

*Mughal-Afghan
Relations
in South Asia
History and Developments*

Himayatullah Yaqubi



**National Institute of Historical and Cultural Research
Centre of Excellence, Quaid-I-Azam University
Islamabad
2015**

*Mughal-Afghan
Relations
in South Asia
History and Developments*

NIHCR Publication No. 174

Copyright © 2015

All rights reserved. No part of this publication be reproduced, translated, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted, in any form or by any means, without the prior permission in writing from the Director, National Institute of Historical and Cultural Research, Centre of Excellence, Quaid-i-Azam University, Islamabad. Enquiries concerning reproduction should be sent to NIHCR at the address below:

National Institute of Historical and Cultural Research
Centre of Excellence, New Campus, Quaid-i-Azam University
P.O. Box 1230, Islamabad-44000.

Tel: +92-51-2896153-54; Fax: +92-51-2896152

Email: nihcr@hotmail.com or nihcr@yahoo.com

Website: www.nihcr.edu.pk

Published by

Muhammad Munir Khawar, Publication Officer

Printed at

M/s. Roohani Art Press, 35-E, Chughtai Plaza,
Blue Area, Islamabad, Pakistan.

Price:

	Pakistan	Rs.	600/-
	SAARC countries:	Rs.	900/-
ISBN: 978-969-415-115-1	Other countries:	US\$	20/-

For my parents

and brothers

**Engineer Qaseemullah Yaqubi (Late),
Dr. Hidayat Ullah Khan**

Contents

<i>Acknowledgement</i>	<i>ix</i>
<i>Illustrations</i>	<i>xii</i>
<i>Introduction</i>	<i>xiii</i>
1. Mughal-Afghan Relations in the Historical Perspective	1
Origin of the Afghans	3
Socio-Political Organization of the Afghans	7
Afghan Nobility in India	11
Emergence of the Mongols	12
Afghans and Mongols in India	19
Timur's Indian Invasion and the Afghans	29
Establishment of the Afghan Lodhi Dynasty	32
2. Babur and the Afghans	43
Origin of the Mughal-Afghan Conflict	45
Babur's Relations with the Afghan Tribes	53
Babur's Marriage with Bibi Mubarak	61
Downfall of the Lodhi Dynasty	66
3. Afghan Revival under Sher Shah Suri	79
Sher Shah Suri's Rise to Prominence	80
Sher Shah's Relations with the Mughals	83
Humayun-Sher Shah Confrontation	89
Establishment of the Afghan Suri Dynasty	91
Successors of Sher Shah Suri	96
4. Roshniya Movement and the Yusufzais' Resistance	101
Bayazid Ansari: Birth and Childhood	107
In Search of Pir-i-Kamil	110
Bayazid's Tussle with the Mughals	114
Bayazid's Messenger in the Court of Akbar	116
Encounter with the Mughals	118
Death of Bayazid Ansari	122

Akhun Darwaiza and Roshniya Movement	124
Yusufzais' Uprising against Akbar	129
Successors of Bayazid Ansari	133
Roshniya Movement and the Afghan Nationalist Discourse	135
Decline of the Roshniya Movement	140
5. Aurangzeb and the Afghan Resistance-I	145
Khattak-Mughal Rapprochement	146
Khushal Khan as a Mughal <i>Mansabdar</i>	153
Afghan Nobles and Mughal War of Succession	160
Imprisonment of Khushal Khan	165
Yusufzais' Uprising under Bhaku Khan	168
Revolt of Darya Khan and Aimal Khan	177
6. Aurangzeb and the Afghan Resistance-II	193
Revolt of Khushal Khan	194
Khushal Khan among the Swat Yusufzais	200
Yusufzais Attacks on Mughal Installations	212
Downfall of the Afghan Resistance	215
The Last days of Khushal Khan	218
Afghan Resistance after the Death of Khushal Khan	220
Glossary	225
Bibliography	229
Index	235

Acknowledgement

The history and culture of the Afghans is one of the uphill tasks to deal with. It was a testing job for me to come out of my Pakhtun psyche along with personal biases, prejudices and lucidly present their historical records in an analytical manner. Facts are few whereas opinion and folktales are numerous. In the process, I remain engaged in intellectual cross-current discussions with renowned scholars and most of the time found some of them anchoring on their biases only. But the objective of the present research endeavour was to do justice with the facts to write a comprehensive history of the Afghans' relationship with the Mughals. The topic seems to be simple but it takes into account all the important events and aspects which took place in encounters between these two important ruling ethnic groups in South Asia.

I was fortunate enough to have the guidance of Prof. Dr. Sayed Wiqar Ali Shah, Director, National Institute of Historical and Cultural Research, Quaid-i-Azam University who happens to be one of the authorities on the history and politics of the Afghans. The feedback I got from Prof. Wiqar is of immense significance. I discussed various themes regarding the Mughal-Afghan relations with him and got not only rare materials but also thoughtful academic cruising. I am also thankful to Prof. Dr. Sultan-i-Rome, Government Jehanzeb College, Saidu Sharif, Swat, for his cooperation in the completion of this work. He went through the entire manuscript and took pains to thoroughly check methodology and text. His scholarly suggestions and criticism prove to be practical and befitting. The valuable suggestions of Dr. Salman Bangash, Department of History, University of Peshawar, nevertheless provided me with immense thought products in the process of publication.

The credit of this work also goes to my parents and elder brother Dr. Hidayatullah Khan as without their moral support and encouragement, I would have not been able to complete this work in time. My brother, in spite of his busy schedule,

made arrangements for composition of the entire manuscript. I also express my gratitude for my uncle Haji Ikramullah, who, at the early stage of my career, invoked my interest in history and encouraged me to study the Afghan history at home. My cousins Engineer Qaseemullah (Late), Iftikhar Ahmad Yusufzai, Karam Sattar Yaqubi and Shahar Yar Yaqubi chose this discipline for me since my early days, as a student in Islamia College University, Peshawar. Prof. Ghulam Qasim Marwat, Director, Higher Education Teachers Training Academy, Peshawar, deserve special thanks. Exchange of ideas with him and Iftikhar Ahmad greatly refined the manuscript. My deep gratitude goes to the Librarians, Pashto Academy, Pakistan Study Centre and Department of History, University of Peshawar, who allowed me to consult and collect the source materials available in those repositories. Hazoor Bux Channa, librarian in the National Institute of Historical and Cultural Research also provided me the available literature on the history of the Mughals and the Afghans. In the Publication section I would mention specially the names of Rao Tahir Hussain, Zahid Imran, Sher Afgan and Khalid Mahmood for their sincere effort in the proof-reading process of the manuscript. Mr. Muhammad Munir Khawar, Publication Officer, was always kind enough to incorporate all my suggestions at the final stage when the manuscript was ready for the press.

Since long I am working on various themes regarding the Mughal-Afghan conflict and published a number of articles in various national and international journals. Therefore, I deem it pertinent to mention my gratitude to the editors of the *Journal of South Asian and Middle Eastern Studies*, Villanova University Pennsylvania USA, *Journal of the Research Society of Pakistan*, Punjab University Lahore and *Pakistan Journal of History and Culture*, National Institute of Historical and Cultural Research, Centre of Excellence, Quaid-i-Azam University Islamabad. I am obliged to all of them for their generous cooperation to publish my article in these journals.

I am grateful to my friends Altaf Ullah, Dr. Shakeel Ahmad Awan (COMSATS), Umar Fazal (IIUI), Naveed Iqbal Khan, Muhammad Ali Shah and Arshad Muhammad (Higher Education Department, Government of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa),

Shahbaz Khan Khattak and Kafeel Ahmad (Pakistan Study Centre, University of Peshawar) who helped me with most valuable materials. Dr. Noor ul Basar Aman (University of Malakand) and Syed Zafar Ullah Bakhshali (Pashto Academy, University of Peshawar) helped me in composing the Pashto verses. I am thankful for their kind cooperation.

I am enormously grateful to my wife Sadaf Ahmad, children Anas Khan Yaqubi, Afia Khan Yaqubi and Yunas Khan Yaqubi. They not only provided me peace and comfort at home but also encouraged me whenever I stayed away from home for the completion of this work.

I tried my level best to make this research endeavour error free. If, however, any error still persists, I will be responsible for that and I would also welcome any further necessary suggestions.

Dr. Himayatullah Yaqubi

Islamabad, 2015

Illustrations

a) Sultan Bahlul Lodhi	184
b) Sultan Ibrahim Lodhi	184
c) Bayazid Ansari	185
d) Gaju Khan Yusufzai	185
e) Afghan Emperor Sher Shah Suri	186
f) A Group of Afridi Fighters	187
g) Khushal Khan Khattak	188
h) Malak Ahmad Khan Yusufzai, Founder of Modern Pakhtunkhwa	189
i) Author at the Grave of Bhaku Khan Yusufzai (the grave is situated in Kankoway village district, Buner)	190
j) Suri Empire at the time of Sher Shah Suri	191

Introduction

Like their origin, the role played by the Afghans in the political history of South Asia is shrouded in their rise and fall, myth and overlapping events. Historically, the Afghans played a momentous role in influencing the political dynamics of not only in Afghanistan, the north-western frontier areas but also shaped and reshaped the fate of the Delhi throne. They captured the throne of Delhi several times and simultaneously resisted and fought incessant wars against the waves of invaders who encroached upon their land. Due to their important position in the political history of South Asia, it is necessary to produce an objective inquiry about their relations with the Mughals who not only challenged them in Afghanistan but also overthrew them twice from the Delhi throne in India.

Generally speaking, both the Mughals and Afghans in South Asia considered and treated each other as political rivals. In dealing with the Mughal-Afghan relations majority of the scholars started their inquiries after the coming of Zahir-ud-Din Babur who occupied the throne of Delhi in 1526. Major research works that has been produced restricted its parameters only to the era of the greater Mughals (1526-1707). Accordingly, a number of significant events and movements have been discussed in details which were regarded as the basis of Afghan national resistance to curtail the Mughal encroachment upon their areas. In most of these academic inquiries various movements and periods of their resistance in their homeland such as Roshniya Movement, Yusufzai struggle and Khushal Khan Khattak's fighting against the Mughals has been highlighted from different angles. In addition, the rise of Bahlul Lodhi and Sher Shah Suri in the Indian mainland has been looked at by many scholars in the Afghan nationalist paradigm. However, no efforts have been made to explore any political or strategic connection between the two-cleft struggles of the Afghans.

Interestingly, to write about the Mughal-Afghan relations, it is very much important to look into the Afghan struggle against the Mughals in two geographical patterns. They were in constant struggle to resist the Mughals not only in the Afghan borderland areas but also in the Delhi court and other provinces. Very little research work has been done to integrate these overlapping events and trace the origin of the conflict between the two people in historical perspective. First and foremost is to trace and explore the relations of the Afghans and the Mongols, the ancestors of the Mughals, because without studying the Mongol-Afghan relations it would be quite difficult to understand the true nature of the Mughal-Afghan conflict. It would provide a good understanding and a sound historical background to study the Mughal-Afghan relation in its true perspective. In this connection, Muhammad Abdur Rahim has observed that throughout the Muslim rule in India, the Afghan remained quite successful in preserving their distinct political identity. Hence, they had their own history as a political community even after they had lost their Sultanate twice to the Mughals.¹

Any objective research endeavour cannot ignore the role played by the Afghans in the political paradigm of India that developed during the Sultanate period much before the coming of the Mughals. The Mongol invasions started during the period of the Delhi Sultans which largely disturbed the social and political setting of the Afghans. Obviously, the history of both the communities should be traced back with the emergence of the Mongols and their repeated Indian invasions under different commanders. These invasions were carried out not only by the Mongols but also by the Tatars and Turks who also hailed from Central Asia and Mongolia. However, the attacks carried out by Genghiz Khan and Timur, the former a Mongol and the latter a Turk of Barlas tribe, left their everlasting marks on the Indian political milieu. Later on, the attacks of the Mughals, which is the Persianized form of the term Mongol, were the continuation of the trend set by these two Mongol and Tartar invaders. Agha

1 Muhammad Abdur Rahim, *History of the Afghans in India* (Karachi: University of Karachi, n-d), p. 10.

Hussain Hamadani has recorded that, in 1397-98, the invasion of Timur not only brought miseries to the Indians but also created a political and administrative turmoil in Delhi. From that onwards the Mongol and then the Mughal successors of Timur perceived the idea that the throne of Delhi was their rightful dominion.² They considered it their rightful territories earlier conquered by their ancestors many a time. Yet, the case of Zahir-ud-Din Babur, who possessed blood of both the Mongol and the Tartar in his veins, was markedly different in many aspects from his two great ancestors. Unlike Genghiz Khan and Timur, Babur established the Mughal dynasty and decided to stay and rule permanently in South Asia. The logic, however, he provided in his autobiography *Tuzk-i-Baburi* was the same that all these territories were once held by Timur and hence are his legal dominions to capture.

The mountainous belt in the north-western frontier of India stretching westwards up-to Kabul in modern day Afghanistan known as '*Ruh*' (روه) in historical manuscripts, was the early homeland of the Afghans. They were recruited in large number as mercenaries by all the conquerors, who came to Afghanistan and then crossed the Afghan belt for onward march into the South Asian region. The territory to which they belonged even today produces the best fighting force of the world. Along with their great fighting quality, they brought a strong physique and robust body to India. Well-built and stout they infused new vigour into the life of the Indian people in general and Muslims in particular. With these physical and intellectual qualities they carved out a significant place for themselves in the Indian politics. Due to these qualities they were regarded an influential and major player not only in South Asia but also in Afghanistan and Persia.³ Their influence and power was stronger in eastern Afghanistan and Peshawar at the dawn of the eleventh century. The Hindu Raja Jaipal and later Subuktigin conferred Laghman and Multan on Hamid Lodhi, an Afghan chieftain of the area. Peshawar was administered by several local Afghan officers on

2 Agha Hussain Hamadani, *The Frontier Policy of the Delhi Sultans* (Islamabad: National Institute of Historical and Cultural Research, 1986), p. 18.

3 Rite Joshi, *The Afghan Nobility and the Mughals* (Delhi: Vikas Publishing House, 1985). p. 11.

behalf of the Ghazni Sultans. They also enjoyed the favour in the courts of Muhammad Ghauri, Qutb-ud-Din Aibak and Shams-ud-Din Iltutmish.⁴

During the reign of Qutb-ud-Din Aibak, a new development took place on the political scene of the entire region. It was the emergence of the Mongols in the east under their leader Genghiz Khan. Mongols and Afghans came into contact with each other when Genghiz Khan and Jalal-ud-Din Khwarzam Shah came across each others in Afghanistan. Afghans fought along-side Khwarzam Shah against the Mongol invaders. However, he was defeated and then chased up to the river Indus by the army of Genghiz Khan. With this incursion into the Indian territories, a long series of Mongol invasions started which directly tumbled, disturbed and often dislocated the Afghan population on their way to India. Thus from the very start of their interaction a sense of hatred and distrust permeated into the body politic of both the communities. A feeling of rivalry prevailed among them which afterwards took the shape of a full-fledge political conflict during the Mughal period. Both the people regarded one another as political rivals in South Asia and Afghanistan and the supremacy of one was considered disaster of the other. Hence, no less important and interesting in the political history of the Afghans was their relation with the Mughals who were the predecessors of the Mongols.

Genghiz Khan after his Indian campaigns abandoned the region and returned back to his kingdom. However, their conquest of India and crossing the Afghan borderland was a significant historical and political development. A trend of frequent Mongol invasions was started which, subsequently, followed by their successors Timur and Zahir-ud-Din Babur. Therefore, it is worthwhile to discuss in brief about the emergence of the Mongols as a political force, origin of their relationship, development of animosity with the Afghans, and the subsequent migration of the Afghans to India and other South Asian countries from Afghanistan and their rise to power and authority in the Indian subcontinent.

4 *Ibid.*, p. 21.

These frequent Mongol invasions were also a great source of trouble for the Delhi Sultans. Therefore, they recruited a large number of the Afghans in their armies to counteract the Mongol menace within the border limits of the Sultanate. After Timur's invasion the Sultanate began to disintegrate and the recalcitrant elements emerged on account of large-scale devastation. However, the Afghans under the inspiring leadership of Bahlul Lodhi revived the authority and prestige of the Sultanate by capturing the throne of Delhi in 1451.

The main focus of the present study would be to comprehend and analyse the relations of the Mughals and Afghans and the origin of their conflict in historical and analytical perspectives. The main cause of the rivalry between the two communities was the murder of about 700 Yusufzai and other Afghan malaks by Mirza Ulugh Beg, the ruler of Kabul from 1460 to 1501. He was the brother of Umar Shaikh Mirza and paternal uncle of Babur. The massacre probably took place in 1490 at the Kabul Palace of the Mughal prince. This specific incident has been mentioned as a passing reference by a number of scholars but no one has critically evaluated or analysed it in its true historical perspective. So, the Mughals and various Afghan tribes had carried the unpleasant effects of their animosity along with them from Afghanistan to the South Asian region.

After the establishment of the Lodhi dynasty in India the Afghans did not maintain their supremacy for long. Ibrahim, the last Lodhi Sultan, was defeated by Zahir-ud-Din Babur, a Mughal prince and successor of Ulugh Beg to the Kabul throne, in the first battle of Panipat in 1526. The strange aspect of the matter was the crossing of Babur of the rugged and tough north-western borderland region largely inhabited by various Afghan tribes. Initially, it proved a daunting task for him but quite surprisingly he remained successful in subduing all the Afghan tribes through various means i.e. intimidation, threats, defeats, massacres and friendship. It is also a matter of surprising negligence on the part of the three Afghan Lodhi monarchs that they failed to secure the strategically important north-western border which was inhabited mostly by their brethren.

It is to be mentioned here that the political dynamics of the north-western Afghan borderland were much different from that of the mainland of India. As, geographically, the area remained in the periphery of Kabul and India therefore; majority of the Delhi Sultans took least interest to firmly consolidate it for the safety of their throne. Very often the invasions from the north-western side proved one of the main causes of the downfall of various ruling dynasties in Delhi. In the same manner, in 1526, Babur founded the Mughal dynasty of India by crossing the Afghan borderland. But the Afghans did not tamely submit to the position of vanquished after losing the throne of Delhi. They continued their struggle for generations against the successive Mughal emperors and in the process maintained hold on various places in India.

The policy of Babur and his son and successor Humayun towards the Afghans was both of conciliation and reprisal. They gave them fiefs and let them undisturbed in the possession of their *jagirs*. On some occasions, however, they were harshly treated by the Mughals. On their part, the Afghans stubbornly maintained their supremacy in the borderland areas, Bengal, Bihar and Orissa. This provided them with a rallying centre against the Mughals. Afterwards, when the Mughals were somewhat weakened by the death of Babur, Sher Shah Suri made another successful bid to restore the lost glory and position of the Afghan by capturing the throne of Delhi. He rallied all the influential Afghan nobles under his banner which ultimately enabled him to expel Humayun, son and successor of Babur, from India.⁵ In fact, he very adroitly exploited the weaknesses of the Mughals and proved himself a challenging contender for the throne. Interestingly enough, Sher Shah Suri, the shrewdest Afghan statesman, failed to consolidate the north-western borderland, the most dangerous strategic loophole, inhabited by his Afghan brethren. At the end, it was that vulnerable strip that was utilized by Humayun to appear and regained the throne of Delhi from the Afghans.

Among the Mughal emperors Akbar was regarded as the classic founder of the Mughal dynasty. He was suspicious

5 Joshi, *The Afghan Nobility*, p.181.

about the role of the Afghan nobility. He did not trust them in view of their past conduct. On the other hand, the Afghans in general and the north-western borderland areas in particular remained hostile towards him. They were never relaxed in causing trouble to the Mughal Empire. Inspired by great leaders like Kalu Khan Yusufzai and Bayazid Ansari, the Afghans asserted their supremacy in their respective areas. Kalu Khan inflicted a crushing defeat on the Mughal army in the Karakar defiles at the mountainous belt in Buner by storming their camps in 1587. Akbar's favourite Raja Birbal along with 10,000 Mughal fighters was killed in the encounter. Besides the Yusufzais' attacks, Bayazid Ansari started a vigorous drive, the Roshniya Movement against the Mughals. Initially, the movement was started with a programme of socio-religious reforms but later on when it gained popularity among the public it got political heights. At the same time it also alarmed the Mughal authorities in Kabul and Delhi.⁶

Emperor Akbar considered it a movement having the potentials to challenge his authority in the north-western Afghan borderland, therefore, he ordered for a strong action against the followers of Bayazid. Under these circumstances the hostility and distrust between the Mughals and the Afghans increased manifold. Although some Afghan Malaks like Akor Khan served Akbar with distinction, but he did not trust them with any responsible post. He was not ready to tolerate any leader to unite the Afghans against the Mughals. To crush their power he sent several punitive expeditions against them. During Akbar's reign, the Mughal-Afghan conflict intensified in which thousands of the Afghans sacrificed their lives and a number of their leaders were either imprisoned or murdered.

After the death of Bayazid Ansari, his successors continued his movement with fresh zeal. They offered tough resistance and created a lot of problems for the Mughals. At last, during the reign of Emperor Shah Jehan the tussle between the Roshnites and the Mughals came to an end. Abdul Qadir, son

6 Hamid-ul-Haq, 'Roushaniya Movement: Its Contribution to Pashto Literature' (Unpublished MPhil Thesis, National Institute of Pakistan Studies, Quaid-i-Azam University, Islamabad, 2003), p. x.

of Ahdad and grandson of Bayazid, through Umar and Aladad Khan, submitted to the Mughal authority and joined their service.⁷ It was followed by the rebellion of Khan Jahan Lodhi which cautioned Shah Jehan in appointing the Afghans in military services and trusting them with responsible posts. A critical investigation has also been given that whether Bayazid Ansari was an Afghan nationalist as projected by the nationalist and progressive writers in their academic discourses. In fact, the extremist views of his militant cult have largely and gravely been ignored by these writers in constructing the Afghan nationalist paradigm.

Emperor Aurangzeb did not implicitly trust the Afghans at all. His era witnessed grave uprising of the Afghans. In the commencement of his reign, despite their support for him in the war of succession, he gradually, lost the support of the Afghan elites. Before Aurangzeb's reign it was during the time of Emperor Akbar that he entrusted the responsibility of the protection of the imperial highway from Nowshehra to Peshawar to Akor Khan, grand-grandfather of Khushal Khan. During Shah Jehan's rule Khushal Khan became the chief of the Khattak tribe and was given the old responsibility of his forefathers by the Emperor. He served the Mughal and participated in the campaigns of Kanhra and Badakhshan under the command of Asalat Khan. During this period he was a loyal servant of the Mughals and fought many battles against Mohmand, Bangash and Yusufzai tribes to get the Emperors' favours. During the reign of Aurangzeb, he was arrested in 1664 under a conspiracy which also involved some Mughal officials and two of his uncles. He was sent to Delhi and afterwards was shifted to the fort of Ranthambur. During his imprisonment Khushal Khan changed his perception about the Mughals. In 1667 the uprising of the Yusufzai in the Afghan borderland compelled Aurangzeb once again to exploit his services against the Yusufzais. He was accordingly released and sent to the frontier region along with Mahabat Khan, the

7 Dost Muhammad Khan Kamil Momand, *Khushal Khan Khattak* [Urdu] (Peshawar: Idara-i-Ashaat-i-Sarhad, 1951), p. 237.

newly appointed governor of Kabul.⁸ After his release, he remained close to the Mughal authorities for some time either for gaining their favour or other reasons. Later on, he somewhat turned against them when he realized that he has been pushed to the wall. He was no more a loyal servant of the Mughals rather eulogized in his poetry the nationalist struggle to unite the Afghans against them. Majority of the Afghans consider him a nationalist for his thought-provoking poetry for the Afghan cause and their unification. But it was a time when he was deprived of his *mansab* (rank), perks and *jagirs*. An analysis of Khushal Khan's political thoughts has been given to understand whether he was a true Afghan nationalist or otherwise.

This study aims at filling the gapes in the history of the relationship between the Mughals and the Afghans. Its objective is not only to explore the relationship of the two powerful and influential ethnicities i.e. Mughals and the Afghans in South Asia but also to dig out and critically evaluate the nature and different dimensions of the Afghan resistance to the Mughal Empire throughout the Greater Mughal period (1526-1707). It also aims at discovering the factual position and place which both of them deserve in the course of history. Special effort has been made to mention the Mughal-Afghan relationship in analytical and historical perspective. In the process, a cursory analysis has been added to understand the basis of the Afghan nationalism which emerged during the Mughal-Afghan conflict in South Asian context. As the subject and theme has not received proper attention from the researchers so far, therefore, it is hoped that this work would pave new avenues of research and scholarships. This work, however, is an attempt to fill the gap.

Review of Literature

For this study, various contemporary sources have been consulted and utilized. The Mughal histories have formed the main source and have supplied plenty of materials. The Pashto sources, however, played a remarkable role in exploring

8 *Ibid.*

various dynamics of the Mughal-Afghan conflict. On the other hand, the work done by other scholars and orientalists, and the accounts of the foreign travellers have also been profitably utilized. The secondary works have not been neglected in the study of the Mughal-Afghan relationship. Their ideas have been accommodated where found suitable in the light of historical evidence. The following are some of the important primary sources which were consulted for this study.

Afghan Histories

The book of Khwaja Niamatullah Harvi titled *Tarikh Khan Jahani wa Makhzan-i-Afghani* was compiled in 1612-13 under the patronage of Khan Jahan Lodi, a prominent noble of Emperor Jahangir. Niamatullah served in the *Khalsa* department at the time of Emperor Akbar and then worked as Librarian of Abdur Rahim Khan Khanan. His book is an important source to study the Afghan history, their genealogy and relations with the Mughals. Although, he eulogized the Afghan legends but his genealogical details of the tribes is much useful. The book has highlighted different periods of the Afghans' historical evolution from the age of Bahlul Lodhi to 1615 when the Afghans were largely subdued by the Mughals in South Asia. The book was written originally in Persian but translated into English by Bernhard Dorn in 1829.

Another Afghan historian was Abbas Khan Sarwani who compiled *Tarikh-i-Sher Shahi* which is truly regarded a valuable historical work. He worked as *Waqi Nawis* in the court of Emperor Akbar. His history begins with the period of Bahlul Lodhi up to the reign of Sher Shah Suri. It was compiled in 1587 under the instructions of Akbar. He not only has praised the Afghan monarchs but also recorded the defects of the Afghans. He has exposed the unruly and tribal nature of his own people and analysed these as the main cause responsible for their political downfall in South Asia.

Tarikh-i-Shahi or *Tarikh-i-Salatin-i-Afaghania* of Ahmad Yadgar is another important historical manuscript to study the period from Bahlul up to the restoration of Mughal Empire by Humayun in 1555. The author has claimed that the book was written on the instruction of Abul Muzaffar Dawud Karrani, son

of Sulaiman, the last Afghan ruler of Bengal. Dawud Karrani wanted to produce a comprehensive history of the Afghan kings on the pattern adopted in books like *Tabaqat-i-Nasiri* and *Tarikh-i-Feroz Shahi*. The book is much useful in terms of the role played by different chiefs and *zamindars* in the Mughal-Afghan conflict. It is, however, full of historical distortion and cannot be considered a reliable source until crosschecked with other contemporary manuscripts. The Urdu translation of the book was completed in 1985 by Syed Nazeer Niazi.

One of the astonishing works regarding the history of the Afghans particularly about the Yusufzai is *Tawarikh Hafiz Rahmat Khani* written by Pir Muazzam Shah. It has been first compiled on the order of Nawab Bahadur Khan Dawudzai. Afterwards the manuscript was completed and submitted to Hafiz Rahmat Khan, the *Diwan* of the Ruhila Afghan state of Ruhilkhand. The book is full of information about the relationship of the Afghans and Mughals in Afghanistan and India. It traces the origin of the conflict when Mirza Ulugh Beg was the ruler in Kabul in the second half of the fifteenth century. The book provides a detail account of the Yusufzais' settlement in Swat, Bajaur and in the plain area up to river Indus. It is indeed a rare document to study the emergence of modern Pakhtunkhwa by the Yusufzai Malak Ahmad Khan and his successors.

The most outstanding work regarding Khushal Khan Khattak, his life and struggle against the Mughals is *Tarikh-i-Murassa* written by his grandson Afzal Khan. Hence, Afzal Khan accompanied his father and grandfather on many occasions and witnessed the rise and fall of the Afghans' anti-Mughal struggle; therefore it is considered one of the best sources available to study the aforementioned subject. In addition, various poetic collections (*diwans*) of Khushal Khan are also available to study the Mughal-Afghan conflict. These books are the best available sources on the subject under study.

Bayazid Ansari's *Khair-ul-Bayan* is also a valuable source in many aspects. The book focuses on his religious ideas and other ecclesiastical matters. It is an outstanding work written during the Mughal rule in India. His other works also provide

information regarding Roshniya movement with particular reference to the Mughal-Afghan relations in the Sixteenth century. Besides, Akhun Darwaiza's works *Makhzan* and *Tazkirat-ul-Abrare wal Ashrar* are some other useful historical sources that can provide important information to understand the Mughal-Afghan relations. The focus of his work was to counteract the heretical thoughts of Bayazid Ansari who was his contemporary. For that matter, *Makhzan* is full of spiritual thoughts and understanding of various religious problems and its solutions.

Hayat-i-Afghani written by Muhammad Hayat Khan also provides materials in some aspects of the Mughal-Afghan relations. The book has been written in three volumes with brief histories of every Afghan tribe. Besides, *Tarikh-i-Khurshid Jahan* of Sher Muhammad Khan Gandapur is an important work about the history of the Afghans. The author of the book was a learned scholar of his time who produced several other books on religion, politics and culture of various countries. The book was originally written in Persian during the Sikh rule in the Punjab. The Urdu translation was completed by Siraj Ahmad Alvi. It covers some important aspects regarding the history, culture and role played by the Afghans in the South Asian politics.

Afsana-i-Shahan written in 1612 by Sheikh Muhammad Kabir Hazyani, son of Shaikh Ismail Hazyani, provides useful information about society, culture, politics and various ruling dynasties from Feroz Shah Tughlaq up to Akbar the Great. It is basically the collection of 140 stories of the Afghan kings of the Lodhi and Sur dynasties. Its author Muhammad Kabir belonged to a learned Afghan family of Baitani tribe of Jaunpur. Because of his family's close association with Sher Shah Suri and other Afghan nobles, his account of the Mughal-Afghan relation is a reliable source of information. The book is regarded as an important primary source to study the political history of the Sultanate and the Mughal periods.

Mughal Historical Manuscripts

Zahir-ud-Din Babur's autobiography called *Babur Nama* or *Waqiat-i-Baburi* is an important source of information about the

Mughal-Afghan relations during his time. In his book Babur has recorded all the events of his life and has never concealed even his failure and personal drawbacks. His information regarding various tribes, their settlement, towns and cities and other information regarding the Afghans and their region are so accurate that even today it cannot be challenged. He has recorded all the events of his life with sincerity and frankness. In fact, *Babur Nama* is an extraordinary source of not only Babur's character and career but also provide first-hand knowledge about the Mughal-Afghan conflict. It seems from *Babur Nama* that its author regarded the Afghans as the most dangerous political rivals of the Mughals.

Gul Badan Begum, the eldest daughter of Babur compiled the history of her brother Humayun entitled *Humayun Nama*. Princess Gul Badan was born somewhere in 1523. She compiled it during the reign of Emperor Akbar in 1587. She was an eyewitness of the major events happened during the reign of Humayun. She has delicately discussed interesting side-lights on the Mughal-Afghan relations in her book. The events that occurred at the time of Humayun's withdrawal from India have been discussed in detail. Particularly, discord of Humayun and his brother, a major factor in the defeat of the Mughals against the Afghans, have been discussed in the book. The book was translated into English by Annette S. Beveridge in 1902.

Abul Fazal's books *Akbar Nama* and *Ain-i-Akbari* are two valuable histories of the Mughal period. Being a court historian, Abul Fazal had facilities for obtaining materials from various sources. As a court historian, he was naturally hostile towards his master's enemies, i.e. the Afghans. He often has mentioned them with the appellation of black facet, black fated and wicked. He has great facility for obtaining sources from various libraries of Akbar. There are few other original sources including *Muntakhab-ul-Lubab* of Muhammad Hashim Khwafi Khan. This monumental work is about the Muslim rule over India of which the most important chapter is on the reign of Aurangzeb Alamgir. He had been in the service of the various Mughal emperors and also spent several years in the provinces under different commanders. He has been described as a historian of great merit.

Masir-i-Alamgiri was written by Muhammad Saqi famous by his name Saqi Musta'ad Khan. The book covers the reign of Aurangzeb from 1658 to 1707. Muhammad Saqi held several important posts during the Mughal reign. He served under Bakhtawar Khan, an important officer of Aurangzeb. He compiled this work on the order of Inayatullah Kashmiri. The book has been written in a very much abridged form. Some of its portions provide valuable information especially about Mughal-Afghan relations. Sir Jadu-Nath Sarkar translated it into English in 1947.

Tarikh-i-Rashidi is a monumental work regarding the origin of the Mongols, Turks and various other Central Asian ethnic groups. It was written by Mirza Muhammad Hyder Dughlat who was said to be one of the cousins of Babur. It is a good source of the history of the Mongol in Central Asia, their rise and fall, Mughals ascendancy in India up to the defeat of Humayun at the hands of Sher Shah Suri. He was an eyewitness of the events unfolded at the time of Humayun particularly his relations with the Afghans which are of great historical value.

Nizam-ud-Din Ahmad Bakhshi wrote *Tabaqat-i-Akbari* in 1593-94. The forefathers of Nizam-ud-Din belonged to Herat. He was born in 1551 in Akbar Abad. His father Khwaja Muhammad Muqem accompanied Babur in his Indian campaign and participated in the battle of Panipat in 1526. The primary aim of the author was to produce a detailed history of Emperor Akbar. However, it is like a general history of the Muslim rulers of India with least glorification for Akbar. For the present study, the book provides some significant information regarding the Lodhi and Suri Afghan dynasties in India. Although, there are some errors regarding some events but it forms one of the main primary sources for the present study. He took part in many campaigns against the Afghans and hence had direct knowledge of the Mughal-Afghan relations.

In the secondary sources, the story of the emergence of the Lodhis and the part they played in the political life of northern India has been analyzed in *The First Afghan Empire* by Dr. A. B. Pandey and by Abdul Halim in *History of the Lodi Sultans of Delhi and Agra*. Their gradual decline and the subsequent rise of despotism in the last two Lodhi sultans were

thoroughly discussed by Ishtiaq Hussain Siddiqi in his book *Some Aspects of Afghan Despotism in India*. The most important work in this regard is the doctoral dissertation of Muhammad Abdur Rahim titled "History of the Afghans in India: 1545-1631". The work has been completed with special emphasis on Mughal-Afghan relations. However, the focus of his research is to outline the rise and fall, culture and rivalry of the Afghans with the Mughal in the court and various parts of India.

Bahadar Shah Zafar Kakakhel's celebrated Pashto work *Pukhtanah da Tarikh pa Ranra Kay* is the most outstanding work that discussed the Afghan history from their origin up to the modern Afghanistan. He minutely describes the history of the Afghans using much praise for their legends. Despite its drawbacks the book provides useful information to study the Mughal-Afghan conflict in India. Among the foreign writers the celebrated work of Olaf Caroe titled *The Pathans* is of great significance. He has discussed various periods in the Afghan history starting from 550 BCE to 1957 CE. The book singularly provides a lot of information regarding the origin and development of the Mughal-Afghan conflict in South Asia.

The books written by Khan Roshan Khan, himself an Afghan, were of immense importance and provide rare information particularly about the relationship of Yusufzai tribe with Babur, founder of the Mughal dynasty in India. He compiled his works under various titles for instance *Yusufzai Qaum ki Sarguzasht*, *Tazkirah*, *Shaheeda Bibi: Malika-i-Swat* etc. The account of the contemporary European travellers in many places reflects the nature of the Afghans and their attitude towards the Mughals. They also shed light on the policy of the Mughal emperors towards the Afghans. A number of other secondary sources, journals and encyclopaedias have also been consulted for this research work.

Chapter 1

Mughal-Afghan Relations in the Historical Perspective

Afghan, Pashtun, Pashtoon, Pakhtun and Pukhtun are the same set of names used for the majority people living in the north-western borderland of the subcontinent and Afghanistan.¹ In the present day Pakistan a large number of them are living in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA), Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, Balochistan, Karachi and various parts of the Punjab. The overwhelming portion of population in Afghanistan is also comprised of the Afghans. Throughout history the Afghan borderland was of significant political and geo-strategic importance. The mountainous belt of Hindu Kush and the hills running alongside Durand Line is a natural boundary and international border between Afghanistan and Pakistan. It is also like a juncture of the world's three most important regions, i.e. Central Asia, South Asia and China.

Thousands years back the Hindu's religious book *Rig Veda* used the term 'Paktha' for the people who lived in this area. According to *Rig Veda* these people were much influential and belonged to a powerful clan among the Aryan

1 For the sake of consistency, in this study the term Afghan is used instead of Pukhtun because of the term's prevalence in the local and non-local chronicles, manuscripts and other books regarding the study's specific time period. The term should not be confused with its present connotation as the citizens of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan.

tribal confederacy.² *Avesta* written between 1000 and 600 BCE was another religious script of the Aryans. It has mentioned the name of the city of Bakhd. The name was given after the inhabitants of the city who were called Bakhdi. Accordingly, the term 'Pakht' of the *Rig Veda* and 'Bakhd' of *Avesta* are basically the same names used for the Pukhtuns or Afghans. Greek historians, for instance, Herodotus used the term 'Pakatvis' and 'Paktvan' for them and cited their country by the name of 'Paktika'. He mentioned the names of four tribes who lived in the same area. These tribes were Gandharis (the inhabitants of Gandhara), Apariti (present day Afridis), Satagidis (Khattaks) and Dadikis.³

The name Afghan was given to them first by the Arab and Muslim historians and later on it was used frequently by the Persian and Indian writers. Some writers are of the view that the term Afghan was derived from two Hebrew words 'af' which means catching and 'ghan' was the name of a dev (demon) in the Hebrew tradition. So it means the one who caught the ghan dev.⁴ Among the Muslim Historians Abu Rehan Alberuni, Firdausi, Abul Fazl Behaiqi, Minhaj-ul-Siraj and a number of other writers used the word Afghan for them. Bahadar Shah Zafar, on the authority of Shams-ud-Din, stated that the word Afghan was first used by the Persians and then gradually was assumed an acceptable nomenclature for all the tribes collectively.⁵ Among the Muslim historians the term Afghan was used for the first time in 986 AD in the text of *Hudud-ul-Alam Minal Mashriq Ilal Maghrib*.⁶

2 Sayed Bahadar Shah Zafar Kakakhel, *Pukhtanah da Tarikh pa Ranra Kay* [Pukhtu] (Peshawar: University Book Agency, 1999), p. 70.

3 *Ibid.*, p. 73.

4 Khushal Khan Khattak, *Dastar Nama* (Peshawar: Pashto Academy, n.d), p. 80; Asar Jan, *Dalazak: Tarikh, Shakhsiat, Shajary* [Urdu] (Peshawar: n.p, 2011), p. 26. Also See Sultan-i-Rome, *The North-West Frontier (Khyber Pakhtunkhwa): Essays on History* (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 2013), p. 35.

5 Sultan-i-Rome, *The North-West Frontier*, p. 83.

6 Kakakhel, *Pukhtanah da Tarikh Pa Ranra Kay*, p. 84.

The word Afghan was used in the inscription of Shapur I, the second king of the Sassanian Dynasty. The name "Vindapharn Afghan Kazm Had" or "Goundifer Abagan Rismaund" which occurs in the sixth part of the inscription, means Vindapharn, the Afghan chieftain of the war. 'Apakan' the title of the Shapur III, was another form of Abagan, which means polite, noble and dignified.⁷

It is quite clear that the name Afghan was not their original name. They called themselves Pukhtun or Pashtun and not Afghan. Usually, Pukhtuns living in Pakistan call themselves as Pashtun and Pukhtun. In the present dispensation none of them ever referred to themselves as Pathan or Afghan.⁸ Raverty has claimed that the term Pukhtun or Pashtun is derived from the Persian 'Pusht' meaning 'back.' Therefore, the Persian called them Pashtun; the tribe living on the backside of the mountain. Persians called them Pashtun which is also pronouncing as Pakhtun. It is also said that the word was taken from an Iranian term "parsava parsa" meaning robust men, knights.⁹ Thus, it is very clear from the available evidences that the word, Afghan is very old term, which indicates politeness, respect, bravery etc. There are no racial differences between Afghan, Pukhtun and Pathan. These words are synonymous referring to one and the same people.

Origin of the Afghans

According to some chronicles, the original homeland of the Afghans was known as *Ruh*, a mountainous territory in north-western border of the Indian subcontinent. Iqtidar Hussain Siddiqui, on the authority of al-Utbi, stated that the Afghans' country has started from the south of Ghazni (Afghanistan).¹⁰ It was, however, a large tract of land

7 *Ibid.*, p. 18.

8 *Ibid.*, p. 86.

9 Syed Abdul Quddus, *The Pathans* (Lahore: Ferozsons, 1987), p. 17.

10 Iqtidar Hussain Siddiqui, 'The Afghans and their Emergence in India as Ruling elite During the Delhi Sultanate Period', *Central Asiatic Journal*, Vol. 26 (July-September 1982), p. 245.

extending in length from Swat and Bajaur to the town of Sibi in Balochistan, and in breadth from Hasan Abdal up to Kabul, the capital of Afghanistan.¹¹ Beyond *Ruh* were the provinces of Kabul and Ghazni, inhabited largely by scattered Turkish tribes.¹² It seems that Afghan tribes migrated to these provinces apparently on account of the upheaval caused by the Mongols' invasions.

Like their remote and hilly landscapes hidden away in the vast mountainous tracts, the origin of the Afghans is also shrouded in mystery. There is a good deal of controversy among the historians and writers. Because there are not sufficient evidences available to fix that a particular theory is accepted by the researchers, a definite theory about the origin of the Afghans has not been evolved so far. The three prominent theories i.e. the Bani Israelite Theory, the Aryan Race Theory and the Mixed Race Theory are often theme of discussions among the historians and social scientists.¹³

In this regard, Khwaja Niamatullah Harvi in his book *Tarikh-i-Khan Jahan Lodhi wa Makhzan-i-Afghani* propounded the first theory about the origin of the Afghans. The book was written during the reign of the Mughal Emperor Jahangir and was completed between the years 1609-1612. It was written to counter the propaganda of the Mughals regarding the pedigree of the Afghans because they were the leading rivals of the Mughals in the Indian subcontinent. In the process of demoralizing the Afghans some Mughal court historians created baseless novels about their ethnic history. To counter this propaganda and to resolve their ethnic question, some Afghan courtiers took

11 Khwaja Nizam-ud-Din Ahmad, *Tabaqat-i-Akbari*, Vol. II (Calcutta: The Royal Asiatic Society of Bengal, 1936), p. 40.

12 Zia-ud-Din Barani, *Tarikh-i-Feroz Shahi*, Eng. tr. H. M. Elliot (Lahore: Sang-i-Meel Publications, 1974), p. 482.

13 The other famous theories are the Banu Qaturite Theory according to which they are the descendants of Prophet Ibrahim (AS) through his wife Qatura. Khushal Khan Khattak stated that the real ancestor of the Afghans was the brother of Prophet Ibrahim. Another theory is the Saka origin theory which ascribed them as Sakas by origin. Sultan-i-Rome, *The North-West Frontier*, p. 24.

interest to compile their true history and genealogy. Hence, the compilation of *Makhzan-i-Afghani* was the first attempt in this regard which denotes them of Bani-Israelites stock.

Another theory regarding the origin of the Afghans was that they belong to the Aryan race.¹⁴ This theory was put forward in the nineteenth century after the exploration of similarities between Indo-European languages by a number of Western linguists and scholars. Their research and linguistic survey concluded that the root of all the Indo-Aryan and European languages was that ancient Aryan language which they used to speak thousands year ago before migration in different directions. The name of that non-existent language was "Arik".¹⁵

Klaproth was probably the first Orientalist who has mentioned Pashto as a branch of the Indo-Germanic languages. Henry Walter Bellew¹⁶ has described Pashto a dialect of the Sanskrit which evolved to its present Indo-Persian shape due to strong Persian influence on Indian tribes. Earnest Trumpp, Dar Mesteter, Sir George Abraham Grierson and Fr. Muller were those Orientalists who affirmed that Pashto was a member of the Indo-Aryan family of languages. This view was supported by some Afghan and non-Afghan scholars. In this regard, Abdul Hay Habibi in his

-
- 14 The word 'Aryan' was used for the first time by Friedric Max Muller in the mid-eighteenth century. In his lectures on the Science of Languages, he used this term for a race or group of people. According to some writers in *Rig Veda* the term refers to some clans, gods and enemy also. However, it also indicates glorified or sacred land where Zarhusta was born whence later he delivered his first sermon. On a number of occasions it was used as a cultural and religious term. The term Aryan is quite confused word which was used to indicate different meaning by the scholars. However, it came into use as a race by the politically and ideologically motivated writers to prove the racial supremacy of the Caucasian/European/Nordic race over other races. See for more details Sanjay Sonawani, Aryan Migration Issue: A Critique, sanjaysonawami.blogspot.com, visited on 16.02.2015.
- 15 Preshan Khattak, *Pashtun Kaun?: Tarikh, Tahqiq, Tanqid* [Urdu] (Peshawar: Pashto Academy, 2005), p. 63.
- 16 Henry Walter Bellew served as Mansabdar in the British Bengal army in 1867. He wrote *A Grammar of the Pukkhtu or Pushtu Language* published from London in 1867. See Abdullah Jan Abid, *Pashto Zaban wa Adab ki Mukhtasar Tarikh* [Urdu] (Peshawar: University Publisher, 2001).

work *Da Pukhtu Adabiatu Tarikh* and Bahadar Shah Zafar Kakakhel in his book *Pukhtanah da Tarikh Pa Ranra Kay* acknowledged the claim of these scholars and accordingly argued that Pashto belongs to Zend and Avesta.¹⁷ This affinity between Pashto, Zend and its developed form the Sanskrit provided these scholars the argument in support of the Aryan Race theory.

Another group of historians argued that the region of the north-western India was not only a natural frontier but was an ancient zone of incessant battlefields between the warring tribes and the foreign invaders. The area was invaded throughout history by the powerful commanders and conquerors. There are thousands of ancient historical sites in the area which speak of its connection with the pre-historic ages. Hence, they said that the Afghans are that ethnic group having mix race origin.

After the flourishing of the Aryan civilization, the area was affected by the rise and falls of the Indus Valley Civilization and afterwards witnessed the Achaemenians migration (550-331 BCE).¹⁸ With the fall of Achaemenian Empire, Alexander the Great absorbed the mighty Achaemenian Empire into his kingdom. He occupied Afghanistan and then made further headway to the north-western parts of India in about 327 BCE. A large number of Greeks settled in the region during that period. The Mauryans occupation (322-185 BCE) followed the Greco-Bactrian age. The greatest ruler of this dynasty was Ashoka who captured Afghanistan, Kashmir, the Swat valley with tribal territory, Balochistan, Makran, Sindh, Nepal and the whole of India and Chinese Turkestan. The area witnessed

17 *Ibid.*, p. 26.

18 Achaemenians belonged to those Bactrian Aryans who went to Persia from Bakhtar in their onward migration. They were called "Parswa". On the authority of Herodotus, Zafar Kakakhel has mentioned that originally they were ten tribes and Achaemenian was a tribal leader among them. The tribe of Achaemenian was made popular after his name. It produced great leaders and rulers who then conquered great chunk of land for the Persians. Kakakhel, *Pukhtanah da Tarikh Pa Ranra Kay*, p. 127.

the flourishing of Buddhism which has been widely accepted by the Afghans.

The Arab conquests in the area started during the time of Hazrat Usman (RA), the fourth Islamic Caliph, who appointed Abdullah Ibn Amir as the governor of Khurasan. He sent military expeditions to Ghazni, Balakh and Helmand. However, they faced many difficulties in subjugating the area. It was not until the era of Mahmud of Ghazni who defeated the Hindu Shahi dynasty of the area. At that time many Afghans were the followers of Hinduism. In the year 1001 he defeated Raja Jaipal and captured most of the Afghan territory.¹⁹

The area then saw the coming of the Mongols, Mughals and other Muslim tribes from Central Asia. A large number of Muslim Arabs arranged marriages with the local people and permanently settled in the area. With the passage of time their descendants intermingled with the population and became part and parcel of the society. All these foreign invaders and conquerors left their everlasting signs and characteristics on the area and people residing therein. With the passage of time they lost their separate identities. According to George Macmunn:

In thinking of the North West Frontier of India, we must think of it as a country full of remains of the ancient way, presenting countless unexplored sites and an immense wealth of Buddhist as well as Greek remains.²⁰

Presently one can observe the settlement of hundreds and thousands of foreigners in the tribal areas along with the Durand Line. On the face of these historical facts many writers are of the opinion that the Afghans are comprised of many ethnic groups and hence are mixed race.

Socio-political Organization of the Afghans

Information about the Afghans' socio-political organization in '*Ruh*' is scanty and limited. It appears from

19 *Ibid.*, p. 147.

20 George Macmunn, *The Romance of the Indian Frontier* (Quetta: Nisa Traders, 1978), p. 58.

the available sources that their political cohesion was based upon tribes and clans (*khels*) which formed the units of their political and social organization. All the chiefs and malaks of the tribes, sub-tribes and clans were not necessarily hereditary and were treated as first among equals. The chief was regarded by the people as only a delegate with very little authority over his people or tribe. The emphasis on equality was also reflected through one of their old custom of *wesh*²¹ (the distribution of the acquired land), which prevented any tribesman from getting too power and influence.²² The code of conduct, a common law of vendetta, called Pukhtu or *Pukhtunwali*, was mandatory and obligatory upon all big and small tribes. It came into existence through evolutionary process and was deemed as an unwritten constitution, which regulates the relations between various clans and tribes, even individuals. These ties, though frail, do exist and give them, despite their division into tribes, clans; section and subsection, the semblance of a people who belonged to the same ethnic stock.²³

It was a democratic type of system in medieval times in which important decisions were taken in consultation with the tribal elders in a council called *jirga* (council of elders). *jirga* acted like a court and council of war and peace,

21 When the Yusufzais and Mandanrs, under the leadership of Malak Ahmad Khan migrated from Kabul in the last quarter of the fifteenth century and occupied the Peshawar valley and Swat, differences emerged between them over the distribution of the occupied territories. The system of *wesh* was then devised by their saintly leader Shaikh Malli to resolve the land distribution problem. In this system lands allotted to the sub-branches of the Yusufzai were re-allotted every five, seven or ten years. It is believed that Shaikh Malli had kept the record of the entire land arrangement and shares of the different lineages in his famous book *Daftar-i-Shaikh Malli* which was lost in the dust of history and no copy can be traced of this celebrated book. Sultan-i-Rome, 'Land Ownership in Swat: Historical and Contemporary Perspective', in Zabta Khan Shinwari, Ashiq Ahmad Khan, *Land Tenure and Resource Ownership in Pakistan* (Peshawar: By the editors themselves, 2002), p. 128.

22 Sadia K. Karamat, *The Western Frontier of West Pakistan: A Study in Political Geography* (Unpublished PhD Dissertation, University of Michigan, 1958), pp. 82-83.

23 *Ibid.*

sometime utilized for making peace whereas another time for mobilizing army in the defence of their land in case of external threats. This type of tribal society was very identical in cultural, social and political spheres like the early Roman society of the ancient time in which every member of the republic was a soldier and a lawgiver who believed in the equality of the members of every tribe.²⁴ According to Iqtidar Hussain Siddiqui, the sense of an exclusive loyalty and tribal parochialism deprived them of coming close to one another thus eliminating the chances of the creation of the larger Afghan state. The absence of such state reduced the possibility of settled economic development and increased poverty and misery of the member of the tribes.²⁵

In their dresses and food habits the Afghans were considerably influenced by the Hindus and Persian speaking people of Central Asia. They also remained under the suzerainty of the Kabul Shahis and then Hindu Shahis rulers who ruled over Gandhara for about 400 years.²⁶ Hence, a number of Hindu costumes were also adopted by the Afghans. However, with the annexation of the Punjab by Sultan Mahmud Ghaznavi between 999 and 1026, they came into direct contact with Turks and Tajiks. Their chief sources of income were rearing flocks and herds of cattle, sheep and agriculture. There were also people who were recruited as mercenaries by a number of military commanders. Some of the families carried on the business of horse-trading between Central Asia and India.

Sir Olaf Caroe argues that it was in the time of Mahmud Ghaznavi when the Afghans embraced Islam.²⁷ However, A. H. Dani suggested that in the year 44 H/664 CE Al-Muhallab bin Abi Sufra, a lieutenant of Ibni Samura, led his soldiers

24 *Ibid.*

25 Siddiqui, 'The Afghans and their Emergence', pp. 248-49.

26 Bahadar Shah Zafar Kakakhel is of the view that it was probably the last non-Muslim dynasty which ruled over the Afghan land. Kakakhel, however, has ignored the British and then the Sikh rule on this region. Kakakhel, *Pukhtanah da Tarikh Pa Ranra Kay*, p. 265.

