountbatten had come to India with five specific instructions from British Government.

1. To obtain a unitary Government for British India and the Indian States.
2. Handing over power “on the due date” that is in June, 1948.
3. Persuade Princes to enter into “fair and just” arrangement.
4. Have closest co-operation with the Indians.
5. Avoid break in the continuity of Indian army.

In each aspect of these objectives, which he himself had helped to draft, Mountbatten failed miserably.⁴⁷

Economic Condition of Punjab in 1940s

Social or political development cannot be studied in isolation of the economic realities of the time. The British had ruled India for over hundred years. In the economic field, the Second World War had given a big boost to the industrial and commercial sectors but this had benefitted only the Hindu upper crust. The Unionist Party representing the landed class tried to curb that trend by pushing through the Punjab Sales Tax Bill in the Assembly in January 1941. It aroused strong reaction among the non-agriculturist classes. The British, however, were keen “to pull resources out of India, not to bring them into it.” They could not allow India to become ‘a burden’ on the British taxpayer. But in the post-war period British administration had started to crumble. The British found it increasingly difficult to run the administrative machinery. As Lord Mountbatten told Larry Collins and Dominique Lapierre in interviews during 1971-73:

We had stopped recruiting for the Indian Civil Service in 1939. We’d stopped recruiting for the Indian Police. The people carrying on included a lot of people who were past retirement age. They were running it extremely competently- but supposing Churchill had come back, and given a decision that we were not going to discuss anything for 25 years. I don’t know if we could

⁴⁷ Robert, *Eminent Churchillians*, 132.

have restored that machine that we had. It had run down completely.⁴⁸

Economically also Punjab was a unity difficult to divide. Its prosperity rested on an elaborate network of canals, spread right across it from east to west, which had enabled large tracts of desert to be converted into flourishing farming 'colonies'. People from all over the province had a stake in those colonies and they had played their part in its development. A line drawn down the centre of the Punjab might serve well enough as a boundary between two provincial administrations both subordinate to the same central government; but if it were to be made a regular frontier between two separate, sovereign, independent states it would at best cause enormous economic dislocation and hardship and at worst lead to serious disorders.⁴⁹ Muslims no matter to which political party or group they belonged to wished for a united Punjab. Its division on a population basis would mean acceptance by them of an economically unviable Pakistan with Hindustan in control of the headworks of three (the Sutlej, Beas and Ravi) of the five rivers.⁵⁰ The Great Depression of 1929-32 was felt greatly by the agriculturists in Punjab. Muslims in West Punjab, Sikhs in Central Punjab and Hindus in East Punjab were mostly farmers. The prices of wheat fell sharply from Rs.4 to 5 a maund to Rs.1 to 4 in 1931. In 1926 the total value of agricultural production was Rs 103 crores that in 1933 came down to less than half at Rs 47 crores.⁵¹

The *Beopar Mandal* [an organization of Punjabi merchants and industrialists comprising mainly Hindus with a sprinkling of Muslims and Sikhs] characterized the Punjab Sales Tax Bill as a "deterrent to future industrialization in the province." As a protest against the Bill, a complete *hartal* was observed in a number of

48 Sikandar Hayat, *Aspects of Pakistan Movement* (Islamabad: NIHCR, 1998), 117.

49 Penderel Moon, *Divide and Quit: An Eyewitness Account of the Partition of India*, (New Delhi: OUP, 2003), 34-35.

50 Moon, *Divide and Quit: An Eyewitness Account of the Partition of India*, 35.

51 Satya M. Rai, "Socio Economic Condition in the Punjab on the Eve of Independence and Partition", in Gupta (ed.), *Myth and Reality*, 272.

Punjab towns for nearly a month. Due to the pressure of the traders the Unionist Party was forced to modify some of the provisions of the Bill. Before the economic crisis of the Depression years had ended the War began with its negative impact on the economy. As a result, the prices of foodstuff and cotton yarn increased. It became difficult for the poor sections to meet even their basic needs while the landlords, money lenders and the industrialists made huge profits through rise in prices and "black marketing". Profiteering soared to the extent that traders were virtually selling iron at the rate of gold. To meet the difficult price situation the central government introduced rationing and control of wheat. The farmers were angry when prices of uncontrolled items like cloth, salt and kerosene oil increased. They demanded control on the prices of all items of daily use. In Punjab the Unionist government set up a price control committee in each district. But the checks did not work.

The wheat from Punjab was finding its way to Bengal markets where it was being sold at a very high price. Hoarding, black-marketing and smuggling soon became rampant with the help of corrupt revenue and police officials. The common people were feeling squeezed due to the prevalent corruption. The price of wheat had gone up by 280 percent while that of other commodities had risen by 550 percent.

Chaudhri Chhotu Ram, a senior minister and leading member of Unionist Party, interpreted the Central Government's bid to reduce the wheat price as interference in provincial autonomy and instigated the farmers not to take their product to market.

The rapid prosperity of the commercial and industrial classes was one of the important factors that induced the Muslim elite to change their loyalties. They left the Unionist Party and joined Muslim League which had by then intensified the campaign for a separate homeland for the Muslims. Khizr Hayat Khan faced rough weather not only on account of an overstrained economy and spiraling prices in the province but also owing to ideological onslaught of the Muslim League. To consolidate their position in the election of 1945-46, the Muslim League announced an economic programme that promised better prospects for all

sections of the Muslims, and on the other enlisted the help of *Pirs* and *Ulema* of the Jamiat-ul-Ulama Hind during the election campaign.⁵²

British rule in India in economic terms had three distinct phases: the period of monopoly of trade and revenue (2) exploitation through trade (3) the era of foreign investments and international competition. Colonialism manifested itself in the transformation of the colony into a dependent trading partner, specializing in the export of raw materials and import of manufactured goods.

The economy of Punjab was based on ploughed farming, producing wheat, millet, corn, cotton, sugar-cane and cattle breeding. Cottage industries such as carpet weaving, rug making, leather goods, wood and stone carving and metal works were widespread.

Under British rule, the part of Punjab that became Pakistan supplied agricultural products for processing in the territory that became India. Energy sources were rudimentary dependent on wood in the cities and animal dung in rural areas. Transportation and other services, such as banking and government, were underdeveloped. In 1949, a dispute over exchange rates halted the flow of goods between Pakistan and India, disrupting the complementary nature of their economies that had developed under British colonial rule.

Operation Ebb and Tide

Before the arrival of Mountbatten, Lord Wavell (October 1943-March 1947) had been working on the process of partition for quite some time. After the Second World War the British realized that they could not hold on to the Indian Subcontinent and they would have to leave it sooner or later. They assumed that it would be better if they transferred power stage-wise in an organized way. Wavell had lived with the Indians and knew, they lacked administrative ability and British officers would have to guide them to carry out the official work after independence. It was necessary for the Indians to take the responsibility of setting its

52 Amit Kumar Gupta (ed.), "Studies in History & Society", *Myth and Reality*, 267-291.

future aims and making peace between the diverse communities. With the help of his chief advisor, he drew up a plan named “Operation Ebb and Tide”. It was a scheme to withdraw British administration and troops from India in stages. Jenkins was against it and thought it would not work.⁵³ Owain, Evan Jenkin’s younger brother, mentions in his book that British Government which had long disregarded Wavell’s proposals for a phased withdrawal, “was to put an end to further political wrangling by dropping the Empire like a hot brick”.⁵⁴

Lucy Chester says that it was in the interest of three parties involved in partition to speed up the whole process, the British, the Congress and the Muslim League. Britain was suffering from financial constraints at home, Congress was anxious to take over power after years of protests and imprisonments, and Muslim League’s Jinnah had his personal reason due to his failing health.⁵⁵

The frequent riots in Bihar and Bengal, wrote Leonard Mosley, helped Jinnah. He could now say “even Hindus need Pakistan, if only to save their people from continued slaughter.”⁵⁶

Wavell dispatched “Operation Ebb-Tide” to Mr. Attlee for the consideration of the cabinet early in 1947. In view of the decision, which to be promulgating, they sheared away from it like frightened rabbits. Their difficulty was that they were reluctant to accept the withdrawal policy.⁵⁷

Owain Jenkins was in Lahore in February 1947. Evan Jenkins told him that there was a cable from London. It carried a bad news. The plan was for quick handover and it would be disastrous for the Punjab. It amounted to holding a *chupatti* (bread) over two hungry dogs. They would tear one another to pieces. Evan gave a wry smile, according to his brother, “It seemed I am to complete my

53 Mosley, *The Last Days of British Raj*, 50.

54 Jenkins, *Merchant Prince*, 188.

55 Chester, *Borders and Conflict*, 13.

56 Jenkins, *Merchant Prince*, 188.

57 Mosley, *The Last Days of British Raj*, 51.

career by presiding over a colossal failure.” It was, for him, a great personal tragedy.⁵⁸

Francis Mudie told Kirpal Singh that Mountbatten had realized that he could not pull on with both the parties up till June 1948. Therefore, the date had to be fixed earlier by Attlee. Francis added that “when you declare you are leaving you lose all powers, as persons in transit cannot exercise their powers effectively”.⁵⁹ Jenkins also spoke in the same tone when he said that “when one is on move, British administration on exit, your authority dilutes, one is not in the position of reward and punish, an administration so vulnerable to losses”. Its result was what the world witnessed in Punjab of 1947.⁶⁰

In December 1944, a question was delved into in British Indian ruling circles as to what exactly, in terms of territory, did “Pakistan” mean. During the course of 1945, a number of officials endeavored to supply an answer. Evan Jenkins, as the Viceroy’s joint Secretary and Personal Secretary (and soon to be Governor of Punjab) observed in July 1945, there was indeed a problem in answering that question as the current definition of Pakistan was only the one that was provided in the Muslim League’s Lahore Resolution of 1940 which, Jenkins thought, was not without ambiguities.⁶¹

Evan Jenkins told Wavell about the Muslim League Resolution of 1940 according to which, no constitution or plan would be workable or acceptable to Muslims until it was designed on the principle that geographically contiguous areas in which the Muslims were in a majority, as in the North-West and Eastern Zones of India, should be grouped as independent states in which the constituent units should be autonomous and sovereign.⁶²

British constitutional experts, notably Sir Reginald Coupland, was quick to point out the implied conflict between the expressions

58 Jenkins, *Merchant Prince*, 188-189.

59 Singh (ed.), *Select Documents on Partition of Punjab, 1947*, 736.

60 Jenkins Papers, Microfilm No. 2684, 215.

61 Lamb, *Kashmir*, 32.

62 Lamb, *Kashmir*.

“autonomous” and “sovereign”, but they probably missed the point in that use by Jinnah of these terms’ typical redundancy in legal language. The Lahore Resolution (in this version at least) made it quite clear where the Muslim-majority areas were located but it left open the question whether there would be one Muslim state or two.⁶³

Mountbatten was following the pattern of Wavell, which Wavell had explored in late 1945 and early 1946, and no doubt, the Mountbatten administration was acting much on the same precedent. Difficulties inherent in the process of delimitation and demarcation in the Punjab so evident in 1947, were perceived clearly enough in 1945-46 by Wavell and his advisers, among whom was George Abell (Wavell’s Private Secretary and later occupying the same position under Mountbatten), V. P. Menon who was still very much in harness in the summer of 1947, and Sir Evan Jenkins (later governor of the Punjab).⁶⁴ Wavell had warned quite early that there would be great administrative confusion if the partition was decided at the last moment and enough homework of transfer not done before June 1948.⁶⁵

The resignation of the Khizr Ministry flabbergasted the Sikhs as Master Tara Singh brandished his *kirpan* (sword) on the stairs of the Punjab Legislative Assembly and vowed to fight. With this

63 Lamb, *Kashmir*, 32, Between April and July 1944, the idea of Pakistan was examined by a leading Congress figure, C.Rajagopalachari (who was to follow Mountbatten as Governor General of India in 1948). Rajagopalachari came up with the statement that after the termination of the war a Commission shall be appointed for demarcating contiguous districts in the North-West and East of India wherein the Muslim population is in an absolute majority. In the areas thus demarcated a plebiscite of all the inhabitants held on the basis of adult suffrage or other practicable franchise shall ultimately decide the issue of separation from Hindustan. If the majority decides in favour of forming a sovereign State separate from Hindustan such decision shall be given effect without prejudice of the right of districts on the border to choose to join either State.

64 Lamb, *Kashmir*, 43-44.

65 Mansergh, *Transfer of Power*, Vol. IX, Doc.526, 927.

utterance of Tara Singh, riots broke out in various parts of the province. The Viceroy and the Governor to the disadvantage of the League used the “civil war” begun by Tara Singh to deny the League its constitutional right of forming the Government on the plea that that would aggravate the communal strife, which, in any case, continued to spread due to the complacency of the administration. The turmoil created by Tara Singh was also used to promote the idea of dividing Punjab: the Congress Working Committee’s stand on the Punjab situation was that “there can be no settlement of the problem of Punjab by violence and coercion, and that no arrangement based on coercion can last.”⁶⁶

Both Jinnah and Nehru suggested for imposing Martial Law in the province, but Mountbatten avoided it due to the negative attitude of the Governor who pleaded that things would become even worse. Nehru demanded sacking of every official from Governor downward who were dilly-dallying in carrying out the orders.⁶⁷ Jenkins difficulty was that he could not rely on the police or the army.

Mountbatten took the situation seriously but was unable to fathom its tragic side. Earlier in April, Jenkins had told Mountbatten that if partition was imposed on Punjab, it would take four divisions of army from outside Punjab to restore peace. Mountbatten told Azad, the Congress President, “once partition is accepted in principle, I shall issue order to see that there is no communal disturbances in the country. If there shall be slightest agitation, I shall adopt the sternest measures to nip the trouble in the bud. I shall use tanks, aeroplanes to suppress anybody who would like to create trouble.”⁶⁸ However, when actual violence spread out in Punjab, Mountbatten took no practical step to stop it. It seemed that the main British concern at that time was the safe exit of their citizens

66 S. M Burke and Salimal-Din Qureishi, *The British Raj in India* (Karachi: OUP, 1995). This statement was given at Delhi on 8th March 1947, 478-79.

67 *Jenkins Papers*, IORL 3/1/176, NDC Microfilm .no.1616; telegram, The Secretary to the Governor of Punjab, 25th June 1947.

68 Philip Ziegler, *Mountbatten: The Official Biography* (London: Collins, 1985), 401.

from India. They were not involved in any position to tackle communal violence prudently. Jenkins believed that an agreed partition seemed impossible.⁶⁹

Preliminaries concerning Punjab

Jenkins was in Simla when the future of Indians was being decided; it were the early days of May 1947, when Mountbatten had shown to Nehru the secret plan of the transfer of power and Jawaharlal Nehru had been greatly agitated by the Balkanization of India.⁷⁰ Ironically, Nehru's acquiescence in splitting the Punjab and Bengal did not imply casting away the idea of India's geographical and historical oneness.⁷¹

The Plan that was to be announced on 18th May was cancelled; the meeting of the leaders Nehru, Jinnah, Patel, Liaquat and Baldev Singh at the Viceroy's House in Delhi on 17th May at 10.30 a.m. was postponed. This delay lingered on till 2nd June and by then the transfer of power plan had been smoothened and the Press was prompted to report incorrectly that the delay was because of either the British parliamentary recess, or because Gandhi had rejected Pakistan. High ups in the Himalayan Hills such as Mountbatten, Nehru, the Reform Commissioner V. P. Menon and the Governor of Punjab, Evan Jenkins, had given the plan an acceptable shape.⁷² However, the opportunity afforded to Congress to review the plan was not offered to Muslim League, neither the princes nor any other body in India before its announcement.⁷³

The revised Mountbatten plan was announced on 3rd June 1947, and at a press conference on the following day the Viceroy publicly made it clear that the whole exercise would terminate on 15th August 1947 (rather than in June 1948), by which date the

69 Ziegler, *Mountbatten: The Official Biography*, 401.

70 H. V. Hodson, *The Great Divide: Britain-India-Pakistan* (Karachi: OUP, 1997), 308.

71 Narendra Singh Sarila, *The Shadow of Great Game* (New Delhi: Harper Collins, 2005), 292.

72 Alex Von Tunzelmann, *Indian Summer: The Secret History of the End of an Empire* (London: Simon and Schuster, 2007), 190-191.

73 Tunzelmann, *Indian Summer: The Secret History of the End of an Empire*, 192.

British Raj would be over for good. The magnitude of problems which had to be solved by that date included Bengal, Punjab, Kashmir and a host of other issues seemed to be impossible.

It was clear from the outset that the Punjab boundary would have to run somewhere through a stretch of territory about 250 miles in length between Bahawalpur State in the South and the state of Jammu and Kashmir in the North, neither of these Princely states being within the proposed Commission's brief. In one way, by running a line between contiguous Muslim majority districts and districts without such majority a technically correct boundary could be derived through no more labour than consulting the appropriate administrative map. However, technically the matter was not so easy to be dealt with in the practical terms.⁷⁴

In a letter dated 5th June 1947, Mountbatten wrote to Jenkins that it was not possible to implement any Boundary Commission reports before the transfer of power. It was important that in his conversations he should stress the provisional nature of the boundaries, and the fact that the notional partition had only been used in order to enable them to get ahead with the necessary speed. It was stressed that the Boundary Commission would obviously not consider the matter pre-judged by the fixing of those arbitrary boundaries, but would go into the merits.⁷⁵

Jenkins in his fortnightly report to Mountbatten on 15th June 1947 wrote that there was complete absence of enthusiasm concerning the transfer of power; no one seemed to be happy with it. Muslim Leaguers thought it was a masterstroke by Jinnah, who secured the recognition of Pakistan. In the end, they would get what they all had wanted. Congressmen thought that it was a great stroke by Patel, who had pushed the Muslims into a corner, in fact two corners, and would be able to destroy them before very long. Patel's private conversation seemed to be menacing—Barq, who was a minister in the Coalition government, told him (Jenkins) he had heard Patel that Hindustan could quickly make an end of its Muslim inhabitants if Pakistan did not behave. That might be quite

74 Lamb, *Kashmir*, 43.

75 *The Partition of Punjab*, Vol. I, 27-28.

untrue, but the story represented the attitude the Hindus hoped and the Muslims feared Patel would adopt. The Sikhs pinned their faith in the Boundary Commission; they thought it was quite likely that they would refuse to go very far with partition until they knew where the boundary would be.⁷⁶

Mountbatten, in a letter to Jenkins on 17th June, 1947, wrote “there is no decision yet on the terms of reference for the Boundary Commission. Congress suggested very short terms of reference, on the lines of demarcating the boundaries on the basis of ascertaining the contiguous majority areas of Muslims and non-Muslims, and in doing so, taking into account other factors. The Party leaders are considering the matter further, I will let you know as soon as a decision is reached”.⁷⁷

The Story of the Map

Radcliffe arrived in New Delhi on 8th July 1947. On the evening of his arrival, he was summoned by the Viceroy to meet the Indian leaders. Nehru and Patel represented Congress and Muhammad Ali Jinnah and Liaquat Ali Khan represented the Muslim League. Sir Cyril Radcliffe pointed out the difficulties of the task. He spoke of the vastness of India, of the multitudinous population, he pointed out, that it would take years to decide by the most careful arbitrator but he realized that there was something urgent. How long had he got? “Five weeks,” said Mountbatten.⁷⁸

It is interesting to note that on the same date i.e. 8th July 1947, Jenkins sent a secret letter to C.I.D. chief Mr. Liddel in London, indicating that the Radcliffe Award would be against the just and rightful demands of the Muslims. He (Jenkins) wrote that:

It is possible that the Boundary Commission will make the Muslims rather more disgruntled than they were now. Even if this should happen, I think that they will welcome the help a link-up with British security would afford them. I do not think I would find it difficult to raise the issue when the right time comes, or perhaps, as an alternative, suggest who should do so. I

76 *The Partition of Punjab*, Vol. I, 41-42.

77 *The Partition of Punjab*, Vol. I, 44.

78 Mosley, *The Last Days of British Raj*, 194-195.

am half inclined already to stay in India for a month or two and see how things are going. If it will help you, I will decide to do so. Will you please let me know and also if you can arrange a quick means of communication between us? I believe there is somebody in Lahore as the High Commissioner's representative. Could he be channel of signals between us?⁷⁹

From the above letter it can be presumed that things had already been arranged prior to Radcliffe's arrival to India and the Barrister was invited only to draft it in the legal jargon. Jenkins knew what would happen with the boundary line thus charted out and it was not only of considerable significance, it was crucial, as was demonstrated by the subsequent behavior of India, made possible by the modification.⁸⁰

The substance of the difference between the map that was enclosed with Sir George Abell's letter of 8th August to Mr. Abbott and the Award was the transfer to India of the two Tahsils of the Ferozpur district. On or about 11th August, Sir Evan Jenkins received a cipher telegram reading, "Eliminate the Salient". He correctly understood that that referred to the Ferozpur area. The two tahsils in question were not thought by him to be of any great significance but they were subsequently regarded as highly important for Pakistan for irrigational water and military reasons.⁸¹

Secondly, it is not possible to accept the suggestion that the two tahsils in question were not thought by him to be of any great significance: The area involved, comprising *inter alia* the district headquarters in the city of Ferozpur, the sub-district headquarters in the city of Ferozpur and the sub-district headquarters at Zira alone would make it of considerable significance. But it had to be remembered that the inclusion of the headworks of one of the major irrigation projects of the Province upon which depended the

79 G. Allana (Compiled and ed.), *Pakistan Movement: Historic Documents* (Karachi: Paradise Subscription Agency, 1968), 542.

80 Muhammad Zafarulla Khan, *The Agony of Pakistan* (Oxford: Alden and Mowbray Ltd., 1973), 69-70.

81 H. V. Hodson, *The Great Divide: Britain-India-Pakistan* (Karachi: OUP, 1985), 353.

prosperity of a large sector of West Punjab enhanced its significance manifold.

About the time that Sir Evan Jenkins received the ciphers telegram reading “Eliminate Salient”, Sir Penderel Moon received a telegram from Major Short who was still in Delhi, which read: “your line has it.” “This told me [Penderel Moon] approximately where the line would run and gave assurance that Lahore would come to Pakistan”.⁸²

The meaning of it was clear that from the short telegraphic message received from Major Short, Sir Penderel Moon was able to decipher that the boundary line marked on the map in Lord Ismay’s room would not be deflected (turn from the direction of movement) further West so as to include the Lahore and Montgomery districts in India but that the two Tehsils of the Ferozpur district included in Pakistan according to that line had been transferred from Pakistan to India. In other words, the “juggling” with the boundary line, which had been mentioned and considered several times between V.P. Menon, Lord Ismay, Major Billy Short, Sir Penderel Moon and others, had finally assumed the shape of the transfer of the Ferozpur area from Pakistan to India.⁸³

Under pressure from the Congress, Sikhs had insisted upon the partition of the Province, though they should have known that it would mean a disruption of their community. Then they began to cast about for means and devices to alleviate the consequence of their own demand. They demanded for the allotment of some of the richest Muslim majority areas in the newly irrigated districts of West Punjab. Though it was ridiculous, however, Sir Evan Jenkins conveyed this view to the Viceroy.

Radcliffe, the so called author of the demarcating lines, destroyed all papers in his possession relating to the Punjab and Bengal Boundary Commissions. He died in 1977 without ever throwing much light on what he had actually done in India in 1947.⁸⁴

82 Khan, *The Agony of Pakistan*, 70. Zafarulla Khan has reference of Penderel Moon book *Divide and Quit*, within quotes.

83 Khan, *The Agony of Pakistan*, 70.

84 Lamb, *Kashmir*, 53.

Radcliffe had a major role in the tragedy of Punjab partition, and he remained regretful about the killings in Punjab till the end of his life. An interviewer of Radcliffe who met him near the end of his life observed, "He had never really recovered from his impossible task as the drawer of boundaries between India and Pakistan in 1947 and the bloodshed which ensued." For Radcliffe, his duty had a price. Nevertheless, the price that Punjabis paid in 1947 was exorbitant and its bitterness still lingers on.⁸⁵

85 Chester, *Borders and Conflict in South Asia*, 183.

Chapter III

Jenkins Correspondence with Mountbatten on Punjab

Lord Ismay, who was Lord Mountbatten's Chief of Staff, told (Mountbatten) at a lunch time meeting organized by London Royal Empire Society, that while in London he had felt that the date fixed June 1948, was "far too early." When he reached Delhi, he found that it was "too late". The administration was creaking; "the communal bitterness was far too intense both at headquarter in Delhi and in the provinces than anything he [Ismay] could have imagined".¹

In a letter to Wavell, the Punjab Governor wrote that he was fully aware of the province's adverse situation. He thought no stable government in the Punjab was possible then unless there was agreement at the Centre.²

Jenkins correspondence with Mountbatten is very important from the point of view of the topic of this research. In-depth analysis of the telegrams, fortnightly reports, letters and finally memoranda, help us in understanding the actual situation behind the scene. It clearly depicts the callous approach of the British towards the Indians. When actually they had to decide something, they shirked their responsibilities. Mountbatten's, Jenkins's and Commander-in-Chief Field Marshal Claude Auchinleck's main concern was to send home safely their own forces and citizens. The British ranks and files were tired and exhausted after the Second World War and communal affairs had taxed their endurance level to the hilt. However, the British would not like to accept who actually brought India to this conflagration. They laid all blame on the shoulders of Muslim and non-Muslim communal groups. The other factor on which they had focused their attention was to keep the new states in the Commonwealth of Nations. Mountbatten was dealing with Nehru and Jinnah quite tactfully. Jinnah was adamant to secure separate homeland for the Muslims, but he was given a truncated

1 Nripendra Nath Mitra (ed.), *The Indian Annual Register, Jan-June 1947*, Vol. I (Calcutta: The Annual Register Office, 1948), 119.

2 Jenkins to Viceroy; dated 20. 3. 47. *Jenkins Paper*, IOLR 3/1/176, NDC.MF. no. 1616, 133.

Pakistan. Nehru demanded united India. Mountbatten showed him the glimpse of India after transfer of power in an early draft, which depicted India as fragmented. Nehru was flabbergasted. To cool him down, V.P.Menon was invited at Mashobra (Kashmir) and the new plan was drafted.³ With hindsight, it seemed that Mountbatten was trying to keep the two leaders under his influence by showing them the bleaker side of the picture if they did not act on his advice. They effectively used the carrot and stick policy that the powerful countries follow to coerce the third world countries even to this day.

Correspondence and Letters

From March to August 1947, Jenkins wrote in detail to Mountbatten about the communal violence in Punjab. He not only gave fortnightly reports but also sent telegrams to inform Mountbatten of the deteriorating situation. Jenkins wrote 25 letters, 12 telegrams, 5 fortnightly reports and a memorandum. Mountbatten manipulated these reports to absolve himself of any blame for the violence in India. One glaring example of this manipulation was not making public the Radcliffe Award that he was sure to cause an outburst when the gerrymandering of the boundaries was found. Nine districts* were shifted from one side to the other with one stroke of the pen without caring for the horror that this stroke would wreak.

Prime Minister Attlee had told the cabinet that the first sign of trouble should be promptly and ruthlessly crushed even using excessive force including tanks and aircraft.⁴ Mountbatten had also reiterated that in the same words. However, Maulana Abul Kalam Azad doubted Mountbatten's sincerity in that respect. He wrote, "The whole world knows what the result of Lord Mountbatten's brave declaration was". Large-scale killing followed partition. Innocent men, women and children were massacred. The Indian

3 H. V. Hodson, *The Great Divide: Britain-India-Pakistan* (Karachi: OUP, 2005), 295-299.

*Nine districts names, their position: 1.Gurdaspur; 2.Ajnala; 3.Hoshiarpur; 4.Dasuya; 5.Nakodar; 6.Jallundar; 7.Ferozpur; 8.Zira; 9.Ludhiana.

4 Hodson, *The Great Divide: Britain-India-Pakistan*, 401.

army was divided communally and nothing could be done to stop the murder of innocent Hindus and Muslims.⁵

In those letters, we observe that the promises did not match at all with what actually happened. Mountbatten was a scion of the royal family and he was very much particular about his own success. He wanted to exit India in triumph. However, he lacked that element of honesty that his job required. He was more obsessed with avenging the insult he thought he was subjected to by Jinnah when he refused him the honour of becoming Governor General of Pakistan. In addition, his wife's friendship with Nehru also proved detrimental to the interests of Muslims. He (Nehru) told her he wanted Kashmir to be part of India. Mountbatten could not deny his wife whom he had used so often as a bridge for cordial relations with Nehru.^{6*}

...India Hicks, daughter of Pamela [Pamela daughter of Mountbatten] wrote about her grandfather in the book *India Remembered* "foreword" "It is hard for me to imagine my grandfather, only a few years older than I am now, being asked to dismantle an empire. Un-imaginable the responsibility of checking the tide of violence and controlling cities that were committing suicide. It is not hard, however, to imagine that from the moment my grandparents arrived, he rejected all the Raj stereotypes and looked towards the job with open mind. It is also understandable that, despite all royal ties, my grandfather was a tough-minded realist, committed to those liberal principles, which made him acceptable to Attlee's Labour party.⁷

This practice of writing letters to report on provincial affairs to the Viceroy and other high officials such as Secretary of State of India started during the First World War.⁸ Jenkins acted on the

5 Maulana Abul Kalam Azad, *India Wins Freedom* (Lahore: Vanguard, 1988), 207.

6 Alex Von Tunzelmann, *Indian Summer: The Secret History of the End of an Empire* (London: Simon & Schuster, 2007), 208.
*For detail, see Chapter IV.

7 Pamela Mountbatten, *India Remembered* (London: Pavilion Roli Books, 2007), 7.

8 Lionel Carter (Compiled and ed.), *Punjab Politics 1936-1939: The Start of Provincial Autonomy* (New Delhi: Manohar, 2004), 7.

instructions he received in response to his messages and sometimes used his own discretion in tackling a given situation. In this chapter, the contents of Jenkin's letters to Mountbatten are investigated. There are letters that are not included in *Transfer of Power* volumes, but are part of Jenkins papers.

British leadership always preferred the Hindu majority over minorities like Muslims and Sikhs. This was despite the fact that in the two World Wars those two communities had laid down their lives to defend the honour of the Union Jack. In return, the Muslims were rewarded with a truncated Pakistan and a simmering Kashmir problem. The Sikhs did not get the homeland they demanded and lost their holy places.

Mountbatten arrived in Delhi on 22nd March, Jenkins in his first letter to Mountbatten narrated the law and order situation in Punjab. He informed him about the Punjab Disturbed Area Act, 1947; and the Punjab Disturbed Areas (Special Power of Armed Forces) Ordinance 1947 that had authorised the use of extreme force against persons who in a disturbed area disobey orders, the orders were prohibiting gatherings of five or more persons, or the carrying of weapons etc.⁹ Mountbatten took notice of Jenkins' concerns and gave him permission to enforce law in the crisis.¹⁰

Jenkins in his fortnightly report to Mountbatten wrote that the situation was under control. He informed Mountbatten of the political situation in his province and about the differences between the main political entities—Hindus, Muslims and Sikhs. He also informed him about the factors that were behind the spread of communal virus that had disturbed the political, agricultural and economic life in the Punjab.¹¹

9 *Jenkins Papers*, IOLR/3/1/176, printouts from Microfilm No.1616 (Islamabad: National Documentation Centre, NDC).

10 *Jenkins Papers*, IOLR/3/1/176, printouts from Microfilm No.1616. Mountbatten replies to Jenkins; dated 29th March 1947.

11 Rukhsana Zafar (ed.), *Disturbances in the Punjab* (Islamabad: National Documentation Centre, 1995), dated, 31st March 1947. 119-22.

Events in April 1947

Jenkins informed Mountbatten that eight villages, four Muslim and four Hindu were burned down. As a result, ten Hindus were killed. Although police had been stationed in major villages to control any untoward incidence ¹², however, Jenkins complained about communication difficulties.

Jenkins updated Mountbatten about the political situation in the province. He wrote to Mountbatten that there was then little doubt that some Sikh leaders were preparing for violent agitation against the Muslims in the Punjab. He also attached two documents in *Gurmukhi*.

1. One pamphlet gave a grossly exaggerated account of the events in the Rawalpindi division.
2. The second was an appeal duly signed by 18 Sikhs including Sardar Baldev Singh for contributions to what appeared to be a “war fund” amounting to fifty lakh rupees.

During the Governor’s Conference in Delhi on 16th April, Mountbatten inquired from Baldev Singh, the Defence Minister, in the presence of Jenkins about the Sikh War Fund. But Baldev denied being the treasurer of the war fund that had issued the appeal.¹³

Both documents were an appeal for help in cash and kind as a preliminary preparation against the Muslims. Jenkins seemed to justify those preparations as he thought the Sikhs were justified in preparing themselves against the Muslims. Apparently, it was a lapse, on the part of British administrators that ignited killing and arson in major areas of Punjab.¹⁴

12 Lionel Carter (ed.), *Punjab Politics 3rd March-31st May 1947: At the Abyss*, (New Delhi: Manohar, 2007), Jenkins to Mountbatten, 2nd April 1947, 113.

13 Alan Campbell-Johnson, *Mission with Mountbatten* (London: Robert Hale Limited, 1951), 66.

14 Carter, *Punjab Politics*, 117-118. Zafar, *Disturbances in the Punjab*, Jenkins letter to Mountbatten dated 9th April 1947. 129.

The duty of administrators was to use force and take appropriate measures to pre-empt an uprising but Jenkins took no action against arsonists and hence the result was total chaos, wanton killings and lawlessness. It was of utmost urgency that Jenkins should have identified areas of trouble and doused the flames of hatred well in time. It seemed that he used his office at the end of the British Empire to transfer that problem of his making to future governments of Punjab. According to Leonard Mosley, Jenkins and the high command in Delhi knew very well the plans of massacre and disruption in Punjab well before time but they preferred to look the other way. This was mainly due to weariness, or may be lack of foresight, or to avert another clash with Jinnah but this slackness, if it was actually so, was disastrous for Punjab.¹⁵

In a note of 4th April 1947, Jenkins wrote that the Muslim League would sweep the polls if general elections were held and would easily grab 90 seats but it would hardly bring any change as Hindus and Sikhs would rebel. The communal tussle grew with the unrest and disturbances in Punjab.¹⁶ Jenkins visited Gurgaon and mentioned how Hindu Ahirs, Jats and Gujjars had united against the Muslim Meos and were burning down each other's villages. Four villages were set to fire in Alwar State on the night of 4th and 5th April 1947. Police and three battalions of armed forces were deployed to restore order.¹⁷

Mountbatten took notice of Jenkins' letter's third paragraph dated 9th April 1947. He [Jenkins] had written that it would be injudicious to attack the Sikhs as the Sikhs had valid reasons for resentment against Muslims. Mountbatten consulted Jinnah in order to ease this tense situation. Jinnah proposed a meeting between Viceroy Mountbatten, Governor Jenkins and Mamdot.

15 Leonard Mosley, *The Last Days of the British Raj* (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1961), 215-216. Also see Stanley Wolpert, *Shameful Flight*, 155, 167.

16 Carter, *Punjab Politics*, 115-116.

17 Carter, *Punjab Politics*, 116.

The Viceroy agreed and issued instructions to Jenkins to arrange for the meeting.¹⁸

Jenkins told the Governor's conference held at the Viceroy's House in New Delhi on 16th April, 1947 about "Operation Solomon" for the Punjab and suggested the possibility of appointing a statistical Boundary Commission.¹⁹

Mountbatten took the situation seriously. Jenkins had warned him that if partition was imposed on the Punjab, it would take four army divisions from outside the province to restore order.²⁰ Again, in his fortnightly report Jenkins narrated to Mountbatten the killings of Muslims and Hindus, which began in Gurgaon and had spread to other areas of Punjab like Alwar State and Amritsar. He updated him on the burning of the wheat crop and property for which the rioters were making use of crude soda-bottle petrol bombs. Local people had erected barriers to block entrance to *mohallas* and streets for protection. Since the Sikhs were carrying their traditional weapon—Kirpan—in public as a show of strength, the Muslims demanded that they also be allowed to carry swords. But this was not allowed though Jenkins agreed that this was their right.²¹

Jenkins also mentioned that the Muslim League was anxious to form the ministry as they considered it to be their right and if the province was not divided they declared they would treat the non-Muslims with generosity.²²

18 *Jenkins Papers*, IOLR/3/2/17, (available at NDC, Islamabad, from Microfilm No.1616), Mountbatten letter to Jenkins; dated 27th April 1947.

19 Johnson, *Mission with Mountbatten*, 65. "Operation Solomon" terminology is used settling of Jews at Israel from different parts of world.

20 Zeigler, *Mountbatten: The Official Biography* (London: Collin, 1985), 401.

21 Carter, *Punjab Politics 3rd March-31 May 1947 At the Abyss* (New Delhi: Manohar, 2007), 138. Note by Jenkins sent to Mountbatten, dated 16th April, 1947.

22 Zafar, (ed.), *Disturbances in the Punjab*, 170-72.

Mountbatten wrote to Jenkins about his meeting with Jinnah on 23 April 1947. They had talked about Punjab and the imposition of sections of India Act 93 which Jinnah had not agreed to, however, Mr Jinnah suggested that Mountbatten should discuss the matter of the ministry with Mamdot directly and involve Jenkins only after they had met.²³

Jenkins and Mountbatten on Technicalities of Government of India Act 1935

Jenkins had written to Mountbatten on 30th April that he was not satisfied about Mamdot's majority as some of his (Mamdot) supporters might be unreliable. Jenkins emphasised that once any large section of the population declined to recognize a parliamentary majority, it would become impossible to run a constitutional government. Jenkins said that the Government of India Act 1935 could not be worked by a communal Ministry in the Punjab and constitutionally it was a delicate matter.²⁴ Jenkins contemplated whether the revolutionary situation that existed at the time justified the refusal to lift Section 93 or not. He thought it would be foolish to permit the formation of a ministry when an important announcement about the future of India was imminent. Jenkins agreed with Mountbatten that he (Jenkins) should handover the reply to Mamdot personally and explain it to him that Mountbatten would be glad to meet him in Delhi.²⁵

The violence in Punjab in early 1947 was not all senseless as it was in fact a clash over territorial rights. Indeed the violence in Lahore and Amritsar in March and April 1947 made the Punjab partition acceptable.²⁶

23 Mountbatten Letter to Jenkins, *Jenkins Papers*, R/3/1/176, 23 April, 1947. Mamdot was requesting that he should be allowed to form ministry in Punjab.