27 Olaf Caroe, *The Pathans* (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 2003), p. 120.

towards Sijistan, Zabul, and Gandhara. That was not just a military campaign against Kabul Shah but was a part of a concerted action for the spread of Islam in the area. Al-Baladhury states that Abdullah bin Sawwar al-Abdi was the governor of the Indian borderland on behalf of Muawiya bin Abu-Sufyan. Hence, the spread of Islam among the Afghans was a by-product of the Arab activities in Central Asia.²⁸

Before the advent of Islam, the Afghans were either Hindus or Buddhists. According to Hiuen Tsang²⁹ all these areas were under the rule of Kshatriya king of Kapisa called Ratbil, the Kabul Shah of the Arab chronicles. The inscriptions of the ninth century, which were found in North Waziristan, clearly showed the spread and propagation of Islam among the people of the area. The first inscription was in Arabic and Sanskrit dated 857, recording the construction of a water tank. The second was in Arabic and Bactrian script which has not been so far deciphered. It may safely be concluded that in the second half of the ninth century the areas of Idak and Spinwam in North Waziristan were under the overall control of an Arab officer Hayy bin Amar.³⁰ According to the Chinese accounts, the Afghans were Buddhists and embraced Islam quite earlier as a result of the Arabs activities in Sijistan, Zabul and the borders of the then India.³¹

28 Ahmad Hasan Dani, *Peshawar: Historic City of the Frontier* (Lahore: Sang-i-Meel Publications, 1995), pp. 78-79.

29 A Chinese traveller Hiuen Tsang visited Gandhara in 640 CE. He described the people soft, with timid disposition; most of them belonged to heretical schools who love literature. He also stated about the *pepal* trees in Peshawar city. At present, a market by the name of *pepal mandi* (Pepal market) is situated in the middle of the city. The spread and propagation of Buddhism in the Afghans' mainland covered a lengthy time span from the Kushan period to the Muslim conquest. The area witnessed the creation of a new social and ecclesiastical order in the shape of Buddhism. All these historical facts are attested by many inscriptions left by Buddhist pilgrims, Chinese travellers, and by the discovery of other important relics from the area. Himayatullah, 'Religious Transformation and Development among the Pakhtuns: A Historical and Analytical Study' in *Pakistan Journal of History and Culture* Vol. XXVIII, No. 2, July-December 2007.

30 Quddus, *The Pathans*, p. 24.

31 Dani, *Historic City*, p. 84.

Afghan Nobility in India

In about 682 AD the Afghans issued from their mountainous abode and trickled down into the plains of Punjab. However, their further advance was checked by the Raja of Lahore.³² At the dawn of the eleventh century the Afghans were influential and politically strong in eastern Afghanistan, Peshawar, the borderland and the surrounding areas. During the Hindu Shahi Dynasty some Afghans attained important positions as military commanders and court nobles. *Fakhr-i-Mudabbir* has mentioned Adhira Afghan as *kotwal* under Jaipal. One Shaikh Hamid Lodhi was a *jagirdar* (fief-holder) in Laghman and Multan. Raja Jaipal concluded a treaty with him, through which he conferred his suzerainty on Laghman and the surrounding areas and Hamid Lodhi, in return, agreed to guard the frontier against the inroads of the Arabs. Afterwards, Gandhara and Qandahar were also included in his *jagir* (fief). Subuktigin, after ascending the throne of Ghazni, befriended Shaikh Hamid Lodhi in 991 and retained his *jagir*. After the death of Shaikh Hamid, his son Nasar succeeded him. The last influential *jagirdar* in this line was Fatah Khan Dawud, who was attacked and deprived of his *jagir* by Mahmud Ghaznawi due to his adoption and propagation of Ismaelite sect.³³

A distinctive nature of the Afghan society clearly demonstrates a mark of religious dynamism in the unfolding of its history. The religious transformation of the area constantly shaped and reshaped the perception of the people and their way of dealing the others. The land of the Afghan can rightly be called 'the cradle of religions and civilizations' for its association with the emergence of Indus Valley civilization, the rise of Gandhara, the creation of Buddhism and so many other religious orders. The area is immensely rich in terms of Aryan relics, Brahman religious

32 Niamatullah, *History of the Afghans*, English Tr. Bernhard Dorn (Karachi: Indus Publications, 1976), p. b.

33 Kakakhel, *Pukhtanah da Tarikh Pa Ranra Kay*, pp. 362-63.

scripts, Buddhist remains, Zoroastrian legacies and a large number of historical sites.

In the available literature the subsequent history of the Afghans was very little recorded. They were reduced to submission by Mahmud Ghaznavi who recruited them as mercenaries in his army for his Indian campaigns. At the time of these campaigns they trickled into the Indian mainland and a large number of them got permanent settlement along with their families. At that time, Peshawar was an important and strategic place next to Ghazni. Several local Afghan officers including Abdur Razzaq and Mubarak Mard administered it on behalf of the Ghaznavid Sultans.³⁴

The Afghans formed a significant contingent in the army of Muhammad Ghauri, himself an Afghan. About twelve thousand Afghans fought under their leader Malak Mahmud Lodhi on the side of Muhammad Ghauri against Prithvi Raj Chauhan. Malak Shahu, brother of Mahmud Lodi, was also a leading figure in the court of Muhammad Ghauri. Gradually, some important Afghan Malaks settled permanently in the Indian mainland. Soon, they carved out a significant position for themselves under various sultans. The Afghans enjoyed favour in the courts of Qutb-ud-din Aibak and Sultan Iltutmish. It has been said that Sultan Iltutmish employed them in his army to counteract the recalcitrant Turkish nobility who had gained much power and influence during his reign.³⁵

Emergence of the Mongols

Throughout history, the countries in the South Asian subcontinent were subjected to frequent invasions from the north-west of the Mongol, Tartar and Turk hordes of Central Asia. These people pouring from their inhospitable native abodes, have in the case of Genghiz Khan and Timur, devastated the genial regions and went back, and in others, like Babur have conquered the areas and settled

34 Dani, *Historic City*, p. 85.

35 Rita Joshi, *The Afghan Nobility and the Mughals: 1526-1707* (Delhi: Vikas Publishing House, 1985), pp. 21-22.

permanently. In Afghan, Persian and Indian literature these invaders were often referred to as Mongols, Turks, Tartars and Mughals.

An academic discourse of the Mughal-Afghan conflict cannot be scholastically discovered without studying the Mongol-Afghan relations. In retrospect, the Mongols were the predecessors of the Mughals. The Tartar, Mongol and Mughal's Indian incursions were significant occurrences in the South Asian historical and political context. Crossing the Afghan borderland into India was one of their regular routine in the medieval Indian history. One major aspect among these invaders was that unlike his predecessors, i.e. Genghiz Khan and Timur, Zahir-ud-Din Babur established the Mughal Empire in India on permanent footings. He proved himself master of the game that was unfolded at that time in the entire South Asian region.

The terms 'Mongol' and 'Mughal' has been used for a number of nations by the European historians. The original word was '*Mungkur*' which was used to denote brave and courageous people. They belonged to an old Turkish tribal race which lived in Siberia. Herodotus referred to them with the name of 'Sabhtin' while Chinese people used the name of 'Hangtohan' for them. Their first abode was the area of Gobi desert and the Tundra region. According to Bahadar Shah Zafar Kakakhel, Mughal and Mongol are the same words which denote the same meaning and stand for the same people.³⁶

William Erskine rather provides a comprehensive division of the tribes largely known under Tartar denomination. These tribes were different from each-others in their dwellings, manners, institutions and languages. He divided these tribes into the following three distinct races or branches:

1. The Manchus or Tungus largely occupied the areas east of Asia and north of China. They conquered China in earlier times. This race does not play any

36 Kakakhel, *Pukhtanah da Tarikh Pa Ranra Kay*, p. 315.

significant role in the politics of South Asia or India. Therefore, it is not known much to the writers of South Asia and Persia and had thus no influence directly or indirectly on the fortunes of these countries.

2. The Mongols or as they were called by the Indian and Persian historians, the Mughals, occupied the middle portion north of Tibet and part of desert between Turfan and Yaik. They lived between the two other races i.e. Manchus and Turks. They were often at war with each-others and known only to their Chinese and Turkic neighbours. However, after the emergence of Genghiz Khan all the areas, tribes, Turks and others were eventually overrun by them.
3. The Turks were the wider and larger race among the Tatars. Their territory extended from the desert of Kobi to the Wolga, and from the Oxus and the Caspian far into Siberia. With the passage of time they extended their region and occupied many terrains around them.³⁷

There is a legend much popular about the origin of the Mongols. According to the legend, the Mongol people descended from the union of a grey wolf (a hunter) and either a human female or a tawny doe. It has been stated that about eight generation before Genghiz Khan a woman Alan-goia by name narrated the story that once a golden man who came from the heavens visited her at night and impregnated her. Majority of the people accepted her narration and afterwards the giving birth of her son Bodonchar. It was believed that eventually the descendants of Bodonchar would conquer the whole world. He was also credited with being the founder of the Borjigin tribe and the direct ancestor of Genghiz Khan.³⁸

37 William Erskine, *A History of India under Babur* (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 1974), pp. 11-15.

38 Paul Lococo, Jr., *Genghiz Khan: History's Greatest Empire Builder* (New Delhi: Pentagon Press, 2009), p. 5.

Like the hard climate of the Afghans' abode, the environment of Mongolia, most of the time wrought by rainstorms, snowstorms and sandstorms. The first Mongols' tribal settlement has been recorded in the area between the Onon and Kerulen rivers, tributaries of Amur River. These steppes was chosen by one of their tribal leader Bodonchar because of its fertile fields and geographically safe from the attacks of other tribes and Chinese adventurers. In their habitat they spoke a variety of languages mostly of Turkic origin. Very little history is recorded of these tribes before the emergence of Genghiz Khan. Before coming into prominence, Mongols referred to themselves as Turks and their language as Tatar. They were one of many Altaic people.³⁹ In fact, Mongol and Tatars had spent times mostly in the same locality and their history was shaped by overlapping events. The Tatar tribes, in fact, were the rivals of the Mongols. They mostly lived in fields near Lake Buyur, Lake Kolun and near Khingan hills. But after the dominancy of the Mongol people in the middle of the thirteenth century all the people and their languages were called Mongolian. It has also been customary to refer to the whole region as Mongolia including those areas not inhabited by the Mongols.⁴⁰

Corresponding to the Afghan social cohesion, there were tribes divided into several other sub-clans dwelling in the hard steppes of Mongolia. The Mongol tribes itself were divided into two leading branches: Taijiut and Borjigin, the tribe of Genghiz Khan. These tribes were often at war with each-others on petty issues. In ecclesiastical domain most of the Mongols followed a form of shamanism. Various mediums especially women used to form mystic union with the spirit world that dominated their religious lives. They even bargained with the spirit for assistance in this world. They could control the spirits with the help of certain prayers, incantation, smoke and herbs. The greatest spirit was called

39 *Ibid.*

40 *Ibid.*, p. 3.

Tengri or Heaven which said to protect the Mongols. Before launching any military campaign, Genghiz Khan used to pray to Tengri for success. He projected himself as the chosen commander by Tengri for the creation of a great Mongol Empire.⁴¹

During Sultan Qutb-ud-din Aibak's time, the Mongols, appeared in the East of India and emerged as a great power under the leadership of Genghiz Khan (1165-1227).⁴² Genghiz Khan was born in 1165 to Yesugei and Hoelun. He was brought up by his ablest mother Hoelun after his father was poisoned to death by Tatars. In his incessant wars, he exhibited such remarkable traits of heroism and diplomacy that led him to transform the entire social and military structure of Mongolia. Along with tactics of diplomacy, Genghiz Khan ruthlessly crushed his adversaries in the open battlegrounds. In 1189 the chiefs of Mongol tribal confederacy informally conferred on him the title of Genghiz Khan. However, it was in fact, during the Kuriltay ceremony of all the united tribes held in 1206 that he adopted this title.⁴³

Temujin, as he was popularly known, Genghiz Khan proved himself master of the time and established Mongol power in the East. He turned the barbaric Mongol tribes into a strong and formidable force through his leadership, discipline and organizational abilities. Between 1207 and 1215 Genghiz invaded northern China and sacked Peking. However, after the death of Genghiz Khan the world

41 *Ibid.*

42 The term Tatar was used for Timur which was then changed with the coming of Zahir-ud-Babur to India and they were called by the local people as Mughal. It was a term largely used by the Persian people and writers. According to *Encyclopaedia Britannica*, the Mongols spoke a Paleo-Asiatic language, represented today by the 'Ket' dialect of the Yenisey valley in Siberia. In the roll of tribes the name Mongol first appeared in a tribal list prepared under T'ang dynasty and was again used in the eleventh century when the Khitan ruled and controlled a large part of Mongolia. The Khitan, who established the Chinese dynasty of Liao (907-1125), were themselves of Mughal origin. *Encyclopaedia Britannica*, p. 722.

43 Lococo, Jr., *Genghiz Khan*, p. 24.

witnessed the Mongol conquests of Europe and Asia within the span of a century.

During these developments in Mongolia, the Sultanate of Delhi had faced many internal and external challenges. On external front it felt threatened by the growing power of the Khwarzam Shahs and the Mongols, the later knocking at its north-western border. For the first time the Mongols came into contact with the Afghans when Genghiz Khan undertook his attacks on the forces of Jalal-ud-Din Khwarzam Shah. In these battles Afghans fought on the side of the latter and once inflicted a crushing defeat on the Mongol army near the province of Parwan (Afghanistan). After winning the ground, Khwarzam Shah was unable to devise a good strategy of keeping the Mongols at bay and to manage the affairs. In the meantime, the vulnerable combined army of Khwarzam Shah and Afghans came under a severe attack of the Mongols. As a result, many Afghans were perished and their influx was abandoned towards Khwarzam Shah.⁴⁴

While chasing Jalal-ud-Din Khwarzam Shah, Genghiz Khan stormed Afghanistan and the territories nowadays parts of Pakistan. Initially, Jalal-ud-Din defeated an advance Mongol army with the help of the Afghan fighters. However, after the coming of Genghiz Khan, Jalal-ud-Din left Ghazni and entered into the areas of the Delhi Sultanate and encamped at the west bank of the river Indus. In December 1221, Genghiz Khan followed him and crushed his army while Jalal-ud-Din fled crossing the Indus waters. He was given refuge by the Delhi Sultan. Genghiz Khan marched back due to hot summer. But in his way back he devastated the present day Punjab, Afghan borderland, Ghazni and Herat. In 1222, Genghiz Khan returned towards Ghazni and completely ruined that splendid city of the area. He died at the age of 72 in 1227.⁴⁵ After one year of his death, Malak Khan, a Khalji chief, fought a battle against his son, Toli Khan. The Mongols were defeated at Sewistan (present day

44 Kakakhel, *Pukhtanah da Tarikh Pa Rama Kay*, p. 319.

45 Lococo, Jr., *Genghiz Khan*, p. 68.

Sibi in Balochistan) and the city was captured by the Afghans.⁴⁶

After the death of Genghiz Khan in 1227, his empire was divided between his sons, in which Chaghtai Khan received Kashgharia and most parts of modern Afghanistan. After a prolonged civil war with varying intervals, at last Dava or Deva succeeded and ruled for about thirty-two years. He was the upholder of the Mongol cause in the Indian territories and between 1296 and 1301 launched several attacks on Sindh, Punjab, Multan, Peshawar, Delhi and Lahore. Afterwards, anarchy prevailed in the Mongol dominion which further was divided between a numbers of contenders. In Transoxiana the emerging political scene was more intricate due to which anarchy prevailed for about fifty years. In this state of affairs, Amir Timur, a Tatar, conquered most of the area and proclaimed himself master of the land, brought back order and controlled the mischief-mongers with iron hands.⁴⁷

The successors of Genghiz Khan ruled over Afghanistan till 1251, and the present ethnic stocks of Hazaras are the descendants of those Mongols who permanently settled in Afghanistan. After Genghiz Khan's invasion it became a precedent for the later Mongols, Turks and afterwards for the Mughals to frequently cross over the Afghan borderland in their onward march to India. This trend was made a permanent practice in the future historical development of the region. In 1245, the area of Herat was entrusted to Shams-ud-Din Kurt, an Afghan Malak. He administered the region on behalf of the Mongols. However, with the degeneration of the Mongols' power, Ghayas-ud-Din, fourth ruler of the Kurt family, was strong enough to declare independence from the Mongol yoke. Soon, in 1383, Timur Lang or Tamerlane overthrew this Afghan Kurt dynasty. Timur was the son of a *sardar* belonged to the Barlas Tatar

46 Abdul Ali Ghorghashti, *Pushtunu Ka Tahzibi, Tarikhi aur Azadi Ka Safar* [Urdu] (Zhob: By the author himself, 2007), p. 53.

47 Mirza Muhammad Haider Dughlat, *Tarikh-i-Rashidi*, English. tr. E. Denison Ross (Lahore: Book Traders, n.d.), pp. 36-40.

tribe of Turkish origin, while from his mother side he was Mongol, a descendent of Genghiz Khan.⁴⁸ Then during Bahram Shah's time (1240-42) the Mongols invaded Lahore under Bahadar Tair, a lieutenant of Chaghtai Khan. They captured Lahore on 22 December 1241, and massacred its population. Again encouraged by the intrigues in the court of Ala-ud-Din Masud (1242-46), the Mongols captured Multan in 1245, and besieged the city of Uchch. But they had to retire from the area due to political chaos in Mongol Khanate.⁴⁹

Halaku Khan, who founded the Il Khan dynasty in Persia, had no aggressive designs regarding the Delhi Sultanate and was always keen to establish friendly relations with the Sultans. But on account of his large-scale atrocities and high-handedness in Western and Central Asia, many people were dislocated; majority of them migrated to India and settled there. Moreover, Halaku seemed to have been adopted a policy of non-involvement in the affairs of the Delhi Sultanate. He considered the territories of Sindh, Uchch and Multan as enough under Mongol vassalage and regarded these areas as a buffer zone between the Il Khan of Persia and Delhi Sultanate.

Afghans and Mongols in India

At the start, successive Sultans of Delhi tried to befriend the Mongols by conciliation and diplomacy. But after Sultan Nasir-ud-Din Mahmud's reign (1246-66), their policies changed and a more aggressive approach was adopted in dealing with the Mongol's menace. Ghayas-ud-Din Balban, first as *wazir* (1245-66) and then as Sultan (1266-86), was never overawed by the Mongol terror. He devised a well-

48 Timur was born at the town of Kesh near Samarqand in 1335. He conquered Herat, Sistan, Ghazni, Kabul and Qandahar in between 1379 and 1383. He attacked India in 1397. Himayatullah Yaqubi, 'Pukhtunu aur Mughlu Kay Siyasi Tanazay Kay Bunyadi Awamil aur Muharrikat' *Mujalla Tarikh wa Saqafat-i-Pakistan*, (October-2011 March-2012), p. 26.

49 Yar Muhammad Khan, 'The Political Relations of the Turkish Sultans of Indo-Pakistan Subcontinent with the Mongols in the 13th Century', *Journal of the Research Society of Pakistan*, Vol. XXV, No 4 (December, 1988), p. 19.

defined and articulated forward policy and led a punitive expedition against the Raja of Koh-i-Jud who had supported the Mongols since Nasir-ud-Din Mahmud's time. As a result of this policy Lahore and Multan were captured and the damaged walls of the Lahore fort were repaired as a part of his forward policy, Balban won over the support of the tribes like Khokars, Jats, Rajputs and Afghans, who lived on western frontier.⁵⁰

During that time the Afghans were politically prominent in the court of Delhi rulers. Balban recruited three thousands Afghans for subduing the hill tribe of Mewat. Threatened by the incursion of the Mongols, Balban concentrated on the security of the Sultanate from the north-western side. Accordingly, the Afghan commanders, sawars (horsemen or cavalry) and other regular mercenaries were deployed in a large number at strategic places in the Sultanate. Major frontier forts were mainly garrisoned by the Afghans at that time. One of them Ahmad Nabi Khan was given the fort of Dipalpur, who maintained a well-equipped army of several thousand horsemen under him. In Multan, the contingent under the command of Prince Muhammad Khan was largely composed of the Afghan soldiers.

In 1285, the Mongols invaded Multan and killed Prince Muhammad Khan. This was the greatest of the shocks received by Balban. In the same invasion they captured Amir Khusraw Dihlavi, the famous poet. However, after some time he managed to escape from the Mongols and safely reached Delhi. Amir Khusraw once narrated the description of Mongols, his captors, in the following words:

Their eyes were so narrow and piercing that they might have bored a hole in a brazen vessel, and their stench was more horrible than their colour. Their heads were set on their bodies as if they have no necks, and their cheeks resembled leathern bottles, full of wrinkles and knots. Their noses extended from cheek to cheek and their mouth from cheekbone to cheekbone...their origin is derived from dogs, but they have

50 Khan, *The Political Relations*, p. 29.

large bones. The king marvelled at their beastly countenances and said that God had created them out of hell fire.⁵¹

In order to establish a strong defence line, Balban built new forts and young Afghan recruits were stationed therein. In the internal security apparatus too, they were entrusted with the charge of military outposts (*thanas*) around Delhi and the *parganas* of Jalali, Patiali, Kampila and Bhojpur with a view to defend these important places and to suppress the dacoits and highway robbers.⁵² The services of the Afghans were thus largely utilized to check the intrusions of the Mongols and to firmly control the law and order situation in the Sultanate. Due to their fighting abilities they faced little difficulty in finding respectable positions in the Sultanate and various other princely states. They were largely recruited as mercenaries under various commanders.

Balban was replaced by Malak Jalal-ud-Din Feroz Khalji, an officer who was also a fief-holder in Samana. The Khalji dynasty ruled over India for some 30 years. There is controversy regarding the origin of the Khaljis. To some scholars they were of Turkish origin while others assert that they were predominantly Afghans. Major Raverty has refuted the claim of their Afghan lineage. He was of the view that there is no truth in the notion that they belonged to the Ghilzai stock of the Afghans. In the *Cambridge History of India*, Wellesley Haig writes that due to their long stay in Afghanistan they intermingled with the native Afghans and adopted the customs and traditions of the local population. He further states that majority of the Turkish nobles in court opposed the cause of Khaljis due to the fact that they belonged to the second generation in India and thus refused to acknowledge them as Turks.⁵³ If one accepts this statement then one also have to accept that Jalal-ud-Din Feroz Shah never held the *jagir* at Samana and that the Khaljis were totally new in the Indian political environment.

51 Wellesley Haig, *The Cambridge History of India*, Vol. III (Delhi: S. Chand and Company, 1958), p. 84.

52 Joshi, *The Afghan Nobility*, p. 22.

53 Haig, *The Cambridge History of India*, p. 102.

Nonetheless, in historiography mere assertions cannot determine the origin of a community. It seems plausible that the Turkish nobility never reconciled with the Khaljis and were always looking for an opportunity to dethrone them. On the other hand Khushal Khan Khattak in his *Diwan* of poetry claimed the Khaljis as Ghiljis Afghans. According to him:

بیا سلطان جلال الدین پہ سریر کیناست
چی پہ اصل کبھی غلجے د ولایت و⁵⁴

Then Sultan Jalal-ud-Din became the sultan of Delhi, who by origin was Ghaljay (Ghalji) of the Afghan land.

On the other hand Preshan Khattak has mentioned that most of the historians wrongly marked “Khaljis” instead of “Ghiljis”. There were several similarities between the Khalji and other Afghan dynasties. For instance majority of the Afghan monarchs were very lenient and the simplicity of the court was a common feature shared by all these rulers. Many Afghan monarchs fell victim to the conspiracies of their own relatives and so was the fate of Jalal-ud-Din. Another common feature of the Khalji and other Afghan dynasties was their disunity and intra-tribal warfare. Every monarchy ceased to exist after its third heir such as Khaljis ruled over northern India with three monarchs and so were Lodhis, Suris, and royal Ghalji family of Qandahar, Abdalis and Barakzais etc.⁵⁵ On the basis of these assertions he had said that the Khaljis were ethnically belonged to the Afghan race. However, the recent research in this regard proved their origin as Turks and not Afghans. In fact, Khaljis, though Turks by ethnic origin settled among the Afghans and adopted their way of living, intermingled with them in the region of Ghazni and Ghaur.⁵⁶ William Erskine has supported this view of the Khalji belonging to Turkic

54 Khushal Khan Khattak, *Kulyat Khushal Khan Khattak*, ed. Abdul Qayum Zahid Mashwani (Kabul: Danish Publishers, 2013), p. 321.

55 Khattak, *Pashtun Kaun?*, p. 55.

56 Ghulam Sarwar Khan Niazi, *The Life and Works of Sultan Alauddin Khalji* (New Delhi: Atlantic Publishers, 1992), p. 17.

extraction but which seems rather to have of Afghan ethnic stock.⁵⁷

During the time of Muhammad Ghauri, Khaljis formed the most important section of the population in Ghazni. In 1200, Ikhtiar-ud-Din Muhammad bin Bakhtiar Khalji was recruitment officer in the army of Muhammad Ghauri. He came to India with his master during his Indian campaign and exhibited marvellous bravery. He had conquered Eastern Bihar and Northern Bengal with only eighteen horsemen in a sensational manner. Afterwards, he conquered Lucknow and the surrounding areas. He overpowered the Hindu ruler of Bengal in 1206, and thus founded the first Khalji dynasty under Ghauride vassalage in Bengal.⁵⁸ It indicates that around this time the Afghans would have come and settled down in Bengal and Bihar. After about twenty years Shams-ud-Din Iltutmish overthrew the Khalji dynasty in Bengal in 1226.⁵⁹

During the Khalji dynasty the Mongol inroads continued with fresh zeal. In 1292, Sultan Jalal-ud-Din defeated a strong Mongol army consisted of 150,000 strong men. Their leader Ulghu, along with his contingent sued for peace and accepted Islam. Most of them permanently settled in India and joined services under the Khalji rulers in Delhi. Afterwards, Jalal-ud-Din, on account of their services for the Sultanate, displayed extraordinary lenient attitude towards them. He gave Ulghu, the defeated Mongol commander, his daughter in marriage. Majority of them had acquired residence in the suburbs of Delhi and came to be known among the local population as the "New Muslims."⁶⁰ In this regard Barani wrote that the Mongols, who followed Ulghu, were brought into the city with their wives and children. Provision was made for their support and houses were provided for them in Kilughari and Indarpal in the suburb of

57 Erskine, *A Story of India Under Baber*, p. 404.

58 Haig, *The Cambridge History of India*, p. 85.

59 *Ibid.*, p. 92.

60 *Ibid.*

Delhi. Their locality was called Mughalpura.⁶¹ During that time the Mongols' incursions continued. A battle was fought between Abdullah, grandson of Halaku Khan and Jalal-ud-Din. The commander of Abdullah's army was defeated and was arrested. An agreement was then inked between the two rulers and the commander of the Mongol army was then released.⁶² With these defeats they halted further expeditions into the areas of the Delhi Sultans. Afterwards, Sultan Jalal-ud-Din Khalji's relations with the Mongols were to some extent cordial and his policy can be termed as a policy of peace.

With the accession of Ala-ud-Din Khalji to the throne of Delhi, the relations between the Mongols of Transoxiana and the Afghans deteriorated to a large extent. Like Sultan Jalal-ud-Din, he continued friendly relations with the Il Khanide rulers Ghazan Khan (1295-1304) and Al-Jaitu (1304-1316). The former sent his envoy, Khwaja Rashid-al-Din, to Delhi who was warmly received by Ala-ud-Din. As a gesture of goodwill a *jagir* was bestowed upon him. Al-Jaitu sent a message of goodwill and warm wishes to Ala-ud-Din at the time of the later succession. But the Sultan faced almost six invasions from another Mongol ruler Deva Khan of Transoxiana, who held bad intentions towards the Sultan due to his friendly relations with Il Khanide rulers of Persia.⁶³

Unlike his uncle, Ala-ud-Din Khalji (1296-1326) never compromised or reconciled with the Mongols intrusions. The available literature indicated the fact that he was extremely careful as far as his north-western and Mongol policies were concerned. However, despite his strong measures at the border areas, the inroads of the Mongols continued with frequent intervals. In 1296, Deva Khan, the ruler of Transoxiana, sent an expedition towards India under the command of Kadar with 10,000 soldiers. This time they crossed the river Indus and ravaged the Jud hills. In the

61 Hamadani, *The Frontier Policy*, p. 118.

62 Zia-ud-Din Barani, *Tarikh-i-Feroz Shahi* (Lahore: Sindh Sagar Academy, 1974), p. 67.

63 *Ibid.*

vicinity of Jalandhar a fierce battle took place in which the Mongols suffered heavy losses. Thousands of them were killed and their heads were sent to Delhi. At the time of the invasion the tribes of Koh-i-Jud, unlike their previous track record, remained loyal to Ala-ud-Din Khalji. In the past, these tribes were a constant source of trouble for the Delhi Sultans because they facilitated and provided help to the Mongols in their Indian invasions. However, this time they refused to stand with the Mongols against the Sultan. The manoeuvring of situations in his favour greatly boosted the leverage of the Delhi Sultanate. It strengthened the position of the Sultan vis-à-vis the Mongol menace. In the year 1299, the Mongols again faced a humiliating defeat. Their commander was arrested and brought to Delhi along with thousands of other captive soldiers.⁶⁴

In the *Tabaqat-i-Akbari* another attack of the Mongols was recorded in the year 1299. This time they directed their attack on Sewistan (Sibi). A huge Mongol force under one of their commanders Saldi chose the present areas of Balochistan as the next target of his attack. They directed this time to target the Afghans of the areas because of their constant support for the Sultan. Ala-ud-Din sent an army under the command of Zafar Khan who inflicted a crushing defeat on them and arrested Saldi along with several thousand Mongols.⁶⁵

By the end of 1299, Qutlagh Khwaja, a prominent Mongol military general, crossed the river Indus with the intention to capture the Delhi throne and avenge the humiliating defeats in the previous battles. "He started from Mavraunnahr," writes Barani, "and passing the Indus with a large force, he marched in the vicinity of Delhi. In this campaign Delhi was the object of the attack, so the Mongols did not ravage the countries bordering on their march nor did they attack the forts..." He further stated that, "Great anxiety prevailed in Delhi, and the people of the

64 *Ibid.*, p. 124.

65 Khwaja Nizam-ud-Din, *Tabaqat-i-Akbari*, Urdu tr. Muhammad Ayyub Qadri (Lahore: Urdu Science Board, n.d.), p 229.

neighbouring villages took refuge within its walls and distress fell upon the people.”⁶⁶ Some nobles advised the Sultan that it would be suicidal to face the Mongol and the best plan would be to stand a siege and to tire out their patience. He refused to bow down and surrender the city and issued immediate orders to confront the Mongols. Ala-ul-Mulk, *kotwal* of Delhi was called to take care of the city and the inhabitants.⁶⁷

Sultan Ala-ud-Din himself marched out and encamped in the plains near Seri where a horrible battle took place between the two armies. In this encounter more than 5,000 Mongols were killed. With the approach of the night, the invading army took a hasty retreat. Zafar Khan chased them up to Maysara but the Mongols fled to their country with a humiliating and formidable defeat. Albeit this battle caused the death of Zafar Khan, who was a great and capable commander of Ala-ud-Din, but such a fear of his courage was set in the hearts of the Mongols that it worked as an unyielding warning to them. Ala-ud-Din, therefore, more firmly fortified the defence of the Sultanate and built strong forts for the purpose to secure the territorial integrity of his empire.⁶⁸ In 1302 and 1304 the usual Mongol forays regularly took place, however, they miserably failed to gain any victory against Ala-ud-Din.

These successive defeats greatly hampered the Mongol might. Though they again tried several times to avenge their previous defeats but every time they suffered defeats. In December 1305, in one such battle, thousands of Mongols were perished and their leaders Ali Beg and Tartaq were arrested and the heads of thousands of their soldiers were used in the construction of the Siri. Sultan Ala-ud-Din was wise enough to pardon Ali Beg and Tartaq for the purpose to go back home and create a sense of awe and horror in the Mongol's ranks.⁶⁹ It shows that during the Delhi Sultans the

66 Barani, *Tarikh-i-Feroz Shahi*, p. 67.

67 Nizam-ud-Din, *Tabaqat-i-Akbari*, p. 230.

68 *Ibid.*, pp. 125-26.

69 *Ibid.*, p. 129.

Afghan borderland remained politically fragile. More possibly they were largely utilized in these rivalries because of the proximity of the battlegrounds with their mainland.

As stated earlier, those Mongols who permanently settled in and around Delhi were called the "New Muslims or New Mussalmans". Sultan Jalal-ud-Din accorded them great privileges and also established matrimonial relations by giving his daughter to Ulghu, the Mongol leader. However, these New Muslims were a constant source of headache for Ala-ud-Din.

In 1297, Ala-ud-Din sent Nusrat Khan and Ulugh Khan to subdue Raja Karan who had been for long enjoyed immunity and an independent status. He was defeated and the sway of the Sultan over Gujarat was established and after rejoices of the victory Nusrat Khan started distributing the war booty among the soldiers. The allotment caused discontent in the files and ranks of the "New Muslims". On the plea of injustice in distribution of the war-booty the New Muslims mutinied and killed a brother of Nusrat Khan along with a nephew of Ala-ud-Din. They were generally discontented; not entirely without cause, but at that moment Sultan Ala-ud-Din was preoccupied with the Mongols of Transoxiana. Under the prevailing circumstances, Sultan deemed it as an act of treason. He did not tolerate this act on the part of the New Muslims. As a result, he not only removed all of them from the state services but also blinded Ulghu Khan. It caused great anxiety among them and later some of them hatched a plot to kill the Sultan while he was hunting near Delhi. Ala-ud-Din received wounds during the encounter and hurriedly managed to reach the camp. On the discovery of this plot, Sultan issued an immediate order of the *en masse* massacre of the New Muslims both in Delhi and in provinces. Around twenty to thirty thousand were killed and their belongings including wives, children and property were distributed amongst the state soldiers.⁷⁰ He thus got rid of them.

70 Haig, *The Cambridge History of India*, p. 117.

Quite amazingly, Ala-ud-Din due to his military reforms, and, partly due to the confusion caused by the death of Deva Khan, the ruler of Transoxiana, adopted an expansionist policy to tackle the Mongols. He led several expeditions on regular basis to Kabul, Qandahar, and Garmsir and consequently ravaged and in some cases, levied tribute from its inhabitants. At that time, there was turmoil, confusion, chaos and the Mongols in Transoxiana were not in the position to challenge the authority of the Sultan of Delhi. Even in the territory of Ghazni, the *khutba* (Friday sermon) was read in Sultan's name. Due to his wise forward policy, Sultan Ala-u-Din somehow secured the north-western border of India. Particularly after 1307; the Mongol for the time being, ceased their raids against Delhi. When that problem eliminated, the region of north-western India remained calm and quiet and the people of these areas once again carried on their agriculture and business pursuits in peace and tranquillity.⁷¹

In Ghiyas-ud-Din Tughlaq's time (1320-1325) there were internal disturbances in the Mongol dominion and they were not able to take notice of the activities beyond the Indus. On the other hand, the Afghans continued to enjoy prominence under the Tughlaq Sultans. They needed their services to defend the north-west frontier against the Mongol and to suppress internal rebellion as well.⁷² Around this time the Afghans gained considerable prominence, although a number of their commanders revolted but their rebellions were suppressed by Tughlaq Sultans. However, the Afghans lost a golden opportunity to establish an independent kingdom in the Deccan where they were much stronger militarily.

The Afghans shifted their energies to the development and progress of their community. They entered the imperial services in large number. Bihar and Tughlaqpur were entrusted to Malak Bir Afghan and Muhammad Shah Afghan

71 *Ibid.*, pp. 132-33.

72 Joshi, *The Afghan Nobility*, p. 23.

respectively, where both of them succeeded by their sons. The *iqta* of Rapri was under Malak Khattab Afghan. Malak Mardan Dawlat, the *muqta* of Multan, had largely recruited the Afghans to defend the frontier against the Mongol attacks. Among them was Malak Bahram, the ancestor of Sultan Bahlul Lodi.⁷³

Timur's Indian Invasion and the Afghans

The successors of Feroz Shah Tughlaq were too incompetent to handle smoothly the affairs of the Sultanate and the disintegration of the empire gradually got momentum. A civil war between different claimants to the throne coupled with the increased interference in the nomination of the king by the court's nobles considerably weakened the position of the Sultans. About the same time the rebellion of Shaikh Khokar, a former and powerful governor of Lahore, took place. Feroz Tughlaq decided to send an expedition against him. Threatened by this imminent danger, Shaikh Khokar approached Amir Timur and persuaded him to invade India. The Afghan territory was also in disarray due to incessant wars between Sarang Khan and Khizar Khan, the governor of Multan. Khizar Khan fled to Bayana where he also joined the bandwagon of Timur in the invasion of India.

It appears in *Malfuzat-i-Timuri* that Amir Timur was ninth in descent from Toman Khan, great-great-grandfather of Genghiz Khan.⁷⁴ He emerged a powerful man who ruled over large dominions in Transoxiana⁷⁵ in 1369. Ethnically he

73 *Ibid.*, p. 25. Discussing the origin of the term *iqta* and *muqta* the author of *Sher Shah Suri* informed us that when the Muslims conquered large tracks of land in the early Islamic period they called it *qata* to which later they preferred the abstract term *iqta*. Then these lands were assigned to various governors to manage it properly and these assignee were called *muqta*. In the present context it was used as provinces and governors respectively. See Hussain Khan, *Sher Shah Suri* (Lahore: Ferozsons, 1987), p. 13.

74 Amir Timur, *Tuzuk-i-Timuri*, English. tr. H. M. Elliot (Lahore: Sindh Sager Academy, 1974), p. 55.

75 Transoxiana, known in Arabic and Persian literature as Mawarunnahar is the ancient name used for that region of Central Asia corresponding to the modern day Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, southern Kyrgyzstan and southwest Kazakhstan. Geographically, the region is situated between the Amu Darya and Syr Darya. The name Transoxiana (Land beyond the Oxus), was first

was a Turkic Mongol who belonged to Barlas tribe dwelling in Kesh town situated south of Samarqand. Olaf Caroe has regarded him as the ancestor of the Mughal Dynasty in India. In 1398, he attacked the Afghans and reduced them to submission. Afghan tribes of Lodhi and Shirani were largely recruited in his army.⁷⁶ The real aim of his Indian expedition was only to plunder and loot the cities and collect its wealth. He never exercised the idea to subjugate permanently the throne of Delhi. During his campaign he also exploited the services of the Afghans and recruited them in his army. About twelve thousands Afghans under various commanders participated in the campaign. Lodhis and Shiranis swelled his army with large contingents. He spent almost six months amongst the Afghans in the tribal areas. In the first phase of his invasion he started to subdue tribal malaks of the Afghans. Some other Afghan malaks of *Ruh* supported his cause. Famous among them were Malak Sarbani, Malak Khizar Khan Sarwani, Malak Baha-ud-Din Niazi, Malak Yusuf Sarwani and Malak Habib Sarbani.⁷⁷ Timur crossed Hindu Kush near Indarab with an army of ninety-two thousands under his command. Before capturing Delhi, he fought a battle with the forces of Sultan Nasir-ud-Din Mahmud Tughlaq.

In Meerut, his soldiers indiscriminately plundered the houses of the common masses. This brutal treatment greatly perturbed the local population, including the Hindus and Afghans. They resented this high-handedness and consequently rebelled under the leadership of Ilyas Afghan and Ahmad Thanseri. Equally assisted by the Hindus, the Afghans offered tough resistance to the invading army. Timur besieged the city and a fierce fight took place. At the end, the invading army captured the city in January 1399. This incident increased the already existing gulf between the

given by the Romans. The Arabs and Persian called it as Mawarunnahar (Land beyond the River).

76 Caroe, *The Pathan*, p. 137.

77 Sardar Sher Muhammad Khan Gandapur, *Tarikh-i-Khurshid Jahan*, Urdu trs. Siraj Ahmad Alvi (Karachi: Shaikh Shaukat Ali and Sons, 1991), p. 208.

Afghans and the Mongols.⁷⁸ On the bank of river Dandana (Jhelum) Timur held a court on 6 March 1399 wherein robes and rewards were bestowed on the officers and other princes. Then he appointed Khizar Khan, the former governor of Multan, from which Sarang Khan had expelled him before Timur's invasion, as the new Sultan of Delhi.

Dawlat Khan Lodhi, the *faujdar* (Commander) of Mian Doab, had tried his level best to protect the interests of the former Sultan in that hour of trial. He won the support of most of the nobles and sent several expeditions to establish the imperial hold over Punjab but in vain. He defeated Behram Khan, *naib* of Khizar Khan, on 22 December 1406, and then established himself at Samana. But on the approach of Khizar Khan's army, majority of his soldiers deserted and went to the enemy camp. With the passage of time his own people, for instance Ikhtiar Khan also joined the army of Khizar Khan. At last in March 1414, Dawlat Khan Lodhi was besieged at Siri by 60,000 strong army of Khizar Khan. The unrelenting process of desertion gravely weakened his position and at the eleventh hour too some of his officers treacherously deserted and went to the side of Khizar Khan. In this way he was forced by circumstances to surrender. On 28 May, Khizar Khan captured Delhi, imprisoned Dawlat Khan Lodhi and founded a new dynasty known as the Sayed Dynasty of India.⁷⁹ Khizar Khan ruled over India from 1414 to 1421.

The impact of Timur's invasion of India was tremendous, because it not only shattered the very structure of its administrative machinery but also led to the emergence of a large number of small independent states. Consequently the authority of the Sultan over the frontier *iqtas* became extremely weak. Most importantly the establishment of the Sayed dynasty by Khizar Khan brought about a tricky controversy in the political structure of the Delhi throne in India. From this political development the Mughal

78 Haig, *The Cambridge History of India*, p. 199.

79 Joshi, *The Afghan Nobility*, p. 26.

successors of Timur in Kabul and Central Asia perceived the impression that not only the *iqtas* of Multan and Lahore but also the whole of India was their rightful dominions.⁸⁰ As far as the Afghans were concerned, the whole of their country including that of Ghakkar came under the control of the Central Asian Empire built by Timur. A large number of people were dislocated and for the time being the frontier was wiped out from the contemporary historical narration.

Establishment of the Afghan Lodhi Dynasty

As mentioned earlier, Lodhis were not new in the realm of Indian politics. Their ancestors once enjoyed eminence and high prestige during the time of Hindu Raja Jaipal. Shaikh Hamid Lodhi was a *jagirdar* in the area of Multan and Laghman on behalf of Raja Jaipal. He was made responsible in protecting his western border from the foreign invasions. Subuktigin, after ascending the throne of Ghazni, befriended him and conferred on him his *jagir*. After the death of Shaikh Hamid Lodhi his son Nasar succeeded him.⁸¹

Like their predecessors, the Sayed Sultans also relied upon the Afghans nobility for the stability of their rule. It was a time when the Afghans strengthened their positions in the strategically important *iqtas* of the Sultanate. Due to their martial and administrative abilities they won the support of the Sultan who in return gave them high positions in imperial services. Among them was Malak Shah Bahram Lodhi who held the territory of Sarhind on behalf of Khizar Khan. He was the commander of 12,000 Mughal and Afghan *sawars*. During that time the Afghans had very firmly established their position in various places but due to their internal feuds, they were not in the position to exploit the fluid political condition for their advantage.

At the start of his military career, Bahlul Lodhi also carried trade of horses. In this regard he was much popular for his finest breed of horses. Once he concluded a deal of finely bred horses with the Sultan Muhammad Shah. As a

80 *Ibid.*, p. 200.

81 Kakakhel, *Pukhtanah da Tarikh Pa Ranra Kay*, p. 363.

payment he was granted a *pargana* in the Punjab where already the Afghans were in large number. Besides, his status was raised to the position of *amir*. After the death of Malik Sultan, he became the governor of Sarhind. He was allowed to annex Lahore to his charge. Once, Sultan Muhammad Shah asked for his help when the Malwa Sultan Mahmud Shah I, invaded his territory. Accordingly, he joined the imperial army with 20,000 soldiers. By his war strategy, cleverness and bravery he defeated the army of the Malwa Sultan. Afterwards, Sultan Muhammad Shah conferred on him the title of *Khan-i-Khanan* (khan of the khans). In fact, after this victory he became the virtual ruler of the Punjab with strong position and influence in the imperial court.

In 1436, Sultan Muhammad Shah (1434-1445) ceased to take any interest in the affairs of the state. He was a nephew of Mubarak Shah (1421-1434) and proved himself to be a weak ruler. As a result of his slackness, rebellions broke out in the nook and corner of the Sultanate. Accordingly, he lost control over some important part of his dominion. In the prevailing circumstances the *malakzadas* of Mewat invited Sultan Mahmud Khalji of Malwa to capture Delhi. However, Malak Bahlul Lodi was strong enough to repel the attack. He was at that time stationed in the Punjab holding together a loose confederacy of the Afghan and Turks nobles.

Bahlul won the support of the Sultan due to his bravery and courage. He was addressed as his son and was given the title of *Khan-i-Khanan*. Bahlul was a wise and politically shrewd commander. He further strengthened his position by inviting Afghan tribesmen from *Ruh* to support him against his rivals. He held the whole of the Punjab up to Panipat and appointed his trusted commanders in districts around Delhi. Important positions were entrusted to the Afghan chiefs in the administration of these areas. After strengthening his position firmly, Bahlul twice tried his luck to capture the throne of Delhi but in vain. It was in 1448, when Sultan Ala-ud-Din Alam Shah (1445-1451), on his own volition, left the capital and went to Badayun to spend the rest of his life in

tranquillity away from the problematic court proceedings. Thereafter, Hamid Khan, the *wazir*, invited Bahlul to settle the affairs of the state in the absence of the Sultan.⁸² For some time he remained quite obedient and exhibited loyalty to Hamid Khan. He pretended himself to be a trusted officer of the court while making preparation for the last bid to capture the throne.

The position of Bahlul Lodhi was subordinate immediately to that of his master Hamid Khan but he was intelligent and clever. He at once assumed the title of Sultan Bahlul Lodhi after the occupation of Delhi.⁸³ After confidently establishing his writ, he was searching for an opportunity to raise himself in to the status of Sultan of Delhi. He cleverly gained the confidence of Hamid Khan and frequently visited his court along with his Afghan personal guards. At last on 19 April, 1451, Bahlul Lodhi arrested Hamid Khan and crowned himself as Abul Muzaffar Bahlul Shah and founded the Lodhi Afghan dynasty. After capturing the supreme position in the Sultanate he did not sever his connection with Sultan Ala-ud-Din and very diplomatically won his support. According to *Tarikh-i-Shahi*, Bahlul wrote a letter to Ala-ud-Din explaining his intention of eradicating an evil in the Sultanate. He left the Sultan undisturbed in his residence at Badayun and kept his name along with his own in the *khutba* (sermon) and the *sikah* (currency) which he issued immediately after his elevation to the throne of Delhi.⁸⁴

The aforesaid accounts reveal that after the invasion of Timur the Sultanate began to disintegrate and the recalcitrant elements emerged on account of subsequent political unrest and turmoil. But the Afghans, however, did not give up hope of reviving the authority of the Sultan. They

82 Abdul Halim, *History of the Lodi Sultans of Delhi and Agra* (Dacca: University of Dacca, 1961), pp. 15-16.

83 Humaira Faiz Dasti, 'Multan on the Eve of the Mughal Invasion', *Journal of the Research Society of Pakistan*, Vol. XXXII, No. 2 (December, 1995), p. 27.

84 Ahmad Yadgar, *Tarikh-i-Shahi*, Urdu tr. Syed Nazir Niazi (Lahore: Urdu Science Board, 1985), p. 11.

first tried to secure Delhi from the invasion of Khizar Khan and then made several bids to oust the Syed Sultans from the capital. It was due to the Syed Sultans previous connections with the Temurides successors in Kabul for which they were perceived as usurpers and the vassals of the Mongol rulers.

In 1451, immediately after his accession to the throne of Delhi, Bahlul Lodhi went out to capture the *iqta* of Multan. Since the establishment of the Sayed dynasty the control of the Delhi Sultans over its frontier provinces had become waning down to the maximum level. In such circumstances, Multan became unprotected and exposed to invasion from all sides. At that time, it was independent under a local ruler Shaikh Yusuf Qureshi. Bahlul was determined to conquer it because of its strategically important location. It played an important role in the politics of the north-western frontier region and controlled most of the foreign trade on Qandahar-Quetta route. The most important factor for the occupation of Multan was its legitimate position and belonging to the empire of Delhi.

However, his desire of the occupation of Multan did not materialize and he had to return from Dipalpur due to the attack on Delhi by Mahmud Shah Sharqi, ruler of Jaunpur. At that time the fort of Delhi was vulnerable and there were very few soldiers inside the fort. In that hour of danger, Bibi Matto, mother-in-law of Bahlul, displayed great astuteness and courage. She clad all the Afghan ladies of the fort in men's attire and stationed them on the walls of the fort.⁸⁵ Meanwhile, when the news of the siege reached Bahlul, he sent an invitation to the Afghans of *Ruh* because he seriously felt the vulnerability of his throne in case of his leading an expedition to the far-flung *iqtas*. In the face of such endangerment he rightly thought that for the safety of his throne the Afghans of *Ruh* could be a challenging force

85 Yadgar, *Tarikh-i-Shahi*, p. 13. Also see Halim, *History of the Lodi Sultans*, p. 21.

to be reckoned with. Thus he wrote letter of invitation to the Afghans of *Ruh* in the following enthralling words:

If my dear friends are pleased to come down to this country, I shall have only the name of king, while each kingdom and territory that has been conquered and will pass under our control will be shared by us as between brothers.⁸⁶

Olaf Caroe has mentioned that large number of the Afghans from *Ruh* flocked down in response of the *firman* of Bahlul Lodhi. Different Afghan border tribes warmly responded and many of them belonging to Lodhi, Lohani, Niazi, Marwat, Baitani, Mandanr, Yusufzais and Karlanris came down and settled in various parts of the empire. Among them also came Ibrahim of the Sur, sub-section of the Lodhi tribe. He was the grandfather of Sher Shah.⁸⁷ The fresh influx of the Afghans into the mainland of India continued even during the time of Sultan Sikandar Lodhi. A contingent of about twelve hundred Afghan mercenaries came from their homeland aimed at joining the army of Sikandar Lodhi. They were warmly received and *jagirs* were granted to them in different provinces. They rendered great services for the safety of the Delhi throne and in expeditions against the disobedient elements.⁸⁸

The Afghan elites exclusively constituted the ruling circle during the reign of Bahlul Lodhi. They belonged to various Afghan tribes but among them were Shahu Khel Lodhis, the ruling elites, Yusaf Khel Lodhis, Sarang Khani Lodhis, Farmulis, Nauhanis, Sarwanis, Suris and Kakar. In terms of Afghan national cohesion, the invitation of Bahlul Lodhi and the coming of Afghan influx cannot be called an Afghan national political dispensation. He needed the military support of his brethren from *Ruh* which he got up to some extent. However, he took no practical step in the context of cementing a strong bond of national cohesion with the

86 Iqtidar Hussain Siddiqui, *Some Aspects of Afghans Despotism in India* (Lahore: Book Traders, n.d.), p. 9.

87 Caroe, *The Pathans*, p. 38.

88 Shaikh Muhammad Kabir Hazyani, *Afsana-i-Shahan*, Urdu tr. Saud-ul-Hasan Khan Ruhila (Lahore: Book Fort, 2011), p. 143.

remaining tribes of *Ruh*. Neither had he initiated any meaningful policy to secure the Afghan borderland from the Mughal forays nor did anything concrete to win over the hearts of those Afghans. In fact, he failed to devise an expansionist north-western policy for the safety of his empire.

During the time of Bahlul Lodhi, the trans-Indus territories were under the control of the Mughals, which had become an Indianized term for the Mongols. But due to incessant hostilities between the house of Abu Said, Babur's grandfather, and Mirza Hussain Baiqara, the political situation of the area remained in the doldrums. Samarqand, Ghazni and Kabul were under the control of Mirza Abu Said, who was powerful as compared to Mirza Hussain Baiqara, the ruler of Herat and Qandahar. During Bahlul's reign no Mughal invasion took place. On the other hand, his internecine warfare with the Sharqi Sultans of Jaunpur, Bahlul did not give much attention to consolidate his rule over the frontier *iqtas*. His forays and expeditions against Sultan Qutb-ud-Din Langa, an independent ruler of Multan, continued unabated during that period. Notwithstanding his large-scale attacks, Bahlul never succeeded to capture Multan. On the contrary, Hussain Shah Langa, son and successor of Qutb-ud-Din Langa, adopted an expansionist policy and fought many wars against neighbouring tiny states and captured considerable territory. He cleverly maintained cordial relations with major frontier Afghan tribes and won their support against any adventurism. He also captured many territories from Ghazi Khan, a Temuride prince. He succeeded to retain the independent status of Multan by protecting it from the Mughals and Delhi forces.⁸⁹ Bahlul misread the strategic position of Multan and underestimated the military position of its ruler. It was rather his strategic mistake to wage war against the Langas. He should have tactfully avoided such sort of misadventurism for the consolidation and security of his own position. It was much easy for Bahlul to get the support of the Afghan tribes

89 Dasti, *Multan*, p. 29.

in dealing with the Langas. Quite surprisingly, Qutb-ud-Din Langa established friendly relations with the border Afghan tribes probably to pre-empt any political or military alliance between Bahlul and these tribes against him.

Bahlul Lodhi died in 1489 at the age of eighty while returning from a battle. He was typically an Afghan character. He was wise, simple, brave and courageous. He was religious in his thought and lenient in his habits and dealings. He allotted all the high posts of the Sultanate to his relatives and other Afghan officers. He failed however, in adopting such policies through which all the Afghan tribes could be united on a single platform. He also patronized a number of Rajputs and Hindus whom he considered men of merit. The prominent Hindu chiefs during his period were Rai Dudu, Rai Sakit Singh and Rai Man Singh.⁹⁰ He never behaved like an autocrat and considered his position as first among equals. Hence, his position may be rightly called like the leader of a democratic tribe or a citizen king. He was very kind towards his nobles and never treated them harshly. To share his Sultanate among the Afghans, he distributed even the strategically important provinces among his trusted nobles. For instance, Malak Hussain Farmuli got the country from Sarun down to Gung, Agra was given to Humayun Sarwani, Khwaja Ahmad was sent to administer Qanauj, Barhayech and Gorakhpur and a vast chunk of land were bestowed on Farmuli nobles. Moreover, his near relatives i.e. Bhai Khel Lodhis got the entire province of the Punjab. He had fulfilled his promise which he had made with Ahmad Khan Jilwani by giving him Bayana and bestowed on him the title of Sultani. Mahmud Khan Lodhi received the entire area of Kalpi.⁹¹ If any of these noble got offended, he usually visited his house and put his turban and sword before him by saying: "If you do not consider me fit for the royal office, entrust it to somebody else." Unlike other Sultans of Delhi, Bahlul never used to sit on a throne neither chose a special dignified

90 Siddiqui, *Some Aspects of Afghans*, p. 24.

91 Hazyani, *Afsana-i-Shahan*, p. 112.

place when accompanied by his nobles. He used to say "It is enough if my name is associated with the kingdom".⁹² In fact, these soft and lenient policies towards the Afghan nobles diminished his position to a large extent. His status of *primus inter pares*, though a decent way to satisfy the Afghan chiefs, was not a good strategy for the larger interest of the empire. Indeed, these policies were, at the end, responsible for the downfall of the Lodhi Dynasty.

At the time of the thickest danger Bahlul Lodhi remained steadfast and never lost temper or got nervous. In every encounter, he preferred to conduct it personally. He also kept under his command many thousand Mughal *sawars*. He was an admirer of their bravery and soldier-ship. Even he kept many Mughal soldiers in his personal army called *Khasa Khel* and also recruited them as bodyguard for the princes. He learnt a lot of fighting tactics from the Mughal war strategies and successfully applied it in his war against the Sharqi Sultans.⁹³ He considered Mughals trusted soldiers. For that matter he recruited about twenty thousand Mughal princes and nobles in his court. A number of able administrators were invited to join state service under him.⁹⁴

As a result of these policies of the Sultan, majority Afghan and other nobles of different racial stock took great interest in the safety of the Lodhi Sultanate and considered it as their own. Many of them then settled permanently while some went back after the need for their support was over. As the Afghan nobles belonged to different tribes and were jealous of one another's power and positions, the only authority to wield these heterogeneous elements into one organized and harmonious unit was the personality of the Sultan.⁹⁵

The greatest drawback of Bahlul Lodhi was his failure to devise a careful north-western policy during his reign.

92 Halim, *History of the Lodi Sultans*, p. 53.

93 *Ibid.*, p. 65.

94 Gandapur, *Tarikh-i-Khurshid Jahan*, p. 223.

95 Siddiqui, *Some Aspects of the Afghans*, p. 25.

Though he exploited the services of the Afghans of *Ruh* by inviting them to consolidate his position but failed to channelize their energies in securing his borders. He would have been in a much stronger position to firmly establish strong defence lines with the help of the Afghan of *Ruh*. The absence of a communication link between the two geographically distant segments of the Afghans hampered the emergence of nationalist sentiments among them. Evidently, the Afghans were placed at strategically important positions in the political geography of the Delhi Sultanate but they never utilized it as a cherished prize. Though the Afghan border tribes enthusiastically trickled down on his call for cooperation but he failed to understand the importance of the Afghan borderland. This failure may be called as the greatest flaw of his north-western policy.

The successor of Bahlul Lodhi was Sikandar Lodhi, who ruled over India from 1489 to 1517. He was a great conqueror who tried to revive the greatness of the Delhi Sultanate. He greatly extended the boundaries of his empire by annexing Jaunpur, Chanderi, Dholpur and Gwalyar. He successfully kept the turbulent chiefs and the rebellious governors under his control. It was during his time that despotism pervaded into the body politic of the court to the maximum level. He died in 1517 and was succeeded by his son Ibrahim Lodhi. He proved himself extremely incapable of keeping the Afghan nobles united and under his firm control. Rebellions and revolts started in different parts of the Empire. In this state of affairs Zahir-ud-Din Babur emerged from Farghana, who captured Kabul in 1504 and afterwards defeated Ibrahim Lodhi at Panipat in 1526.

It was after one year of Sikandar Lodhi's accession to the throne of Delhi in 1490 that an incident of far-reaching consequences took place in Kabul. Kabul was a Temuride dominion at that time ruled by Ulugh Beg Mirza. The mass-killing of 700 Afghan Yusufzai malaks by Ulugh Beg occurred in 1490, which was considered the root cause of the Mughal-Afghan conflict. Ulugh Beg was the uncle of Babur who died in Kabul after 42 years of rule. Babur's

appearance first in Kabul and then his attempts for the conquest of India are significant political and historical periods in the history of the Mughal-Afghan relations. Khushal Khan Khattak claimed that Babur accomplished the gigantic task of capturing the throne of Delhi with the help of the Afghans. How he accomplished that task? All these important and other related events would be discussed in detail in the subsequent chapter.

Chapter 2

Babur and the Afghans

The intensity of rivalry between the Mughals and Afghans has started from Kabul much before the coming of Babur. However, with his emergence on the political scene the scale of the conflict was not limited only to the boundaries of Afghanistan because his continuous raids on India and the Afghan tribes of the Peshawar and Swat valleys carried its effects into the South Asian region. Babur's attacks on the Indian territories marked the beginning of the downfall of the Lodhi Afghan dynasty in Delhi. It was due to his enduring qualities of statesmanship, military strategy and leadership that he founded powerful Mughal Dynasty despite the Afghans' divergent resistance in the borderland and in the plains of India. A superb commander and strategist as Babur was, he determinately overpowered most of the major obstacles on his way in a short span of 21 years to seize the throne of Delhi in 1526.

Zahir-ud-Din Muhammad Babur was born on Friday, 14 February, 1483 at Andijan. His father Umar Shaikh Mirza was the brother of Ulugh Beg Mirza, the ruler of Kabul. Umar Shaikh held the fertile tract of Farghana nowadays in Uzbekistan. He was fifth in descent from Timur while his mother Qutlagh Nigar Khanum was the Daughter of Yunus Khan, a descendent of Genghiz Khan through his son Chaghtai Khan. In this way he combined the Turkic and Mongol blood in his veins. In his father's domain he also adopted many Persian traits and manners. Thus all these qualities, i.e. Persian, Mongol and Turkic were present in the personality and character of Babur.

The term Mughal, at that time in India, was used as a general appellation for all those invaders who came from the north-western side. Thus the dynasty founded by Babur was become popular as the Mughal dynasty of India. In fact, the empire was founded by the Chaghtai Turks, which according to William Erskine, was a perfectly different race.¹ The tradition prevalent among the Central and South Asian nations about tracing the family genealogy connect it with the father lineages. It was probably due to this reason that despite his blood relation with the Mongols from his mother side, Babur wrote contemptuously about them and called himself a Turk in his memoirs *Babur Nama*.²

On 8 June, 1494, Babur succeeded his father at the age of 11 years to the throne of Farghana. He was surrounded by many misfortunes. At the start of his military career he succeeded not only saving his small principality but even captured Samarqand in 1497. But he lost his own throne of Farghana, which he recaptured only to lose Samarqand in 1500. Till 1503, he was engaged in a series of wars with Shaibani Khan, an Uzbek chief. After the death of Ulugh Beg there were uncertainty and chaos in Kabul. In 1504, Babur tried his luck successfully in Kabul. It was a time when it was ruled by Muhammad Muqem. In 1504 Babur besieged the city and compelled Muhammad Muqem to surrender.³ Kabul was made the launching-pad by Babur for the conquest of the Indus and Ganges valleys. He deemed

1 Babur's genealogy from his father side was Babur, son of Umer Shaikh Mirza, son of Abusaid Mirza, son of Sultan Muhammad Mirza, son Miran Shah, son of Amir Timur Korkan. While from his mother side it was Qutlagh Nigar Khanum daughter of Yunus Khan, son of Weis Khan, son of Sher Ali Khan, son of Muhammad Khwaja Khan, son of Khizar Khwaja Khan, son of Tughlak Timur Khan, son of Isan Bugha Khan, son of Dewa Chichan, son of Borak Khan, styled Ghiyas-ud-Din the son of Sukar, son of Kamgar, son of Chaghtai Khan, son of Genghiz Khan. Zahir-ud-Din Muhammad Babur, *Tuzuk-i-Baburi*, English tr. Annette S. Beveridge (Lahore: Sang-e-Meel Publications, 1975), p. 19. Also see William Erskine, *A History of India under Baber* (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 1974), pp. 14 and 78.

2 Babur, *Tuzuk-i-Baburi*, p. 23.

3 Abdur Rahim Bakhtani, *Babur au Pukhtanah* [Pashto] (Peshawar: By the author himself, 2007), p. 35.

these areas rightful dominions conquered for his family by Timur. Before elaborating more on Babur's Indian campaigns, it is extremely important to mention the Mughal-Afghan relations at the time of his uncle Ulugh Beg Mirza in Kabul. Because it was in Kabul, during Ulugh Beg's reign, that the conflict between the two nations developed into a full-fledged rivalry.

Origin of the Mughal-Afghan Conflict

After the death of Timur, there was chaos in his vast empire which was divided amongst his four sons; Miran Shah, Jahangir, Amir Shaikh and Shah Rukh Mirza. In the family of Timur, Abu Said was the son of Sultan Muhammad Mirza, grandson of Miran Shah and grand-grandson of Timur. Abu Said ruled over Mawarunnahar and then came to the province of Kabul. Two of his sons which were important in the aforesaid discussion were Umar Shaikh and Ulugh Beg, the rulers of Farghana and Kabul respectively.⁴ In those days there was chaos in the Temuride dominions everywhere. Around that time all the *Khakhi* or *Khashi* Afghan tribes (Yusufzai, Gigyani, Tarklanri and Muhammadzai) got permanent settlements in Kabul and the surrounding areas. The leading malak of all these tribes was Malak Sulaiman Shah, son of Malak Taj-ud-Din Khan bin Malak Razzar who belonged to the Yusufzai tribe. As time passed on, the Yusufzai grew in numbers and gained power and influence in and around Kabul and Ghazni. It was difficult for any Mughal prince to rule over Kabul and Ghazni without their support.⁵

The Yusufzai tribe was considered as the ruling clan of the Afghans. The tribe belonged to the *Sarban* section in the Afghan genealogy. Qays Abdur Rashid, the progenitor of the Afghans, had a son by the name of Sarban. Yusuf, who happened to be the ancestor of the Yusufzais, descended

4 *Ibid.*, p. 22. Also see Sardar Sher Muhammad Khan Gandapur, *Tarikh-i-Khurshid Jahan*, Urdu tr. Siraj Ahmad Alvi (Karachi: Shaikh Shaukat Ali and Sons, 1991). 220.

5 Pir Muazzam Shah, *Tawarikh Hafiz Rahmat Khani: Afghan Qabail aur unki Tarikh* (Peshawar: Pashto Academy, 1977), p. 73.

from Sarban in fifth generation. Mandy, son of Khakhi or Khashi had two sons named Umar and Yusuf. It is stated that Umar lived for some time in Hasan Abdal where a son by the name of Mandanr was born to him. After the death of Umar, Mandanr along with his family re-joined his tribe. As Yusuf was elder than him, therefore, the entire tribe was then called as Yusufzais. The tribe once lived in Kunar and Bajaur.

In the fifth century CE when the Huns invaded India from the west then they migrated to Ghwara Margha in Khurasan. Afterwards, they created differences with Tarin tribe and a battle was fought in which the latter came out victorious. Owing to the cruelties of other invading tribes, they migrated to Gara and Nushki (Balochistan). In the fourteenth century they migrated to Ghazni and Kabul.⁶

It was around 1460 when Mirza Ulugh Beg reached Kabul with only handful of his men. Helpless and depressed after successive defeats in Transoxiana (Mawarunnahar), he requested Malak Sulaiman Shah for his help in recapturing Kabul and Ghazni. The Yusufzai malak at once agreed and provided him the much needed help. Malak Sulaiman Shah treated him like his son and put his entire tribal force on his disposal for capturing the lost Temurides' territories. Very wisely and cleverly, Ulugh Beg manoeuvred the situations in his favour with the help of the Afghan tribal confederacy led by Sulaiman Shah. For some time he got the much needed support from the tribes and consolidated his position. In fact, Malak Sulaiman Shah, worked as an informal but powerful prime minister of Ulugh Beg in the initial days. The inhabitants of Kabul considered Ulugh Beg a nominal head and real authority was vested in the hands of Sulaiman Shah.⁷ With unbounded power and influence, a number of Yusufzai malaks became too arrogant and openly defied the orders of Ulugh Beg. They considered themselves

⁶ Allah Bux Yusufi, *Yusufzai Pathan* (Karachi: Muhammad Ali Educational Society, 1973), p. 24.

⁷ Muhammad Hayat Khan, *Hayat-i-Afghan*, Eng. tr. Henry Priestly (Lahore: Sang-i-Meel Publications, 1981), pp. 101-2.

independent tribes following their own customs. Their forays on the neighbouring tiny principalities some time created law and order situation which naturally embarrassed Mughal princes who gathered around Ulugh Beg in Kabul. One can trace the roots of the Afghan nascent tribal confederacy from these political developments that took place in Kabul. They were quite influential in the affairs of Kabul due to their unity and tribal cohesion. At that time their political and military strength was a source of trouble for the Mughals in Kabul. Keeping in view the power of the Afghan tribal confederacy Ulugh Beg Mirza diplomatically kept a vigilant eye on the situation. He held the supreme position in Kabul with the help of the Afghans and did not want to disturb the arrangement and loose his supreme position.

Ulugh Beg looked for an opportunity to ward off the kingdom of Kabul from the Yusufzais' arrogance. He set to exploit the differences between the Yusufzai and Gigyani, another powerful Afghan tribe living in the environs of Kabul. It was under this backdrop that the Afghan power divided due to the political interference of the Mughals. One section under Sulaiman Shah stood in front of Mirza Ulugh Beg while another group led by the Gigyani chiefs formed alliance with the Mughals. In fact, an often practicing element in the history of the Afghans was their utterly disorganized state of national cohesion, disloyalty and insincerity with each-others. They lost major important battles due to inter and intra-tribal feuds and jealousies. It is now a trade-mark of their social and political structure that they can be easily exploited even against their own tribesmen. On account of their internal hostilities Ulugh Beg skilfully broke their power in Kabul. Ignoring Malak Sulaiman Shah, Gigyani malaks were given great respect in those days by Mirza Ulugh Beg. They were received warmly by his men in the court of Kabul. His intention was to smash the strength of the powerful Afghan confederacy. He considered Yusufzai and Gigyani two strong arms of that confederacy

and the diminishing of any of them would be in his interest.⁸ In this state of affairs Malak Sulaiman Shah abandoned to visit the court at Kabul because of his strained relationship with Ulugh Beg and Gigyani malaks. As a result, the Yusufzais became much hostile and a huge gulf was created between them and the Mughals.

Consequently, the Gigyani malaks and Ulugh Beg formed an alliance and their combined army marched towards the Yusufzai. The battle of *Ghwarah Marghah*⁹ was fought in which initially the Yusufzais and their allied tribes i.e. Muhammadzai, Khalil and Gadoon were defeated and dispersed. However, after the initial setback they assembled and inflicted a crushing defeat on the combined army of Ulugh Beg Mirza and Gigyanis. With broken heart, Ulugh Beg sued for peace with Sulaiman Shah. On the other hand, Sulaiman Shah also considered it appropriate to reach a settlement with the Mughals. He wanted to develop a workable understanding with the Gigyanis for the purpose to restore the former glory of the Afghans in Kabul.¹⁰

Although victory against Ulugh Beg had re-established the former position and influence of Sulaiman Shah but he looked for the creation of a much stronger Afghan tribal confederacy. He was satisfied with the outcome of his negotiation with the Gigyanis. He was of the view to convince them for creating a strong bond of national cohesion among all the Afghan tribes. For that matter he started discussion with other Afghan malaks to form a united front against the Mughals. He was aware that Ulugh Beg will depend on the Afghan military power if unity comes in their ranks.

Ulugh Beg was mindful of the Afghan military strength and his dependence over them. He hurriedly arranged a

8 Khan Roshan Khan, *Yusufzai Qaum ki Sarguzasht* [Urdu] (Karachi: By the author, 1986), p. 24.

9 Caroe, *The Pathans*, p. 174.

10 Himayatullah Yaqubi, 'Pukhtunu aur Mughlun Kay Siyasi Tanazay Kay Bunyadi Muharikat', *Mujalla Tarikh wa Saqafat-i-Pakistan*, October-2011 March-2012, p. 34.

council of peace with them after which he cunningly reinstated them with their earlier position in the court. Pretended himself as a good friend of the Afghans, he strengthened his position by the accession of many Mughal princes and soldiers from Central Asia. He wrote several reconciliatory letters to Sulaiman Shah, assuring him of his friendship and repentance. In one of such letters he assured him that:

I pardoned, with the core of my sincere heart, all the mistakes you made in dealing with me. You people come [to the court] that we consolidate our everlasting relationship. We will spend our times as we spent it before [author translation].¹¹

In this way he successfully restored his trust in the Yusufzais. He was in search of an appropriate opportunity to transform his defeat into an everlasting success. Thus he once again resolved to crush the power of an unfit ally. It has been mentioned in *Tawarikh Hafiz Rahmat Khani* that Gigyani malaks Hasan Ibn Changa and Shibli Ibn Tory advised Ulugh Beg of inviting the leading Yusufzai malaks for a feast and do away with their power. Without this tactic, they asserted on Ulugh Beg, the Yusufzais would never be reduced to submission. They even pledged to join his men in this large-scale massacre.¹²

Subsequently, he invited the leading malaks, around 800 in number, according to *Hayat-i-Afghani*.¹³ At the site of the feast, Mahmud, the malak of Chagharzai branch of the Yusufzai, sensed the tricky and treacherous setting around them in the court. In fact, he suggested to his other Yusufzai

11 Khan, *Yusufzai Qaum ki Sarguzisht*, p. 28.

12 Shah, *Tawarikh Hafiz Rahmat Khani*, p. 81.

13 Khan, *Hayat-i-Afghani*, p. 255. Some sources mention that the figure of the slain malaks were seventy, which according to Sultan-i-Rome, sound more accurate as no tribe can have such a large number of malaks at that time. However, as mentioned in this study all the malaks did not belong only to the tribe of the Yusufzai. At that time there was a confederacy of a number of allied tribes i.e. Khalil, Muhammadzai, Utmanzai, Mohmand, Gadoon etc. This tribal confederacy was led by the Yusufzai malak. Probably the slain malaks represented all these tribes and not only the Yusufzai. Secondly, the slain people consisted of those men who were the backbone of the tribe. They were all the fighting and elite class of the tribal confederacy.

friends that Ulugh Beg should be overpowered and killed at once. But majority of the elder malaks opposed his idea and pressed him to restrain from such an eventuality. They, perhaps did not expecting such sort of breach by a Temurid's prince whom they helped in restoring his dominions. However, Mahmud's observations were based on thoughtful judgement of the court environment which he never seen earlier. In the Meantime, Janga, a Gigyani malak and a bitter enemy of the Yusufzai, proposed to Mirza Ulugh Beg that it is a golden opportunity to getting rid of the power of the Yusufzai. Accordingly, they overpowered all the malaks and killed them one by one in the imperial palace at Kabul.¹⁴ This large-scale massacre of the leading Yusufzai and other Afghan malaks including Malak Sulaiman Shah was a rare precedent in the Mughal-Afghan relationship in which en masse murder took place in deception. It was an exceptional display of trickery and deceit on the part of a Mughal prince. This exceptional event can be rightly called as the root cause of the Mughal-Afghan conflict that occurred in Kabul however; it gravely affected the relationship of both the nations throughout the Mughal reign in India.

It has been stated in local sources that Malak Sulaiman Shah was stunned at this horrible incident happening around him. At first, he passionately requested Ulugh Beg for saving the lives of his tribesmen. He reminded him of their past services but to no avail. At last, he pleaded three things before Ulugh Beg. First, he should be killed first because he could not be able to watch the murder of his tribesmen. Second, Malak Ahmad Khan should be left unhurt for there was not a single capable man to lead the tribe, and the third request was that his tribe should not be punished for his act of commission and omission. The tribe should be allowed to migrate anywhere out of your dominions. Mirza Ulugh Beg accepted all these three requests and then executed his plan of crippling the Afghan might by killing some 700 malaks.

14 *Ibid.* p. 102.

So far, no confirm number of the persons killed by Ulugh Beg is available. *Hayat-i-Afghani* had mentioned the figure 800 while *Tawarikh Hafiz Rahmat Khani*, Roshan Khan and Olaf Caroe stated that 700 malaks were murdered.¹⁵ Similarly, the exact date of the event is also not known. Olaf Caroe pointed out that probably the massacre happened between 1480 and 1490.¹⁶ However, the probable year of the incident is 1490 because at the time of incident Malak Ahmad Khan was fifteen years of age and his year of birth was 1475. He was the nephew of Malak Sulaiman Shah who trained him in the art of politics, leadership and statesmanship.¹⁷

Afterwards, the dead bodies of the slain Afghan Malaks were buried in a graveyard which is famous among the Kabul inhabitants by the name of “*Shaheedan-i-Yusufzai Muqbara*” (Graveyard of the Yusufzai Martyrs). After the carnage, a *jirga* of the Yusufzai and the allied tribes was held in which Malak Ahmad Khan was nominated as the new malak of the Afghan tribal confederacy. In the same *jirga* it was decided to migrate to Peshawar valley along with Uthman Khel, Khalil, Muhammadzai, Dawudzai and Gadoon tribes. At the time of Babur’s Kabul and Indian invasions, the Afghan tribal confederacy under Malak Ahmad Khan occupied most of the territories in the Peshawar valley along with Bajaur and Swat.¹⁸ Although Malak Ahmad Khan was nominated at a very tender age but he proved himself worthy of the task in that hour of trial. He successfully brought out the Afghans without further harm from the stormy environs of Kabul. His greatest achievement was the occupation of a very large track of land from river Indus up to Bajaur and Swat. With the cooperation of his trusted advisors like

15 Khan, *Hayat-i-Afghani*, p. 255, Shah, *Tawarikh Hafiz Rahmat Khani*, p. 85, Khan, *Yusufzai Qaum Ki Sarguzisht*, p. 34, Caroe, *The Pathans*, p. 174.

16 Caroe, *The Pathans*, p. 103.

17 Ziaullah Jadoon, *Shakhsyat-i-Swabi* (Swabi: Diyar Khan Educational Foundation, 2014), p. 9.

18 Himayatullah Yaqubi, ‘Pukhtunu aur Mughlun Kay Siyasi Tanazay Kay Bunyadi Muharikat’, p. 39.

Shaikh Malli and Khan Kaju he established a sound system of administration in the occupied territories. In fact, the occupation of Swat provided the Yusufzai an upper-hand on all the Afghan tribes. It placed them in such a strategically important position that for some time it even threatened Babur's future Indian designs at large. The significant geographical location occupied by the Afghans, however, turned to be their greatest snag and strategic fault. Olaf Caroe is of the view that the Afghans were unable to establish a compact system of administration in their own homeland¹⁹ however; his statement in this regard does not hold the ground in view of the Yusufzais' creating of a sound system of tribal confederacy under the leadership of Malak Ahmad Khan. He may rightly be called the founder of modern Pakhtunkhwa.

The contemporary literature did not mention any thing about the response of the Lodhi Sultan towards the murder of the Yusufzai malaks. Probably at the time of that large-scale massacre the imperial affairs were not smooth in Delhi. Sultan Bahlul had died in 1489, one year before the incident. There were incessant wars between Sultan Sikandar Lodhi and the Sharqi Sultan of Jaunpur. Probably, at that time Multan was independent under Sultan Hussain Langa and was a buffer state between Delhi and Kabul. Its rulers were engaged in their wars against Ghazi Khan, the Temuride ruler of the Indian dominions.²⁰ Their disregard probably was due to the Temuride ruler of the Indian dominions willingness to acknowledge the authority of Sultan Sikandar Lodhi and started reading the *Khutba* and issuing *Sikah* in the latter's name.²¹ Apart from enlisting their military support in the time of trouble the Lodhi Sultan showed least concern for the tribes. Around this time the Mughals of Kabul were also engaged in wars against each other. With the death of Ulugh

19 Caroe, *The Pathans*, p. 249.

20 Abdul Halim, *History of the Lodi Sultans of Delhi and Agra* (Dacca: University of Dacca, 1961), p. 92.

21 Dasti, Humaira Faiz, 'Multan on the Eve of the Mughal Invasion,' *Journal of the Research Society of Pakistan*, Lahore, Vol. XXXII, Dec. 1995, p. 33.

Beg chaos was added by confusion. Abd-ur-Razzaq, son and successor of Ulugh Beg was very young and inexperienced. Hence, he was unfit to properly manage the intricate liabilities of the court. General disorder was the natural outcome. In the midst of this disorder Zahir-ud-Din Babur appeared on the scene and captured it in 1504.

Babur's Relations with the Afghan Tribes

After firmly establishing his position, Babur made Kabul a centre of his operation against the Afghan and other bordering tribes and later against Ibrahim Lodhi as well. He had to face two streams of the Afghan resistance on his way from Kabul to Delhi the Afghan tribes dwelling the borderland and Ibrahim Lodhi the Sultan of Delhi. Olaf Caroe tells us that the suzerainty of the Lodhi Empire extended from the Jhelum River to Bihar. Its writ did not run effectively to the west of river Indus and virtually had no control over the Afghan borderland tribes from which its rulers had originally migrated to Indian mainland.²²

These tribes were independent in their socio-political structure. Neither the Temuride rulers of Kabul held sway over them nor were they under any Indian or Lodhi prince. Caroe had mentioned that these areas were not the seat of any ruler nor there existed any central authority.²³ However, the political structure of the area was not the same as was mentioned by Babur or Olaf Caroe. There was an established central authority at least in the territories of *samah* (plain) along with Swat Valley and Malakand which have been occupied by the Yusufzai before the coming of Babur. They had expelled the Dalazaks, another Afghan tribe, from the area and extended their domain further by encroaching on the territory of the Sultan of Swat. They consolidated their position in the conquered areas with an established central authority administered by the Yusufzai's malaks under the leadership of Malak Ahmad Khan. He was the virtual ruler of the Afghan tribes inhabiting these areas.

22 Caroe, *The Pathans*, p. 154.

23 *Ibid.*, p. 156.

There existed a code of rules, regulations, punishment, regular police force, advisors and a well-articulated system of *wesh*.²⁴

At that time Sayed Ali Khan, son of Ghazi Khan, was the ruler of the Temuride dominions, which included Bhera, Khushab, Chenab and Chiniot. Babur undertook the task of recapturing all these dominions. But, his first and most formidable task was to clear the line of communication which any prospect conqueror of India must have to secure. The area was predominantly inhabited by the Afghan tribes who were a source of nervousness for him. Initially, he undertook several expeditions against Qandahar and Ghiljis living areas mostly in Ghazni. He mentioned the names of all those tribes he dealt with and places he seized. In his memoirs he vividly talks about of his engagements with the Afghan tribes for instance Yusufzai, Afridi, Aurakzai, Bangash, Turi, Dalazak, Mohmand, Muhammadzai, Gugyani, Lohani, Niazi, Wazir, Isa Khel, Mehsud and Ghalji. His description of the places was eloquently accurate which he had given in the *Babur Nama*. Peshawar, Swat, Khyber, Bajaur, Ali Masjid, Kohat, Hangu, Swabi, Jam, Katlang, Mukam, Sudham and Shahbazgarhi and many other settlements were given due place in the memoirs. Even he mentioned the names of the small locality where he halted for a while and hunted rhinoceros.²⁵ Probably that locality is Yaqubi, a small town in Swabi district. In dealing with them majority of these tribes were treated by him separately. They projected a state of utter disregard for making a united front strategy against Babur. Tribal parochialism sharply entrenched into the body politic of the Afghan society. In fact, their response to the Mughal intrusion was clearly tribal in nature and temperament. Although, there was an Afghan tribal confederacy under Malak Ahmad Khan but owing to deep tribal jealousies he failed to unite them against Babur.

24 For all these details see Shah, *Tawarikh Hafiz Rahmat Khani*.

25 For all these details see Zahir-ud-Din Babur, *Tuzuk-i-Baburi*, Eng tr. Annette S. Beveridge (Lahore: Sang-i-Meel Publications, 1974).

Babur had spent a short time in Kabul when in 1504-5 Yarhussain, the son of Deria Khan, a chieftain of Bhera, beyond river Indus, visited him. William Erskine is of the view that he was invited to arrange a visit across river Indus. It was probably the first invitation received by him from any Indian chief. At that time he had not prepared his mind for any Indian incursion but the invitation from Yarhussain was so much in unison that after a few days he resolved for his first Indian inroad.²⁶ The statement of *Babur Nama* is very clear about the Indian campaign of Kabul. He had made up his mind very early for the conquest of India. Yarhussain just paid homage and acknowledged his overlord-ship. There is no mention of invitation in *Babur Nama* as claimed by William Erskine.

For the first time he left Kabul in January 1505, and came to Bagram (Peshawar) *via* Adina-pur (Jalalabad), Jamrud and Khyber. His intention, according to *Babur Nama*, was to drive towards Hindustan. Peshawar at that time was called Bagram which was inhabited by Gigyani. In this first Indian expedition of Babur two of Gogyani leading Malaks Yahya Khan and Khusraw Khan served him as guides in his campaign in Kohat.²⁷ One of his noble Baqi Chaghaniani suggested him to move towards Kohat for its richness and large amount of corn. He crossed the river Jhelum and marched towards Kohat through Adam Khel and Kotal up to Indus. Here, Babur discussed with his nobles about his next move. Yarhussain rather advised Babur to give the Yusufzai, Gigyani and Dalazak in his control if *Padshah* wished to take his swords on the other side of the river Indus.²⁸

At Hangu the Bangash tribe halted his advance and a fierce battle was fought with the Bangash Afghans. Initially, they occupied a strategically important slope but at the last moment they left that place, came down and surrounded by Babur's men. At last, they submitted. According to tribal

26 Erskine, *A History of India under Babur*, p. 225.

27 Bakhtani, *Babur au Pukhtana*, p. 39.

28 Babur, *Babur Nama*, p. 231.

custom, the tribal people surrendered with few stripes of grass in their mouths suing for mercy, exclaiming 'I am your cow'.²⁹ However, they were killed and a minaret of heads was erected on the top of a hill. Babur mentioned that around two hundred Afghans were taken away. The place where the Mughal forces stationed is famous by the name of 'Babur Mila'.³⁰

At Bannu he faced a little resistance from the local population. Looting and plundering of the invading Mughal army continued. Large sum of cash was snatched from some Afghan merchants and a leading trader Khizar Lohani was put to death.³¹ On the request of Sardar Shadi Khan, a well-known chief, he proclaimed general amnesty to all the inhabitants of Bannu. A well-equipped army was dispatched under Jahangir Mirza who made general slaughter and a pillar of heads was erected. Here large catches of white cloth was snatched from the Afghans.³² At that point Babur decided to left for Ghazni and then reached Kabul *via* Duki (at present in Loralai district Balochistan). He crossed Gomal Pass on 7 March, 1505. After crossing Gomal Pass an Afghan group appeared on a hill-slope. They were few in number but challenged Babur's army. Some of them were killed and those arrested were taken free.³³ All his way to Kabul his men frequently scuffled with the Afghans and perished many of their dwellings. After Babur's departure, Dawlat Khan entrusted all the Temuride possessions to his son Ali Khan. It is not clear that how many expeditions he undertook to India. Babur mentioned that he invaded Indian territories five times and the last one bestowed on him the throne of Delhi.³⁴

29 Caroe, *The Pathans*, p. 156. Also see Babur, *Babur Nama*, p. 232.

30 Khanzada Shahab-ud-Din Bangash, *Tarikh-i-Bangash* (Peshawar: n.p., 2003), p. 88.

31 Bakhtani, *Babur au Pukhtanah*, p. 41.

32 Babur, *Babur Nama*, p. 233.

33 *Ibid.* p. 237.

34 Caroe, *The Pathans*, p. 158.

In his memoirs, Babur recorded a number of other raids on the Afghan tribes. In 1507 he subjugated the tribes of Khizar Khel, Shaimu Khel, Khirilji (probably Khalji) and Gugyani Afghans in Jalalabad. It was followed by his sacking the areas of Alishang Afghans and the Kafirs.³⁵ In the same year he successfully subdued a rebellion in Kabul by some of his commanders. Afterwards he once again went out to subjugate the Khalji and Mohmand Afghans in Sih-kana. Here also dwelled the Mesh Khel Afghans to which Annette S. Beveridge has given the name of sheep-tribe due to its pastoral wealth. These tribes situated some twenty five or thirty miles away from Ghazni. The Afghans fought with bravery but at the end majority of them were put to death. Babur has mentioned that masses of sheep fell to the Mughals. Almost 100,000 sheep were taken away from them. Likewise, his usual brutality in dealing with the Afghans, a pillar of their heads was erected.³⁶

In his memoirs, Babur has used derogatory terms for the Afghans such as Afghan enemies, darkened Afghans, thieves Afghans etc. while fighting with them he has portrayed them as death-devoted. He raided on their pastoral wealth, grain, their families, wives and trading goods. All these events he has mentioned in detail in his memoirs. He showed an extreme sort of brutality in dealing with them by cutting their throats in barbarian manner. Several times he has mentioned erecting minarets of their skulls. Whether they were a challenging adversary or a potential threat to his future designs? However, that was for the first time in the Afghan history that such severe and inhuman treatment was meted out to them.

For the second time he left Kabul for India in September 1507. On his way he subdued the Afghans between Kabul and Laghman which he has described as the abettors of thieves. He captured the Adinapur fort near Nangarhar. Up to that time people usually called the Temuride rulers as

35 Erskine, *A History of India under Baber*, p. 123.

36 Babur, *Babur Nama*, p. 324.

Mirzas. However, in the same year Babur styled himself as *Padshah* (King). In 1515, he quelled a Mughal revolt in his army which left him for some time in peace. This time he engaged himself to subdue a number of hill tribes. In all these expeditions he chastised Afghans, Hazaras, Aimaks and other tribes and compelled them to pay tributes. He forced them to accept his suzerainty for some time but the Afghans remained successful in retaining their independence although sending tributes with less punctuality.

As discussed above, Babur's second Indian attack took place in September 1507. He entered India *via* the Khurd-Kabul Pass. But he had to return from Adinapur due to the fear of rebellion in his own army. He abandoned calling himself Amir and adopted the title of *Padshah*. In January 1519, Babur led his army for the third time into India. In his autobiography *Babur Nama* he has stated "As it was always in my heart to possess Hindustan, and as these several countries, Bhera, Khushab, Chenab and Chiniot, had once been held by the Turk, I pictured them as my own and was resolved to get them into my hands whether peacefully or by force."³⁷ This time the circumstances also favoured him due to the large-scale differences between Ibrahim Lodhi and his nobles. Majority of the Afghan nobles considered the inroads of Babur as the continuation of the old Mongol's policy of looting and sacking.

For the first time Babur used artillery and gunpowder and issued order of general massacre against the Afghans in Bajaur because, according to *Babur Nama*, the people were infidels. But there is no truth in the assumption of Babur that the people of Bajaur were infidels. At that time the whole population were strictly the follower of Islam.³⁸ Narrating the event Babur has mentioned that Sultan Hyder Ali, the ruler of Bajaur, was approached through a Dalazak malak to handover the fort to Babur. Hyder Ali was not ready to submit and preferred rather a battle with the Mughal

37 Babur, *Babur Nama*

38 Halim, *History of the Lodi Sultans*, pp. 171-72.

contingent. Finally, with the help of fire-artillery and gun-powder, Babur captured the fort on 6 January, 1519. About three thousands men, including Sultan Hyder Ali, were killed inside the fort. A minaret of the human skulls was then raised on the top of a hill to create fear of the Mughal army among the Afghans.³⁹ Malak Shah Mansur of the Yusufzai tribe was an eyewitness of the massacre at Bajaur. He was given a threatening letter for his tribe along with a coat as a gesture of goodwill.⁴⁰

In fact, it was a tactical move on the part of Babur for building up horror hysteria among the Afghan tribes particularly the Yusufzai. In fact, he considered it a hard challenge that how to subdue that powerful tribe. William Erskine has mentioned that the purpose of the cruelty employed at Bajaur was to frighten the surrounding tribes. Earlier, when Babur crossed the Afghan borderland he was received by several Dalazak chiefs who served him as guides and filled his ears against their rival tribe i.e. the Yusufzai. After subduing the hill fort at Bajaur Khwaja Kalan was appointed to administer the area.⁴¹ To celebrate victory Babur drank along with Khwaja Kalan and other friends the special wine brought from the neighbouring Kafiristan in the goat-skins. As a matter of fact, general massacre at the fort of Bajaur because of their perceived infidelity was described as legal while celebration with wine was lawful according to Babur's tenets of religion.

Having completed his task in Bajaur, he then turned his attention towards the Yusufzai, an influential Afghan tribe that lived in Swat. He was keenly interested to get the support of the tribe because without its help it would have been impossible for him to bring the other Afghan tribes completely under his firm control. The firm control of the

39 Babur, *Babur Nama*, p. 370. Also see Bakhtani, *Babur au Pukhtanah*, p. 68. Babur has mentioned that Malak Hyder Ali was the ruler of Bajaur however, *Tawarikh Hafiz Rahmat Khani* narrates that he was the Sardar of Gibris. This place was called Gibarkot. Shah, *Tawarikh Hafiz Rahmat Khani*, p. 110.

40 *Ibid.*, p. 371.

41 Erskine, *A History of India under Baber*, p. 337.

Yusufzai on the strategically important areas of Swat and the *samah* (settled areas nowadays districts of Peshawar, Mardan, Swabi Newshehra up to Attock and Charsadda plains) was an added edge of strength. Furthermore, it was probably his reading of the power and military might of the Yusufzai that he avoided direct confrontation with them. Perhaps, he proved himself wiser than his grandson, Akbar the Great, in keeping his finger out of the Swat pie. While terrorizing the tribal malaks with his usual attacks in the adjacent areas, Babur avoided entering his army into the valley of Swat. At the outset, he marched and stationed his troops between the water of Panjkora and the united water of Jandol and Bajaur. A number of historians are of the view that Babur found it much difficult to subdue them by mere military strategy. By his experience and as a military strategist of no mean order, Babur knew that the rugged hilly area inhabited by the Yusufzais would be an ungainly task.⁴²

He kept his vigilant eyes on the moment of the Yusufzai tribal force and the rugged hilly terrains. While avoiding tactfully his force entry into Swat, he spread havoc in the nearby areas. Probably, an entry into the Swat hilly passes would prove counter-productive in terms of military strategy. On the other hand, the Yusufzai malaks also used diplomacy instead of confrontation. Although in his memoirs Babur recounted that on 21 January, 1519 he marched with the intention of attacking the Yusufzai but at the same time reported the story of eating well-flavoured intoxicating confections (*majun*) with Malak Shah Mansur Yusufzai. The *majun* brought by Shah Mansur was so inebriating that it delighted Babur so much so that he was unable to get out for meeting with his advisors.⁴³ He avoided direct confrontation with them either due to sheer fear or it was a strategic move. Most likely he wanted to befriend a powerful Afghan tribe for securing a safe passage to Kabul through their territory in case of any future defeat at the hands of Ibrahim Lodhi or

42 *Ibid.*, p. 338.

43 Babur, *Babur Nama*, p. 373.

any other powerful Indian ruler. A top-notch diplomat as he was, Babur could not afford to confront all the border tribes. In this respect, he proved himself a remarkable schemer and statesman.

Babur's Marriage with Bibi Mubaraka

Keeping this in mind, Babur deemed it suitable to befriend the Yusufzai through diplomacy. Therefore, he summoned Malak Ahmad Khan, and spread rumours among the Kabul inhabitants that he would be murdered in the court. But Malak Ahmad after a diplomatic session with Babur in Kabul returned safely to his tribe in Swat. When he was again invited to the court, Malak Ahmad Khan politely avoided making his presence possible in his court.⁴⁴ The visit of Yusufzai's malaks into the court of Babur in Kabul confirmed that they wanted to conciliate him probably for saving the tribe from the brutality he demonstrated in dealing with other Afghan tribes. Most likely after perceiving the role played by the Gigyani and Dalazak malaks, they thought it rather prudent to soothe his resentment against the tribe. It was quite possible that after infusing hatred in Babur's mind against the Yusufzai, these malaks would certainly join his force against them.

Pir Muazzam Shah and a number of other writers have given a detailed account of these developments. According to the plan after storming the fort of Malak Hyder Ali, the ruler of Bajaur, Babur then crossed river Panjkora and encamped in a place called Diyarun.⁴⁵ He sent his spies to get him informed about the activities of the Yusufzai but in every strategic point they found the men of Malak Ahmad Khan. Thereafter, he disguised himself as a *fakir* (saint) and went out to acquaint himself with the current situation. It was the occasion of the *Baqar Eid* and there was gathering at the house of Shah Mansur; situated on the back of Maura Hill

44 Shah, *Tawarikh Hafiz Rahmat Khani*, pp. 122-126.

45 Harold Lamb, *Babur: The Tiger* (Karachi: Pak-Britain Publications, 1981), pp. 140-41, Shah, *Tawarikh Hafiz Rahmat Khani* and Khan, *Yusufzai Qaum ki Sarguzasht*.

and today the place is called the “Throne of Shah Mansur.” Babur went there and sat among the crowd in the courtyard. At that very moment Bibi Mubarak, the daughter of Malak Shah Mansur, sent cooked meat folded between bread stripes to Babur.⁴⁶ In fact, this story has been repudiated by many scholars because of its weak historical assertion. If it was so then Babur would certainly have narrated it in his memoirs.

Then he returned to his camp at Diyarun and thought of establishing matrimonial relations with the Yusufzai. He wrote to Malak Ahmad and informed him about his intention. Malak Ahmad refused at once the proposal and replied that Malak Shah Mansur has no daughter to be given to him. Babur wrote them about his visit in disguise. Still Malak Ahmad was adamant and strongly opposed the idea but the other leading malaks urged him to consider the proposal once again because it was a matter of the whole tribe and urged Malak Shah Mansur to save the tribe from the anger of Babur. After a lot of deliberations they agreed to accept his proposal.⁴⁷

One may also call it a ‘marriage of convenience’ because it has created a direct link between Babur and the Yusufzai and thus he kept himself in touch with the day-to-day happening in the frontier region. Sultan-i-Rome is of the opinion that the marriage gave Babur a strong and intimate connection with the tribe and a sort of guarantee of protecting the Mughal army from the usual forays of several of its sub-clans. He negates the element of romance in the whole story and concludes that the knot was just to gain political and diplomatic advantages by both the sides.⁴⁸ On the other hand, the union between Babur and Bibi Mubarak

46 The story has been reported by a number of local and non-local sources. For instance Shah, *Tawarikh Hafiz Rahmat Khani*, Caroe, *The Pathans*, Khan, *Yusufzai Qaum ki Sarguzasht*, Khattak, *Pashtun Kaun?*, Sultan-i-Rome, ‘Mughals and Swat’ in *Journal of Pakistan Historical Society*, Vol. 50, No. 4, October-December, 2002.

47 *Ibid.*, p. 30.

48 Sultan-i-Rome, ‘Mughal and Swat’, p. 32.

was a sort of guarantee to the Mughal to check the customary raids of the tribe and of its other branches. William Erskine has mentioned that a deal was concluded between the Yusufzai and Babur. According to the agreement reached between the two sides, the Mughal force would make no inroads into the Swat valley, the amount of contribution, which the tribe had been accustomed to levy higher up, being allowed as a deduction in the rolls of their revenue collections; and that the tribe should pay six thousands loads of grains to the government.⁴⁹ However, there was no formal agreement that was concluded between the two sides. Perhaps Erskine considered the tribute imposed upon the people of Kahraj by Babur through Sultan Awais, the former ruler of Swat. Sultan Awais frequently visited the camp of Babur in those days. Babur has mentioned that he himself went to collect four thousands ass-load of rice from the people.⁵⁰ Moreover, there is no proof that the Yusufzai ever paid tribute or taxes to Babur or any other Mughal emperor. Some historians have argued that although the Yusufzais accepted the suzerainty of Babur but not to the extent to pay taxes or tributes. Malik Ahmad Khan did not have any trust in Babur and suspicions existed on both sides. Probably he wanted to create mistrust between Malak Ahmad Khan and Malak Shah Mansur but his efforts in this regard did not succeed.⁵¹

Bibi Mubaraka has been mentioned by the name of 'Afghani Aghacha' in Gul Badan Begum's *Humayun Nama*. The date of the marriage, according to *Humayun Nama*, was Sunday, 30 January, 1519.⁵² The brother of Malak Shah Mansur by the name of Tawus Khan carried Bibi Mubaraka along with the Yusufzai tribute to the camp of Babur. She remained in the fort of Bajaur at the time of Babur's

49 Erskine, *A History of India under Baber*, p. 338.

50 Babur, *Babur Nama*, p. 374

51 Shah, *Tawarikh Hafiz Rahmat Khani*, p. 158.

52 Gul-Badan Begum, *Humayun Nama*, Eng. tr. Annette S. Beveridge (Delhi: Goodword Books, 2001), pp. 266-67.

engagements with the tribes.⁵³ A brother of Bibi Mubarak Mir Jamal entered in the services of Babur and accompanied him in the famous battle of Panipat and rose to high status under Humayun and Akbar. A detailed account of Bibi Mubarak is given in the *Tawarikh-i-Hafiz-i-Rahmat Khani*.⁵⁴ It may be mentioned that it must have been largely due to his marriage with Bibi Mubarak that Babur learned so much of the Afghan customs, traditions, tribal nomenclature, and the accurate names of all the places he has given in his memoirs. There are no details of her life in the *Babur Nama* more than great respect of Babur for that Yusufzai lady. She had no issue from Babur but like a traditional Afghan bride she gave respect to Babur and always remained with him throughout his eventful life.

Some writers have mentioned the role of Shaikh Malli in establishing matrimonial alliance with Babur because he wanted to save his tribe from the brutality of the Mughals as the memories of the murder of their malaks by Ulugh Beg were still alive in their minds. In return, Babur left them undisturbed and never interfered in their internal affairs. Shaikh Malli was in hurry to compile his '*Daftar*' and also establish the Yusufzai's sway on the surrounding areas. In a nutshell, the Yusufzais' alliance made it possible for Babur to safely cross the Afghan borderland and crush the forces of Ibrahim Lodhi in Panipat. While detailing the merits and demerits of the event, these writers made the tribe responsible in providing Babur a chance of winning the throne of Delhi. Without the active help of the Yusufzais, they opined, it was quite impossible for Babur to have a smooth sail among the Afghans in the porous borderland.⁵⁵

The fact of the matter and the political situation of the event, however, were not properly evaluated by these scholars. The Yusufzai's alliance with Babur was not a permanent union. Throughout the Mughal era, the Yusufzai

53 Babur, *Babur Nama*, p. 376.

54 See Shah, *Tawarikh-i-Hafiz Rahmat Khani*.

55 Bakhtani, *Babur au Pukhtana*, pp. 81-83.

tribe never made any compromise with them and frequently resisted its intrusions in the Afghan areas. In fact, a little earlier of Babur's invasion the tribe underwent a very harsh experience of the perfidy of their Afghan brethren in dealing with Ulugh Beg in Kabul. It was due to the treachery of the Gigyanis that such a large-scale massacre took place. In the case of Babur the options with the Yusufzai malaks were either to face the Mughal savagery or to work out a policy of diplomatic engagement. And choosing the latter option show their political wisdom. Major Afghan tribes of Kabul and Ghazni remained untouched when their forefathers were brutally murdered by Mirza Ulugh Beg. Even the Lodhi nobles, who sought their help several times at the time of difficulties, remained silent over the butchery by Ulugh Beg.

These writers have overlooked the dynamics of the internal disunity between the Lodhi nobles in the Delhi court. In fact, Babur dealt all the Afghan tribes, chiefs, nobles, governors and malaks separately and interestingly at the end most of them reduced to submission. Malak Hamza Khan, a chief of Gigyani in Peshawar, discretely visited the court of Babur at Kabul and allied himself with the Mughals against the wishes of his Afghan tribesmen. Moreover, the tribe of Dalazak, rival of Yusufzai, also joined Babur much before the marriage of Bibi Mubarak. In fact, majority of the Afghan malaks were against the rising power of the Yusufzai in the region and were searching for an opportunity to destroy their nascent state which they established under the leadership of Malak Ahmad Khan.

In his next march, Babur briefly stayed in the vicinity of Hashtnagar where his skirmishes occurred with Mohmand tribe. Afterwards, he went to Shahbazgarhi nowadays situated in Mardan district. According to *Babur Nama* he proceeded further and went for a hunting expedition of wild buffalos in the vicinity of the present day Swabi. The place probably was Yaqubi, a town situated nowadays in the Razzar Tehsil of Swabi district. At Peshawar he gave precious gifts to a number of Dalazak and other tribal malaks

for their services which they rendered in support of Mughal expeditions.⁵⁶

According to the local sources, Babur stayed at Ali Masjid for a feast which was given in his honour by Yaqub, a Dalazak malak. Here some of his advisors pressed him to devastate the Afridi areas but Babur was very much apprehensive about the might of the Yusufzais. Despite his marriage with Bibi Mubarak, Babur was not satisfied with the attitude of the Yusufzai malaks. Their military strength and strategic location in the hills always haunted him.⁵⁷ Despite all his methods and mechanism he was not sure of their cooperation. In the midst of his journey he changed his plan and rather went on to destroy the Afridi, Shinwari and Wazir tribes. He snatched some three hundred goats from the Wazir tribe. Although Babur devastated here and there the Afghan mainland, however he remained unsuccessful in the complete subjugation of the area. In the midst of this campaign, rebellion broke out in Badakhshan which compelled him to return back to Kabul.⁵⁸

Downfall of the Lodhi Dynasty

At the time of the establishment of the Lodhi Dynasty, nobles of the Lodhi, Farmuli and Lohani Afghan tribes were much influential because of the lenient attitude of the Sultans. A strange thinking was permeated into their minds that the position they attained was due to their swords rather than any bounty from the Sultan. The affairs unfolding in the court of Sultan Ibrahim Lodhi were not so much different from that displayed by the Afghan border tribes. There was no coordination among the nobles and the Sultan.

During the time of Sultan Sikandar Lodhi the nobles were to a certain degree obedient because he did not tolerate any fault on the part of them. Unlike his father he behaved like an all-powerful monarch but at the same time he kept the nobles completely loyal and subservient due to

56 *Ibid.*, p. 91.

57 *Ibid.*

58 *Ibid.*, p. 96. Also see Caroe, *The Pathans*, p. 163.

his humanism, tactfulness and high sense of purpose. He also established a sound administrative system and renovated the intelligence department through which he kept himself informed about the general condition of the people throughout his dominions. But, despite all these measures, the expansion of the Lodhi Empire also gave birth to some powerful Afghan *muqtas* in the various *iqtas* who had 30,000 to 45,000 *sawars* under them. The emergence of these influential elements made it quite difficult for the Sultan to exert his control over them. When Ibrahim Lodhi initiated a policy of checking the power of some strong Afghan governors, they in turn tried to put him on weak position.

The net result was that when Sikandar Lodhi died, the entire powerful nobles rose in rebellions, which further increased the differences among Sultan Ibrahim, his near relatives and the recalcitrant nobles. With the death of a Sultan, usually the emergence of the internal conflicts within the nobility has been a common feature throughout the Sultanate period. However, with the accession of Ibrahim Lodhi to the throne of Delhi it assumed such a high proportion that it culminated in the dismissal of the Lodhi dynasty at the hands of Zahir-ud-Din Babur, a Temuride invader of Central Asia.⁵⁹

With the accession of Ibrahim Lodhi on 22 November, 1517, an internal conflict had started between the incompetent Sultan and the powerful and self-seeking Afghan nobles in the court. When Ibrahim tried to counterbalance the strength of his Afghan nobles by the inclusion of non-Afghan *umaras*, he observed stiff resistance. Unlike his father and grand-father, he began to treat them as servants of the kings and not as his kith and kin. He used to say that "kings have no relations".⁶⁰ His policy brought about a structural change in the Afghan monarchy for which majority of the nobles were not ready by temperament and unruly nature. His new policy laid down that the monarchy

59 Iqtidar Hussain Siddique, *Some Aspects of Afghan Despotism in India* (Lahore. Book Traders, n.d), pp. 37-38.

60 Hussain Khan, *Sher Shah Sur* (Lahore: Ferozsons, 1987), p. 4.

was an institution which would deal all the nobles with a sense of impartiality.

The tribal pattern of the Afghan society in *Ruh* determined their relationship with the Sultan, the monarchy and other *umara*. Every one of them acted like a tribal chief having exhibited least affiliation towards the Lodhi Kingdom. When several Afghan chiefs moved to India on the invitation of Bahlul Lodhi, they considered themselves as leaders acting in the domain of their tribes. At that time there was no despotism in the Afghan kingdom and they were treated as brothers and equals by Bahlul. He was satisfied with a hollow title of *Masnad-i-Ali* and his provincial Afghan chiefs were independent in their respective jurisdictions. As a matter of fact, they were only co-ordinated by the person of the Sultan. They maintained a large number of troops, and some of them were so strong that they could easily challenge the central authority, as they did against Ibrahim Lodhi. In a nutshell, the Lodhi Kingdom was a loose, ill-knit structure based on the tribal pattern which they practised at *Ruh*, their original homeland.