24 Nicholas Mansergh, *Transfer of Power*, Vol. X (London: Her Majesty's Stationary Office, 1980), 500. Jenkins to Mountbatten, 30th April, 1947.

25 Mansergh, *Transfer of Power*, Vol. X, 501.

26 Ian Talbot, "Violence, Migration and Resettlement: The Case of Amitsar", in Ian Talbot & Shinder Thandi (ed.), *People on the Move*:

Transfer of Population Questioned

In a meeting on 11th May, Mountbatten asked Jenkins if he had chalked out any plan for the transfer of population, Jenkins admitted he had not so far.²⁷

Jenkins met Mountbatten in the presence of Mieville and Lieutenant Colonel Erskine Crum and was asked about the solution of Punjab Province, Jenkins told them frankly that there was no easy solution for Punjab; civil war was imminent, if efforts were made to keep Muslim power in position then Sikhs and Hindus were likely to react...²⁸

Tara Singh Refusal to attend Peace Meeting

In the fortnightly report of 15th May 1947, Jenkins reviewing violent activities in the province mentioned Tara Singh's refusal to meet him for peace talks to which Muslims were also been invited. There was curfew in the walled city of Lahore; "*Jor Mela*" that the Sikhs observed on 23rd May in the memory of Guru Arjan Singh, who was killed in the reign of Emperor Jehangir in 1606 had been cancelled. Jenkins wrote that when some Muslim League leaders visited Lahore city to persuade the Muslims to refrain from violence, however, those leaders had to retreat unceremoniously.²⁹

All communities were arming themselves. A fine of Rs 30 lakh was imposed on the Muslims for killing non-Muslims in Rawalpindi. The fine was an attempt to compensate and pacify the non-Muslims to some extent.³⁰

Jenkins in a telegram to Mountbatten on 16th May 1947 said there were no reports from Amritsar though the situation there was tense.³¹ Mountbatten sympathized with Jenkins and assured him he

Punjabi Colonial and Post-Colonial Migration (Karachi: OUP, 2004), 91.

27 Carter (ed.), *Punjab Politics*, 306.

28 Carter (ed.), *Punjab Politics*, 301.

29 Carter (ed.), *Punjab Politics*, 196.

30 Carter (ed.), *Punjab Politics*. Jenkins letter to Mountbatten, 15th May 1947, 182-83.

31 Carter (ed.), *Punjab Politics*. Jenkins sent a telegram to Mountbatten, 16 May, 1947, 183; mentioning that due to tense situation in which

was persuading the leaders of Muslims, Hindus and Sikhs to calm down.

He appreciated the hard work of Jenkins and wished him success before he left for London [to talk about the partition plan with Prime Minister Attlee]. Mountbatten approved the strict measures taken by Jenkins such as the cancellation of “*Jor Mela*”; the action against “Dawn” correspondent [who wrote an article for *Dawn* (Dehli) and *Pakistan Times* (Lahore) in which he criticized Punjab government of the grossest partiality and had unsavoury comments for an Indian Act article 93 under which the Punjab government was administered] and the imposition of collective fine on Muslims of Rawalpindi district.³²

Mountbatten spoke to Baldev Singh about Tara Singh’s refusal to cooperate with Muslim leaders in provincial government’s efforts to deal with disturbances. Tara Singh believed that the Muslims threatened his life and he refused to meet them. However, Sikh leaders like Baldev Singh, the Raja of Patiala and Faridkot promised to keep their people calm and peaceful.³³

Mountbatten authorized Jenkins to use force if required to quell the communal riots and told him that the cabinet had approved it. Mountbatten extended full support to Jenkins in this matter.³⁴

In his report of 26th May 1947, Jenkins was critical of people who were advising harsh measures to curb rioting. He said, “The Hitlerian method would be to take hostages and to shoot them, and I could no doubt improve the situation remarkably by shooting all the members of the High Commands. He did not, however, himself

30 were killed, and 57 injured, Gurkha troops were called in to reinforce police.

32 Zafar, *Disturbances in Punjab*, 184-185. Mountbatten telegram to Jenkins dated 17th May 1947. For full details also see Lionel Carter, *Punjab Politics 3 March-31 May 1947 At the Abyss Governors’ Fortnightly Reports and other Key Documents*, (New Delhi, Manohar, 2007). 195-199.

33 Zafar, *Disturbances in Punjab*. 185.

34 Zafar, *Disturbances in Punjab*. Mountbatten telegram to Jenkins, dated 17th May 1947, 183.

recommend action of that kind, which equated the innocent with the guilty.”³⁵

In a telegram to Mountbatten, Jenkins mentioned about the dead and wounded in Lahore. He said that the situation was difficult to control especially the fires that the culprits used to start with missiles.³⁶

Involvement of Faridkot House in Lahore Violence

In a letter to Mountbatten, Jenkins wrote about an attack launched between 0300 and 0400 hours on 18th May 1947 on Gujjar residents on the suspicion that the Faridkot House in Lahore was involved in the killing of Muslims. The vehicles used in the crime were seen moving in and out of that house the night before.

Jenkins informed about his action against the Faridkot government. He had asked the Raja of Faridkot to produce the Station Wagon which destroyed the control post, its driver, passengers and also all other vehicles which were in Lahore during the previous 48 hours.

The Raja of Faridkot was instructed not to send any vehicles into Lahore without the specific permission of Punjab Government; they were forewarned that if those instructions were not complied with at once and if they refused to assist in the process of investigation, most drastic action would be taken against the Raja of Faridkot.³⁷

Deteriorating Condition in Lahore

Jenkins was concerned about the deteriorating situation of law and order in Lahore. He kept the High Command at Delhi informed

35 Lionel Carter, (Compiled and ed.) *Punjab Politics 3rd March-31May 1947 At the Abyss* (New Delhi, Manohar, 2007), 217.

36 Zafar, (ed.), *Disturbances in Punjab*, 186-87. Jenkins telegram to Mountbatten dated 18th May 1947. Jenkins gave the numbers, that was six dead and two injured and on 18th May 1947 in an attack on Gujjar Muslims at Chauburji [a place in Lahore], seven died and twenty were injured. Incendiaries was on largescale continues, Amritsar was tense.

37 Zafar, (ed.), *Disturbances in Punjab*, 187. Jenkins wrote a letter to Mountbatten.

about the worsening situation of his province. A telegram to Mountbatten on 19th May, in which he said that things were worse and on the verge of a civil war, organized Sikh gangs were attacking Muslims, in it he gave the exact figures of the casualties and the incendiary cases.³⁸

Jenkins wrote to Mountbatten about 10 men of Nabha State entering Lahore armed with rifles, stenguns and 900 round of ammunition. Since they were violating orders against carrying of arms, they were disarmed and their weapons confiscated. Jenkins considered it necessary to prevent armed personnel entering Lahore.³⁹ Police searched the Orthodox Hindus, as there were reports that the Punjab Relief Committee had distributed arms among them.⁴⁰ He also narrated Amritsar's deteriorating circumstances.⁴¹

Jenkins' telegram of 28th May 1947 to Mountbatten indicated that Lahore had suffered only one casualty (not fatal) that day but there were four more fires. In Amritsar, five persons were injured by gunshots. In Gurgaon, 15 villages were torched on May 27th alone in spite of troops being deployed there. Meanwhile, there were reports of stabbings and fires from Ludhiana, Gurdaspur, Montgomery, Lyallpur, Muzaffargarh districts. There were fears of very serious disturbances after the June announcement, which increased the prevailing tension.⁴²

In a letter dated 29th May, 1947, Jenkins reported four killed and six injured on 28th and four dead and two injured with four incidences of fires on 29th.

Gurgaon was reported calm; however, Meos did extensive damage to villages on Tauru Hattin line, apparently in a revenge for earlier

38 Zafar, (ed.), *Disturbances in Punjab.*, 188.

39 Zafar, (ed.), *Disturbances in Punjab.* 21st May 1947, 190.

40 Zafar (ed.), *Disturbances in Punjab*, 196. Jenkins telegram to Mountbatten, 24 May, 1947.

41 Zafar, (ed.), *Disturbances in Punjab*, 196. Casualties and incidence of incendiaries, there were six dead, thirteen injured and seven incidences reported.

42 Zafar, (ed.), *Disturbances in Punjab*, 204. Jenkins telegram dated 28th May (Recd 29th May) 1947 to Mountbatten.

atrocities by Hindus. No detailed report was received from Deputy Commissioners. Lyallpur was reported quiet, however, incidences were reported from many districts and there was apprehension about the June announcement. Migration had started and a number of families left Amritsar and arrived in Lahore.⁴³

In a telegram to the Viceroy on 31st May, Jenkins wrote, Muslims seemed determined to clear Hindus and Sikhs from their midst in Lahore. He deployed three companies of troops in the city but the situation could not be brought under control. In some places, fires were started right under the nose of the police. Stabbing incidences were fewer but uncontrollable. Jenkins wrote that fires were difficult to control due to narrow streets and inadequate water supply and that he was trying to get trailer pumps. He stressed the need for more police, troops and speedier justice.⁴⁴

June 1947 Punjab Voted for Partition

By the end of June 1947, the provincial assemblies of Bengal and the Punjab had voted for partition. Mountbatten never doubted that this was a prescription for disaster, acceptable only because no alternative was conceivable. As for Punjab, that was in a worse situation at the time Jenkins wrote that “an agreed partition of Punjab appears to be impossible.”⁴⁵

Jenkins was thankful to Mountbatten for the arrangement of a car for the trip to Gurgaon where he met Brendon and Patel. Jenkins recorded all the changes that were then occurring in India in 1947 and said a revolution was in progress. At Gurgaon, there were only 365 soldiers, which Jenkins thought were not enough for a district. They had talks with Sikhs at Sohna where they discussed administrative matters about Gurgaon.⁴⁶

43 Zafar, (ed.), *Disturbances in Punjab*, 211. In a write up dated 29th (Recd. 30th May) 1947.

44 IOLR/3/1/176, Microfilm No.1616, *Jenkins' Paper* at NDC, Islamabad. Also see Carter, *Punjab Politics*, 231-232.

45 Zeigler, *Mountbatten*, 400.

46 Lionel Carter, (ed.) *Punjab Politics 1 June-14 August 1957 Tragedy* (New Delhi: Manohar, 2007), 49. 1st June 1947.

There were serious disturbances in Amritsar between the night of 1st and 2nd June. There were fires and communal rioting in which both Muslims and non-Muslims were using firearms. Police and troops had to resort to firing several times.

There was no report from Gurgaon. The raid by Meos into Muttra District reported by the Governor of U.P. was apparently in retaliation of attacks by Muttra Hindus. There was no change in the general condition, which remained most unsatisfactory.⁴⁷ Gurgaon disorders remained widespread and people were resentful. As many as 60 villages were burnt down. Casualties were unknown as parties removed the dead and injured. The known number of the dead was 100; 63 were hospitalized. Meanwhile, the provincial government called additional troops to control the situation.

The partition plan had a mixed reaction. In Lahore and Amritsar, Hindus accepted it while Sikhs and Muslims were angry and critical of their leaders. In reaction, Muslims threatened to destroy Amritsar. However, no agitation was reported from other districts.⁴⁸

3rd June Mountbatten Plan and its reaction in Punjab

Mountbatten had made it clear that partition would be on time that is 15th August 1947. Secondly, the British statement provided a procedure whereby the Punjab Legislative Assembly would meet in two parts, one representing the Muslim majority districts and the other the rest of the Province. If a simple majority of either part decided in favour of partition, then division would take place.

47 Zafar (ed.), *Disturbances in Punjab*, 228. Jenkins telegram to Mountbatten dated 2nd (Recd. 3rd June) 1947. Also see Carter (ed.), *Punjab Politics*, 52. Situation report was 7 dead and 14 injured but the list was incomplete. Fire fighting was most difficult and Sapper Demolition Company had to be sent to assist. Two fire engines were also sent from Lahore. Sikhs were attacking rural areas of Amritsar; however, no casualties were reported.

48 Zafar, (ed.), *Disturbances in Punjab*, 229. 4th June (Recd. 5th) 1947. Also see Carter, (ed.), *Punjab Politics*1, 53. Situation report of Lahore was five dead and one injured with five fires in Lahore. Amritsar had two communal riots and four fires. Casualties were four dead, nine injured apparently due to police firing.

Finally, it was announced that as soon as the decision in favour of partition was made, a Boundary Commission would be set up to demarcate the boundaries of the two parts of the Punjab based on ascertaining the contiguous majority areas of Muslims and non-Muslims. The Commission would also be instructed to take into account 'other factors'. There was no doubt that the provisions of the Mountbatten Plan would lead to the partition of the Punjab. On 23rd June, the East Punjab members of the Legislative Assembly (representing the non-Muslim majority districts) voted 50 to 22 in favour of partition.⁴⁹

The Hindus in the west and Muslims in the eastern part were dissatisfied but Congress and Muslim League both claimed that the plan was a masterstroke of their respective leaders. The Sikhs pinned their faith on the Boundary Commission and declared that they wanted the Chenab River as the western boundary. Jenkins wrote that the Muslim League could face a minor revolt against Jinnah, which he would probably suppress with ease.⁵⁰

Before their departure from India, the British made sure of the division of India and the division of two major provinces where Muslims had an overall majority. They divided the two as the Western and Eastern parts. The Punjab Governor confided to Sardar Swaran Singh on 31st May that if it came about, he "would of course do what I could to see that everyone, including the Sikhs, to get a fair deal." It was not easy for him to prove.⁵¹

Reporting the law and order situation Jenkins wrote to Mountbatten that in Lahore police injured one person when he broke the curfew order. There were 11 incidents of fires, one bomb explosion took place, and in Amritsar, there were two fires, one of them in the building of a high school. Gurgaon had three serious incidents the previous day when a village near Palwal was partly burnt by displaced Meos. Another village Tikli was attacked and burnt by Meos though additional police troops were posted there.

49 Zafar, (ed.), *Disturbances in Punjab*, 8.

50 Zafar, (ed.), *Disturbances in Punjab*, 231-32. Jenkins reported on 7th June that in Lahore there were 3 killed, 2 wounded and 3 fires, while in Amritsar 2 killed 2 wounded and 9 fires.

51 Carter (ed.), *Punjab Politics I*, Vol. V, 8.

There were 20 casualties with 12 dead. Hindus attacked Muslim camel drivers and killed one Muslim.⁵² The general situation remained unchanged in Gujranwala. One Muslim was injured by Sikhs in Hoshiarpur; several minor arson cases were reported and a rural fight was controlled by patrol of troops and police. There was one case of attempted arson at Jhang.⁵³

In another message Jenkins reported one killed, 19 injured and 23 fires with three bomb explosions in Lahore. There were bomb explosions by non Muslims in Amritsar where Muslims were retaliating by setting houses on fire. Meos burnt down a village at Tauru plateau; fires also erupted in Bharatpur State. The Congress press blamed Muslims for the Gurgaon situation but actually, Meos had suffered more than the Hindus had. Communal murder of Muslims was reported in Kartarpur, Jullundar on June 18th. A mosque in Gurdaspur was set on fire and on June 19th some copies of the Holy Quran were burnt. The general situation in the province remained unchanged.⁵⁴

The law and order machinery was reinforced but there was no let up in the disturbances. The administration was tired. Brendon was on leave; he had something like a nervous breakdown. As a show of concern with the victims, the viceroy's wife visited some patients at the Gurgaon hospital on 26th⁵⁵

Jinnah and Nehru for Extreme Measures

In a June 24 message to the Governor of Punjab, Mountbatten said that Mr. Jinnah strongly supported strong measures for suppressing the trouble in Lahore and Amritsar. Nehru too talked in the same vein. He urged a fresh approach to the problem, which might have excellent psychological effect. He suggested that:

52 Carter (ed.), *Punjab Politics I*, Vol. V, 8.

53 Carter (ed.), *Punjab Politics I*, Vol. V, 79, 15th June 1947, Jenkins telegram to Mountbatten.

54 Carter (ed.), *Punjab Politics I*, Vol. V, 94-95. Jenkins to Mountbatten in a telegram dated 20th June, 1947).

55 Carter (ed.), *Punjab Politics I*, Vol. V, 256-57. On 22 June, 1947, Jenkins letter to Lord Mountbatten reporting about his visit to Gurgaon.

1. Martial law be declared forthwith in Lahore, Amritsar and other areas;
2. The whole operation be handed over to the military, all police be withdrawn ostensibly for rest and recuperation;
3. In addition, that the troops should be empowered to be utterly ruthless and to shoot at sight.

Mountbatten agreed with the Indian leaders, and sought Jenkins' consent and asked him to consult the local Military commanders as well. He proposed to raise the matter in the Cabinet the next day before the final announcement.⁵⁶

Philip Zeigler wrote in Mountbatten's official biography that both Nehru and Jinnah urged Mountbatten to take drastic steps to restore order. When Mountbatten refused to allow imposition of martial law—not out of squeamishness but because the Governor assured him that it would merely make things worse—however, the Viceroy was abused in the cabinet by representatives of Congress and the League alike. Nehru as usual, completely lost his control and demanded the sacking of every official, from the Governor downwards, that same day. “I [Mountbatten] had to reprimand him publicly for this irresponsible suggestion.” To Jenkins, the most sinister feature was that neither the police nor the army could be trusted to perform their duty to quell the disorder. The worst thing was that British officials too were involved in communal division.⁵⁷

In his fortnightly report to Mountbatten, dated 25th June, Jenkins explained why the culprits were not being apprehended. He said the rioters acted individually by throwing petrol bombs or stabbed people in lonely narrow streets. The victims of those incidents were all communal entities—Hindu, Muslim and Sikhs.⁵⁸

Martial law would not make much difference, he believed. He thought that extreme measures like shooting at sight might not work but at the same time admitted that his assessment could be

56 Mansergh, *Transfer of Power 1942-47*, Vol. XI, 623-28.

57 Zeigler, *Mountbatten*, 401.

58 Carter, (ed.) *Punjab Politics*, 99-100.

wrong. The political leaders did not actually mean that they should be shooting the residents of an area where an outrage had occurred, he thought. The real remedy, according to Jenkins, was genuine efforts by party leaders to stop the trouble not by peace appeals, but by pressure on their own *goondas*; supplemented by better intelligence, more coordinated investigation with speedier justice, especially where the offenders were caught red-handed. Jenkins conveyed Mountbatten his views, in which the Lahore Area Commander, concurred, in reply to a telephone message dated 24th June 1947.⁵⁹

The letter dated 26th June (Recd. 27th June) reported a few casualties in Lahore, incendiaries in Amritsar but calm in Gurgaon.⁶⁰

Mountbatten to Jenkins on 28th June 1947 appreciated Jenkins' efforts in maintaining law and order in the province. Mountbatten was critical of local leaders who put the blame of all wrongs on the British. He sympathised with officers who were doing very well in India and they would have to leave India in the midst of their career. He felt sorry about them and desired to do something good for them, to be able to compensate them in some way. Mountbatten congratulated Jenkins that Congress and Muslim League have both agreed to his proposals and that Jenkins should choose two sets of advisers for East and West Punjab.⁶¹

Communal Tussle soaked in Poison

The intensity of communal tussle added another aspect of hate and distrust in the form of the scare created by poisoning incidents. The first incidence occurred in the Civil Supplies department. There were reports that a Muslim bought *Sherbet* causing illness and in another complaint about the flour bought by Muslims from a Hindu shop, which was poisoned. There was looting in houses left abandoned by their occupants in Gurgaon, Lahore and Amritsar.⁶²

July 1947 Partition in Process

59 Zafar, *Disturbances in Punjab*, 264-68.

60 Zafar, *Disturbances in Punjab*, 271.

61 Mansergh, *Transfer of Power 1942-47*, Vol.XI, 715.

62 Zafar, *Disturbances in Punjab*, 272.

Jenkins reporting to Mountbatten, on 1st July 1947 said there were no major incidents in Lahore and Amritsar. Gurgaon was facing problems due to refugees from Bharatpur. There was a bomb explosion at Jullundur in a mosque killing a number of men. Sikhs had planned 8th July as a protest day.⁶³ On July 2nd, 1947, Jenkins wrote to Mountbatten that Lahore remained peaceful; however, a bank was looted in Amritsar.⁶⁴

The report of July 3rd 1947, included the news that Mamdot had resigned from the Security Committees, formed in compliance with paragraph 5 of his telegram of 25th June. Mamdot had sent a long letter to Jenkins complaining of repressive actions against Muslims at Misri Shah. Mamdot had claimed that he had played a big role in improving the situation in Lahore. Jenkins objected to Mamdot's non-co-operation and complained that it was against the policy of Jinnah who had demanded "utter ruthlessness" against the culprits irrespective of religion.⁶⁵

On 4th July 1947, Mountbatten instructed Jenkins that if local leaders were satisfied with the arrangements of the partition and security committees, then there would be no trouble and they would leave things as they were, if there was a strong demand for change only then it could be reconsidered.⁶⁶

On 9th July 1947, Jenkins wrote to Mountbatten and discussed with him the matter of relieving the British troops, however; the decision was to be taken by G.H.Q. on 17th July. Jenkins was fully aware of the resentment in the Punjab about partition.⁶⁷

63 Zafar, *Disturbances in Punjab*, 277-78.

64 Zafar, *Disturbances in Punjab*, 285. Situation report four Muslims were murdered at Amritsar. Gurgaon situation remained unchanged. There was an explosion at a shrine in Jullundur, murder and arsons at Hoshiarpur, Sialkot and Sargodha.

65 *Jenkins Papers*, (MF. No. 1616, NDC, Islamabad). Jenkins letter to Mountbatten, dated 1st July, 1947.

66 *Papers*, (MF. No. 1616, NDC, Islamabad). Jenkins letter to Mountbatten, dated 1st July, 1947.

67 *Papers*, (MF. No. 1616, NDC, Islamabad). Jenkins letter to Mountbatten, dated 1st July, 1947, 9th July 1947.

The same day on 9th July 1947, Mountbatten discussed with Jenkins the division of the armed forces. He (Mountbatten) realized Jenkins' difficulties in handling the volatile situation in Punjab but insisted that the work be expedited and troops released. Mountbatten advised Jenkins to consult the Army Commander and do whatever was necessary in that direction.⁶⁸

On 10th July 1947, Jenkins revealed to Mountbatten his talks with Giani Kartar Singh who was dissatisfied with the Boundary Commission's Report as it was not to the Sikhs' liking. Jenkins wrote frankly that the boundary problem could be solved in a rational way to start the two provinces peacefully; and that the settlement should be out of court. Both Sikhs and Muslims were making irrational demands—Giani Kartar Singh claiming areas up to Montgomery (Sahiwal) and Muslim leaders demanding areas up to Ambala. Both were adamant in their demands and he anticipated a new armed conflict within few weeks.⁶⁹

Evan Jenkins clearly warned Mountbatten that insistence on "speed" was disastrous for Punjab in his report of 11th July 1947. He mentioned that the higher services had virtually disintegrated, which turned professional civil servants into subordinate politicians. In the I.C.S. cadre non-Muslims were not prepared to serve in West Punjab and only one Muslim was prepared to serve in East Punjab which meant that hatred and suspicion were so undisguised.⁷⁰

Jenkins was not alone in believing that things were being dangerously hurried. The second most important Englishman on the Subcontinent in 1947, Field Marshal Sir Claude Auchinleck, commenting on the 3rd June Plan noted, "Independence in 30 days

68 *Papers*, (MF. No. 1616, NDC, Islamabad). Jenkins letter to Mountbatten, dated 1st July, 1947.

69 *Papers*, (MF. No. 1616, NDC, Islamabad). Jenkins letter to Mountbatten, dated 1st July, 1947.

70 Jaswant Singh, *Jinnah: India-Partition-Independence* (New Delhi: Rupa & Co., 2009), 445.

when it really ought to have been spread over three years..." it was quite absurd.⁷¹

Cracker Flared Communal Trouble at Lahore Railway

On July 14th 1947, Jenkins wrote to Mountbatten that during the first half of July, Lahore and Amritsar remained comparatively calm but so tense even a small mischief could trigger a big riot like the fire cracker incident in a Sikh Canteen at Lahore Railway station turned into a fight in which 32 Sikhs, 1 Muslim and 1 Hindu were injured. Two Sikh died two days later due to their wounds.

Jenkins was worried about rural areas like Gujranwala and Gurgaon. In areas where Sikhs dominated like Amritsar and Taran Taran, Muslims were murdered mercilessly. In this case, the aggressors were Sikhs. Jenkins mentioned other similar cases of killing and arson to Mountbatten as well.⁷²

On 30th July 1947, Jenkins admitted that there was no improvement in the communal situation in Lahore and only little improvement in Amritsar. There were fires, street stabbings, and bomb explosions in which the toll of casualties was high. In incidents, during 21st July to 23rd July several non-Muslims were murdered. At Amritsar, there was a bomb explosion outside the Sessions Court. Killing of Muslims went unabated. In Gurdaspur, Muslim villages were targeted for killing and looting. Again, the aggressors were all Sikhs. Gurgaon remained quiet due to the presence of troops there. The Sikhs were dissatisfied with the Boundary Commission Reports and they were confused and did not know what to do.⁷³

On 30th July 1947, Mountbatten wrote to Jenkins in a telegram that the partition council had discussed the precautionary actions to prevent disturbances before and after 15th August. Jenkins was asked to cover the period from 1st to 15th August by declaration

71 Raghuvendra Tanwar, *Reporting the Partition of Punjab 1947* (New Delhi: Vanguard, 2006), 36.

72 Tanwar, *Reporting the Partition of Punjab 1947*, 2. Zafar, *Disturbances in Punjab*, 289-91.

73 Tanwar, *Reporting the Partition of Punjab 1947*, 316-18.

under Punjab Legislation. Accordingly the districts, likely to be affected on either side of the boundary were to be declared as “disturbed areas”.⁷⁴

From the above recommendations of Mountbatten, one could see how meticulous and mindful Mountbatten was in his actions. He worked out things in a calculated way. He was quite sure of the direction his policies were taking, and he made preparations accordingly. He knew it would be a bloody and tumultuous process so he gave instructions in accordance with that. By analyzing his actions, one could comfortably state that Mountbatten was aware of the turbulent reaction of the communal forces in Punjab and he rushed into that torrent and tried his best to send his own Englishmen safely back home to England and leaving the communal war of succession take its own course. However, the refugees’ movement in large numbers shuttling from one part to another without having any knowledge where the border was located resulted in total chaos.⁷⁵

On 31st July 1947, Jenkins wrote to Mountbatten that in response to his telegram of 30th July, the whole of Punjab was declared as a “disturbed area”. He also proposed that the imposition should remain effective even beyond 15th August by virtue of section 18 of the Indian Independence Act with the approval of the respective governments of India and Pakistan.⁷⁶

On 4th August 1947 (11.55 pm), in a telegram message, Jenkins informed Mountbatten about the security arrangement in Lahore city and how he had deployed troops in different areas.⁷⁷

In his letter of 4th August 1947, Jenkins enclosed a memorandum for which Mountbatten had asked him to prepare about the main criticism against the Punjab Government for its handling of the disturbances. Jenkins admitted it was rather sketchy as he had a

74 Tanwar, *Reporting the Partition of Punjab 1947*, 315. Mountbatten to Jenkins dated 30th July, 1947.

75 Tanwar, *Reporting the Partition of Punjab 1947*, 315-16.

76 Tanwar, *Reporting the Partition of Punjab 1947*, 318-19.

77 Nicholas Mansergh, *Transfer of Power 1942-47*, Vol. XII, (London: Her Majesty’s Stationery Office, 1983) 531.

good deal of other work on his hands and that most of the material required for a full survey was on record but it would take time to get it arranged.⁷⁸ Jenkins had explained his position serial-wise by noting the complaints of the Congress and Muslim League leaders and then explained his limitations in quelling the incendiaries, killing and general disturbances. The account of both the sides is very convincing yet as far as the security and protection of the common people was concerned both the authorities, political and administrative, had miserably failed. They left masses at the mercy of the hooligans. Jenkins blamed the politicians of being callous and unable to grasp the magnitude of the crisis. He blamed the leaders of the three communities for inciting the communal riots. They not only incited but also provided arms and ammunition to their workers.

On 8th August 1947, Jenkins discussed the situation in different towns of Punjab, with the Commander of the Punjab Boundary Force and the Inspector General of Police. Jenkins elaborated further that:

The civil side of picture was not encouraging. Transfers and postings connected with partition were going on. Standard of reporting of incidents had fallen off. Police in East Punjab were unsteady and Muslim police officers in Amritsar intended to migrate to West Punjab on 15th August. Arrangement for security concerning public was very precarious. Commander Punjab Boundary Force had told Jenkins the strength of his 5th Brigade averages 1500 effective rifles. It meant that the overall strength of say 7500 effective rifles including police, to control 12 districts with a population of no less than 12 million.⁷⁹

Jenkins then asked for more force from the centre to look after Punjab but his demand gone unheard.⁸⁰

78 Mansergh, *Transfer of Power 1942-47*, Vol. XII, 510. The detail about the said memorandum is in the appendix.

79 Mansergh, *Transfer of Power*, Vol. XII, 583-584. Jenkins letter to Mountbatten.

80 Zafar, *Disturbances in Punjab*, 328-29.

Tara Singh Arrest Case in Early August 1947

In the letter dated 9th August 1947, Jenkins thanked Mountbatten for his prompt response on dated 8th August regarding the subversive activities of Tara Singh and other Sikh leaders. Jenkins thought it was not a good advice to arrest Tara Singh and other Sikh leaders, and the Boundary Commission Report would not improve but worsen the immediate situation. As the Sikhs were likely to create more trouble, the British civil servants were advised to leave the mess for the new government to deal with.⁸¹ Jenkins elaborated that the confinement of the Sikh leaders, not on criminal charges but under his emergency powers, would be most embarrassing and he was not clear where he could put the leaders without instigating trouble and that he could hardly send them to what would in a few days be Pakistani jails. On the other hand, if he left them in East Punjab, it would then be the centre of agitation.⁸²

Jenkins had given a number of reasons for not arresting Tara Singh, though evidence was there of his violent activities and planning. Jenkins wrote that he had decided to plan the arrest, but he was against its execution unless he was forced. He knew that it would be difficult to arrest Sikh leaders as they travel and usually rest in places like the Golden Temple, where police action would attract a lot of public attention. Jenkins commented that Jinnah wanted harsh treatment for troublemakers. The British policy was to have smooth transfer of power, even at considerable risk. If Jenkins stirred up the hornet's nest, the new government of Punjab would inherit that animosity and he thought that would not be fair to the new governments. The arrest, therefore, should not be made unless the action before the transfer of power was quite unavoidable. According to Leonard Mosley, the author of *The Last Days of the British Raj*, Mountbatten conferred with Jenkins and the two designated Governors of East and West Punjab (Sir Chandulal Trivedi and Sir Francis Mudie) and asked them what their suggestion was. They agreed to leave Tara Singh and his cohorts free. Jenkins maintained that it was of no use arresting Tara Singh

81 Zafar, *Disturbances in Punjab*, 330-31. Telegram No.3268-S.

82 Zafar, *Disturbances in Punjab*, 331.

in the beginning of August and then releasing him in the mid of August when independence would be declared.⁸³

Jenkins in a way wanted the transfer of power to proceed in a calm atmosphere so that the British were not blamed for mishandling the situation and preventing mass murder of the populations and limiting the warring communal groups to devour each other. No judicial inquiry took place against the crimes that were committed from March to August 1947. In any case, Muslims and non-Muslims, who had lived quite peacefully till 1946, could not be wholly blamed for the mayhem which occurred in 1947.

In his letter dated 12th August 1947, Jenkins wrote to Mountbatten that a special train had been derailed which had angered the Sikhs in Amritsar. He said he had removed from duty a Hindu Superintendent of Police who had disarmed Muslim policemen without consulting higher authorities. Muslim policemen were indispensable in East Punjab and the British policy was to keep them at their posts. They were threatened that they would lose their jobs in west-Punjab (Pakistan) if they left their job in East Punjab. Lahore was at that time under control of the Muslim League National Guards as the Police was ineffective. The strength of the Punjab Boundary Force was inadequate to handle the law and order situation.⁸⁴

On 12th August 1947, Jenkins informed Mountbatten that police in Lahore and Amritsar could not be relied upon. Some police stations in rural areas of Amritsar had ceased working. There were no troops or police available to maintain law and order. The Muslim League National Guard had taken over Lahore and was indulged in hostile acts against the non-Muslims.⁸⁵

In his next letter to Mountbatten, Jenkins admitted that Lahore and Amritsar were out of control. Curfew had been enforced. Sikhs had been firing from Dera Sahib Gurdwara, which was then searched

83 Mosley, *The Last Days of the British Raj*, 215.

84 Mansergh, *Transfer of Power 1942-47*, Vol.XII, 674-75.

85 Mansergh, *Transfer of Power 1942-47*, Vol.XII, 688. On 12th August (Recd. 13 August) 1947.

for seizing the culprits. The Majitha Jatha was punished for firing which repercussion in Amritsar.⁸⁶

In another communiqué of the same date, 13th August 1947, Jenkins merely reported the casualty figures for Punjab.⁸⁷

In the fortnightly report dated 13th August, 1947 Jenkins wrote to Mountbatten that communal disturbances had overshadowed everything. Sikhs were very violent and they were killing Muslims in Amritsar, Jullundur, Hoshiarpur, Gurdaspur, while there were isolated outrages in Ludhiana, Lahore and Ferozpur. It was difficult to keep track of the killings and their number. The machinery of the government was in disarray in anticipation of new governments of India and Pakistan to take over command. Sikhs had gone berserk and were indulging in brutal acts against Muslims.

Muslim policemen were deserting Amritsar to reach Lahore in safety despite warning from IG Police Qurban Ali Khan that they would not be recruited in West Punjab if they deserted their station of duty. Jenkins explained that the Muslim policemen were targeted in Amritsar and their lives were in danger in that violent city ruled by Sikh mobs.

The Hindus had kept a low profile during the communal frenzy, as they wanted to migrate to Hindu majority provinces safely. Muslim leaders wanted that Hindus, Sikhs and the British should leave Muslim majority areas, and were using violent means to achieve their objective.⁸⁸

In a telegram on 14th August 1947, Jenkins informed Mountbatten about the situation in Lahore and Amritsar. Muslims had attacked two trains in Rawalpindi as a reprisal against Sikh atrocities in

86 Mansergh, *Transfer of Power 1942-47*, Vol.XII, 709.

* See Lionel Carter, *Punjab Politics 1 June-14 August 1947 Tragedy*, 232. Also see *Transfer of Power*, Vol. XII, Jenkins letter to Mountbatten, 13 August 1947, para 7, 700-704.

87 Zafar (ed.), *Disturbances in Punjab*, 338-39. 13 August 1947, 11.40 a.m. received at 9:00 p.m. on 14 August, gave merely casualty figures in Punjab.

88 Zafar (ed.), *Disturbances in Punjab*, 339-43.

Central Punjab. He expected this to be dealt with by the new government.⁸⁹

Mountbatten accelerated the whole process of transfer of power without taking the consequences of simultaneous disruption of all departments and government agencies as well as people in general into consideration, which was bound to result in total disorder and at worse mayhem. The British officers feared the local population would not respect them or listen to them as they were leaving. Mountbatten's callous and hasty decisions played a criminal role in the widespread destruction that accompanied partition.

Wavell chalked out the roadmap of transfer of power. He had thoroughly studied the ground realities of India. He could see the problems related to partition. Mountbatten was there only to execute that pre-planned schedule. No one could deny that Mountbatten had a penchant for self-aggrandizement; he was not only proud of his royal blood but was overly conscious about it. He wanted to deal with the whole affair of India in a royal way but he lacked that sensitivity where humans were treated with dignity and honour. He was a pompous man, who liked to overawe others by his mannerisms and dress. For the Independence Day celebration, he was fussy about buttons and dresses. He was least concerned about the killing that was going on in Punjab.

The British had done a lot of paperwork, recording incidences and trying to prove that they handled every problem that cropped up efficiently. In reality, they had disturbed the whole process which otherwise would have gone smoothly. They even ridiculed the local leaders, especially Sikhs, when they demanded regions to be included on their side of Punjab.

Jenkins, the author of the memorandum, wrote in detail about the fact and figures of communal violence. His stress was how violent the two sides were, i.e., the Muslims and non-Muslims; however, he failed to mention anything about how the British planned to tackle it. The whole government machinery was under British rule. So section 93 of India Act was applicable in Punjab under which Jenkins was ruling Punjab. The people's representatives, though

89 Zafar (ed.), *Disturbances in Punjab*, 344.

elected, could not use their power until they were given authority to execute orders and activate the process of administration.

Jenkins wrote quite innocently that he had no contacts with officials at home. He only sent telegrams on a daily basis to the Secretary of State informing him of the ground realities in his province.⁹⁰

The local leadership of Muslims and non-Muslims were conscious that the British were not handling the communal problem with sagacity. It was the duty of the administration to “nip the evil in the bud” before it turned into a monster. The administrator of the province was fully aware of the trouble mongers but refrained from taking appropriate steps at the required time. Master Tara Singh had declared an open war against Muslims; his poison spitting tongue engulfed the whole of Punjab in turmoil. Jenkins and his subordinates took no action against him. He claimed that he treated every one equally. He was the only person who was meeting all the communal leaders without discrimination⁹¹ but that approach did not solve the problems facing him. H.V. Hodson has very aptly described British Viceroy Mountbatten, “The Viceroy’s threats of the most drastic action against law-breakers while he remained responsible were known: the charge was that they remained what they were, merely words.”⁹²

Jenkins had vividly explained why the British failed to cope with troubled Punjab. He claimed that circumstances were extraordinary, the relationship between the two communal groups was strained, Muslims and non-Muslims both were trying to resist the others’ dominance. Jenkins had aptly dubbed it as a “War of Succession”. He blamed Muslims and non-Muslims leaders alike for the trouble in Punjab as, according to him, they played no role in pacifying the flames of communal disharmony. They were concerned only about their particular community; they did not try to pacify the strained relations with calmness and sympathetic attitudes towards the aggrieved communal segments. In fact, some of those leaders further aggravated the situation by their speeches and actions.