The nobles wanted to get maximum advantage by dividing sovereignty between the Sultan and his brother the rebel prince Jalal Khan. The nobles tried to divide the sovereignty by giving the throne of Delhi to Ibrahim and placing Jalal Khan in the government of Jaunpur and the surrounding areas. Ibrahim Lodhi emerged as an autocrat, hence frequently resorted to force to implement his political will over the arrogant nobles. In the beginning, he crushed the powerful nobles of his father's time and then favoured his own loyal nobles who gathered around him. Some of the non-Afghan nobles were comparatively much closer with the Sultan. This favour naturally antagonised the Afghan elite circle of the court that hatched conspiracies against Sultan Ibrahim. Thus, the administration of the government went into the hands of these incompetent persons.⁶¹

61 For instance the post of *Dar-al-Mulk* Delhi was bestowed upon Haibat Khan Gurgandaz, Karim Dad Togh and Dawlat Khan Indar. Shahzada Manjhu was given the *muqta* of Chanderi. These appointments must have caused

The first revolt was started in South Bihar where many Nauhani and Farmuli chiefs acknowledged Bihar Khan, son of Darya Khan, as their king. However, the revolt of Dawlat Khan was much serious in nature and consequences than any of the rebellion. Punjab was strategically much important and vulnerable in terms of defence from the north. At the end, it proved *Achilles' heel* of the Lodhi dynasty. It is stated in the *Afsana-i-Shahan* that Dawlat Khan Lodhi sent his two sons to the court of Ibrahim with a letter for displaying mercy towards the loyal nobles of the court. In an utter display of cruelty he killed both the sons of Dawlat Khan Lodhi and imprisoned two others who were in the court service at Delhi.⁶²

In an utter frustration many nobles shifted their loyalties and joined other contenders. Mian Hussain went to the camp of Rana Sanga, a powerful Rajput warlord of Mewar. Another blow to the status of Ibrahim was that many nobles including Qasim Khan (Sambhal), Nizam Khan (Bayana), Hasan Khan (Mewat), Muhammad Zaitun (Dholpur), Tatar Khan Sarang Khani (Gwalyar), Hussain Khan Nauhani (Rapri), Qutub Khan (Etowah) and Alam Khan (Kalpi) had firmly established themselves in their respective *iqtas*. They openly defied the authority of the Sultan.

When the Nauhani chief in South Bihar revolted against Ibrahim he summoned Dawlat Khan, the governor of the Punjab, to assist him in quelling the Nauhanis' rebellion. At that time, most of the influential Afghan *umara* were being persecuted as they had not reconciled with the Sultan's ideal of kingship. Therefore, Dawlat Khan excused himself and instead sent his son Dilawar Khan, which was perceived as an act of defiance against the Sultan. Dilawar was sent to

discontentment among the sensitive Afghan nobles who still held important positions. But they did not conceal their feelings and grievances when the Sultan dismissed his able but aged *wazir* Mian Bhua and Azam Humayun Sarwani. The natural outcome of this high-handedness was that the wide spread rebellions broke out in every part of the Sultanate against the Sultan. Siddiqui, *Some Aspects of Afghan*, pp. 37-38.

62 Shaikh Muhammad Kabir Hazyani, *Afsana-i-Shahan*, Urdu tr. Saud-ul-Hasan Khan Ruhila (Lahore: Book Fort, 2011), p. 164.

prison. However, he managed escape and after wondering for six days reached Lahore. Considering himself very weak and unable to resist the Sultan, Dawlat summoned another son Ghazi Khan and other loyal nobles to Lahore. He also invited Alam Khan (Ala-ud-Din), son of the late Sultan Bahlul Lodhi, who was unhappy with Ibrahim and was living as a refugee with Sultan Muzaffar Shah of Gujarat.

From that onwards, Dawlat Khan Lodhi openly defied the orders of Ibrahim Lodhi. Finding himself in trouble he sent his son Dilawar Khan with some gifts including Indian mangoes preserved in honey, to Babur at Kabul. Babur was informed of the dissatisfaction of the nobles and was also requested to help them against the atrocities of the Sultan. Prior to all these recent developments, Babur had long been eagerly waiting for such an opportunity.⁶³ However, the version of *Afsana-i-Shahan* is that Dawlat Khan was a friend of Babur and they usually exchange gifts with each other. He sent his trusted noble Bhatian Khatri to the court of Babur at the time when Sultan Ibrahim killed his sons. He informed him of the cruel attitude of Ibrahim and sought his help in eliminating him from the throne of Delhi.⁶⁴ Whatever might be the reason of his friendship with Babur, the fact is that he failed to perceive the grim consequences of his explicit role in the whole development.

It was a time when the political affairs of the Delhi court and other Afghan nobles touched high proportion of deceit and mistrust. Dilawar Khan, son of Dawlat Khan Lodhi, in an attempt to secure his position, arranged a meeting with Babur on his way back to Kabul. Getting Babur into confidence and receiving the title of *Khan-i-Khanan*, Dilawar Khan informed him about the treacherous nature of his father and advised him to eliminate him if he wished to acquire Delhi. Accordingly, Babur planned his attack on Delhi and defeated all those who had come in his way to

63 Erskin, *A History of India under Babur*, pp. 412-13.

64 Hazyani, *Afsana-i-Shahan*, p. 165.

capture the throne at Delhi. He had decided to eliminate the Lodhis once for all.⁶⁵

Earlier on the eve of his fourth invasion in 1519, Babur sent his ambassador named Mulla Murshid to Ibrahim Lodhi to congratulate him on his elevation as the Sultan of Delhi. Besides, to negotiate the restoration of the Temuride dominions in India was also demanded by Babur. A letter was also given for Dawlat Khan Lodhi. But neither Dawlat Khan nor Sultan Ibrahim Lodhi met him and he returned without getting anything in hands.⁶⁶ In response of Dawlat Khan's unscrupulous attitude in blocking his envoy, Babur has mentioned in his memoirs the following derogatory remarks about the Afghans:

Far from sense and wisdom, shut off from judgement and counsel must people in Hindustan be, the Afghans above all; for they could not move and make stand like a foe, nor did they know ways and rules of friendliness.⁶⁷

On account of an attack on Kabul by Shah Beg Arghun, Babur had to leave Bhera for Kabul. Afterwards, Babur sent an advance army with Alam Khan and after some time joined them and marched towards Lahore and Dipalpur, which they occupied on 1523. Again he went back to Kabul. On the course of his way back near Peshawar a meeting was arranged by Khalifa between Babur and Dawlat Khan.

Olaf Caroe has described the fifth expedition he undertook in 1524. It was the last preparatory expedition in which he stormed Lahore and Sarhind. It was directed against the Punjabi tribes in the hill country close to Hazara and Hasan Abdal. He fought a war against the army of Ibrahim Lodhi for the possession of Lahore. Notwithstanding his victories against a number of tribal chiefs, he was not strong enough to challenge Ibrahim in this campaign. Sensing his position too weak for such a gigantic task, he had to left for Kabul very soon.⁶⁸

65 *Ibid.*, p. 166.

66 Babur, *Babur Nama*, p. 385.

67 *Ibid.*

68 Caroe, *The Pathans*, p. 164.

On 9 December, 1525 he came to Peshawar through Khyber Pass. Meanwhile, a deal was concluded between Ala-ud-Din Alam Khan, uncle of Ibrahim Lodhi, Ghazi Khan and Dilawar Khan. They forgot their past differences and decided to restore Dawlat Khan on Punjab while Alam Khan should occupy the throne of Delhi. Thus Alam Khan at once assumed the title of Sultan Ala-ud-Din and started preparation for a final assault on Delhi. Ismael Jilwani and Shahzada Sulaiman Farmuli, governor of Idri, also joined him. Thus, his army swelled to about thirty to forty thousand and encamped at a point twelve miles from Delhi. But at the end an advance army of Ibrahim Lodhi defeated Alam Khan. He fled to Doab and took shelter in the fort of Ginguta. It was the state of affairs in India and Babur kept his vigilant eyes on all these events. Political situation at the Lodhi court was in the doldrums. Dawlat Khan sent his grandson Ismael Khan to Babur and after some time surrendered with a lot of shame. Babur imprisoned him and his property was distributed among the Mughal soldiers. He met with his natural death probably in the prison at Bhera. Frustration prevailed in the ranks of Dilawar Khan and Alam Khan who soon offered submission to Babur. Rana Sanga of Mewar and Hussain Khan Mewati also promised Babur of their help against Sultan Ibrahim.⁶⁹

On 26 February, 1526 Humayun defeated an advance army of the Sultan at Hissar Ferozah. Another advance party of the Sultan was routed out in the vicinity of Doab by the Mughals. After these initial defeats Ibrahim Lodhi went out from Delhi with one hundred thousand cavalry under his command. On 12 April, Babur also reached the town of Panipat and encamped there at a distance of 12 miles from the camp of Sultan Ibrahim Lodhi. It is stated by Babur that he had only twelve thousands soldiers under his command. It seems that it is an exaggerated figure. Many Afghan and Punjabi tribes joined his army on his way from Kabul to India. Desertions also took place in the army of Ibrahim Lodhi due

69 Babur, *Babur Nama*, p. 170.

to which Mughal army swelled to a large extent. Maximum portion of the Mughal army was consisted of the Afghan nobles, *sawars*, mercenaries and hirelings. Their anti-Ibrahim sentiments were adroitly exploited by Babur to his own advantage. In fact, the contest at Panipat was between two Afghan forces; however the leader of the challenging army was Babur, a Mughal prince.

On 21 April, Ibrahim marched upon the Mughals and directed his attack on the right wing of Babur's army and a general war started. The Afghans pressing from the front and both wings were caught by confusion and so unable to advance or retire. Sultan Ibrahim fought with his usual Afghan courage and bravery. The Mughal artillery caused much panic in his army attempting to flee. Some fifteen thousand Afghans were killed including Ibrahim, Shadi Khan and Raja Bikramajit. The dead body of Ibrahim was found in the midst of six thousand slain soldiers. On the order of Babur, Dilawar Khan found his body and was brought before Babur, who exclaimed, "*praised be thy heroism.*" Dilawar Khan and Amir Khalifa buried his body on the same spot where he had died. The same day Babur entered Delhi and ordered that *Khutba* to be read and *Sikah* to be issued in his name. Humayun captured Agra on May 5, and Babur founded the Mughal dynasty with Delhi, Agra and Punjab under him.⁷⁰

After his victory in Panipat, Babur shaped his policy towards the Afghan nobles with two aims in mind. Elimination of the powerful Afghans around Agra and Delhi and winning their support against Rana Sanga for the consolidation of his position were his objectives. He proclaimed general amnesty for the time being and warmly received those Afghans who joined him and admitted them into the Mughal nobility. A large number of them submitted.⁷¹

70 Halim, *History of the Lodi Sultans*, pp. 171-90.

71 For instance Shaikh Ghuran of Koel, Ali Khan Farnuli and other Afghan leaders who joined Babur after Humayun defeated Sultan Muhammad Nauhani. Before the battle of Kanawha, Hussain Nauhani of Rapri, Alam

In all expeditions his army was strengthened by the influx of the Afghan tribal mercenaries on regular basis. Of these Afghan tribes the Kasuria Afghans (Khweshgi section of Muhammadzai)⁷² joined the Mughal armies in large numbers. They were given *jagir* in central Punjab as reward. About the Afghans' strengthening of the Mughal army, Olaf Caroe vividly quoted a verse of Khushal Khan Khattak:

بيالہ پاسہ د دہلي بادشاہ بابر شو
چي يي کار د پښتنو په برکت و⁷³

After him Babur became the King of Delhi, who owed his place to the support of Pukhtuns.

In other words, Khushal Khan Khattak is of the view that it was due to the Afghans' disunity and short-sightedness that Babur captured the throne of Dehli while using them against each-others. But still Babur was not completely sure of their loyalty and hence kept them at a distance from one another. Slowly he got rid of those Afghan nobles whom he considered the slightest threat for his interest. He sent Alam Khan Lodhi to Gwalior and Muhammad Zaitun to Sambhal. According to *Tarikh-i-Khurshid Jahan*, Babur treacherously murdered Dawlat Khan Lodhi. Afterward the mother of Ibrahim Lodhi was banished from the palace and then killed on the plea that she tried to kill Babur by giving him poison in meal. Ghazi Khan Tarin and Alam Khan were put to death in front of his courtiers in palace.⁷⁴ If one observes the political response of the Afghan tribes and their chiefs to the Babur invasions, it is amply clear that the reaction of the Afghans

Khan Lodi of Kalpi, Haibat Khan Gurgandaz and Sher Khan joined and assisted Babur in his campaigns.

72 According to Olaf Caroe Khweshgi are the cousins of Muhammadzais of Hashtnagar. They also inhabit the village of Khweshgi north of river Kabul in Nowshehra. Caroe, *The Pathans*, p. 165.

73 This couplet has been taken from a poem of Khushal Kahn Khattak titled "Da Delhi Kha'ar Mukhtasar Tarikh" (Brief History of the City of Delhi). This is a masterpiece of his poetry in which he vividly described the names of Muslim emperors of India from Moez-ud-Din to Shah Jehan. See Khushal Khan Khattak, *Kulyat Khushal Khan Khattak*, ed. Abdul Qayum Zahid Mashwani (Kabul: Danish Publishers, 2013), p. 591.

74 Gandapur, *Tarikh-i-Khurshid Jahan*, p. 253.

were tribal in nature. Babur dealt almost the whole of them separately. And the Afghan at that time completely failed to form a combined or united approach to the Mughal invasion. Or the elements of nationalism were altogether absent in their social and political structure. The Afghans were largely under the influence of a confusing type of tribal parochialism. If unity ever prevailed among them, they would have been such a formidable force which could rule over India and Afghanistan for all the times to come.

Meanwhile, some Afghan nobles joined Rana Sanga, the powerful Rajput ruler of Mewar, against Babur. Probably they realized their futility of joining Babur, who was their political rival. They were under the impression that like Timur, Babur after sacking and looting Delhi, would return to his native land. But quite contrary to their expectations, he decided to stay in India. Soon resistance was launched against the Mughals by the Afghans. Hence, the rebellion of Ilyas Khan in Mian Doab, of Qutub Khan in Chandwar and of Biban Khan in Qanauj occurred in intervals. After the death of Sultan Muhammad Nauhani, the centre of gravity of the Afghans shifted to Bihar where they joined hands with Sultan Mahmud Lodhi, brother of Ibrahim who fled to Bengal after the battle of Panipat. Some Afghan nobles, who had earlier joined Babur, also shifted their loyalty and rallied round Sultan Mahmud Lodhi. Though the assemblage of the Afghans was a new development but it hardly hindered Babur's designs because in terms of military might and stratagem he was in a better position as compared to Sultan Mahmud Lodhi.⁷⁵

Qazi Zia was among those who informed Babur about the large-scale preparation of the Afghans in Bihar. Sultan Mahmud also took maximum advantages of Babur's preoccupation elsewhere. Initially, the Mughals were driven away from Shams Abad, Qanauj and Lucknow and the Afghans occupied the entire region. It seemed that the

75 Rita Joshi, *The Afghan Nobility and the Mughals: 1526-1707* (Delhi: Vikas Publishing House, 1985), pp. 39-45.

Afghans ceased their factions and almost all chiefs, except Lohanis, took the battle against Babur. Sher Khan Sur, a *de facto* ruler of Bihar at that time also joined them and formed an advance army of the Afghans.⁷⁶ On 19 December 1528, Babur sent Mirza Askari against them and he himself proceeded towards Rapri, Etawah and crossed the Ganges. At Ghazipur, a number of Afghans deserted Mahmud Lodhi including Sher Khan Sur. Many other Afghan nobles who were not sure of their success against Babur decided to offer submission including Jalal-ud-Din Sharqi, Taj Khan Sarang Khani and Shah Mahmud Farmuli, Sher Khan Sur, Alau Khan Sur, many Farmuli *Shaikhzadas*, Jalal Khan Lohani and his mother Dudu.

In February 1529, Babur reoccupied his lost territories including Sambhal and Qanauj. He continued his march against Mahmud Lodhi whose army became weak because of large-scale desertion. Without facing Mughal army, he fled to Bengal and took asylum with Nusrat Shah, the then ruler of Bengal. Babur faced the combined army of Nusrat Shah and Mahmud Lodhi at Gogra on 6 May 1529, and inflicted a crushing defeat on them. One by one he overpowered all the rebellious commanders. With the defeat at Gogra, for the time being resistance of the Afghan in the east came to an end.⁷⁷ In the conquered territories he started the process of consolidation with the help of his trusted lieutenants. During those days his health deteriorated due to which he terminated conquering more territories. Gradually, he fell ill and breathed his last in 1530 at the age of forty-seven.

It has been stated that initially Babur was buried in a garden at Agra where his dead body remained for nine years. In his life-time he has given important instructions to his trusted disciples about the-would-be place of his burial. However, at the time of Humayun's defeat at the hands of Sher Shah Suri, Bibi Mubarak made proper arrangements for shifting his dead-body to the vicinity of Kabul in

76 *Ibid.*, p. 46.

77 *Ibid.*

Afghanistan. He was, afterwards, buried near Balahisar Mountain in the surrounding of Kabul.⁷⁸ The mausoleum is now situated in a magnificent garden called 'Bagh-i-Babur' in Kabul.

Interestingly, among the Afghans, neither the Lodhi nor the Suri kings took any meaningful measures for the development of the Afghan tribes of *Ruh*. It was with the coming of Babur that matters regarding the homeland of the Afghans came to light. The control of the Lodi and Sur Empires was limited up to river Jhelum in the Punjab. They failed to rule over their original homeland from where they migrated to India. In terms of political wisdom and statesmanship Bahlul Lodhi was far more superior to his successors. However, Sher Shah surpassed all of them as an outstanding strategist and extraordinary military general. He was the most illustrious Afghan king. A detailed account of his rise to prominence and his relation with the Mughals are given in the next chapter.

78 Sayed Bahadar Shah Zafar Kakakhel, *Pukhtanah da Tarikh pa Ranra Kay* [Pukhtu] (Peshawar: University Book Agency, 1999), p. 418.

Chapter 3

Afghan Revival under Sher Shah Suri

The political rivalry between Mughals and the Afghans in South Asia is a complex phenomenon which has been rooted in intersecting events. Both considered each-other as usurpers and interlopers. Mughals' claim on the throne of Delhi was based on their assertion that it was once captured by Timur and retained by his deputies, the Sayed Sultans. However, the Afghans' claim was based on strong footings. Firstly, they were prominent in South Asia for centuries and were the permanent residents of India. They never devastated or looted the Indian cities as did by the Mongol and Turk hordes. Quite contrary, the Afghans played an important role in the progress and development of the South Asian social and political fabrics. In this regard Olaf Caroe has stated in *The Pathans*:

It is well to realize that the Afghans in India naturally regarded Babur and Humayun as nothing but interlopers; Afghans had been prominent in India for three hundred years, and for a third of that time had actually ruled as Sultans; the seizure of the throne by Sher Shah was in their eyes a justifiable restoration of a normal and rightful authority, and not an interruption, as with hindsight it may seem to us. It would perhaps be more accurate to treat Babur and Humayun as usurpers and the Mughal period as really only starting with Akbar.¹

Till his death in December 1530, Babur considerably diminished the Afghan menace. But he had not completely

1 Olaf Caroe, *The Pathans* (London: Macmillan and Company Limited, 1958), p. 138.

liquidated their power in the eastern region. Due to their close attachment with the restoration of the Afghans' cause, a large number of Afghans arrived in Bihar from different parts of India and permanently settled there. The Nauhanis made a bid to restore their position and regain the throne of Bihar, but they did not succeed because of the absence of an able leader to infuse into them a new vigour and to properly guide them against the Mughals. A man of character and talent was required to provide them cohesion and channelize their energies through which they could achieve the desired results. All this was happening in various princedoms in the Indian mainland. The Afghans operating in the political paradigms of India by hook or crook abandoned their previous rivalries and gathered for a common cause. Hence, the rise of Sher Shah in such circumstances was welcomed by majority of the nobles and ordinary soldiers. Sher Shah Suri, who revived the Afghans' lost prestige, belonged to the Sur sub-section of the Lodhi tribe.

Sher Shah Suri's Rise to Prominence

The original name of Sher Shah was Farid Khan. He was the grandson of Ibrahim Sur and the son of Hussain who belonged to the Sur a sub-clan of the Lodhi Afghan tribe. When Sultan Bahlul Lodhi issued a *farman* for inviting the Afghan tribes to India for assisting him in the consolidation of his empire many people responded to his call. Among them were also *Karlanris* and *Sarbanri* Afghans.² It was in 1452 that his grandfather had come to India from their original homeland near Peshawar and joined services in the Punjab under various Afghan nobles. Farid is said to have been born in the Punjab. Iqtidar Hussain Siddiqui stated that he was born somewhere between 1486 and 1490.³ After his

2 Most of those Afghan tribes who migrated to India on the invitation of Bahlul Lodhi were drawn from Ghalji section such as Lodhi, Lohani, Niazi, Marwat and Baitani. Among the Sarbanri tribes Mandanr Yusufzai settled in the Indian plains. While in the Karlanris section Bangash and Aurakzai tribesmen tricked into India. See Olaf, *The Pathans*, p. 138.

3 Iqtidar Hussain Siddiqui, *Sher Shah Sur and his Dynasty* (Jaipur: Publication Scheme, 1995), p. 11.

birth, both his grandfather and father entered into the services of Jamal Khan in the Punjab. When Jamal Khan was transferred to Jaunpur in the time of Sikandar Lodhi, he granted the *jagir* of Sahsaram, Khawaspur and Thanda to Hussain in Bihar.⁴ As Farid was a brilliant and promising youth, he caught the eye of Jamal Khan, the patron of his father. But his domestic environment was not at ease due to his father's extreme love for his slave girls and indifferent attitude to Farid's mother. For that matter he left his home and went to Jaunpur but after some time he was reconciled with his father. The governor of Jaunpur Khan-i-Azam Ahmad Khan Lodhi was kind on him who granted him a stipend after observing his keen interest in learning. He learned *Gulistan* and *Bustan* of Shaikh Sa'adi, *Sikandar Nama* of Nizami Gunjavi, works of some Arab philosophers and other traditional Persian books. Moreover, he studied history books of great kings. When his father visited the court of Khan-i-Azam he got acquainted with Farid's progress in learning. His father agreed to send him to Sahsaram probably in 1512 or 1513. He was entrusted with the responsibility of administering his father's *jagir* which he did with excellent talent.⁵ At that time he was a young man of twenty two years of age. This provided him an opportunity to acquire experience in the art of administration which afterwards shaped his attitude and policies as the ultimate sovereign of India.

Once again, Sher Khan was dismissed from his position of administering his father's *jagir* due to his father's indifferent attitude towards him. In the beginning of Ibrahim Lodhi's reign he settled in Agra searching a reasonable job for himself. In that period of his life he organized his gang and raided the territories of small independent *rajas* and

4 Muhammad Hayat Khan, *Hayat-i-Afghan*, Eng. trs. Henery Priestly (Lahore: Sang-i-Meel Publication, 1981), p. 66.

5 Abdullah, *Tarikh-i-Daudi*, Pashto tr. Abd-ul-Latif Yad Talibi (Peshawar: Danish Publications, 2007), p. 178. For studying more details about the early life of Sher Shah and his education see Siddiqui, *Sher Shah Sur and his Dynasty*.

zamindars in Bihar. Once another gang overcame his men, however, he escaped the scene with much strain that he decided to give up it for a profession in soldiery. At the start of his career as a professional soldier, he served under Dawlat Khan Sarwani, a Nauhani Afghan noble of the rank of 4000 *sawars* in the territory of Kara.⁶

After Babur's victory in the battle of Panipat, confusion and anarchy prevailed among the rank and file of the Afghan nobles. During that period he allied himself with Nauhani Sultan of Bihar. He won over the confidence of his master by dint of his bravery and courage. Once during a hunting expedition, accompanied by his master, Farid killed a tiger single-handedly and got the title of Sher Khan.⁷ Another version in this regard has been given in *Waqiat-i-Mushtaqi* that he courageously led a successful expedition against Muhammad Sur, the powerful governor of Chaund while other nobles were reluctant to accompany him. Muhammad Nauhani was deeply impressed and he bestowed upon him the title of Sher Khan.⁸ It was after the emergence of mistrust that the Nauhani chief seized his *jagir* at Sahsaram and that was handed over to his step-brother Sulaiman. But Sher Khan refused to bow before the order of Muhammad Nauhani. However, a battle was fought and the areas of Khawaspur and Thanda were taken away from him. Thus his *jagir* was restricted to a meagre chunk of land. It was due to this animosity that compelled him to seek Mughal assistance against the Nauhani chief. In this connection he arranged his meetings with the Mughal officials in Jaunpur. These meetings and events took place round about 1527.⁹

6 *Ibid.*, p. 28.

7 Abbas Sarwani Khan, *Tarikh-i-Sher Shahi*, tr. Sir H. M. Elliot and Prof. John Dowson (Lahore: Sang-i-Meel Publications, 2006), p. 25.

8 Shaikh Rizqullah Mushtaqi, *Waqiat-i-Mushtaqi*, Eng. trs. Iqtidar Hussain Siddiqui, (New Delhi: Indian Council of Historical Research, 1993), p. 48.

9 Siddiqui, *Sher Shah Sur and his Dynasty*, p. 36.

Sher Shah's Relations with the Mughals

Through Junaid Barlas, Mughal governor of Jaunpur, Sher Khan entered the services of Babur and took part in the expedition of Chanderi. He also exploited the Mughal soldiery and recovered his *jagirs*. Having submitted to the Mughal authority, Sher Khan was duty-bound to attend the court of Babur at Agra. In that capacity he closely studied and observed the military tactics of the Mughals and their administrative structure. He acquainted himself with their different war techniques. Though describing the siege of Chanderi, Babur did not mention Sher Khan in his autobiography, but in recording the events of February 1529, he wrote that Sher Khan had joined Mahmud Lodhi.¹⁰ The greatest talent he possessed was the reading of faces, observation of war strategy and comprehending the technicalities of the different conditions. He can be rightly called as one of the celebrated statesmen the Afghans ever produced. Once, an incident took place at the court of Babur which changed the future course of his political career.

It is stated that Sher Khan went to Agra to pay his allegiance to Babur in a banquet at which he was served with a plateful of some strange dishes not known in his country. Being an Afghan he, without hesitation, cut it into pieces with his dagger to the amusement of Babur, who said to Khalifa, one of his trusted nobles: 'Keep an eye on Sher Khan; he is a clever man and the marks of royalty are visible on his forehead.' Khalifa replied that he is a middle ranking soldier with meagre resources and could not be a potential threat. When Babur turned away to other things, Sher Khan at once left the banquet and hurriedly left for Sahsaram. Later on, he used to say that during his attendance at court he acquired full insight into the manners and habits of the Mughals. He found from his personal experience that it would not be difficult for the Afghans to expel them from their home country. All the contemporary historians had

10 Zahir-ud-Din Babur, *Tuzuk-i-Baburi*, Eng. trs., Annette S. Beveridge (Lahore: Sang-i-Meel Publication, 1979), pp. 651-659.

mentioned this event including Abbas Sarwani, Abul Fazal and Niamatullah.¹¹

From the very start of his career under Babur, Sher Khan was convinced that the Mughals were in no way stronger and superior to the Afghans and that the Afghans had lost their empire because of their internal petty disputes and disunity. He thoroughly studied the strategies of the Mughals and formed an opinion that their ministers and chiefs could be seduced through bribery and gold.¹² For the larger Afghan cause he decided to bring unity and cohesion into their ranks for driving the Mughals out of India. Having this aim in mind, he started to play a wise game and initially kept it secret and did not disclose his real designs. He discussed the matter with his brother Nizam Khan and told him that he had no faith in the Mughals.

He wrote a letter to Junaid Barlas and sent it with presents and apologized for his sudden departure from the court at Agra. He did not at once terminate his contacts with them but avoided his coming in front of Babur. Then in 1529 he went to the court of Sultan Mahmud at Bihar. It was a time when the anti-Mughal Afghan nobles pledged to fight against Babur along with Mahmud Lodhi who at that time was in Bihar. A large number of other Afghans had gathered around him against the Mughals. Babur at once started his march towards Bihar. With his approach, Sultan Mahmud disappeared and his position dwindled to a large extent after the large-scale desertion. They were all united till Babur was away but once he appeared near Bihar; they dispersed and could not challenge the Mughal army.

The Afghans defeat at the hands of Babur had actually proved a blessing in disguise for Sher Khan. It conveyed a message to all the nobles that the traditional Afghan leadership had virtually collapsed in front of the Mughals. In

11 Abbas had given the name of the dish as *Ash mahicha*. *Tarikh-i-Daudi* mentioned the name of the dish as Mancho (Mahicho). See Abdullah, *Tarikh-i-Daudi*, p. 179.

12 Ishwari Prasad, *The Life and Time of Humayun* (Calcutta: Orient Longman Ltd, 1956), pp. 109-113.

that hour of trial he infused a new vigour into the demoralised minds of the Afghans that Mughals should not be considered as impregnable. Simultaneously, he projected himself as a Lodhi stalwart with a distinct and revolutionary strategy. In fact, he appealed to the Afghan *nang* (honour) for gaining maximum support. To keep the Afghan loyalty intact, he recruited trustworthy and tactful officers. In this way general Afghans saw in Sher Shah, a leader capable of fulfilling their dream of not only restoring for them their lost pride but also securing a prosperous future.

A talented strategist as Sher Khan was, he initiated his campaign from the province of Bihar. For two reasons he made Bihar a launching pad against Humayun; firstly, it was a resourceful province in terms of money and Afghan recruits. Secondly, he knew every nook and corner of the area which he strategically employed against the Mughals.¹³ To convince the Mughals of his fidelity he wrote several dutiful letters to Babur to win over his favour. During this time he remained at Bihar and joined the court of Sultan Muhammad Nauhani, his old master and patron. After his death he was reinstated as the deputy and tutor of his minor son Jalal Khan. Gradually, he became a strong man in the politics of Bihar. He became the virtual ruler of the kingdom of Bihar, a post that he filled with brilliant success. The influence, which he exerted over Jalal Khan, has excited jealousy and opposition of the nobles at the court of Bihar. They tried to poison the ears of Jalal Khan against Sher Khan, who conceived the mad idea of flying to Bengal requesting Nusrat Shah, the ruler of Bengal, for help against Sher Khan. Consequently, a battle was fought between Sher Khan and the Bengali army in which the former stood victorious. He administered properly the conquered territories with utmost care and warned his soldiers against unjust and arrogant behaviour with the local population. His victory also won him the favour of Lad Malika, the widow of Taj Khan Sarang Khani, a wealthy Afghan noble. Afterwards, he was on the point of being recognized as a virtual ruler of

13 Caroe, *The Pathans*, p. 142.

Bihar. He also tried to win over the support of other Afghan malaks as far as possible.¹⁴

Lad Malika, afterwards, decided to marry Sher Khan a marriage that enabled him in building up considerable strength in India. Iqtidar Hussain Siddiqui is of the view that as a result of this marriage Sher Khan got control over the strong fort of Chunar along with tributary principalities. In addition, she offered him one hundred and fifty precious diamonds, seven maunds of pearls, one hundred maunds of gold. In this way the whole *pargana* of Chunar along with its treasure came under his control. It was during this time that he started thinking of occupying the status of a sovereign position in India.¹⁵ Besides, his marriage with Lad Malika, Sher Khan had another good fortune in the shape of his marriage with Hargusa'in, widow of Nasir Khan Nauhani. She put all her treasure, which contained three hundred maunds of gold, at the disposal of Sher Khan. It must have enabled him to raise a strong and well-equipped military force under his command. Soon afterwards he was faced with a difficult situation caused by Babur's death in 1530.¹⁶

For Sher Khan an unfavourable development took place when some Afghan malaks of Bihar and Bengal again supported Sultan Mahmud Lodhi, son of Sultan Sikandar Lodhi and a potential candidate for the throne of Delhi. Sultan Mahmud, after the battle of Kanawha took refuge in Chittor. Majority of the influential Afghan chiefs and malaks including Azam Humayun, Isa Khan, Ibrahim Khan, Bayazid Farmuli and Mian Biban Jiwani went to Patna and rendered their enthusiastic support to Sultan Mahmud. Thus Sher Khan's scheme of seizing the leadership of the Afghan nobility suffered a temporary blow. But he was wise enough to obtain a *farman* from Sultan Mahmud bestowing upon him the kingdom of Bihar as soon as Jaunpur and the districts to the west recovered by the Afghans. He was well aware of

14 *Ibid.*

15 Siddiqui, *Sher Shah Sur and his Dynasty*, p. 47.

16 *Ibid.*

the Afghan ostensible division in case of a superior adversary. In this way he initially neither supported nor opposed the cause of Sultan Mahmud.

For the moment, the death of Babur spread discord and confusion in the rank and file of the Mughals. Sher Khan decided to exploit indolent and easy-going Humayun, son and successor of Babur, and to make use of the opportunities arising out of the Mughals' weaknesses. He also foresaw the jealousies between Biban and Bayazid, two influential Afghan malaks and leading figures of Sultan Mahmud's army. From the outset, he adopted the strategy of mobilizing the Afghan military strength and to keep them loyal to the very end. According to Abbas Sarwani, the other Afghan malaks accused him as an ally of the Mughals. Therefore, before marching towards Jaunpur, they first swooped down upon Sher Khan and compelled him to reinforce them against the Mughals. The Afghans under Sultan Mahmud recaptured Jaunpur and then advanced towards Lucknow. Here Sher Khan secretly wrote to Hindu Beg that he had been reluctantly joined the Afghans and that he would leave them on the day of the battle. It clearly manifests his fitness for the task he was struggling for. He showed his loyalty to Sultan Mahmud and the same time negotiated terms with the Mughals. At the eleventh hour in September 1531 Sher Khan, accordingly, deserted the Afghan main army, which caused great panic and consequently their power was completely broken. Sultan Mahmud seeing no chance of success abdicated his claim and settled as *jagirdar* at Patna.¹⁷

Battle at Dorah near Lucknow sealed the fate of Mahmud Lodhi. He completely abandoned taking part in active politics. It seems that he was not strong enough to regain his former position and had plunged into womanish inclinations. The Afghans under his command were not a compact body because he was not competent enough to transform them into an organized political and military force.

17 *Ibid.*, pp. 109-113.

He did not possess leadership qualities through which the Afghans could be knitted together. Otherwise they were capable of offering heroic sacrifices. Quite contrary Sher Khan was a leader of outstanding abilities who knew well how to respond in a particular situation. Well aware of the Afghan national characteristics, he saved himself from several imminent destructions.

Sher Khan's alliance with the Mughals was just a diplomatic venture for the purpose to achieve his own goal. Meantime, he enhanced his sphere of influence and strengthened his position. Humayun though did not consider him harmful for his interest but prepared his army to reduce him to submission. Humayun demanded from him the submission of Chunar fort but he refused to obey the order. On hearing the news of Humayun's marching eastward, he sent a protesting letter. In the letter he assured Humayun of his loyalty and non-interference with the emperor in any way. But for Humayun it was not the time to ignore the growing power of the Afghans in Bengal under Sher Khan. It was in November 1531 that he besieged the fort but the Afghans under his son Jalal Khan and another brave commander namely Jalal Khan, son of Jilo, offered them tough resistance. Humayun was compelled to negotiate a peace treaty with Sher Khan under which the latter submitted to the Mughal authority under certain conditions.¹⁸ The treaty which was concluded in December 1531 was proved very beneficial for Sher Khan in terms of consolidating his position in Bihar.

In the year 1533 Qutub Khan, governor of Monghyr invaded Bihar which was successfully repulsed by Sher Khan. This victory further raised his prestige in Bihar. He gained considerable time to consolidate his position and properly administer his territories. He is said to have freed himself from the unscrupulous elements in his army through wise policies. He trained his loyal soldiers under his own

18 Shaikh Muhammad Kabir Hazyani, *Afsana-i-Shahan*, Urdu tr. Saud-ul-Hasan Ruhila (Lahore: Book Fort, 2011), p. 188.

trusted officers. He never put blind trust in the traditional Afghan nobles. Rather he trained his military commander in hardship exercises. He raised their stamina and fighting mobility by regularly sending them on many small expeditions. For his part, he took keen interest in the well-being of the families of his loyal Afghan soldiers by generous help. Through this way he won over the confidence of other Afghans who had not yet joined his army.¹⁹ In the years 1533 to 1535 Humayun was pre-occupied in his wars with Bahadar Shah of Gujarat. Sher Shah was busy in the process of building up a strong military force under his personal supervision. Majority of his military commanders were members of ordinary families who never appear to have occupied high political or military posts. Famous among them were the sons of Sukkah, his slave, Khawas Khan the elder, Shihab Khan and Shamsheer Khan; Shuja'at Khan Sur, Sarmast Khan Sarbani, Haibat Khan Niazi (Azam Humayun), Isa Khan Hajib Niazi, Jalal Khan son of Jilo Sur and Qutb Khan Sur. His own sons Jalal Khan, Adil Khan and Qutub Khan were also brave and fierce commanders. As they owed their position of strength to the personality of Sher Khan, they had a sense of gratitude to serve him with utmost loyalty.²⁰

Humayun-Sher Shah Confrontation

Junaid Barlas was appointed as the new Mughal governor of Jaunpur. Sher Shah tackled Junaid Barlas through sending gifts and conciliatory letters to him. As Junaid Barlas was aware of the tactics of Sher Khan, he informed Humayun of his growing military strength in Bihar. The death of Junaid Barlas left the eastern provinces in a state of confusion, which was aggravated by Sher Khan's rapid successes in Bengal. The ruler of Bengal Sultan Mahmud Shah had signed a treaty with Sher Shah under which he accepted his position as the master of Bengal and Bihar. By the year 1535 Sher Khan was strong enough to

19 Siddiqui, *Sher Shah Sur and his Dynasty*, p. 56.

20 *Ibid.*, p. 60

issue *Sikah* of his name after his first coronation. When Humayun appeared on the scene Mahmud Shah sought his help against Sher Khan.²¹

The rising military strength and political influence of Sher Shah soon brought him into direct conflict with Humayun. He was busy in Mandu at the time of these developments in the first week of August 1536. Other cause of the Mughal's nervousness was the gradual concentration of the Afghan nobility in Bihar. Many Afghan nobles, military commanders and soldiers joined hands with Sher Shah after the defeats of Bahadar Shah and Mahmud Lodhi. Moreover, the rebel Mughal relatives of Humayun, for instance Sultan Mirza and his sons, also took refuge with him after their defeat at the hands of Mirza Hindal in 1536. All these factors contributed in the campaign of Humayun against Sher Shah in Bihar.²²

Thus Humayun in the first instance was bent upon to crush the Afghan power in the east. He marched towards Bengal but received the news of capture of Gaur, the capital of Bengal by Sher Shah. Plenty of booty including the insignia of royalty fell into his hands. Mahmud Shah, the king of Bengal, rushed to Humayun's camp and took refuge there. Humayun sent his envoy to Sher Shah for negotiations but the uncompromising attitude of Mahmud Shah was mainly responsible for the failure of the negotiations process. Sher Shah gained considerable advantage from every moment of negotiations. He shifted his treasury to Ruhtasgarh fort in Bihar. Then he let Humayun to enter into Bengal and seized the entire area and the most strategic passes including Bihar. Simultaneously, he cut off all the communications of Humayun with Agra and Delhi. Humayun occupied Gaur without much difficulty in 1538, but took no pain to befriend the local population or to properly manage the administration of the conquered areas. Between the rainy season of 1538 and the cold weather of 1538-39, Humayun wasted his time but Sher Shah was not indolent. He exploited all the

21 *Ibid.*, p. 65.

22 *Ibid.*, p. 68.

opportunities and organized all his resources for a final encounter with Humayun.²³

Humayun received a serious blow when the news of the desertion of his brother Hindal reached his camp. Hindal threw off his allegiance and went to Agra. His desertion placed the entire communication links of Humayun completely at Sher Khan's mercy. The Afghans seized the areas of Monghyr, Banaras, Sambhal and the entire place west of Bengal. They also collected the revenue for both the autumn and the spring harvest from the inhabitants of the areas. Like his predecessor Bahlul Lodhi, Sher Khan also made an appeal to all the Afghans malaks and impressed upon them the need for a united action against the Mughals. Around this time he assumed the title of *Shah* (king) and marched out to face them in the open field. Humayun on his part advanced from Patna to Monia with his usual coolness and on the fourth day reached Chaunsa. Sher Shah also appeared with a great force under his command.

While Humayun was at Chaunsa confronting the Afghans, Hindal occupied the Royal Palace at Agra and issued *farmans* in his name. This was an open revolt against Humayun who sent messages to Kamran, the governor of Punjab and the most powerful of his brothers to come to his rescue. But Kamran's advisers restrained him from helping his brother. Thus during this critical time Kamran and Hindal left Humayun to his unfortunate fate.²⁴

Establishment of the Afghan Suri Dynasty

From April to June 1539, Humayun and Sher Shah confronted each other. The latter tactfully delayed his course of action. With long delays Humayun became desperate and exhausted. At last on 26 June 1539, Sher Shah stormed the tired Mughal camp. He inflicted huge losses upon Humayun soldiers who himself was wounded in his arm and fled from the field. He attempted to swim his horse across the Ganges and was half-drowned when his life was saved by a water-

23 Prasad, *The Life and Time of Humayun*, pp. 120-21.

24 *Ibid.*, 127.

career who offered him an inflated *mashk*. Nearly seven or eight thousands Mughal soldiers perished. Gul Badan Begum in *Humayun Nama* has mentioned the names of several notable ladies of the harem of whom no trace could be found in spite of diligent search. Humayun's Queen Haji Begum fell into the hands of the Afghans but the victors treated her honourably.²⁵ Sher Shah issued an immediate order that no Mughal women should be made captive or enslaved and that the family of officers left behind should be conducted safely to the camp of Empress.²⁶

It was a classic Afghan conduct even at the scene of fierce battle against their hard-core enemies. During the course of the war the Mughal imperial tent including the royal families and ladies, fell into the hands of the Afghans. When Sher Shah was informed he at once reached on the spot and after due respect to the queen he appointed a contingent of vigilant Afghan force to guard the tent. He issued strict orders that not a single member of the families should be ill-treated. In the following day they were deputed to Bihar where they were supplied with necessary items and then released with extreme honour and royal dignity.²⁷

Humayun made his escape from the battlefield and was pursued by Sher Shah's Gaur's military contingent. At this crucial juncture Raja Bir Bhan of Arail helped Humayun to escape approaching Afghan force. Humayun left Kalpi and hurriedly went to Agra where he met his perfidious brothers to decide the future course of their action against Sher Shah. Afghans were now supreme in Bengal and Bihar and Sher Shah openly announced his title. He ordered the *Sikah* should be struck and *khutba* should be read in his name and assumed the additional title of Shah Alam. Isa Khan prepared the *farman* of victory and the Afghan youths came

25 Gulbadan Begum, *Humayun Nama*, Eng tran. Annette S. Beveridge (Delhi Goodwords Books, 2001), p. 109.

26 *Ibid.*, p. 128.

27 Caroe, *The Pathans*, p. 144.

from the surrounding areas to celebrate the victory with their traditional tribal dance.²⁸

Sher Shah was now the undisputed master of Bengal, Bihar and the whole country west of Qanauj. The dominions of Humayun had shrunk to little more than Delhi and Agra. He was now convinced of the Afghan's power and saw clearly that success against them was impossible without unity of plan and purpose. Another encounter between the Afghan and the Mughals took place at Qanauj. According to some historian, Panipat was revenged at Qanauj by Sher Khan. Humayun succeeded in saving his life, left Delhi for Sarhind from where he went to Multan. But Sher Khan was determined to expel him from India at any cost. He dispatched a force, which shepherded him out of the boundaries of India. Another force followed Kamran who was retreating to Kabul. At this point many Afghan from *Ruh*, Kabul, Kandahar and Helmand presented themselves to their king. Among them was Shaikh Bayazid Sarwani, the grandfather of the author of the *History of Sher Shah*. Then he met a number of Baloch chiefs including Fateh Khan, Ghazi Khan and Ismail Khan, the latter two founders of Dera Ghazi Khan and Dera Ismail Khan respectively. In the Niazi territory he firmly held the area as his Governor of Punjab Haibat Khan was himself a Niazi.²⁹

When the task had been successfully accomplished and having expelled the Mughals from the country, there remained the less difficult task of ordering the affairs of the state. Sher Shah intended to plant Afghans from *Ruh* in the tract of land from Nilab to Lahore so their swords might serve as a barrier against the return of the Mughals to India. Without any difficulties he turned his attention towards the subjugation of different areas and between 1540 and 1545, he conquered Bengal, Malwa, Rasin, Rajasthan, Multan and Sindh. However, his sway never ran beyond margalla hills in the north-western region. In the south his realm just touched

28 Prasad, *The Life and Time of Humayun*, pp. 132-33.

29 Caroe, *The Pathans*, pp. 145-46.

the Niazi areas close to Mianwali. River Jhelum remained his boundary with Ruhtas fort as his outpost in the region.

The institutions, which he devised for the better administration of these areas, won him the admiration and esteem of friends and foes alike. His great achievement was his unremitting industry with which he united most of the scattered Afghans and provided them a strong bond of cohesiveness and eliminated from their minds the separatist tendencies. He learned from the blunders of his predecessors and emerged as a national hero of the Afghans in South Asia. His efforts culminated in the expulsion of Humayun and the subsequent establishment of the Sur Afghan Dynasty in India. He challenged formidable adversaries, but in terms of courage and bravery, he surpassed and proved himself far greater than the Mughals.

Olaf Caroe has narrated an exceptional account about the future designs of Sher Shah which he failed to fulfil in his life time. This tale testifies that how future of the Afghans was viewed by that great monarch. Once during the court proceedings the courtiers observed unusual grieves on his face. He was asked by one of his nobles that despite excellent order in the state, what can be the reason of his grief. To which Sher Shah replied that four unaccomplished tasks rest in my hearts. First and the foremost was to discard the territory of *Ruh* and shift its Afghan inhabitants in the plain areas from Indus to Lahore. In this way they would be in a better position to check any Mughal attempt of invasion from Central Asia. It would infuse into their mind the liking of civilized life in the plains. Second was to desolate Lahore for it always provided a footing ground to all the invaders wishing to reduce Delhi. Third was the establishment of fifty splendid *serais* at the road to Makkah for the easy and comfortable journey of the pilgrims. Next and the last was the erection of a marvellous mausoleum on the grave of Sultan Ibrahim Lodhi at Panipat and its opposite should be raised the tomb of Babur, the Chaghtai Sultan.³⁰ The first

30 Caroe, *The Pathans*, p. 148.

wish of Sher Shah seems quite significant as far as the future of the Afghans was concerned. This point was quite vividly elaborated by Olaf Caroe in the following passage:

In his [Sher Shah] first and most striking design for the frontier tribes he is pursuing the train of thought which made him think of Lahore. He had realized the strength and the weakness of the mountaineers of Roh. From them he had drawn the soldiers in whose company he had marched to the throne of Delhi, but he knew only too well that the disorganized tribal societies in their homelands, rent with faction and the blood-feud provided no adequate shield for the protection of the kingdom against further invasion...*He divined also that the Pathan future lay with the Indus Valley region, and not with the vague and shifting principalities in the direction of Central Asia.*³¹ [Italic mine]

In 1545, Sher Shah turned his attention to subdue the fort of Bundelkhand. Kirat Singh, the ruler of Kalinjar did not come to offer his submission and started preparation for resistance. Therefore, the Afghans under his personal command besieged the fort of Kalinjar. Sher Shah himself directed the operation and ordered loaded rockets to be discharged. One of these rockets rebounded from the wall and tailed on the ground and blew up the whole magazine. Sher Shah along with Shaikh Khalil, Shaikh Nizam, Babu and another young man were dreadfully burnt. Sher Shah directed his soldiers to continue the siege and do the best to capture the fort. According to Abbas, the chiefs and commanders attacked the fort from all the sides and succeeded in their attempt. With his face lit up with joy, Sher Shah hearing the news died on 22 May, 1545.³²

Perhaps Sher Shah was the only Afghan monarch having a realist vision about the future of the Afghans of *Ruh*. To protect their interest the best possible course of action, according to his vision, was to control the Afghan borderland area with a strong defence line. In terms of political wisdom he can be compared with the most successful kings in the

31 *Ibid.*, p. 149.

32 Prasad, *The Life and Time of Humayun*, p. 175.

medieval times. His career as an ordinary soldier confronted him with the issue of life and death. He faced critical situations on several occasions but every time he rose from obscurity to popularity. Like every successful emperor he exhibited intelligence, cruelty, deceitfulness, cunningness, mild attitude and above all the Afghan bearings in achieving the magnificent position of the Emperor of India. His successes revealed that the political setbacks suffered by the old Afghan monarchs were due to their selfishness, disunity and the absence of a great purpose. In the initial phase of his political career he was considered mere an upstart by many Afghan nobles. They could not think of coming under his banner to capture the throne of Delhi. But his rapid successes against the mighty rulers in Bengal and Bihar raised him to prominence on the political scene of India. He demonstrated the quality of being a superior noble which was altogether absent in the traditional Afghan nobility serving under various rulers.

Successors of Sher Shah Suri

The death of Sher Shah brought confusion and chaos to the Afghan kingdom. It led to the usual tussle for the throne of Delhi among various contenders. He did not nominate any successor to the throne in his life. But amid anarchy and disorder Jalal Khan ascended the throne and assumed the title of Islam Shah. During this time, the disgruntled Afghan chiefs began to show signs of insubordination. But he adopted very rigid policy towards these elements and many of them were put to death. He strengthened his position by crushing the power of the rebel nobles and stationed troops throughout the kingdom. This state of affairs continued till the death of Islam Shah at Gwalior in 1554. He was succeeded by Muhammad Adil.

During Muhammad Adil's time the Sur Afghan Empire divided into five parts and with the decline of the central authority, the old separatist tendencies of the Afghans once more asserted themselves. The independent governor of Punjab Sikandar Shah marched towards Delhi and expelled the unfortunate Ibrahim. Bengal was independent under

Muhammad Shah Sur. In the north, Sindh, Malwa and Gujarat had been in a distracted condition. The Afghans were fighting themselves and the rest of the country seemed to be indifferent to what was happening around them. Already with the death of Islam Shah, the Mughals had started their preparation to regain the throne of Delhi.

In the beginning of 1554, Humayun gathered equipment for his army in Kabul. He also got rid of his turbulent and selfish brothers and captured Qandahar. In November, he started his march and in December 1554, he reached Peshawar via Jalalabad. This was very favourable time for Humayun because all the fighting men of the Afghan were in Delhi with Sultan Sikandar Shah who was busy in consolidating his position. Therefore, the fort of Ruhtas, which was built by Sher Shah for such emergency, was captured without any resistance. The chiefs of Lahore submitted and Humayun entered the city on 24 February, 1555.

At Lahore Humayun settled the country and collected the revenue from the people. At Dipalpur, Shah Abdul Ma'ali defeated an advanced party of the Afghan under Shahbaz Khan and Nasir Khan. The Mughal force proceeded to Jalandhar and expelled the Afghans from the town. Sultan Sikandar Sur divided his army into two sections. Tatar Khan with 30,000 soldiers under him marched towards Sarhind. The Mughal soldiers moved from Jalandhar towards Macchiwara on the bank of the Sutlej. Bairam Khan, the most trusted and loyal noble of Humayun wrote him about the inadequacy of his force. But Humayun infused into them new energy and vigour. Due to superior war strategy on the part of Bairam Khan, the Afghans were at last routed out. After this victory, the whole of the Punjab, Sarhind and Hissar Ferozah came under the Mughals. The incessant attacks of Humayun on the dependencies of Delhi alarmed Sultan Sikandar. He started preparation, gathered his entire force and went out from Delhi to meet the Mughals. On 28 May, 1555 Humayun reached Sarhind and the morale of the Mughal soldiers boosted up. Discouraged by the presence of

Humayun, Sultan Sikandar constructed a fortified camp to block the road to Delhi. The Afghans were defeated and Humayun ascended once again to the throne of Delhi on Tuesday, 23 July 1555. Thus was happened the downfall of the Sur Afghan dynasty which owed its establishment to the untiring efforts of Sher Shah. However, his incapable successors did not maintain their supremacy for long. The empire was lost to the Mughals who crossed the Afghan borderland on their way towards Delhi. This was, however, the biggest irony that neither the Lodhis nor Suris took least interest to consolidate the north-western borderland.

The ideal of Sher Shah was to bring about regeneration among the Afghans. To a large extent he succeeded in bringing them on a common platform and infused in them a new spirit. Under his brilliant leadership, they tried their best to retain unity, understanding and cohesion among each-others. Their co-operation with the central authority and devotion towards the Afghan Empire cherished the lofty ideal of kingship, which they considered a sacred and hard duty to perform. Sher Shah used to say: "It behoves the great to be always very active."³³ But this kind of feeling was altogether absent among Sher Shah's successors and other Afghan chiefs. They waged wars and struggled more for their personal and petty goals and thus shattered the very bases of the Afghan Empire. Consequently, their dissention ruined the larger cause of the consolidation of Afghan Empire in India. The Mughals under Humayun adroitly exploited their internal feuds and overpowered them on strong footings. With the accession of Akbar as the next Mughal emperor after the death of Humayun, the Afghans were to a large extent pacified in the Indian mainland. Although a number of Afghan stalwarts challenged Akbar but they were no more in the position to face the mighty Mughal force. However, in the north-western region many Afghan leaders rose in revolt against the Mughals.

33 Bashir Ahmad Khan Matta, *Sher Shah Suri: A Fresh Perspective* (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 2005), p. 58.

In the years to come, many Afghan leaders tried their level best to protect their independence at least in the north-western frontier region. Some of them were spiritual leaders while other led particular tribes and groups in resisting the Mughal authorities. The most popular among them were Bayazid Ansari's Roshniya Movement and the Yusufzais' resistance under Bhaku Khan, which are the subject matters of the next chapter.

Chapter 4

Roshniya Movement and the Yusufzai Resistance

With the occupation of Delhi and Agra in July 1555, Humayun once again became the emperor of India after his oust by Sher Shah Suri. He died in January 1556 and his son Akbar succeeded him as the next Mughal emperor of India. There was a state of anarchy throughout the empire. A number of provinces had been taken over by some rival princes and chieftains. Afghan chieftains were dominant in various parts of the country that resisted Mughal authority under different commanders. After the downfall of the Sur dynasty, they never reconciled with the Mughals and adopted an attitude of hostility towards them. They tried their utmost to grab the reins of power but as their resistance was not uniformed, they did not succeed in bringing all the hostile Afghan elements on a single platform that represents their nationalist aspirations.

After the fall of the Sur dynasty some influential Afghan belonging to that dynasty went scattered in northern India and various other parts of the country. In the Punjab Sikandar Suri had gathered a large army of his supporters and was proved to be a great source of trouble for the Mughals. Rajasthan became a strong centre of the activities of Haji Khan who wielded great influence on the surrounding areas. In the United Provinces, the Afghans gathered around Hasan Khan Bachaghotti, a prominent landlord who revolted against Akbar. In 1557, Miyana Afghan of Sironj raised the standard of rebellion. The most prominent and strong leader

of the Afghans was Baz Bahadar¹ of Malwa. He ruled over Malwa until 1562, when Akbar annexed it to the Mughal Empire. Similarly in Gujarat, the Afghans were in huge number where they supported the cause of Sultan Muhammad Mirza, a relative of Akbar and aspirant of the Mughal throne. Eastern region was another important area where they were quite powerful under the leadership of Sulaiman Karrani, the virtual ruler of Bengal. In the Punjab, Ruhtas Fort was under Fatah Khan, a Baitani commander.²

By the end of 1585, Akbar had scored a number of victories in suppressing these rebellions. For him, the problem was not only the liquidation of their power but, if possible, their assimilation into the Mughal nobility. He adopted various policies to get them over and used every possible means to befriend them. At the same time, he was reluctant and much apprehensive in granting them influential positions and *jagirs* or other high posts of responsibility in the court. He was not ready to recognize their autonomous status anywhere in his empire. He felt that the Afghan nobles in particular and common Afghans in general should be subdued and kept under firm control. However, most of these chiefs were in no mood to submit to the Mughals or recognize the Mughal authority. The designs of the Emperor Akbar ran counter to the high-scoring ambitions of these nobles. It was partly due to his vast resources and stratagem

1 In 1560, Malwa was under Baz Bahadar and was regarded a stronghold of the Afghans. Akbar decided to annex it to the Mughal Empire. In 1562 Malwa was annexed to the empire. Baz Bahadar was compelled to leave Malwa and to take refuge in Gondwana. According to *Tabaqat-i-Akbari*, Baz Bahadar was the son of Shuja Khan. He killed his brother Dawlat Khan and occupied most of his father dominions. It was after his coronation ceremony that he adopted the title of Baz Bahadar while his real name was Bayazid. He went to Gujarat after his defeat and joined the Mughal Court through Hasan Khan, a trusted noble. See Khwaja Nizam-ud-Din Ahmad, *Tabaqat-i-Akbari*, Urdu tr. Muhammad Ayub Qadri (Lahore: Urdu Science Board, n.d.), p. 410. It is stated, in the *Mughal Durbar* Vol. IV p. 151, that he was granted the *mansab* of 1000. Nizam-ud-Din Ahmad and Shah Nawaz Khan refer to him as an *amir* with rank of 2000. Niamatullah mentions that he remained at court until his death, Rita Joshi, *The Afghan Nobility and the Mughals: 1526-1707* (Delhi: Vikas Publishing House, 1985), pp. 21-22.

2 *Ibid.*, pp. 56-66.

and partly due to the personal conflict and rivalries of different Afghan tribal chiefs. The expansionist designs of Akbar were threatening their existence, yet they were not politically mature enough to forge a common platform against the Mughals.³

Akbar was much apprehensive about the events occurring in the trans-Indus north-western region, inhabited predominantly by different Afghans tribes like Yusufzai, Khattak, Afridi, Bangash, Khalil, Mohmand etc. These tribes of the north-western frontier proved a stumbling block on the way of the expansionist designs of Akbar towards Afghanistan and beyond. Thus, for Akbar the Afghans of the frontier region remained a flash-point throughout his rule. He kept himself abreast of the latest developments in the frontier and adjoining areas. The effective control of the tribal leaders and the pacification of the frontier region remained always a pre-requisite for the peace and stability of the Delhi throne in every period. Throughout history the policy of every ruler towards the Afghan borderland was to pacify it on whatever price. The surety of an uninterrupted flow of trade caravans and military mobilization through Khyber Pass was the corner-stone of the policy and desire of every ruling dynasty. It was largely for this purpose that different tactics were adopted and different policies have been devised to achieve these objectives. Akbar spent much of his time and energy in subjugating the eastern region, and the task of subduing the Afghans of the frontier was entrusted to different commanders.⁴ For a number of occasions he

3 *Ibid.*

4 The apprehensions of Akbar were not totally baseless. The geographical location of the frontier was strategically much important for the Mughal Empire because of the political developments in Central Asia. The ruler of Turan Abdullah Uzbek was an ambitious person who in 1585-86 had captured Badakhshan and Balkh. The seditious activities of his stepbrother Mirza Muhammad Hakim, the governor of Kabul, were also a source of headache for him. He overran the city of Lahore several times and set his hands to spoiling and looting the adjacent districts. Akbar himself marched to Kabul on 17 November 1566. He also instructed Raja Todar Mal to keep a vigilant eye on the activities of the Afghans as he feared that they might

himself commanded Mughal army to penetrate into the Afghan borderland to subdue different tribes.

Initially, the whole of the trans-Indus area, including the plain and the hilly tracts, was beyond the effective control of the Mughal authority. The most these rulers, including Sher Shah, did was no more than to secure the hilly passes for transportation. However, the Mughal rulers regarded the area not independent but subordinate to the imperial authority. In the geographical distribution, generally it laid under the suzerainty of the governor at Kabul, regarded a province of the Mughal Empire. The position of the frontier during the initial years of Akbar rule was such that neither Mirza Hakim held it firmly nor Akbar showed any interest to subjugate it due to his own expediencies.

Owing to the anti-state activities of Mirza Muhammad Hakim, a stepbrother of the emperor and the governor of Kabul, Akbar brought about many administrative changes in the Punjab and sent several expeditions to the areas of the Afghan borderland for instance Kabul, Swat, Buner and Tirah. In the winter of 1580-81, Mirza Hakim twice attacked Punjab but was repulsed. He was a rival to Akbar in his claim over the throne of Delhi. The state of anarchy in Bengal and Bihar greatly favoured Mirza Hakim and he made his position stronger in Kabul. But the Valley of Swat inhabited predominantly by the Yusufzais remained independent during the time of Babur, Kamran, Humayun and Mirza Hakim reigns.

This compelled Akbar to proceed to Kabul via Punjab and to bring the area under his control. At Attock he stayed for some time and ordered the construction of a fort to station imperial troops to secure the area from the Yusufzai's disturbance. For the first time, he entered Kabul on 9 August 1581, restored his authority and stayed over there for seven

create trouble through supporting Mirza Hakim. See Joshi, *The Afghan Nobility and the Mughals*, p. 78.

days.⁵ But the real issue between the Afghans of Swat and Akbar started after the death of Mirza Hakim in 1585.⁶

During the reign of Akbar Afghans of the frontier region witnessed the emergence of a movement called the Roshniya Movement. Its leader Bayazid Ansari was a charismatic and mysterious figure who mustered great support from different Afghan tribes. In the beginning it was a religio-cum-reformist movement. Started from Kaniguram (South Waziristan) in the second half of the sixteenth century the movement made considerable headway to some of the Afghan tribes including Bangash, Afridi, Mohmand, Khalil, Yusufzai etc. The devoted supporters of the Movement were a source of great trouble for the Mughals in the north-west frontier throughout the reign of Akbar, Jahangir and Shah Jehan.

Major writings on Bayazid and Roshniya Movement highlight some of its often repeated aspects without going into detail to rediscover its different dynamics. Its anti-Mughal stance was often portrayed as the manifestation of the Afghan national cohesion. The works produced by different scholar are generally narrative in nature. Very little analytical work is available regarding the movement. Generally, three aspects of the movement have been discussed in detail. Firstly, the focus of some writers is that Bayazid was a religious figure and *sufi* saint. The findings of this section of inquiry, deal it mere a religious struggle based on his religious views. It is stated that his doctrine depicted a kind of pantheistic sufism in which the transmigration of the soul was a permanent feature.⁷ Secondly, the findings of another section of writers underscore that the nature of the

5 Olaf Caroe, *The Pathans* (London: Macmillan and Co Ltd, 1958), p. 208.

6 Sultan-i-Rome, 'Mughuls and Swat' *Journal of the Pakistan Historical Society*, Vol. 50, No. 4 (October-December 2002).

7 The most active exponents of this view were largely those local writers who associated themselves with shrines of Pir Baba and his disciple Akhun Darwaiza. They opined that it was mere his religious views which divided the Afghan society into two rival sections. Some western writers considered this assertion as valid. See for instance Mian Zahir Shah, *Akhun Darwaiza Baba* (Swat: Maktaba Ghosia, 2000) and Caroe, *The Pathans*, p. 200.

movement was political. In their opinion, Bayazid Ansari tried to muster the support of other Afghans against the Mughals by making recourse to mystic activities and giving up mundane activities. He made of himself a *pir* in the eyes of the common Afghans just to give them the impression of being a person with supernatural force and embedded with extra-ordinary qualities. His purpose was to dethrone the Mughals, at least in the Afghan borderland areas, and to establish his independent rule.⁸ Lastly, there are some writers whose approach is nationalistic in the study of the Roshniya Movement. They think that it was the first endeavour in the Afghan area, the whole purpose of which was to provide a single platform to them against the Mughals. For them it was mere the expression of the dormant sentiments of the Afghan nationalism which may be traced from this movement.⁹

It would be discussed in the present study that how Bayazid emerged and what was his source of strength. A number of other issues will be dealt to understand the rise and the subsequent resurgence of the Roshniya Movement. The candle of the movement was kept alive by the devoted followers of Bayazid despite tough resistance from the Mughals. Therefore, its relation with the Mughals would be looked at to know its controversial aspects and to give a perspective based on the given evidences. Moreover, it would be better to discuss the opposition which largely came from traditional religious figures i.e. Syed Ali Tarmizi alias Pir

8 The crux of the view expressed by this section of scholars was that Bayazid was brought up in an extremely anti-Mughal environment. Personally, he went through these harsh experiences when he was a child. Consequently, he developed a sense of antipathy towards the Mughals. See for this view Preshan Khattak, *Pakhtun Kaun?: Tarikh, Tahqiq, Tanqeed* [Urdu], (Peshawar: Pashto Academy University of Peshawar, 2005), p. 242.

9 For nationalist approach see Allah Bakhsh Yusufi, *Yusufzai Pathan* [Urdu], (Karachi: Muhammad Ali Educational Society, 1973) and Sayed Bahadar Shah Zafar Kakakhel, *Pukhtanah da Tarikh Pa Ranra Kay* [Pashto] (Peshawar, Pashto Academy, 1999), Pir Muazzam Shah, *Tawarikh Hafiz Rahmat Khani: Afghan Qabail aur unki Tarikh* (Peshawar: Pashto Academy, 1977), Saif-ur-Rahman Masud, *Pir Rukhan aw Rukhnai Inqilab* [Pashto] (Peshawar: University Book Agency, 1998).

Baba (RA) and Akhun Darwaiza (RA) dwelling in the Yusufzai areas. It would be judged that whether Roshniya Movement was a nationalist venture or mere to gain some advantages from the anti-Mughal sentiments of the Afghans. In terms of Pashto literature, it contributed immensely to the Afghan society but it would be seen that how it affected the common masses and what kind of changes it brought which are still visible.

Bayazid Ansari: Birth and Childhood

The people of Urmur (Urmury or Bargasta¹⁰ speaking) or Barki tribe¹¹ of the Afghans largely inhabit Kaniguram, a town situated in the South Waziristan agency of the present day Federally Administered Tribal Areas of Pakistan. It is stated that some descendants of Hazrat Abu Ayub Ansari (RA) also settled in Kaniguram. Generally, they were called Ansari who intermingled with the local people. When Sultan Bahlul Lodhi (1451-1489) ascended to the throne of Delhi, a large number of Afghans migrated to Punjab and other parts of India. Majority of the people belonging to Barki tribe went to Jalandhar in the present day Indian Punjab and undertook trade as their profession. They built a new town by the name of *Basti Danishmandan* after the name of Ibrahim

10 The name Bargasta was written only by Hafiz Abdul Quddus Qasmi in the preface of the *Khair-ul-Bayan* which he has the credit of edition. Preface of Hafiz Abdul Quddus Qasmi to Bayazid Ansari, *Khair-ul-Bayan* [Pashto] (Peshawar: Pashto Academy, 1967), p. 2.

11 The Barki tribe participated in *jihad* with Sultan Mahmud Ghaznavi (970-1030). He bestowed upon them the territory of Kaniguram as a *jagir*. After two hundred years a *murid* (disciple) of Shaikh Shahab-ud-Din Suhrawardy (1155-1191) by the name of Shaikh Ibrahim Danishmand, a descendant of Abu Ayub Ansari, came to Multan from Iraq and became a follower of Shaikh Baha-ud-Din Zakariya Multani (1182-1266). He was sent to South Waziristan by his spiritual guide to spread his message in these areas. The Barki tribe provided him residence at Kaniguram. As time passed on, some other Ansari people came and got permanent settlement with the Barki tribe. Bayazid Ansari, *Khair-ul-Bayan*, Hafiz Muhammad Abdul Quddus Qasmi ed., p. 2. Also see Hamid-ul-Haq, *Roushaniya Movement: Its Contribution to Pashto Literature* (Islamabad: Unpublished MPhil Thesis National Institute of Pakistan Studies, 2002), Rajwali Shah Khattak, *Da Pukhtu Adabi Tahrikona* [Pashto], (Peshawar: Pashto Academy, University of Peshawar, 1989), p. 61.

Danishmand.¹² Among them was Shaikh Muhammad, the paternal grandfather of Bayazid who along with other fellow-tribesmen went to Jalandhar. He stayed with his cousin Abu Bakar.

Once, Shaikh Muhammad expressed his intention before Abu Bakar if he would agree to marry Abu Bakar's daughter Amina to one of his sons.¹³ Abu Bakr happily agreed on the proposal on the condition that his son-in-law would be allowed to live in Jalandhar along with his wife. It was a rare moment of joy for both the families and after marrying Amina, Abd-ur-Rahman son of Shaikh Muhammad, settled permanently in Jalandhar. Abd-ur-Rahman had two daughters from Amina. After some times, Abd-ur-Rahman passed away and according to tribal costumes his younger brother Abdullah married the widow of his deceased brother. Bayazid was the son of that new couple.¹⁴ The year of birth of Bayazid has been stated in *Kitab Dabistan-ul-Mazahib* as 1526-27 in the city of Jalandhar.¹⁵ Majority of the historians are of the view that Bayazid was born in 1525 (931 AH), a year before the first battle of Panipat between the Mughals and the Afghans. Bayazid was of only forty days when Abdullah went back to Kaniguram and left his wife and son at Jalandhar. In Kaniguram he joined his first wife Fatima and his two daughters and a son Yaqub.

It was the time when Mughal Emperor Babur had started his Indian campaign and his army attacked Bhera (present day Khushab) and let loose a reign of terror on its residents. One of Bayazid's uncles Shaikh Khudadad was also among

12 Bayazid Ansari, *Khair-ul-Bayan*, p. 3.

13 However, there are writers who are of the view that Haji Mubarak was the maternal grandfather of Bayazid. But it is mentioned in the preface of *Makhzan* that the maternal grandfather of Bayazid was Haji Abu Bakar. See Tariq Rahman, 'The First Book of Old Urdu in the Pashto Speaking Areas', *Pakistan Journal of History and Culture*, Vol. 29, (August-September, 2008). Also see "Muqadimah" to Akhun Darwaiza, *Makhzan* (Peshawar: Pashto Academy, University of Peshawar, 1987), p. 16.

14 Hamid-ul-Haq, 'Roushaniya Movement', p. 3.

15 Mobid Danishmand, *Kitab Dabistan ul Mazahib* (Mumbai: n.p., 1846), p. 254.

the victims. Owing to the state of anarchy prevailed at that time in Bhera; he went to Jalandhar and settled with Amina, mother of Bayazid. Bayazid was a child of four years when the Mughal forces sacked Jalandhar and the people of that area had to leave the city. Bayazid along with his mother and uncle Khudadad abandoned the city and went to Tirhat. Khudadad decided to take Bayazid and his mother back to Kaniguram. With this intention in mind, they started their journey for Kaniguram with a caravan.¹⁶ When they reached Qanauj they were stopped by the Mughal soldiers who demanded a huge amount as ransom. Khudadad collected 70,000 rupees from his companions and offered it to the commander of the troops and saved the caravan from further miseries. With tremendous difficulties, they eventually reached Kaniguram in 1530. In Kaniguram, Abdullah remained indifferent towards Amina and Bayazid.¹⁷ The domestic environment was very tense due to the arrival of the newcomers for some time. Abdullah was more inclined towards his first wife Fatima and eventually he divorced Amina. Thereafter, she went back to Jalandhar leaving Bayazid with his father at Kaniguram. For some time Bayazid lived with his uncle Khudadad, who loved his nephew like his own sons. Soon, some differences arose between Abdullah and Khudadad due to which the latter left Kaniguram and went to the Dawar tribal area and settled there permanently.¹⁸

In Kaniguram, the domestic life of Bayazid was unstable and miserable. Acquiring education in the prevailing atmosphere was rather impossible for him. The murder of his affectionate uncle Khudadad at Baitur in Dawar area was very shocking news for the young boy. After the sad demise of Khudadad, Abdullah took him and another son Yaqub to Mulla Painsa, one of his old disciples. Thus, he started his education and Mulla Painsa became his first teacher who

16 "Muqadimah" to Bayazid Ansari, *Khair-ul-Bayan*, p. 4.

17 Abdul Akbar Khan Akbar, *Rokhaniyan: Da Mugholo Tarikiyan* [Pashtu] (Peshawar: Idara Ishaat-i-Sarhad, n.d.), p. 18.

18 "Muqadimah" to Bayazid Ansari, *Khair-ul-Bayan*, p. 5.

taught him the Holy Quran and other basic books of Islamic *fiqh* (jurisprudence) including *Quduri*, *Lubab-ul-Akbar*, *Munyat-ul-Musalli* and *Umdat-ul-Islam*. He concentrated whole-heartedly on his studies and showed great interest in religious discussion and discourse. It is stated that his stepmother became jealous of his growing interests in books; therefore, she tried to keep him away of the studies. He was frequently kept busy in domestic affairs for the purpose to divert his mind in some other direction. This state of affairs continued till he left the *madrassa* of Mulla Painda and sought his father permission for visiting Hejaz to perform *Hajj* (pilgrimage). His father declined due to financial constraints rather he persuaded Bayazid to start his own business. He was left with no option but to obey and join a trade caravan.¹⁹ In this capacity he undertook considerable number of business-related journeys to different parts of India and Afghanistan. Once, Mughal soldiers looted his trade caravan. He complained to its commander Bairam Khan but to no avail. From his early years of childhood he developed resentment from the setting norms and traditions. He often participated in music and dancing programs along with other people. His father reprimanded him always for these activities.

In Search of Pir-i-Kamil

In one of his journeys, he met Shaikh Ismail, son of Khudadad and a famous saint of *Ismaili* sect. Bayazid took keen interest in his religious ideas and decided to take the oath of allegiance to Ismail. Olaf Caroe, however, provides a different version regarding his initial association with a mystic of *Ismaili* sect. He has given the name of Mullah Sulaiman in Jalandhar who developed his interest in *Ismaeli* doctrine.²⁰ It was not in Jalandhar because he spent few years in the city and he was not grown enough to be influenced by any priest. It is possible that he would have

19 Maulana Abdul Qadir, 'Bayazid Ansari', *Pashto*, Vol.4. (July-August-September, 1959), p. 22.

20 Caroe, *The Pathans*, p. 201.

visited Jalandhar, for the second time, in order to see his mother.

His father warned him against his intentions and impressed upon him to go to Multan and seek spiritual guidance from the *Gaddi Nashin* (spiritual successor) of Shaikh Baha-ud-Din Zakariya.²¹ However, against the advice of his father, he frequently visited the house of Ismael and developed understanding with his ideas and beliefs. It has been said that Ismael moulded his mind and infused in him the idea that the attainment of the spiritual height was impossible without a *pir-i-kamil* (the perfect spiritual guide). Therefore, his next step was to undertake a search to find out a *pir-i-kamil* to guide him towards the attainment of spiritual heights.²²

After coming back to his home, he demanded his share in the property from his father and kept himself indulge in religious activities and meditations. He constructed a new house for himself and lived independently with his bride Bibi Shamsu, his first cousin and the daughter of Shaikh Hasan. In his new house, he underwent several times in excessive meditations (*chillas*) and was known a mystic person in his locality. Through meditations, he wanted to find the right path towards *Tauhid* (belief in oneness of Allah) and passed through different experiences. He became seriously engaged in invoking mentally the divine name (*Ism-i-Azam*). It has been stated that he heard the voice from the unknown and received inspiration from God. Gradually, he passed through the eight stages which he himself conceived essential for spiritual elevation.²³ He proclaimed himself as *Miskin* and engaged himself invoking the divine name of God. He started the propagation of his mission after he thought

21 "Muqadimah" to Bayazid Ansari, *Khair-ul-Bayan*, p. 9. Also see Akbar, *Rokhaniyan*, p. 22.

22 Hamid-ul-Haq, 'Roushaniya Movement', p. 78.

23 A mystic, according to Bayazid, becomes *Pir-i-Kamil* by going through the stages of *Shariat* (Islamic code of conduct), *Tariqat* (the right path), *Haqiqat* (the reality), *Marifat* (gnosis), *Qurbat* (nearness), *Wasalat* (communion), *Wahdat* (unity) and *Sukunat* (tranquillity). See Hamid-ul-Haq, *Roushaniya Movement*, p. 87.

that he had acquired all the credentials of a complete spiritual guide. In this pronouncement he was elevated to the position of *Pir-i-Kamil* at the age of forty and soon became very popular by the name of *Mian Rukhan* (enlightened figure).²⁴ If one assumes 1525 as the year of his birth then it would be round about in 1565 that he started propagation of his doctrine at the age of forty.

Bayazid then came out openly to propagate his religious ideas in the area. He termed the gnosis of God (*Marifat*) as an obligatory duty (*fard-i-ayn*). To him Obedience (*Itt'at*), worship (*ibadat*), charities and good deeds were unacceptable to God without truth. The truth can be obtained through a perfect spiritual director (*Pir-i-Kamil*). He called himself the one who was a man of law (*shariat*), of the way (*tariqat*), of the truth (*haqiqat*), of the gnosis of God (*marifat*), of nearness (*qurbat*), of union (*waslat*), of oneness of God (*wahdat*) and of tranquillity (*sukunat*). Bayazid termed these eight stages a complete code for spiritual attainment. The first four are stations and the last four are different stages of observation or feelings which were related with the present of individual. It requires meditation and cannot be attained in just reading or reciting.²⁵

It must be mentioned here that all these spiritual stages were his self-conceived which he attained without the help of any spiritual guide or mentor. Revelations and dreams were often quoted to explain all these happenings before his disciples. He was a gifted orator and possessed strong argumentative power. He used to say that he was the person upon who has been revealed the truth of the divine secret.

24 *Ibid.*, p. 21. Generally there is a big difference ethnically among the Afghans and the Sayeds who permanently settled among them. Sayeds generally proclaimed separate identity from that of Afghan genealogies. Therefore, Bayazid was not an Afghan rather his forefathers were from *Ansars* of Madinah. He can be called an Afghan according to the Mixed Race Theory of the Afghans. *Ansars* were those people who provided shelter and help to the Prophet Muhammad (SAW) when he was ordered by Allah to migrate from Makkah. The *Ansars* at Kaniguram set up a claim to Shaikh descendants from the original Arab *Ansars*. See Caroe, *The Pathans*, p. 200.

25 Khattak, *Da Pakhtu Adabi Tahrikuna*, p. 69.

Likewise, he told the people that obeying him was incumbent on all the masses. Obeying him was obeying the Apostles of God and therefore obeying God. He would lead those who sincerely obey him through the above stages to *Tauhid*.²⁶

Gradually, his movement got momentum and the number of his followers increased. He became a well-known figure in the surrounding areas. Meanwhile, he organized combined meditation groups of male and female in his own home. Besides, music programs were arranged where he along with some other people danced together in the extreme emotional fervour.²⁷ In the latter stages Bayazid-the dancing *pir* was so elevated that people took up arms to propagate his ideas and to spread his message.

Ulama used to discuss his views in public meetings in the light of the traditional Islamic concepts. Gradually, he gathered around him some zealot followers who were extremists in their views. As a matter of fact his father, along with some local ulama, took a strong position against him. His relationship with his father went from bad to worse when he termed all his opponents along with his father as comrades of unbelievers. There were three categories of people, Bayazid told his cousin Muhammad Kamal: Those who obey him were the true *mominin* (believers), then the *munkirin* (unbelievers) and third category was those of *Munafiqin* (hypocrites). He was of the view that he is *hadi* (true guide) and all his preaching was *ilham* (revealed truth). This sort of attitude and views in a tribal society was bent to expose him to harsh opposition. As a result, some strong opponents emerged to challenge him in his locality. Finally, he was compelled to leave his hometown and went to Dawar area and then chose to stay in Tirah. On the way to Tirah, a large number of Aurakzais, Afridis and Tirahis²⁸ took the

26 H.A.R. Gibbs, J.H. Karamers, E Levi and J Schacht, ed. *The Encyclopaedia of Islam* (Leiden: EJ Brill, 1967), p. 1121.

27 "Muqadimah" to Bayazid Ansari, *Khair-ul-Bayan*, p. 6.

28 Though, the territory of Tirah is situated on the Afghan borderland but some writers have mentioned the people living there as Tirahis. This term has not been used by any orientalist rather some local writers mention this word. It has been mentioned in the preface of *Khair-ul-Bayan* by Abdul Quddus

oath of his allegiance.²⁹ Later on, his views divided the Afghans into two rival groups: one group rendered support to Bayazid while the opponents launched a vigorous campaign against him on religious grounds. The centre of gravity of his doctrine was Bayazid himself. Unlike other *sufic* traditions his *khalifas* used to take the oath of allegiance from the newcomers on Bayazid's name. The opponents used to call him *Pir-i-Tarik* (Apostle of Darkness) for his strange views unacceptable to most of the Afghans.

Bayazid's Tussle with the Mughals

The Mughal perspective with regard to Bayazid Ansari is summarized by Nizam-ud-Din Ahmad Bakhshi in *Tabaqat-i-Akbari* thus: "In former times a Hindustani soldiers had come among the Afghans, and set up a heretical sect. He induced many foolish people to become disciples, and he gave himself the title of *Pir Roshani*."³⁰ From the beginning Bayazid was indifferent towards the Mughals. He considered the Mughals as usurpers and oppressors. He himself was a witness to their oppression, suppression and atrocities committed over the Afghans after the defeat of Ibrahim Lodhi in the first battle of Panipat (1526).

Despite his antagonistic views against the Mughals, Bayazid never took part in politics and stayed away from such sort of activities in the initial stage of his popularity. His popularity was not politically-based rather religious inspiration of his devoted followers was the foremost cause of his growing influence. The local ulema along with his father did not like his views and subsequently disbanded him and was forced to leave the area. He went to Tirah and then settled among the Khalil tribe. The ever-increasing popularity of Bayazid alarmed some malaks of the tribe. They

Qasmi, Bahadar Shah Zafar Kakakhel, *Pukhtanah da Tarikh pa Ranra Kay* and Allah Bakhsh Yusufi, *Yusufzai Pathan* that once Bayazid attacked Tirah and ousted the Tirahis from their land and established his own rule there.

29 "Muqadimah" to Bayazid Ansari, *Khair-ul-Bayan*, p. 22.

30 Nizam-ud-Din Ahmad Bakhshi, *Tabaqat-i-Akbari*, English tr. H. M. Elliot (Lahore: Sind Sagar Academy, 1975), p. 119.

approached Mirza Muhammad Hakim, the governor of Kabul, through Habib Khan and filled his ears against Bayazid and the Roshnites. In the “Muqadimah” to *Khair-ul-Bayan* it is stated by Abdul Quddus that Habib Khan even distributed 12000 rupees among the courtiers of Mirza Hakim to persuade him to kill Bayazid. But they failed to convince him for this act. The governor just issued order to summon Bayazid to Kabul for necessary explanation.³¹

After his popularity, the first and direct link between Bayazid and Mughals was that of his meeting with Mirza Muhammad Hakim in his court at Kabul. Mirza Hakim summoned Bayazid to his court. Though the exact date of his visit to Kabul is unclear, other details of the visit are available in many books written on Bayazid and his movement. At Kabul he faced an inquisition about his understanding of Islam and religious approach, which was conducted in the presence of Mirza Hakim and Qazi Khan, the Chief *Qazi* of Kabul. Qazi Khan asked different types of questions from Bayazid about various *sufi* orders and, of course, of his own. He gave satisfactory answers and removed their doubts regarding his beliefs and activities. As Bayazid was an excellent orator, therefore he convinced Mirza Hakim about the rationale behind his movement. He prevailed over the governor that he had no intention to create troubles for the authorities. Afterwards, Mirza Hakim allowed him to go back with honour. He was so impressed by Bayazid’s religious knowledge that he wished to join his movement but he could not do so because of his political compulsions. Bayazid, after his first engagement with the Mughals, returned to Peshawar and started once again his usual activities among the populace.³²

Bayazid used all means and tactics to achieve his goals. After his first meeting with Mirza Muhammad Hakim and

31 Qazi Abdul Halim Asar Afghan, ‘Bayazid Ansari: Pir Rukhan ya Pir Tarik, *Pashto* (April 1983), p. 8. Also see Akhund Darwaiza, *Makhzan-ul-Islam* (Peshawar: Pashto Academy, 1966), p. 18 and “Muqadimah” to Bayazid Ansari, *Khair-ul-Bayan*, p. 23.

32 Hamid-ul-Haq, ‘Roushaniya Movement’, p. 8

Qazi Khan in Kabul, he came to Peshawar but the environment of Peshawar did not suit to his activities as the Mughal Governor of Peshawar, Masum Khan, was against his movement and he kept a vigilant eye over him. As a result, Bayazid left for Hashtnagar (nowadays in district Charsadda, Khyber Pakhtunkhwa) and won over the support of Muhammadzais. He also established matrimonial relations with Bahar Khan and Painsa Khan, leaders of the tribe. Bayazid considered this area very safe and protected for the propagation of his ideas. Keeping its strategic importance in mind, he established an operational base there and sent his messengers to some prominent personalities of India and Afghanistan. These included Mirza Sulaiman of Khurasan and Emperor Akbar of Delhi. One such letter of invitation was sent to Pir Baba who was settled among the Yusufzais at Buner.³³

Probably one reason for the establishment of his centre in the heart of the Yusufzai area was that he wanted to exploit the long traditional enmity between the Mughals and the Yusufzai tribe.³⁴ Moreover, he found the residents of these area enthusiastic supporters of his movement. The area was also free from the influence of the Mughal ruler. The control of the area was in the hands of the local malaks of the Yusufzai who did not tolerate any outside interference.

Bayazid's Messenger in the Court of Akbar

Encouraged by his prominence and support among the local population, Bayazid expanded the circle of his followers with a fresh zeal. Working for few years in Dawar area, Tirah, Bangash territory and Peshawar valley, he, at last, settled in Kaladhir, (Hashtnagar) near Charsadda. Following the *Sunnah* of the Holy Prophet (SAW), he decided to send some of his *khalifas* (vice-regents) to different directions. In other words, his popularity intoxicated him for he wanted to make his mark in the courts of some prominent political figures. In this way, Bayazid became more engaged in his

33 Masud, *Pir Rukhan au Rukhani Inqilab*, p. 159.

34 Kakakhel, *Pukhtanah da Tarikh Pa Ranra Kay*, p. 538.

mission. He sent Khalifa Maudud to Qandahar who preached his ideas to Kasi and Tarin tribes. He also went to Sindh and Baluchistan. Then he settled in Saidpur in Sindh. Mullah Arzani visited India, while Khalifa Yusuf was sent with a copy of *Fakhr-ut-Talibin* to Mirza Sulaiman, the ruler of Badakhshan. Khalifa Dawlat was sent to Delhi with a copy of Bayazid's book *Sirat-ut-Tauhid* to deliver his message to Akbar.³⁵ Dawlat was a devoted and trusted disciple of Bayazid. He presented Bayazid's book *Sirat-ut-Tauhid* and delivered his message in the court of Akbar. Although no more details are available, it can be said that keeping in view the interest of Emperor Akbar in such sort of discussions, he was received warmly in his court. In the Afghan nationalist literature it has often been claimed that Akbar took deep interest in the views of Bayazid. Even he proclaimed Bayazid as his *pir* and accepted his spiritual pre-eminence. He presented precious gifts to Dawlat for Bayazid.³⁶

It is quite clear that if Bayazid was an Afghan nationalist, fighting against the Mughals for that sacred cause, Akbar would never ever submitted to either his political or spiritual authority. It was for some implicit reasons that he accepted him as his spiritual *pir* and encouraged his activities in the Afghan borderland. Akbar's tacit support and initial benevolent response towards Bayazid indicate the relationship of Roshniya Movement with the Mughals. It is quite clear that it was encouraged to make its way among the masses for the purpose to divide the Afghans' strength.

In the preface of *Makhzan*, Sayed Taqwim-ul-Haq stated that Emperor Akbar himself was interested to let Bayazid gain more influence in the area for two reasons. First, he wanted to create trouble in the area for Mirza Hakim and to drain his resources. Secondly, Akbar was much apprehensive about the growing opposition of the Yusufzai. and he found a suitable counterbalance in the shape of Bayazid Ansari.³⁷ Along this line some other disciples were

35 *Ibid.*, p. 9.

36 Masud, *Pir Rukhan aw Rukhani Inqilab*, p. 110.

37 Darwaiza, *Makhzan*, p. 19.

sent to different parts of the country to guide the people towards *Tauhid*. Most of these devotees returned successful because majority of the rulers and people responded positively. They treated these devotees with honour and in most of the cases as a token of goodwill gesture some sent gifts to Bayazid.³⁸ From these statements it is also important that sending messengers to different rulers is an ample proof that he was not a nationalist as has been projected by some writers. Rather he dreamt the expansion of his sphere of influence beyond the Afghan borderland. The discourse of the Roshniya Movement as an Afghan nationalist endeavour was out of place as there is no evidence to support the assertion. There is not a single word in the Roshniya literature to support this argument. The Roshnites ascendancy in the Yusufzai area and Tirah for some time was not a nationalist venture at all. Neither, at any time, Bayazid or any of his successor emerged as an undisputed leader of the Afghans nor was it a struggle for their unification. The mobilization of support from a number of tribes should not be taken as the basis of his being a nationalist.

Encounter with the Mughals

As it is mentioned earlier that Bayazid was a *pir* of some devoted and extremist followers. Among them were the people of Tui tribe. They took the oath of allegiance to Bayazid under their chief, Abdul Karim. They showed deep emotional attachment towards him and indulged themselves in self-mortification, started spiritual activities and completely gave up any interest in worldly affairs. Once, a trade caravan passed through their territory on its way to Kabul from India. Some zealous devotees of the tribe deemed it right to punish the caravan for their engagement in mundane activities. They attacked them and snatched their belongings from them and dumped them in a certain place. After reaching Kabul the affected people complained to Mirza Hakim against Bayazid and his emotional followers and blamed

38 Hamid-ul-Haq, *Roushaniya Movement*, p. 9.

them for this act. In order to punish the tribe, Mirza Hakim sent 500 cavalrymen. The Mughal army attacked the tribe and after killing many tribesmen, took their children and women as prisoners of war. Bayazid was informed about the whole incident; he criticized the Tui tribe and wrote a letter of regret to Mirza Hakim. Moreover, he impressed upon the governor that the women and children were innocent and they should be released.³⁹

Mirza Hakim ordered Masum Khan, the Mughal governor of Peshawar, to arrest Bayazid immediately and present him before the governor in Kabul. Bayazid was informed in advance by his two disciples namely Bahar Khan and Painsa Khan of the Muhammadzai tribe, about the intentions of Masum Khan. Knowing this, he left Hashtnagar and proceeded towards Mardan. It was on the bank of Kalpani that the first encounter between Bayazid and the Mughal soldiers took place. Bayazid with his band of 313 followers fought with bravery and defeated the Mughal army at a place called Kalpani. The place is probably Shahbazgarhi near District Mardan (Khyber Pakhtunkhwa) about ten km away from Kalpani. The losses of the Mughal side were enormous. This battle was called the Battle of Aghazpur by Bayazid. The battle of Aghazpur was a turning point as far as Bayazid was concerned. This victory over the Mughal force, with only 313 companions led him to think about his own authority over some parts of the Afghan borderland.⁴⁰ It is evident here from the fact that he only wanted to take revenge from the Mughal soldiers for the atrocities which he suffered in certain times. That is why he named the battle as Aghazpur.

39 Yar Muhammad Khan Maghmoom, *The Rowshanites and the Pashto Literature* (Peshawar: Unpublished PhD Thesis, Area Study Centre, 1994), p. 117. There are different versions about this incident. Akhun Darwaiza narrated that Bayazid started looting trade caravans with the help of the Tui tribesmen. Mulla Arzani deserted Bayazid because of this act of commission and omission. As a matter of fact, Arzani deemed these activities against the teaching of the latter and left his movement. He then settled in a certain place in India. "Muqadimah" of Abdul Quddus Qasmi, Bayazid Ansari, *Khair-ul-Bayan*, p. 26.

40 *Ibid.*

With the battle of Aghazpur began the incessant war between the Mughals and Roshnites. Emboldened by his first victory, Bayazid went to Tirah and drove away the local people with the help of Afridis and established his independent rule.⁴¹ He started collecting tributes and revenues from the local population and levied taxes on the trade caravans passing through Khyber from Central Asia and Afghanistan. He also started military preparation for another show of strength with the Mughals. Within a short span of time, Bayazid organized different Afghan tribes in Tirah. Afridis, Bangash, Mohmands, Khalils and bands of some other Afghans were organized on one platform to fight the Mughals. In this way Roshniya Movement drifted away from a religious and social reformative endeavour to purely a political struggle. An objective analysis of the whole politicization of the movement would reveal its ultimate failure. The reason was the inadequacy of the resources, absence of a smart strategy and a viable communication system on the part of the Roshnites. Though the area was hilly terrain but on the face of the huge Mughal might, it was rather very difficult for the Roshnites to gain any meaningful success. The more Bayazid politicised the movement the more it went near to its downfall.

On the other hand, the Mughals were in no mood to tolerate these sorts of situations in the frontier, which might challenge their authority within the Empire. The peripheries of the movement lay within the area of the ruler of Kabul therefore Bayazid's first engagement was with the Mughal ruler of Kabul. Emperor Akbar himself was well-aware of the importance of the Afghan borderland militarily and strategically. Therefore, after the initial failure of the ruler of Kabul he realized the possible gruesome outcome. After thorough deliberations with his lieutenants, Akbar decided to utilize all means to flush out the Roshnites from the political stage of the region.⁴² It was decided to start a military

41 Kakakhel, Pukhtanah da *Tarikh Pa Ranra Kay*, p. 538.

42 Maghmoom, *The Rowshanites and the Pushtu Literature*, p. 117.

offensive against the disruptive elements who had challenged the imperial authority. Particularly, Akbar felt its urgency when he was informed of Bayazid's bid to run a state within the state after he established his own authority. He was not in favour of providing any other opportunity to Bayazid for gaining more strength. For him the safety of the route, which led from Peshawar to Kabul, was very important.

When the Roshniya Movement was in full swing in the Afghan borderland, Mirza Sulaiman, the ruler of Badakhshan, decided to visit Delhi and to attend the court on the invitation of Akbar. On passing through Khyber, his convoy was attacked by some disgruntled elements and their belongings and precious gifts were snatched away from them. It was a big development as far as Bayazid was concerned. In the subsequent months this was the main reason that prompted Akbar to take decisive action against Bayazid. It has been stated that Bayazid criticized this action of robbery because it was against the Afghan code of conduct, i.e. *Pukhtunwali*. Although the real perpetrators of this incident were not known but the Afridis of Khyber were held responsible along with the supporters of Bayazid. Therefore, Mohsin Khan, the Mughal governor of Peshawar, was ordered to chastise the Roshnites with a huge force under his command and also to teach a lesson to the Afridis and to take revenge of the dishonour of Mirza Sulaiman. He also got orders to crush Bayazid and his followers.

In the meantime, Bayazid left Tirah and once again went to the area of the Yusufzai. It was a grave blunder because the hilly terrain of Tirah might provide him good escape routes in case of any Mughal assault. While in the new area such sorts of manoeuvrings were very difficult because it was plain and cannot provide any help in guerrilla warfare. In this way, he made his force extremely vulnerable to the Mughal as it was easy for them to go behind any foe. Thus, Bayazid failed to understand the outcome of his coming back to the plain area of Yusufzai, which ultimately proved very disastrous both for him and his movement. Akbar realized it

and he deemed it suitable time to make a final assault on the Roshnites.⁴³

The attack on the convoy of Mirza Sulaiman of Khurasan was an event that needs further analysis and clarification. As a matter of fact, Bayazid did not harbour any antagonistic designs against him. On the other hand, Mirza Sulaiman warmly received his *Khalifa* in his court and sent gifts to Bayazid which showed the kind of relationship among both of them. Thus Bayazid did not have any serious issue with him. After the attack he at once resented it and supported the idea that the culprit should be brought to justice. However, it was used as an excuse without any investigation and the Mughal forces unleashed a series of successive attacks on his followers.

Death of Bayazid Ansari

After his release from the court of Mirza Hakim, Bayazid went to Tirah and once again made fresh overtures to establish his own authority in that area. His resources were inadequate for such enterprises. He had to fight not only against the might of an organized army but also had to face the opposition of Akhun Darwaiza and his followers on religious ground. These seeming disadvantages did not damp his enthusiasm. He embarked on the task of gaining more leverages with his usual courage and optimism. Mohsin Khan's patience was also tired out and he resolved for a prompt action. He started his march to get rid of Bayazid and dispersing his followers. He pursued him and a battle took place at Chora in Tirah. Bayazid got an upper hand and defeated the forces of the Mughals with 220 casualties.⁴⁴ Mohsin Khan fled from the battlefield and escaped to Kabul. After this impressive victory over the Mughals, Bayazid realized that he could defeat the Mughals and expand his rule over some other territories. Therefore, he kept himself busy in making preparation for the conquest

43 Kakakhel, *Pukhtanah da Tarikh Pa Ranra Kay*, p. 538.

44 *Ibid.*

of Nangarhar. He established his new centre in Baro which, afterwards, proved very fatal for the movement.⁴⁵

With the intention of capturing the province of Kabul, he crossed over the hilly tract of the borderland accompanied by his followers. But it proved a grave strategic mistake on the part of Bayazid because his resources were too meagre to match the Mughal power. Initially, he waged a successful attack on Nangarhar but was repulsed. Mohsin Khan waged the last war against Bayazid at Tora Ragha in Shinwari territory. The Roshnites suffered defeat and Bayazid escaped from the battlefield through the efforts of his followers.⁴⁶ On the way back he was affected by the hot wind and thirst. He then made his way towards Hashtnagar, and as he had been affected by hot wind and intense heat, he died in Kalpani (Mardan) in 980 A.H. (1572 A.D).⁴⁷ The writers are not agreeing on the exact date of Bayazid's death. The year of his death according to *Makhzan* was 1573-74 but *Tawarikh Hafiz Rahmat Khani* has given 1578 as the year when he died.⁴⁸

On the authority of Akhun Darwaiza, Maghmoom states that the dead body of Bayazid fell into the hands of Dalazaks who were his staunch opponents on religious ground. They burnt his dead body and threw his head along with the remaining ashes into the river.⁴⁹ Another account suggested that the coffin of Bayazid was thrown into the river but some of his followers found it and escaped it to Idak and buried there.⁵⁰

It is a matter of further investigation and research that why such treatment was meted out to his dead body. It is rather very strange in the Afghan society to desecrate a

45 Sher Afzal Khan Barikoti, *Bayazid: Pir Rokhan* (Karachi: n.p., n.d.), p. 166.

46 "Muqadimah" to Bayazid, *Khair-ul-Bayan*, p. 30.

47 Maghmoom, *The Rowshanites and the Pushtu Literature*, p. 119.

48 Darwaiza, *Makhzan*, p. 29, also see Pir Muazzam Shah, *Tawarikh Hafiz Rahmat Khani: Afghan Qabail aur unki Tarikh* (Peshawar: Pashto Academy, 1977), p. 878.

49 Maghmoom, *The Rowshanites and the Pushtu Literature*, p. 119.

50 *Ibid.*

dead body. The act of burning his body shows extreme anger and revenge among his enemies. It was either an exaggerated account or some factors were behind this incident which might reveal the true story.

Akhun Darwaiza and Roshniya Movement

Due to the extremist views of Bayazid Ansari, the major portion of the Afghan population resisted his brand of Islam. The implementation of the kind of religious ideas propagated by him through the barrel of a gun was something hard to swallow for the common Afghans. Perhaps his initial popularity was because of his recourse to anti-Mughal sentiments of the people. He adroitly exploited the feelings of the population and after getting considerable strength; he imposed a fanatical type of *Shariat* with coming hard on those who declined to obey him.

This kind of dealing in the traditional Afghan society was bound to breed the opposition. The person who criticized and opposed Bayazid and his movement was Akhun Darwaiza, a well-known traditional theologian and a *sufi alim* of the Yusufzai area. He started a rigorous campaign against Bayazid and his followers. In this connection, he wrote several books such as *Tazkirat-ul-Abrar-i-Wal-Ashrar* (Persian), *Makhzan-ul-Islam* (Pashto) and *Irshad-ul-Talibin*. All these books have been revised and edited by his elder son Abdul Karim.⁵¹

Akhun Darwaiza was born in 940 AH (1533 AD). His father Shaikh Gadai was a Tajik by origin. From his mother side he was descendent of the ruler of the Balkh. Jeewan-bin-Jannati was a well-known figure among the forefathers of Akhun Darwaiza. His grandfather used to live with Muhammadzai in Kabul but after some time differences arose between Muhammadzai and Shaikh Sadi. Therefore, he first migrated to Nangarhar along with the Yusufzai tribe (1474-75) and later on, when the Yusufzais settled in Swat, Shaikh Sadi also settled amongst them. The members of the

51 "Muqadimah" to Darwaiza, *Makhzan*, p. 30. Also see Hamid ul-Haq, 'Roushaniya Movement', p. 39.

Yusufzai tribe treated him with utmost respect and gave him the tribal title of malak. It has been stated that he settled among the Ismail Khel in the Chagharzai area of Buner in the present Khyber Pakhtunkhwa. Taqwim-ul-Haq Kakakhel has mentioned that Akhun Darwaiza died in the year 1048 A.H. (1638 AD).⁵²

Akhun Darwaiza was initially an orthodox *alim* who belonged to the Transoxiana school of thought. From early childhood he was exceptionally brilliant. He read Quran and *fiqh* (Islamic jurisprudence) from Maulana Sayed Misar Ahmad and Maulana Sanjar Pabini. Then he visited India, Central Asia and other great seats of Islamic learning. Sayed Ali Tarmizi, popularly known as Pir Baba,⁵³ was the spiritual teacher of Akhun Darwaiza. Pir Baba trained him in different spiritual orders. He also undertook extensive meditations under his guidance. He read from him *Jam-i-Jahan Numa*, *Lamghat* and *Sawanih wa Diwan Khwaja Qasim Anwar*. The most difficult stage of his studies under Pir Baba, according to him, was the discourse of *Wahdat-ul-Wajud* (unity of being) which later became a contentious issue between him and Bayazid. It was in 1570 that Bayazid sent one of his messengers to Pir Baba who became perturbed over his confusing ideas regarding some Islamic concepts. These new religious ideas triggered a heated debate among other religious scholars too. There appeared a strong section among the Afghans who opposed Bayazid on the ground of these ideas. Those *mullas* who criticized Bayazid were led by Pir Baba and after his death by his disciple Akhun Darwaiza.⁵⁴ These two figures were very popular for their

52 *Ibid.*

53 The forefathers of Sayed Ali Tarmizi, popularly known as Pir Baba, belonged to Tarmiz, a town on the bank of the river Amu. His grandfather Sayed Ahmad Nawaz was a pious person of his time who left Tarmiz and migrated to Kunduz. Pir Baba along with his father, Qambar Ali, accompanied Babur in his last attack on India. Qambar Ali was a trusted amir of Babur and was given the title of Amir Nazar Bahadar. Pir Baba took spiritual guidance from Shaikh Salar Rumi in four *silsilas* (Sufic Orders), i.e. Cheshtia, Suharwardia, Shattaria and Najjia hallajia. See "Muqadimah" to Darwaiza, *Makhzan*, p. 21.

54 *Ibid.*, p. 33.

piety and piousness. They were the torch-bearers of the established Islamic teachings. It was due to his ideas that Bayazid was for the first time called as *Pir Tarik* by Mulla Haji Zangi who was said to be a teacher of Akhun Darwaiza. With the passage of time all their followers and other political opponents called Bayazid, *Pir-i-Tarik*.⁵⁵

Roshniya Movement was a religious and social movement and it had no political dimension in the start. Bayazid, from the very beginning, criticized some influential *ulama* and their religious beliefs. Even he dubbed his opponents infidels and liable to death. Naturally these things made a large number of the *ulama* and their followers critical of Bayazid and his movement.

It is mentioned by some writers that when Akhun Darwaiza failed to defeat him through discussion, he invited Mohsin Khan, *naib* governor of Kabul, to take a strong action against Bayazid. Akhun Darwaiza wanted to punish Bayazid for his “un-Islamic” preaching. But there is no evidence to prove the authenticity of this allegation. Rather Akhun Darwaiza himself remained the target of the Mughal atrocities in a number of times. At the time of the Mughal’s invasion of the Yusufzai area he migrated to Peshawar along with other people. Had he been in contact with them then definitely he would have rewarded and safely evacuated. These allegations are polemic which contains no historical truth. Besides, there is no evidence to support that Akhun Darwaiza was in constant contact with the Mughals. These are mentioned in a number of studies which seem as passing references. There is no evidence to authenticate the claim that he invited the Mughals to crush the Roshnites. It was rather Bayazid’s activities which attracted the wrath of the authority against him at Kabul.

Consequently, an army was sent under the command of Mohsin Khan to arrest Bayazid. He was arrested but released later on. It was stated that he was released because he convinced Mirza Hakim about his views in a

55 Hamid ul-Haq, Roushaniya Movement, p. 40.

munazira (Religious discussion) which was held in the presence of other *ulama* of Kabul.⁵⁶

Bayazid had seven sons and one daughter.⁵⁷ His followers unanimously elected Shaikh Umar, his eldest son, as his successor. Within a short span of time, he gathered large number of followers around him. Meanwhile, he established his writ in the Yusufzai area by forcefully levying taxes on them. Allah Bakhsh Yusufi mentions that he also started collecting *ushar* (one-tenth deduction from agricultural products) from the Yusufzais with the help of Mulla Miru Mandanr.⁵⁸ This state of affairs continued up-to 1581 without any interruption. Neither authorities in Kabul nor Akbar took cognizance of Shaikh Umar's activities.⁵⁹

However, Hamza Khan, the leader of Akozai, sub-clan of the Yusufzai, was Shaikh Umar's opponent in the area. The incident of desecrating the tomb of Bayazid was a bone of contention between the two sides. It has also been stated that Shaikh Umar stormed the territory of those Gujjars who were said to be the allies of Hamza Khan. There occurred some minor skirmishes first in Sarkavai then a battle was fought in Menai (Swabi). But the last battle between the two sides was fought on the bank of the river Indus in a village called Bara north of Topi in district Swabi. In this battle the Roshnites suffered a severe defeat which proved disastrous for the family of Bayazid as well as Roshniya Movement. Majority of the Yusufzai malaks and masses fought on the side of Hamza Khan. Shaikh Umar and Khair-ud-Din were killed by Dalazak. Nur-ud-Din was caught by some

56 Kakakhel, *Pukhtanah da Tarikh Pa Ranra Kay*, p. 539.

57 Bayazid's sons were: Shaikh Umar, Nur-ud-Din, Dawlat, Allah Dad, Kamal-ud-Din, Khair-ud-Din and Jalal-ud-Din. Kamal Khatun was his only daughter who was married to Ali Muhammad son of Painsa Khan Muhammadzai.