90 Mansergh, *Transfer of Power 1942-47*, Vol. XII, 511.

91 Mansergh, *Transfer of Power 1942-47*, Vol. XII.

92 Hodson, *The Great Divide*, 340.

He wrote about Lahore communal riots and Hindu leadership's demand to impose Martial Law in Lahore; he explained that "When a Hindu leader talks about "utter ruthlessness" or "martial law" he meant that he wanted as many Muslims as possible shot out of hand." One can easily be misled by Jenkins' comment that Hindus wanted Muslims to be shot. Jenkins was using the British time-tested strategy of "divide and rule". The fiery speech of Master Tara Singh at the Punjab Secretariat stairs on 2nd March 1947 was enough for the administrators of Punjab to put him behind the bars as he was instigating communal riots in the province, but Jenkins took no action against him. Jenkins explained that he did not want to worsen the already tense atmosphere in the region.⁹³ The situation in Punjab had forced the worst polarization of the communities with practically all Muslims on one side of the fence and all non-Muslims on the other.

Churchill was critical of Mountbatten's appointment and his handling of Indian affairs. He refused to shake hands with Mountbatten for years and told him, "what you did in India is as though you had struck me across the face with a riding whip." Six years later at the Bermuda conference, he was still upset for giving independence to India. He expressed his sorrow in the presence of the US President, the French Prime Minister and all their advisers on the passing of British Raj in India. He said: "This was a colossal disaster which he had lived to see."⁹⁴

The terrible happenings of partition days still seem to cast their shadow on the future of the two states, but people cannot live in that mode of mutual hatred and distrust forever. The nations have to shed the baggage of the past and move on by overcoming their weaknesses and workout their way for progress and development and the future of the coming generations.

Jenkins never said a word even though he was blamed for the Punjab tragedy. Once when Major General Shahid Hamid met him in London and pressed him (Jenkins) to write his memoirs, he replied that 'it is not in the interest of Commonwealth.' It was

93 Hodson, *The Great Divide*, 512.

94 Clive Ponting, *Churchill* (London: Sinclair-Stevenson, 1994), 742.

known that at that time before his departure on 15th August he was ordered by Mountbatten to burn down all his papers concerning Boundary affairs. So there was a bonfire in the cellar of Governor House, Lahore, but still a few papers including the original sketch map demarcating the boundaries between the two Dominions before it was altered by Mountbatten fell into the hands of Sir Francis Mudie, the Governor, who gave them to Liaquat, the then Prime Minister of Pakistan. However, the enigma whether he [Jenkins] kept some papers with him or not remained unclear.⁹⁵

95 Shahid Hamid, *Disastrous Twilight* (London: Leo Cooper, 1986), 235.

Chapter IV

Jenkins Deliberations with Punjab Leaders 1946-47

The Second World War in which thousands of Indians laid down their lives to save the empire ended in 1945. During the war, Britain had committed that it would grant independence to India after the war.¹ The end of the war therefore meant freedom for India. However, it did not mean the British were conceding freedom to India as a gift and the Indians had done nothing to achieve it. In fact, the British had realized that after the war it would not be possible for them to keep their hold on India, which had struggled for independence for a century. There were a number of factors that were in play in determining the future course of India. Both the Hindu and Muslim leadership had different ideas for the post-colonial period and in Punjab the thinking of the leadership was entirely parochial.² Especially in the wake of British departure, a new pattern was to unfold and the leadership of the two communities had to determine their place in the new set up.

In this study, an analysis has been done to find how far Sir Evan Meredith Jenkins, the Governor of Punjab, succeeded in keeping his province safe from the adverse fallout of partition. Did he succeed in his endeavours or not? What were the impediments, which stood in the way of a man holding the highest office in the land? Was he a good administrator? Or was he only good at informing his superiors of doomsday scenarios? Was he able to nip the evil in the bud as was expected of him? Did the course of events, in which the British were to leave India to its own fate, overtook him? These questions need to be answered to understand his role in the last days of the Raj.

The focus is on Jenkins' correspondence with Indian leaders with special reference to his meetings, talks and the reports that he communicated to the higher authorities at Delhi and England.

1 Nicholas Mansergh, *Transfer of Power 1942-47*, Vol. I (London: Her Majesty's Stationery Office, 1980), 155, 171-172.

2 *Police Abstract of Intelligence Punjab*, para 17, commented by J. M. Dean, Assistant to the DIG of Police, Punjab, 19.

The main leadership of the Punjab at that time was consisted of Iftikhar Hussain Mamdot (President, Punjab Muslim League), Mian Mumtaz Daultana (MLA), Firoz Khan Noon (MLA), Tara Singh (MLA), Giani Kartar Singh (MLA), Sardar Baldev Singh (Defence Minister in 1946-47) and Dr. Gopi Chand Bhargava (MLA). This correspondence reveals the extent to which Jenkins was taking the provincial leadership and some other people into confidence. Did they trust him? How sincere he was with them? Are important query to be investigated?

A dispassionate study of the partition would reveal how the political motives and the uncompromising attitude of the leaders of the majority party had made a farce of democratic institutions and distorted the fine values of the three communities, who were otherwise quite accommodative with each other in their day-to-day dealings. It would also be instructive to know why the communal rift intensified in Punjab and why the ambassador of Hindu-Muslim unity became adamant about a separate Muslim state; what were the factors that such a drastic change came in his stance? The results of the 1937 election provide the background to these political developments. The Congress was in majority in eight of the eleven provinces mainly Bihar, Orissa, C.P., U.P., and Madras. In these five provinces, Congress had a clear-cut majority. In Bombay and NWFP, it had a coalition government, while Punjab and Bengal had a Muslim tilt. In Punjab it was Sir Fazl-i-Hussain's Unionist Party and in Bengal Fazl-i-Haq's Praja Krishak Party dominated the political scene. In eight majority provinces, Congress adopted discriminatory policies against the Muslim minorities. In schools, it was obligatory to learn Sanskrit; in the job market as well as in government offices Hindu candidates were given preference over Muslim candidates. Muslims faced discrimination in every field of life. It was a foretaste of things to come. The Congress policy of excluding all the other parties from the Provincial Executive could set at naught the wishes of the minorities that meant representation in the legislatures alone would not be a sufficient safeguard. Hindu extremists in Congress disheartened Jinnah, who were not ready to give any concession to the minorities in India. This put Jinnah on the separatist path and

gave birth to the demand for Pakistan.³ Now the question arises how far the common person supported this stance of the Jinnah. The people who had been living together peacefully for centuries turned into enemies and indulged in such an inhuman acts against each other that people were ashamed even to narrate those ghastly events. Both Muslims and non-Muslims acted with brutality and barbarism. They had no mercy for each other. What were the misgivings that caused them to behave like this? As the focus of this study is on the partition of Punjab, the grievances of the local population have to be kept in mind. Their properties were being taken over by Hindu banias and their lives had become hostage to rich moneylenders of the province. The illiterate peasants in need of money used to take loans at high interest rates against their landed property and when they could not pay back the Hindu *Sahukar* (money-lender) they would ultimately take possession of their land, depriving the Muslim farmers of their property and position, making him subservient to non-Muslims. Now with political change in 1947 and rumours of Muslim massacre in Bihar, Patna and Calcutta infuriated the Punjabis and Pathans who in retaliation killed thousands of non-Muslims in Hazara.⁴ The situation in Hazara incited Muslims of Kharral village who attacked Sikhs to flee to Rawalpindi. The number of Sikh refugees rose to 6000 with as many as 5000 taking shelter in the shrine of Panja Sahib Gurdwara of Hasan Abdal in Attock District. Mehr Chand Khanna, Finance Minister of NWFP, visited Rawalpindi and Hasan Abdal to persuade the refugees to return to their homes but the Sikhs refused saying they would go back when they themselves felt safe. The trouble had not yet spread to Punjab, although a detachment of the Rawalpindi Police had to open fire on January 10th to disperse a mob in a village of Murree. Extensive police patrolling had been ordered on the Rawalpindi-Hazara border areas as a precautionary measure.⁵ These actions of the Punjabis and Pathans widened the rift between the Muslims and Sikhs. When Muslim League tried to seek reconciliation with the

3 Mansergh, *The Transfer of Power 1942-47*, Vol. XII, 790.

4 *Police Abstract of Intelligence Punjab*, January 21.

5 *Police Abstract of Intelligence Punjab*, 19.

non-Muslims, these incidents came in the way of conciliatory efforts.

On February 20, 1947, the Labour Government in England decided to hand over power to the Indians by June 1948. This was the date which set the ball rolling. After this announcement, the Indian political scenario moved like a torrent towards its logical end. In this chain of events, Punjab and Bengal suffered the most.⁶

The Labour government called Viceroy Wavell back to England. A royal family scion, Louis Mountbatten, replaced him. He reached India on 22 March, 1947. He met all the eminent leaders of India and consulted them on the future course of events. In Punjab political developments were in turmoil as in the elections of 1946, Muslim League had emerged as a single major party based on its communal identity. Jinnah tried to convince the minorities in the province that after the creation of Pakistan all citizens would be treated equally.⁷ The state would not discriminate the minorities. In fact, their rights would be jealously guarded. The Sikhs did not believe those words as they had watched the election campaign, which was very communal oriented and gave no indication of impartiality in the future. From February 1946 to March 1947, the Muslim League had been campaigning against the Unionist government, which consisted of Muslims, Sikhs and Hindus. The Muslim League continued raising the slogans of Islam and Pakistan as the ultimate goals. On 2nd March, 1947 Khizr Hayat Tiwana resigned, much to the chagrin of the British administration which did not expect his resignation. Jenkins wrote in a letter to Viceroy Wavell, dated March 3rd, that Khizr had resigned earlier than it was expected. He was perturbed by Muslim League's continuous agitation against his government and the final blow came when His Majesty's Government (HMG) announced the transfer of power by June 1948. The Muslim Leaguers were jubilant on this action of Khizr Tiwana, which frustrated the non-Muslim community. The Akali leader Master Tara Singh stood on

6 Madhav Godbole, *The Holocaust of Indian Partition: An Inquest* (New Delhi: Rupa & Co., 2006), 19.

7 G. Allana, *Pakistan Movement: Historic Documents* (Karachi: Paradise Subscription Agency, 1968), 513-514.

the stairs of the Punjab Assembly building with a *Kirpan* in his hand and uttered these bellicose words: “We will annihilate Muslims from Punjab”. That utterance of the Sikh leader led to violent incidents in the whole of Punjab. Baldev Singh, who had the portfolio of defense minister in the interim government, wrote in the foreword of the booklet, *Punjab the Homeland of the Sikhs*, “The Sikhs will, under no circumstances, consent to live in a theocratic Muslim state, whether it is “Pakistan”, or is styled on any other pattern. They stand, as their history too clearly shows, for a free and united India where their rights and privileges are fully secured”.⁸ These lines were written by Baldev Singh way back in March 1945. There were Sikhs who under no circumstances were ready to accept Pakistan and so the question of joining with Pakistan’s Punjab was next to impossible for them.

Jenkins had requested Mamdot to form the ministry; however, he showed his simple majority even without the support of the Akali and Congress members. Jenkins insisted on Mamdot to seek the support of the minorities, which was not possible for him as Muslim League had fought the elections on communal basis and agitated against the Unionist ministry without let up. Muslim League’s main objective was to safeguard the rights of Indian Muslims. However, after the announcement of the date for the transfer of power it was ready to have conciliatory talks with the Sikhs, assuring them of certain concessions if they acquiesced in joining the Muslim majority areas. But the Sikhs were not ready to listen after their massacre in Rawalpindi in January and February at the hands of the Muslims. They simply refused to fall in line with Muslim League’s conciliatory efforts. The Muslims were eager to keep Punjab united but Sikhs demanded partition with their share in the pie.

With immense anxiety, different communities were agitating for their rights and share in power; however, it was the collapse of the administrative machinery that caused the colossal loss of lives. According to Punjab Police Abstracts, the resignation of the coalition Ministry under Khizar Hayat late on the night of March

8 Harnam Singh, *Punjab: The Homeland of the Sikhs* (Lahore: The Civil and Military Gazette Ltd., 1945).

2nd destabilized the provincial set up in an atmosphere where everybody had been talking about civil war and all communities were being exhorted by their leaders to lose no time in preparing themselves for the eventual struggle. In such circumstances, both the communities were equally responsible for what happened as a result.⁹ The spread of communal strife from the cities of Amritsar, Multan, Rawalpindi and Lahore to rural areas was mostly marked in the villages of Multan and Rawalpindi, where, as in the case of cities, special protective and deterrent arrangements had been made. An All Parties Peace Committee was formed in Lahore, but it was more for appearances sake than with any real wish to restore communal harmony.¹⁰

Sikhs against Muslim Rule

The Sikhs strongly suspected that Muslim League had an unholy alliance with the British and they would establish Pakistan in Punjab come what may. The Sikh leaders painted a very gloomy picture for their community under Muslim rule in the province. They believed that Muslims would prohibit *jhatka* (sudden slaughter of animals that renders meat non-kosher for Muslims) meat, Persian would be made the official language and Sikhs would be subject to higher rates of taxes and land revenues than Muslims. They accused the Muslim premier of denying canal water to Doaba areas creating widespread resentment among the Sikh peasantry giving birth to rebels like Babbar Akalis and Bhagat Singh. The Sikhs were told by their leaders to prevent the formation of Pakistan with their blood and devote a son to the cause of the *Panth* (path of Sikh warrior). They vowed that they would not allow Muslim League ministry in Punjab. They demanded that British had to allocate Punjab to the Sikhs from whom they had taken it. The brutal killing of Babu Labh Singh infuriated Master Tara Singh, and in a press statement, he repeated that he would not negotiate with Muslim League until they stop the killings and disturbances in general. Baldev Singh wanted Muslims to give assurance that they would protect the minorities. In his

9 *Police Abstract of Intelligence Punjab* (Lahore: 8th March 1947, Para 140), 101.

10 *Police Abstract of Intelligence Punjab*.

opinion, there could be no settlement with the local Muslim League leaders and that the matter would be taken up with Mr. Jinnah himself.¹¹

Marching of Punjab towards Disaster

In his notes of March 4th Jenkins wrote about the bad communal situation of the last two days. The Muslim Leaguers were jubilant on the resignation of Khizr Hayat on the night of March 2nd. The Sikhs held their meeting at Kapurthala House and they decided not to accept any Muslim League government in Punjab. The Muslim League flags were taken down from the roads and buildings of Lahore and Muslim League badges worn by Muslims were snatched and torn. The Hindu students quarreled with police in which 30 policemen were injured.¹² The resignation of the Coalition Ministry, which became known on March 3rd, took Congress circles by surprise but they lost no time and aligned themselves with anti-Muslim League elements in an attempt to prevent the formation of a government consisting solely of the members of one community. A Lahore District Congress Committee arranged a massive rally of about one lakh audience. The speakers were MLAs like Tara Singh, Ch. Lehri Singh, Master Kabul Singh, Dr. Gopi Chand and Giani Kartar Singh. The speeches by them called for a united front against Pakistan and they blamed the British for encouraging the Muslim League agitation; the Governor was accused of having intrigued with the Muslim League and it was decided to organize large public meetings to be known as "Anti-Pakistan Conferences".¹³ On the same day, Hindu and Sikh leaders issued a statement that "under no circumstances are we willing to give the slightest assurance of support (*sic*) to Muslim League in the formation of a Ministry, as we are opposed to Pakistan in any shape or form".¹⁴

11 *Police Abstract of Intelligence Punjab*, 15 March 1947, Para 160, 115.

12 *Jenkins Papers*, Microfilm No. 1616 (IOLR 3/1/176), dated 4th March, 1947, NDC, Islamabad, 18.

13 *Police Abstract* (Lahore: 8th March 1947, Para 141), 102.

14 *Police Abstract* (Lahore: 8th March 1947, Para 141).

Jenkins told Mamdot that communal disharmony was causing him great anxiety. There had been serious clashes and arson in Murree, Taxila and other places in close proximity to Hazara and dislocation of mail and road traffic. Military and Police were dealing with the situation in Rawalpindi and outside; they had done all that was possible with the forces at their disposal to bring the situation under control.¹⁵ In a meeting with Mamdot, Jenkins discussed the communal problem in Lahore and elsewhere in Punjab. Jenkins insisted that he (Mamdot) should negotiate with Sikhs as time was running out and it was important Muslims reached some agreement with Sikhs before the opportunity was lost.¹⁶ In his report of that day (4th March), Jenkins wrote that he had discussed the killing of a number of Muslims at Shalmi and Lahori gate with Mamdot who had told Jenkins that Muslims had maintained peace in Lahore for the last 34 days, but non-Muslims had been violent from the very first day of their agitation. Jenkins insisted that the truth was yet to be ascertained when the full report about the killing was received.¹⁷

Jenkins Inquiry of Mamdot's Parliamentary Position

Jenkins inquired from Mamdot about his parliamentary position. Mamdot confided to him that he had Muslim majority and support of a few other members. Jenkins believed that the Muslim ministry with a few insignificant supporters would not last for more than six weeks.¹⁸

The Members of the Punjab Legislative Assembly were to meet by 20th March. Jenkins' assumption was that there would be hostile and possibly violent demonstrations against the new government. He wanted Mamdot to give him the complete list of his supporters. Yet, even if he (Jenkins) was satisfied, he might still not be able to appoint him as Chief Minister. On the other hand, Muslim League

15 *Police Abstract* (Lahore: 8th March 1947, Para 141), Para 149, 106.

16 *Police Abstract* (Lahore: 8th March 1947, Para 141). *Jenkins Papers*, dated 4th March, 1947, 2.

17 *Police Abstract* (Lahore: 8th March 1947, Para 141), Report of Jenkins, dated 4.3.47, Iftikhar Mamdot to Jenkins, *Jenkins Papers*, 1616.

18 *Police Abstract* (Lahore: 8th March 1947, Para 141).

was adamant that the result of elections dictated that it should be allowed to rule the province. The Punjab administration with the help of Congress, Akalis and the Unionist Party assumed the ministries and started their government; the Muslim League agitated and continued their struggle till independence. They continued to demand their fair share in the Punjab government, which they were denied rendering them subservient to an influential minority. Jenkins alleged that it was the Muslim League, which had caused the disorder, and it was Muslim Leagues's responsibility to restore peace in the province.¹⁹ On the other hand, Muslim League thought there was little weight in Jenkins' claim that he had maintained peace for ten months since taking over as governor on 10th April 1946 which the Muslim League agitation had spoiled.

In a meeting of 5th March, Mamdot assured Jenkins that he would form the ministry in Punjab. He had the support of 100 members. He brushed aside Jenkins apprehensions that he would not be able to run the provincial government without the support of opposition. Mamdot referred to that apprehension as theoretical speculation. He believed that without being involved (practically) one should not have tried to reach a conclusion.²⁰

Mamdot gave the following figures in his support: M.L. 80 plus 3 other Muslim members, 4 members of Scheduled Caste, 1 European and 2 Indian Christians. The number was most likely to go up to about 100 before the Legislature resumed its session. Mamdot stressed that he could prove his majority on the floor of the house.²¹

Mamdot wrote to Jenkins on March 5th 1947 assuring him of his majority. The important points to note in that letter were the last

19 Lionel Carter (ed.), *Punjab Politics 3rd March-31May 1947 at the Abyss Governors' Fortnightly Reports and Other Key Documents* (New Delhi: Manohar, 2007), 232-234.

20 *Jenkins Papers*, MF No. 1616, NDC, Dated 5.3.47. Notes of Jenkins dated 5th March 1947; Nawab Iftikhar Hussain met him at 1:00 p.m.

21 *Papers*, MF No. 1616, NDC, Dated 5.3.47, 24 and Rukhsana Zafar (ed.), *Disturbances in The Punjab 1947* (Islamabad: National Documentation Centre, 1995), 69. Mamdot letter to Jenkins dated 5.3.47.

few lines: “As for the risk which to my mind does not exist that the Ministry might fall as soon as it faces the Assembly”. He said that such a risk was a theoretical possibility, which would be there in the formation of any Ministry at any time. Moreover, he said that normal constitutional procedure should not, however, be deviated from. Mamdot requested Jenkins to permit him to submit the names of ministers for his approval for the new cabinet.²²

Jenkins had himself written to Wavell on 3rd March that technically speaking Mamdot commanded majority in the Punjab parliament and he should have been allowed to form the ministry but without minority support he could not last for more than a few weeks, and he had no choice but to enforce Section 93 of India Act 1935 from the outset.²³

Jenkins, in his manuscript notes, mentioned his interview with Malik Firoz Khan Noon in which the latter had said that League would not oppose Section 93 that most sensible Leaguers thought it to be inevitable. He wished a return to Unionism in some form—a coalition between Muslims and Sikhs. He did not think a purely Muslim government would succeed—he practically admitted that Mamdot had only 83 votes in total. In fact Mamdot’s cabinet was consisted of himself, Daultana, Firoz and Shaukat. He (Firoz) thought that Jenkins could only bring the parties together. He did not want that any of those facts should be made public, since he had not discussed them with Mamdot. For the future, Firoz thought that the return of the Unionists was impossible. He could not contemplate the idea of an undiluted Muslim Ministry; he asked Jenkins for his views, and rejected the idea of general elections that had attracted him for a time. In fact, Firoz thought that the alternatives were a coalition government or imposition of Section 93 of Indian Act.²⁴

On his return from a tour of Multan and Rawalpindi, Jenkins met Mamdot and Mumtaz Daultana at the Governor’s House and gave them an account of areas where Muslims were the aggressors. The

22 *Papers*, MF No. 1616, NDC, Dated 5.3.47, 32.

23 *Jenkins Paper*, Jenkins letter to Wavell, 3 March 1947, 4.

24 Carter, *Punjab Politics, 3rd March-6th March 1947*, 238-239.

two agreed with Jenkins' views and both of them wanted reconciliation with Sikhs and Hindus.

Jenkins told them that Hindus were bitter over the Multan episode in which Muslims had killed a number of Hindus. Similarly, in Rawalpindi, Muslims had committed atrocities and Hindus strongly believed that the only solution of that communal bitterness was division of Punjab.²⁵

Jenkins Persuasion for the Meeting of the Three Communities

Jenkins had a meeting with Sardar Baldev Singh on 11th March 1947. He had a long talk with him from 5.00 to 7.30 p.m. During the meeting, they were joined by Sardar Swaran Singh. The Sikhs were angry and were not in a mood to negotiate with the Muslim League. After much persuasion, Sardar Swaran Singh and Sardar Baldev Singh agreed that if the Muslim League took steps to stop the outrages and were authorised by their high command to negotiate with the minorities of Punjab, the Sikhs would be prepared to attend the meeting convened by Jenkins.

The meeting was to be between the three parliamentary leaders—Mamdot, Sardar Swaran Singh and Bhim Sen Sachar. They could bring one associate each with them. Jenkins contacted Mamdot and arranged the meeting on the next day.

There was little doubt that the mind of the Sikhs was intent only on reprisals and the Muslims had little chance of maintaining a united Punjab. The Sikhs' demand was partition and especially an immediate partition of the province. They were not clear about the boundary but, what was clear, they demanded a good deal more than the Muslims could ever be expected to concede. Sardar Swaran Singh produced a cyclostyled questionnaire and a writing pad, alleged to have been found by H.S. Badri Dass in the High Court. The questionnaire invited Muslims to give information to an unspecified authority on various subjects, which indicated revolutionary intentions. The writing pad contained what purported to be a note on a revolutionary organization. Those documents were taken over by DIG/CID.

²⁵ *Jenkins Papers*, dated 10. 3. 47.

When the talks were over, Jenkins asked the DIG/CID to contact Mamdot that night and to make an appointment to meet him next day at 10.30 a.m. He told the DIG/CID to explain to Mamdot the conditions on which the Sikhs would be prepared to negotiate.²⁶

Those conditions were:

- a. Muslim leaders would do their utmost to stop disturbances in Rawalpindi, Attock and Multan.
- b. Obtain permission from their authority that they would negotiate freely as Punjabis both on short term and long term issues.

On the first condition, Mamdot said that he had sent Maulana Daud Ghaznavi to Rawalpindi and *en route* he would stop at places like Gujranwala, Wazirabad, Gujrat and Jhelum. He would also visit Cambellpur in addition to Rawalpindi. Nawab Ashiq Hussain was to tour Multan, and by then he had proceeded to Multan. He would be assisted by Mian Allah Yar Khan Daultana, who was then in Multan.

On the second condition, Mamdot could not commit anything. Daultana was awaiting availability of air passage to Bombay to meet Mr. Jinnah. According to Police Abstracts, Mumtaz Daultana flew to Bombay to meet Mr Jinnah and returned to Lahore on the 18th of March. Since then Punjab Muslim League leaders had been engaged in further private discussions and Mamdot had issued a formal invitation to Master Tara Singh to co-operate with him in restoring communal peace. While efforts continued to form a stable ministry, the Punjab ML Council directed Muslims to observe 'Pakistan Day' quietly and not to take out rallies.²⁷

Jenkins asked Mamdot about the instructions he expected Mr Jinnah would give. Mamdot replied that he had no idea. Mamdot than mentioned a number of League grievances. Several League workers were under arrest. Although carrying of sheathed swords in public was allowed, Muslims were being arrested if found carrying sheathed swords while the Sikhs were free to display their *kirpans*. On All-India Radio it was announced that sheathed

²⁶ *Papers*, dated 10. 3. 47, 70-71.

²⁷ *Police Abstract*, Para 177, 130.

swords were allowed but Muslims were being arrested on carrying even sheathed swords. Mamdot had received a telegram, which he gave to Jenkins mentioning the possibility of Sikhs' reprisal at Eminabad.

Jenkins responded that he had taken note of Mamdot's grievances but at the same time he repeated that Hindus and Sikhs were complaining that Muslim police were victimizing them. Therefore, it was necessary to arrest Muslims carrying arms. Jenkins explained the history of *Kirpan* controversy and said that government could not do anything about it. He noted that he would make enquiries about Sikhs' reprisal at Eminabad.²⁸

Jenkins Arrangements for the Safety of Minorities

Lala Bhim Sen Sachar on 12st March 1947, requested Jenkins to arrange more police pickets as the situation had deteriorated. He predicted that Malakwal (near Mandi Bahauddin) would be attacked by rioters. He requested for more non-Muslim police. Jenkins told him that the I.G. had 2,000 vacancies and would gladly recruit non-Muslims if they were suitable. About Sachar's request for inquiry into police excesses, Jenkins told him that they were dealing with a national disaster and in those disastrous times, they could not go for witch-hunting in deciding who was guilty and who was innocent. Sachar then changed his tone and said what he meant was that law and order should be restored. Sachar had complained against Dildar Hussain Shah against whom Gyani Kartar Singh too had earlier complained. Jenkins thought it was the I.G.'s duty to look into Dildar Hussain Shah's matter.

Sachar asked for the appointment of a new officer on the investigation of criminal cases arising from rioting. He complained that police had wantonly fired on the Ganga Ice Factory and shot at some *chowkidars* who had annoyed them. Jenkins told him that actually there was firing from inside the factory targeting the police that had returned the fire. Sachar complained about firing at Ch. Chhajju Ram Auhkh's house, Jenkins told him it was the result of a fight in the neighbourhood. Then he said that one Sardar Khazan Singh had fired a shot to frighten away a mob and that the

28 Lionel Carter, *Punjab Politics*, Vol. IV, 242-243.

gun was taken away by police. Jenkins thought it was quite right. Sachar said that a certain Jagan Nath Sharma who had a licence for a weapon was away in Calcutta but his weapon, apparently a revolver, had been removed from his house. Jenkins said that there was nothing wrong in that. He then cited the case of the Mahavidyalaya, whose weapons were recovered by the police on Rajgarh Road.

Sachar requested that non-Muslim police should be used in Hindu areas. Jenkins informed him that the District police were not organized communally and that the recruits were from all communities.

Jenkins Solution to Communal Rift: Punjabis Should Think in Terms of Punjab Only

In the end, Jenkins and Sachar discussed the general situation. Jenkins then narrated what he had gathered from the attitude of Muslim League and the Sikhs, and told Sachar that they were facing a disaster which was far beyond politics; and selfish interests should not further aggravate it. Jenkins thought that the Congress like the League was chained closely to their High Command who did not care a bit of what happened to Punjab and that unless the leaders themselves got down to the nitty-gritty of making a settlement as Punjabis, there would be no progress. Sachar was friendly and he told Jenkins that he would meet him once a week.²⁹ This theory of Jenkins that Punjabis should think in terms of Punjab only, did not impress the leaders, as they believed that their respective people had gone too far down the road to be swayed by appealing to their basic identities.

Jenkins in his notes of 20th March 1947 wrote that Ghazanfar Ali Khan came to meet him and talked about a new Central Ordinance. According to this ordinance, the houses of different communities would be inspected by the opposite religion's group police force. Ghazanfar Ali had his apprehensions on the practicality of the ordinance. He thought that non-Muslims would face resistance if

29 Lionel Carter, *Punjab Politics*, Vol. IV, 244-245. Note by Jenkins of Interview with Sachar on 12th March 1947, probably at Governor House. Sachar met Jenkins at 6 p.m.

they went into a Muslim village and demanded house search, similar would be the case when Muslims would visit Hindu or Sikh dominant villages. It would further divide the society and that ordinance was supposed to be extended to military units, which would create cleavage within the armed forces and would be harmful for the security of various communities in Punjab and elsewhere.

The important point that Jenkins discussed in his notes was that he met Malik Khizr Hayat Khan Tiwana [the ex-premier of Punjab] on 20th March 1947. Khizr gave him an important hint that several of the Muslim Unionists would be joining Muslim League. The Schedule Castes and Christians too would be joining Muslim League. Khizr himself did not intend to join Muslim League as he had already made plans to visit Europe in the summer from May onwards.³⁰ He (Khizr) thought that Muslim League with the backing of few Schedule Castes or Christian members could not work at all. There would be immediate bloodshed on a much wider scale than hitherto. According to Jenkins, Khizr was very pessimistic about the future of Punjab. In his view, no stable government would be possible in Punjab without an agreement at the Centre.³¹

Evacuation of Non-Muslim Women from Jhelum

Gokul Chand Narang wrote to Jenkins dated 21st March 1947 beseeching assistance for security during the Shalamar fair and evacuation of Hindus and Sikhs in military vehicles from the villages around Jhelum and requested for the recovery of women abducted from Jhand.³²

Gokul Chand Narang came to meet Jenkins on the 22nd of March, 1947 in the afternoon. Jenkins assured him that proper precautions had been taken for security of Shalamar fair. For the Jhelum evacuees special arrangements had been made. Measures had been taken to recover the abducted women. His apprehensions about 23rd March celebrations by the Muslims were dismissed by Jenkins

30 *Jenkins Paper*, 3rd March 1947, MF No. 1616, 3.

31 *Paper*, 3rd March 1947, 131.

32 *Paper*, 3rd March 1947, 134-135.

as misplaced. He told Narang that Muslims not receiving arms from Kohat and NWFP. Jenkins confided in him that arrangements had been underway to recruit 4,000 policemen who would all be non-Muslims. Narang asked for permission to give a statement to the press in this regard, but Jenkins refused until the I.G. of Police had cleared that.³³

Giani Kartar Singh and Sardar Jagjit Singh Mann had a meeting with Jenkins on 24th March 1947 for over an hour in the afternoon. They had discussion on fourteen points concerning the condition of Sikhs in West Punjab. Giani stressed that there was a need for more camps for refugees. The Patiala, Kapurthala and Faridkot States would accept 7,000 to 8,000 refugees.

On the recovery of abducted women, he said that they would be around four hundred. A large number of Sikh refugees were to be accommodated in *Gurdwaras*. Giani stressed that I.G. of Police should recruit non-Muslims on priority basis and for it, the recruiting officer should make special efforts; he was not against Muslim quota in police as such. He did not insist on the recruitment of prosecution officers under the circumstances when division on communal basis was looming on the horizon. His main stress remained on recruitment of non-Muslims.

Giani stressed that a Sikh should be appointed as A.D.M. or D.S.P. in Amritsar, but Jenkins informed him that he was pressed by all communities on the issue of appointments of police and each community desired that officers of their community should spearhead the administrative jobs.³⁴

Malik Firoz Khan Noon had a meeting with Jenkins to discuss the communal impasse in Punjab. Jenkins' understanding of Malik Firoz Khan Noon was similar to that of other Muslim leaders; he (Firoz) did not quite realize what would be the consequences of the massacre of non-Muslims.³⁵

Malik Firoz Khan Noon's mention of opening a food supply in Rawalpindi annoyed Jenkins who replied that he would not be

33 *Paper*, 3rd March 1947, 139-140.

34 *Paper*, 3rd March 1947, 145-146.

35 *Paper*, 3rd March 1947, 151

worried if Muslims of Rawalpindi went without food as they themselves had destroyed the food depots. Nevertheless, when his anger subsided the next day, he said he would see to that.

Non-Muslims *hartals*' (strikes) were still common in Rawalpindi division. Each day they appealed for observing *hartals*. Firoz said that the non-Muslims wanted to pressurize the authorities. Jenkins advised him that Muslim League should change its stance towards the Sikhs and Hindus who had suffered in the riots of January and February initiated by Muslims in Rawalpindi division.

Firoz Khan told Jenkins that Muslims felt strongly about Sikhs being allowed to carry *kirpans* under the Arms Act. Jenkins said that Muslims could not get away with 4000 corpses of non-Muslims. He said he would not interfere with Sikhs' privileges as long as he remained the administrator of Punjab. Asked how could Muslim League's efforts for reconciliation with the non-Muslims succeed, Jenkins told Firoz that Muslims would have to repent for what they had done to the non-Muslims in the early part of 1947 in Rawalpindi.³⁶

Jenkins Confers with Punjab Leaders for Reconciliation

Jenkins met Sardar Swaran Singh and Giani Kartar Singh on 26th March to discuss the problems of Sikh refugees and relief efforts.³⁷ The Darbar Sahib Committee in Amritsar had employed around 80 Sikh ex-soldiers at Rs.40 per month per person, with free rations, to protect the Gurdawaras and auxiliary properties. In Rawalpindi, the Singh Sabha had set up an enquiry office with Niranjana Singh as in-charge to collect evidence about the recent riots. Also recruitment to the Akali Fauj picked up.

In Jullunder, the Sikhs were more disturbed by the death of Babu Labh Singh (President of Shiromani Akali Dal) than by the news of Sikh casualties in Attock and Rawalpindi riots. Refugees from Rawalpindi had started reaching the central districts and it was

36 *Paper*, 3rd March 1947, 151-152. Firoz Khan Noon's meeting with Jenkins, 24th March 1947.

37 *Paper*, 3rd March 1947, 155-157. Sardar Swaran Singh and Giani Kartar Singh meet Jenkins on 26th March 1947.

natural that Sikhs would be infuriated when they heard their sufferings at the hands of Muslims.³⁸

Muslim League leaders like Sardar Abdur Rab Nishtar (MLA) and Nawab Siddiq Ali Khan, *Salar-i-Ala* of Muslim League National Guards (MLNGs) visited Amritsar, Multan and Rawalpindi. They urged Punjab Muslim League leaders' to do all they could to bring the disturbances under control.³⁹

Muslim League was eager to help the administration in Punjab as it wanted a way out of the political and constitutional deadlock. But, they did not know how to proceed to bring about stability in the province since it was difficult to pacify the Sikhs who had demanded partition of the province. They refused to live with Muslims after the Rawalpindi massacre. Jenkins held on to his belief that Muslim League was not following the right path by pursuing a communal approach. Jenkins was for the unity of Punjab but Muslim League had nullified his efforts by pursuing policies that he thought to be wrong. Looked at from the non-parochial angle, a united Punjab suited even the Sikh community. "Punjab could prosper only if it retains its present boundaries", said Jenkins.⁴⁰ He thought it better to find a solution acceptable to the majority of Punjabis rather than to adopt a Center plan.

Jenkins advised Muslims, "If the Muslims seriously wanted reconciliation with the Sikhs, they must act as it is necessary to act after a serious personal quarrel. They must go to the Sikhs preferably in the first instance to some one like Sardar Swaran Singh—admit the blame for events in the Rawalpindi Division and ask what they can now do to put things right. Hair splitting about the degree of blame attributable to the different communities would get the Muslims nowhere."⁴¹

Sardar Swaran Singh, Dr. Gokul Chand Narang, Dr. Gopi Chand Bhargava and Lala Bhim Sen Sachar saw Jenkins on 31st March 1947 and discussed with him matters such as the recruitment of non-Muslims in the police cadre which the Muslim police highups

38 *Police Abstracts*, Para 176, 130.

39 *Abstracts*, Para 176.

40 Mansergh (ed.), *Transfer of Power 1942-47*, Vol. X, 45.

41 Mansergh (ed.), *Transfer of Power 1942-47*, Vol. X, 46.

were discouraging. The atrocities and excesses committed against non-Muslims in Rawalpindi and other places of west Punjab were also discussed. The question of paying adequate compensation to the aggrieved was raised which Jenkins approved. The provision of security to non-Muslim grain dealers was also agreed upon in the face of harassment by Muslims. The problems relating to rehabilitation of non-Muslim refugees was also discussed.

Jenkins Concern for the Army

It was a matter of satisfaction for Jenkins that the army had no communal structure that could have greatly complicated things in Punjab and probably the whole country. It meant the Muslims were not thinking in terms of some bigger adventure. He said, "The Army, though it did well while the disturbances were at their height, was now likely to develop a communal outlook". Many Punjabi troops were Muslims belonging to affected districts. Jenkins narrated that the army, like the police, had in his opinion done very well indeed, Muslim officers' commanded non-Muslims and vice-versa. Jenkins was particularly anxious that nothing should be said to cast doubts regarding the impartiality of the army. He said, "...we owed much to the co-operation of the Military commanders and their troops, and it would be disastrous if Punjab forfeited their good-will". There was not a single unit which had a fully Muslim force and Muslim command.⁴² Jenkins, however, complained about Sikh leader Master Tara Singh who instigated riots in Delhi, Cawnpore and Calcutta. He argued that the excessive display of weapons by Sikhs had forced Muslims to demand for arming themselves with swords, though there was prohibition on keeping weapons of any sort. Sardar Swaran Singh protested against politicizing Master Tara Singh and said that Muslims might also be allowed to keep swords. He pointed out that in Rawalpindi division Sikhs were not allowed to carry *kirpans*;

42 *Jenkins Papers*, 1616. Jenkins meeting with Sardar Swaran Singh, Dr. Gokul Chand Narang, Dr. Gopi Chand Bhargava and Lala Bhim San Sachar dated 31st March 1947.

however, a Sikh never used his *kirpan* for any unlawful act.⁴³ However, this assertion by Sardar Swaran Singh is not supported by facts. On the contrary, Bhag Singh was making preparation for the defence of the Sikhs by manufacturing kirpans that were to be supplied to different districts according to their requirements.⁴⁴

According to N.D.T. Sutton, assistant to the DIG (Deputy Inspector General) Police, Punjab, dated 5th of April, 1947, the leading politicians representing the three major communities in the Punjab appear to have come to the conclusion that a civil war was inevitable. No one made the slightest effort to suggest a peaceful approach and the campaign of vilification and preparation for war continued apace. Punjab was taking on the air of an armed camp. This utter dearth of statesmanship and the attendant dangers were gradually stirring the concern of conscientious who realized that the policy of drift could only lead to a bloodbath, and they had pinned their hopes on the talks in Delhi between the viceroy and the representatives of the two major communities.⁴⁵

The Police Abstract of Punjab explained the situation in these words, "Communal incidents real or imagined, continue to be reported without respite, gave rise to immediate panic and heightened mistrust. It was not surprising that a growing number of people of all communities betray an increasing annoyance at the continual jingoism of their political leaders and pin all their hopes of peace on a solution, imposed if necessary, from New Delhi."⁴⁶

Administrative Flaws

Malik Firoz Khan Noon had a meeting with Jenkins and told him about the false cases against Muslims. Jenkins explained to him that it was natural when so many disturbances were taking place in the province. However, Firoz Khan Noon thought that disturbances had subsided, but instigating of false cases against Muslims was

43 *Papers*, 1616. Jenkins meeting with Sardar Swaran Singh, Dr. Gokul Chand Narang, Dr. Gopi Chand Bhargava and Lala Bhim San Sachar dated 31st March 1947, 171-176.

44 *Police Abstract of Intelligence*, 3rd May 1947, Para 319, 234.

45 *Police Abstract of Intelligence*, 3rd May 1947, Para 319, 153.

46 *Police Abstract of Intelligence*, 12th April 1947, 171.

still a disturbing factor. The Muslims were not satisfied with the investigation of Bhag Singh (Advocate). Jenkins thought Bhag Singh was not a communal-minded person, though Bhag Singh was active in manufacturing Kirpan and supplying them according to demand. In fact, he was disliked by both Congress and Muslim League. Firoz Khan Noon insisted that only a British Magistrate should decide cases arising from disturbances. He suggested that petty cases should be dropped. He was critical of police harassment of Muslim population.⁴⁷

Ch. Lahri Singh (Minister for Public Works) met Jenkins as he was anxious about the situation in Gurgaon. He thought retired military officers should be reinstated to keep Gurgaon and Rohtak peaceful. He talked about the political situation in Punjab and its future. He requested him as the Governor of Punjab to bring the three parties to some settlement so that Punjab could remain united—something that Jenkins himself wanted. But it was impracticable because Punjabi leaders were now so communal in outlook that they would not listen to reason.⁴⁸

The general atmosphere was tense and anxiety prevailed among the public. People wanted and wished for the successful outcome of the talks in Delhi between the Viceroy and the political leaders. But, they knew that it was their wishful thinking as the gulf of differences had widened between the provincial political and communal leaders. The influx of refugees and incidents of communal strife which continued to occur in many districts were sufficient to keep Punjab in acute tension.⁴⁹

47 *Police Abstract of Intelligence*, 12th April 1947, 197. Carter, *Punjab Politics*, 266-267. Lionel Carter (ed.), *Punjab Politics 3rd March-31 May 1947 at the Abyss Governors' Fortnightly Reports and Other Key Documents* (New Delhi: Manohar, 2007), 118. Jenkins wrote in his notes of 3rd April 1947 time of meeting.

48 *Police Abstract of Intelligence*, 12th April 1947, 199-200. MF No. 1616. Ch. Lahri Singh came to meet Jenkins at 12.00 noon on 4th April 1947.

49 *Police Abstract of intelligence Punjab*, dated 19th April 1947, Para 253, 189.

A pamphlet signed by a number of Sikh leaders narrated the woes of Sikhs in Muslim majority areas of Rawalpindi, Attock and Jhelum. The pamphlet mentioned that “thousands of innocent Sikhs were murdered in cold blood. Loot and arson in Attock and Jhelum districts, villages upon villages were destroyed and razed to the ground.”

In order to establish Pakistan the atrocities committed against Sikhs in the Punjab since 5th March 1947 have not come to light because of censorship on news. Although the Sikh population was small in the District of Attock, Rawalpindi and Jhelum they owned valuable property in these places. All the Sikhs of these districts except few have been done to death. Their properties were looted, their houses burnt, women outraged and many young girls converted to Islam. Their woeful tale was worth Jenkins patient hearing. But all what was done was according to a pre-arranged plan. At first, the Muslim took Sikhs into their confidence on the pretext of providing them shelter from being attacked. Later, they were forced to part with their money in order to pay to the *goondas* who threatened to attack and loot. Besides spears, swords, guns and bombs were also used. *Lambardars* were the ring-leaders of the *goondas*. Only the lives of those Sikh women were saved who agreed to their conversion to Islam. The others either committed suicide or were burnt alive. The souls of all those innocent women demanded justice. The *goondas* had brought camels and bullocks-cart to take away the booty. About thirty thousands Sikh lives were saved by the military, and all of them were shifted to Relief Camps. Those who owned lacs of rupees were now living a miserable life. There were thousands of Sikhs in Relief Camps-including women and children. They were in need of everything. Thousands of young girls needed clothing.⁵⁰

The details of atrocities committed by Muslims on Non-Muslims in Potohar and N.W.F.P. were given and an appeal for preparation for revenge was issued.

Sd/-

50 *Police Abstract of intelligence Punjab*, dated 19th April 1947, Para 253, 219-221. *Jenkins Paper*, MF No. 1616 and Lionel Carter, *At the Abyss*, 118-122.

1. Tara Singh (Master)
2. Harkishan Singh (Bawa)
3. Bhag Singh (Advocate)
4. Jogindar Singh Mann (M.L.A.)
5. Gurbachan Singh (M.L.A.)
6. Indar Singh (M.L.A.) Cawnpore.
7. Mohan Singh Jathedar Sri Akal Takht Sahib
8. Buta Singh (Sir) (Lyallpur)
9. Udham Singh Nagoke
10. Jagjit Singh Mann (M.L.A.)
11. Pritam Singh Gujran (Pardhan Shrimoni Riasti Akali Dal)
12. Santokh Singh (ex-M.L.A.)
13. Kartar Singh Giani (M.L.A.) (Pardhan, Shrimoni Akali Dal)
14. Baldev Singh (Hon'ble Defence Minister), Delhi
15. Jaswant Singh Duggal (M.L.A.)
16. Ujjal Singh (M.L.A.)
17. Narotam Singh (Advocate) Hissar
18. Hukam Singh (Advocate), Montgomery⁵¹

In this pamphlet, an appeal was made for collection of fifty lakh rupees for fighting Pakistan in which Sikhs thought they had buried their dead. Every house, every mohalla, every village was to contribute one rupee per head. Also in every house one handful of flour was to be set apart for the Guru's fund at the time of kneading flour.⁵²

Jenkins confided to Sir Claude Auchinleck [Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces, India] and Baldev Singh [Defense Minister

51 *Police Abstract of intelligence Punjab*, dated 19th April 1947, Para 253, 222-224.

52 Shahid Hamid, *Disastrous Twilight* (London: Leo Cooper, 1986), 159.

of India] that he was of the opinion that the attack on non-Muslims was predetermined and organized. Muslim League leaders were inciting their followers to violence. No action was taken against them when they had launched civil disobedience movement. Thus, the trouble continued to grow which finally resulted in the resignation of the coalition ministry. Baldev Singh maintained that it was partly the fault of the administration which encouraged such circumstances and then allowed the Muslims to commit violence. He said that the gulf created between the two communities was unbridgeable. He even told Jenkins that he had written directly to His Majesty's Government on the subject.⁵³

In his notes of 9th of April, Jenkins wrote about his talks with His Highness the Raja of Faridkot. He said that in that meeting, they discussed Master Tara Singh and Baldev Singh and their violent propaganda from which it could be inferred that they intended to attack Muslim population in the province. Jenkins believed that during those crucial times, it was necessary that both the fellows should take a moderate line. Retaliation would do no good to any one but could bring untold harm. Jenkins said that no matter what decision Delhi took, Punjab must maintain its peace. The Sikhs screaming for revenge were making it impossible by their bellicose stance. Jenkins asked about the federation of Sikh states. The Raja of Faridkot replied that it was still under consideration as the leading spirit of that project was he himself and ruler of Nabha. The Sikhs would like a federation of states under Patiala, to which the Sikh districts of Punjab could later accede. The Raja agreed with Jenkins that Tara Singh and Baldev Singh were extremely violent. He promised Jenkins that he would try his best to make the Sikh Akalis cool down. He and other Sikh leaders later co-operated with Congress to have their own states amalgamated with India.⁵⁴

Baldev Singh wrote a letter to Jenkins dated 7th April, 1947, in which he narrated that during his visit to Punjab he was overwhelmed by the sufferings of the Sikhs. He blamed the

53 Hamid, *Disastrous Twilight*, 160.

54 Carter, *Punjab Politics*, 269-270. In his notes of 9th April 1947 Jenkins wrote about his talks with His Highness Raja of Faridkot at 3:00 p.m.

irresponsible behaviour of the Muslim League for the atrocities. The coalition government resigned because of Muslim League defiance. It was rumoured that large quantities of arms were being smuggled into the Punjab from the Frontier and Tribal Areas.⁵⁵ The outcome of the disturbances was the manifest desire of the Hindus and Sikhs to increase their representation in the ranks of the Punjab Police.⁵⁶ Baldev Singh thanked Jenkins for recruiting non-Muslims in Punjab Police which was reassuring for the minority community.⁵⁷

Jenkins requested to plead the Sikh case

Giani Kartar Singh wanted Jenkins to plead the Sikh case with Viceroy Mountbatten but Jenkins wanted to know what the Sikhs actually wanted. He (Giani) argued that if the British could settle the cases of Hindus and Muslims, why they couldn't do the same for the Sikhs? Jenkins asked him that if the Muslim League and Congress co-operated in the Constituent Assembly, would the Sikhs support that or would they stay out of that. The Giani replied that the Sikhs were still dissatisfied with the statement of 16th May, 1946. He said the Sikhs would go to the Constituent Assembly if they were given the same right of communal veto as had been granted to the Muslims in the Assembly. Giani Kartar Singh wanted immediate partition but Jenkins pointed out that that would be extremely difficult as then the Hindu Jats would also demand their own "Jat State". Giani said that the Sikhs had no intention of coercing Hindu Jats. The Hindus might have their own state; he would raise no objection. The Sikhs only wanted a non-Muslim state. Such a state would be amalgamated or federated with the Phulkian* states, and would be free to join Hindustan or Pakistan or to remain completely independent and to make a separate treaty with Her Majesty's Government.

Giani Kartar Singh said that the Muslim League had only rhetoric about United Punjab but practically they had done nothing; their whole scheme was based on communalism and Muslim dominance

55 *Jenkins Paper*, MF No.1616, 226-228.

56 *Police Abstract*, 19th April 1947, Para 265, 196.

57 *Jenkins Papers*, MF No.1616, 228.

* Federation of States under Patiala, see p.136.

in Punjab. He appreciated British efforts to improve Punjab in the last century of their rule.⁵⁸

Sikh's efforts to punish Muslims

Jenkins reminded Giani Kartar Singh of Sikhs' intention to oust Muslims from Punjab and referred to the two pamphlets in Gurmukhi in this connection. He also mentioned Sikhs' call to raise a fund of fifty lakh rupees to buy weapons and fight the Muslims. Giani laughed heartily at this and said Sikhs would not attack Muslims as long as the British were ruling.⁵⁹

Giani Kartar Singh again visited Jenkins. Jenkins gave him two letters from the Viceroy; one was for Giani and the other was for Tara Singh. These were probably invitations to the two leaders for a meeting with the Viceroy. Giani pleaded that Sikh cause must be given importance by His Majesty's Government and it would be grossly unjust if the British left without any appropriate provisions for them.⁶⁰

Mian Mumtaz Daultana and Shaukat Hayat Khan called on Jenkins as they had visited Multan while Shaukat had visited Amritsar, Ludhiana and Hoshiarpur. The following main points were taken up for discussion.

Daultana said that at Multan, non-Muslims were the aggressors. Jenkins pointed out that the casualties told a different tale. In the rural areas, Muslims had behaved quite decently. The attacks on Hindu landlords had economic motives. Twelve hundred Muslims had been arrested. Daultana asserted that the arrested persons were innocent. Jenkins refused to agree with Daultana's assessment.

Daultana mentioned reports about women who were molested at Lahore Railway Station. The report he mentioned stated that they were Muslim women who were molested in the belief that they were Sikh. He believed that in those incidents non-Muslim volunteers were involved. Daultana asserted that Muslim League

58 Mansergh, *Transfer of Power*, Vol. X, 185.

59 Mansergh, *Transfer of Power*, Vol. X.

60 *Jenkins Papers*, MF No. 1616, 252-256. Giani Kartar Singh visited Jenkins on 10th April, 1947.

had the impression that the administration was very hostile towards them. They thought press censorship was unfair, inflammatory statements by non-Muslims were allowed though but reactions by Mamdot and other Muslim Leaguers were not published in newspapers. They complained about this communal bias.⁶¹

Jenkins views about Sikhs

The Sikhs were a very important community of Punjab. Their number was not very large. They were about 28 million according to 1941 census. However, they were a compact militant community. Jenkins thought of Punjab having three parts representing the three communal groups bound together in a loose federation. He thought that a total break-up or partition would be harmful for Punjab in the long run.⁶²

Mamdot and Shaukat met Jenkins on 19th of May, 1947. They complained about the general situation in Punjab. They said all their efforts to make peace with Hindus and Sikhs had failed. The Muslim League felt that British officials were against them. In Lahore, firearms were openly used by Sikh students of the Sikh National College. The Sikhs were preparing for a big operation and they were supplied with arms owned by Allen Berry and Co., the firm which provided transport and arms to the Sikh *Gurdawaras*. Jenkins was not satisfied with Shaukat and Mamdot's arguments against the Sikhs. He argued that most of the casualties were caused by the Muslims; Jenkins observed that the Sikhs undoubtedly talked foolishly and truculently. Mamdot told Jenkins that the Muslim League tried to patch-up with the Sikhs but Tara Singh refused to meet any member of the Muslim League. Jenkins then told them about Tara Singh's letter to him (Jenkins) in which he wrote that the League was responsible for the killing of members of his community including women and children. Jenkins, therefore, thought that Tara Singh was justified in refusing to meet the Muslim League leaders. Later, Jenkins had talks with Sardar Swaran Singh about Muslim League's anxiousness for

61 *Papers*, MF No. 1616, 241-245. Mian Mumtaz Daultana and Shaukat Hayat Khan called on Jenkins dated: 11-04-1947.

62 *Papers*, MF No. 1616, 249-251.

reconciliation. Sawaran Singh's reply was that deeds would be more to the point than words.⁶³

Incendiaries at Lahore in May

Bhim Sen Sacher informed Jenkins about the destruction caused by arson in Lahore. Akbari Mandi, Chune Mandi, Chauhatta Basti, Bhagat Singh Basti, Kucha Kagzian and Pipal Vehra had been burnt down. The fire brigade could not cope with those vast and dispersed areas. If someone tried to extinguish the fire he was shot at by the police. Bhim Sen Sacher suggested that the only way to save Lahore was to impose "Martial Law" in the city. He hoped that the Governor would take that step immediately.⁶⁴

Jenkins thanked Lala Bhim Sen Sacher and Gokul for their letters informing him about Lahore. Jenkins explained that fire brigade had done a good job in spite of constraints and difficulties. He believed that all communities had access to incendiary materials and could use it without detection by traversing joined roof-tops. Throwing fire-balls from one house to another was wreaking devastation. Checking trouble of that kind was not an easy job, but searches were carried out and culprits were arrested.⁶⁵

Jenkins Meeting With Tara Singh

Jenkins had a meeting with Master Tara Singh who came to see him. Jenkins inquired from him about his talks at Delhi with Mountbatten. Tara Singh did not answer that question and replied that the only solution of Punjab problem was that Hindus and Sikhs should wipe-off Muslims from their majority areas and similarly Muslims should do vice-versa. That was the only solution of the Punjab problem.

Jenkins then inquired about the Lahore and Amritsar disturbances. Master Tara Singh said that police was actively helping Muslims. When Jenkins further questioned him, he said that he himself saw

63 *Jenkins Papers*, MF No. 1616, 304-306. Mamdot and Shaukat met Jenkins on 19th May 1947.

64 Rukhsana, *Disturbances in Punjab*, 186. Bhim Sen Sacher wrote a letter to Sir Evan Jenkins dated 18th May 1947. Also in *Jenkins Papers*, MF No. 1616, 312.

65 Rukhsana, *Disturbances in Punjab*, 313-314. MF No. 1616.

two boys looting shops in Amritsar and policemen standing by watching them. He mentioned other incidents of atrocities committed by Sikhs against Muslims in Sikh majority areas. The police dared not stop those atrocities. Master Tara Singh was clear about the fact that police was helpless in that mass communal disturbance and politicians were witless in such circumstances.

Jenkins accused Tara Singh of instigating disturbances in Punjab. He told him that he was responsible for creating an atmosphere in which no one trusted the police. Tara Singh agreed and said that he had no confidence in the police and he had advised others as well not to trust the police.

Master Tara Singh requested Jenkins to help the Sikhs in Punjab. Jenkins told him about the boundaries of Sikh areas. Tara Singh was not satisfied with that, both talked about communal issue and believed that there seemed no end to that discussion. Tara Singh was very clear about one thing though—he could not be friendly with the Muslims.

Tara Singh wanted an agreement with Muslims to allow non-Muslims a passage to relocate to areas where they were in a majority. Jenkins told him that it was a gigantic task and it was not that easy to work that out immediately. Tara Singh was skeptical about the Boundary Commission and could foresee chaos in Punjab.

Jenkins did not feel comfortable with Tara Singh's eccentric notions. He wrote:

“Master Tara was quite amiable but incoherent and obstinate as usual. Before he left, I drew attention to the violence in some of his statements and asked him to do his best to keep his community quiet. It is lamentable that at this juncture the affair of the Punjab should be so largely in the hands of this eccentric old man.”⁶⁶

66 Mansergh, *Transfer of Power*, Vol. X, 893-894. Jenkins wrote in his notes dated 19th May, 1947 that Master Tara Singh came to see him that day between 4 to 5 p.m.

Here it can be observed that Jenkins had an air of superiority. He could not appreciate Tara Singh's practical suggestion to relocate populations, which could only be done by the government of the province headed by Jenkins. But Jenkins in full view of the communal mayhem could not make arrangements to smoothly relocate populations to their majority safe-zone areas.

Buta Singh (M.L.A. from Lyallpur) met Jenkins⁶⁷ with his companions Sardar Santokh Singh, Sardar Surjit Singh Majithia, R.B. Labh Chand Mehra, R.B. Prakash Chand Mehra, Lala Keshab Chandra and Mr. G.R. Sethi of Amritsar. The points put forward by Buta Singh were about Amritsar District staff that had failed to win the confidence of the public. The Chowk Prag Das incident on 11th April could have been avoided if the Deputy Commissioner (D.C.) and the Superintendent Police (S.P.) had properly advised their subordinates. Amritsar police was openly siding with Muslim League. A League flag was flown for sometime at the Divisional Head Quarter and the house of a Sikh where there was a police picket burnt down with the Police inside. Jenkins interrupted him and said that he knew about both the cases. In the first, the flag was not hoisted on the Police Station, but on a neighbouring gateway. The officer who had allowed that had been punished. In the second case, an inquiry was held. Jenkins understood that the fire was accidental. Police and troops were not always careful tenants of houses requisitioned for them. No attempts seemed to have been made to make arrests or open investigations in cases of arson. Jenkins referred to his Lahore experience and maintained it was unlikely that the average arson case could be traced at all. However, the visitors blamed the Police for obstructing the fire brigades.

The old practice had been for the Additional District Magistrate (A.D.M.) and the *kotwal* to be of different communities. It was a

67 *Police Abstract of Intelligence Punjab*. Note of Jenkins of interview with Buta Singh and others dated 19th May 1947 advocating Sikhs territorial claims and preaching the necessity for offence against Muslims; training Sikh suicide squads (*Shahidi Jatha*) securing arms and ammunition for anti-Pakistan activities. Youth in villages were taught Gatka (stick or bamboo) fighting. All economic activities with Muslims were boycotted, where Sikh had their influence, 272.

great pity that this practice had been abandoned. There was no safe entrance to Amritsar city. The Hall Bazar which was once considered very safe was now dangerous due to communal violence. One safe gate was required with full security arrangements so people might move without fear of arson.

Sardar Buta Singh was annoyed by the ridiculously small amount of fine imposed on the Daimganj area for the murder of seven non-Muslims only at the rate of Rs.20/- per ration card. The murder was committed within a very short distance of the Police Station, and that had shaken public confidence. Jenkins asked his visitors about partition. Sardar Buta Singh said that if the British Government announced a partition and enforced it, then all would be well taken. However, if they left the matter to the Punjabis, then there would be chaos.⁶⁸

A deputation comprising Lala Dev Raja Sethi, M.L.A., S. Dalip Singh Kang, M.L.A., Mr. Ganesh Dutt and Mr. Kundan Lal Lamba met Jenkins. They were concerned about refugees' safety, who were moving from Muslim majority areas to non-Muslim areas.

Non-Muslims leaving Muslim Majority Areas

There was great apprehension in Jhang, a big town, about the *thanas* (police stations) with their small strength of police force. The non-Muslims had left Jhang in large numbers. The Muslim villagers had armed themselves. The non-Muslims at Meghiana, Shorkot and Chiniot feared and believed that Muslims would massacre them before any help arrived. The Lyallpur story was the same as the Magistrate was a Muslim and the police force was mostly Muslims. Jenkins sympathized with the delegation and told them that he would send a battalion to Lyallpur and Jhang to protect the non-Muslims there.

The delegation then asked him about the partition plan. Jenkins told them that it would broadly be based on population basis. He emphasized that partition would be a national disaster and

68 Carter, *Politics in Punjab*, 284-285.

communities must go to great lengths and make the greatest possible sacrifice in order to hold the province together.⁶⁹

Liaquat Ali Khan met Jenkins; he discussed the general situation of Punjab and told Jenkins that Muslims did not agree with certain particulars in the partition proposal. Jenkins asked him what those particulars were. He replied that the League could not agree to the partition of Bengal or Punjab.

Jenkins responded that in that case the outlook was not promising. The Muslims wanted the whole of Punjab; the Sikhs would yield only two-fifth of it; and the Hindus would follow the Congress leaders. There was a "civil war" atmosphere in Punjab and all communities were fatalistic and hysterical. Liaquat Ali Khan giving his suggestions complained that the Muslims felt aggrieved as they were not the aggressors, but the present administration in the Punjab was bitterly hostile towards them. Only two of the magistrates employed in Lahore city were Muslims. British officers were rough and discourteous in their dealings with Muslims. Jenkins replied that he worked on facts and not on party propaganda. The official figures for deaths caused by the disturbances since March 4th till 20th May 1947 was 3410. Jenkins believed that the correct figure, including Rawalpindi deaths were not yet registered, was around 3600. Jenkins estimated that in those total figures, the number of Muslims was not more than 500. Similarly, the loss of Muslim property was probably 10 to 15 percent. Jenkins emphasized that it was difficult for him to believe that Muslims were not aggressors; even in Lahore's renewed rioting the number of Muslim casualties was less than one-third of total deaths recorded. He said that he had done his best to preserve communal balance in posting Magistrates, and he had no doubt that police did the same in posting police officers. As regards British officers, Jenkins was sure that they were being fair. In fact many of them were greatly shocked by the Rawalpindi massacre.

Liaquat Ali Khan stressed that the administration must deal strictly with Sikhs. They had missed their chance of forming the ministry with Muslim League in the spring of 1946. Jenkins took a different

69 *Jenkins Papers*, MF No. 1616, dated: 22-5-47, 339-340.

view and tried for a mid-way approach and asked Liaquat Ali Khan to understand the Sikh point of view. They might be unreasonable and difficult but then they were really the aggrieved party. The League had never apologized for the Rawalpindi massacre and continuous incidents of arson in Lahore and Amritsar. The Muslims were making reconciliation impossible. Jenkins insisted that if Punjabis wanted to avoid partition than all parties must be prepared to make sacrifices. It was no solution to say that Sikhs were headstrong and unreasonable. This allegation against the Sikhs had some truth three months ago but not after that. He pondered that in ten years time the present dispute would lose its bitterness and probably would look trivial. Then he asked Liaquat Ali Khan how he would solve the problem. Liaquat Ali Khan replied that the right solution was the one that caused the least trouble.

Jenkins told Liaquat Ali Khan that the British too did not want to get involved in a communal civil war. Liaquat Ali Khan retorted that the British could not evade their responsibilities. Jenkins responded by asserting that the Muslim League had hardly anything for the non-Muslims in Pakistan's Punjab and the non Muslims rightly claimed a home in India. Liaquat Ali Khan replied that a "truncated Pakistan was a Congress device for the ultimate suppression of the Muslims and that all India and Punjab partition was not in our agenda".

Jenkins narrated that it was a jejune record of a long and rambling talk. Its main points were: a. The determination of Muslim League to reject partition; b. complacency of the Muslim League about Muslim atrocities. Jenkins tried to bring Liaquat Ali Khan's attention on that aspect of the communal disturbances. c. hostility of the Muslim Leaguers to Hindus and Sikhs. d. dissatisfaction of the Muslim Leaguers with the then administration. e. the advice of HMG that law should be enforced ruthlessly. Also Liaquat Ali Khan was very upset about the communal composition of the army.

After this depressing exchange of views, Liaquat Ali Khan's fears of an impending civil war grew. He told Jenkins that he might meet him [Jenkins] the next day after his visit to Amritsar.⁷⁰

Baldev Singh, the Defence Minister, discussed the Boundary Commission with Jenkins. He said that three political party leaders must be taken into confidence on the Boundary Commission plan. Baldev believed that Jinnah would not co-operate with the partition plan. He had his doubts about the political parties'—Congress, Muslim League and Akalis—views and attitudes towards the Boundary Commission.

Jenkins explained to him about the immediate situation and it seemed to deal only with greater Lahore area where more men were needed i.e. deployment of troops; Jenkins gathered that Baldev Singh did not know the difference between a Brigade and a Division.

Sardar Baldev Singh demanded that those involved in arson incidents i.e. the Muslims, should be heavily fined. Jenkins regretted the administrative steps in Rajgarh and other areas where Muslims admitted their excesses against non-Muslims. Yet Jenkins thought that it was easy to talk about excessive measures than to take them. Jenkins explained the Hitlerian method which could be applied i.e. to take hostages and then shoot them and Jenkins thought he could improve upon his method by shooting, all the members of the high commands. Jenkins did not, however, recommend any action of that kind, which treated the innocent and guilty alike. Jenkins explained that they had few targets in Lahore city and the police seldom had an opportunity to fire effectively. Sardar Baldev Singh appealed for Martial Law. Muslims believed that the Sikhs were collecting weapons and the Sikhs believed the same about Muslims but these rumours were product of fear.⁷¹

70 *Ibid.*, 367-370. *Jenkins Papers*, MF No. 1616, Liaquat Ali Khan met Jenkins, 25 May, 1947. See also Lionel Carter, *Punjab Politics 3 March-31 May 1947*, 213-215.

71 *Ibid.*, 371-375. MF No. 1616. Baldev Singh parley with Jenkins on 26th May, 1947. For details, see Carter (ed.) *Punjab Politics: At the Abyss*, 215-218.

In his day meeting with Jenkins, Liaquat Ali Khan discussed the concerns of the Muslims. He inquired Jenkins that Mr. Harding, Deputy Inspector General (DIG) police was regarded as a *persona non-grata* by the Muslims. Jenkins defended Harding as a very competent police officer. The Amritsar investigating staff had insufficient Muslims, and though Mr. Harding inspired confidence, his assistants did not. Jenkins said the I.G. Police might discuss that point with him. Whenever mass arrests took place, the main targets were Muslims as in the case of an inquiry regarding the stabbing of a Sikh in Amritsar. Muslims and Sikhs were arming themselves for the final round of riots. In Faridkot an official car was being used for distributing arms. Jenkins told Liaquat that all communities were arming themselves. The Muslim League was no different. The latest Order in Amritsar under section 13 of the Punjab Safety Act, 1947 prohibited the carrying even of *lathis* [staves] by people in the rural areas. Muslims considered that discriminatory as the Sikhs were allowed to keep *kirpans*. Jenkins' remarked that it was unwise of Muslims to kill a Sikh at Taran Taran. To Liaquat's suggestion that Muslims should be adequately represented while stationing troops for public safety, Jenkins said that there were a fair number of Muslim troops deployed in Punjab and assured that due care had been taken to have a fair proportion of Muslims in the troops. Jenkins could not convince Liaquat Ali Khan that the Muslim League had made very serious blunders in Punjab from the end of 1942 onwards. Liaquat said that Punjab was viewed as a part of India and it was impossible for the Muslim League to take any other line. Jenkins pointed out that the Muslim League was unable to define what Pakistan would be like. The attitude of the Muslims towards the other Punjabis was condescending as implied in a statement which said the Hindus and Sikhs would receive 'generous' treatment. The Sikhs were particularly sore. Liaquat Ali Khan explained that no condescension was intended. Mr Jinnah had made it clear that in Pakistan all citizens would be equal. Liaquat Ali Khan at this meeting looked worried about future events. He was subdued compared to his stance of the day before. He said that newsmen had asked him whether he would be able to control the situation and he had refused to reply. Jenkins thought that Liaquat was quite

right and he hoped he would make no statement to the press about their talks.⁷²

Iftikhar Hussain Mamdot wrote an urgent letter to Jenkins dated May 30th, 1947, in which he mentioned Jullundur, where a Hindu police officer was openly helping Rashtriya Swayamsewak Sangh (RSS) with men and materials. Even military officers were helping the RSS. The Gurkha (Hindu) force was also in the district and there was no Muslim regiment stationed there.

Mamdot reported that different heads of institutions were active in RSS and they were slaughtering Muslims mercilessly. Mamdot demanded that such communally affiliated officials should be replaced. He told Jenkins about the plight of the Muslim minority in Kangra. Their existence was in danger as the Hindus were being incited to clear the district of the Muslims. Mamdot requested Jenkins to provide security to the Muslims of Kangra. He requested Jenkins to let him know about the arrangements so Muslim League workers could safely escort them to protected Muslim areas.⁷³

Hoshiarpur: The entire officialdom in the district was non-Muslim including the Deputy Commissioner; Superintendent Police; Deputy Superintendent Police; Sessions Judge; principals of schools, colleges and even Revenue Assistants. Non-Muslims were being issued licences to keep firearms to target Muslims.

Ferozapore District: Here too the entire administrative staff including the Deputy Commissioner; Sessions Judge; the Sub Divisional Officer etc comprised Hindus or Sikhs. All non-Muslims had been armed to kill and harass Muslims.

Iftikhar Mamdot called on Jenkins and pointed out that in different divisions of Punjab—Jullundur, Rawalpindi, Lahore, Multan—all administrative posts were occupied by Hindus and Sikhs and they were all hostile towards their Muslim subjects and subordinates.⁷⁴

72 *Ibid.*, 376-380. MF No. 1616. Liaquat Ali Khan met Jenkins at 5.00 p.m. on 26.5.47.

73 Zafar, *Disturbances in Punjab*, 214-215. May 30, 1947.

74 Zafar, *Disturbances in Punjab*, 216-220.

They talked about the political situation in Punjab for about eighty minutes. The main points discussed were:

Incendiaries: Jenkins was worried about incendiaries caused by riots. He compared them to the German blitz on London during the Second World War.

Complaints against Police: They talked about complaints of a communal nature against police. Jenkins thought police had played its role very well during those taxing times and mentioned their long hours of duty.⁷⁵

Transfers: Jenkins thanked Mamdot for his undated letter in which he had asked for largescale transfers of communal minded officials and rearrangement in police department and redeployment of military forces for security purposes. Jenkins said that at that juncture it was impossible to contemplate wholesale transfers in the civil service or restructuring in Police or Military. But he promised that he would do everything possible to maintain peace in the province. Jenkins complained that at present he was receiving very little help from political parties including the League.⁷⁶

Sardar Swaran Singh saw Jenkins that afternoon at his own request. He reiterated the usual communal complaints at great length. The important points discussed in that meeting were as follow:

Jenkins told him that through several sources he had confirmed that the Sikh leadership, including Swaran Singh himself, was exceedingly bellicose. Swaran Singh denied that report but Jenkins told him that he used multiple sources before forming an opinion or making any statement. Swaran Singh then categorically said that the policy of the Sikhs was not to make trouble and to co-operate with authorities wholeheartedly.

Swaran Singh then showed a letter to Jenkins alleging that Muslims wanted to kill Tara Singh. He demanded security for Tara

75 Carter, *At the Abyss*, 288-91. Jenkins notes about a meeting with Nehru dated 30th May 1947 at 11:00.

76 Carter, *At the Abyss*, 298. Letter of Jenkins to Mamdot dated 30th May 1947.

Singh. Jenkins returned him the letter and said that it was rubbish and he should not mention their talk to anyone else.

Swaran Singh talked at length about partition. He asked about other leaders' views about partition. Jenkins told him that he had met a number of leaders and it seemed that Muslims would follow their established lines but in the end it would be more accommodating, though Jenkins doubted they would support any partition plan, even as a temporary measure. Jenkins thought that they all had to wait and see. Though he was against Punjab partition, he wanted everyone, including the Sikhs, to have their share. Swaran Singh expressed the desire that the vacancy resulting from the resignation of Sir Abdur Rahman should go to a Sikh. However, Jenkins did not answer that request and only responded that the Chief Justice had not discussed the matter of resignation with him.

Sikhs had evacuated Gujar Khan and he complained that legal proceedings against rioters were slow. Jenkins told him that the procedure was slow as they were short of jail accommodation. Swaran Singh asked Jenkins if he had told Jawaharlal Nehru that Sikhs had collected 50 lakh rupees in their war fund. Jenkins clarified that he had told Nehru that that was the sum the Sikhs intended ultimately to collect. Swaran Singh then told him that all that the Sikhs could collect was two lakhs and fifty thousand rupees.

Jenkins suggested that the Nihangs (suicidal squad) should not be allowed to carry spears. Swaran Singh said that the Sikhs would co-operate with the administration in that regard and furnish a list about the Nihangs.

The deployment of troops in Lahore was mentioned and it was alleged that he (Jenkins) had told somebody that troops could not be deployed in the walled city. Jenkins said that that was nonsense; what he had said to Nehru and others was that the actual placing of the troops was a matter to be dealt with by the Military Commander, and in fact Sardar Swaran asked for troops to be posted at Baghbanpura.

Sardar Swaran Singh said that something ought to be done to prevent torture at police stations and suggested visits to under trial prisoners by high judicial officers. But Jenkins replied that it was not a good idea.

Swaran Singh left a note of Bakshi Sir Tek Chand with Jenkins regarding the principles of compensation. However, Jenkins doubted whether the principles of 1919 were applicable then, however, he believed that the I.G. Police and Home Secretary might see that note.⁷⁷

Hindus Dominance and 3rd June Plan

In the Central Punjab diehard Hindus celebrated Mr Jinnah's failure for accepting only a truncated Pakistan. They bitterly criticised the Congress for having conceded even that much to the Muslim League.⁷⁸ The Sikh leaders were satisfied after attending meetings immediately preceding the 3rd June plan, in which Hindus had succeeded in cornering the Muslim League to accept a truncated Punjab. Subsequently, Master Tara Singh and Kartar Singh (MLA) paid another visit to Delhi in the second week of June; they were disappointed at the attitude shown by the Congress High Command to the Sikh Plan for a sovereign state. Congress leaders were believed to have told the Sikhs that the idea was wholly impracticable.⁷⁹

Gurgaon Turmoils

Baldev Singh wrote to Jenkins that he had received several requests for military escort for small groups of Hindus evacuated from Muslim areas in Gurgaon where the inhabitants were predominantly members of the opposite community. The situation in Gurgaon was still very serious and they had to be evacuated. That was normally done through the Deputy Commissioner, but he was not helpful in that respect.⁸⁰ Jenkins replied to Baldev Singh

77 Carter, *At the Abyss*, 299-300. Note of Jenkins of his interview with Swaran Singh dated 31st May 1947.

78 *Police Abstract*, Para 430, 327.

79 *Police Abstract*, Para, 431, 327.