58 Mulla Miru Mandanr was a trusted disciple of Bayazid in the Yusufzai area. He was the son of Sulaiman who belonged to Amanzai, sub-branch of Mandanr Yusufzai. Bayazid gave him the title of Pir Hasan. See Yusufi, *Yusufzai Pathan*, p. 182.

59 "Muqadiamh" to Darwaiza, *Makhzan*, p. 33. Also see Allah Bakhsh Yusufi, *Yusufzai Pathan*, p. 179.

miscreants and was put to death in the territory of Muhammadzai tribe.⁶⁰

Jalal-ud-Din, another son of Bayazid, during the course of the battle, was plunged into the river and about to be drowned but saved by some will-wishers of his father and took him away to Mohmand area. It was in 1581 that Emperor Akbar was busy in his operations against Mirza Hakim, the governor of Kabul. After subduing Mirza Hakim, he left Kabul and crossed the River Indus through a bridge of boats, prepared by Qasim Khan, his chief engineer. During a short stay at Attock, he accorded royal pardon to Jalal-ud-Din or Jalalah, son of Bayazid, who was presented by some elders of Muhammadzai, Khalil and Khattak tribes. As Jalalah was 14 years of age at the time, therefore he captivated Akbar's eyes. Akbar ordered that the child must be set at liberty and took him away to Delhi. It was a sort of *jirga* of the Roshnites and other Afghan tribes in which Kamal-ud-Din and Wali Dad also participated to get the help of the Mughal Emperor. In fact, Jalalah was taken into captivity by Akbar. In the evolution of the movement it is worth observing that it went dormant despite the presence of Kamal-ud-Din and his other relatives in the Afghan borderland. During the captivity of Jalalah, they remained peaceful and did not embark on any serious adventure against the Mughals.

Akbar kept Jalalah under custody in the court. One night Jalalah, with the help of his disciples, managed his escape. The version of "Muqadimah" to *Makhzan* in this regard is that he spent one year in the court. Once, Shaikh Khalil, disciple of his father, brought him secretly when he found him unconscious.⁶¹ Consequently, he was taken away straight to Tirah where he organized the movement with some band of his loyal followers and enlisted large-scale support. In *Tabaqat-i-Akbari*, Nizam-ud-Din Ahmad Bakhshi has stated that he (Jalalah) was kindly received, but after a few days his

60 *Ibid.*

61 *Ibid.*, p. 35.

evil imposition induced him to take flight, and go off the Afghans. There he created disturbances and gathering a good number of men around him.⁶²

Jalalah kept alive the Roshniya Movement. He was formally elevated as the successor of his brother in a ceremony in Tirah. He provided a fresh boost to the movement, organized his followers and started an anti-Mughal campaign. Akbar sent his trusted and able commander Raja Man Singh to chastise the Roshnites, subdue the whole Afghan populace and then move to Kabul. Jalalah attacked Peshawar in 1585, and killed Sayed Hamid, the Mughal governor of the city.⁶³ It is indeed a matter of further research that under what circumstances Akbar took away Jalalah along with him to Delhi. He was a minor child of 14 years of age at that time. His presence in the Afghan borderland was not a threat of high proportion for Akbar. Perhaps his interest in the lad was politically motivated. It was possible that in his future designs especially in the frontier region, the factor of Jalalah could be of challenging importance for Akbar. In that sense Akbar probably kept him to exploit his services in proper timing to create division in the Afghan military strength in the area.

Yusufzais' Uprising against Akbar

The political dynamics of the Afghan resistance against Akbar was running in two divergent streams i.e. the Mughal-Yusufzai rivalry and the Roshnites' opposition to the Mughal imperialism. It was very critical moment for Akbar. Significantly, there was no coordination among various anti-Mughal Afghan forces with regard to facing the imperialist. Very often they were used against each other by the Mughal

62 Nizam-ud-Din Ahmad Bakhshi, *Tabaqat-i-Akbari*, p. 19.

63 According to *Akbar Nama*, Sayed Hamid was present in the fort of Bagram (Peshawar) and left the work of administration to one of his officers Musa. Musa was cruel and avaricious person. He attacked and looted the surrounding tribes of Ghuria Khel and Mohmand. These tribes joined hands with Jalalah and gave a pitch battle to the Mughals in which Sayed Hamid lost his life. The Roshnites at the end captured the fort of Peshawar. Abul Fazal, *Akbar Nama*, vol. I, English tr. By H. Beveridge (Kolkata: Asiatic Society, 2010), p. 220.

emperors and local governors. During the reign of Akbar, situation in the frontier deteriorated day by day. To secure the line of communication he personally went out from Delhi and reached Attock in January 1586. He sent the following expeditionary forces into different direction:

1. Kanwar Man Singh was entrusted with the task to clear the disturbance created by Jalalah in Khyber. Afterwards, he was instructed to stay in Kabul.
2. A force was sent to Kashmir under the command of Bhagwan Das and Shah Quli Mahram.
3. Ismael Quli Khan and Rai Singh were given the task to subdue the Baloch insurgency.
4. Zain Khan Koka was ordered to march towards Swat and Buner to submit the Yusufzai tribe.⁶⁴

The situation in the frontier was turned from bad to worse. As usual the Afghans resisted the Mughal intrusion but the nature of their tactics did not change altogether. They lacked a coherent strategy to be adopted through the inclusion of all the tribal force. Their resistance was not articulated and united. Critical analysis of the events revealed the lack of coordination among the various Afghan tribal leaders. In fact, they formed separate fronts at various passes to confront the army of Akbar. Moreover, absence of well-articulated policy, deficiency of strong and capable leadership to form a tribal confederacy and to channelize their energies were some of the major factors that kept them away from achieving meaningful success against the Mughals.

Encouraged by their initial success in Peshawar, the Khalils and Mohmands entered Khyber and blocked the pass. Meantime, the Afridis and the followers of Jalalah were stationed in Ali Masjid (Landi Kotal) to confront the Mughals. In fact, in Swat the tribe of Yusufzai proved disastrous for the

64 "Muqadimah" to Darwaiza, *Makhzan*, p. 40.

Mughals and inflicted a crushing defeat on them. Almost the whole Afghan tribes rose in rebellion against them.

A number of inquiries have mentioned that it was after the Roshnites that Akbar sent a force to march on the defiles in Swat. But the facts did not support the contention that Bayazid enjoyed any influence among the Yusufzais in Swat. Although, he did have some followers among the Yusufzais in *samah* but he never succeeded in gaining any headway in the Valley of Swat.⁶⁵ Keeping in view the dynamics of rivalry between the Yusufzais and the Mughals it can safely be argued that it operated in secular paradigm and religion was not an element of tribal mobilization. Moreover, they were under the strong influence of Pir Baba and Akhun Darwaiza both of them were regarded as spiritual *pirs* of the tribe. They preferred to be free from any sort of coercion imposed upon them by any political or religious dispensations.

In fact, the Roshnites made it difficult for Man Singh to enter into Tirah at the time of the massacre of Mughal army in the defiles of Karakar in the Buner-Swat border area. This defeat of the Mughals in Swat at the hands of Yusufzais under the leadership of Malak Kalu Khan was one of the greatest defeats Akbar had ever received in his entire regime. His expedition was prompted by his strong desire to subdue the Yusufzai, to maintain his line of communication safe from tribal attacks and to block any possible reinforcement of the Yusufzais towards the Kashmir. For that matter he entrusted the responsibility of maintaining peace around the Grand-Trunk Road to Akor Khan, grand-grandfather of Khushal Khan. It was a strategic move to counter the *samah* Yusufzai attacks on the imperial caravans.

For that matter Akbar embarked upon his policy to send a strong force under Zain Khan Koka. Owing to stiff resistance by the Yusufzai fighters he asked for reinforcement and hence fresh contingents were sent under capable commanders like Hakim Abul Fatah Raja Birbal. At

65 Sultan-i-Rome, 'Mughuls and Swat', p. 41.

Chakdara, the three commanders held a meeting and it was decided to march on to Buner through Karakar pass, a decision which was a strategic blunder and proved disastrous for them. Birbal was given the command of vanguard while the two others followed him through.⁶⁶ About these developments Zain Khan reported:

While he [Zain Khan] had been able to force an entry into Bajaur, he was powerless to proceed to the heart of the trouble in Swat until reinforcements reached him. These reinforcements must also harry and devastate the Mandanr settlements in the *Samah* to prevent them aiding their brethren in the hills. Akbar agreed, and dispatched two forces, one under his Brahmin favorite, Raja Birbal (Birbar, or the very courageous), and the other under another of his cronies, Hakim Abul Fath.⁶⁷

After the Mughal army reached Malandaray, they sensed the approaching threat. Some of them spotted the Yusufzai fighters taking position on the top of the hills. In the narrow gorges of Krhapa, the Yusufzai attacked and inflicted great losses to the Mughal forces. The attack was so sudden and unexpected that it caused panic in the ranks of the Mughal *sawars*. They met enormous disaster with eight thousands of soldiers died on the spot. Raja Birbal along with Khwaja Arab Bakhshi, Mulla Shirin and a Baitani commander Hasan Khan were among the dead. Zain Khan and Hakim Abul Fatah escaped to the fort of Attock with difficulties. Akbar refused to meet the two escaping commanders for two days due to his anger on the death of Birbal.⁶⁸

This was followed by another Mughal expedition under Prince Murad and Zain Khan. In the *samah* areas they gained initial success. Between 1587 and 1592 the Mughals tried to enter into Swat but without gaining any meaningful victory. The Mughal army during the reign of Akbar never succeeded in subduing the Yusufzais in Swat. In this connection Sultan-i-Rome, on the authority of Ahmad Hasan Dani has stated:

66 Kakakhel, *Pukhtanah da Tarikh Pa Ranra Kay*, p. 553.

67 Sultan-i-Rome, 'Mughuls and Swat', p. 42.

68 Kakakhel, *Pukhtanah da Tarikh Pa Ranra Kay*, p. 554.

A battle of game started between the Yusufzais and the Mughals in which hill forts played a dominant role...The Mughals learnt the tactics of hill fighting from the Yusufzais and as long as they held the forts they managed to keep the passage open. However, except for this passage over Malakand to Chakdara and beyond to Bajaur, the Mughals, never attempted to enter the main home of the Yusufzais in Swat and Buner.⁶⁹

It should be mentioned that during Mughal rule in India the areas of Swat, Buner and Bajaur never surrendered to the imperial sway. They maintained their independence and successfully resisted every Mughal attempt of penetration. In this regard even Abul Fadl, Akbar's favourite and court historian, acknowledges the insubordination of the Yusufzais of Swat.⁷⁰

In chasing the Roshnites, Man Singh left for Tirah on the route of Narawan to subdue the Afridis and Roshnites. When they reached to the defiles of Tirah, Jalalah appeared with his companions and surrounded the Mughals from every side. After a fierce fighting, the Mughal army was defeated and Man Singh fled from the battlefield and escaped to Peshawar.

Successors of Bayazid Ansari

Jalalah fought many a battles against the Mughals, but due to his meagre resources he suffered many setbacks and gradually majority of his followers perished or imprisoned. In an assault in 1592 some 14000 Roshnites had been killed while fighting against the Mughals. After some time Jalalah went to Turan and requested Abdullah Uzbek for his help. He failed in getting the support of the Uzbeks and came back to Tirah and with the help of some Lohani tribesmen from Bannu, made a fresh offensive upon Ghazni in 1599. He driven away the governor Sharif Khan and captured a large booty. When they were busy in settling affairs in Ghazni, Jalalah and his followers came under a sudden

69 Sultan-i-Rome, 'Mughuls and Swat', p. 42.

70 *Ibid.*, p. 43.

attack of the Hazaras. In the midst of the fighting, Jalalah received a fatal wound and died.

The movement did not end with the death of Jalalah and was kept alive by Shaikh Ahdad, his nephew and son-in-law. Shaikh Ahdad was the son of Shaikh Umar. He provided good leadership to the Roshnites. He gave them a new courage and impetus, assembled the dispersed followers and continued their struggle against the Mughals. With the accession of Ahdad, differences emerged between him and Alahdad Khan, son of Jalalah. The latter probably wanted to be the successor of his father. However, majority of the followers supported Shaikh Ahdad. In 1601, he prepared a well-disciplined army consisted of men belonging to various Afghan tribes. But around this time some of his relatives including Alahdad Khan, Hadi Khan and Mirza Khan Ansari deserted him and surrendered to the Mughal authority. It was a severe blow to Roshniya Movement from which it never recovered.⁷¹ In 1615, Alahdad Khan entered the imperial service and he was given a jewelled dagger. The desertion of Ahdad and his joining of the Mughal service largely contributed in the downfall of the movement. In those days Alahdad continued his struggle against the Mughals. Several times, he attacked Kabul and put his hands on the spoils of war. Emperor Jahangir, not satisfied with the strategies of Shah Beg, governor of Kabul, transferred Mahabat Khan who used diplomacy in subduing the Roshnites. He invited about 300 Malaks of Dawlat Khel, sub-branch of the Aurakzai tribe of Kohat, for a feast and put them to death. Ahdad took revenge from the Mughals in Mastura valley (Tirah). He inflicted a crushing defeat on the Mughals and killed Syed Khan and Jalal Khan, the Mughal commanders.

In the subsequent developments in 1617, Alahdad was appointed to serve under Mahabat Khan in his own areas. He was sent with a contingent to Bangash territory where he intrigued with other Afghans and took arms against the

71 Caroe, *The Pathans*, p. 214.

Mughals. However, he again changed his mind and in 1620 expressed his repentance and sought imperial clemency. He was pardoned by Emperor Jahangir and given his old ranks.

At that time, the revolt of Ahdad developed into a full-fledged rebellion; there was no other option with Emperor Jahangir but to send imperial army to deal with them. The imperial army comprised of the Afghan nobles, such as Taj Khan, Sher Khan Afghan and Nand Ali Maidani. They rendered valuable services in Bangash territory while dealing with the Roshnites. The death of Ahdad in the battle of Koh Lawaghar (Kohat) in 1626 proved a blow for the movement. Emperor Jahangir was in Kabul in those days. He celebrated the death of Ahdad and ordered his head to be hanged with the wall of the Lahore fort. Shah Nawaz Khan, in spite of being a Mughal servant, has paid rich tribute to Ahdad. About his bravery he stated that he surpassed even Rostam and Suhrab.⁷²

After the death of Ahdad his son Abdul Qadir took in his hand the reign of the movement in 1627.

Roshniya Movement and the Afghan Nationalist Discourse

A number of 'nationalist and progressive' writers have developed the perception of Bayazid as the first Afghan nationalist protagonist due to his struggle for their unification against the Mughals. Ignoring all other drawbacks including the militant and religious based contentions of Bayazid, these writers have tried to find out a link between Roshniya movement and other Afghan nationalist popular discourses. Perhaps the element of strong antipathy towards the central Mughal authority provided these scholars to interlink Roshniya movement with other Afghan nationalist movements. Ali Khan Mahsud asserted in this regard:

Roshniya Movement was the first movement in the area in which the Pakhtuns participated as a nation. Due to

⁷² Shah Nawaz Khan, *Ma'asir-ul-Umara*, Urdu Trans. Muhammad Ayub Qadri, Vol. II (Lahore: Urdu Science Board, 2004), p. 167.

this movement Pakhtuns fought incessant wars against the slavery of the Mughals. Due to these reasons the Britishers also failed to subdue the Pakhtuns.⁷³ [Author's translation]

He has linked-up the struggle of Bayazid with that of anti-colonial movement of Abdul Ghaffar Khan in the twentieth century. Likewise Yar Muhammad Maghmoom adopted the same argument by designating Bayazid the nationalist leader of the Afghans. The approach of majority of these writers is the same i.e. to establish a link between the anti-British Khudai Khidmatgar Movement of Abdul Ghaffar Khan in the twentieth century and the anti-Mughal Roshniya Movement of Bayazid Ansari in the sixteenth century. They have anticipated Bayazid's movement as the first manifestation of the nationalist tendencies which culminated in the emergence of Abdul Ghaffar Khan. Yar Muhammad Maghmoom thus writes in his book:

The emergence of the Pashtoons uprising under the leadership of Khushal Khan Khattak, Aimal Khan Moomand and Darya Khan Afridi against the Mughals and that of the Pashtoons under the leadership of Bacha Khan against the British was continuation of the Rowshani movement.⁷⁴

The assertion of these writers needs proper evaluation not dismissal. The first and the foremost contradiction in the approaches of these writers is the comparable historical placement of Bayazid Ansari, Khushal Khan Khattak and Abdul Ghaffar Khan. The former was a religious extremist militant in his ideas while the latter were secular figures. The irony is that Abdul Ghaffar Khan was propagating non-violence while Bayazid was the champion of violence. It is very strange to make comparison of the two in nationalist disposition. Rather one may term it a sheer historical misjudgment on the part of these writers to draw a similar ideological assessment between the two movements. Objective analysis of both the movements reveals strong

73 Ali Khan Mahsud, *La Pir Rukhana tar Bacha Khana: Da Pukhtanu Milli Mubarizi ta Katana* [Pashto] (Peshawar: n.p., n.d.), p. 61.

74 Maghmoom, *The Rowshanites and Pashto Literature*, p. 8.

and divergent practical and ideological contradictions. Roshniya Movement was based on the extremist and Sufic ideas of Bayazid while the Khudai Khidmatgar Movement expounded a secular and tolerant approach towards politics. Even the non-Muslims were included in the list of the Khudai Khidmatgar Movement by signing its pledge. Bayazid termed his obedience and accepting his cult as an obligatory on all the masses. He claimed himself the most perfect man in spiritual wisdom not in political one. One common thing between the two movements was their opposition to oppression by the rulers in their respective timings. To base the nationalist struggle of the Afghans on such extremist thoughts and concepts propounded by Bayazid is nothing than a historical misnomer. Under these rationales in future some historians would develop the same argument with regard to present day *Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan* by interpreting it as a nationalist endeavor due to its dominant Afghan outlook and administering a large piece of land in FATA and Afghanistan. Generally, the progressive writers often discarded such sacred and ecclesiastical notions in their political discourses. However, in the case of Bayazid and his successors they completely overlooked these tendencies in his movement.

It is pertinent to mention that if it was a cause of nationalism for Bayazid, he would have definitely promoted it instead of creating division in the Afghan society by presenting and imposing new religious ideas upon them. His main object was to spread his militant cult and the same trend was kept continued by his successors. Some of the tribes took his cause and supported him while other vehemently opposed him and sided with his opponents. The base of his movement was spiritual and religious. Some of his steps for instance forceful taxation on the inhabitants caused great resentment in many tribes. Particularly, the Yusufzai, Bangash and the Dalazak tribes withdrew its initial support from Bayazid after large-scale militant activities of his disciples. The immediate reason was the militants' looting and plundering in these areas. The quite

unblemished categorization of people by Bayazid was not on ethnic or national grounds at all; rather it was made purely on accepting or rejecting his militant faith. There is not a single evidence to prove that Bayazid propagated the cause of nationalism among his writings. Bayazid and his movement got no support from the Afghan tribes in Swat. They never entered the area or influenced the religious order of the society at that time. Although, very little support was provided in the initial phase of the movement by the Yusufzais of the settled areas but afterwards they opposed it vehemently. The influence of Bayazid among the Yusufzai begun to shrink considerably even the tribal tide had begun against him in the *samah* (settled) area because of Akhun Darwaiza's influence.⁷⁵

In the preface of *Makhzan*, Sayed Taqwim-ul-Haq stated that Emperor Akbar himself was interested to let Bayazid gain more influence in the area for two reasons. Firstly, he wanted to create trouble in the area for Mirza Hakim, the Mughal governor of Kabul and to drain his resources. Secondly, Akbar was much apprehensive about the growing opposition of the Yusufzais, and he found a suitable counterbalance of their uprising in the shape of Bayazid Ansari.⁷⁶ The discourse of the Roshniya Movement as a nationalist venture is out of place as there is no evidence to support this assertion. There is not a single word in the Roshniya literature to support this argument. The Roshnites' ascendancy in the Yusufzai area and Tirah for some time was not a nationalist venture at all. Neither, at any time, Bayazid or any of his successors emerged as an undisputed leader of the tribes, nor was it a struggle for their unification. The mobilization of militants' support from a number of tribes should not be taken as the basis of his being a nationalist.⁷⁷

75 Sultan-i-Rome, 'Mughals and Swat', p. 41.

76' Muqadimah' to Darwaiza, *Makhzan* (Peshawar: Pakhto Academy, University of Peshawar, 1987), p. 19.

77 Himayatullah Yaqubi, 'Conservative Sufism in the Pakhtun Borderland: Bayazid Ansari and Roushaniya Movement', *Journal of South Asian and Middle Eastern Studies*, Villanova (USA), summer 2010, Vol. XXXIII, No. 4.p. 73.

The extremist views of Bayazid and his successors, particularly overlooked by majority historians. The two major elements they used for the mobilization of the Afghans were anti-Mughal sentiments and strong attachment with the religion. The kind of extremism they employed against the Mughals was equally used against the Afghans with the same brutality. During Jahangir's time a battle was fought between Ahdad and the Mughal at Kot Tirah in which Ahdad was defeated. After his defeat Ahdad ordered the Roshnites to arrest all those Afghans who did not fight for him in the battle. Those captive Afghans were then released by the Mughals.⁷⁸ This indicated the Roshnites' extremist approach and whoever did not support him were harshly treated. After some time Aladad, son of Jalalah, created differences with Ahdad and left him in the lurch. He joined the Mughal service and received the title of Rashid Khan. During the time of Shah Jahan's reign in 1635 Abdul Qadir also submitted to the Mughals. Bibi Alai along with her two sons-in-law Muhammad Zaman and Sahibdad shifted to Telangana and resided with Rashid Khan.⁷⁹

Some historians put forward the argument that Bayazid established his rule in Tirah and the Muhammadzai areas for a brief time. He started collecting taxes from local population and from the trade caravans passing through the Roshnites' territories. The establishment of the Roshnites' rule in these areas is interpreted as an indication of the dormant nationalist propensities among the Afghans. However, the same argument can rightly and more accurately be placed in the case of Yusufzai struggle for their unification against the Mughals. The struggle of Malak Sulaiman Shah in Kabul during the second half of the fifteenth century and Malak Ahmad Khan in the Peshawar Valley for establishing an Afghan tribal confederacy, much earlier than Bayazid, is a stronger case in discussing the historical roots of nationalism.

⁷⁸ Noor-ud-Din Jahangir, *Tuzuk-i-Jahangiri*, Eng Trans. Alexander Rogers, Vol. II (Lahore: Snag-i-Meel Publications, 1974), p. 263-64.

⁷⁹ Shah Nawaz Khan, *Ma'asir-ul-Umara*, p. 168.

Their struggle was more secular, rational, democratic and modern in contents. It was based on political and secular grounds. Religion was not an issue between them and the Mughals. Moreover, the establishment of self-rule on very sound footings in the Peshawar Valley and in the entire present day Swat in the sixteenth century by the Yusufzai and their allied tribes was an ample proof that their struggle was more national in character than that of Bayazid's. The Yusufzai malaks were much flexible and friendly and they imposed no taxation on the other tribes who wished to reside with them. In the first decade of the sixteenth century after their settlement in the Peshawar Valley, they encouraged the arrival of Khalil, Muhammadzai, Gadoon, Gugyani and other tribes for the cause of an Afghan tribal confederacy against the Mughals.⁸⁰ Interestingly enough, the Yusufzai's state pattern of administration during the Mughal period was not a family estate. It was democratic in nature and content. For example after the death of Malak Ahmad Khan in 1530 his successor Khan Kaju was chosen by a grand *jirga* of the Afghans. Likewise other Yusufzai rulers i.e. Kalu Khan, Bhaku Khan and Mesri Khan were elected through this pattern due to their service for the Afghans, bravery, sagacity and struggle against the Mughals.

Decline of the Roshniya Movement

An important factor in the decline of the Roshniya Movement was the propaganda of its opponents. Particularly, Akhund Darwaiza played a vital role in this connection. In the area of the Yusufzai, he was very influential. Therefore, the movement faced some severe setbacks in this area. If one looks at the development of the movement, it is visible that it did not receive much enthusiasm and encouragement among the settled areas of Yusufzais. The movement completely failed to penetrate into the Yusufzais dwelling in the Swat valley.⁸¹ It is partly because the people of the area were inimical towards Bayazid and partly due to the Afghan

80 For Details see Shah, *Tawarikh Hafiz Rahmat Khani*.

81 Sultan-i-Rome, 'Mughuls and Swat', p. 42.

usual tribal parochialism. In his anti-Bayazid campaign, Darwaiza gathered a large number of them to strengthen his influence against the Roshniya Movement.⁸²

The disunity among the family members of Bayazid was another cause, which contributed to the decline of the movement. In the time of Emperor Shah Jehan, Bibi Alai and Abd-ul-Qadir (son of Ahdad) defeated Zafar Khan, newly appointed governor of Kabul. After this victory over the imperial force, many Afghan tribes came under the leadership of Bibi Alai and Abd-ul-Qadir. They devised a plan of attack on Peshawar but jealousies among the people of different tribes put them on defensive. In the midst of this confusion and wrangling, Abd-ul-Qadir along with some of his companions went to Tirah. The remaining Roshnites came under attack of Syed Khan, *Faujdar* (commander) of Bangash territory. Some of them were killed and a great number were arrested.

After some time, Syed Khan started negotiations with Bibi Alai and Abd-ul-Qadir for conciliation. Gradually, the enthusiasm of their followers witnessed steady decline. Alahdad, brother of Bibi Alai, also persuaded them in changing their policy towards the Mughals. In this way Abd-ul-Qadir and Bibi Alai joined the Mughal services. After some time, Abd-ul-Qadir died in Peshawar. Bibi Alai along with Alahdad went to Delhi in royal escort. He was sent to Farrukhabad where he died in 1647. Mirza Khan Ansari, son of Nur-ud-Din, also joined the Mughal army and was died in a battle at Deccan in 1636.⁸³

It is also stated that Khan Jahan, through a letter succeeded in instigating Kamal-ud-Din, a royal officer to turn traitor. Khan Jahan was an Afghan chief in the court who later deserted. Kamal-ud-Din solicited the support of the Khalil, Mohmand, Dawudzai, Yusufzai and Khattak tribes. He invited Abd-ul-Qadir to assume their leadership. He also invited Karimdad, son of Jalalah, to unite and led an

82 Kakakhel, *Pukhtanah da Tarikh Pa Ranra Kay*, p. 520.

83 *Ibid.*, p. 521.

offensive against the imperialists. He won over Muhammad Zaman (a relative of Ahdad) for the same purpose. In 1630 various Afghan tribes assembled under Kamal-ud-Din and threatened to attack Peshawar.⁸⁴ Another factor probably was the conservative ideas of Bayazid because majority of the Afghans were not ready to accept such rigid interpretation of the religion.

It is remarkably clear that the nature of the conflict that ensued between the Afghans and the Mughals in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries was completely political. The socio-political tradition of the Afghans grew in such a way that it never provided an opportunity to the upholder of the religion to hijack people's perception. The reason probably was that it did not operate in the paradigm of faith and beliefs. Both the Mughals and the Afghans shared Islam as a religion. Religion was not a matter of dispute and it never occurred in the area that religious sentiments were exploited mere to arouse tribal emotion against the Mughal emperors. It was despite the fact that majority of the Afghans were pious Muslims and they were almost independent in their territory.

The Roshniya Movement was perfect example of polarization of the Afghan society on religious lines which one can easily compare with the present militarization of the society. Bayazid Ansari was the first Islamic militant who took up arms against the Mughals in the name of Islam. It was his religious views from which his followers took inspiration and through which the elements of extremism and militancy permeated into the body politic of the Afghan society. To call it a nationalist movement would be sheer injustice with the Afghan history. There is not a single nationalist element from which it took inspiration other than large-scale mobilization of the tribes. Neither Bayazid exploited any nationalist feeling of the Afghan nor did he try to persuade other influential tribes to form a united front against the Mughals. In the coming years Roshniya

84 *Ibid.*, pp. 107-8.

Movement polarized the society on a pattern not existed till that time. One could describe it the first-ever uprising of a kind of religious extremists for gaining political concessions.

Opposition to the Movement largely came from the Yusufzai area. It was because the area was under the influence of Pir Baba and Akhun Darwaiza who practiced and preached the traditional *Sufi* Islam. The emergence of this opposing line of *pirs* in Swat and Buner was a perfect example of the division of Afghan tribal strength. In broad analysis, the movement infused an antagonistic religious fervour into the minds of the Afghan masses. The formation of brigades, regimentation and militarization against each-others transformed common perceptions. It was an understandable shift in the ideological paradigm and the creation of a new social order. The process then took different facets and shapes throughout history.

The forces operated in the social milieu were tilted in favour of religious figures that expanded gradually their sphere of influence. One can trace the origin of the institutionalization of religion from this specific movement. Alongside the Afghans' anti-Mughal sentiments, Bayazid used Islam as a tool to get the support of the tribes in his endeavour to establish his rule. The imposition of a brand of extremist Islam was its permanent feature. Those Afghans who upheld different views were subjected to severe punishment. Shaikh Umar declared independence and assumed the title of the king of the Afghans for the first time in the Yusufzai area.

The intellectual foundation of the movement was largely the writings of Bayazid and his doctrine. It was widely and sincerely propagated by his trusted disciples in and outside the frontier region. The drawback of his policy was that he did not build a strong line of leadership to continue his struggle. After his demise the mantle of its leadership remained within the circle of his blood relatives. At the end, it was assumed a family dispute between them and the Mughals. It was the Roshnites' leadership that deserted the disciples otherwise it might have been continued for long

time. After the fervour died down, the Roshniya literature was regarded as heretic and was banned in the area under the pressure of orthodox ulama though some families kept the manuscript secretly in their homes.

The Mughal emperors, i.e. Akbar, Jahangir and Shah Jehan attempted to liquidate the Afghan power and did not give proper positions to them in the Mughal nobility. The policy of Akbar to control the Yusufzais in Swat proved disastrous for the Mughals. On the face of seeming dangers involved in such sort of expeditions Jahangir and Shah Jehan did not make any attempt to subdue the Yusufzais in Swat. To keep the Afghans in their firm control and for maintaining peace in the frontier areas, they utilized every means ranging from military confrontation to intimidations. But the Afghans never submitted to the Mughal authority nor lost their independence. In the days of Aurangzeb, Mohmands, Afridis, Yusufzais rose against the Mughals and tried to organize the Afghans. In addition, Khushal Khan Khattak after his release transformed his perceptions owing to his personal grudges much later about the Mughals.

At the time of Emperor Akbar there appeared three dominant Afghan factions in the frontier region. Yusufzais and the successors of Bayazid Ansari led the anti-Mughal forces while the pro-Mughal group looked at Akor Khan as their leader. Akbar sent several punitive expeditions against the Yusufzais after they defeated the Mughal forces at Malandaray Pass. Therefore, Akbar had to explore a local stalwart in the shape of Akor Khan as the chief of the Khattak tribe to check the forays of the Yusufzais. Akor Khan took full advantage of the difficulties of the Yusufzais and with the help of the Mughals he grabbed a chunk of their territory. Thus Akbar found in Akor Khan a suitable person to counteract the mighty Yusufzai tribe. Akor Khan was the first prominent figure having accepted the office of protecting the imperial highway, which was something unacceptable for other Afghan tribes particularly the Yusufzais. All these and other related events would be discussed in the proceeding chapter.

Chapter 5

Aurangzeb and the Afghan Resistance-I

During Akbar's reign, Mughal armies received a number of humiliating defeats at the hands of Roshnites and the Yusufzais. Owing to these setbacks, Jahangir and Shah Jahan perhaps side-tracked their Afghan policies and did not make any bid to subdue them in the frontier region. They, by hook or by crook, adopted lenient attitude towards the Afghan nobility. In 1606, after his coronation, Emperor Jahangir raised the *mansab* of Dilawar Khan Kakar, an Afghan noble of Kakar tribe. He served the Mughal court for quite long time. He rose to prominence due to his victories in many campaigns for the Mughals. Consequently, his *jagir* enhanced with the inclusion of the entire area of Khanpur. Afterwards, in 1617 he was appointed the governor of Kashmir which raised his stature in the Mughal court. His sons were rewarded lavishly by Jahangir. He died in 1619.¹

In the year 1622 Afghans of Pishin (Balochistan) chose Sher Khan Tarin as their malak. In his leadership the Afghans defeated the invading Persian army in 1628. He established his rule on Sibi, Shalkot and Pishin and was a potent threat to the expansionist policy of the Persians. It was in 1631 that he was defeated at Pishin by Ali Mardan Khan, the Persian governor of Kandahar. He fled and took refuge with Shah Jahan in Delhi. He was arrested afterwards and imprisoned in the fort of Akbarabad. In his absence, Safdar Khan and Hayat Khan Tarin made an unsuccessful

1 Abdul Ali Ghurghashti, *Pashtunun Ka Tehzibi, Tarikhi wa Azadi ka Safar* [Urdu] (Quetta: By the author himself, 2007), p. 96.

bid to establish their rule in Sarawan (Balochistan). The *sardars* of Raisani, which is a sub-clan of Tarin, are still holding influential position in Sarawan. In 1639, the Mughal restored normalcy in the area and Taza Khan was appointed as *faujdar* of Sibi. The principality of Sibi afterwards was administered by various Afghan nobles appointed by the Mughals such as Qazaq Khan and Amir Khan. It was regarded as an important area by the Mughals due to its geographical location.²

The era of Shah Jahan and Aurangzeb witnessed the grave uprising of the Yusufzais, Afridis and Mohmands in the frontier region. Though they had realized the importance of the Afghans and had devised a little bit lenient policy towards them. Both these emperors made several attempts to persuade them to surrender to the Mughal authority. But at the same time were reluctant and did not trust their Afghan nobles. That was the reason that Aurangzeb lost the support of some of his Afghan elites during the commencement of his reign. At the start of his reign, a number of skirmishes took place between the Yusufzais and the Mughal forces in the *samah* areas. It was in 1667 that a Mughal contingent entered Swat and destroyed some villages, but they had to leave the area in haste due to the fear of large-scale tribal reprisal.

Here an attempt has been made to highlight relations and policies of Shah Jahan and Aurangzeb with the Afghans of the north-western borderland. Special attention would be made to discuss the Yusufzai uprising, Darya Khan and Aimal Khan's rebellion and the episode of Khushal Khan Khattak vis-à-vis the Mughals.

Khattak-Mughal Rapprochement

The name Khattak was given to Luqman, son of Burhan, who belonged to the Karlanri tribe in the Afghans' genealogy. It has been stated by Gopal Das in *Tarikh-i-Peshawar* that the ancestor of the Khattak was Luqman who always used to go for hunting expeditions accompanied by his brothers

2 *Ibid.*

namely Usman, Uthman and Zidran. Once during a hunting expedition in a desert they spotted four young ladies covering their faces in veil. Being the elder one Luqman asked his brothers that he is entitled to first select a lady for himself. The remaining three would be given to them through toss. However, the lady chosen by Luqman was blackish having unpleasant facial structure. Seeing her, the younger brothers exclaimed out of surprise in Pashto:

لقمان په خټه لارو³

Luqman stuck in the mud.

It was due to this reason that all the ancestors of Luqman were called as Khattak. He had two sons; Turmaan and Bulaq. The two famous branches of Bulaq and Teri are descended from Bulaq and Turmaan respectively. The present day sub-branches of Barak, Mahmandi, Akora and Seni are Teri Khattaks whereas the Saghris, Nandrak, Khurram and Bangi Khel belong to the Bulaq branch of the Khattak tribe. Teri village seems to have got its name from the association of the Teri branch as their abode for very long time. The chief of the tribe used to live there. With the passage of time they crossed the Indus on the west bank of the district Attock and on north to district Nowshehra present day in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa province of Pakistan.⁴

Akor Khan, son of Darwish Muhammad Khan Chanju and the great-grandfather of Khushal Khan was a Barak Khattak. However, Khwaja Muhammad Sayal is of the view that the original name of Akor Khan was Anwar Khan who came from India and settled among the Khattaks. His observation regarding the family of Akor Khan is that they were 'Beg' by origin and the blood-relatives of the Mughals. They afterwards became Afghans by dwelling among them.⁵

3 Gopal Das, *Tarikh-i-Peshawar*, [Urdu] (Lahore: Global Publishers, n.d.), pp. 384-85.

4 Muhammad Nawaz Khan, *Khattak: A Restless People* (Mardan: Gandhara Markaz, 2004), pp. 2-3.

5 Khwaja Muhammad Sayal, *Khushaliyat aw Haqayaq (Inteqadi Jaj)* [Pashto] (Peshawar: By the Author himself, 2006), p. 142.

They were granted *jagirs* (fiefs) in the area by the Mughals for their services against the Yusufzai and other Afghan tribes.

As discussed in the preceding chapter that during the reign of Akbar there emerged three dominant factions among the Afghans. The nature and makeup of general Afghan public was anti-Mughal which was largely represented by the Yusufzais and the followers of Bayazid Ansari. In the midst of such political pattern the Mughal officials strongly felt the need of a group to balance the political scene of the Afghan region in their favour. The emergence of Akor Khan and the Khattak tribe can be seen as the creation of the pro-Mughal Afghan bloc in the region.

It was in the first half of 1580s that Akor Khan left Karbogha, his native village, and went to Nizampur (Khwara) and got settlement there. His migration proved very beneficial not only for him but also for the Khattak tribe because around that period they gained political popularity and fame. Prior to the emergence of Akor Khan there is no mention of the Khattak tribe in any manuscript or other historical documents. Akor Khan was a bold and tactful person whose sources of income were his *jagir*, forceful extraction of taxes from the local population and looting the caravans passing through the area. The fact that they were professional robbers has also been confirmed by Afzal Khan, grandson of Khushal Khan.⁶ It seems that before his friendship with the Mughals, Akor Khan was not in the good book of the local authorities due to his fame as a notorious dacoit of the area.

Shah Beg, a Mughal *kotwal* of Peshawar, appointed by Mirza Hakim of Kabul, tried to check the recalcitrant activities of Akor Khan but did not succeed in controlling him. Once in 1584-85 a minor encounter took place between Akor Khan and the Mughal forces in which he killed the brother of Shah

6 See Afzal Khan Khattak, *Tarikh Murasa*, ed. Dost Muhammad Khan Kamil Momand (Peshawar: University Book Agency, 2006), p. 316.

Beg.⁷ After this incident a force was sent from Peshawar to crush the power of Akor Khan. As a result two battles were fought between Akor Khan and the Mughals which resulted in the victory of the former. After his victories over the Mughal forces he emerged as a powerful figure of the area who could even challenge the authority of the Mughal in the area.⁸

With the emergence of Akor Khan, his tribe also gained prominence as a strong political force in the surrounding area. In 1586, the critical political conditions of Kabul and the frontier region brought Emperor Akbar to the area. At Attock, he received a group of malaks belonged to Mohmand, Khalil and Khattak tribes. They informed Akbar about the increasing law and order situations on the imperial road passing through Khairabad, Nowshehra, and Peshawar. During his discussion with the local malaks, he was also informed of the strength and influence of Akor Khan who was accordingly summoned by Akbar to his camp at Attock. In their meeting, the Emperor elaborated on the importance of the protection of the imperial road for the caravans passing through the Yusufzais' areas.⁹

While another source stated that it was in 1586; on his way back from Kabul that Akbar convened a meeting of the influential peoples of Peshawar and the surrounding areas and discussed with them the safety of the imperial road from the Yusufzai assaults. In the meeting the name of Akor Khan was suggested to Akbar by majority of the tribal malaks. Thus, he was assigned with the responsibility of the safety of road down to Peshawar from Attock. Besides, a portion of the tax incurred from the transportation was also collected by Akor Khan.¹⁰ Mian Syed Rasool Rasa in the preface of *Armaghan-i-Khushal* contends that it was Raja Man Singh

7 Khadija Begum Feroz-ud-din, *Khushal Khan Khattak: Zhwand wa Hunar*, Pashto tr. Ajmal Khkuly (Kabul: Afghan Cultural Jirga, 2008), p. 60.

8 Preshan Khattak, *Pushtun Kaun?: Tarikh, Tahqiq, Tanqid* [Urdu] (Peshawar: Pashto Academy, 1984), pp. 326-330.

9 Olaf Caroe, *The Pathans* (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 2003), p. 212.

10 Begum, *Khushal Khan Khattak: Zhwand wa Hunar*, p. 62.

who introduced Akor Khan to Akbar as an influential person of the area. He pressed the emperor for exploiting the services of Akor Khan with regard to the protection of the imperial road. As Akor Khan was against the Yusufzais so were the Mughals, therefore the convergence of interest made the rapprochement more likely for both the sides. Akbar also gave him the right of collecting toll tax on the road from trade caravans.¹¹

Earlier, the Yusufzai forays on the imperial caravans were a constant source of headache for Akbar. Among the Afghans the Yusufzai tribe was a traditional rival of the Mughals. The communication link between Kabul and Delhi always interrupted by frequent attacks from the Yusufzai tribesmen. They acquired most of the land around River Kabul and were expanding their tentacles day by day. Akor Khan always looked for an opportunity to capture a chunk of fertile land from the Yusufzais for having abided therein. In view of his strained relations with the Yusufzai, Akbar wanted to use him against the tribe for his own interest.¹²

In Akor Khan, Akbar found a suitable person to counter the might and strength of the Yusufzais with the active help of the Mughal power. In Mughal-Akor Khan's rapprochement, a conflict of interests started between the Yusufzai and the Khattak tribes. This divergence of interests proved very harmful for the Afghans which ultimately developed into a full-fledged hostility between the two Afghan tribes.¹³

Akbar was impressed by the courage, sagacity and boldness of Akor Khan and bestowed upon him various rewards in lieu of the protection of the imperial road. In return, he was given the area between Khairabad and Nowshehra in *jagir*. The emperor also authorized him to collect the road-toll and taxes from the caravans. With the Mughal-Khattak rapprochement, Akbar acquired double

11 Mian Syed Rasool Rasa, *Armaghan-i-Khushal* [Pashto] (Peshawar: University Book Agency, n. d.), p. 9.

12 *Ibid.*

13 Ghani Khan Khattak, *Khushal Khan Khattak* (Islamabad: Pukhtun Culture Society, 2002), pp. 17-18.

advantage of not only the safety of the road but he also considerably weakened the Afghan power and influence. Besides, he successfully disseminated the seeds of disunity among the tribes by using Khattak against those tribes who were against the Mughals. Akbar truly found in him a potential stalwart who could counterweight the might of the anti-Mughal Afghan tribes because he wanted to exploit the already existing rift between these tribes.¹⁴

Earlier, the territory between Khairabad and Nowshehra were granted to Ghauria Khel tribes (Mohmands, Khalils and Dawudzai) under the Shaikh Mali's *wesh* settlement as pastureland.¹⁵ After their settlement in Khwara (Nowshehra), the Seni and Bulaq Khattaks also inhabited the village of Dag Ismail Khel and the adjacent areas. Another branch of the Khattak was known as Akor Khel Khattak after Akor Khan's settlement in the area.¹⁶ The settlement of Akor Khan along with thousands of Khattak tribesmen near the Yusufzai area was a new development. They came face to face with each other and there was always the danger of a full-fledged tribal war between the two tribesmen. From that onwards frequent skirmishes took place between the men of Akor Khan and the Yusufzais.

There is no denying the fact that Akor Khan possessed the characteristics of a good leader but by the time his chieftainship was bestowed on him by the Mughal government, the common people of his tribe suspected his leadership. Meantime, he imposed illegitimate taxes on the people which gravely shattered his prestige even among his own people. As a result, Nazu Khan, a Bulaq Khattak, killed

14 *Ibid.*

15 Shaikh Mali belonged to the Akazai branch of the Yusufzai tribe. He was a wise and intelligent leader of the Afghans. In his scheme of *wesh* he distributed the land among different branches of the Yusufzai in such a way that every branch accepted his scheme. He divided land in six parts and gave it in the possession of different sections, i.e. Yusufzai, Muhammadzai, Gugyani, Dawudzai, Khalil, and Mohmand. Khan Roshan Khan, *Afghano Ki Nasli Tarikh* (Karachi: Roshan Khan and Company, 1984). p. 50.

16 Khan, *Khattak: A Restless People*, pp. 5-6.

him along with his son Yusuf at Pir Sabaq.¹⁷ His son Yahya Khan succeeded him as the chief of his tribe. Yahya Khan took the revenge of his father's death by killing a large number of the Bulaq Khattaks and many of them were taken as prisoners. To revenge these killings, Malak Shadi Khan, a chief of Bulaq Khattaks, killed Yahya Khan along with his son Alam Khan at Pir Sabaq. After some time Shahbaz Khan, son and successor of Yahya Khan, killed the son of Shadi Khan in an encounter.¹⁸ A truce was then concluded between the two sub-sections of the tribe and the long standing enmity came to an end.

On the other hand, the Yusufzais were not ready to tolerate the alliance between Akor Khan and the Mughals. They considered it a threat to the interests of the Afghans in the area. Accordingly, during those days two prominent groups emerged among the Afghans. The anti-Mughal group was leading by the Yusufzai malaks while the pro-Mughal group was leading by Shahbaz Khan. When Shahbaz Khan ascended to the chieftainship of his tribe, he very cleverly diverted the attention of his fellow Khattaks from their internal feuds towards the Yusufzai and Bangash. Immediately, he organized his tribesmen and planned several attacks on some Yusufzais' villages.¹⁹

During these skirmishes he used to devastate the Yusufzai area and fled back. A battle was fought between Shahbaz Khan's force and the combined force of the Yusufzai and Bulaq Khattaks at Mayar (presently in Mardan

17 When the Bulaq Khattaks got aware of the vengeance of Yahya Khan, son and successor of Akor Khan, they crossed the river Kabul and entered into the Yusufzai area. According to the tradition of *Pukhtunwali*, the Yusufzai decided in the *jirga* presided over by their chief Kalu Khan that shelter would be given to the Bulaq in the Mandanr Yusufzai areas of Lahor Gharbi, Jalbai, Jalsai, Nandrak, Manki, Tordher and Jehangira villages. Nowadays the entire area is known as Bulaq Nama. Around half of the Bulaq were habilitated in Baizai area which include Katlang, Kati Ghari, Jamal Ghari, Sawaldher, Mian Isa, Lund Khwar, Taza Gram, Qutabghar, Dandia, Sherghar, Dagi, Sarubi, Qasami and Jangidher villages. Khan, *Khattak A Restless People*, p. 17.

18 Khan, *Tarikh-i-Murassa*, p. 45.

19 Khan, *Khattak: A Restless People*, p. 7.

district of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa). In the midst of the war Shahbaz Khan and Khushal Khan received injuries. Shahbaz Khan passed away because of his wounds on 18 January, 1641.²⁰ *Hayat-i-Afghani* has described Shahbaz Khan a talented person whose abilities were undeniable like his cruelty and tyranny. He was a tyrant and on account of personal grudges killed a large number of people belonging to his own tribe and his traditional rival tribe the Yusufzai.²¹

Khushal Khan as a Mughal *Mansabdar*

Khushal Khan Khattak was born in May 1613 at the time when Nur-ud-Din Muhammad Jahangir was the ruler of India. He was the eldest son of Shahbaz Khan. After his father's death he was selected the chief of the Khattak tribe by Emperor Shah Jahan. At the time of his ascendancy, Khushal Khan was a young man of twenty-eight years. During his childhood he narrowly escaped accidental death several times. He, for the first time, took part in a battle against the Yusufzais at the age of thirteen and witnessed the defeat of his tribe. In 1631, at the age of eighteen, he was married and after three years, he commanded an independent raid on the territory of the Bangash tribe. In January 1640-41, he accompanied his father in the disastrous raid on the Yusufzais, which proved very fatal for his tribe. Khushal Khan Khattak himself received an arrow wound in the anklebone. In 1641, Shah Jahan conferred upon him the chieftainship of his tribe through an imperial *farman*, which also required him to join the imperial army stationed at Ajmer. It was an additional responsibility on Khushal Khan to serve the Mughal campaign. He remained loyal and served the Mughals with utmost commitment both in his own area against the Yusufzais and in campaigns against Uzbeks in Balakh and Badakhshan in 1645. Khushal Khan being outspoken and sincere towards the Mughals

20 Ghani, *Khushal Khan*, p. 19.

21 Muhammad Hayat Khan, *Hayat-i-Afghan*, Eng tr. Henry Priestly (Lahore: Sang-i-Meel Publication, 1981), p. 211.

never tried to mislead the history. He several times mentioned his services for the Mughals in his poetry:

که له خپله حقیقته درته وایم
 زه خایي یم د مغل نمک حلال
 که د جنگ د پرهرونو درته وایم
 چی له درده می په تن و لکه نال
 یو پرهر به می له روغ په وجود نه و
 بل پرهر به می په تن شو یا په دال
 چی قضا د سړي نه وی سړی نه مری
 که بی درست صورت په غشو شی غریال²²

The fact is that from the beginning I have been faithful and loyal to the Mughals. What to say of the wounds I received in the wars I fought for them, my whole body would become twisted due to pain. I never got relief from wounds and before the healing of the old wounds, received always fresh wounds. [I am convinced on this belief that] there is no death before the appointed time even if one's body is pierced by arrows a hundred and more times.

His father Shahbaz Khan had previously leased the land of Yusufzai and Teri Bulaq on twelve thousands yearly imbursement. But Khushal Khan, on making frequent requests to the Mughals, had acquired it as his *jagir* during Shah Jahan's reign.²³ Thus it can be rightly said that the influence and standing of the family of Khushal Khan in the area was due to the unbounded Mughal support for them. The Mughal emperors usually conferred the titles of chieftainship of the Khattak tribe upon them. This tradition was a unique in the sense that till that time no other Afghan tribe ever permitted the Mughals to appoint their chiefs. The very permanent traits of the family of Khushal Khan were alliance with the Mughals at the cost of enmity with the Yusufzai and other Afghan tribes.²⁴ Interestingly, he has

22 Khattak, *Khushal Khan*, p. 21.

23 Begum, *Khushal Khan Khattak: Zhwand wa Hunar*, p. 80.

24 Rasa, *Armaghan-i-Khushal*, p. 16.

admitted in his poetry about rivalry with the Yusufzais for the Mughals' cause:

زه د يوسفزيو په خـان زهر وم قاتل
 بل مقصود مي نه و په خدمت كښي د مغل
 ډېر شاهان خـوانان مي يو تر بله ووژل
 تېرساعت ارمان د پېښماني نشته حاصل²⁵

I was a deadly poison for the Yusufzais and wished nothing else in serving the Mughals but to kill and destroy them. I have killed numerous kingly youths that I regret now.

During the chieftainship of his tribe he continued his tirades against the Yusufzais. In one such war he burnt the village of Mayar situated present day in Mardan district.²⁶ Having avenged his father's murder from the Yusufzais by burning and looting their villages, he went to Delhi to pay homage in the court of Emperor Shah Jahan. It is said that in Delhi he developed friendly relations with Asalat Khan and Amanat Khan who were prominent nobles in the Mughal court of Shah Jahan. Using their influence, he presented his services to the Emperor.²⁷

In 1641, Prince Murad was sent with a huge army under his command to subdue Jagat Singh, the rebellious *jagirdar* of Mau and the troop commander of the Kanghra valley. The prince was also accompanied by a number of other Afghan commanders.²⁸ At the time of attack on the fort of Taragarh,

25 Khushal Khan Khattak, *Kulyat-i-Khushal Khan Khattak*, Haji Purdil Khan, ed. (Peshawar: Idara-i-Saqafat Sarhad, n.d.), p. 366.

26 *Ibid.*, p. 28.

27 Dost Muhammad Khan Kamil Mohmand, *On a Foreign Approach to Khushal: A Critique of Caroe and Howell* (Peshawar: Maktaba-i-Sarhad, 1968), p. 34. See also Caroe, *The Pathans*, p. 233 and Rasa, *Armaghan-i-Khushal*, p. 18.

28 For instance Bahadar Khan and Nazar Bahadar Khweshgi. The campaign began in August 1641 and which afterwards was reinforced by Bahadar Khan Ruhila with 6000 fresh Afghan soldiers. During this campaign the Afghans displayed great courage under their leader Bahadar Khan. They easily occupied Mau and compelled Jagat Singh to sue for peace. Jagat Singh was imprisoned by the Afghans and was sent to Delhi accompanied by Nazar Bahadar Khweshgi and Sayid Khan Jahan. See Rita Joshi, *The*

Prince Murad appointed Bahadar Khan and Asalat Khan to lead the imperial expedition. In the campaign of Kanghra, Khushal Khan fought along with his two thousand companions.²⁹ Particularly, he showed unprecedented courage in the capture of Taragarh fort. He actively participated in the siege and did not withdraw until the fort was captured. After subduing the rebel *Raja*, he was rewarded four lakh rupees and a *jagir* was conferred on him. He was also given the right of retaining 500 cavalry and 1000 infantry.³⁰ Syed Rasool Rasa has mentioned that Khushal Khan participated in the campaign and courageously fought alongside the Mughal soldiers. The fort of Taragarh was captured after which he was given a lavish reward and more *jagir* was bestowed upon him.³¹

In 1646, the Persian ruler sent an advance army under Rustam Khan Girji to capture Qandahar. When the emperor was informed about it, he ordered Prince Dara Shukuh to lead an army towards Qandahar. Prince Dara Shukuh was warmly received by Khushal Khan at Kohat and offered his services to the prince. However, he was not accorded much importance in his meeting with the prince. Against his expectations, Dara Shukuh ordered that the territories of Mahal, Teri and Bulaq, which were earlier in the possession of Khushal Khan, should be taken away from him. It was the first major rift between Dara Shukuh and Khushal Khan. Later on, these differences culminated in the opposition of the latter for Dara Shukuh in the war of succession between the sons of Emperor Shah Jahan.³² Despite this emerging rift, his services were actively used by Dara Shukuh in the campaigns of Balkh and Badakhshan. He took part in the

Afghan Nobility and the Mughals: 1526-1707 (Delhi: Vikas Publishing House, 1985), pp. 129-30.

29 Mohmand, *Khushal Khan Khattak*, p. 45.

30 Khan, *Hayat-i-Afghani*, p. 211.

31 Rasa, *Armaghan-i-Khushal*, p. 18.

32 Khattak, *Pashtun Kaun?: Tarikh, Tahqiq, Tanqid*, p. 373.

battles under the command of Bahadar Khan and Asalat Khan.³³

In the year 1627 Nazar Muhammad, the ruler of Turan, attacked Kabul. Situations in Balkh and Badakhshan were far from normal. Hence, Emperor Shah Jahan decided to personally proceed to Kabul in 1645. Preshan Khattak and Rita Joshi has given the year 1645, however Rasool Rasa has recorded the year 1649 in which the emperor led the campaign of Badakhshan.³⁴ Asalat Khan was appointed to lead the vanguard of the imperial army. Being brave and hard fighters, the Afghans along with the Rajputs played a prominent role in the Balkh campaign. A host of the Indian Afghan nobles like Bahadar Khan Ruhila, Nazar Bahadar Khweshgi, Hayat Tarin, Nek Nam Khan, Jamal Khan Nauhani and others played a substantial role during these expeditions. It was probably due to their link with the region and partly their knowledge of the passes and roads that they were ordered to join the Mughal force. The supreme command of the Mughal army was in the hands of Prince Murad Bakhsh. When Nazar Muhammad was informed of the arrival of the Mughal army, he fled from Balkh and encamped along with the bank of River Amu for an encounter. In the initial stage Bahadar Khan Ruhila and Asalat Khan, who were in the rear-guard, arrayed their forces to confront the enemy.³⁵

In this campaign, Khushal Khan fought under the command of Asalat Khan. He was stationed at Kotal Hindu Koh to protect the highway of Indarab and Badakhshan. Afterwards, Khushal Khan, with some of his companions formed the vanguard of the army of Asalat Khan in his march towards Sarab. He also fought against the anti-Mughal Hazaras of the area. Asalat Khan, after capturing the remaining territories, started his march towards Lahore. He was accompanied by Khushal Khan and his contingent. He

33 Rasa, *Armaghan-i-Khushal*, p. 18.

34 *Ibid.*

35 Joshi. *Afghan Nobility*, p. 131.

also met Shah Jahan who enhanced his authority on his *jagir* and also bestowed the imperial favour on twelve other malaks of his tribe.³⁶

In 1646, Nazar Muhammad again threatened an attack on Badakhshan. Shah Jahan dispatched a force. The pro-Mughal elements of Ghauria Khel, Gugyani, Muhammadzai, Afridi, Bangash and Aurakzais were also ordered to reinforce the Mughal army. Khushal Khan also received nine thousand rupees from the Mughals for meeting the expenses of a thousand soldiers, which he required to produce. Thus, he once again participated under the command of his old patron, Asalat Khan.³⁷

In 1648, Khushal Khan hosted Bahadar Khan at Akora Khattak. They also went to the shrine of Hazrat Shaikh Rahamkar Kaka Sahib and paid homage to him.³⁸ In March-April 1649, he accompanied Shah Jahan up-to Peshawar in his journey towards Kabul. Shah Jahan discussed many things with him about the area. Particularly he inquired about the Yusufzai tribe, its chiefs and the causes of his rivalry with them. Khadija Feroz-ud-Din stated that during those days the affairs of the Mughal Empire were administered by Dara Shukuh. He was close to the Yusufzai chief Bhaku Khan and his son. They revealed to him the reasons behind their enmity with the family of Khushal Khan and their battles fought against them. Probably Khushal Khan was asked by the emperor to explain his position and that of his tribe in their long-standing antagonism. Khadija Feroz-ud-Din has mentioned the following detailed account of his discussion with Shah Jahan:

Emperor: Why he is against the Yusufzais?

Khushal: Since they [Yusufzais] were averse to the Mughals and did not submit to their authority while he is a loyal servant of the Emperor.

Emperor: How many fighters the Yusufzai possess and who were there leading malaks?

36 Mohmand, *Khushal Khan*, p. 50.

37 *Ibid.*

38 *Ibid.*, p. 58.

- Khushal: There would be eleven thousand fighters with them. And their prominent malaks were Habib, Bhaku, Zarif, Hamid and Kaju.
- Emperor: How many soldiers they can bring to the battlefields?
- Khushal: About five thousand.
- Emperor: What they take in their meal?
- Khushal: Usually wheat and rice.
- Emperor: Do they eat meat?
- Khushal: They eat meat of cows and sheep.
- Emperor: Is this true that there were no horses with them?
- Khushal: Yes, there are no horses with them. There are cows, buffalos and sheep in their area.
- Emperor: Do you possess horses?
- Khushal: Yes, we have horses of Ghazni breed.
- Emperor: Do you know those Khattaks who always attacked on Khushab and Bhera?
- Khushal: They are our adversaries and called 'Red Khattaks'.³⁹

At that occasion he requested Shah Jahan to provide him some artillery through which he would be in a position to control the entire territory and the imperial road.⁴⁰ Khushal Khan also told him that the Yusufzais were capable of making a large-scale war preparation and offering tough resistance. He accompanied Shah Jahan up-to Dakka, a little beyond Khyber Pass, and then he returned to Akora Khattak. Then he facilitated the rear-guard of the Mughal army in crossing of the river Indus. After some time he left for Kabul to attend the imperial court. On his frequent requests Shah Jahan gave him the control of the entire Yusufzai area. For quite some time he managed the new responsibility with courage and talent.⁴¹

Surprisingly, the Yusufzais' areas were again taken away from him because Bhaku Khan, the Yusufzai chief, had

39 Begum, *Khushal Khan Khattak: Zhwand wa Hunar*, p. 84.

40 Masal Shah Ghulam Lundkhwar, 'Khushal Khan Khattak aw Yusufzai' *Khushal Review*, Pashto Academy, University of Peshawar, Vol. II. (April 1985), p. 160. Also see Mohmand, *Khushal Khan*, p. 62.

41 Kamil, *Khushal Khan*, p. 62.

established friendly relations with Prince Dara Shukuh. Emperor Shah Jahan, on the recommendation of Dara Shukuh, accepted the son of Bhaku Khan to enter in the imperial services. It was the time when Khushal Khan was busy in his battles with the Bangash tribe. The bone of contention between Khushal Khan and Sher Muhammad Khan, the Bangash chief, was the lease of Teri-Bulaq areas. Right from Shahbaz Khan to Khushal Khan these areas were given to them as *jagir* on lease by the Mughals. However, Sher Muhammad Khan wanted to include the territories of Mahal, Teri and Bulaq to his *jagir*. In December 1662 a battle was fought in which Bahadar Khan, uncle of Sher Muhammad Khan, died. Another deadly battle between Khushal Khan and Sher Muhammad Khan was fought in 1673 in Kohat. Interestingly, in this battle Darya Khan Afridi fought from the side of Khushal Khan. His brother, Tatar Khan lost his life during the encounter. These battles resulted in the massacre of many Bangash, Afridi and Khattak tribesmen.⁴²

Afghan Nobles and Mughal War of Succession

The role of the Afghan malaks in the war of succession is an interesting study which has not received due attention from the scholars. Their role was of immense importance because of their significant influence during the reign of Shah Jahan. Not only in the Afghan borderland and various provinces but in the Mughal court also they put their weight behind different contenders of the Mughal throne. It can be safely argued that their support at the critical stage had virtually decided the war in favour of Aurangzeb.

Shah Jahan had four sons; Dara Shukuh, Aurangzeb, Shah Shuja and Murad Bakhsh. The heir apparent of Shah Jahan was Dara Shukuh, the eldest son of the Emperor. At the time of Shah Jahan's illness he started to manage the affairs of the state and of court in Delhi. With this development in the court, his brothers became jealous of his

42 Also see Khanzada Shahab-ud-Din Bangash, *Tarikh-i-Bangash* [Urdu] (Peshawar: By the author himself, 2003), pp. 108-10.

position. They too exhibited a strong penchant for the occupation of the magnificent position as the ultimate emperor of India. It was a crucial moment for them and other nobles in the court. Aurangzeb, like his predecessors, had realized the importance of the nobles as far as the war of succession was concerned. All the sons of Shah Jahan regarded the Afghans as an effective political bloc and a fighting force. They seemed very cordial towards them. Generally, the Afghan nobles in the court supported Aurangzeb due to his soft corner towards most of them, conservative views and strong attachment with religion. Dara was a liberal person and did not like by many of them on the basis of his progressive views and aversion to the use of religion in the state affairs.⁴³

Right at the start of his career, Aurangzeb was an experienced statesman, shrewd diplomat and a fearless commander. He did not conceal his desire of capturing the throne of Delhi when he was informed of his father's illness. In this connection he had started preparation quite earlier than his brothers. Before leaving Burhanpur for the north he rewarded lavishly a large number of his nobles to get an unbounded support of the nobility in his bid to capture the throne. Among them the Afghan nobles also received many favours. Their *mansabs* were raised and they were assured of more benefits after the occupation of the throne of Delhi. In the battle of Dharmat which he fought against the Delhi army under the command of Jaswant Singh, many Afghans exhibited their valour to protect Aurangzeb's interest. He also exploited the Afghans when he set out in pursuit of his elder brother Dara Shukuh who had fled to the Punjab. Accompanied by some prominent Afghan nobles like Hazbar Khan, Purdil Khan and Janbaz Khan Khweshgi he at once went out to chastise Dara Shukuh.⁴⁴

In *Tarikh-i-Murassa*, Afzal Khan has stated that after facing defeat from the combined army of Aurangzeb and

43 Mohmand, *Khushal Khan*, p. 65.

44 Joshi, *Afghan Nobility*, pp. 144-46.

Murad Bakhsh, Dara Shukuh fled to the Punjab. The intention of the unfortunate prince was to go towards Kabul and to secure his position there. He sent one of his confidential nobles along with his royal insignia to Khushal Khan who informed him about the coming of the crown prince towards the frontier region. But he flatly repudiated the idea on the plea that *zamindars* of the area were totally against the coming of the prince; therefore, the best option was that the prince should not come towards the north and go somewhere else. As pointed out earlier that Bhaku Khan, the Yusufzai chief was in friendly terms with Dara Shukuh. He was then approached to receive the prince on the bank of River Indus.

Accordingly, Bhaku Khan went to Attock along with his contingent and other companions to receive the prince. He captured all the ferries on the bank of the River Indus and encamped there waiting for the prince's arrival. On the other hand, Khushal Khan was not ready to let Bhaku Khan facilitate Dara Shukuh in crossing the river. Without wasting any time he sent his uncle Feroz Khan to do away with Bhaku Khan and the Yusufzais. Consequently, a battle was fought in which Bhaku Khan received a wound and fled towards his territory. Sayed Khan, brother of Bhaku Khan, was killed in this encounter.⁴⁵

When the news of the defeat of Bhaku Khan reached Dara Shukuh, he abandoned his idea and changed his intention of coming to the Afghan borderland. Instead, he fled towards Bhakkar in the Punjab. Aurangzeb dispatched a strong force to pursue him. Purdil Khan, Inayat Miyana, Dalir Khan, Mangli Khan and other notable Afghans accompanied the force in pursuit of Dara Shukuh. Due to imminent endangerment from the border areas, Aurangzeb personally waited in Multan where he rewarded many Afghan soldiers.⁴⁶

The above discussion reveals that in the years 1657-58 a large number of the Afghans remained engaged in the

45 Mohmad, *Khushal Khan*, p. 81. Also see Rasa, *Armaghan-i-Khushal*, p. 21.

46 Joshi, *The Afghan Nobility*, p. 147.

Mughal war of succession. They had played significant roles in the north-western frontier region and in different other areas, i.e. Delhi and the surrounding provinces. Their response, however, was not uniformed and nationalistic. It was completely tribal and varied from noble to noble with their narrow and petty interests. It not only intensified the inter-tribal rivalries between them rather in fact, symbolized their deep-rooted mutual antagonism. Not a single Afghan tribal malak or noble exhibited the quality of being a leader capable of infusing a sense of unanimity among the Afghan masses.

Aurangzeb was determined in the task of crushing the power of the fugitive prince. At the later stage of their dispute, Khafi Khan informs us that Dara Shukuh was arrested and then handed over to the representatives of Aurangzeb by Malik Jiwan, an Afghan *zamindar* in Ghakkar. Malik Jiwan, right from the beginning, supported Dara Shukuh but then shifted his loyalty after observing the strong position of Aurangzeb. For that act of treachery with Dara Shukuh, he was granted the title of Bakhtiar Khan by Aurangzeb. In 1659, a role of honour and a *mansab* of *hazari* were accordingly bestowed on him.⁴⁷

Khushal Khan's support for Aurangzeb was for his personal gains and objectives. He was an opportunist and a shrewd statesman. The war of succession was a game of interests for every individual Afghan noble. As stated above, Khushal Khan had personal grudges and jealousy for Dara Shukuh. The prince was indifferent towards him in granting him certain facilities during Shah Jahan's reign. He was inclined towards Yusufzais and established friendly relations with Bhaku Khan and his son. Dara Shukuh twice used his influence against the decision of granting more *jagir* to Khushal Khan. Moreover, he was deadly against the prince's preference to Bhaku Khan in the area. Another factor was that during the war of succession majority of the Indian

47 Khafi Khan Nizam-ul-Mulk, *Muntakhab-ul-Lubbab*, Urdu tr. Muhammad Ahmad Farooqi, Vol. II (Karachi: Nafees Academy, 1976), p. 35.

Afghan nobles who were having friendly terms with Khushal Khan sided with Aurangzeb. Khushal Khan had many friends among them including Bahadar Khan and Asalat Khan. At the final stage, Bahadar Khan's sons Dalir Khan, Mangli Khan and Ranmast Khan played vital role in the success of Aurangzeb against his rival brothers. The other Khweshgi nobles also lend their support to Aurangzeb.⁴⁸ Probably it might be another reason of his support for Aurangzeb.

At the end of the war of succession, Aurangzeb emerged successful and firmly established himself on the throne. The contributions of the Afghan nobles in his victory were overwhelming and remarkable. Like his predecessors, he was cautious that the Afghans officials did not get too much promotion. Khafi Khan stated in this regard, "Keeping in view the attitude and behaviour of the former Afghans, the Emperor did not want that the Afghan should exercise so much control and power in the families of the rulers".⁴⁹ Bernier who travelled India and stayed there from 1658 to 1667 also informs us of the same feelings of the Emperor towards the Afghans.⁵⁰ In fact, despite superb military strategies and personal influence of Aurangzeb, the Afghan nobles played much pivotal role in his bid to subdue other claimants of the throne. Like many of them, Khushal Khan remained a loyal servant of Aurangzeb and did not exercise the slightest desire for rebellion. There was no transformation occurred in his attitude towards neither the Afghan national cause nor the Mughals. As per his policy of being a loyal commander of Aurangzeb, Khushal Khan continued his tirades against the Yusufzais, Bangash and Mandanr Yusufzais. He personally participated in the battle of Tirah against Afridis and Aurakzais in 1659.⁵¹

48 Joshi. *The Afghan Nobility*, p. 147.

49 Khan, *Muntakhab-ul-Lubbab*, p. 440.

50 F. Bernier, *Travels in the Mughal Empire: 1658-1668* (Edinburgh: n.p., 1955), p. 210.

51 Khattak, *Tarikh-i-Murassa*, p. 316.

Imprisonment of Khushal Khan

Aurangzeb ascended to the throne of India in July 1658. In the second year of his reign he announced the remission of all road-toll in the empire. This order was equally extended to the north-west frontier areas. There is no authenticity of the view that the frontier was exempted from the royal order abolishing the road-toll or that it was extended to the frontier on the instigation of Syed Amir Khan Khwafi, the Mughal governor of Kabul. However, Preshan Khattak is of the view that Syed Amir was against the growing influence of Khushal Khan and tacitly got permission to detain certain disobedient *zamindars* of the area. Obviously, his target was Khushal Khan to arrest his growing influence.⁵² As a matter of fact the Mughal policy throughout the history remained quite vigilant towards the Afghans. They did not let anyone among them to gain too much influence and power. In exhibiting political wisdom they were far superior to their Indian adversaries including the Afghans. What could be the reason for Khushal Khan's arrest? The fact was that his services were no more required. As for the road toll, it was implemented across the whole Mughal Empire. To quote from the *Alamgir-Nama*:

The account of the general munificence of his Imperial Majesty, and the remission of the tax on food grains and other articles, and the abolition of the collection of road-toll in the whole domain.⁵³

Ma'asir Alamgiri has recorded accordingly:

At this time, according to his usual generosity, the collection of road-toll [*sic rahdari*] on the transit of grains and other articles was abolished for ever. On this account the crown land made a sacrifice to the extent of 25 lakhs of rupees, and what was given up for the whole empire cannot be imagined.⁵⁴

52 Khattak, *Pashtun Kaun?*, p. 386.

53 Mohmand, *On a Foreign Approach*, p. 39. Also see Mirza Muhammad Kazim, *Alamgir Nama* (Calcutta: n.p., 1867), p. 435.

54 Saqi Mustad Khan, *Ma'asir-i-Alamgiri*, English tr. Jadu Nath Sarkar (Lahore: Sohail Academy, 1981), p. 25.

On account of reduction in the income, majority of the *zamindars*, landlords and fief-holders were not happy with this *farman* of Aurangzeb. It struck the very basis of their financial power. Many of them continued realizing the taxes in covert and thus it remained an open secret in the court. Khushal Khan's position at that time was well-entrenched as a loyal Mughal noble. It was in mid-January 1664 that after reaching Peshawar Sayed Amir Khan summoned Khushal Khan and arrested him through Shaikh Gujar. For two months he was kept in Peshawar and then was shifted to Delhi in an escort consisted of Muhib Khel Mohmands along with Mesri Khan Dawudzai and his men. Arbab Mustajab Khan Mohmand headed the escort. Meanwhile, Mirbaz Khan, Khushal's brother, Baqi Khan, his cousin and his son Sadat Khan reached Delhi before their arrival. They arranged meetings with Muhammad Amin Khan, the *Mir Bakhshi*, for the release of Khushal Khan.⁵⁵

Hamesh Khalil opines that it was rather a conspiracy of Abd-ur-Rahim, *naib-subedar* of Kabul, and two uncles of Khushal Khan namely Bahadar Khan and Feroz Khan. It is stated that for the arrest of Khushal Khan, they bribed Abdur Rahim with fifty thousand rupees. Abd-ur-Rahim told Sayed Amir Khan that it would be impossible for him to continue his governorship for long without arresting some prominent personalities. Thus the imperial order of the abolition of the road-toll provided the conspirators⁵⁶ the opportunity to implicate Khushal Khan. Afzal Khan has informed us about the imprisonment of Khushal Khan thus:

55 Khattak, *Pashtun Kaun?* p. 389.

56 The persons involved in the conspiracy were his two uncles Feroz Khan and Bahadar Khan, Hidayat Tarin of the Tareen tribe, Abd-ur-Rahim, *naib-subidar* of Peshawar, Khwaja Sadiq, a Badakhshani by origin, Khuda Yar, chief of Khalil tribe, Sayed Amir, the governor of Kabul and Khafi Sayid. There were other four or three persons but their names could not be ascertained. Khushal Khan Khattak spent ten months in Delhi and from there he was dispatched to the fort of Ranthambore in January 1665. He was released from imprisonment after about three years and in August 1668 he returned home. Khushal Khan Khattak, *Firaq Nama*, ed. Hamesh Khalil (Peshawar: Pakistan Study Centre University of Peshawar, 1982), p. 8.

The object of Amir Khan was that he should imprison a prominent person so that others frightened thereby, and [thus the realization of] road toll prohibited. And he thought otherwise it will not be prohibited and the Pashtuns will not accept this situation.⁵⁷ [Author's translation]

The conspirators hatched another plot to involve him in the murder case of Alukai Razzar. However, the Yusufzai elders deemed it against the *Pukhtunwali* (code of conduct) and accordingly the brother of the deceased, Shahdad Khan, did not offer any help to accuse Khushal Khan.⁵⁸

At Delhi, Muhammad Amin Khan persuaded Aurangzeb to release Khushal Khan, but at the eleventh hour, Aurangzeb cancelled his decision because he had received a letter from Sayed Amir Khan who informed him about the possible serious political outcome of his release. Yet Muhammad Amin Khan kept his struggle alive. Aurangzeb ordered that the family of Khushal Khan should be brought to Delhi as hostages and set it a condition for his release. In that hour of trial the Yusufzais showed 'great spirit of magnanimity'. They offered asylum to the family of Khushal Khan along with one hundred other Khattak families. They were accommodated in the villages of Sikri and Sangawu in Baizai area of the present district Mardan. Malik Hamza Khan, the chief of the Baizai sub-clan of the Akozai Yusufzai, was the brother-in-law of Khushal Khan. He along with a Yusufzai contingent escorted the family of Khushal Khan to safe locations. Many times Khushal Khan expressed his gratitude to the Yusufzais. Written in a poem in 1669-70 he says:

ډيرو اولسونو غلیمي راسره وکړه
 سر یې راته کوز کړ هله خلاص شول له ماتمه
 یو یوسفزي دي چې په مایې منت بار کړ
 لا په اکوزیو د ننگ چار ده مسلمه
 زه چې د غعد په کال بندي د اورنگ زیب شوم
 کور او خیل خانه مي پکښي ډیره وه له دمه⁵⁹

57 Khattak, *Tarikh-i-Murassa*, p. 234.

58 Mohmand, *On a Foreign Approach*, p. 44.

59 *Ibid.*

Many tribes stood up as enemies against me. But at last found their safety in bowing their heads. Before the Yusufzais, however, I bow under the burden of their kind favour. Among them the Akozai's sense of honour being the most prominent. When I was Aurangzeb's captive in the year 1074 AH. My family lived in comfort among them.

Yusufzais' Uprising under Bhaku Khan

The imprisonment of Khushal Khan was a source of relief for the anti-Mughal Afghan confederacy under the Yusufzai chief Bhaku Khan. Their struggle for an independent Afghan homeland was greatly hampered by Khushal Khan's frequent wars against them. Supported by the Mughals through money, men and weapons, he considerably weakened the position of the Afghans during his pro-establishment period. The influence and strength of the Yusufzais was significantly reduced and they were not able to challenge both the fronts, i.e. the Mughals and Khushal Khan. For the purpose to check the rising influence of Khushal Khan in the Mughal court, the Yusufzai chief Bhaku Khan tried to establish friendly relations with Emperor Shah Jahan through Dara Shukuh. Yet, the imprisonment of Khushal Khan by Aurangzeb left the field clear for Bhaku Khan in Pakhtunkhwa. There was no Khushal Khan to confront with. So he diverted all his energies to secure the Pakhtuns' land from the further Mughal forays.

In spite of Aurangzeb's extended domain in South Asia, his relations with the Afghan tribes were strained. Instead of negotiation, he tried to confront and subdue them by force. Besides, the arrest of Khushal Khan, he sent punitive expeditions against other Afghan tribes. One of the major causes of his expedition against the Yusufzais was his revenge for not supporting his cause during the war of succession. The Yusufzai chief Bhaku Khan was close to Dara Shukuh and tried to receive him at the bank of River Indus near Hund when the latter was in search of refuge. Owing to these grudges, Yusufzais expected from Aurangzeb such kind of harsh treatment. Therefore, in January 1667, Bhaku took his tribesmen into confidence in a

grand *jirga*. It was decided to confront the Mughals. A young man Muhammad Shah was crowned as king and secured religious allegiance to him from the people. Probably, Bhaku Khan wanted to arouse religious sentiments of the Afghans against the Mughals. The objective was to mobilize large-scale popular support and to weaken the Mughal influence among the Afghans. His strategy was to project himself as the temporal head while for securing religious support for his movement he sought the help of Mulla Salak and Muhammad Shah. However, he retained his supreme position as the virtual leader of the Afghans.

Malak Bhaku Khan was not only the leading Yusufzai chief but also a practical ruler of the Afghan land west of the river Indus. His rule even extended to Chach area of Attock. It was during the time of Khan Kaju that some Yusufzai clan had settled in Chach and Hazro areas of Attock. Although, the Mughal check-posts were active there but the activities of the Yusufzai fighters greatly hampered their moments. It was under this background that Bhaku Khan tried to confront the Mughal east of the River Indus. Saqi Musta'ad Khan, the Mughal court historians, has given the following statement in this regard:

When the Emperor learnt of the rising of the Yusufzai Afghans, their exalting as their commander a silly beggar under the name of Muhammad Shah, the disturbances caused by the exertions of that deceitful imposter the wicked Mulla Chalak, and the leadership of the black-faced Baghu [sic Bhaku Khan].⁶⁰

Thus the year 1667 witnessed the great uprising of the Yusufzais under the leadership of Bhaku Khan. The dynamics of Yusufzai-Mughal rivalry were entirely different from that of Khushal Khan's. They were the traditional rivals of the Mughal and virtually established an independent Afghan confederacy on very sound footing. Yusufzai tribal force encroached upon the Mughal territory on the bank of the River Indus. They also defeated Kamil Khan, the *faujdar*

⁶⁰ Saqi Musta'ad Khan, *Ma'asir-i-Alamgiri* (Lahore: Sohail Academy, 1981), p. 238.

of Attock. The Mughals had almost lost control on the territories west of River Indus. Bhaku Khan provided a contingent of the Afghan fighters to Mulla Salak to create trouble in the Attock area. They crossed the River Indus above Attock and invaded Pakhli, a plain area east of the river near Mansehra. They also occupied the main route to Kashmir. Mughal check-posts were attacked on regular basis in Attock area.⁶¹ It clearly indicates that it was not an ordinary uprising of the Afghans, rather a planned effort of Bhaku Khan to revive the Afghan supremacy at least in the north-western Afghan part of South Asia. In the earlier Yusufzais' uprisings usually the battle field had been the Yusufzai land of Swat and Buner. But the strategy of Bhaku Khan was to engage the Mughal east of River Indus. But this tactics was not so much of help for the Afghans.

Aurangzeb deputed Kamil Khan, *faujdar* of Attock, for checking the activities of the Yusufzais and ordered Sayed Amir Khan, governor of Kabul, to dispatch five thousand soldiers to the troubled areas. Due to the gravity of the situation, Mughal reinforcement from other parts was directed to the area. From Delhi a contingent of nine thousand Mughal fighters were also sent under Muhammad Amin Khan. Meantime, Raja Man Singh joined the Mughal army on 1st April 1667. For about a month both the armies confront each other on the bank of River Haru near Attock. At last the battle started on 1st April in which initially the Afghans displayed great feat of bravery and valour. Jadu-Nath Sarkar mentioned about the battle that "after a stubborn fight, Yusufzais tasted a thumping defeat, the enemy broke and were driven into the river; two thousands of them were slain, many wounded, and many more drowned. The imperial territory on this side of the river [Indus] was cleared of the enemy."⁶² In the historical manuscript the

⁶¹ Muhammad Shafi Sabir, *Tarikh-i-Suba Sarhad* (Peshawar: University Book Agency, 1986), p. 331.

⁶² Jadu-Nath Sarkar, *A Short History of Aurangzeb* (New Delhi: Orient Blackswan, 2011), p. 109.

place of the battle was mentioned near the bank of River Haru which is almost fifty km east of the River Indus. Therefore, in spite of the Mughal upper hand in the battle, the significant point is extension of Bhaku Khan's authority east of the River Indus.

It was followed by a series of battles between Bhaku Khan and the Mughals. The Afghan confederacy got the upper hand in the initial encounters at Chach and Hazro situated at Attock in the Punjab. Unable to manoeuvre the situation in the plains of the Punjab where usual reinforcement was quite costly, Bhaku Khan stationed his force at various locations in Tordher, Jalsai, Lahor and Hund. Meanwhile, Akozai and Utmanzai sent fresh reinforcements from Swat and Bajaur. From Tirah, Mohmands and Afridis also joined the Afghan force. It was a mass uprising of the Afghans in the *samah* areas. However, the strategic location of the area was not so much of help from military point of view. But they fought with usual valour and came across the Mughals in a number of encounters. In one such encounter in 1667 two thousand Mughal soldiers were killed while fighting against the Yusufzais.⁶³

To restore peace and to quell the Yusufzais' uprising, Muhammad Amin used diplomacy and tried to find out ways for truce. Rewards and incentives were offered to a number of tribal malaks which tilted the situation in favour of the Mughals. Moreover, he created dissention and mistrust among the Afghans by exploiting intra-tribal jealousies. Expeditions were then dispatched into Shahbazgarhi and Bajaur to block the tribal reinforcement towards Bhaku Khan.⁶⁴ Shamsheer Khan then stationed his troops near Hund and destroyed the villages of Panjpir, Shah Mansur and nearby hamlets. They burnt down the standing crops, looted the property and took away the livestock.⁶⁵

63 Khan Roshan Khan, *Yusufzai Qaum Ki Sarguzasht* (Karachi: Roshan Khan and Company, 1986), p. 246.

64 *Ibid.*, p. 247.

65 Sarkar, *A Short History of Aurangzeb*, p. 110.

Aurangzeb sent many expeditions but he gained no meaningful success in subduing the Yusufzai-led Afghan uprising. Muhammad Amin personally marched towards Swat but was unable to enter the valley and had to return back to Hund. In the Mughal camp at Hund, some officers gave him advice of making compromise with Bhaku Khan. Their assessment was based on the reason that for six months the insurgency was gaining strength day by day. At last Muhammad Amin concluded a ceasefire with Bhaku Khan. Afterwards, the Mughals returned to Delhi crossing through rivers Kabul and Indus.⁶⁶ The area as usual was under the influence of the Afghan confederacy. The Mughal authority was nominal and was restricted only to the Mughal forts at various places. In practice, the area was administered by Bhaku Khan.

Bhaku Khan was the malak of not only the Yusufzai but all the *Khashi* or *Khakhi* tribes. He was the son of Mammun Khan of Khadu Khel, sub-clan of Yusufzai. He rose to prominence during the reign of Emperor Jahangir. He was close to Dara Shukuh and established his relations with other nobles of the court. As a courageous lad, he led an expedition and dispelled *Domas*, who were said to be Tartars by origin, from the areas of Hasanzai Akazai, Mada Khel, Makhozai, Chagharzai and the hills of Poran nowadays situated in Shangla district. Bhaku Khan, with the help of Akhun Salak, assembled a great number of the Afghan tribal force.⁶⁷ He ruled over the area stretching from Bajaur and Swat to Hashtnagar in the west and towards east up to Hazara and Chach areas. He was assisted in the

66 *Ibid.*, p. 248.

67 There is no truth in the assertion of Preshan Khattak that during those days the Yusufzais had chosen a king of their own by the name of Muhammad Shah. He was given this position just to extract maximum support from the people. However, the supreme position was that of Bhaku Khan. In *Tawarikh Hafiz Rahmat Khani* it is stated that due to the spiritual influence of Akhun Salak, a considerable number of people revered him as their *pir*. Both Bhaku Khan and Akhun Salak played significant role in the occupation of Duma, which was described as the land of infidels. On the face of these developments, even Shah Jahan requested Akhun Salak to abandon the area of Yusufzais. *Ibid.*, p. 571.

administration of these areas by other capable malaks for instance Malak Zarif, Malak Hamid, Malak Kache, Malak Kachu and Malak Habib Khan.⁶⁸ In fact, during this period the Afghans under Bhaku Khan shifted the focal point away from the Yusufzais' plain to the east of river Indus. This was, in fact, a great achievement of Bhaku Khan to infiltrate deep in to the Mughal territories. He changed his guerrilla warfare and concentrated on defending the plain area by stationing his troops in Jalbai, Hund and Tordher. It was a tactical move to restrict the Mughal just to the Indus waters. However, militarily the strategy of Bhaku Khan was not so much of help for the Afghans. He was compelled to leave the plain areas when the Mughal sent fresh contingents to confront his fighters. Many thousands of them were put to death and their crops devastated by the Mughals.

It has been mentioned that Emperor Shah Jahan virtually endorsed Bhaku Khan's authority on these areas. He sent precious gifts and a horse from the royal stable as a sign of goodwill for him. That is why the area remained peaceful and no uprising happened. Afterwards, he firmly established his writ and operated like an independent ruler of the region from Bajaur up to the River Indus. He died in the year 1668 and was buried in Kankoway village situated in district Buner. On the authority of *Bifatih-ul-Ansab*, Roshan Khan has recorded the following statement about Bhaku Khan:

In the Yusufzai's country a Raja was born by the name of Bhaku. He established military cantonments from Bajaur to River Indus with proper contingents and guards resided therein. He used to collect taxes from the inhabitants of the conquered land. He subdued the Gadoons and compelled them to recognize him as their ruler and pay taxes.⁶⁹ [Author's translation]

The situation in the Afghan borderland was a source of concern for Aurangzeb. The growing influence of the Afghan confederacy and the sway of Bhaku Khan could not fit in

68 *Ibid.*, p. 577.

69 *Ibid.*, p. 577.

their policy paradigm for the frontier. The elimination of Khushal Khan from the political scene was a factor that tilted the balance of power in favour of the Yusufzai Afghans. To restore the Mughal authority in the area Emperor Aurangzeb brought about some administrative changes in the province of Kabul. He also thought of exploiting the services of Khushal Khan. He summoned him to the court and discussed with him his concerns about the Afghan uprising. He asked Khushal Khan that how peace could be restored to the troubled frontier? In reply he made Sayed Amir Khan and Abd-ur-Rahim responsible for all bad occurrences in the area. He advised Emperor Aurangzeb that Mahabat Khan should be appointed as the governor of Kabul.⁷⁰ Accordingly, in 1668-69 Aurangzeb appointed Mahabat Khan as the new governor of Kabul. It was at the request of Mahabat Khan that he agreed to release Khushal Khan and allowed him to go home accompanying the new governor. Dost Muhammad Kamil has mentioned that in the year 1668 Khushal Khan reached his home-town.⁷¹

Majority of the researchers have considered the release of Khushal Khan as a watershed in his political career. He was discussed in the Afghan nationalist jargon. A popular myth was created that after his release he had transformed himself as an Afghan nationalist. It has often been interpreted by the progressive and nationalist writers that the change in the mind of Khushal Khan did not occur suddenly. It was the result of some unpleasant events, which strongly made him resentful of the Mughal rule. The nationalist ideas and ideals entered into his thoughts and poetry after observing the attitude of the Mughals towards the Afghans. Naturally, it was very hard for an Afghan like him to bear such treatment and kept his mouth shut on the face of a superior adversary. He started to inspire his poetry with elements such as *nang* (honour), *wahdat* (unity) and hatred

70 Mohmand, *Khushal Khan*, p. 118.

71 *Ibid.* Also see Khushal Khan Khattak, *Swat Nama*, ed. and English tr. Shakeel Ahmad (Peshawar: Pashto Academy, University of Peshawar, n.d.), p. 9.

for the Mughals.⁷² His poetry became an inner cry of his thoughts and the spontaneous voice of a person expressing his innocence over the wrong doings done to him. At the same time it was the voice of an honest person never concealing his personal differences with the emperor. Albeit, he never made secret of his struggle having been initially motivated at personal grievances. When he suffered a personal injury by the hands of the Mughals, he lamented:

پښتنو سره زړه تور دے د مغلو
خبردار يې په نيتونو يک په يک يم⁷³

Black are the hearts of the Mughals towards the
Pashtuns, I am aware of their evil designs one by one.

But the fact of the matter is that he adopted a cautious policy towards the Mughals. Around that time a change occurred in the mind of Khushal Khan about the Mughals in general and Aurangzeb in particular. He had been transformed after a long and hefty service for the Mughals. His power and strength was crippled in his area and was not that prominent and influential figure. Hence, he adopted a careful policy in dealing with them. The following are extracts from some of his poems, written during and after his imprisonment and touching the imaginations of his thoughts about the Mughals:

په اوان د اورنگ زيب بادشاه په بند شوم
بے تقصيره، بي گناه دردمند شوم
دري څلور كاله په بند د اورنگ زيب شوم
خدائے چي خلاص كرم، انتقام ته نا شكيب شوم
ناگ هانه په دا ملك فساد بنياد شه
زما هم د تلافيو كار په ياد شه
د فساد كه يو بخري و ما اور كر
اور مي پوري د اورنگ بادشاه په كور كر⁷⁴

I was made a prisoner in the Emperor Aurangzeb's reign.
I was tortured without guilt or fault of mine. For three or
four years I was Aurangzeb's captive. On becoming free
I became impatient for revenge. All of a sudden

72 Mohmand, *On a Foreign Approach*, p. 34.

73 Khan, *Kulyat-i-Khushal Khan Khattak*, p. 34.

74 Caroe, *The Pathans*, p. 236.

disturbance appeared in this land. And I also thought of retaliation. I turned the mere spark of disturbance into a blazing fire. And set it to the house of Aurangzeb.

Khushal Khan has condemned Aurangzeb and the Mughals in his poetry after he had gone through their painful treatment. It is quite clear from his poetry that the force behind transforming him was personal grudge against Aurangzeb. In his poems he has scorned Aurangzeb for his treatment with his brothers and father. Interestingly, Khushal Khan himself adopted similar kind of cruel behaviour with his own son, uncles and other relatives for power, influence and the Mughal *mansab*. In fact, it was his personal grudge against Aurangzeb that changed his thoughts. Till his dismissal from *mansab*, imprisonment and deprivation from the Mughal perks he did not exhibit the least disliking for them. Like in the days during Shah Jahan, he remained a loyal servant; neither criticized him for his treatment with father and brother nor showed any disgust for fighting against the Afghans. His joining of the Afghan national discourse occurred at a time when he was deprived of his *mansab*, men, money and material that the *nang* of his poetry took the shape of a national honour. And the purpose of his poetry was the liberation of the Afghan land from the Mughal yoke.

Aurangzeb personally came to Hasan Abdal in June 1675. He dispatched punitive expeditions in various directions. Mukaram Khan was sent *en route* to Bajaur to restore imperial sway in the areas. In one of his battles against the Yusufzais, considerable numbers of Mughals were slain. Mukaram Khan's brother Shamsheer Khan and Mir Azizullah were killed during the encounter. Mukaram Khan fled from the battle-ground and left Bajaur in very miserable condition.⁷⁵

75 Pir Muazzam Shah, *Tawarikh Hafiz Rahmat Khani: Afghan Qabail aur unki Tarikh* (Peshawar: Pashto, Academy), p. 576.

Revolt of Darya Khan and Aimal Khan

As stated above, due to the uprising of the Yusufzais, Aurangzeb brought about some administrative changes in the province of Kabul. The uprising of the Yusufzais under Bhaku Khan was a great threat to the authority of the Mughals. Aurangzeb also feared a confederacy of the Yusufzais and other Afghan tribes including the Khattaks, which would have the potentials to challenge his authority. Therefore, he did not underestimate the full swing of the Afghan force and once again tried to exploit their disunity. After his release, Khushal Khan remained reluctant to be used by the Mughals against the Yusufzais. But quite surprisingly he did not openly announce the course of his policy and remained cautious. When Mahabat Khan offered him a *mansab* and the administration of the Yusufzai country, he did not accept the offer and instead made excuses that he needed rest. Regarding the construction of the fort of Langar Kot he advised Mahabat Khan not to build such an unwanted fort. His opinion was that it would be dangerous for the Mughal soldiers to stay in the midst of the Yusufzais.

لنګر کوټ مـغلو سازکړو
 زه په ننگ بیا د افغان شوم
 که یوسف و که مندن و
 زه دواړو نګه هـبان شوم⁷⁶

The Mughal constructed the fort of Langar Kot, and after that I took up the cause of the Afghan *nang*. I stood up to protect both, the Yusufzai and Mandanr.

Khushal Khan simply observed the political developments around him. At that time he was neither ready nor equipped to take a practical step against the Mughals. He did not sever his connections with them but his opposition to the construction of the Langar Kot fort was an obvious sign of the “parting of the ways”. One may call it a transitional period in his life in which he switched over from a loyal servant after losing trust and confidence of the Mughal.

76 Mohmand, *On a Foreign Approach*, p. 48.

That period in his life and perceptions, however, cannot categorize him to be a nationalist leader of the Afghans.

During this transitional period in Khushal's life, Aurangzeb transferred Muhammad Amin to Kabul in 1670. He was a trusted friend and an old supporter of Khushal Khan. At the time of his arrival the Afghan borderland witnessed grave uprising of the Yusufzais, Mohmands, Afridis and Bangash. Law and order situation prevailed everywhere in the region. The Mughals showed no mercy towards the Yusufzais, but they proved too difficult to control. However, unity of purpose and proper direction was absent altogether from the rank and file of the Afghan resistance.

The event which completely changed the already charged atmosphere of the Afghan borderland was the disgrace of a girl belonging to Safi, a sub-branch of the Karlanri tribe. It was an intolerable act as far as the Afghans were concerned. To avenge this disgrace, Afridi, Shinwari and Mohmand forces joined hands with the Safi tribal *lashkar*. They killed those soldiers who had committed this terrible crime. Then they inflicted a defeat on Hussain Beg, the Mughal *faujdar* of Kunar (a border province of Afghanistan). Muhammad Amin greatly resented the defeat of Hussain Beg and wanted to retaliate with full force.

Muhammad Amin sought the help of Khushal Khan in the task to clear the area from the miscreant Afghan fighters. Khushal Khan, after receiving the order, joined Muhammad Amin in his journey towards Kabul. The purpose was to clear Khyber Pass from those Afghans who assembled under the leadership of Aimal Khan Mohmand who belonged to the Khoezai branch of the Mohmand tribe. Among the Khoezai his clan was Kukuzai. His descendants were called Badsha Khel. Because it is stated that he proclaimed himself the king of the Afghans and coins were struck in his name on skin of animals. The other great hero of the Afghans during the uprising was Darya Khan, an Adam Khel Afridi.⁷⁷

77 Murad Layeq, *Aimal Khan Baba: Tahqiqi au Tanqidi Jaiza* [Pashto] (Peshawar: n.p., 2007), p. 42.

It was the beginning of the summer of 1672 when the Mughal caravan reached Landi Khana near Landi Kotal. They found the Afghan force consisted of the Afridi, Mohmand and Shinwari tribal *lashkars*. They offered tough resistance and at last caused havoc and chaos in the Mughal camp. In this battle the imperial forces suffered great losses. A great number of soldiers were put to the sword. The Afghans imprisoned the daughter, sister and mother of Muhammad Amin. His wife committed suicide and his son Abdullah, was killed.⁷⁸ Interestingly, in the battle Khushal Khan fought alongside the Mughals against the Afghans. It was after this victory that Aimal Khan was chosen as the king of the area in a formal ceremony. Afterwards, it was recorded that *sikah* was also struck in his name. The wars between the Mughals and Aimal Khan were continued for a long time in which the formers suffered heavy losses.⁷⁹

On the face of these evidences the nationalist assertion of Khushal Khan seems unsound till that time. Perhaps he acted like a confused person looking like dithering about his future political course. It is absurd to contemplate, especially after his participation in the battle in Landi Kotal that he transformed from a loyal servant of the Mughals to an Afghan nationalist. The reason behind Khushal Khan's joining the Mughals might be his great regards and considerations for Muhammad Amin Khan. In one of his poems he has described him in these words:

آفرين د مير جمله په زويه باندي
چي نن دي د مير بخشي په استقلال
که هزار توري چاري غشي وريږي
ده زما په سر نيولي دي خپل ډال⁸⁰

Blessed be upon the son of *Mir Jumlah*. Firmly occupying the office of paymaster general [*Mir Bakhshi*]. Though swords, daggers and darts in thousands are showered at me, he is holding his shield over my head.

78 *Kulyat-i-Khushal* p. 83.

79 *Ibid.*, 83.

80 Mohmand, *On a Foreign Approach*, p. 86.

After the battle of Landi Kotal he glorified the triumph of the Afghans because of his aversion for the Mughals in general. But it does not mean that he rejoiced the defeat of his friend Muhammad Amin. The poem, which he wrote soon after the battle, is full of anguish. According to Dost Muhammad Khan Kamil “we find the poet commiserating with his friend [Muhammad Amin]. Though at the same time he warned the Afghans to be vigilant and on their guard, because the Mughals would never take easily the shame that had befallen upon them.”⁸¹

The elevation of Aimal Khan to the status of a king in the tribal area as evidence indicated was a clear example of the Afghans’ divergent and sometime opposing streams of resisting the Mughals. There was complete lack of organization and coordination among them. It would have been in favour of Aimal Khan Mohmand, Bhaku Khan and Khushal Khan Khattak to outline a workable strategy against the Mughals but there was no proper coordination among them. Khushal Khan’s personal regard for Muhammad Amin, the Mughal governor, gave the impression that he sacrificed the greater cause of the Afghan nationalism. The placement of his ‘personal regard’ greatly jeopardised his standing as a nationalist hero of the Afghans. It clearly indicated his tangible preferences of personal friendship against larger interest of the Afghan nationalism.

After the humiliating defeat at Landi Kotal, Aurangzeb once again changed the governor of Kabul. The appointment of Mahabat Khan as the new governor proved to be a turning point in his relations with the Mughals. Mahabat Khan, after his arrival, wrote to Khushal Khan to come to his court. As reported by his grandson Afzal Khan, being loyal and well-wisher of the Mughals and having no bad intentions for Mahabat Khan, Khushal Khan preferred to retire from his home-town for Teri-Bulaq so as to remain at bay from the Mughal-Afghan conflict.⁸²

81 *Ibid.*, p. 122.

82 Khattak, *Tarikh-i-Murassa*, pp. 351-52.

In this state of affairs, Mahabat Khan tried to win the confidence of his son Ashraf Khan. He was persuaded to take up arms against his father but to no avail. But after some time he found in Bahram Khan, his third son, a person who may be capable enough to counterbalance Khushal Khan. Accordingly, Bahram Khan was made chief of the Khattak tribe through imperial *farman*. Besides, Mahabat Khan conferred upon him several other privileges. Bahram Khan became an open ally of the Mughals not only against his father but also against other Afghan tribes. Differences were created not only between Khushal Khan and his sons but also his near relatives as well. Khattak tribe got divided some fighting for and other against the Mughals. It created a lot of trouble and resulted in a series of fighting among the tribesmen. In the midst of these scuffles, Khushal Khan was running from post to pillar like a fugitive for his own survival.⁸³

Khushal Khan himself, as has been reported by his grandson Afzal Khan, has made Mahabat Khan responsible for all that tricky mess. Moreover, he was pushed to the wall by extracting a bond or affidavit from his son Ashraf Khan not to allow his father in his *jagir* in their home-town. Interestingly, Khushal Khan had criticized Ashraf Khan for giving such a bond and expressed that rather submitting such a bond, he may have given only the surety that his father would not create any troublesome situation for the Mughals.⁸⁴ Having observed his weak position, deprived of his *jagir* by his own son, he intended that he will, henceforth, refrain from the Mughals and will spend the rest of his life in worship. He said at this time in one of his *ghazals* (amatory poem):

د فساد فکر می نشسته خدائے حاضر دے
خپل ساعت به تیروم عمر آخر دے⁸⁵

83 *Ibid.*, pp. 352-70,

84 *Ibid.*, p. 351.

85 Khattak, *Kulyat-e-Khushal Khan Khattak*, 50.

Allah knows, I have no intention of turmoil; and will pass my time as it is old age.

It was something unbearable political developments for him. Faced with such kind of grave situation even in his own family he was pushed to the extreme. As his mind was already filled up against the Mughals he started denouncing them openly as usurpers and invited all the Afghans to be united against the Mughals. A number of writers are of the view that Khushal Khan did not revolt against the Mughals even after his imprisonment and remained loyal thereafter too. It was when he pushed to the wall and left with no option but either to surrender or fight for his personal survival—as his own son Bahram Khan became his rival for the chieftainship and thus his tribe also divided—then he took up arms for the first time against the Mughals. His fighting against the Mughals, therefore, was not for the Afghan *nang* (Afghan honor/cause) as he claimed in the following verse:

د افغان په ننگ مے وتړله توره
تنگيالے د زمانے خوشحال خټک يم

I took up sword (against the Mughals) for the sake of the Afghan *nang* (honor) I, Khushal Khattak, am the esteemed of the age.⁸⁶

It was just for his personal survival that he was fighting, to which he tried to give the name of the Pukhtun *nang*.⁸⁷ Bahadar Shah Zafar Kakakhel endorses that it was due to his personal disgrace and un-acknowledgement of his personal and family services that broke Khushal Khan's heart vis-à-vis the Mughals. However, the breach was so much deep that was not to be remedied by gifts and rank.⁸⁸ He, moreover, admits that the severed relation between Khushal Khan and Aurangzeb was due to personal reasons rather than 'Pukhtun *nang*'.⁸⁹ According to Allah Bakhsh Yusufi, Khushal Khan's taking arms against the Mughals

86 *Ibid.*, p. 52.

87 Sultan-i-Rome, 'Khushal Khan Khattak and Swat', p. 120.

88 Kakakhel, *Pukhtanah da Tarikh Pah Ranra kay*, p. 621.

89 *Ibid.*, p. 637.

was neither for Afghan cause, nor any national necessity made him to oppose them and nor did the desire to expel the Mughals from the Afghan land guided him. He and his ancestors have remained loyal to the Mughals. The sole reason of the fury that erupted was taking revenge of personal grudges. He painted his personal opposition and revenge as a national one and aroused the tribesmen against the Mughals in which he made thousands of the Afghans to be sacrificed in vain that brought no benefit to the Afghan *millat*.⁹⁰

However, the things were not so smooth even after his release. The unification of the Afghans was not an easy task to be achieved. Khushal Khan's relation with the Mughals largely influenced the political situation of the area. After his release, imperial presence was clearly felt in the politics of the Afghan borderland in the form of his pro-Mughal sons and family members. Meanwhile, the Yusufzais under Bhaku Khan established its rule from Bajaur up-to River Indus. In fact, his nationalist poetry, in which he speaks of the golden period of the Afghans, provided a boost to the anti-Mughal sentiments among them. He reminded them of Bahlul and Sher Shah who established Afghan dynasties in India.

90 Allah Bakhsh Yusufi, *Yusufzai Pathan* [Urdu], (Karachi: Muhammad Ali Educational Society, 1973), pp. 279-80.



Sultan Bahlul Lodhi



Sultan Ibrahim Lodhi



Bayazid Ansari




Gaju Khan Yusufzai



Afghan Emperor Sher Shah Suri



A group of Afriidi Fighters




Khushal Khan Khattak



Malak Ahmad Khan Yusufzai
Founder of Modern Pakhtunkhwa



Author at the grave of Bhaku Khan Yusufzai



Empire of Sher Shah Suri 1540-1545

Chapter 6

Aurangzeb and the Afghan Resistance-II

In his pre-imprisonment period Khushal Khan did not allow any anti-Mughal uprising in the area and always fought wars against the Afghans for the establishment of the Mughal authority. However, the situation was quite different this time. The political environment of the Afghan borderland at the time of Khushal Khan's release was charged with revolts. The turning point in the life of Khushal Khan was the rebellion of his son Bahram Khan against the former at the behest of the Mughals. It was after his release that he nominated Ashraf Khan as the chief of the Khattak tribe. But Bahram Khan got offended and openly violated his father's nomination. With the emergence of these differences in his own family, the entire Khattak tribe was accordingly affected which ultimately diminished the influence and power of Khushal Khan to a larger extent.

Deprived of his *mansab* and disturbed by the emerging rumpus with his son, Khushal Khan was like a fugitive noble in that phase of his political life. The Mughals remained successful in creating a rift not only in his family but the whole Khattak tribe got divided. It was a serious blow and a surprising development for which he was not mentally and physically prepared. In fact, he tried his utmost to restore his former glory among his tribesmen. He discussed the matter with some Khattak nobles who plainly told him of the large-scale tribal support for Bahram Khan. Ibrahim, a Khattak noble, even asked him to leave his village Totki for Teri and

Sutra due to backlash from Bahram. There was a pro-Khushal faction among them but they were not powerful enough to challenge Bahram and took up arms against him.¹ This was the state of affairs in his tribe and the level of his influence upon them. His hey days were gone and his last days were made extremely difficult by Bahram Khan.

What made the situation more complicated for Khushal Khan was the role played by Shaikh Zia-ud-Din, son of Hazrat Shaikh Rahamkar Kaka Sahib, who was very close to the Mughals. In the whole affairs he used his influence in support of Bahram. He was constantly in touch with the Mughals and played their game along with Bahram Khan. To curtail the position of Ashraf Khan he pressed the Mughal governor to issue a *farman* to confer on Bahram Khan the chieftainship of the tribe. Preshan Khattak in his book has given a detailed account of these developments.² It is a matter of further research that despite Khushal Khan's spiritual attachment with Kaka Sahib why he was pushed to the wall by Zia-ud-Din. In 1673 there occurred some minor skirmishes between Khushal Khan and Bahram Khan who received active support from the Mughals. In all these intra-family encounters hundreds of Khattak tribesmen were killed.