80 Carter, *Punjab Politics*, Vol. V, 237-238. Baldev Singh wrote a letter to Jenkins on 7th June 1947.

that he was pleased to know that more troops were involved to quell the rioters in Gurgaon. Jenkins clarified the position of the Deputy Commissioner who Jenkins believed had done very well considering his limited resources. Jenkins clarified that district officers were over cautious with relief workers because they were involved in distribution of arms and ammunition from the stores to the rioters. In that respect Jenkins gave the example of Lahore and two incidences occurring at Gurgaon. Jenkins believed that genuine demands of the relief workers would be definitely entertained by the Deputy Commissioner. However, Jenkins warned that evacuation took place only when people of that area requested for that.⁸¹

Mamdot's Astonishment on Sachdev's Appointment as Partition Commissioner

In a letter to Jenkins, Mamdot expressed his surprise after having read in the newspaper that Mr. Sachdev had been appointed as Partition Commissioner at the Partition Office and an expert committee had been charged to deal with partition matters in Punjab. He thought it was "most astounding" that such an arrangement had already been made without prior consultation and approval of the 'Leaders of the Parties' and added that Muslim League could not approve it. He urged the early setting up of a supervisory Partition Committee and stressed the importance he attached to adequate representation of Muslim interests in the 'Partition and expert committee'.⁸²

Mamdot wrote to Jenkins that he was afraid he could not agree with his viewpoint on the proposals thus formulated, that the communal complexion of the official machinery which was to prepare the necessary data for the Partition Committee was of no importance or consequence. Punjab or in fact the whole of India, was to be partitioned between Muslims and non-Muslims on the basis of religion forming the main basis of the plan at that stage. It seemed to him, therefore, of utmost importance that the

81 Carter, *Punjab Politics*, Vol. V, 238. Jenkins reply to Baldev Singh dated 12.6.47 for his letter of 7th June.

82 Mansergh, *Transfer of Power*, Vol. XI, 269. *Mountbatten Papers*, a letter of 8th June, 1947 the Khan of Mamdot expressed his surprise.

composition of the bodies of official experts, who were not merely to present but to prepare necessary facts and figures for the Partition Committee, should be representative and satisfactory from the point of view of both the parties. There need to be, he thought, no difficulty in securing that, if the personnel were chosen in consultation with the parties concerned.⁸³

Communal Groups Concerns for Partition

A meeting was held at the Governor House, Lahore on June 10, 1947. The following persons were present in the meeting on Punjab Partition Preliminaries: Governor Jenkins, Khan Iftikhar Husain Khan of Mamdot, Lala Bhim Sen Sachar and Sardar Swaran Singh. The governor opened the meeting with a brief explanation of problems relating to partition at the centre and at Punjab provincial level. He said that the centre would be concerned with the determination of two new dominions. In Punjab, the government thought that it would resemble a large business negotiation. The powerful administration first of all must decide the future division of Punjab. This powerful administration must be the controlling body. This controlling body must consist of leaders of the three parties i.e. Congress, Muslim League and Panthic Party. It must be autonomous, with full authority to take decisions. The governor described it as "Partition Committee". Lala Bhim Sen Sacher asked what would be done in the event of deadlock in the Partition committee. The governor replied that deadlock would be decided by arbitration committee.⁸⁴

The Nawab of Mamdot, Sardar Swaran Singh and Lala Bhim Sen Sachar mentioned the meeting held on the 16th of June at the Governor House, Lahore and the points discussed on which they had reached an agreement, that the Partition Committee, besides the Governor, would consist of four members, two nominees of Muslim League, one of the Congress and other one of the Panthic Party. The parties would have full liberty with regard to the choice

83 Mansergh, *Transfer of Power*, 269-270. Nawab of Mamdot wrote to Jenkins on 10th June 1947.

84 Kirpal Singh (ed.), *Select Documents on Partition of Punjab 1947* (Delhi: National Bookshop, 1991), 109-110. Monday 10:00 a.m, the 16th June 1947.

of their nominees whether from within or outside of Punjab. The Governor would preside over the meeting. They would not be decided by votes; and in case of disagreement, parties would set up agreed machinery for the settlement of disputes. It was agreed that a Steering Committee would consist of Mr. M.R.Sachdev and Syed Yaqub Shah of Finance Department of Government of India. It was consented that there was no need to add a third member to that committee. It was agreed that as soon as the Steering Committee assembled, it should form the nucleus of the Partition Committee Secretariat in addition to steering the Expert Committee. It was also agreed that when members of the Steering Committee would assume office, the office of the Partition Commissioner could be declared superfluous. It was agreed that part time official advisers to the members of the Partition Committee could be attached to the Steering Committee.⁸⁵

Jenkins had discussion with Lala Bhim Sen Sachar (MLA) and Swaran Singh (MLA): They spoke about the law and order situation. They were particularly against Magistrate A.G. Cheema because he had used the police against Hindus and he had used abusive language while talking with Hindu women. Jenkins clarified that he had documentary proof that Mr. Cheema was a competent Magistrate and what had been said about him in High Court was untrue; he had not used foul language with Hindu women. Some other policemen might have used harsh words but not the concerned officer, it was all concocted. In fact each community was blaming the opposite community.⁸⁶

Malik Firoz Khan Noon met Jenkins and talked to him about the future of Punjab; he desired to have Jullundur Division within Punjab. Jenkins said that, that could only be done by the Boundary Commission. The H.M.G contemplated a division based on district majority and that could not be modified. Jenkins noted that

85 Mansergh, *Transfer of Power*, XI, 454-455. 17th June 1947 letter, 233.

86 Carter, *Punjab Politics*, Vol. V, 239-240. On 19th June 1947 Jenkins wrote a note of his interview with Lala Bhim Sen Sachar and Swaran Singh.

changes that Firoz Khan Noon desired were so large that they could not be achieved.

Malik Firoz Khan Noon handed him a petition from Khushab people about their collective fine. He requested that Muslims detained at Yol and elsewhere be freed. Jenkins thought that he was pretending about not knowing what had happened at Kulu. According to Jenkins, Firoz Khan Noon talked about Mamdot, Daultana and Shaukat in slighting terms. Among other things he mentioned to Jenkins that Quaid-i-Azam wanted to retain British officers in the service of Pakistan. He considered them to be preferable to Hindus. At the same time he agreed with Jenkins that it would be difficult to run a province with a considerable non-Muslim minority without a fair number of non-Muslim officials. Firoz Khan Noon questioned Jenkins what he thought of Muslim I.C.S. officers and he replied that they might suffice to run a province, if substantially reinforced from the P.C.S. but in his opinion, it would be difficult to staff the Pakistan Secretariat.⁸⁷

Iftikhar Hussain Mamdot wrote a letter on June 21, 1947 to Jenkins acknowledging the receipt of an invitation for All Parties' Leaders meeting. Mamdot assured Jenkins that he and his party had always been eager to restore peace and tranquility in the province, but their efforts failed because of intransigence of other parties. Mamdot requested Jenkins for permission to have free and open discussion with him along with his colleagues before calling the All Parties Leaders meeting. He reminded Jenkins of their last discussion on Gurgaon where the disturbances were the worst in the whole province. He demanded that the meeting should focus its discussion on that to avert a repetition.⁸⁸

As on June 21 1947, Jenkins met Mamdot and his friends Daultana and Shaukat Hayat, they went over the old Muslim League grievances and mentioned in particular the problem of refugees in Gurgaon and Amritsar; the food problem in Amritsar; the alleged misconduct of certain Sub-Inspectors of Police after the Sabzi

87 Carter, *Punjab Politics*, 240. Note of Jenkins interview with Firoz Khan Noon, dated 20th June 1947.

88 Carter, *Punjab Politics*, 241. Mamdot's Letter to Jenkins dated 21st June 1947.

Mandi incident that morning, the refusal of a curfew pass to Amir-ud-Din, the Mayor of Lahore; the need for exemption in respect of carrying arms by party leaders; and the harshness and unpopularity of Mr. Taylor, the D.C. of Campbellpur (Attock).

Jenkins said that he would look into the situation in Gurgaon. He made a separate note about Amritsar refugees. Jenkins dismissed the complaint about curfew passes and carrying of arms by the party leaders. However, they might be provided with police escort, but Mamdot thought that would be beneath the dignity of a leader. Jenkins told his visitors that he thought Mr. Taylor had done his best in a difficult situation. Then they discussed the arson and killings and Jenkins made it clear that it was difficult to apprehend the culprits. He had urged the party leaders earlier as well to take effective preventive measures, since he believed that only public opinion could stop the disturbances. He then urged them to do so again in their own interest.⁸⁹

No Trust Move against Governor Punjab

On June 21st 1947, the Punjab Muslim League Assembly Party passed a resolution expressing lack of confidence in Sir Evan Jenkins in view of his 'partisan attitude' and requesting the Governor-General to withdraw Jenkins, because "during these decisive days which will affect the destiny of our people for many generations to come "a non-partisan man is needed on this important post. They need an impartial man at the helm of affairs". The meeting appointed a sub-committee consisting of Malik Firoz Khan Noon, Mian Mumtaz Daultana and Maulana Daud Ghaznavi to visit Mr. Jinnah and acquaint him with the feelings of Punjabi Muslims towards the Governor.⁹⁰

Jenkins advice to the two new Punjab Premiers

Jenkins, in the meanwhile, was concerned about the arson and killings in Amritsar and Lahore. He believed action by the police or the army alone could not bring peace. The real remedy was to

89 Carter, *Punjab Politics*. Note of Jenkins interview with Mamdot, Daultana and Shaukat Hayat Khan dated 21st June, 1947.

90 *The Statesman* (Col. 3), 22nd June 1947, 9. Mansergh, *Transfer of Power*, Vol. XI, 569.

bring about a change in public opinion. He believed that only political parties could bring about that change. Jenkins paid no attention to press statements issued by politicians. He insisted that politicians must meet disgruntled and disorderly elements among their supporters. He warned the two would be premiers of the about to be created new provinces that if they did not heed his advice they would find themselves in a very difficult situation as the formation of the new provinces was around the corner.

The three leaders (Mamdot, Sardar Swaran Singh and Lala Bhim Sen Sachar) agreed with Jenkins' suggestions and they consented to hold meetings within their own parties and deliberated on the strategy they should adopt. They desired that British officers should be relieved of their duties and replaced by selected Indian officers. Jenkins narrated that the meeting was held in a cordial atmosphere but there was not yet very cordial cooperation between the parties.⁹¹

After the meeting with the party leaders, Jenkins met Lala Bhim Sen Sachar and Sardar Swaran Singh that afternoon. They stayed with Jenkins for some time. Lala Bhim Sen Sachar and Sardar Swaran Singh spoke about the alleged misconduct of Mr. A. G. Cheema and the law and order situation in the city. Jenkins accused the political parties for corrupting the services for their own ends. In the past people wanted officials to be fair and the task of the District Officer, particularly of the British officer, was comparatively easy. Now no one wanted fairness and district officers who tried to be impartial were criticized. Sardar Swaran Singh, who was a fair-minded person, said that there was a good deal of truth in that statement. As regards Mr. Cheema, Jenkins told his audience that certain reports and enquiries about him were in progress.⁹²

91 Mansergh, *Transfer of Power*, Vol. XI, 567-569.

92 Carter, *Punjab Politics*, Vol. V, 244-245. Note by Jenkins of separate talks with Sachar and Swaran Singh dated 23rd June 1947.

Khan Iftikhar Hussain Khan of Mamdot and Sheikh Sadiq Hassan met Jenkins on 30th June 1947

Mamdot was critical of the search operation at Misri Shah and demanded for the release of all detainees. He thought it was targeted against Muslims. Jenkins clarified that detainees would not be released in haste and the search was not against Muslims. Nawab Sadiq Hassan was concerned with the distribution of wheat in Amritsar. He insisted that government had not formulated any clear policy for wheat distribution by Muslim League. Jenkins clarified that Government had allowed distribution and had stipulated that the unemployed persons and refugees must be gathered in a camp. Jenkins spoke to Nilkanthrai Mohanlal Buch about that on the telephone. Sadiq Hassan complained that Muslims of Amritsar were displeased with Jenkins because he had declined to meet a deputation of the Muslims from there. The entire business of Amritsar was in the hands of non-Muslims.

Meanwhile, peace efforts in Amritsar failed because the Sikhs refused to co-operate. Muslim Leaguers insisted that search operations would nullify the peace efforts between the communities. Mamdot suggested that in order to speed up disposal of cases, the communal ones should be referred to non-official committees representing all the three communities who should decide which case should be dropped and which case should be pursued. Jenkins made no comment on that, as he preferred to discuss that with the I.G. Police.

Moreover, Mamdot pointed out that non-Muslims were hatching conspiracies and arms were being brought freely from NWFP. Mamdot emphasized that Muslim League attached great importance to the protection of the canal headworks. Jenkins replied that he was aware of that. He drew Jenkins' attention to the transfer of valuable instruments from the I.B. Laboratories to Nangal. Jenkins said that, that would make no difference since any instruments that belonged to the laboratories would be common property and would be handled by the Partition Committee. Jenkins, however, mentioned that he would refer that to the concerned Chief Engineer.

Mamdot stressed that two Muslims should be included in the security committee. Jenkins replied that the Committee did not work through voting. However, personally he had no objection to add a Muslim, but the point might be discussed in the Committee next day.⁹³

Jenkins' minutes dated 30th June 1947

Mamdot told Jenkins on June 30, 1947 in a meeting that day that a couple of days back, a meeting of Hindus and Sikhs was held at the Saraswati Insurance Company. It was stated at the meeting: (i) that the present peace effort was only a limited cease-fire; and (ii) that every effort be made to replace the arms and explosives lost in the Shah Almi Gate, Lahore fire. Ten persons—six Jats and four Sikhs were sent to NWFP with Rs. 2 lakhs to buy arms. This information was passed on to concerned authorities.⁹⁴

Mamdot and Jenkins' Peace Concerns

Mamdot wrote to Jenkins on 2nd July that he had come to an agreement with Indian leaders to maintain peace in the province. They had worked on those lines and there was considerable betterment in the peace situation of the province; they had gone around and told people to respect their pledges with the governor and maintain peace in their areas. Mamdot was shocked that after doing all that, curfew was declared in Misri Shah, a Muslim *abadi*, where no communal riots had occurred. Mamdot said that large army and detachment of police had been stationed there to search the locality. Mamdot argued that during recent riots in Lahore the provocation always came from non-Muslims. It had been Hindus/Sikhs who took the initiative to start the trouble.

Mamdot was critical of the British targeting Muslim *abadis* and *mohallas*, putting them under curfew without water and food supplies and giving free hand to non-Muslims to store hand grenades and fire-arms. Muslims, nevertheless, were co-operating with the governor and maintaining peace in Punjab. Mamdot

93 Carter, *Politics of Punjab*, Vol. V, 245-246.

94 Carter, *Politics of Punjab*, Vol. V, 247. Note by Jenkins of separate talks with Sachar and Swaran Singh dated 23rd June, 1947. Also see Mansergh, *Transfer of Power*, Vol. XI, 822-824.

maintained that such policies of administration were belittling leaders in the eyes of their followers. He said no search had so far been carried out in the *mohallas* and *abadies* of the aggressors, who were well-equipped with explosives, hand-grenades and fire-arms. They were also not interrogated by the special staff.

Mamdot warned Jenkins that if British policies did not become sympathetic towards the Muslims, he would spurn the hand of co-operation. Mamdot insisted that if parity was to be maintained it would be advisable to have two Muslim as members in Security Council instead of only one. He said that all repressive measures against Muslims must cease. In case if any such measures were to be taken, they should be taken only after consultation with the Security Council. There should be a complete parity of Muslim and non-Muslim members officers. Mamdot was told by an informer that Special Staff has been brought into existence under the immediate supervision of the D.I.G. (CID), in the Lahore mental hospital. The Special Staff consisted of non-Muslims, were preponderous, they tortured, tormented and used cruelest methods to extort false statements from the Muslims who were arrested and taken there.⁹⁵

In a letter to Jenkins, Mamdot wrote that he should tell the public why he (Mamdot) had left the Security Council, and also to release to the press the correspondence that took place between them.⁹⁶ Jenkins replied that he disapproved of Mamdot's intention to publish what he wrote to him (Jenkins) on the 2nd of July.⁹⁷

Dr. Gopi Chand Bhargava, a member of Legislative Assembly, talked to Jenkins about the Partition Committee meeting that discussed the refugee problem in Rawalpindi. He discussed with Jenkins about refugees residing at Wah and what would be their fate after August 15th. Jenkins told him that those issues had to be dealt politically and not administratively.

95 *Jenkins Paper*, MF No. 1616, 405-407.

96 Carter, *Punjab Politics*, Vol. V, 247. Mamdot letter to Jenkins, dated 5th July 1947.

97 Carter, *Punjab Politics*, Vol. V, 248.

At this point Jenkins seems to be shirking his responsibilities since partition was inevitable and he should have arranged for the secure transfer of population from one part of Punjab to the other. In a way one can conclude that Jenkins was also responsible for the massacre of Punjabis. Jenkins thought that the way out for him as governor was to let the two Punjab governments sort out the issues mutually. Interestingly, the two Chief Ministers of Punjab were non-existent at the time as power was transferred after 14th August 1947.⁹⁸

Jenkins and Jathedar Mohan Singh and Sardar Harnam Singh

Jenkins wrote that the above mentioned two leaders came to meet him on 11th July 1947. They wanted to know about the arrangements after 15th August. Jathedar Mohan Singh of the Sikh community claimed that Jenkins was solely responsible for the future of Sikhs and that he must help them out. Jenkins made it clear to the Sikhs that he was not in a position to get justice to the Sikhs; it was up to the Boundary Commission which was appointed by the Governor General. It was ultimately up to the Governor General to decide. The Jathedar mentioned the same solution that Giani Kartar Singh had talked about transfer of population to avoid bloodshed. Strong distrust of the Congress was apparent throughout his statement. When Jenkins indicated that the Sikhs would secure Premiership or Governorship, the Jathedar said that concessions of that kind had no value and he was sure that Hindus would see to that, that Sikh influence from such high posts was gradually eliminated.⁹⁹

He wrote that Jathedar Mohan Singh and Sardar Harnam Singh had specifically spoken about three matters that were closely connected to the partition. One concerning payment for a Jagir or *Muafi* attached to Kot Bhai Than Singh in Attock district that successive Deputy Commissioners had recommended for its resumption. The case was pending when the Coalition Ministry resigned. Jathedar Mohan Singh and Sardar Harman Singh wanted the case to be decided by 15th August. Jenkins advised they must wait for the

98 Carter, *Punjab Politics*, Vol. V, 248. Jenkins notes on his talks with Dr. Gopi Chand Bhargava.

99 Mansergh, *Transfer of Power*, Vol. XII, 11th July 1947, 103.

formation of the new Government of West Punjab, but they could raise the matter in the Partition Committee or when a meeting was convened between the party leaders. The other matter concerned the future of the refugees at Wah Camp who needed to be transferred safely to East Punjab. Here again Jenkins thought that the decision must be made by the Partition Committee or by the party leaders. The third issue related to the protection of Gurdawaras in Rawalpindi, particularly Panja Sahib, Choa Sahib, Rohtas and Narali Sahib. Jenkins said he could not take the responsibility after 15th August which would pass to the new government in another sovereign country.

Jenkins thought that he had cleared his position to Jathedar Mohan Singh and Sardar Harman Singh regarding the responsibility of all matters passing on to the new governments, when Jenkins and other British officers would be out of it.¹⁰⁰

On July 12, 1947 Gopi Chand Bhargava in his meeting with the Governor discussed the situation in Gujranwala which was bad despite speeches of the party leaders. The demonstrators or public at large did not care about the orders of the Deputy Commissioner or the Superintendent of Police. He referred to the outrage at the Railway workshop on 10th July and said that non-Muslims should stop working. To normalize the situation, he suggested that resort to indiscriminate arrests should be avoided. Railway trains carrying refugees should be guarded particularly those leaving Gujranwala, Lahore and Amritsar.

Bhargava was also worried about the administration of Eastern Punjab. Jenkins advised him to discuss that with the new government. Jenkins was aware that the next few weeks would be very difficult and he wanted that order be maintained so the new governments might have the best possible start.¹⁰¹

100 Carter, *Punjab Politics*, 250-251.

101 Carter, *Punjab Politics*, 251-252. 12th July 1947, narrating Gopi Chand Bhargava's apprehensions.

Sikh plans to hold massive rally (Diwan) at Nankana Sahib on 27th July

Sikh leadership announced plans to hold a massive rally on 27th July at Nankana Sahib through a poster that carried the names of 22 MLAs and other Sikh leaders including Master Tara Singh and Giani Kartar Singh; but it was not certain who the actual organizers were. Although public meetings were prohibited throughout the Sheikhpura district, and that meeting could not be called a religious gathering to be exempted. It was indeed a political meeting that was being held to impress the Boundary Commission and the general public with the enthusiasm of the Sikhs for their boundary claims. The poster was widely distributed among villagers with request to come in *Jathas*. The leaders hoped to be arrested; if no arrests were made they would announce a further programme of their meetings.

To stop the gathering, government deputed the Commander, Lahore Area, to Sheikhpura district with a force consisting of a brigade and one Squadron of 18th Cavalry and the 3rd Baluch Regiment. That force was to be under the command of 23rd Brigade and would be in addition to the Gurkha Company then stationed at Nankana Sahib/Sheikhpura. It had to be in position by the morning of 25th July. The Inspector General of Police had ordered the following restrictions:

- a) Stop bookings by rail to Nankana Sahib and adjacent stations;
- b) Control posts on main roads giving access to Nankana Sahib;
- c) Control posts at convenient places on the railway lines; and
- d) Patrol villages to discourage attendance.

The Lahore Area Commander had intimated to Jenkins personally that troops would assist in these arrangements as per requirement, e.g. there were troops available at Lyallpur as well.¹⁰²

102 Mansergh, *Transfer of Power*, Vol. XII, 309-310, dated 23rd July 1947.

In a telegram, Jenkins informed Mountbatten that “this meeting had been advertised” and outlined the measures he proposed to take to prevent it. He added that an actual organizer is almost certainly Giani Kartar Singh and explained that Sardar Swaran Singh been informed that the meeting was illegal and it would be dealt with unless stopped.¹⁰³

Record of interview between Jenkins and Sardar Swaran Singh

Jenkins arranged a meeting on 25th July 1947 with Sardar Swaran Singh (MLA) that evening and questioned him about Nankana Sahib Diwan on 27th July. The Sardar was clearly evasive, and said that it was not an officially sanctioned meeting. He did not believe that it would command a very large attendance. Jenkins warned him of communal clashes, if Muslims saw Sikh Jathas moving to and fro in their villages, it was certain they would clash. Jenkins cautioned Swaran Singh to call off that meeting and ask other leaders to avoid clashes with Muslims. He clarified to Swaran Singh that the Sikhs could not back out of Sardar Baldev Singh’s statement, as a member of Partition Council, that the Boundary Commission’s award would be accepted, whatever it might be and would be enforced.

They both had discussion on the boundary issue. Sardar Swaran Singh was anxious to have whole or part of Montgomery (now Sahiwal) district and Nankana Sahib. Jenkins explained that there would not be much deviation from the “notional” boundary. He said if the Sikhs had made no extravagant claims and had simply stated their case for the transfer to the East of some colony land, they might possibly have secured some sympathy from the Boundary Commission; as it was, Jenkins thought they must dismiss from their minds any idea of large territorial gains. He made it clear that the Boundary Commission had nothing

103 Mansergh, *Transfer of Power*, Vol. XII, tel.189—G of 23rd July Sir Evan Jenkins informed Lord Mountbatten. *Mountbatten Papers* official correspondence Files: Punjab situation in, Part II (b).

whatsoever to do with him, and it was not his business to advise the members to make any recommendations.¹⁰⁴

Gopi Chand Bhargava wrote to Jenkins on 26th July 1947 that the situation in Lahore required military pickets to be posted at strategic points and that military should patrol the bazaars and areas where stabbing had taken place. He knew there were nine stabbing cases in Amritsar and three in Lahore. It was rumored a bomb was thrown on a mosque and five shops were set on fire in Bazar Hatta, Lahore.

Bhargava reminded Jenkins that when he last met him [Jenkins], he had told him that military pickets would be installed and troops would patrol the whole area. It was also said that this would begin to function from August 1st 1947. But as so far no pickets had been placed he requested to expedite the arrangement.¹⁰⁵

Conclusion

From the above discussion about Jenkins' interaction with the leaders of the three communities, it can be easily gathered that the governor was aware of the intensity of the communal conflict but he did not have either the will or the power to resolve it. At times, his own partiality towards the Sikhs seems quite evident. Though he exhorted Indian leaders to act with sagacity and not to fan communal tension but it was futile exercise since the atmosphere that was brewing before and after the elections (1945-46) was all based on communal identities. It had gained momentum after the Second World War when it became obvious that the British would leave India. From the day the British announced their programme of leaving India, political movements started moving with torrential speed. Jenkins was unable to check leaders who started communal agitation on 3rd March 1947, when Tara Singh openly announced that they would exterminate Muslims from Punjab. Jenkins administrative machinery took no action against instigative utterances of Sikh leaders on the pretext that it would aggravate the

104 Mansergh, *Transfer of Power*, Vol. XII, Vol. XII, 354. Record of interview between Sir Evan Jenkins and Sardar Swaran Singh dated 25th July 1947, 354.

105 Carter, *Punjab Politics*, Vol. V, 254-255.

volatile situation in Punjab. It can also be deduced from this study that the transitory period was tough on all communities; the sudden disappearance of mutual trust had unleashed unimaginable evil; everyone was eager to grab, not realizing what they were losing. The implication of that greed to occupy property after ousting the other communal group underscored the blindness of the crude, uncivilized process. On top of that, the administrative failure to check arson and murder created such misgivings between the Hindu and Muslim communities that the two countries still suffer from distrust though more than 64 years have passed. Lastly, it is hard to explain why Jenkins, who was so opposed to partition of Punjab, could not put his weight behind the Muslim demand for keeping Punjab united.

Chapter V

Revealing the Borderline Areas Consisting of Punjab 1947

The people of India had struggled for a long time for freedom from the alien rule of the British. At the close of World War II, Britain was ultimately obliged to leave India. The British had their stakes in leaving a united country behind them. On 20th February 1947, the British announced its intention to transfer power to Indian hands by June 1948. By an overwhelming majority, 337 against 185, the House of Commons voted for the end of British rule in India.¹ In his speech of 6th March 1947, Winston Churchill lambasted Attlee's Labour government for fixing a date for the final withdrawal; this powerful speech is still quoted by historians regarding India's independence, however, it could not change history.

India was not a homogenous country that they could hand over power to its natives and walk away. It was a land of diverse communities. Hindus were in a dominant majority; Muslims constituted the largest single minority—a nation in its own right—apprehensive of Hindu dominance in any future democratic dispensation. They demanded that before the British leave, the subcontinent should be divided into two sovereign states—Pakistan and India—the former to be formed in the region where Muslims were in a majority and the later in areas where they were in greater number.

Hindus, however, bitterly opposed the division of India. They wanted it to remain a unified country after the British withdrawal. Mahatma Gandhi, their venerated leader and patron of Indian National Congress, regarded partition as the dissection of “*gao mata*” (mother-cow) whom the Hindus considered as holy as a goddess.

Muslims stood firm in their demand for a separate homeland defying all forces of opposition. Eventually, the Indian National Congress and the British Government were obliged to accept the demand for Pakistan. It shattered the Hindus' dream of *Akhand*

1 H. D. Sharma (Compiled and Ed.), *100 Significant Pre-Independence Speeches* (New Delhi: Rupa & Co., 2007), 379.

Bharat (United India) and hurt their pride and prestige. They accepted it willy-nilly, convinced that Pakistan was not a viable entity. It was a tactical move in their grand plan to achieve the ultimate goal—*Akhand Bharat*.²

According to Lucy Chester, the British seized the opportunity to withdraw from their onerous Indian responsibility as quickly as possible; the Indian Congress headed by Jawaharlal Nehru and Sardar Patel, took control of India. Muhammad Ali Jinnah won Pakistan, led the Muslim League, which claimed to represent Indian Muslims. Although the British had decided to leave India in 1946, transferring the power to individual provinces as they withdrew. They subsequently thought that their approach was not workable as the entity or entities that would come in power needed to be defined with their geo-political boundaries. Lord Radcliffe who was given the job to draw the boundary did not follow the usual pattern of delineating boundaries and under political pressures deviated from normal practice of using natural boundaries as formed by the courses of rivers. In the province of Punjab, the population of Hindus, Muslims and Sikhs was not in separate blocks and no neat line could be drawn to divide the three communities.³

Mountbatten regretted the partition of provinces as much as he regretted the partition of India. However, he observed that the minority communal group was not ready to accept majority rule of the Hindus.

Mountbatten reiterated, “It has always been the desire of His Majesty’s Government that power should be transferred in accordance with the wishes of the Indian people. The task would have been greatly facilitated if there had been an agreement among the political parties. In the absence of such an agreement, the task of devising a method by which the wishes of the Indian people could be ascertained devolved upon His Majesty’s Government.

2 H. D. Sharma (Compiled and Ed.), 54-55.

3 Lucy Chester, *The 1947 Partition: Drawing the Indo-Pakistani Boundary*, (article) www.une.edu/depts/diplomat/archives_roll/2002_01-03/chester_pa.../chester_partition.htm. 2. Also see, Lucy Chester, *Borders and Conflicts*, Chapters 4 and 6.

After full consultation with political leaders in India, His Majesty's Government decided to adopt for that purpose the set out plan. His Majesty's Government made it clear that they had no intention of attempting to frame any ultimate constitution for India; that was a matter for the Indians themselves nor was there anything in that plan to preclude negotiations between communities for a united India."⁴

The division of provinces of Punjab and Bengal was not part of the original partition plan of India. The questions why were two provinces where Muslims had over-all majority partitioned? The rest of the Indian provinces where the Muslim populations were sizable were allowed to remain intact as in the case of Hyderabad Deccan and Kashmir, as addressed in this chapter.

Punjab governor Sir Evan Jenkins knew that the division of the province was unavoidable. He had been talking of the unity of Punjab for the sake of Punjab. However, ground realities were such that each community was trying to snatch whatever the other community owned. The only desire of Jenkins in the last days was that Muslims and non-Muslims should come to terms with each other, and the British should leave them to mend their own fences. Unfortunately, the leadership of the two sides did not grasp the magnitude of the vacuum that would be created in the transition from British to native rule. The casualties were in the form of human lives, destruction of property, loot, arson, killing and other untold human tragedies. One of the main reasons of the mayhem was the non-declared boundaries between the two countries, especially in Punjab. This factor as was overlooked by the leadership of the two countries showed their lack of sagacity that they accepted independence without exactly knowing the boundaries of their respective countries. The term "Notional Boundaries" that was used at the time of independence made no sense when independence of two states was to be declared. The people of the divided province of Punjab suffered, as they were not

4 Kirpal Singh, *Select Documents on Partition of Punjab 1947* (New Delhi: National Bookshop, 1991), 93-95.

aware of where the divide laid.⁵ Jenkins was demanding the map of Punjab borders to make administrative arrangements by anticipating the areas where trouble could arise. According to his papers [Jenkins] dated 27th November 1967, on the query of Professor Aloys A. Mitchel of USA, who was writing a book on India partition Jenkins replied him in a letter, telling him that he had a rough draft of Punjab's border delineating by late July or early August. Abbot [Jenkins' Private Secretary] was sure that the map was in the form of a sketch, sent by Abell by hand with an aircraft's pilot on communication duty.⁶ Francis Mudie, the Governor-designate for Punjab came to stay with Jenkins in August 7th 1947 and he discussed the map with him on his arrival. Jenkins recalled that the map was in his hand when Trividi, the Governor-designate for East Punjab, came to see him at the Governor's House in Lahore on 5th/6th of August. Jenkins mentioned that he did make a telephone call to Abell on 8th of August about the map. Jenkins recalled that he remembered no difference between the sketch map and the line finally drawn, except for the Ferozpur District allotted in the sketch map to Pakistan. However, he wrote that Abbott was certain that there was a salient that included Ferozpur Tehsil (with the headworks) and he believed that it included Zira also.⁷ Abbot differed from Jenkins in this respect; he believed that some Cis-Ravi parts of Gurdaspur were shown in the sketch map as allotted to Pakistan, though he did not remember the details. Jenkins thought that on this last point Abbot was mistaken.

Very shortly before the transfer of power, probably on 10th or 11th August, Abbot brought a deciphered telegram reading "Eliminate Salient". Jenkins recalls that clearly: Mudie and Jenkins were sitting together at that time and Jenkins understood simply that the


5 Saadat Hasan Manto has very aptly covered agony aspect of Punjab partition in the story of *Toba Tek Singh* how mentally deranged people and others were clueless about unspecified borders of two Punjabs. See Mushirul Hasan (ed.), *India's Partition Process: Strategy and Mobilization* (New Delhi: OUP, 2000), 396-402.

6 *Jenkins Papers*, IOR MSS EUR D787, Microfilm No. 2684, NDC, Islamabad, 205.

7 *Jenkins Papers*.

whole of the Ferozpur district was to be in India. His impression was that Gurdaspur district, excluding the Shakargarh Tahsil, was to be in India too. On that point, according to Jenkins' recollection, that was what the sketch map showed. Mudie was naturally busy in the law and order arrangements. He knew all about the sketch map for that strictly practical purpose which also helped him in making the last minute amendments.⁸

When Abbot asked Jenkins whether they should destroy the sketch map (and presumably, the amending telegram) Jenkins replied that as Mudie had seen it, it would be pointless and perhaps discourteous to do so.⁹



Source: Mian Muhammad Sadullah and others (eds.), *Partition of Punjab 1947*, Volume IV, (Islamabad: NDC, 1983).

It was alleged that the Boundary Commission's Award was changed at some date between the preparation of the sketch map and the publication of the Award. It was incredible, Jenkins mentions in his papers, that Lord Radcliffe or Lord Mountbatten

⁸ *Jenkins Papers*.

⁹ *Jenkins Papers*.

could have been parties to such an arrangement; as far as he was concerned he never supposed that the sketch map was anything more than the rough guide that he had asked for.¹⁰

Jenkins mentioned that he had heard that the Government of Pakistan was more concerned about Gurdaspur than the Ferozepore boundary. If so, and if the sketch map was still in Pakistani hands that showed a Cis-Ravi salient in Gurdaspur as well as in Ferozepore, Jenkins lamented “it is impossible to understand why the sketch map had not been published.”¹¹



10 *Jenkins Papers*, MF. No. 2684, 206. Jenkins correspondence with Prof. Aloys A. Michel, 17 Cedar Circle, Kingston, USA, dated 27th November, 1967.

11 The sketched map copy was later published by National Documentation Centre, in its documents series pertaining to *Partition of Punjab 1947*, Volume IV (Islamabad: NDC, 1983), 2. Mentioned a full-sized photographic reproduction of the map, which was enclosed, with Sir George Abell's letter of 8th August 1947.



Source: Mian Muhammad Sadullah and others (eds.), *Partition of Punjab 1947*, Volume IV (Islamabad: NDC, 1983), 2.

Jenkins believed that it only showed the Ferozpur Salient. It is for that reason that Jenkins preferred his own recollections to that of Abbott's.

Abbott and Jenkins both had been former Deputy Commissioners of Gurdaspur. If he had had Radcliffe's problem, Jenkins thought he would have solved it as he thought he did with "the Indus Rivers" with regard to the effect of partition on the irrigation system. Before partition was mooted, the British in the Punjab had always assumed a very friendly and cooperative Kashmir government. In the partition scheme, however, great dislocations were inevitable, and there were too many imponderables, such as Shakargarh which was an area very much like the adjoining parts of Sialkot, dry and with a frightful erosion problem. The cultivators were largely Muslims: the town Shakargarh and Sukho Chak were largely Hindu and there were Hindu Rajput villages along the Jammu foothills. Pathankot was clearly a predominantly Hindu area. In the other two tehsils, the matters were less clear; but the Jats of Batala adjoined the Amritsar Manjha, and again Jenkins' impression of the villages—including the towns such as Gurdaspur, Batala and Qadian—was that they were on the whole

Hindu/Sikh rather than Muslim. At any count it was a very difficult decision. The river line was perhaps politically the best one and its political aspects were important.¹²

Jenkins wrote that he was not aware of where the boundary line was drawn till the date of his departure, 15th August 1947. The provisional map was not a sure guide. He had, therefore, assumed that the position of all four districts—Gurdaspur, Amritsar, Lahore and Ferozpur—was doubtful. Jenkins' solution was to designate those districts in alternating India/Pakistan terms. Probably Jenkins meant that two districts should go to India and the other two to Pakistan. He doubted that any spectacular changes were needed there. As he knew that capable officers from civil and police services were already there. The important thing was that the senior officials in the districts should be designated early for smooth administrative functions. Jenkins' recollection was that the plan was made difficult than it needed to have been by the direct orders from Delhi around the 10th August for the withdrawal of all British officials from the districts concerned.

However, Jenkins did not have any documentary proof to support his contention or some other confirmation of those orders. Jenkins had close intelligence liaison between the intelligence staff at Lahore and New Delhi. It was true that at one stage this link had completely dried up, but it had become active again.¹³

He left Lahore for good on August 15th, and the Boundary Commission's Award was not announced till the 17th of August. The successor governments had by then taken over the office. Jenkins did not know what instructions, if any, had been given to the Muslim officials in Gurdaspur so far as the ad-hoc arrangements made by him were the only ones possible and he did not really see what else could have been done.¹⁴

Abbot's Recollections about Map

Abbott wrote a letter to Jenkins somewhere in 1961 and mentioned Leonard Mosley's book, *The Last Days of the British Raj in India*,

12 *Partition of Punjab 1947*, Volume IV (NDC, 1983).

13 *Jenkins Paper*, MF. No. 2684, 280.

14 *Jenkins Paper*, MF. No. 2684, 280.

and what Mosley wrote about Punjab's map: "It so happened that on 8th of August, the evening before Mountbatten received the Radcliffe Award, Sir Evan Jenkins came through from Simla on the telephone to George Abell, in a state of considerable agitation to ask if the award for the Punjab was ready." Abbott questioned Jenkins that as far as he remembered he thought that he [Jenkins] was not in Simla on August 8th and he was sure that Jenkins never telephoned to George on the subject and the only papers that he had left was his diary, for 1947. It had a note "Mudie Arrives" against Thursday, 7th August. So, that part of the story was contrary to facts.

Abbot further wrote to Jenkins that he [Abbott] was afraid that he could not exactly remember the details of getting the sketch map, but his recollection was that it came through by hand with a pilot from George [George Abell, the Private Secretary of Mountbatten at Delhi]. He was sure that he or anyone else did not take it down verbally over the telephone and they had it well before Mudie's arrival on 7th August, 1947. The map showed Ferozpur Tehsil including the headworks of Fazilka Tahsil and he supposed Zira (though he had forgotten about that) in Pakistan. He remembered the "Eliminate Salient" telegram. He was very certain about asking Jenkins what to do with the map when clearing his safe and Jenkins instructing him to leave it there for Mudie as he had to see it and know all about it. According to Mosley's book as quoted by Abbot, he (Mudie) found the map and instead of sending it on to Sir Evan Jenkins or to the India Office Record Department, he [Mudie] passed it to Jinnah. Abbot wrote that he had seen somewhere that Mudie admitted that.¹⁵

Nobody in India knew where the borders would lie on Independence Day; rumours, hints and suggestions flew around. The staff at the Viceroy's house leaked information to feed dailies. Newspapers published provisional maps with erroneous indications of where the boundary was likely to be drawn. Guesses were being

15 *Jenkins Papers*, Microfilm No. 2, 684. Abbott to Jenkins, dated 23/9/1961 [Mosley, 230].

made even about the city of Lahore and Gurdaspur and no one knew which town would go to India and which one to Pakistan.¹⁶

Jenkins received an early intimation from George Abell to Stuart Evelyn Abbott [Secretary to the Governor of Punjab 1946-47] on 8th August, 1947; its background was that Jenkins had asked Abell for advance information about the Punjab Boundary Award so that necessary arrangements might be made accordingly.¹⁷ The draft of advance information showed the Ferozepore area and its headworks going to Pakistan. When the final award was released, Ferozepore was assigned to India, which infuriated Pakistanis and they were sure that Nehru and Mountbatten had pressured Radcliffe to change the delineating line. One historian noted “Radcliffe was a barrister following a brief [case]” and Mountbatten was his client.¹⁸

Preserving good Indo-British relations, especially during the lavish ceremonial display of 15th August, was an unjustifiable excuse for holding back the award. The Radcliffe line was finally revealed on 17th August, exactly the same day on which the first regiment of British troops departed from Bombay. According to Lucy Chester, “there is no evidence that Radcliffe was biased towards or against Hindus, Muslims or Sikhs, but he was certainly biased in favour of preserving British interests”. Chester asserts that, “Radcliffe’s wartime experience as director-general of the British Ministry of Information, along with his sound Establishment background, made him intimately familiar with the goals and interests of His Majesty’s Government”.¹⁹

16 Yasmin Khan, *The Great Partition: The Making of India and Pakistan* (New Delhi: Penguin Viking, 2007), 124-25.

17 Kirpal Singh (Ed.), *Select Documents on Partition of Punjab 1947* (Delhi: National Bookshop, 1991), 456.

18 Lucy Chester, book, *Border and Conflicts in South Asia*, 8.

19 Chester, *The 1947 Partition: Drawing the Indo-Pakistan Boundary*, www.une.edu/depts/diplomat/archives_roll/2002_01-03/chester_pa.../chester_partition.htm 1/1/97, 6. This portion is part of her book Chapter 4-6, *Border and Conflicts in South Asia*.

Lahore and Amritsar

Lahore and Amritsar formed the administrative, commercial, educational and industrial heart of the British Punjab. Nevertheless, both cities possessed immense symbolic importance. Indeed, Amritsar after the Jallianwala Bagh massacre possessed national significance in the struggle against the British, although in reality Hindu-Muslim unity was a transient feature of the city's political development.²⁰

Sir Evan Jenkins had dubbed "the battle for control of Punjab" as the "communal war of succession". While many rural areas of the Punjab remained peaceful until the British departure and announcement of the Boundary Award, Lahore and Amritsar suffered violence and disturbances throughout the summer of 1947.

The key episodes of the violence at Chowk Pragdas, Amritsar and the burning of Shah Almi in Lahore should be seen as important turning points. Violence erupted with the announcement of the Boundary Award²¹ and the departure of the British.

At his fourth staff meeting on 28th March, Mountbatten reported that Field Marshal Auchinleck had told him at dinner the night before, that it would take from five to ten years to divide the Indian Army. Non-Muslim parties would be much stronger if the army was communally divided, Hindus and Sikhs taking over the general headquarters, major supply dumps and "a large majority" of officers would go to them. Ismay added that there was not a single unit in the Indian Army that was totally Muslim.

That same day in London, the British Cabinet listened to Lord Wavell's final assessment of the Indian situation. He claimed, astonishingly, that the situation in Punjab was "now in hand," but saw no alternative to governor's rule under Indian Act 1935 Section 93, since Muslim rule was impossible and a coalition unlikely. Wavell considered it too difficult. The Punjab governor was worried about the safety of British families and their possible evacuation. Wavell concluded by saying, "all sensible Indians were

20 Ian Talbot, *Divided Cities* (Karachi: OUP, 2006), 1.

21 Talbot, *Divided Cities*, 37.

anxious for a peaceful settlement but none were prepared to make concessions.”²²

Areas with Muslim Majority Remaining in India

Those areas of Punjab which should have been included in Pakistan because of their predominantly Muslim population were awarded to India by the Boundary Commission.

S.N.	Name of Area	Total Population	Muslims	Hindus/Sikhs
1	Gurdaspur district	1,153,511	589,889	512,316 (this includes 50,000 of the scheduled castes)
2	Ajnala, Tehsil of Amritsar District	224,707	141,406	83,301 (including Indian Christians)
3	Hoshiarpur Tehsil	323,945	145,985	134,960 (-do-)
4	Dasuya Tehsil	258,298	132,105	113,193 (-do-)
5	Nakodar Tehsil	228,224	135,918	85,306 (-do-)
6	Jullundar Tehsil	457,740	226,623	168,117 (-do-)
7	Ferozpure Tehsil	283,510	160,337,	123,173 (-do-)
8	Zira Tehsil	203,067	137,586	61,881 (-do-)
9	A part of Kasur in Lahore District, a Muslim majority district and tehsil			
10	And the strip of Muslim majority area in Ludhiana district on both sides of the Sutlej, which was never claimed by Muslims as it cut into Hindu majority. ²³			

Source: G. Allana (Compiled and Edited), *Pakistan Movement: Historic Documents* (Karachi: Paradise Subscription Agency, 1968), 592.

On 4th June, Mountbatten stated in a press conference that the division of Punjab was mainly due to the Sikhs' own request which was forwarded by the Congress Party. The words of the resolution

²² Wolpert, *Shameful Flight* (Karachi: OUP, 2006), 136.

²³ G. Allana (Compiled and Ed.), *Pakistan Movement: Historic Documents* (Karachi: Paradise Subscription Agency, 1968), 592.

put forward were that Punjab to be divided between predominantly Muslim and non-Muslim areas. In order to work it out to facilitate Sikhs was very difficult as Sikhs were interspersed and they formed only a small entity in Punjab as compared to Muslims and Hindus.²⁴

Punjab Assembly's Verdict

The Punjab Assembly was divided into Eastern and Western entities according to the notional majority (that is district-wise numerical majority according to 1941 census). The West Punjab Assembly voted against partition by 99 votes to 27, while the East Punjab Assembly voted in favour of partition of the province by 50 votes to 22.²⁵ If we observe it in the whole Punjab scenario, the votes polled in favour of partition were 77, and against 112. However, we have to remember that Muslims of India had refused to live under the majority dominance of Hindus. Similarly, in Punjab, Hindus and Sikhs had refused to live under the dominance of Muslims. So partition of Punjab was the only solution.

Sikh Areas in Punjab

The States (Princely States) in East Punjab were four in number—Patiala, Nabha, Jind and Faridkot. They were all Sikh States. The first three were known as Phulkian states by virtue of a common ancestor, Phul. Phul was the descendent of Baryam, to whom Emperor Babur in 1526 had granted the *Chaudrahat* (office of revenue collector) of the vast country to the south-west of Delhi. Phul received a *firman* from Emperor Shah Jahan continuing him in this office. From his eldest son descended the families of Nabha and Jind and from his second the Patiala family. The Faridkot family, which was founded in the middle of the sixteenth century, were the offsprings of the same stock of the Phulkian chiefs. These four Sikh states were under the suzerainty of Maharajah Ranjit

24 Ian Talbot and Gurharpal Singh, *Region and Partition: Bengal, Punjab and the Partition of the Subcontinent* (Karachi, OUP, 2005), 121.

25 Talbot and Gurharpal Singh, *Region and Partition: Bengal, Punjab and the Partition of the Subcontinent*, 121.

Singh, but by the Treaty of Amritsar of 1809 they came under British protection.

The remaining two states were Kapurthala and Malerkotla. The Malerkotla ruler belonged to the Ahluwalia family. The real founder of the family was Rajah Jessa Singh, a contemporary of Nadir Shah. The Malerkotla rulers were Sherwani Afghans who traced their ancestry to Sheikh Sadruddin, who had received a gift of sixty eight villages near Ludhiana in East Punjab when he married the daughter of Sultan Bahlol Lodhi.

The States lay three separate blocks. The main block comprising the territory of Patiala, Nabha, Malerkotla and Faridkot was located in the centre of East Punjab and was a compact group. The Kapurthala State, composed of two enclaves in the Jullunder district, was in the north of East Punjab. The outlying districts of Narnaul, Dadri and Bawal, which formed parts of Patiala, Jind and Nabha States respectively, were located within the geographical orbit of the southern districts of East Punjab. There were also islands of Patiala State in, what was then and is, Himachal Pradesh.

Before partition, the Sikhs constituted the majority community in Faridkot; the Muslims in Kapurthala, and the Hindus in Jind. In Patiala, the Sikhs formed, according to the census of 1941, 47.3 per cent of the total population. Partition and the consequent two way migration materially affected the population ratio in those States. Especially, in Patiala there was a rise in the ratio of Sikhs because of the large influx of refugees into the state belonging to that community.

The first reaction of the Sikhs to the announcement of partition was one of bewilderment. Though their leaders had accepted the June 3rd Plan, they never realized that they would be driven away from the canal colonies in West Punjab to the development of which they had so greatly contributed. Nor they had imagined the magnitude of suffering and deprivations which the partition would entail. The Sikhs were a compact community, whose interests were mainly concentrated in what had been united Punjab. Most of their important shrines were in the territories which now form part of Pakistan. Although numerically a minority, they had virtually held balance in the politics of undivided Punjab. As that their homeland

was partitioned and so they felt that they had lost everything, they set about to plan for their future. When some of the Sikhs leaders, mainly those having Akali sympathies, saw that the states would be merged with the neighbouring provinces, they initiated a plan for merging the Phulkian States with East Punjab. The chief exponent of this idea was Giani Kartar Singh.²⁶

On the other hand, the nationalist Sikhs, who were not very vocal, favoured a separate Union of all the Punjab States. Its leaders were Jathedar Udham Singh Nagoke and the rulers of Faridkot, Jind, Kapurthala and Nabha who opposed the merger with East Punjab in the hope that by this arrangement they would be able to play a decisive role in Sikh politics. The ruler of Patiala was not among this group. But Jathedar Udham Singh Nagoke was definitely against the formation of any Union which did not include Patiala. He, in fact, favoured for a separate Union of all the Punjab States. Such a Union, he thought, would be a stabilizing factor in Sikh politics which had, at that time become vitiated by a variety of personal factors.²⁷

The Union was tentatively to be called Patiala and East Punjab States Union (PEPSU as an acronym) till such time as the Constituent Assembly of the Union should adopt a more suitable name. In addition to the six major states of Patiala, Jind, Nabha, Faridkot, Malerkotla and Kapurthala, there were two non-salute (non-salute meaning not allowed to fire guns as a mark of respect) states—Kalsia and Nalagarh—who also put forward the demand to be allowed to join the proposed Union.²⁸

Patiala and the East Punjab States' Union comprised an area of 10,099 square miles, with a population of 34,24,060 and annual revenues amounting to a little over Rs.5 crore.²⁹

26 V. P. Menon, *The Story of Integration of the Indian State* (New York: ARNO, 1972), 240-41.

27 Menon, *The Story of Integration of the Indian State*, 241.

28 Menon, *The Story of Integration of the Indian State*, 246.

29 Menon, *The Story of Integration of the Indian State*, 249.

Bikaner

Radcliffe tried his best to be fair in tackling what had become an impossible job. Nehru and Mountbatten were taking extraordinary interest in defining Punjab borderlines as they wanted to make sure that neither of the Muslim majority “sub-districts”—the (tehsils) of Ferozpur and Zira—nor the Muslim majority district of Gurdaspur should go to Pakistan, which otherwise would deprive India of road access to Kashmir. The Punjab Boundary Commission, chaired by Radcliffe, was simply asked to divide the province along lines of “Muslim versus non-Muslim majority districts.” Since the number clearly favoured Muslims, Radcliffe awarded the Ferozpur sub-districts and Gurdaspur to Pakistan in his initial maps. He was quite sensible and ready to recommend joint Indo-Pakistan “control of the canal system and electricity” generated in the Rajput princely state of Bikaner, whose Hindu Maharaja controlled the state dam, canal headwork and hydroelectric generators that fed power to Ferozpur, Montgomery (now Sahiwal), and Lahore districts. Bikaner’s power distribution system provided the key to central Punjab’s rich economic growth and development. Nehru sent a message to Mountbatten as soon as he learnt about Radcliffe’s initial “award” in early August that “in both the strategic and irrigation points of views it would be most dangerous if Ferozpur was to fall in Pakistan’s lap.”

He emphasized that whatever might be the decision about areas west of river Sutlej; no area east of the Sutlej must on any account go to Pakistan. The joint control of irrigation canals must on no account be accepted even as a recommendation of the Boundary Commission. Similarly, no joint control of electricity should be accepted.

The Maharaja of Bikaner wired to Mountbatten the next day to express his “every confidence that Your Excellency in finally arriving at decision on award of Boundary Commission will be good enough to safeguard interests of Bikaner State.” The Maharaja sent that message with his prime-minister K.M. Panikkar, Nehru’s close friend, who warned Mountbatten that “Bikaner would have no option then, but to join Pakistan,” unless the

Ferozpur Headwork's were protected by India.³⁰ That strategic risk was judged by Mountbatten to be too high a price to pay, and though he never admitted he told Radcliffe to change his initial Punjab award, the maps were altered accordingly and the award itself was kept under Mountbatten's personal custody until after 15th August celebrations ended.

On 10th August Maharaja Sadul Singh of Bikaner sent a confidential private letter to Mountbatten "to convey my most grateful thanks" for "the action which you so kindly and promptly took after your talk with Mr. Panikkar in regard to the protection of the interests...of my State." Pakistan was thus strategically obliged to "pay" a very high price, as Mountbatten warned Jinnah that it would, for refusing to grant him the pleasure of becoming the Governor-General of Pakistan as well as India.³¹

Lucy Chester elaborated the factor of misappropriation of border lines by quoting Kanwar Sain, irrigation engineer of Bikaner. On 10 August he got information that key sections of Ferozpur would go to Pakistan and Governor Punjab Jenkins had made certain arrangements for new establishment for Ferozpur district. The *tehsils* of Ferozpur, Zira and Fazilka were likely to be awarded to Pakistan. Kanwar Sain narration supports Jenkins intention for advance sketch map, to facilitate administrative arrangements.³²

According to Andrew Roberts' narration in his book *Eminent Churchillian*, "Moon admitted in 1982 that certain documents- some of them quoted in full by Kanwar Sain- were missing from the record. This is hardly surprising if Mountbatten was intending to bring pressure on Radcliffe to alter his Award. Mountbatten was Governor-General of India for many months afterwards, and thus was in a position to cover his track regarding incriminating documents. Seen in the wider context of his visceral bias against Jinnah and Pakistan, and in favour of stronger, larger and more powerful Commonwealth country of which he was to become Governor-General, Mountbatten's actions over Ferozpur fall into place. This was, however, a

30 Nicolas Mansergh, *Transfer of Power*, Vol. XII, 638-39.

31 Stanley Wolpert, *Shameful Flight: The Last Year of British Empire in India* (Karachi: OUP, 2006), 168.

32 Lucy Chester, *Border and Conflicts in SAouth Asia*, 121.

derelection of duty. Inherent in his orders from Attlee, his viceregal oath and his 3rd June Plan was a duty of strict impartiality as representative of British Raj. However, Mountbatten betrayed that trust”.³³

Gurdaspur

Supposing that Gurdaspur District was allotted to Pakistan, then Amritsar, the holy city of the Sikhs, would have been surrounded by the Muslim areas of Sialkot, Jammu, Kashmir and Kapurthala.

On 11th August, when Liaquat Ali learned that much of Punjab’s Muslims-majority Gurdaspur district, with its highway access to Kashmir, was awarded to India, he angrily informed Ismay that Pakistan considered that a “political decision” as well as a British “breach of faith”. Lord Ismay claimed to be “dumbfounded” by that “private message.” As chief of staff to Mountbatten, however, he must have known of the alterations, but he disingenuously assured Liaquat that “the Viceroy has always been, and is determined to keep clear of the whole business...I am at a loss to know what action you wish me to take...In the first place, I am told that the final report of Sir Cyril Radcliffe is not ready yet, and therefore I do not know what ground you have for saying that Gurdaspur has been allotted to the East Punjab.... You surely do not...imply that the Viceroy has influenced this award...Even though for a moment that, you, who is completely in the know, should ever imagine that he could do such a thing.”³⁴

Ferozpur and Zira

For the retention of Ferozpur and Zira Tehsils in India, the Sikh pressure was brought upon Mountbatten and as well as by Nehru and Sadul Singh, the ruler of Bikaner State.³⁵

Kirpal Singh interviewed Sir Francis Mudie, and Mudie told him explicitly, “Yes it was changed. I know Radcliffe. He may be Lord

33 Andrew Roberts, *Eminent Churchillians* (London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1994), 101.

34 Wolpert, *Shameful Flight*, 168.

35 Wolpert, *Shameful Flight*. For details also see Z.H. Zaidi (Ed.), *Quaid-i-Azam Mohammad Ali Jinnah Papers, Pakistan: Pangs of Birth*, Volume V (Islamabad, Cabinet Division, 2000), 431-434.

Privy Seal or anything else but I will never entrust my will to him. He further said, I only lived in the Viceroy's house and I had nothing to do with him. But I know he changed the Award of the Punjab Boundary Commission".³⁶

When Zafarullah Khan was at Delhi, Jinnah asked him to argue Muslim League's case as the Boundary Commission to delimit the boundary between West Punjab and East Punjab was set up. Without any hesitation Zafarullah took on the task.³⁷

Zafarullah Khan, who was later appointed Foreign Minister of Pakistan by the Quaid-i-Azam, writes in his *Memoirs*, that the next day Justice Din Muhammad came to him. He was very agitated and he said he had the suspicion that the boundary line had already been decided upon and all of them were engaged in a farce. Zafarullah asked him why he thought so. He replied that after he had left the previous day, Sir Cyril Radcliffe had mentioned that he would be going up next morning on a flight to survey the area in dispute and to see the layout of the land. He [Din Muhammad] then asked him how the Commission would know what he had looked at and what impression he had formed. They would be sitting in Lahore while he would conduct a survey of which they would have no knowledge. It might prove awkward later on. However, Sir Cyril Radcliffe explained that the aircraft placed at his disposal was a small one, but that two of them, one from each side, could go up with him. It was decided that Mr. Justice Munir (who is remembered for according legitimacy to Ayub Khan's take-over) and Mr. Justice Teja Singh would accompany him the next morning. So, the next morning all of them assembled at an early hour at Walton Airport, but the flight was cancelled because of a dust storm. Just before leaving the airfield, Mr. Justice Munir asked the pilot where they were to go. He put his hand in his pocket and brought out a slip of paper, which he gave to Mr. Justice Munir saying that those were the orders. Mr. Munir brought that slip and gave it to Mr. Din Muhammad. It carried the directions to the pilot. He was to fly east as far as Pathankot where

36 Singh, *Partition of Punjab*, 734.

37 A .H. Batalvi (Ed.), *The Forgotten Years: Memoirs of Sir Muhammad Zafarullah Khan* (Lahore: Vanguard, 1991), 148.

the Ravi emerged from the mountains and debouches into the plains of Punjab and then he was to veer left towards Ferozpur.

Justice Munir was very sure that, that was going to be the boundary. He could not see any other reason in going to a particular point and then following that definite line. Therefore, he decided to go to Delhi the same night and put the matter before Mr Jinnah, suggesting that he (Justice Munir) and Justice Din Muhammad should resign from the commission on the ground that apparently the whole thing had already been determined. He thought that would result either in the appointment of a new commission or the use of some other method to determine the boundary.

Zafarullah told him (Justice Munir) that Jinnah might reject the whole thing as he would not be easily persuaded unless the whole matter was put to him on some legal basis.³⁸

Bikaner and Ferozpur Headworks

In order to understand the point of view of Bikaner State, it has to be taken into account that three other canals took off from the Ferozpur Canal. The headworks were about thirty miles down the confluence of Beyas and Sutlej. The name of the headworks was Ferozpur Headworks. Three canals took off from that place. One was Dipalpur Canal irrigating the Lahore and Montgomery (now Sahiwal) parts of the districts; the second was the Eastern Canal which irrigated 99 per cent of Ferozpur district and a very small area of Bahawalpur State. The third was called Bikaner Canal which ran 74 miles through a territory not belonging to Bikaner. It ran mainly through Ferozpur district and a mile or two in the Faridkot State. Forty-four miles of the canal were owned and paid for by the Bikaner State. The cost of the canal, Rs 158.2 lakhs and also a share in the cost of the Ferozpur Headworks, was paid by the Bikaner State. The Bahawalpur State had not spent a penny either on the canal or had ever paid any sum for the maintenance of the Ferozpur Headworks. Before the canal began, the Bahawalpur State would not allow the Bikaner State to draw water from the Sutlej. The British Government decided that it must decide as to

38 Batalvi (Ed.), *The Forfotten Year* 149-50.

the best use which could be made of the water irrespective of the fact where the lands laid and it found that the Bikaner territory had very good land which could be irrigated from the Ferozpur Headworks while the Bahawalpur State lands were very poor in quality.³⁹

Punjab Boundary Commission

According to Justice Munir, who was one of the judges representing the Muslim side at the Punjab Boundary Commission, Lord Wavell was succeeded by Lord Mountbatten, a man with tremendous energy, unusual intelligence, a passion for bold decisions, and subtle political sagacity but with a mania for speed and an uncontrollable ambition to make a niche for himself in history. He had been entrusted with a stupendous task, to solve the biggest problem of the biggest British possession in the shortest possible time.⁴⁰

He set to the job immediately on his arrival in making the Congress and the Muslim League agree to partition. The Sikhs also agreed. Soon Lord Mountbatten submitted his proposals to the British Government and obtained their approval. The scheme which was announced on June 5th, 1947 partitioned Punjab into Muslim and non-Muslim majority districts and by Para 9 provided as follows:⁴¹

For the immediate purpose of deciding on the issue of partition, the members of the Legislative Assemblies of Bengal and Punjab will sit in two according to Muslim majority districts (as laid down in the Appendix) and non-Muslim majority districts.⁴²

39 Mian Muhammad Sadullah and others (Ed.), *The Partition of the Punjab 1947: A Compilation of Official Documents 1947*, Vol. II (Lahore: National Documentation Centre, 1983), 202-203.

40 Nazir Hussain Chaudhri, *Chief Justice Muhammad Munir: His Life, Writings and Judgements* (Lahore: Research Society of Pakistan, 1973), 47.

41 Chaudhri, *Chief Justice Muhammad Munir: His Life, Writings and Judgements*.

42 Chaudhri, *Chief Justice Muhammad Munir: His Life, Writings and Judgements*, 48.

Sardar Baldev Singh wrote to Lord Mountbatten on 3rd June, 1947 that he had discussed with Sikh leaders the statements which His Majesty's Government had proposed for the next day, a copy of which he (Mountbatten) had given him at that morning's Conference.

That plan then made implied that a substantial part of Sikh community might go to the Muslim dominated area, where a sovereign State based ostensibly on Islamic principles was likely to be established as conceived by the spokesman of the Muslim League. The Sikhs had been unable to obtain any coherent and acceptable guarantee of their security in such a set-up and were therefore unable to contemplate being forced into it against their will. He made that clear to him. The happening in West Punjab had further proved that they could expect no security whatsoever under Muslim domination.⁴³

Sir Penderel Moon was conscious that Sikhs' interests coincided with those of Pakistan rather than India's. He wrote a letter to Sujjan Singh dated 8th June 1947 coaxing him to make Sikh leadership safeguard its people's interests. It should not gamble with the interest of its own people. Owing to the close intermingling of the populations, which would lead to strife in the two halves of the Punjab, which would probably spread steadily through the whole of Northern India, this may involve endless turmoil and anarchy such as they had seen in China during their lifetime.

The proposals for the partition of Punjab implied that the Eastern portion would go to Hindustan and the Western portion to Pakistan. A partition of the Punjab leading to that grouping-up of its two halves, Moon was certain, would benefit peace and good order in Punjab itself and also the Sikh community. A boundary line could hardly be further west than Beyas, assuming that it was along Beas with Amritsar district included in East Punjab, it would leave nearly half of the Sikh community on the wrong side of the line.

Moon requested the Sikh leadership that they should come to terms with the Muslims on the understanding that the Sikh community as

43 Singh, *Partition of Punjab*, 89.

a whole would throw in their lot with Pakistan. In return for this he believed the Muslims would be prepared to make to the Sikh community considerable concessions so that they would be able to feel that their place in the Pakistan scheme was quite secure. That was the time to reach a “*Samjhota*” with the Muslims for they knew the disadvantages of a truncated Pakistan.

Moon knew that what he wrote ran counter to the policy which the Sikhs had been following for the past few months, but it was absurd to blind oneself to the fact that the real interests of the Sikh community laid with North-West India rather than with Hindustan.⁴⁴

In carrying out its very responsible and delicate functions the Boundary Commission no doubt would regard itself bound by its terms of reference and the statement of His Majesty’s Government, dated June the 3rd, 1947, which was the authority under which the Commission had been set up. It would keep in view the larger background which was the division of India and consequently the partition of Punjab.⁴⁵

Mountbatten on 3rd June, 1947 said that 400 millions of Indians have been living together and the country has been administered as a single entity. It has a unified communications, defence, postal services and currency; an absence of tariffs and customs barriers, and an integrated political economy.

He regretted that it was impossible to reach an agreement either on the Cabinet Mission Plan, or on any other plan that could preserve the unity of India. But there was no question of coercing any large areas in which one community had a majority, to live against their will under a government in which another community had a majority and the only alternative to coercion was partition.

British had carefully considered the position of the Sikhs. Sikhs formed about an eighth of the population of the Punjab, but they were distributed in such a way that any partition of the province would inevitably divide them. British cared for the good of the Sikhs community at heart but were very sorry at the thought that

44 Singh, *Partition of Punjab*, 103-04.

45 Khan and others (Eds.), *Partition of Punjab 1947*, Vol.1, 281.

partition of the Punjab, which (Sikh) they themselves desired, cannot avoid splitting them to a greater or lesser extent. The exact degree of the split would be left to the Boundary Commission on which they (Sikhs) would be represented. The whole plan might not be successful, but like other plans, the success would depend on the spirit of goodwill with which it would be carried out.⁴⁶

Mountbatten reiterated he always felt that once it was decided in what way to transfer power, the transfer should take place at the earliest possible moment. But the dilemma was that if they waited until a constitutional set-up for all India was agreed, they should have to wait a long time particularly, if partition was decided on. Whereas if they handed over power before the constituent assemblies had finished their work, they would leave the country without a constitution. The solution to this dilemma, which he put forward, was that HMG should transfer power then to one or two Government of British India, each having Dominion Status as soon as the necessary arrangements could be made. He hoped that he would do that within the next few months. He was glad to announce that His Majesty's Government had accepted the proposal and was already having a bill prepared for introduction in Parliament's current session. As a result of those decisions the special function of the India Office would no longer be needed, and some other machinery would be arranged to conduct future relations between HMG and India.

It became clear then that an arrangement would be made by which power could be transferred many months earlier than the most optimistic of them thought possible and at the same time left it to the people of British India to decide for themselves about their future. Mountbatten had not mentioned about the Indian Princely States, since the new decisions of HMG were concerned with the transfer of power in British India.

The transfer of power was to be affected in a peaceful and orderly manner; every single one of them must make all efforts to fulfill the task. There was no time for bickering, much less for the continuation in any shape or form of the disorders of the past few

46 Singh, *Partition of Punjab*, 91-92.

months. It should not be forgotten the narrow margin of moods they were all working on so they could not afford any toleration of violence. All of them agreed on that.

Whatever way the decision of the people might go, Mountbatten felt sure any British official or officer who might be asked to remain for a while would do everything in his power to help implement that decision. His Majesty as well as his Government had asked Mountbatten to convey to all of them in India their sincere good wishes for their future and the assurance of their continued goodwill.

Mountbatten reiterated that he had faith in the future of India and was proud to be with them all at that momentous time. He wished them well by saying that the decisions be wisely implemented and must be carried out in the peaceful and friendly spirit of the Gandhi-Jinnah appeal.⁴⁷

Chart showing distribution of Muslims and Christian population in some areas of Punjab.

Tehsil	Muslims	Christians	Total
Ajnala	59.4 p.c.	5.3 p.c.	64.7 p.c.
Jullundar	51.1 p.c.	1.5 p.c.	52.6 p.c.
Nakodar	59.4 p.c.	0.6 p.c.	60.0 p.c.
Zira	65.6	1.6 p.c.	67.2 p.c.
Ferozpur	55.2 p.c.	1.9 p.c.	57.1 p.c. ⁴⁸

Source: Kirpal Singh, *Partition of Punjab*, 190.

That stage having been completed, the Commission might then take into account other factors which might necessitate a change in the boundary line already drawn. It was again obvious that

47 Singh, *Partition of Punjab 1947*, 92. I

48 Singh, *Partition of Punjab 1947*, 190.

deviation of the boundary line adopted for the purpose of securing an equitable adjustment of other factors must be local for otherwise the principle of contiguity or the principle of majority areas would be subordinated or over-ridden by consideration of other factors, which was not intended. For instance, if on demarcating the boundary line on the principle of contiguous majority areas, it was discovered that the Headwork of an irrigation system which in its entirety or in the main, served one part of the province, but on the other hand, a deviation of the boundary line ensued if transferred to that part. The adjustment of the boundary would be done to include the Headwork in the same part of the province, which it was designed to serve.⁴⁹

It would also be found that the Jullundur and Nakodar Tehsils of the Jullundur District, which were contiguous to each other and were in their turn contiguous to the Zira and Ferozpur Tehsil of the Ferozpur district had, like the last two mentioned Tehsils, a majority of Muslims in its population.

There was a compact majority of Muslims contiguous to the Ferozpur Tehsil running along the left bank of the river Sutlej through the Muktsar and Fazilka Tehsils up to the border of the Bahawalpur State. The area also included the Suleimanki weir of the Sutlej Valley Project, from where the canals were furnishing irrigation water to the Montgomery and Multan districts of Western Punjab and the Bahawalpur State. This area was also contiguous to the Montgomery district on the opposite bank of the Sutlej. Both sides of the river along that stretch were populated by the Muslim tribe, viz., the Wattus.⁵⁰

Break up of Amritsar District Population-wise in its Tehsils

Ajnala Tehsil of Amritsar District

Total Population	2,37,049
1. Muslims	1, 40,939

49 Singh, *Partition of Punjab 1947*, 185.

50 Singh, *Partition of Punjab 1947*.

2.	Sikhs	67,986
3.	Hindus including Schedule Castes	15,415
	No body was entered as Ad-Dharmi	
4.	Christians	12,709

The percentage was

1.	Muslims	59.5%
2.	Sikhs	28.5%
3.	Hindus	5.6 %
4.	Schedule Castes	0.9%
5.	Christians	5.3%

Source: Kirpal Singh, *Partition of Punjab*, 385.

In case the Muslims and Christians were counted together, the two together would form 64.8 per cent of the population. As far as the twelve districts, which had been included under the notional division in the East Punjab, were concerned, the Muslims had a majority in the Jullundur and Nakodar tehsils of the Jullundur district and the Zira and the Ferozepur tehsils of the Ferozpur district. Those four tehsils were contiguous to each other and were also contiguous to other districts of the West Punjab. For instance, Ferozpur tehsil was contiguous to Kasur tehsil of the Lahore district. Parts of Zira might also be contiguous.

Jullundur Tehsil

1.	Total	4,43,010
2.	Muslims	226,623
3.	Sikhs	86,996
4.	Hindus	64,121

5.	Schedule Castes and Ad-Dharmis	59,597
6.	Christians and others	5,673

Percentages were

1.	Muslims	51.2%
2.	Sikhs	19.6%
3.	Schedule Castes and Ad-Dharmis	13.5%
4.	Christians and others	1.2%
5.	Hindus	14.5%

Source: Mian Muhammad Sadullah and others (eds.), *The Partition of Punjab*, 66.

In case the Christians were counted with Muslims, the combined percentage would be 52.3.⁵¹ The line zigzagged precariously across agricultural land, cut off communication from their sacred pilgrimage sites, paid no heed to railway lines or the integrity of forests, divorced industrial plants from the agriculture hinterlands where raw materials were grown. Penderel Moon was urgently called to the scene of an irrigation plant on the Punjabi borderline shortly after independence. He found a standoff and administrative chaos. There had already been a clash at the site between Indian troops and Pakistani police. It turned out that the line ran directly across the plant's headwork and protective embankments. "It seemed extraordinary that there had been no one to impress upon Radcliffe the importance of including the principal protective works in the same territory as the headworks," he later mused. This could very easily have been done, as the area involved was uninhabited and for the most part, uncultivated. He said, "I fondly imagined that this is absurd error would quickly be rectified. But it never was."⁵²

51 Singh, *Partition of Punjab 1947*, 296-98.

52 Khan, *The Great Partition: The Making of India and Pakistan*, 126.

The changes that occurred in August bewildered the people on both sides of the new border. Jenkins knew that the plan was forged artificially but he remained mum. In his papers he, however, agreed that whatever statement that was given by Francis Mudie about boundary was true. But he himself preferred to keep his mouth shut as it involved relations with Commonwealth countries, which were more important to him than expressing his opinion. For the historian he was not of much help, as he never spoke about the involvement of the centre in the affairs of his province, especially during its partition. Other sources like Francis Mudie and Penderel Moon, who were there in Punjab⁵³ when these monumental events were taking place, endorsed West Punjab's apprehensions that Delhi had certainly betrayed it in 1947. The British wanted to leave India. They desired a safe evacuation of their own countrymen working in India. The Indians had been demanding independence for the past few years. Mountbatten, Jenkins and Auchinleck—all were aware that the transition period would cause upheavals as power would be liquidated, everyone would be in a state of move and law and order will suffer. The system of reward and punishment would no longer be valid. Disorder and mayhem would ensue. The care for an individual's life, property and honour had been forgotten on both sides of the border. Punjabis suffered and blamed each other and let the mischief-makers go scot-free, bereft of all responsibilities. In fact, India prided itself in having the main character of this tragic drama as their first Governor-General. What he did with India, India would not like to ponder on it. India and Pakistan want to prosper; however their past has shackled them. They cannot leap and jump into prosperity. Their future was mortgaged by Mountbatten's so-called impartiality.

53 Khan, *The Great Partition: The Making of India and Pakistan*, *The Great Partition*. Kirpal Singh interview with Francis Mudie, 733-740. Also see H. V. Hudson, author of *The Great Divide*, letter to Jenkins, dated 4th September, 1968 in which they discussed about map and changes that occurred in it, and effect of withdrawal of troops and their division on communal basis and its threat and impact on India security was discussed on 122.

Jenkins mentioned in his papers that the British might have continued to stay in India, but Britain was pressurized by the US government to withdraw immediately from India.⁵⁴

The importance of this study on Jenkins is that Jenkins insisted on being provided with an early draft of Punjab's division map for his administration to keep the turmoil at the minimum. Later, that map was handed over to Governor-General Muhammad Ali Jinnah via Mudie, the successor of Jenkins⁵⁵. It set the ball rolling and the myth of British impartiality exploded. The people of India in general had full faith in the British system of justice; they could not imagine that a Britisher, a descendent of the royal family, could be so devious. Whatever may be the motives behind his dishonesty, for the common people of India and Pakistan, it was like a breach of faith that made millions suffer and that suffering still lingers on in the collective memory of the two nations.

54 *Jenkins Papers*, Microfilm No. 2684, 212.

55 Kirpal Singh, *Partition of Punjab*, 734.

Conclusion

Jenkins was an advocate of united Punjab. In his discussions with the leaders of Punjab, he told them that the importance of Punjab was in its united stature, but his advocacy fell on deaf ears. People's thinking at that time was obsessed with communal considerations. It did not matter if the province was divided; the interests of the community were more important. Jenkins knew that emotions had overtaken reason. It made no sense moving owners of fertile lands in Lyallpur and Montgomery eastward just because of their communal identity. Similarly, rich Hindu and Sikh businessmen comfortably established in Lahore could ill afford to abandon their ancestral establishments in this hub of commercial and educational activity that was Lahore in the forties. The communal frenzy had blinded people to all the norms of decency. Their life, honour and property were not safe anymore. The mutual trust had been lost. The leaders and followers of all communities were collecting arms and ammunition. What was good for them all was far from their minds.

Jenkins had served Punjab from 1920 onwards on different assignments as a civil servant in the Indian Civil Service. He had been the private secretary of Wavell who was the Viceroy of India; he must have been part of the drill that Wavell was chalking out for India since 1945, known as the Wavell Plan, which was a stage-wise transfer of power to natives. Unfortunately, it was the Indian politicians who never agreed on anything. They were always at daggers drawn against each other. They never complied with the practicality of given circumstances, and were always arguing for something that was not there. For example, Muslims desired to get the whole of Punjab, to which Sikhs and Hindus could not agree at any cost. Similarly, Sikhs and Hindus did not want to lose their fertile lands in Faisalabad and Sahiwal which was not possible for them to retain. In fact Sikhs were scattered over the whole of Punjab. They were a minority representing only 13% of the total population. They were devastated when they had to leave their holy places and homes in West Punjab, though they were the ones who had vociferously demanded the partition of Punjab. Their impractical approach made it impossible to have an equitable division of population. On top of it, in the last stages of

transfer of power, things happened at such maddening speed that the politicians failed to comprehend the chain of events. They were left with no choice but to grab what they could. Mountbatten's policy of 'rush and hush' made things even more difficult. He advanced the date of transfer of power from June 1948 to August 1947 and then compounded the confusion by keeping the flawed demarcation line close to his heart.

In Punjab, many Muslim majority areas were demarcated into the Indian Territory like Gurdaspur, Batala, Ferozpur and Zira. Mountbatten might not have realized that his fudging of the demarcation line would condemn India and Pakistan to decades of hostility and fighting. The way he pushed history into a mad spin was not so much an amazing feat for the Guinness book of world records but a callous act that cost millions their lives and possessions. However, Jenkins made sure that the British families and soldiers reached home without harm. His shrewdness saved the British families but he had no planning to save the natives of Punjab from the final momentous upheaval.

In the final round like any loyal Britisher in a responsible position, Jenkins' efforts were to keep the local leadership divided and engaged in mutual bickering, so that he could retain hold over Punjab province keeping power out of Mamdot's reach. He knew that Punjab was an important province, also because most of the Indian soldiers belonged to it. It was some satisfaction to know the army was not organized on communal lines. That would have made Punjab a very dangerous place with its repercussions on the whole of India. Had Jenkins supported Mamdot, and let him take-over power, the Sikhs surely would have reacted violently and would have been dealt with forcefully by the ruling Muslims; yet the things would not have been much different from what had happened eventually, but the Muslims at least would not have allowed Punjab's partition by agreeing to the demands of the Sikhs. This would have been a great boon for the entire population of the province saving them from the mass dislocation that partition brought in its wake.

According to Loveday, the British did not treat Punjab fairly. Punjab had served the British whole-heartedly and deserved a

better deal. Loveday considers the people and the region of Punjab as the key to India. This key position was to give Pakistan its strategic position in the region which the merchants of London ignored. Or perhaps they did not have the foresight. In 1947 they could only see India as a trading partner. The security of Pakistan did not matter to them. By splitting Punjab in a way that left the control of the canal headworks on the other side Pakistan was done a great injustice besides the great harm it did to communal harmony in the province. Had the British federated the Sikhs (who are not Hindus and have much in common with Muslims) with Pakistan, at an earlier stage leaving them on their own land, there would have been no Sikh atrocities, and the Sikh would have felt treated liberally and left in a virtual state of independence. But the British lent their ears to the Hindu hate mongers of Jatistan and Sikhistan. Radcliffe gave material shape to this strategic cleavage by awarding Muslim majority areas in Punjab to India. This made Pakistan's security vulnerable. The British ignored the point of view of the Muslim leadership and entertained Patel and Menon's scheme in making the final award.

In Eastern Punjab, Kapurthala had a Muslim majority; the Hindu majority in Jullundur and Ambala was nominal at just 51 percent against 49 percent of other communities; whereas Gurdaspur had 51 percent Muslims against 49 percent of other communities. Had justice been done by Radcliffe, Hindustan would have had no land connection with Kashmir or Jammu. Loveday believed that the British alone could be blamed for the massacre and for the Kashmir wars as well as the great harm done to Pakistan.¹

Jenkins' role is not different to that of Mountbatten's. One might conclude that both tried to squeeze the Muslims. Both Jenkins and Bertrand Glancy, who was Punjab's Governor (7 April 1941 to 7th April 1946) before Jenkins, kept the Punjab Muslim League out of power after the 1945-46 elections in spite of its majority in the Punjab Assembly. They favoured the Unionists and encouraged Hindus and Sikhs to have a coalition government with the Unionists. Kirpal Singh, the author of *Partition of Punjab 1947*,

1 L.F. Loveday Prior, *Punjab Prelude* (London, John Murray, 1952). 212-213.

recognized Muslim League's majority and he felt that had the leaders of Muslim League been given some hope of attaining office, they would have been compelled to adopt a more conciliatory attitude towards the minority. Then they would not have been that aggressive in their attitude.²

Jenkins was in no mood to solve the problems of Punjab resulting from the division and when Punjab was engulfed by riots, he tried to keep the British citizens living in Punjab out of harms. He exhorted the Punjabi leaders to sort out their problems among themselves but that was too much to ask after the communal killings had embittered relations beyond repair. Jenkins would not like to admit his administration had created the ill-feelings among the communities by not recognizing their due share in power. Then boundaries were fraudulently changed in Punjab and Jenkins knew about that. It became an open secret when he got Abell's "Eliminate Salients", telegram of 8th August. Then he knew that Ferozapore and Zira initially awarded to Pakistan were to be given to India which reveals his liaison with the centre as he knew exactly what the centre meant by "Eliminate Salient." For the strong supporter of Punjab's unity that he was reputed to be, this was strange behavior of Jenkins indeed. In the end, nevertheless, the winner was the policy of divide and rule, and Mountbatten and Jenkins were its architects.

2 Singh, *Partition of Punjab 1947*, xix-xx.

APPENDICES

Appendix I¹

H.C. Beaumont to George Abell

IOR, R/3/1/157²

[PUNJAB BOUNDARY AWARD]

8 August 1947

Starting on the border of Kashmir State, the line will run down the Ujh River until its junction with the Ravi, leaving Chak Andhar in the East Punjab and Shakargarh Tahsil in the West Punjab. The line then follows the Ravi River as far as the Gurdaspur-Amritsar District boundary and proceeds along the Ravi to a point where it meets Lahore District. It then proceeds along the border of the Lahore-Amritsar District to a point north-west of the Bari Doab Canal, near Khalra, cuts across the Canal and proceeds diagonally across Kasur Tahsil to the Sutlej River, cutting the Kasur-Amritsar Railway between Kasur Tahsil and Khemkaran. In Kasur Tahsil the line will follow village boundaries and it is not yet possible to give exact details of these. The line follows the Sutlej River until its junction with the Beas and then follows the boundary of Zira and Ferozepore Tahsils until it again reaches the Sutlej, thereafter proceeding down the Sutlej to Bahawalpur State.

[H. C. BEAUMONT]

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- 1 Z.H.Zaidi, *Quaid-i-Azam Mohammad Ali Jinnah Papers, Pakistan: Pangs of Birth 15th August-30th September 1947*, Vol. V, Islamabad, Quaid-i-Azam Papers Project, Cabinet Division, Government of Pakistan, 386.
 - 2 *The Partition of the Punjab 1947*, Vol. I, National Documentation Centre, Lahore, 1976, No. 198, 246-7.

Appendix II¹

Minute by Evan Jenkins

IOR, R/3/1/157

8 August 1947

I have been through this with General Rees.² The upshot seems to be:

1. Gurdaspur less Shakargarh Tahsil goes East [Punjab]. *Action:*³ to transfer Shakargarh Tahsil bodily to Sialkot District.

1. An unspecified number of villages of Lahore District go East. *Action:* to transfer these villages as soon as defined from Lahore to Amritsar (Tarn Taran Tahsil).
2. *Ferozepore and Zira Tahsils go West* [Punjab],

Action:

- i. to transfer these Tahsils to Lahore District;
 - ii. to constitute new Eastern District (? at Moga) with Tahsils; Moga, Muktsar, Fazilka, and Sub-Tahsils Nathana and Abohar.
2. We must now (a)⁴ get out information to Deputy Commissioners, Sialkot, Gurdaspur, Amritsar, Lahore and Ferozepore (also perhaps Gujranwala and Sheikhpura) and (b) get draft notifications ready with blank names; also (c) make our dispositions. Conference with Inspector-General of Police and General Rees tomorrow 0845 hrs; General Rees knows. Please tell I.G. Police.

[EVAN JENKINS]

1 *Jinnah Papers*, Vol. V, *op.cit.*, p.386.

2 Commander, Punjab Boundary Force.

3 Underlined or sidelined here and subsequently in the original.

4 Marginal note by Jenkins reads "Can best be done by I.G. Police."

Appendix III¹

Jawaharlal Nehru to Louis Mountbatten

IOR, R/3/1/157²

SECRET

EXTERNAL AFFAIRS DEPARTMENT

NEW DELHI,

9 August 1947

Dear Lord Mountbatten,

Mr. A. N. Khosla, Chairman, Central Waterways, Irrigation and Navigation Commission, has sent me a note³ about the canal system in the Punjab. As he has been chiefly concerned with this system and knows all about it, I take it that his views have a certain value and importance. I am, therefore, sending this note to you. If you feel that this might be sent on to Sir Cyril Radcliffe, perhaps this might be done.

Yours sincerely,

JAWAHARLAL NEHRU

1 *Jinnah Papers*, Vol. V, *op.cit.*, p.387.

2 No. 395, ToP, XII, 618.

3 Enclosure.

Appendix IV¹

Louis Mountbatten to Evan Jenkins

Telegram, IOR, R/3/1/157²

12 August 1947

No.3366 S

IMMEDIATE / SECRET

It is now clear that the complete Awards for Punjab and Bengal will not be ready for publication till 15th evening or 16th morning.³

2. I have explained to Trivedi, who agrees, that the two Governments of East and West Punjab must take charge according to the notional boundaries on 15th and adjust later where necessary.⁴

[MOUNTBATTEN OF BURMA]

1 *Jinnah Papers*, Vol. V, *op.cit.*, p.392.

2 No. 446, ToP, XII, 687.

3 No. 436, *ibid*, 673-4.

4 A similar telegram was sent by Mountbatten to Frederick Burrows explaining that the two Governments of East and West Bengal would have to take charge according to the notional boundaries on the 15th and adjust later where necessary. See Mountbatten to Burrows, 12 August 1947, Telegram No. 3365-8. Also see No. 446, ToP, XII, Note 2,687.

Appendix V¹

Louis Mountbatten to Evan Jenkins

IOR, L/P&J/10/119

GOVERNMENT HOUSE

NEW DELHI,

19 March 1948

My dear Jenkins,

1. I have been privately informed that Sir Zafrullah Khan, Pakistan's Foreign Minister and their representative to the Security Council, told a member of the British Delegation at the end of January at Lake Success, that he had evidence of the Punjab Boundary Commission's Award having been decided on 8th August, 1947; of it thereafter having been tampered [with] to the great disadvantage of Pakistan; and of its publication having been delayed for ten days.
2. A similar allegation was made by Begum Liaquat Ali Khan, the wife of the Prime Minister of Pakistan, publicly at a dinner party in Karachi towards the end of February to Mr. Gordon Walker, Parliamentary Undersecretary of State for Commonwealth Relations. I understood from the report of this that copies of the relevant papers had been sent by the Pakistan Government to His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom; but the latter have since reported that they have not received them.
3. I understand that the "evidence" quoted in support of this alleged fraud was a communication from Sir George Abell (my Private Secretary at the time) which had been found among the papers which you left behind in Lahore.
4. The only letter on my files which appears to bear on this matter at all is one dated 8th August from

¹ *Jinnah Papers*, Vol. V, *op.cit.*, 423.

Abell to Abbott, your Private Secretary at the time. This read as follows: [*Omitted*]

5. I have not got copies of either of the documents which were apparently enclosed with this letter. In all likelihood they were only a rough sketch map and a manuscript note. But this I do not know, because I made it an absolute rule personally to have nothing whatsoever to do with the preparation of the Award.
6. Indeed on numerous occasions I refused to pass on to Sir Cyril Radcliffe, the Chairman of the Boundary Commission, representations which were made to me, both verbally and in letters, putting forward one point of view or another. I made a point of not looking at the maps containing the Award until the day on which they were shown to the Prime Ministers of India and Pakistan.
7. The information given in Abell's letter, quoted above, about the date when the Award would be ready, was, of course, wrong. The final Punjab Boundary Award was not completed by Sir Cyril Radcliffe until 13th August. (As I was on the point of-leaving for Karachi, to attend the Independence Ceremonies there on the 14th, when it was submitted; and as the following day saw the Independence Ceremonies in Delhi; I then held up the Award until I could discuss it with Pandit Nehru and Mr. Liaquat Ali Khan on 16th August). I am, of course, unable to say whether any adjustments were made to the previous boundary line between 8th and 13th August.² But the assumptopn [*sic* for assumption] that can be drawn is that the line indicated in the documents attached to Abell's letter was only a tentative one, and that it was amended subsequently to "balance" the Bengal Boundary line. There is also the point that Abell was presumably only being used as a channel of communication.
8. However, I feel, that it is essential that I should now have all possible relevant information on this matter in case

2 See Appendix I, 35 for an account of "Adjustments"

Pakistan's allegations are repeated—although I understand that Zafrullah Khan at least has undertaken not to repeat them in public. Could you therefore be so good as to let me know, consulting Abbott as necessary, whether, from your memory, you are able to throw any further light on it? You may be able to remember the particular documents concerned, or there may be others which you left behind at Lahore.

9. You should also know that Zafrullah Khan has attacked me openly before the Security Council (and has again now undertaken not to repeat these attacks) on the grounds that, as Viceroy, I knew the "Sikh plan"; and that, knowing it, I failed to take effective action, in the form of arresting the leaders and crushing the trouble-makers, despite previous assurances that I would.
10. Zafrullah Khan quotes in particular the decision of a meeting held at Delhi, under my chairmanship, on 5th August, at which it was decided to recommend the arrest, about the time of the announcement of the Boundary Commission's Award, of Master Tara Singh and other suspected Sikh ringleaders.
11. I have, of course, the perfect answer to this charge—because it was in agreement with Mudie, the Governor-designate for West Punjab (as well as Trivedi, Governor-designate for East Punjab) that you stated your decision on 9th August that the arrest of Master Tara Singh and his "friends", then or simultaneously with the announcement of the Boundary Commission Award, could not improve and might worsen the immediate situation; and that, though it might be necessary to make the arrests if the Sikhs gave very serious trouble, it would be far better to leave them to be dealt with by the new Governments of West Punjab and East Punjab,
12. I am sorry to trouble you with matters of past history at this time; but the point really is that it is my honour as Viceroy, and not as present Governor-General of India which is

involved and hence the honour of the British Government generally.

13. I am sending this letter through Ismay who was of course in the know all the time, so that if necessary you can discuss the matter with him.

Yours very sincerely

MOUNTBATTEN OF BURMA

PS. After the above was written, Liaquat Ali Khan himself, at today's Joint Defence Council meeting, brought this question twice again. He said that the documents concerned showed that it was intended to allot Ferozepore and Zira Tahsils to Pakistan, the matter is thus becoming urgent.

Appendix VI¹

Evan Jenkins to Louis Mountbatten

Telegram,² IOR, L/P&J/1Q/119

TOP SECRET/IMPORTANT

LONDON,

No.1153

7 April 1948

I received your letter of 19th March³ through Lord Ismay on 3rd April and have consulted Abell and Abbott about it. It is not easy after eight months and without reference to such records as exist to be absolutely accurate about dates and other details; but the following is to the best of my belief a correct account of what happened in Lahore about the Boundary Commission's Award:

1. The announcement of the Award was in my judgement likely to confuse and worsen an already dangerous situation. The boundary if it did not follow existing district boundaries, would inevitably leave [certain areas "in the air", severed from their old districts and not yet [absorbed by their new ones.
2. I, therefore, asked for such advance information as could be given [to] me of the Award, so that the military and civil authorities directly concerned with law and order might make their plans, and if necessary redistribute their forces. My request was not addressed to the Boundary

1 *Jinnah Papers*, Vol. V, *op.cit.* 425-428.

2 The U.K. High Commissioner to India served as a communication channel for the correspondence of Mountbatten. Copies of this telegram were sent to R.H.A. Carter, Private Secretary; Gordon Walker, Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for Commonwealth Relations; H.A.F. Rumbold, Assistant Secretary, Commonwealth Relations Office.

3 Appendix 1, 31.

Commission with whose proceedings I had nothing what ever to do, but to Viceroy's House. I do not remember whether it was made by letter or telegram, or by scraphone, or in talk with Abell during one of his visits to Lahore. But it was certainly made, and in making it I was merely taking one of the routine security precautions recognised as prudent under the British regime.

3. The result was Abell's letter to Abbott of 8th August, which you quote. The enclosures were a schedule (I think typed) and a section of a printed map with a line drawn thereon, together showing a boundary which included in Pakistan a sharp salient in the Ferozepore District. This salient enclosed the whole of the Ferozepore and Zira Tahsils. Abell says that the question of giving me advance information was raised several times at your morning meetings and that you approved the information being given.
4. At the time we expected the announcement to be made almost immediately. I therefore warned the G.O.C Punjab Boundary Force, the Inspector General of Police, the D.I.G., C.I.D., and the Deputy Commissioner of Lahore of the believed intentions of the Commission; and also had special messengers sent to the Deputy Commissioners of Gurdaspur, Amritsar, and Ferozepore giving them the same information. These warnings were of course secret, and the three outlying Deputy Commissioners were instructed to burn the messages sent to them, and to communicate the gist of them only to their respective Superintendents of Police. I made it clear that no overt action was to be taken; and that in the meantime all concerned must plan for emergency action. (Ferozepore was a district, and a very important one; its headquarters town was to be included in Pakistan along with two of its tahsils, while the remainder of the districts would be "in the air" with no accommodation for Police, Magistrates and Public officers generally). Among those informed the only Indian (in the old sense) was, I think, the Hindu Deputy Commissioner of

Ferozepore. All the other Deputy Commissioners and all the Superintendents of Police were British.

5. On 7th August Mudie, who was Governor-designate of West Punjab, came to stay with me. The object of this was to avoid as far as possible a break in the continuity of our law and order arrangements. I kept Mudie informed of everything that was going on. He knew the contents of Abell's letter of 8th August, and the arrangements I had made. Mudie and I were both Governors under the old regime, and it would in my judgement have been wrong to deny him information that might be vital to security.
6. About the 10th or 11th August, when we were still expecting the Award on 13th August at latest, I received a secret message from Viceroy's House containing the words "Eliminate Salient". Those informed under the arrangements described in (4) above of the expected boundary were apprised of this change. So also was Mudie. The change caused some surprise, not because the Ferozepore salient had been regarded as inevitable or even probable, but because it seemed odd that any advance information had been given by the Commission if the Award was so substantially complete.
7. On 12th or 13th August, I was informed that the Award would not be announced until after the transfer of power. Up to the 15th August there was no leakage. As I have said, my proceedings were not unusual, and every precaution was taken to keep them secret.
8. Generally, Government House papers other than (a) routine administration files and (b) factual telegrams which I had despatched daily in the disturbances were not handed over to Mudie. Most of them were destroyed by my Secretary, Abbott, but a bundle of my fortnightly letters and other papers of current interest were deposited in Viceroy's House. Abbott assures me that Abell's letter of 8th August and its enclosures were left in the Secretary's safe at Government House, to which only Mudie or his Military Secretary, Lt. Col. Craster, could have access. (Mudie had

no “Governor’s Secretary” at the time). Abbott says that these were the only documents of any importance so left. He consulted me about destroying them, and I told him that as Mudie had already seen them it would be best to hand them over. Mudie was aware that the documents had been left with him and were “Old Regime” documents. I have no doubt that Abbott’s recollection on these matters is correct.

9. Putting the matter as briefly as possible, the documents to which the Pakistanis attach so much importance contain simply information which I got quite regularly from Abell for purposes of security planning. I know nothing more about them, nor can I say how they got into “political” hands.

I need not perhaps say much about the “Sikh Plan”. The New Delhi meeting of 5th August covered, I think, only a report of an alleged plot against Jinnah submitted by me. The decision reached was a compromise between the views of Jinnah (who wanted immediate arrests) and Patel (who opposed arrests). Mudie rejected the compromise because he thought that Patel would not carry out his share in it; that arrests in W[est] Punjab would be used to inflame anti-Muslim feeling in E[ast] Punjab; and that E[ast] Punjab would refuse to take over and confine Sikhs arrested in W[est] Punjab. Trivedi, like myself, could see no point in connecting the arrests with the Award. At that stage we could only leave the problem to the new Governments. Any “charge” based on these proceedings is very easy to answer. The general charge that we failed to suppress the Sikhs is -more difficult; but the critics ignore the facts (a) that in the Punjab all three communities had plans involving violent action; (b) that their “plans” were less elaborate than is commonly supposed, and depended on widespread and largely uncoordinated local effort; (c) that because of (a) and (b) effective action to defeat any one “plan” .could be taken only by the simultaneous suppression of all three communities by forces numerically strong and entirely reliable; and (d) that action as in (c) would have implied the detention of nearly all the members of the Executive Council—the leaders of the parries to which we were to hand over—and therefore the postponement or abandonment of H.M.G.’s policy for India. (In

any case the forces at our disposal were inadequate and unreliable). This argument could be developed at length by reference to my reports from Lahore. I have said enough to indicate its general line.

I am handing this letter over to Lord Ismay to be forwarded with any comments he thinks desirable.

[EVAN JENKINS]

Appendix VII¹

Taken from Nicholas Mansergh (Editor-in-Chief), TOP, Vol. XII, London 1982, p.579.

Sir G. Abell to Mr. Abbott

R/3/1/157: f 255

TOP SECRET

8 August 1947

My dear Abbott,

I enclose a map² showing roughly the boundary which Sir Cyril Radcliffe proposes to demarcate in his award, and a note by

1 *ToP*, Vol. XII, 579.

2 No copy of this map, or of the note by Mr Beaumont describing it, is on the file. In April 1948, in a telegram to Lord Ismay discussing points of controversy which had arisen over the Punjab Boundary Award, Lord Mountbatten made the following comment about Sir G. Abell's letter to Mr. Abbott: 'The point that arises here was that Abell sent the letter concerned without my knowledge. It may be hard to convince people that that was so. It will look to have been an odd procedure.' L/P&J/10/119: f 111. It may also be noted that in a letter dated 19th November 1968 to Sir F. Mudie, S. Ghias Uddin Ahmed stated, on behalf of the Government of Pakistan, that both the map and the descriptive note were in the possession of the Pakistan Government. See MSS, EUR. F. 164/63, where also may be found an account of how these documents came to be transferred.

Sir E. Jenkins, in a letter dated April 1948 to Lord Mountbatten in which he too discussed points of controversy which had arisen over the Punjab Award, described the two documents iii. question as follows: "The enclosures were a schedule (I think typed) and a section of a printed map with a line drawn thereon, together showing a Boundary which included in Pakistan a sharp salient in the Ferozepore District. This salient enclosed the whole of the Ferozepore and Zira Tahsils.' Jenkins also stated that: 'About the 10th or 11th August, when we were still expecting the award on 13th August at latest, I received a secraphone message from Viceroy's House containing the words "Eliminate Salient"...The change caused

Christopher Beaumont describing it. There will not be any great changes from this boundary, but it will have to be accurately defined with reference to village and zail boundaries in Lahore district.

The award itself is expected within the next 48 hours, and I will let you know later about the probable time of announcement. Perhaps you would ring me up if H.E. the Governor has any views on this point?

Yours sincerely,

G. E. B. ABELL

some surprise, not because the Ferozepore salient had been regarded as inevitable or even probable, but because it seemed odd that any advance information had been given by the Commission if the award was not substantially complete.' L/P&J/10/119: ff 104-6.

It may be noted that Sir C. Radcliffe confirmed, in a letter now in the possession of the Foreign and Commonwealth Office Research Department, that he had destroyed his own notes and drafts in connection with the proceedings of the Boundary Commission and that he had in fact brought nothing at all of this sort home with him from India.

Appendix VIII¹

Sir E. Jenkins (Punjab) to Rear-Admiral Viscount Mountbatten of Burma

R/3/1/89: ff 212-37

SECRET

GOVERNMENT HOUSE, LAHORE,

NO, 699

4 August 1947

Dear Lord Mountbatten,

Your Excellency asked me on 20th July to prepare a memorandum on the main criticisms against the Punjab Government for its handling of the current disturbances.² I enclose a memorandum which is, I am afraid, rather sketchy; I have a good deal of other work on my hands, and though most of the material required for a full survey is on record, it takes time to get it arranged.

2. I have not dealt in the memorandum with the allegations of partiality made at different times against me personally by the Congress and the Muslim League. Indian politicians and journalists seldom realise that a Governor maintains very close touch with the Governor-General, and takes no important action without the Governor-General's knowledge. I am content to leave it to Lord Wavell and Your Excellency to decide whether my letters and telegrams since I took charge in the Punjab on 8th April 1946 have disclosed a bias for or against any party. These documents give a complete account of political conditions in the Punjab as they appeared to me from time to time, and my appreciations and recommendations for action were generally approved both by Lord Wavell and by Your Excellency. In only one case has a critic dared to make a specific allegation—in a recent editorial in "Dawn" it was stated that the editor "had reason

1 Nicholas Mansergh, (Editor-in-Chief), *Transfer of Power 1942-47*, Vol. XII, London, Her Majesty's Stationery, 510-526.

2 cf. No.228, note 21.

to believe” that I was attempting to influence the higher authorities and the Chairman of the Boundary Commission in favour of the Sikhs. The words “the higher authorities” in this context can only mean the Governor-General and Cabinet Ministers in the United Kingdom. I have certainly kept Your Excellency informed of the Sikh view, but I have never advised that it should be accepted, and I have no direct contacts of any kind with Cabinet Ministers at home—except that during disturbed periods I have, in accordance with the standing orders, sent a daily factual telegram describing events to the Secretary of State. Nor have I discussed the boundary problem with the Chairman of the Boundary Commission or attempted to influence him or his colleagues in any way, directly or indirectly. These facts can be proved, and the falsity of this specific allegation indicates the quality of the more general allegations of partiality.

Yours sincerely,

E.M. JENKINS

Enclosure to No. 337

MEMORANDUM

There have been many criticisms of the Punjab Government’s handling of the disturbances of 1947. During his visit to Lahore on 20th July His Excellency the Governor-General suggested that I should record them and add my comments.

2. The main criticisms are:—

- i. that while the British were able to crush without difficulty the disturbances of 1942, they failed to deal in the same way with the disturbances of 1947 (Congress—particularly Nehru and Patel).³
- ii. that British officials [have been callous and incompetent, and have taken the line that since the British are going,

3 cf. Vol. XI, Nos. 218, and 369, para 5.

- massacre, arson and looting are of no consequence (Congress—particularly Nehru and Patel).⁴
- iii. that in the Punjab the worst districts have been those staffed by British officials—Indian officials have managed to maintain order (Congress—Nehru).⁵
 - iv. that Congress Governments have had no difficulty in suppressing disturbances—the worst Province of all has been the Punjab, which is still “under British rule” (Congress—Nehru).⁶
 - v. that the fire services in the cities, particularly in Lahore and Amritsar, have been inefficient and useless (Congress).⁷
 - vi. that the Magistrates and Police have been both incompetent and partial, and that the Police have connived at and actually participated in murder, arson, and looting (Congress).⁸
 - vii. that Martial Law should have been declared at least in Lahore and possibly elsewhere (Congress).⁹

Attacks on the administration were not confined to the Congress Party—the Muslim League were equally severe,¹⁰ though less precise except in their constant allegations¹¹ of partiality against myself.

3. There are two short answers to most of these criticisms.

In the first place, the critics have missed the significance of what is happening in the Punjab. We are faced not with an ordinary exhibition of political or communal violence, but with a struggle

4 cf. Mansergh Top, Vol XI.

5 cf. Mansergh Top, Vol XI, No.218.

6 cf. Mansergh Top, Vol XI.

7 cf. Mansergh Top, Vol XI. No.300.

8 cf. Mansergh Top, Vol XI, Nos.,218, 300 and 338, case No. 155/32/47.

9 cf. Mansergh Top, Vol XI, No.320.

10 cf. Mansergh Top, Vol XI, Nos., 455, and 472.

11 cf. Mansergh Top, Vol XI, No., 305, note 1,339, para. 8 and 506, para. 7.

between the communities for the power we are shortly to abandon. Normal standards cannot be applied to this communal war of succession, which has subjected all sections of the population to unprecedented strains, has dissolved old loyalties and created new ones, and has produced many of the symptoms of a revolution.

Secondly, the critics are themselves participants in the events which they profess to deplore. During the disturbances Nehru, Patel, and Baldev Singh have visited various parts of the Punjab. They have done so nominally as Members of the Central Government, but in fact as communal leaders. To the best of my belief not one of them made during these visits any contact of importance with any Muslim. Nehru¹² was balanced and sensible; but Baldev Singh¹³ on at least two occasions went in for most violent communal publicity, and Patel's visit¹⁴ to Gurgaon was used to make it appear that Hindus in that district were the victims of Muslim aggression, whereas broadly the contrary was the case. Conversely when Liaquat Ali Khan¹⁵ or Ghazanfar Ali Khan visited the Punjab, they did so not to assist the administration, but to assist the Muslims. When a Hindu leader talks about "utter ruthlessness" or "martial law", he means that he wants as many Muslims as possible shot out of hand; Muslims are less fond of these terms, but all communities, Muslim, Hindu, and Sikh persist in regarding themselves as blameless. Moreover, there is very little doubt that the disturbances have in some degree been organised and paid for by persons or bodies directly or indirectly under 'the control of the Muslim League, the Congress, and the Akali party. The evidence of this is to be found in the daily intelligence summaries, and in the solicitude with which prominent men—particularly among the Hindus—take up the cases of suspects belonging to their own community.

Criticisms which are based upon a genuine or studied misconception of the real situation, and which are made by people

12 cf. Mansergh Top, Vol XI, No.12, paras. 4 and 5.

13 Mansergh Top, Vol XI.

14 No record has been traced of Sardar Patel's visit to Gurgaon in the India office Records.

15 cf. Vol. XI, No. 11.

with an intense personal interest in the communal struggle cannot be accepted at their face value.

4. Before the criticisms are examined individually, some understanding of the Punjab background is essential. From 1921 to the end of 1942 the Punjab was dominated by home-grown Muslim leaders powerful enough to control, or at least to influence very greatly, the policy of the Muslim League as a whole. These leaders saw clearly that the Punjab as it stood then, and still stands until [15th August, could not be governed by a communal party, Muslim or non-Muslim. They therefore developed the Unionist idea—a United Punjab, with a Unionist Party open to members of all communities, under Muslim leadership. As the Muslim League gained strength, the Muslim Unionists were driven to equivocation. They could not deny Pakistan and endeavoured to treat it as a matter external to the Punjab; but it was clear from the first that Pakistan was a vital internal issue and that sooner or later the Punjabi Muslims would have to accept it fully and join the League, or reject it and maintain the Unionist idea. With the death of Sir Sikander Hyat Khan at the end of 1942, the Unionist Party began to disintegrate. The last Unionist Ministry under Malik Sir Khizar Hayat Khan Tiwana continued uneasily until the General Election of 1945-46, which was fought on the most bitter communal lines. Only eight or nine Muslim Unionists survived; with one or two exceptions Hindu Unionists were defeated or absorbed by the Congress party; and Sikh Unionists joined the Panthic Party. The Punjab had reached the worst possible position, so long avoided, in which practically all Muslims were on one side of the fence and practically all non-Muslims on the other.

The situation might have been saved by a genuine coalition between the Muslim League on the one hand and the Congress or the Panthic Party on the other. But communal feeling was too strong, and both the Muslim League and the Congress were under orders from outside the Punjab. A country with thirty million inhabitants was sucked into the vortex of all-India politics; Punjabis ceased to be Punjabis and became Muslims, Hindus, and Sikhs—the Sikhs alone retaining their political independence. In the upshot a makeshift coalition was formed between the Congress,

the Panthic Party, and the small Unionist remnant, under the leadership of Malik Sir Khizar Hayat Khan Tiwana.

The new Coalition Ministry took office in March 1946. When I assumed charge as Governor on 8th April 1946, it had just weathered the Budget Session of the Assembly, but had attempted no legislation. The Ministers lacked confidence in themselves and in one another. They were cordially hated by the Muslim League Opposition, and had no contacts with the Opposition. In fact until the Ministry resigned in March 1947, I was the only member of the Government who could meet members of the Opposition naturally and without constraint.

During the remainder of 1946 the Coalition Ministry managed better than might have been expected. The Ministers were terrified of the Legislature, and when, in July 1946, a Session became inevitable for the elections to the Constituent Assembly, they used their small majority to secure the adjournment as soon as the obligatory business was over. They were most ingenious in avoiding legislation, thus depriving the Opposition of opportunities of constitutional combat; they were equally ingenious in annoying members of the Opposition in various small ways. Many of the Muslim League complaints against the Ministry were exaggerated or untrue; but the tactics and conduct of the Coalition Ministry were intensely annoying to the Muslim League, and with some reason. The largest single party had been shut out of office, and might have to wait indefinitely for its turn.

In these highly explosive conditions, the news of communal disorders on an unprecedented scale in Bombay, Calcutta, Noakhali, Bihar, the Western United Provinces and the N.W.F. Province caused great alarm. The Coalition Ministry took strong action. Minor trouble which occurred in Amritsar and Multan early in the summer had been effectively dealt with; and more serious disturbances at Ludhiana and Rohtak later in the year were quickly suppressed. The Rohtak disturbances were directly connected with those in the Western United Provinces, and were extremely dangerous. A "civil war" atmosphere was at this stage developing throughout the Punjab, and all communities were arming for a struggle which seemed inevitable. The Punjab Public Safety

Ordinance,¹⁶ promulgated in November 1946, reflected the views of the Ministry on the situation.

The Ministry saw that “private armies” might play a large part in communal strife. Two of these—the Muslim League National Guards and the Rashtriya Swayam Sewak Sangh—were prominent and were growing rapidly. The Sikhs had disbanded their Akali Sena in about 1940, and it was thought undesirable that they should have an excuse for reviving it. In January 1947, the Ministry accordingly banned the Muslim League National Guards and the Rashtriya’ Swayam Sewak Sangh under the Criminal Law Amendment Act, 1908. I had advocated this action some months earlier, and concurred in the January decision.¹⁷

The banning of the Muslim League National Guards was the signal for a Civil Disobedience Movement by the Muslim League. This movement was modelled on the Congress movements of the nineteen-twenties, and its object being to dislodge a “popular” Ministry, it was clearly unconstitutional. The “defence of civil liberties” was an inadequate cloak for the real intentions of the demonstrators. By the middle of February the Coalition Ministry decided to compromise with the Muslim League, and did so on about 26th February. The movement had induced a universal contempt for law and order, and the extreme arrogance of the demonstrators had alarmed the non-Muslims to the point of hysteria.

In the meantime on 20th February His Majesty’s Government had announced their intention of leaving India not later than 30th June 1948, and of transferring power to a successor Government or to successor Governments whose identity was unknown. The Muslims were anxious, and apparently almost ready, to seize the whole of the Punjab for Pakistan; the non-Muslims were passionately determined that they should not do so.

The Coalition Ministry, shaken by the Civil Disobedience Movement, and profoundly depressed by the Statement of 20th February, decided initially to see the Budget session through, and

16 See Vol. IX, No.135.

17 See Top, Vol IX, No.310.

to attempt during or after the Session some party adjustments. That at least was the Premier's intention, in which his colleagues concurred. But quite suddenly, and for reasons not fully known to me, the Premier decided on 2nd March to resign. He did so late in the evening, and on 3rd March after seeing the Finance and Development Ministers (to whom the Premier's decision had been a considerable shock), I sent for Mamdot and asked him to form a Ministry.¹⁸

The non-Muslims believed that a Muslim League Ministry would destroy them, and there was little hope of a Coalition, without which Mamdot could not count on a majority in the Assembly. To clinch the matter the Congress and Panthic Sikhs held a large meeting in Lahore on the evening of 3rd March at which very violent speeches were made. On the morning of 4th March rioting broke out in Lahore.¹⁹

On the evening of 4th March, the outgoing Ministers refused to carry on in accordance with the usual convention; and since on 5th March Mamdot showed no signs of producing a Ministry, a proclamation²⁰ under section 93 of the Government of India Act 1935, was made on the evening of that date.

Thus I assumed direct personal charge of the Punjab with the Muslims intent upon the communal domination of the whole of it, the non-Muslims determined not to submit to Muslim domination, fighting in progress in the principal cities, and the prospect of "vacant possession" for some person or persons unknown not later than 30th June 1948. I was without Advisers, because a sufficient number of senior officials were not available. It was clear that a communal Ministry—Muslim or non-Muslim—had no hope of survival. It was equally clear that a new Coalition was out of the question. Between March 1947 and June 1948 officials would inevitably be driven to take sides, and the services would disintegrate. The prospects were therefore not encouraging.

18 See Mansergh Top, Vol XI, No.476.

19 See Mansergh Top, Vol XI, No.481.

20 See Mansergh Top, Vol XI, No.493.

It has been represented from time to time that Mamdot could have formed a Ministry during March. In fact Mamdot showed little eagerness to form a Ministry—the events of the first half of March were too much for him—and it is my belief that he has not at any time had the support of a majority in the Assembly.

5. Riots broke out in Lahore City on 4th March, as I have said above. The disturbances since that date have fallen into three main phases:-

- i. *4th March to 20th March.* Rioting in Lahore, Amritsar, Multan, Rawalpindi, Jullundur and Sialkot Cities. Rural massacres of non-Muslims in Rawalpindi, Attock and Jhelum Districts of the Rawalpindi Division, and in Multan District, casualties very heavy, and much burning especially in Multan and Amritsar. I was able to report²¹ on 21st March that order had been restored everywhere.
- ii. *21st March to 9th May.* Minor incidents in many districts. Serious rioting and burning in Amritsar 11th-13th April with some repercussions in Lahore. Trouble at Hodal, a small town in Gurgaon district, followed by the first outbreak along the Mewat in the same district.
- iii. *10th May onwards.* The communal “war of succession”. Incendiarism, stabbing, and bombing in Lahore and Amritsar. Serious incidents reported from various districts, particularly Gujranwala and Hoshiarpur. Urban rioting almost unknown, and all activities in cities, including some organised raids, conducted on “cloak and dagger” basis. Village raiding begins, especially in Amritsar, Lahore, Ferozepore, Jullundur, and Hoshiarpur districts. Revival of disturbances in Gurgaon with 140 villages burnt and very heavy casualties.

The first phase presented many of the features of normal communal disturbances of the past. The urban slaughter was without precedent (in Multan City about 130 non-Muslims were killed in three hours), and the wholesale burnings both urban and

21 See Mansergh Top, Vol XI, No.558

rural, and the rural massacres were new. But on the whole, the situation yielded to the usual treatment.

The second phase was used by the communities for preparations. It was relatively quiet, but there was much practising with bombs, and ill-feeling never really died down in Lahore and Amritsar.

The third phase showed the real dimensions of the problem. The communities settled down to do the maximum amount of damage to one another while exposing the minimum expanse of surface to the troops and police. Mass terrorism of this kind offers no easy answer—troops and police can act, and sometimes act decisively, against riotous mobs. They can do little against burning, stabbing and bombing by individuals. Nor can all the King's horses and all the King's men prevent—though they may be able to punish—conflict between communities interlocked in villages over wide areas of country.

The casualties in all three phases as reported up to 2nd August are:

A	<i>Urban</i>	<i>Killed</i>	<i>Seriously injured</i>
	Lahore	382	823
	Amritsar	315	666
	Multan	131	133
	Rawalpindi	99	230
	Other cities	<u>117</u>	<u>171</u>
		1044	2023
B	Rawalpindi	2164	167
	Attock	620	30
	Jhelum	210	2
	Multan	58	50
	Gurgaon	284	125
	Amritsar	110	70
	Hoshiarpur	51	19

	Jullundur	47	51
	Other districts	<u>44</u>	<u>36</u>
		3588	550
C	Total Urban and Rural	4632	2573

The figures are clearly incomplete, especially for Gurgaon, where the dead and wounded are usually removed by their own party. In my opinion not less than 5000 (and probably not more than 5200) people have been killed in all, and not more than 3000 seriously injured.

The figures are not classified by communities; but in the cities the Muslim and non-Muslim casualties must now be approximately equal. Almost all the casualties in the rural areas of Rawalpindi, Attock, Jhelum and Multan are non-Muslim. In the other districts (at a rough guess) two-thirds of the casualties may be Muslim.

On this basis I would put the communal distribution of casualties approximately as follows:—

A	<i>Urban</i>	<i>Killed</i>	<i>Seriously injured</i>
	Muslim	522	1011
	Non-Muslim	<u>522</u>	<u>1012</u>
		1044	2023
B	<i>Rural</i>	<i>Killed</i>	<i>Seriously Injured</i>
	Muslim	357	201
	Non-Muslim	<u>3231</u>	<u>349</u>
		3588	550
C	Total:		
	Muslim	879	1212
	Non-Muslim	<u>3753</u>	<u>1361</u>
		4632	2573

Since a large proportion of the unknown Gurgaon casualties are Muslim, of the 5000 persons probably killed perhaps 1200 are

Muslims and 3800 non-Muslims; while of the 3000 persons believed seriously injured about 1500 belong to each community.

The destruction of property by fire has been very great, though less than is sometimes represented. Among the cities Lahore, Amritsar and Multan have suffered most. The Deputy Commissioner of Lahore reports²² that up to 28th July 1947 of 20,256 houses within the walled city 1120 or 5.5 per cent had been destroyed; while outside the walled city of 50,519 houses 225 or .4 percent had been destroyed. The total destruction in the City of Lahore Corporation Area thus amounts, in terms of houses, to 1.8 per cent. A "house" may, however, be anything from a large hotel or office building to a thatched hut, and outside the walled city the damage (except in one or two areas) is not readily noticeable. Similar figures are not immediately available for Amritsar and Multan.

In the Rawalpindi Division and the Gurgaon district there has been much burning of villages. In many Gurgaon villages, however, the mud walls of the houses are sound, and only the roofs and rafters have been destroyed.

No accurate estimate has been made of the total damage.

Throughout the disturbances efficient liaison and excellent relations were maintained with the Army and R.A.F. I could not have wished for better cooperation and support on the part of the General Officer Commanding-in-Chief, Northern Command, and the Commanders employed under him; and the troops who were required to perform unpleasant tasks in conditions of great discomfort, behaved admirably.

Special powers for dealing with the disturbances were taken in the Punjab Disturbed Areas Act, 1947, the Punjab Disturbed Areas (Special Powers of Armed Forces) Ordinance, 1947, and the Punjab Public Safety Act, 1947.

I turn now to a detailed examination of the criticisms set out in paragraph 2 of this memorandum.

22 See No.228, note 21.

6. (i) *that while the British were able to crush without difficulty the disturbances of 1942, they failed to deal in the same way with the disturbances of 1947.*

The disturbances of 1942 were most serious in the United Provinces and Bihar. They were not crushed without difficulty in these Provinces, and I doubt if Bihar has been completely normal since they took place. In the Punjab, where the disturbances of 1942 were conducted by a handful of Congressmen, and the great mass of the people were not opposed to the War effort, they were of little importance.

The disturbances of 1942 in the Provinces in which they were serious were (a) initiated by a single political party, against (b) Governments actually at war, which (c) had at the time no intention whatever of transferring power to any other authority.

The disturbances of 1947 were (a) initiated by the communities, against (b) one another in the presence of (c) a Government which was to transfer power to an unknown successor or successors not later than June 1948.

The object of the disturbances of 1942 was to facilitate the defeat of the British in war by the Germans and the Japanese.

The object of the disturbances of 1947 was to secure a more favourable position for one community or the other on the transfer of power (e.g., in the Rawalpindi Division the underlying idea was to eliminate the non-Muslim; fifth column; in Lahore the Muslims wanted to scare away the non-Muslim element in the population, and so on).

In 1942 attacks were concentrated on Government property and Government servants, in other words on points that were largely known.

In 1947 little attention was paid to Government property and Government servants—the “two nations” fought one another in the streets, in the markets, in the fields, and in the villages. When it was found that rioting could be checked, the fighting took the form of mass terrorism.

The critics are evidently not comparing like with like. There is no resemblance whatever between the two situations. A more relevant comparison is between 1946 and 1947—throughout 1946 the Punjab was in grave danger.

The measures taken to deal with communal trouble were essentially my own, though constitutionally taken by the Ministry, and I had at my disposal the same resources as I had in 1947. It was the knowledge that power was to be transferred that made the disturbances of 1947 so much more widespread and persistent than those of 1946.

7. (ii) *that British officials have been callous and incompetent, and have taken 'the line that since the British are going massacre, arson and looting are of no consequence.*

This criticism is easy to make, but difficult to prove or to disprove. In two cases I was informed that British officials had told persons who asked for help that they should “consult Nehru or Patel”. On enquiry the allegations in both cases were found to be false. I attribute the criticism to two main causes—*first* that the British as a race do not always talk seriously about things which they take seriously; and *secondly* that, to use the current psychological jargon, the average educated Indian is compelled to rationalize the behaviour of his countrymen. As an example of the first cause, Nehru was evidently shocked at a reference by the former Deputy Commissioner of Gurgaon to the “score” of casualties in communal fighting. The analogy from football may sound callous, but it is a convenient way of expressing a thought always in the mind of an experienced District officer, namely, that trouble seldom stops when the number of combatants are roughly equal until casualties are also roughly equal. The second cause is less definite, but the role of scape-goat or whipping boy is not unfamiliar to officials in India.

I am satisfied that no British official has been callous. There are not many British officials left, and those actually concerned with the disturbances have worked with devotion and humanity. They have been incessantly baited by the politicians.

Competence is a different matter. Two officers of the Indian Police and one member of the Indian Civil Service²³ broke down and either asked or had to be relieved. The strain of prolonged civil disturbances differs from that of war, but is not less severe. I have experienced both. I am satisfied that the British members both of the Indian Civil Service and of the Police maintained the high traditions of their respective Services. They have certainly not been influenced by their approaching departure. In particular the Inspector-General of Police and the few British officers of his headquarters staff—all of whom are heavily worked—have taken duty voluntarily in Lahore City night after night in the control room, on patrol, and extinguishing fires.

The criticism assumes that we have failed, and that the small remaining body of British officials is responsible for the failure. In fact, nobody who has not lived through the last six months in the Punjab can conceive of the dangers we have escaped. To take a Province of thirty million people noted for their pugnacity, to whip these people into a communal frenzy, to tell them that the authority which has held the ring for nearly a century is going almost immediately, to divide their Province into two parts by a boundary driven through an area homogeneous in everything but religion, and to convert its two principal cities into frontier towns—these are surely no ordinary operations, and if the critics thought that they would not be attended by disorder, the critics were wrong. It is largely owing to the steadiness and impartiality of the British officials that the Punjab has so far got through as well as it has.

8. (iii) that in the Punjab the worst districts have been those staffed by British officials—Indian officials have managed to maintain order.

The present disturbances are too large and arise from causes too deep-seated for the personality of individual officials to affect their course decisively.

In the Rawalpindi Division, the Commissioner and Deputy Inspector-General of Police were British. The Deputy

23 Presumably a reference to Mr. P. Brendon. See TP, Vol. XI, Nos. 141, note 1 and 299.

Commissioner and Superintendent of Police of Rawalpindi were also British. The Deputy Commissioners of Attock and Jhelum were both Indian when the trouble began (with a British and an Indian Superintendent of Police, respectively), but I sent a British member of the I.C.S. to Attock shortly afterwards. The disturbances were so serious that it was necessary to employ the whole of 7th Indian Division plus Rawalpindi Area troops. Peace was restored in under fourteen days, and has since been maintained.

In the Multan Division, the Commissioner and Deputy Inspector-General of Police were both Indian. The Deputy Commissioner and Superintendent of Police of Multan were both British. No district other than Multan was seriously affected. The disturbances were suppressed within six hours and there has been no recurrence.

In the Lahore Division, the Commissioner was Indian and the Deputy Inspector-General of Police British. The Deputy Commissioner and senior Police officers in the Lahore and Amritsar Districts were British. The disturbances in Lahore and Amritsar Cities have never been entirely suppressed.

In the Ambala Division which includes Gurgaon, the Commissioner when the disturbances of May-June broke out was British and the Deputy Inspector-General of Police was Indian. The Deputy Commissioner of Gurgaon was British, and the Superintendent of Police Anglo-Indian.

The fact is that British officials are (and always have been) posted to the districts most likely to give trouble. Until the early nineteen thirties there were few Indian members of the I.C.S. or Indian Police considered by the then standards sufficiently senior to hold charge of districts like Lahore and Amritsar. There has been one Indian Deputy Commissioner of Lahore, and the City behaved no better and no worse with him than with his British predecessors and successors. Under the pre-1937 regime it was thought unfair when British members of the two Services were available to expose Indians to the political and communal pressures of places like Lahore and Amritsar, and the Ministers from 1937 onwards seem to have seen advantage in posting "neutrals" to such districts. To suggest that the Deputy Commissioners of Lahore and Amritsar have stimulated or connived at communal trouble is manifest

rubbish. Amritsar with its large and turbulent city is clearly more likely to give serious trouble than (say) Gurdaspur or Hoshiarpur—I happen to have been Deputy Commissioner of all these districts—and to argue that because Amritsar under a British Deputy Commissioner is troublesome while Hoshiarpur under an Indian is not, the British official is responsible for the trouble in Amritsar is logically unsound. I might as well argue that because at the moment Hoshiarpur with a completely Indian staff is giving very serious trouble, while Gurdaspur, with a British Deputy Commissioner and Superintendent of Police, is relatively steady, the trouble is due to the Indian staff in Hoshiarpur. The whole criticism is a further example of the psychological “rationalization” on which I touched in dealing with criticism (ii). As the award of the Boundary Commission approaches, and the districts without big cities become affected, it is clear enough that Indian staffs have exactly the same problems as British staffs, and handle them in the same way.

9. (iv) *that Congress Governments have had no difficulty in suppressing disturbances—the worst province of all has been the Punjab which is still “under British rule”.*

During 1946 and/or 1947 very serious disturbances occurred in:

Bombay under a Congress Government.

Calcutta and Noakhali under a Muslim League Government.

Bihar under a Congress Government.

The N.W.F.P. under a Congress Government.

The United Provinces under a Congress Government.

The disturbances in Bombay have never been entirely suppressed. In Bihar and the United Provinces they took the form of a massacre (for no discernible purpose in view of the political supremacy of the non-Muslims) of the Muslim minority in very considerable areas. In the N.W.F.P. there was a similar massacre of non-Muslims. In none of these Congress Provinces was there any question of a struggle for power, and the surprising thing is not that the disturbances were suppressed (in fact they were not in Bombay and the N.W.F.P.) but that they occurred at all.

In Bengal conditions are similar to those in the Punjab—there is a genuine *casus belli* which makes all the difference.

It is questionable whether the Punjab has been worse than any other Province. Bihar almost certainly produced the largest butcher's bill.

The criticism is clearly based on false premises. As for the Punjab being still "under British rule", I need only point out that "rule" connotes some degree of permanence. The troubles are due not to "British rule" (British Rule in law and order matters ceased in 1937 and is not restored save in a very technical sense by a transient Section 93 administration) but to the fact that what remains of "British rule" is now ending.

10. (v) *that the fire services in the Cities particularly in Lahore and Amritsar were inefficient and useless.*

This is partially true. The regular fire services in all Punjab Cities are bad.

During the war a fine Provincial Fire Service was built up—Lahore had 59 trailer fire pumps with accessories, and 20 towing vehicles, and a Fire Brigade with a nominal strength of 619, though this strength was never actually reached. Amritsar had 33 pumps, 10 towing vehicles, and a Fire Brigade with a nominal strength of 356.

In 1943 when the Provincial Fire Service was disbanded (the threat from the North West which seemed real at one time having disappeared) it was proposed to put the City Fire Brigades on a sound footing. For Lahore 16 pumps and a Brigade strength of 172 were recommended; and for Amritsar 9 pumps and a Brigade strength of 95.

The then Finance Minister (Sir Manohar Lal) decided that the "peace-time" plan must be abandoned. He argued that serious fires seldom occur in Indian Cities, and that if there is a fire there are plenty of people to put it out. The equipment was accordingly sold and the "war-time" Brigades dispersed. Similar decisions have been repeatedly made in the U.K. since the days of Pepys, and there was nothing surprising in the democratic desire for economy.

The result was, however, that when the disturbances began the Lahore Corporation had only three pumps and a Brigade 33 strong. Amritsar was in the same condition, with a Brigade strength of 39.

As soon as fires began every possible use was made of pumps and teams belonging to the Army, the R.I.A.F., the North Western Railway, and the Police in Lahore, and several new pumps were acquired. In Amritsar similar use was made of local resources—e.g. the equipment at the Central Workshops of the Irrigation Department.

Experience in Lahore may be taken as typical. Fires fall into three classes—

1. unsuccessful attempts, when a lighted cloth or incendiary bomb is thrown into a house or placed against the external wood-work but fails to cause a fire;
2. “small fires” which are detected and extinguished before extensive damage is done to the structure concerned, and
3. “large fires” which gut a complete building and may spread.

In spite of the difficulty about pumps and the poverty and inaccessibility of the water supply (a feature of all old Indian Cities) early efforts at control were fairly successful. Incendiarism as an essential part of the Communal war did not really get started until about 14th May. Between 4th March and 14th May there were 55 fires—including 31 attempts, 19 small and 5 large. In other words only 5 out of 55 fires were not controlled.

The Deputy Commissioner of Lahore has collected figures for the three months 14th April to 14th July—a period which includes one month before the real incendiarism began and two months of incendiarism- The figures are:—

<i>Nature of Fire</i>	<i>Muslim Property</i>	<i>Non-Muslim Property</i>
Attempts	58	112
“Small”	38	149
“Large”	20	234
Total incidents	116	495



611

During the three months there were 611 incidents (during the worst period sometimes 20 or 30 incidents a day) of which 357 were controlled and 254 were not controlled. The proportion of fires controlled in Muslim buildings is much higher than that of fires controlled in Hindu buildings. The Muslims did not leave Lahore, and were extremely active in protecting their own property. The Hindus abandoned a very large number of buildings, and fires in Hindu property thus tended to become uncontrollable before they were detected.

I have given in paragraph 5 of this memorandum such particulars as are available of the damage done by fires in Lahore.

Generally, given the "war" atmosphere, the skill with which fires were started by individuals using specially prepared incendiary material, the scanty co-operation of the public, and the physical strain of firefighting with inadequate equipment in shade temperatures of anything from 108 to 118, I think the officials concerned and the Fire Brigades did well. The campaign was intended to make Lahore too hot to hold the Hindus and Sikhs; it raised problems similar to those of the Fire Brigades in London and we were ill prepared to deal with them. Frankly, I do not see how very large losses could have been prevented, though we many have failed to control some fires "which might have been controlled.

11. *(vi) that the Magistrates and Police have been both incompetent and partial, and that the Police have connived at and actually participated in murder, arson and looting.*

This criticism does not come well from persons who have themselves shown gross partiality and encouraged it in others.

Magistrates and Policemen are human beings and are subject to human failing. Some of them are impetuous, lacking in judgment, afraid of responsibility and so on. When any large body of men is employed on duties connected with large-scale disturbances, there will be a certain number of personal failures. Critics of the administration never realise this, and attribute to Communalism or worse occurrences which merely indicate that a man is timid or lazy or otherwise not up to his work. There have, naturally, been

cases of neglect of duty and indiscipline; but not more than might be expected in the circumstances.

The question remains whether, apart from personal failures, the Magistrates and Police have shown incompetence or partiality.

As regards their alleged incompetence, it must be remembered that the Punjab has for the better part of a century been a reasonably peaceful Province, and that the standing establishment of Magistrates and Police is designed to deal with normal conditions. The average rural Police Station—dealing perhaps with 100 villages scattered over 100 square miles of country—has strength of not much more than a dozen men. In the Rawalpindi Division extravagant charges of incompetence were made against unfortunate Police Sub-Inspectors, who could not deal simultaneously with several calls for help. In the same way, even with reserves thrown in our Police strength in the Cities was inadequate. On an average, the number of Policemen employed in the Lahore Corporation area during the disturbances has been 3,000—equivalent to one for 27 acres and three to 1,160 of the population. Free use has of course been made of troops, but troops are not, for certain purposes, a complete substitute for Police. I am satisfied that there has been no general incompetence on the part of the Magistrates and Police—no country is normally organised to deal with a communal war, and the best possible use has been made of the somewhat limited resources available.

Partiality is a more difficult matter. There is no doubt at all that it was part of the Congress plan to attack the Police as a Muslim force, and to compel the administration to replace the Police with non-Muslim troops; also to harry Muslim Magistrates. The Muslim League were equally determined to shake the confidence of non-Muslim Magistrates and Policemen. As the disturbances wore on and partition became a certainty, the Civil Services, including the Punjab Civil Service and the Police, began to split communally, and there is no doubt at all that whatever may have been the case on 4th March, every civil official is now acutely conscious of his community. I believe that the average Magistrate and the average Policeman still do their work reasonably well from force of habit; and there have been many cases in which a man has been

extremely active against his own community. But the critics themselves have encouraged communalism for their own political ends, and no normal man will go out of his way to be unpopular with his new masters. No gross case of partiality has been proved; I know of one Magistrate who has probably abused his position and others who may be unable to suppress their communal feelings. In view of the incessant scream of complaints, largely false and all exaggerated, the surprising thing is not that the Services are breaking up but that they have lasted so long.

That the Police have participated in murder, arson, and looting is untrue. Individuals have misbehaved in various ways and have been dealt with when caught; but as a body the Police have not taken sides.

The shortest possible answer to the critics is "*Vous l'avez voulu*".

12. (vii) *that Martial Law should have been declared at least in Lahore and possibly elsewhere.*

The critics are under a misconception about Martial Law. The Congress believed that if the Police (largely Muslim because Hindus and Sikhs were reluctant to enlist in ordinary times) could be withdrawn, and if non-Muslim troops could be substituted for them, and if Martial Law could be declared— then the General administering Martial Law would suppress the Muslims with "utter ruthlessness" and all would be well.

The General Officer Commanding in Chief, Northern Command, the Lahore Area Commander, and now the Commander, Punjab Boundary Force, have all advised against the declaration of Martial Law, and I have myself been opposed to it.

We are not at present dealing with a situation in which Troops can act decisively—"Cloak and dagger" activities are extremely difficult to control, and the best method of controlling them is patient investigation combined with improved intelligence. There is no short-cut by Civil or by military procedure; for neither a Civil Governor nor a General administering Martial Law can properly shoot innocent people merely because they happen to be, or to live, near the scene of an outrage.

The only immediate benefit from Martial Law would be the quicker trial and punishment of offenders. Our performance in this matter has been most unsatisfactory—owing to the enormous number of cases, the lack of trained staff, and the general feeling that all cases will be dropped on 15th August, investigations and trials have been slow, and there have been practically no death sentences.

On the other hand we have made so much progress with intelligence that we could probably within another six months break up every active terrorist gang. The local critics who ask for Martial Law are already alarmed and would like us to “lay off”. What they would say if Martial Law were declared and administered properly, I do not know; but so far they have objected to any drastic action against their own community.

The short answer to this criticism is that Martial Law would in present conditions be inappropriate, and that this is the view of the Senior Military Commanders, as well as my own view.

13. If I have succeeded in showing that we have in the Punjab the kind of situation in which people fight—a situation as real as that in Palestine, which incidentally is about equal in area to, and considerably smaller in population than, the Multan and Muzaffargarh Districts; that the critics themselves are in part responsible for this situation and have given no help to the authorities; that talk about the inefficiency of British rule ignores the fact that the object of the present exercise is to eliminate it; and that on the whole we have done our best in an intolerably difficult situation; this memorandum will have served its purpose. The future is unknown and it would be idle to speculate upon it. But it is a certainty that our present critics will have it both ways—if things go badly it will be because the British made them so; if things go well it will be because of Indian efficiency. It is perhaps worth pointing out that the grouping of forces and the problems to be solved will be entirely different from 15th August, and that neither improvement nor deterioration after that date will prove anything whatever.

E. M. JENKINS,
GOVERNOR OF THE PUNJAB

Appendix IX

4.8.47¹

HOW MOUNTBATTEN BENT THE RULES AND THE INDIAN BORDER²

Simon Scott Plummer Hears a Retired Judge's³ Verdict on Gerrymandering as the Raj Ended.

LONDON, Feb. 24: Earl Mountbatten manipulated in India's favour the findings of the Commission responsible for determining the new frontier between India and Pakistan across Punjab in 1947, according to Mr. Christopher Beaumont, Secretary to the head of the [Boundary] Commission.

Mr. Beaumont, a retired circuit Judge, said, in a statement that Sir Cyril Radcliffe had yielded to what he thought was overwhelming political expediency by agreeing, after he had decided the line, to the transfer of the Ferozepore and Zira sub-districts from Pakistan to India. But no change was made in the north Punjab line in the Gurdaspur District, which abutted Kashmir.

The Boundary Commission's deliberations were supposed to be secret, impartial and isolated from political pressure.

Sir Cyril, its Chairman, later headed inquiries in Britain into the Vassal spy case and into the *Daily Express* and D. Notice System. He was created a Viscount in 1962 and died in 1977.

Mr. Beaumont, 79, who lives in Boroughbridge, Yorkshire, said in a statement that Radcliffe was persuaded to change his mind about Ferozepore and Zira at a lunch with Mountbatten, the last Viceroy of India, from which Mr. Beaumont was "deftly excluded".

"Mountbatten interfered and Radcliffe allowed himself to be overborne. Grave discredit to both," his statement said.

Although the drawing of the Punjab line was a separate issue from the future of Jammu and Kashmir, Mr. Beaumont's revelations cast

1 Presumably a reference to Tara Singh; see No.345.

2 The *Daily Telegraph*, 25 February 1992.

3 Christopher Beaumont.

fresh doubts on Mountbatten's impartiality over the partition of British India, in particular his attitude to the question of whether Jammu and Kashmir should accede to India or Pakistan.

In a book published last year [1991] *Kashmir: A Disputed Legacy 1846-1990*, Mr. Alastair Lamb produced new evidence to suggest that Mountbatten wanted Kashmir to join India despite the fact that most of its population was Muslim and had connived with Indian politicians to force the Ruler's hand on this issue.

As far as Punjab is concerned, the statement made by Mr. Beaumont has caused Mr. Phillip Ziegler to reconsider the conclusions reached in his official biography of Mountbatten in 1985.

Mr. Ziegler wrote at the time, "To argue that Mountbatten tampered with the Awards is to suggest that Radcliffe, a man of monumental integrity and independence of mind/ meekly allowed his recommendations to be set aside by somebody who had no official standing in the matter.

The most likely explanation seems to be that at one point Mountbatten, under pressure from Nehru, did contemplate asking Radcliffe to amend the Awards", he continued.

In the end, however, common sense and the counsels of [Lord] Ismay [Mountbatten's Chief of Staff] must have convinced him that the risks were too great, the game was not worth even a small part of the candle.

"He must have been guilty of indiscretion but not of the arrant folly as well as dishonesty of which his enemies accused him".

In his biography, Mr. Ziegler wrote that a nugget of doubt remained.

However, he still could not understand why Radcliffe should have succumbed so readily nor why Ismay, a man who knew India really well, should not have advised Mountbatten to call Nehru's bluff.

Mr. Beaumont said he thought this was a good point. Not having been present at the lunch he could not say who had said that; it

could be that Ismay had advised against any change in the line, but that his advice had been disregarded.

In his statement, Mr. Beaumont said that “with the death of Sir George Abell, Mountbatten's Private Secretary, in 1989, he remained the only one who knows the truth about the 1947 partition of India and the consequent creation of Pakistan”. Although in the early 1980s he had told his close friend, the historian of India, Sir Penderel Moon and his brother-in-law, Sir Robin Latimer, what had happened? After drawing up his statement in 1989, Mr. Beaumont lodged the original at All Souls College, Oxford, with the request that the contents not be divulged until after his death and to selected persons and only by agreement between the Warden of All Souls and the Head of the Foreign Office.

He said he had been led to reconsider the whole position after his grandson had been given the partition of India as a special subject in the History Tripos at Cambridge University.

“This made me realise belatedly that the event had passed into history and that the time had come for the truth to be revealed”, said Mr. Beaumont.

In his statement he said Radcliffe had objected to an order from Mountbatten, Nehru and Mr. M. A. Jinnah, leader of the Muslim League and later first Governor-General of Pakistan, to complete his findings by August 15 1947.

It was clearly impossible properly to complete the task in one month nine days. Mountbatten, Nehru and Jinnah must share the name for this irresponsible decision.

It was also a serious mistake “to appoint a Hindu, Rao Sahib V. D. Iyer, to the confidential post of Assistant Secretary to the Commission. The job should have gone to someone brought out from Britain.”

Mr. Beaumont said he, Radcliffe and Ayer were the only people who knew about the progress of the lines being drawn across Punjab and Bengal the other part of British India partitioned at Independence.

He said he had “little doubt” that Ayer kept Nehru and Mr. V. P. Menon who handled the accession of States to India, informed of progress.

Evidence for this came at a meeting chaired by Mountbatten on August 12 the day before Mr. Beaumont handed the Commission reports to the Viceregal Lodge, when Nehru complained about the award of Chittagong Hill Tracts in Bengal to Pakistan.

Mr. Beaumont notes that Mr. John Christie, one of Mountbatten's Assistant Private Secretaries, wrote in his diary for August 11: “His Excellency has to be strenuously dissuaded from trying to persuade Radcliffe to amend his Punjab line”.

Mr. Beaumont said, “This was on a date when H.E. ought not to have known where the line was drawn”.

He said he had not kept a diary, so could not be entirely sure about dates.

However, the facts were as follows:

Radcliffe had completed the Punjab line, allotting the Ferozepore and Zira sub-districts to Pakistan.

Mr. Beaumont showed the map to Abell, following a request from Sir Evan Jenkins, Governor of Punjab, who wanted to station troops in the spots where violence was most likely to break out.

Shortly after that, [V.P.] Menon turned up at Radcliffe's residence towards midnight and asked to see him. Mr. Beaumont said he could not. Menon said Mountbatten had sent him to which Mr. Beaumont replied that it made no difference.

“He departed with good grace”, Mr. Beaumont said in his statement.

“I think he anticipated the rebuff. He was a very able and perceptive person.”

The next day Radcliffe told Mr. Beaumont that he had been invited to lunch with Mountbatten by Ismay.

However in both the cases of Mounbatten and Radcliffe there were “mitigating circumstances if not excuses”.

Mountbatten was overworked and overtired and was “doubtless” told by Nehru and Menon that to give Ferozepore to Pakistan would result in war between the two newly independent countries.

Radcliffe was probably persuaded by Mountbatten at the lunch that civil war or at least something like it would result from the award of Ferozepore to Pakistan.

“Radcliffe had only been in India [for] six weeks”, Mr. Beaumont's statement said. “He suffered much from the heat”.

“He probably did not know that Nehru, Menon and [Maharaja of] Bikaner were putting pressure on Mountbatten”.

Radcliffe added that he had been asked not to bring his Private Secretary with him because there was not enough room⁴ at the table for an extra guest.

“Having lived for six months in the house occupied by Ismay, I knew this to be untrue”.

Mr. Beaumont's statement said: “But my suspicions were not aroused as they should have been. I was leaving India the next week, had many preoccupations and welcomed the chance to get on with my own affairs.

This was the first time, however, that Radcliffe and I had been separated at any sort of function.

That evening the Punjab line was changed.

Mr. Beaumont said he thought the alteration took place under pressure from Mountbatten who was in turn under pressure from Nehru and almost certainly from the Maharaja of Bikaner whose State would have been adversely affected if the canal Headworks in Ferozepore had gone to Pakistan and who is said to have told Mountbatten that unless Ferozepore was allotted to India he would have to accede to Pakistan.⁵

4 The reason for not inviting Beaumont could be that Patel had complained to Mountbatten that Secretary to the Commission had pro-League sympathies.

5 See Appendix I. 7, note 1.

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Glossary

Abadi	That part of the village lands on which residential buildings are erected.
Chaudrahat	Heading a village or caste.
Chowk	Crossing
Firman	Order
Gao mata	Mother cow (Holy cow)
Goondas	Hooligan; hired rascals.
Gurdawaras	A Sikh place of worship; generally also the centre of Sikhs social activity.
Hartals	Shopkeepers strike; Strike.
Jathas	A band of fighting Sikhs.
Kirpan	Sikh dagger; a Sikh religious emblem
Kotwal	Police Constable
Lakh	One hundred thousand, written as 1,00,000
Lambardars	Revenue collector
Lathis	A bamboo cane with a metal tip, used by Indian Policemen to control crowds.
Mandis	Open markets
Mohallas	Localities
Samjhota	Reaching an agreement
Shahidi Jatha	Suicidal band
Thanas	Police Stations

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Abbott, Stuart, Evelyn, I.C.S., Secretary to the Governor of Punjab 1946-47.

Abell, Sir George Edmond Brankenbury, I.C.S., Private Secretary to Viceroy from 1946.

Attlee, Clement Richard, M.P (Lab) for Limehouse; Deputy Prime Minister 1942-45; Prime Minister from July 1945.

Auchinleck, Field Marshal Sir Claude John Eyre, C.-in-C., India, Jan.-July 1941 and from June 1943; C.-in-C., Middle East July 1941-Aug. 1942.

Azad, Maulana Abul Kalam, President, Indian National Congress 23 and 1939-June 1946; member, Interim Govt. from Jan. 1947.

Baldev Singh, Sardar, Minister of Development, Punjab 1942-46; Member Interim Govt. (Defence) from 2 September 1945.

Brendon, Patrick, I.C.S., Deputy Commissioner, Gurgaon 1946-47.

Campbell Johnson, Alan, Press Attaché to the Viceroy from March 1947.

Caroe, Sir Olaf Kirkpatrick, I.C.S., Secretary External Affairs Dept, Govt. of India 1939-45; Governor of NWFP, 1946-47

Churchill, Winston Leonard Spencer, M.P. (Con.) for Epping Division of Essex; Prime Minister and Minister of Defence 1940-45; Leader of Opposition from 1945.

Cripps, Sir (Richard) Stafford, M.P. (Lab.) for Bristol East; Minister of Aircraft Production 1942-45; carried constitutional proposals to India March 1942; President Board of Trade from 1945; Member of the Cabinet Mission of India 1946.

Daultana, Mian Mumtaz Muhammad Khan, General Secretary of Punjab Provincial Muslim League; Member, Punjab Legislative Assembly from 1946.

Din Muhammad, Khan Bahadur, Judge of the High Court, Lahore 1936-46; Member of the Punjab Boundary Commission.

Gandhi, Mohandas Karamchand, known as the Mahatma (Great Soul).

Iqbal, Allama Muhammad, known as poet of the East, In Allahabad Address, he identify the areas to be Muslim Majority. President of Punjab Muslim League in 1936.

Ismay, 1st Baron cr 1947 General Hasting Lionel Ismay), Chief of Staff to Minister of Defence 1940-46; Chief of the Viceroy's Staff 1947.

Jenkins, Sir Evan Meredith, I.C.S., Private Secretary to Viceroy 1943-45; Governor of the Punjab 1946-47.

Jinnah Muhammad Ali, President All India Muslim League 1916, 1920 and from 1934; called Quaid-i-Azam (the great leader);

Khizar (Khizr) Hayat Khan Tiwana, Nawab Malik Sir, Premier of the Punjab from December.1942-March 1947.

Liaquat (Liaqat) Ali Khan, Nawabzada, General Secretary, All India Muslim League from 1936; Deputy Leader of Muslim League Party in the Indian Legislative Assembly from 1940; Member, Interim Govt. (Finance) from 26 Oct. 1946; and reconstitution of Interim Government.

Linlithgow, (Victor Alexander John Hope), Viceroy and Governor General of India 1936-43.

Listowel, (William Francis Hare), Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for India and Burma 1944-45; Post Master General 1945-1947, Secretary of State for India and Burma from 23rd April 1947.

Mahajan, Mehr Chand, Judge of the High Court, Punjab from 1943; Member of the Punjab Boundary Commission.

Mamdot, Iftikhar Hussain Khan, Nawab of, Member of the Punjab Legislative Assembly; President of the Punjab Provincial Muslim League; Member, Muslim League Working Committee; Prime Minister, West Punjab 1947.

Menon, Rao Bahadur Vapal Pangunni, Reforms Commissioner to the Government of India from 1942 and also Secretary to the Governor-General (Public) 1945-46. Secretary States Department 1947.

Mountbatten, Pamela, second daughter of Viscount Mountbatten.

Mountbatten, (Lord Louis Francis Albert Victor Nicholas), Rear-Admiral Viscount, Viceroy of India March-August 1947.

Mountbatten, Edwina wife of Mountbatten.

Mudie, Sir (Robert) Francis, I.C.S., Home Member, Viceroy Executive Council 1944-45; Governor of Sind 1946-47; Governor of West Punjab from 15 August 1947.

Muhammad Munir, Judge of the High Court, Lahore from 1942; Member of the Punjab Boundary Commission.

Nazimuddin, Khawaja Sir, Member, Working Committee, All India Muslim League, Chief Minister, Bengal 1943-45.

Nehru, Pundit Jawaharlal, President, Indian National Congress 1929-30, 1936, 1937 and 1946; Member, Interim Government (External Affairs and Commonwealth Relations) from 2 September 1946.

Nicholls, Commander George, R.N., Deputy Personal Secretary to Lord Mountbatten from March 1947.

Nishtar, Sardar Abdur Rab Khan, Member Legislative Assembly N.W.F.P. 1937-46; Finance Member N.W.F.P. 1943-45; Member, Interim Government from 26 October 1946.

Noon, Malik Sir Feroz Khan, Member for Defence, Viceroy Executive Council 1942-45; Indian representative, British War Cabinet 1944-45.

Panikkar, Kavalam Madhava, Prime Minister of Bikaner from 1944.

Patel, Sardar Vallabhbhai Jhaverbhai, Member Working Committee, Indian National Congress, President of Congress 1931; Chairman , Congress Parliamentary Sub-Committee 1935-39; Member, Interim Government (Home) from 2 September, 1946.

Pathick- Lawrence, (Fredrick William Pethick Lawrence) 1st Baron cr.1945, Secretary of State for India and Burma 1945-47; Member of the Cabinet Mission to India.

Patiala, Maharaja of, Pro Chancellor of the Chambers of Princes 1946-47 and officiating Chancellor from June 1947.

Qurban Ali Khan, Khan, Inspector General of Police (Designate), West Punjab.

Radcliffe, Sir Cyril John, Director General, Ministry of Information 1941-45; Vice Chairman, General Council of the Bar from 1946; Chairman, Punjab and Bengal Boundary Commissions 1947.

Sachar, Lala Bhim Sen, Finance Minister, Punjab November 1946-March 1947.

Saidullah Khan, I.C.S., Commissioner Lahore Division 1945-47.

Savage, Gerald Robert, Superintendent of Police, Criminal Investigation Department Lahore 1947.

Scott, Ian Dixon, I.C.S., Deputy Private Secretary to the Viceroy 1945-47.

Shaukat Hayat Khan, Captain Sardar, Minister of Public Works, Punjab 1943-44; a son of Sikander Hayat Khan.

Sikander Hayat Khan, Sardar, Sir, Premier of the Punjab 1937-42.

Suhrawardy, Huseyn Shaheed, Chief Minister and Home Minister, Bengal from 1946.

Swaran Singh, Sardar, Minister of Development, Punjab September 1946-March 1947.

Tara Singh, Master, Leader of the Akali Singh.

Teja Singh, Sardar, Judge of the High Court, Lahore from 1943; Member of the Punjab Boundary Commission.

Wavell, Field Marshall Earl (Archibald Percival Wavell), Viceroy and Governor General of India 1943-47.

Zafrullah Khan, Chaudhuri Sir Muhammad, Member, Viceroy Executive Council 1935-41; Judge Federal Court of India 1941-47; Constitutional Advisor of Nawab of Bhopal.

Zahid Hussain, Indian Audit Department, Finance Commissioner, Railways 1943-46; Vice-Chancellor, Aligarh University 1947.

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