Revolt of Khushal Khan

Around this time Khushal Khan received a letter from Darya Khan Afridi in which the latter sought the former's advice regarding reconciliation with the Mughals. Khushal Khan at once realized the importance of this development and shifted his energies to take advantage out of Darya Khan-Mughal conflict. He got a favourable response there when the Afridis and the Mohmands supported him in his wars against Bahram Khan. The rest of his life he spent in planning attacks on the Mughal installations, journeys into different tribal areas and seeking assistance from different tribes against the Mughals.

1 Preshan Khattak, *Pashtun Kaun?: Tarikh, Tahqiq, Tanqid* [Urdu] (Peshawar: Pashto, Academy, 2005), p. 420.

2 See *Ibid.*, p. 421.

Mahabat Khan continued his correspondence with Khushal Khan and wrote him several letters about his good treatment. At the same time, he fully exploited the differences of Ashraf Khan and Bahram Khan, which diverted the attention of a good number of people in the Khattak tribe away from Khushal Khan's rivalry with the Mughals. Khushal tried his level best to bring unity to his tribe but to no avail. For this purpose he went to Kohat and held discussion with a number of malaks of his tribe. For winning the support of the people he visited Chuntra and a number of other villages. Although Khushal Khan was not ready to endorse the chieftainship of Bahram Khan but in fact majority of the Khattaks were under the strong influence of Bahram Khan and Shaikh Zia-ud-Din. The matter got so much serious that Ashraf Khan imprisoned Zia-ud-Din for supporting Bahram Khan.³

Being disappointed from a section of his own tribe, he wrote to Darya Khan about his future planning. Darya Khan sent his brother Tatar Khan Afridi. They held a *jirga* at a place named Rajgarh. According to Dost Muhammad Khan Kamil, historians do not know the location and whereabouts of Rajgarh. The literature related to the topic does not throw sufficient light, mentioning merely the name Rajgarh. In the *jirga*, a formal agreement was concluded whereby Khushal Khan and Afridi tribesmen agreed to form an alliance for making a united front against their opponents. They also finalized a joint strategy for conducting operations against the Mughals. Tatar Khan and Khushal Khan devised a plan to commence their joint venture by attacking the fort of Nowshehra.⁴

Disappointed from a section of his tribesmen, he now found a comfortable place among the Afridis. Probably at that critical stage he decided not to reconcile with them at any cost. Khushal Khan gathered around him a band of his

3 Sardar Sher Muhammad Gandapur, *Tarikh-i-Khurshid Jahan* (Karachi: Shaikh Shawkat Ali and Sons, 1991), p. 530.

4 Dost Muhammad Khan Kamil Mohmand, *Khushal Khan Khattak* [Urdu] (Peshawar: Idara-i-Ishaat-i-Sarhad, 1951), p. 154.

supporters consisted of some Teri and Bulaq Khattaks. On the other hand, Darya Khan Afridi also produced a force consisted of the Aka Khel, Katuzai and Asha Khel sub-tribes. The strength of the joint force was seven to eight thousands which met at Dag Ismail Khel, situated on the northwest of the Nowshehra fort. They conducted a successful attack on the fort supervised by Tatar Khan and Khushal Khan. There were three thousand Afghan and the Mughal soldiers inside the fort who offered mild resistance and fought for some time. But eventually they lost the ground and were ultimately defeated. In this first ever attack, Khushal Khan fought along with his two sons namely Abid Khan and Abdul Qadir Khan. After the success, he went to Nizampur and then marched towards Rajgarh where he met with his family members and other relatives.⁵

With the passage of time the situations in the Afghan borderland became worse for the Mughals. The enthusiasm of the Afghans increased with the success of attack on the Nowshehra fort. Realizing the gravity of the situation, Mahabat Khan utilized all means to arrest the growing strength of the Afghan uprising. He tried to keep them away from infiltrating into the masses. Several times, he invited Khushal Khan to his court and sought his advice in administering the area. But the latter was suspicious of the Mughals behaviour, and was also afraid of his arrest for his recent raids on the Mughal fort.

These adverse developments in the Afghan borderland proved a source of worry for Aurangzeb. He issued strict orders to bring the area under firm control. The Mughals faced another defeat against the Afghans in a place called Duwabah near Charsadda. They fought under the leadership of Mir Hussaini. A strategy of guerrilla warfare was adopted by the Afghans in attacking the Mughal forces where they considered appropriate. Skirmishes took place on regular intervals and attacks on the Mughal caravans by various Afghan tribes were frequently occurred. With the gradual

5 *Ibid.*, p. 155.

uprising of the Afghans, the smooth administration of the area proved very difficult for the emperor.

The fresh Afghan uprising and the diminishing influence of the Mughal authority alarmed Aurangzeb who was not satisfied with the Kabul administration and their policies, which failed to produce concrete results. Time and again he warned Mahabat Khan to take strong measures against the Afghans but despite his strong measures the anti-Mughal movement got momentum.

Sensing the general mass uprising, Aurangzeb compelled to give top priority to the north-west frontier affairs. In November 1673, he sent his prominent general Shujat Khan with a huge force along with a stern warning for Mahabat Khan. He also issued instruction to Maharaja Jaswant Singh, *faujdar* of Jamrud, to reinforce Shujat Khan. Before coming to the frontier areas Maharaja Jaswant Singh fought against Shivaji in 1671, under Shaista Khan and Prince Muazzam. In December 1671, he was appointed *faujdar* of Jamrud. According to Jadu Nath Sarkar: "It relieved the pressure on Shivaji by draining the Deccan of the best Mughal troops for service on the northwest frontier...." Thus it can be rightly said that the shifting of the Mughal soldiers to the Afghan borderland provided a boost to the Rajputs and Marathas to intensify their activities in the Deccan. The grave situation in the north-western frontier was one of the factors mainly responsible for their spectacular success against the Mughals.⁶

For several times, the Afghan turmoil resulted in the blockage of communication and transportation through imperial road. Aurangzeb dispatched capable officers to the region with specific instructions to give topmost priority to the safety of the road leading to Kabul.⁷ He feared that a successful uprising of the Afghans in the borderland could inspire their brethren in the northern India for a similar kind

6 Jadu Nath Sarkar. *History of Aurangzeb*, Vol. III (Calcutta: M.C. Sarkar and Sons, 1928), p. 170.

7 Rita Joshi, *The Afghan Nobility and the Mughals* (Delhi: Vikas Publishing House, 1985), p. 171.

of rebellion against him. He sent Prince Azam Shah who like Mirza Ulugh Beg in Kabul long time ago, treacherously hatched the plan to smash them by making truce with them. He posed friendship with fifty two Afghan nobles and later on murdered them deceitfully. Aurangzeb was delighted and hailed this act of the Prince.⁸

At a time when the Marathas were raising their heads in the Deccan, the best possible option for Aurangzeb was to adopt a mild and moderate attitude towards the Afghans. But he rather underestimated their actual strength. The more he added reinforcement to the Mughal forces, the more the Afghan uprising intensified.

After his arrival to the region, Shujat Khan and Jaswant Singh sent a letter to Khushal Khan. The letter was a sort of safe conduct and covert threats to him for his recent attack on Mughal forces.⁹ In his reply, he flatly refused to bow down and accept any rapprochement with the Mughals. Shujat Khan, after being disappointed from any understanding with him, stayed at Attock fort for some time and then sent an advance party to arrest Khushal Khan. However, their efforts of arresting Khushal Khan proved unsuccessful. Aurangzeb also released Sher Muhammad Khan, a Bangash chief and a rival of Khushal Khan, and was restored to his old *jagir*. He was sent to his native land in order to weaken the might and influence of the resisting forces and, if possible, arrest Khushal Khan.¹⁰

The Afridis perceived in Sher Muhammad Khan Bangash a great threat to their cause. Despite their strong

8 When the situation in the frontier areas deteriorated between 1677 and 1679, it became very difficult for Aurangzeb to give proper attention to other parts of the Empire. The Afghans' uprising was a source of anxiety for the Mughal administration. Aurangzeb dispatched regular forces but gained no meaningful success. He left behind Prince Azam Shah to deal with the Afghans. He feigned friendship with 52 Afghan chief and then treacherously killed them. Probably he had the approval of Aurangzeb. Manucci, *Storia Do Mogor or Mughal India* Vol. II (Calcutta: n.p., 1969), p. 191.

9 Mohmand, *Khushal Khan*, p. 159.

10 *Ibid.*, p. 160. Also see Khattak, *Pashtoon Kaun?*, pp.483-84.

advice for eliminating him from the scene, Khushal Khan remained busy in his family matters in Mandori near Ziara, accompanied by some of his Mohmand followers. Meanwhile, Sher Muhammad tried to arrest Khushal Khan but he was informed by local Afridis of the designs of the Bangash chief. He immediately started preparation for a showdown with Sher Muhammad, which however, did not take place.¹¹

Khushal Khan remained busy in his bid to unify the Afghan resistance against the Mughals. He reminded them of their glorious past and urged them to resist the Mughals and oust them from their land. He went far and wide and held long meetings with leaders of the different tribes. But the problem, however, he faced was quite understandable. He was no more acceptable to majority of the Afghans, particularly the powerful Yusufzai tribe, for his previous ambivalent role in serving the Mughals, killing hundreds of Afghans and harming the Afghan national cause.

It was in February 1674, that Shujat Khan, after a brief stay at Peshawar, started his march towards Kabul via Mohmand area. Aimal Khan Mohmand thought it a golden opportunity to give the Mughals a pitch battle. He chastised Shujat Khan up-to Gandab valley. Afterwards, he surrounded the Mughals from three sides which took them into surprise. It was such a sudden attack that thousands of the Mughals were slain and a great number of them fled from the battlefield. Shujat Khan received deep wounds in the midst of the battle and died on the spot. *Maharaja Jaswant Singh* was surrounded by some of his followers and was helped with difficulty to flee from the field.¹²

Khushal Khan was in Chuntra when he received the news of the Mughal disaster. He hailed the courageous and able leadership of Aimal Khan Mohmand and his success. But at the same time he got the news of Darya Khan's defeat at Kohat by Sher Muhammad Khan. Despite his promise of a

11 *Ibid.*

12 *Ibid.* Also see Khushal Khan Khattak, *Swat Nama*, ed. and English ts. Shakeel Ahmad Peshawar: Pashto Academy, University of Peshawar, n. d), p. 14.

front venture with Khushal, Darya Khan did not wait for him and attacked prematurely on the Bangash contingent. The main reason probably was Darya Khan's excitement after the humiliating defeat of the Mughals at Gandab. His estimate of the Mughal force and Bangash tribesmen inside the fort was incorrect. As a result, he lost his younger brother Tatar Khan and more than one hundred tribesmen.¹³

Though the defeat of Darya Khan was a great blow to the anti-Mughal forces yet they remained steadfast. Khushal Khan faced difficulties from his own son and was preoccupied to settle his family disputes. Compelled by adverse circumstances he had to shift his family to Tirah from Nizampur. From there he continued his correspondence with the Afghan leaders and sent his messengers to far-flung areas to spread the message of the Afghan unity. It was during these days when he visited the Yusufzai area of Swat.¹⁴

Khushal Khan among the Swat Yusufzais

Dismayed over the death of his prominent commanders and defeats from the Afghan army, Emperor Aurangzeb decided to tackle the issue by himself. For this purpose, he left Lahore for Hasan Abdal in April 1674 with the huge Mughal force under his command. He decided to stay at Hasan Abdal and guided the troops from there.¹⁵ Khushal Khan spent much of his time in the inaccessible eyries of Tirah with his Afridi friends. Their plan of conducting further attacks was foiled by fresh deployment of the Mughals forces in the Bangash area. In one of his poems he has depicted the situation thus:

په لاجی په چونتره وگرځید لم
وس گشت د آفریدو په میدان شي¹⁶

I went round in Lachi and Chuntra, and now I am
travelling about in the fields of the Afridis.

13 Mohmand, *Khushal Khan*, p. 162.

14 Khattak, *Pashtun Kaun?*, p. 495.

15 Mohmand, *Khushal Khan*, p. 163.

16 Ahmad, *Swat Nama*, p. 15.

Khushal Khan's stay in Tirah lasted from June to September 1674. Meanwhile, Emperor Aurangzeb utilized every channel to subdue and control the Afghan uprising. Truce, bribery and force were repeatedly tried. Khushal Khan was also fully aware of the tactics of the Mughals and tried his utmost to retain unity among the Afghans. Afzal Khan in *Tarikh-i-Murassa* has quoted Khushal Khan in the following words: "I stayed there for four months. The Afridis treated me in the best proper manner. Here I received an invitation in written from the Yusufzai malaks invited me to come to their area. I also received the promises of Aurangzeb through Raja Jaswant Singh urging upon me to join the Mughals and he would do some special for me." But, as stated earlier, he refused the invitation and showed determination to fight for the Afghan cause against the Mughals. He informed his Afridi friends about the invitation of the Yusufzais and told them that in such a situation it would be better for him to leave Tirah for cultivating more support amongst the Yusufzais of Swat.¹⁷ Accordingly, he left Tirah in September 1674, went to Bazar, passed through Sarubi *Kandau* to Dakka near Landi Kotal and then onwards through the Mohmand and Mallagori areas into the Khattak region.¹⁸

His enthusiasm about the formation of *lashkar* among the Yusufzais in Swat was too much high. Probably, he was under the impression of leading them from the front. He was dismayed at the cool response of the Khattaks i.e. his fellow tribesmen. It is evident from the following verse:

چہ دنگ توره دواخيسته خوشحاله!
درومه سوات ته خه ختيك خه ئه لبنيكر

If you Khushal ought to fight for the *nang*, you have to look to Swat, for Khattak *lakhkar* is of no worth.¹⁹

17 Khattak, *Tarikh-i-Murassa*, p. 207.

18 *Ibid.*

19 Sultan-i-Rome, 'Khushal Khan Khattak and Swat', p. 125.

On his way to Swat, he received a message from Alahdad Khan informing him of the presence of a huge Mughal force in the fort of Langar Kot. He persuaded Khushal Khan to change the route of his upward journey. He followed Alahdad's advice and went to Rustam near Shahbazgarhi where he met some Khattak malaks who promised their support for the Afghan national cause. Being disappointed by the attitude of his brother-in-law Malak Hamza Khan, he did not prolong his stay there. With the help of Mandanr Yusufzais he crossed the dangerous zone of Nawa Kaley and resumed his journey towards Swat.²⁰

Khushal Khan was well received by the people of Swat and Yusufzai's chiefs. They promised him their full support for the liberation of the Afghan land from the Mughal subjugation. Indeed, there was a section among the Yusufzais who supported him in his bid against the Mughals. However, during his stay among the Yusufzais he involved himself in controversies with a number of revered persons of the area. His attitude made majority of the local people against him which ultimately hampered the Afghan resistance against the Mughals. It was under these circumstances that he lamented about the Yusufzais in one of his poems:

يوسفزي ننگيالي پښتانه نه دي
د بي تنگو پښتنو د مينځه ووځه²¹

Yusufzais are not *nangyali* [brave] Pukhtuns, let go away from amongst these Pukhtuns who had no *nang* [bravery].

Despite the fact that he was a captive at the fort of Ranthambur, he called the Yusufzais as the leaders of the Afghans in the following words:

يوسفزي مير افغان دي
هم د توري هم د خوان دي²²

20 Pareshan, *Pashtun Kaun*, p. 502.

21 Mashwani, *Kulyat-i-Khaushal Khan Khattak*, 586.

22 *Ibid.*, p. 590.

The Yusufzais are the leaders of the Afghans. They are both brave and hospitable.

While on another occasion, he has stated about the bravery of the Yusufzais in the following verse:

کہ دسمے کہہ د غرہ دی یوسف زئی
ہمگی مزی دی مہ تے وے زوال

Long live the Yusufzais—lions of both plain and hills.²³

The main opposition came from Shaikh Mian Noor, grandson of Akhun Darwaiza, who opposed him for some obvious reasons. He was quite influential in his area and possessed a large number of supporters. He started a virulent campaign for his vilification and instigated people against him. The reason of his opposition was most probably Khushal Khan's agonizing attitude towards the former. On the authority of *Swat Nama* of Khushal Khan Khattak, Sultan-i-Rome mentioned vivid description of his criticism about the Yusufzais of Swat. He says: "Khushal Khan severely criticized the malaks, ulama, people, shaikhs and all other influential people of the Yusufzais. Their *alim*, he says, are all ignorant: neither are they scholars, nor educated, nor jurists. Their knowledge is limited to the basic books of *fiqh*, *Kanz* and *Qudoori*, but that too is superficial and lacks the in-depth knowledge. They exploit their religious status and position for worldly gains caring not what is fair and unfair."²⁴ While condemning and reviling Mian Noor, especially, Khushal Khan has put question mark not only on his knowledge but also spoke unscrupulously about his beliefs. It was not a wise venture of Khushal Khan at all especially when the plan was to get the support of that powerful Afghan tribe against the Mughals. He has contended that it was Mian Noor who caused the failure of his mission of collecting *lashkars* from Swat against the

23 Sultan-i-Rome, 'Khushal Khan Khattak and Swat', *Journal of the Research Society of Pakistan*, Vol 51, No. 1, (January-June, 2014), 123.

24 *Ibid.*, pp. 28-30.

Mughals.²⁵ He was set against Khushal Khan and secretly desired to frustrate his plan. As he showed his utter frustration in a poem in *Swat Nama*:

دا ناکس چي نيش هميش وهي په کار کښي
 26 گوره شي د لښکر په کاروبار کښي

When this wicked man sting in some matter, then look!
 What becomes of the force-making business?

But he failed to expose the secret plan of Mian Noor. While visiting Swat, Khushal Khan should have in-depth knowledge and understanding of the sensitivities and culture of the Yusufzais of Swat. However, he lost the support of many of them by accusing Mian Noor of conspiring against his plan. Whatever the fact might be, Mian Noor was a revered religious figure of Swat and that was not a realistic approach of Khushal Khan at that time. It is to be mention here that the anti-Mughals group among the Afghans was always led by the Yusufzais. In fact, their support for any anti-Mughal offensive was essential. On its part, the Yusufzais in this regard provided leadership to the Afghans due to their rivalry with the Mughals. They never compromised on any thing other than to sustain their independence. Their anti-Mughal stance has been mention by Khushal Khan several times in his poetry:

زه نوکر وم ، يوسفزي يي روگردان وو
 27 خکه ورغله تر سواته زما گران وو

I was loyal to Mughals whereas the Yusufzais were rebel.
 That made my going Swat so difficult.

Meanwhile, some of Yusufzai malaks thought it essential to strike a deal between Khushal Khan and Mian Noor for the large interest of the Afghan cause. In the prevailing delicate political atmosphere they deemed it very important to avoid friction within the community and decided to settle the issue with mutual understanding. Due to the efforts of

25 *Ibid.*, 119. Also See Khattak, *Swat Nama of Khushal Khan Khattak*, p. 52. 390.

26 Ahmad, *Swat Nama of Khushal Khan Khattak*, p. 81.

27 Sultan-i-Rome, 'Mughal and Swat', p. 127.

these malaks a *manazira* (religious debate) took place between Khushal Khan and Mian Noor which further exacerbated the already strained relations. Mian Noor²⁸ was especially regarded a respected religious figure among the Yusufzais in Swat. Khushal Khan's assertion regarding his knowledge and status was proved a crushing blow to convince them about his future planning. He failed to understand the sensitivities of the local population rather his activities made them against his intending diplomacies. He should have avoided such sort of indifferences rather he has contended that it was Mian Noor who caused the failure of his mission.²⁹ This blame against Mian Noor made his plan almost difficult in Swat. Likewise, his tirade against Mian Noor and the Yusufzais, Khushal Khan has moreover stated about Swat:

دوه کاره دی په سوات کښه که خفی دی که جلی
 مخزن د درويزه دے یا دفتر د شیخ ملی
 دا دوه نشته په سوات کښه خو کچه وائی یا علی
 الصَّالِحُونَ لِلَّهِ وَالطَّالِحُونَ لِيْ

Two works are reputed in Swat, in public and in private: the *Makhzan* of (Akhun) Darwaiza or the *Daftar* of Shaikh Mali. And two are nonexistent in Swat: those who call Ali (i.e. Shias) and those who attribute all the good things to Allah and the bad to themselves (probably referring to some sect or religion).³⁰

28 Mian Noor was grandson of Akhun Darwizah and a reverend religious person in Swat at that time. He had his differences with Khushal Khan over his views about Akhun Darwizah's religious stature and criticism of his book *Makhzan*. Khushal Khan alleges that he was a Mughal agent also. For detail about Mian Noor, his family and influence see Rahim Shah Rahim, *Swat Namah Jawab Namah* (Pashto verse) (Mingawara: Shoiab Sons Publishers and Booksellers, 2006), pp. 106-10, 113.

29 Sultan-i-Rome, 'Khushal Khan Khattak and Swat', p. 390.

30 Khattak, *Kulyat-e-Khushal Khan Khattak*, Vol. 2, p. 349.

Whereas at another place he has stated:

مخزن د درويزه د ميان نور شيخى پيرى
 الثالثُ بالخير د حمزه خانى ميرى
 دادرى توکهدير قدر دير عزت لرى په سوات کنښه
 و خدائى و ته بنکاره دى وئيل نشى په خيىرى

Makhzan of Darwaiza and *sheikhi* and *piri* (priesthood and sainthood) of Mian Noor, and the third one is the *khanship* and chieftainship of Hamza. All the three carry great value and respect in Swat. This I am not saying due to grudge but Allah knows it is so.³¹

Sultan-i-Rome is of the view that the main reason of Khushal Khan grudges against and reviling the Yusufzais of Swat was their not taking arms at his behest and fighting the Mughals, although some did so. Due to the anti-Mughal stance of the Yusufzais Khushal Khan expected much more from their side. Probably his plan was to lead the Yusufzais' uprising against the Mughals. However, he has undue expectation which is evident from his following verse.

چه د ننگ توره د واخيسته خوشحاله!
 درومه سوات ته خه خهك خه ئه لببكر

Meaning: If you Khushal ought to fight for the *nang*, you have to look to Swat, for Khattak *lakhkar* is of no worth.³²

Sultan-i-Rome is of the view that the Swat Yusufzais have their own grounds for such a course of action and policy. They could not side with him, because relations between Aurangzeb and their brethren — the Yusufzais of the plain area — had already become cordial.³³ In fact, the timing of Khushal Khan's struggle for a united action against the Mughals was such that it could not motivate all the Afghans for such adventurism. The relations of the Yusufzais and Aurangzeb were not cordial as claimed by Sultan-i-

31 *Ibid.*, p. 281.

32 Sultan-i-Rome, 'Khushal Khan Khattak and Swat', p. 125.

33 *Ibid.*

Rome. Emperor Aurangzeb several times sent punitive expeditions against the Yusufzai Afghans. The fact was that Bhaku Khan had firmly resisted their entry to the Afghan mainland and established his rule over the entire areas. In quelling his uprising Aurangzeb even personally came to Hasan Abdal but gained no success. At last, he was compelled to make truce with the Afghans and the Yusufzai of the *samah* areas. However, the truce between the Mughal and Yusufzais can not be called the end of their rivalry. The ascendancy of Bhaku Khan was due to the failure of several Mughal expeditions in the areas. Therefore, Khushal Khan's struggle for reinforcement did not held much ground at that time.

Despite other factors of his failure in Swat, Mian Noor's role, because of divergent views and beliefs, also contributed to the failure of Khushal Khan's mission in Swat. He was so much frustrated that he caused unnecessary controversies and debates by criticizing the religious figures and the beliefs of the Yusufzais in Swat. In fact, it seems from his activities that he himself was also not interested in the forming of *lashkar* as he spent much of his time in other undertakings. Interestingly, the time which Khushal Khan should have spent in battlefield or swiftly convening Yusufzais to fight for a cause, was instead wasted in touring, hunting, debates, creating controversies and unwanted grudges with the people and leaders (both religious and mundane) of Swat.³⁴

Sultan-i-Rome mentioned that Khushal Khan used his own yardstick of love and hate. While condemning Mian Noor, he said that it was not him but his heart to speak against Mian Noor; and his heart is unlike others; and that when his heart judges someone as good, he can never be called bad, and that those whom his heart rejects, shall be rejected as such. That why the Mughals were good as long as he was in their good books and the Afghans (including Yusufzais), who opposed the Mughals, were bad and hence

34 *Ibid.*

deserved to be beheaded, effaced from the surface of the earth and domes be made of their skulls. And when he turned against the Mughals, they became the lot to be beheaded, destroyed and effaced from the surface of the earth and the Yusufzais to be made allies and befriended in self-interest.³⁵

But, despite all these when he came to Swat, a *jirga* was held in Damghar and the Yusufzais pardoned his past deeds and promised to take arms and form *lashkars* in his support against the Mughals.³⁶ It was his revile and scornful remarks about *Makhzan* that turned the tide³⁷ and the core issue of forming *lashkars* and fighting the Mughals went into the background. Basically, he was not a good politician and has stumbled at each and every step in Swat. He, moreover, did not know the politics of Swat.³⁸ Like the Khattak tribe's discord, his undiplomatic and unwise behavior even divided the Yusufzais into two blocs, i.e. one siding with Mian Noor and the other with him.³⁹ Instead of having been diplomatic and polite, he was taken over by emotions which ruined all his previous efforts and the main purpose for which he was in Swat.⁴⁰

Hamesh Khalil has evaluated Khushal Khan's pitfalls and shortcomings and contended that for achieving the strategically important alliance of the Yusufzais of Swat he was required to concentrate all his efforts on the completion of his mission rather than indulging in activities that were to be counterproductive. Instead of controlling his temper, in fury, he went beyond moderation which directly resulted in his failure.⁴¹ While dealing with Khushal Khan's approach to the Yusufzais for an alliance against the Mughals, Olaf

35 *Ibid.*, p. 125.

36 Rahim, *Swat Namah Jawab Namah*, pp. 115-21.

37 *Ibid.*, pp. 121-30.

38 *Ibid.*, p. 153.

39 *Ibid.*, p. 132.

40 *Ibid.*, pp. 139-41.

41 Hamish Khalil, "Sarizah" to Khattak, *Swat Namah da Khushal Khan Khattak*, pp. 39-42, 45-46.

Caroe has stated that “with the Yusufzais he failed, and failed completely”. He has asserted that this “failure was more or less inevitable, it was rooted in history”.⁴² His previous track record proved one of the greatest factors in his failure. The Yusufzai was a leading tribe and a traditional rival of the Mughals and without former’s active support it would have been impossible for any struggle to succeed. Olaf Caroe further writes:

The Khataks had basked in Mughal smiles when the empire was fighting the Yusufzais; they had taken advantage of the imperial aid to occupy large slices of Yusufzai territory. Now that the Khataks were out of favour, the Yusufzais saw no reason to help them — very much the reverse. Khushhal himself seemed unable to see this; he merely scorned the Yusufzais as cowards and opportunists. Some of the verses he wrote about them are amusing, but their colour has to be corrected with this in view. In Khushhal’s eyes they were double-dyed villains, first because they were hereditary foes and secondly because, when he approached them, they would not play.⁴³

Interestingly, Sultan-i-Rome states that the people of Swat had no conflict of interest with Aurangzeb. They were neither his subject, nor neighbors. Neither Aurangzeb has made attempt against Swat like his great-grandfather Emperor Akbar nor did he usurp their independence. In fact, Aurangzeb dispatched several expeditions against the Yusufzais for their suppression. In the year 1667, Afghan borderland witnessed the uprising of the Yusufzais under the leadership of Bhaku Khan. They also defeated Kamil Khan, the *faujdar* of Attock. An expedition of the Mughal was routed in 1667 in which two thousand Mughal soldiers were killed while fighting against the Yusufzais.⁴⁴ Aurangzeb personally came to Hasan Abdal in June 1675. As stated somewhere else, Mukaram Khan was sent *en route* to Bajaur to restore imperial sway in the areas. In one of his

42 Olaf Caroe, *The Pathans* (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 2003), p. 241.

43 *Ibid.*, pp. 241-42.

44 Khan Roshan Khan, *Yusufzai Qaum Ki Sarguzasht* (Karachi: Roshan Khan and Company, 1986), p. 246.

battles against the Yusufzais considerable numbers of Mughals were slain.⁴⁵

In fact, Khushal Khan Khattak underestimated the significance of the geographical location of Swat and the strength of the Yusufzai tribe. His previous pro-Mughal role was, understandably, a factor in the failure of his mission in Swat. Although there was a deep-rooted tribal enmity between the Yusufzai and Khattak tribes yet Khushal Khan established matrimonial relation with them. Due to this reason it is quite clear that a section of the tribe sided with him in forming *lashkar* against the Mughals but he failed in getting overwhelming support of the Yusufzais dwelling in Swat. Unlike Olaf Caroe and Sultan-i-Rome's claims, Khushal Khan did not fail completely rather the timing of his effort was not quite appropriate. The Yusufzais had already established their writ in their areas under Bhaku Khan after inflicted so many defeats upon the Mughals. At that moment there was no need of fresh mobilization of *lashkar* in Swat. At the end, he mobilized a section of the Yusufzai tribe but it was not of so much use as they had already defeated Mughal several times under Bhaku Khan. In fact, Bhaku Khan at that time was the virtual ruler of the entire area from Bajaur to the Indus and there are no evidences to support the claim whether he needed the support of Khushal Khan at that time.

While evaluating the causes as to why the Yusufzais did not take arms and side with Khushal Khan against the Mughals, Bahadar Shah Zafar Kakakhel has stated that one of the reasons was that the enmity between the Yusufzais and the Khattaks was quite old and, despite the relations becoming somewhat friendly after Khushal Khan's imprisonment, its roots had spread quite deeper.⁴⁶ Besides, Khushal Khan himself has openly admitted his personal and of his father's and grandfathers' loyalty and services to the

45 *Ibid.*

46 Kakakhel, *Pukhtanah da Tarikh Pah Ranra kay*, p. 619.

Mughals and was proud for them.⁴⁷ It is evident from a number of his poems that he took pride in serving the Mughals:

قـدردان زما د کار و شـاجـا — هـان
داورنگ بادشاه بنکاره دے خوداخوا
چي نېکخواه بدخواه همه ورته یکسان دي
نه تمییز نه یی د عدل اعتدال⁴⁸

Shah Jahan duly appreciated my services. The case of Aurangzeb is evident, to whom both well-wishers and malevolent are equal and who has neither sense nor moderation of justice.

Khushal Khan Khattak was brought up and raised in a Mughal friendly environment. Like his father and grandfather he sincerely served the Mughal cause in the frontier and other parts of the empire. It was after his arrest by Emperor Aurangzeb that he became an anti-Mughals and started a vigorous movement for the unification of the Afghans. He considered his past a dark chapter of his life by saying that his pride on his valour in the service of the Mughals was misplaced:

که خوشحال پنج هزاري کا مه يي وينه
د مغل له نوکری دے اغیر لے⁴⁹

Do not look at Khushal *panj hazari mansab*; he is fed-up of the Mughal service.

Similarly, in his poetry he expressed his regret for diffusing and breaking the Yusufzais power which was wrong, unwise and detrimental to the Afghan cause. He expressed his repentance in the following verses:

زه د يوسفزيو په خان زهر وم قاتل
بل مقصود مي نه و په خدمت کبني د مغل
دېر شاهان خوانان مي يو تر بله ووژل
تېر ساعت ارمان د پېنېماني نشته حاصل⁵⁰

47 *Ibid.*, p. 635. Also see Khattak, *Kulyat-e-Khushal Khan Khattak*, Vol. 2, pp. 36-37, 40, 45-47, 50, 53-55, 366-67, 369; Yusufi, *Yusufzai*, p. 277.

48 Ahmad, *Swat Nama*, p. 78.

49 *Ibid.*, p. 99.

I was a deadly poison for the Yusufzais and wished nothing else in serving the Mughals but to kill and destroy them. I have killed numerous kingly youths that I regret now.

Yusufzais' Attacks on Mughal Installations

Significantly, despite all these, the Swat Yusufzais apparently kept the past grudges and grievances aside, but Khushal Khan turned the tide by causing fresh unnecessary controversies, debates and disputes. Some Yusufzai tribesmen did provide him with every possible help. Despite his differences with Mian Noor, he partially succeeded in mustering a number of Yusufzai supporters. When he left Swat and went to Maidan, he was accompanied by a number of Yusufzai combatants. He was received by a gathering of the Mandanr Yusufzais, dwelling in the *samah* area, waiting for his arrival in Maidan. For some time they stayed at Panjpir, discussing various plans and devising further strategy. They organized a tribal *lashkar* under Khushal Khan's leadership and finalized a plan of attack on the Mughal troops stationed at the fort of Langar Kot.

In those days the *faujdar* of the fort of Langar Kot was Mir Hazara. There were some Afghan and Mughal soldiers inside the fort. The Afghans surrounded the fort from all sides, which created hue and cry in the rank and file of the army stationed inside the fort. Despite their strength and resources, they failed to face the growing number and enthusiasm of the Afghans. Initially, they thought of repulsing the attack. However, superior war strategy and the sudden attack of the Afghans took them into surprise. Mir Hazara along with forty other Mughal soldiers was killed in the attack. After their victory, Khushal Khan with his Yusufzai followers

50 Muhammad Nawaz Tair, "Dibachah" to Pir Muazam Shah, *Tawarikh Hafiz Rahmat Khani*, with "Dibachah" by Muhammad Nawaz Tair, 2nd print (Pashto/Persian) (Peshawar: Pukhto Academy, 1987), p. 20.

pursued the Gujjars for their alleged pro-Mughal role in the war.⁵¹

After suffering some humiliating defeats at the hands of the Afghans, it was deemed fit to stop further incursion on their territory. Fidayi Khan, governor of Kabul, gained no success in his attempts to either arrest or befriends Khushal Khan. He utilized every possible method in suppressing the Afghans but could not succeed. The stronger his cruelty and suppression grew the greater became enthusiasm of the Afghans. The more aggressive became the tone of the Mughal administration the greater grew the interest of Afghans in the movement. Fidayi Khan was aware of the Afghans' psyche in general and Khushal Khan's in particular. To stop him from further attacks, he came forward with another tactic. He transferred Ganj Ali Khan from the Afghan frontier areas and appointed Multafat Khan, son of Asalat Khan, in his place. As mentioned above, Asalat Khan was an intimate friend of Khushal Khan who served under his command in the Kanghra and Balkh campaigns during Shah Jahan's time.⁵²

Multafat Khan reached Newshehra with a large force under his command. After his arrival Ashraf Khan, son of Khushal Khan, also joined him. The Mughal troops were on the way towards Newshehra to receive Multafat Khan but were caught by the Yusufzais in a surprise attack. In the skirmish the Yusufzai Afghans killed Mesri Khan, *faujdar* of Ghala Dher, and sixty soldiers under his command. When the news of the incident reached Multafat Khan, he became perturbed. He did not consider the situations favourable for a military action and resorted to diplomacy. He sent a person, Pir Abdu, with precious gifts and a large amount to Khushal Khan and requested him to cease his activities. Pir Abdu also told him to use his influence in dispersing his fellow Afghans from the *samah* area. Khushal Khan received Pir Abdu but sent him back with his gifts. Then he discussed the

51 Khattak, *Pashtun Kaun?*, pp. 527-28.

52 Khattak, *Tarikh-i-Murassa*, p. 287.

matter with his followers and some other tribal chiefs. He urged them to halt their activities for some time and go back to their respective areas.⁵³ It seems that he was present along with some of his followers in the area but was not in the position to take an initiative as there was already the presence of a large number of Yusufzai fighters under Bhaku Khan.

In June 1675, with a view to accomplish his goal of suppressing the Afghan uprising, Aurangzeb dispatched a heavy force under the command of Mukaram Khan and Shamsheer Khan with strict instruction to control the area and chastise the Afghans. They crossed the River Indus near Attock and started their march towards Khapush via Krappa. They heard of the concentration of the Yusufzai *lashkar* but they took the matter lightly and continued their march. At Khapush they realized their mistake and found a large number of the Yusufzai Afghans awaiting the Mughal troops. The Afghans under the command of Bhaku Khan along with Afridis and Mohmands attacked the Mughal army. The Mughals faced a crushing defeat. Their commander Shamsheer Khan was killed while Mukaram Khan fled from the battlefield and reached Bajaur after facing extreme hardships. In Bajaur, Izzat Khan, *faujdar* of the fort gave him shelter.⁵⁴

After three months of the victory of the Afghans at Khapush, Aurangzeb received shocking news that Hazbar Khan, in-charge of Jagdalak outpost between Jalalabad and Kabul, was found slain along with his son and several other soldiers. Then he received the news of Abdullah Khan Khweshgi abandoning the *thana* of Barang in the Uthman Khel area of Bajaur. In Jalalabad, Gandamak and Jagdalak areas the Ghilzai Afghans offered stubborn resistance to the Mughal force.⁵⁵ In the skirmishes both sides received heavy losses. Khushal Khan paid rich tribute to the Ghilzais for

53 Caroe, *The Pathan*, p. 236.

54 *Ibid.*, p. 90.

55 Mohmand, *On a Foreign Approach*, pp. 72-73.

their bravery which they exhibited in resisting the Mughal action to recapture the post of Jagdalak.⁵⁶

Meanwhile, Khushal Khan decided to punish Sher Muhammad Khan, the Mughal supporter in the area, for his pro-Mughal activities and also to avenge the death of Tatar Khan. After the necessary preparation, he crossed Kundiala and entered Kohat with a band of his Khattak followers. Sher Muhammad also came forward and encamped at a place called Gumbat. During the course of the battle, he received an arrow wound from Abid Khan, son of Khushal Khan. But some Khattaks deserted Khushal Khan and joined the Bangash army. This changed the whole scenario. Khushal Khan was defeated and after heavy loss fled from the battlefield.⁵⁷ In 1680, he attacked the Bangash territory and defeated the Bangash chief at Dodah near Kohat. It has been stated that almost one hundred and sixty Bangash were killed in the encounter.⁵⁸

Downfall of the Afghan Resistance

Afghan forces achieved a number of great victories under the inspiring leadership of Bhaku Khan, Khushal Khan Khattak, Darya Khan Afridi and Aimal Khan Mohmand. But, at the end, they were reduced in great straits due to their meagre resources and lack of unity and cohesion. On the other hand, they confronted a well disciplined, organized and heavily equipped force. The Mughal governor Fidayi Khan and his commander Asghar Khan (Pir Muhammad) came out successful in cooling down the intensity of the Afghans' uprising. After conducting incessant operations, the circumstances became favourable for them. Therefore, Aurangzeb left Hasan Abdal for Delhi in December 1675. Before leaving for Delhi he distributed a large sum of rupees

56 Mohmand, *Khushal Khan*, pp. 187-88.

57 Mohmand, *On a Foreign Approach*, p. 73.

58 *Ibid.*

among his soldiers and also conferred on Fidayi Khan the title of Azam Khan Koka.⁵⁹

According to *Ma'asir-i-Alamgiri*, Amir Khan, the new governor of Kabul, greatly succeeded in establishing peace in the region. He secured a three-fold success during his stay at Kabul. A number of the Afghan tribes became obedient and friendly; they sought the advice of Amir Khan in the management of their affairs and finally they enrolled themselves in the Mughal army.⁶⁰ Amir Khan was quite successful in bringing disunity in the Afghan forces through different means.⁶¹

The differences between Khushal Khan and his sons Ashraf Khan and Bahram Khan was another factor, which contributed in cooling down the enthusiasm of the Afghan uprising. Bahram Khan convinced his brother Ashraf Khan and Khushal Khan about his good conduct. But after getting the *mansab* he also became an opponent of his father. Their relations were further deteriorated when Amir Khan arrested Ashraf Khan.⁶²

Amir Khan (Mir Miran), the governor of Kabul, was a clever and shrewd person. After assuming the governorship of Kabul, he at once started his struggle for creating dissensions in different Afghan tribes. He very thoroughly observed those mistakes, which his predecessors committed in dealing with the resentful Afghans. He weakened the strength of the anti-Mughal forces by distributing gold and gifts among them and diverting their attention from the Afghan unity. But in the case of Khushal Khan he gained success not through gold but through diplomacy. He started correspondence with Khushal Khan and reminded him of his friendship with Khalilullah Khan and Asalat Khan, respectively father and uncle of Amir Khan. As mentioned

59 Saqi Mustad Khan, *Maasir-i-Alamgiri* (Lahore: Sohail Academy, 1981). p. 168.

60 Mohmand, *On a Foreign Approach*, pp. 74-75.

61 Mohmand, *Khushal Khan*, p. 202.

62 Mohmand, *On a Foreign Approach*, p. 74.

earlier Khushal Khan served under Asalat Khan in the Kanghra and Turkestan campaigns. Because of these old family relationships, Amir Khan started venturing to influence him by making frequent promises of good conduct. He reminded him of Muhammad Amin's efforts for his release during his imprisonment at Ranthambur. Khushal Khan always felt a sense of gratitude and best regards for them. He never forgot their valuable services, which they rendered for him when he was imprisoned by Aurangzeb.⁶³

Khushal Khan left the Yusufzais' area at once when he learnt about the appointment of Multafat Khan as the *faujdar* of Langar Kot. Also on his request he used his influence due to which a section of the Yusufzais agreed to abandon their further activities and return to their respective areas. He also wrote to his son Ashraf Khan to receive Multafat Khan and provide him every facility in passing the troubled areas. Multafat Khan sent him gifts and cash for these acts of magnanimity, but he refused to accept it by saying that his purpose in what he had done was nothing except that Multafat Khan should raise high in the Emperor's eyes.⁶⁴ Surprisingly, Khushal Khan's conduct which he exhibited at the time of the arrival of Multafat Khan was a sheer example of a confused and fortune hunter man who was not clear of his purpose and proper direction of his movement. He individually dealt with each Mughal governor sent by Aurangzeb and adopted varying attitudes towards them. Whether he was interested in creating a cherished Afghan national cohesion or projecting himself an influential person of the area was not clear from his renewed relationship with the Mughals. On one side he begged the Yusufzais for help against the Mughals and on another side he used his influence in dispersing their *lashkar* when Multafat Khan reached the area.

The truce that he concluded with Amir Khan proved short-lived. Amir Khan brought about bit normalcy in the area

63 *Ibid.*

64 Khattak, *Pashtun Kaun?*, p. 522.

partly by creating rift between some Afghan nobles and exploiting their internal feuds and partly through distributing cash and gold among them. Instead of taking arms against the Mughals they started fighting each other over petty issues. Bhaku Khan, Darya Khan and Aimal Khan, “the men of insight” have died. Dismayed and distressed, in the coming days, Khushal Khan also felt completely isolated from the mainstream Afghan national struggle against the Mughals.

Last Days of Khushal Khan

The last days of Khushal Khan were pathetic and full of lament. The Mughal authorities created a lot of problems for him within family and followers. The irony of majority of the Afghan malaks and political leaders with their cause further jeopardized the concept of their national uprising. A considerable number of the Afghan malaks looked for the Mughal favours and *mansabs*. Despite having been in strategically important areas, the Afghans failed to crystallize their concept of at least an ethnic-based cohesion. In the last days, Khushal Khan failed to convince even his family members to exhibit attachment with the Afghan national cause. The race for Mughal favours, that had largely been initiated and developed by Khushal Khan and his forefathers, had made its way among other Afghan chiefs and his family members.

In a nutshell, Khushal Khan was a Mughal loyalist but once arrested and then disappointed from the Mughals and some of his Khattak relatives he much later on turned towards the Afghan national cause as a freebooter. His Afghan nationalism some time, operated in a paradigm of warfare, another time in personal regards for certain Mughal governors and commanders. He was further side-lined when his son Ashraf Khan also turned against him and strongly opposed his policy against the Mughals. More importantly Bahram Khan, his rebellious son, seriously disturbed him in his last days. To upset Khushal Khan was made an inherent

element of his family members for gaining more Mughal favours. Particularly in the last two years of his life, Bahram Khan tried his best to arrest his father and hand him over to the Mughals. Time and again he sent his son Mukaram Khan to arrest his aged grandfather. For that purpose he even wrote to Amir Khan for help against his father. When Khushal Khan was at Ziara, he came under attack of Bahram Khan's men. He lost some of his followers but himself fled to Musa Darrah in the territory of Hasan Khel Afridis.⁶⁵

The occurrence of a famine in 1685-86 also contributed largely in the scaling down of the Afghan uprising. Another source of trouble for Khushal Khan was the activities of his other son Abid Khan against the Mohmands. Abid Khan started enmity with the Mohmands over a petty issue. As a result of this enmity, he lost another son, Tahir Khan. Surrounded by these adverse circumstances, he was unable to muster support from the Afghans. Rivalries and conflicts among his family crippled his stature among the general masses. Khushal rightly claimed when he says "I have not been pierced by arrows thrown at me by aliens, my own people pierced me with my own arrows." He was chased by his own sons and grandsons just for winning the Mughal rewards. The people for whom he first served under the Mughals and then fought against them deserted him in the last days of his life. Ignored by the Afghans and disowned by the Khattaks, Khushal Khan took refuge in the hills of Dambarah where he and his two sons lived in a hut surrounded by a life of poverty and misery but accompanied by freedom and independence.

Due to all these heavy odds, his health deteriorated therefore, he had to seek refuge with the Hasan Khel a sub-clan of the Adam Khel Afridis. He breathed his last at the age of seventy eight among the Hasan Khel Afridis at Dambarah near Musa Darrah early in the morning on Friday 20 February 1689. His dead body was brought from

65 *Ibid.*, p. 213.

Dambarah and buried at Isori Bala about four miles south of his hometown *Sarai Akora* in Nowshehra.⁶⁶

Afghan Resistance after the Death of Khushal Khan

It is quite clear that the rivalry between the Mughals and the Afghans was basically the struggle of the latter for sustaining their independence in the north-western border of India. The Afghan struggle was led by the Yusufzais due to its fighting capabilities and strategic location. They never paid taxes to the Mughal authorities nor permitted them to interfere in their internal affairs. In fact, after establishing a sound and independent system of administration in the settled areas including Swat, Buner and Bajaur they should be called as the founder of modern Pakhtunkhwa. The intensity of their rivalry with the Mughals was deep which is evident from several historical manuscripts and sources. Khushal Khan Khattak himself endorsed this point in his poetry many times.

Notwithstanding the excessive use of force against the Afghans, the Mughals never succeeded in establishing their rule over the Afghan borderland. They were unable to keep the tribes under their control without the presence of a huge force. They could not even control the Afghan forays on their caravans. None of the Mughal historians have mentioned about the revenue collection in Peshawar Valley or in its mountain fringe. During the last years of Aurangzeb's reign the Mughal domination was nominal on the Afghan areas.⁶⁷ They were independent in running the affairs of their region.

It has been mentioned in the *Tarikh-i-Murassa* that after the death of Khushal Khan, his son Afzal Khan remained at the Mughal service. He acted as the Khattak chief in the time of Shah Alam (Bahadar Shah). When Aurangzeb died in 1707, Shah Alam bestowed upon Afzal Khan his family's old responsibility. With the passage of time Mughal rule over the

66 *Ibid.*

67 Caroe, *The Palhans*, p. 236.

Afghan areas vanished. Many of their emperors in the latter days took least interest in controlling the Afghan borderland.⁶⁸

Although for the time being Aurangzeb was able to keep the Afghans in control by using harsh measures. Yet his wars in the north-western frontier areas could not be considered as complete successes. His wars against the Afghans drained the economic resources of the Mughal Empire. Not only was a huge sum spent to befriend some dissidents of Khushal Khan, a huge amount was also spent on keeping a large army in the reckless mountains of the area. Some of his seasoned commanders, expert generals and thousands ordinary Mughal soldiers were perished during these wars.

For quite a long time Aurangzeb was preoccupied in the problems arising out of the situations in the Afghan borderland. He ignored other turbulent areas and due to these short-sighted policies the Mughal Empire received several setbacks. He deployed the best Mughal soldiers and also transferred a great chunk of his army from the Deccan to fight against the Afghans. This provided an ample opportunity to Shivaji for boosting up his military activities and to advance his plans in the Deccan. He established his hegemony and swept the whole area with his marches quite unhampered. Wars against the Afghans and the Marathas changed the whole political scenario in the Mughal Empire. The most important political effect of Aurangzeb's wars on the one hand enabled the Marathas to occupy Carnatic and on the other shifted the political paradigms in favour of the Afghans in the frontier areas. By waging ruthless wars against the Afghans, he made them his and his empire's worst enemies at a time when he needed their services in the Deccan. Thus he deprived himself of an invaluable help that he would have expected from them against the Marathas and the Rajputs in Rajputana.

68 Khattak, *Tarikh-i-Murassa*

In a nutshell, the Mughals never succeeded to bring the north-western frontier along with the whole Afghan area under their firm control. Notwithstanding the personal interest of some of their emperors, the Mughals paid huge price for every blow they directed towards the Afghan tribes. At the end, in the face of continued resistance Aurangzeb became exhausted and abandoned the idea of launching more campaigns against them. During the last ten years of his reign the tribesmen enjoyed the same independent status as was prevailed before.

During the long reign of Aurangzeb, the Mughals had exhausted their resources and they were unable to provide funds and forces for more expeditions. No serious effort was made to bring the Afghans under their firm control which had become weak. And after some time the Mughals completely lost their sway over Kabul and Peshawar. These areas remained without any governor and finally their rule over this area completely came to an end. The gravity of the situation may be judged from the fact that they even left the Afghan areas and Kabul without a governor until Nadir Shah's invasion in 1739. Later on, there was no more centralization in the Mughal Empire and they lost their actual control not only on the frontier areas but on the whole of India.⁶⁹ After the death of Nadir Shah, Ahmad Shah Durrani founded Modern Afghanistan and the Afghan borderland along with the Punjab came under his rule.

Circumstances, expediency and the exigency of the situations mainly determined the Mughals' policy towards the Afghans. The general attitude of the Mughal ruling family towards them was neither of aversion and hostility, nor was it very friendly and cordial. The historians of Aurangzeb's reign have talked about the Afghans in unequivocal terms expressing their personal indignation and dissatisfaction towards them. It cannot, however, be maintained that these historians represented the general public and their feelings regarding the Afghans.

69 *Ibid.*

To curb the activities of the Afghans, Aurangzeb adopted a policy of coercion and conciliation. He instigated and bribed Khushal Khan's sons Ashraf Khan and Bahram Khan to take up arms against their father. He stressed upon his sons to shun their pro-Mughal activities but failed in his persuasion. Aurangzeb also appointed those persons in the frontier who were on friendly terms with Khushal Khan. For instance he sent Multafat Khan at a time when the Yusufzais caught the imperialists in trouble. But on the advice of Khushal Khan the Yusufzais withdrew and provided a safe route to Multafat Khan because he was the son of Asalat Khan, one of the intimate friends of Khushal Khan. Even Khushal Khan instructed Ashraf Khan to provide protection to Multafat Khan upon his arrival at Langar Kot. This kind of short-sighted and ambiguous policy did not prove helpful and created a lot of doubts in the minds of the Afghans about Khushal's credentials as their leader. Nevertheless the Afghan uprising under the leadership of Bhaku Khan, Aimal Khan, Darya Khan and Khushal Khan were tribal in nature and outlook. The dynamics of the resistance remained violent, assertive and determined for almost six years, which almost broken the very foundations of the Mughal Empire.

Although the features and timing of Khushal Khan's association with the Afghan cause needs analysis and evaluation but it can not be dismissed out rightly that his poetry contributed in the emergence of the Afghan nationalist assertions. He warned the Afghans of the evil designs of the Mughals, whose real intention was to see them under their control. Through his nationalistic poetry he reminded them of unity and sacrifices. He said that the ignominies befalling the Afghans were the results of their own misdeeds. Therefore he gave a call of unity and integrity to all the Afghans. But the task of Afghan unity was quite difficult because of racial characteristics, tribal pattern of the Afghan society and deep inter and intra-tribal rivalries. Sher Shah once remarked that the Afghans were not inferior to the Mughals in valour and courage; the reason they lost

Hindustan [India] was that they were divided amongst themselves. The Afghan leaders, except Bahlul Lodhi and Sher Shah Suri, failed to give their struggle a uniform and cohesive direction. On many occasions they fought and waged tribal guerrilla attacks on the Mughals for scoring victories. It was not a decent strategy because the Mughals were well-experienced and skilled soldiers.

Glossary

<i>Alim</i>	Religious scholar
<i>Chilla</i>	Meditation of forty days or more
<i>Daftar</i>	Office/Shaikh Milli's celebrated work of land distribution among the Khakhi tribes.
<i>Diwan</i>	Poetic collection
<i>Durbar</i>	Court
<i>Fakir</i>	Saint/Sufi
<i>Faujdar</i>	Commander
<i>Fiqh</i>	Jurisprudence
<i>Gaddi Nashin</i>	Successors of a Sufi
<i>Ghazal</i>	amatory poem
<i>Hazari</i>	Thousand/containing one thousand armed men
<i>Iqta</i>	Province/Suba
<i>Ism-i-Azam</i>	Great name of Allah
<i>Jagir</i>	Land
<i>Jagirdar</i>	Big fief-holder
<i>Jirga</i>	Council of elders
<i>Khan-i-Khanan</i>	Khan of the Khans
<i>Khasa Khel</i>	Personal guards of the Lodhi emperors
<i>Khel</i>	Clan
<i>Khutba</i>	Friday sermon
<i>Kotwal</i>	Security officer
<i>Majun</i>	Intoxicating confection
<i>Malak</i>	Tribal chief/Revenue collector

<i>Malakzada</i>	Son of a malak
<i>Mandi</i>	Market
<i>Mansab</i>	Rank
<i>Masnad</i>	Throne
<i>Mavraunnahr</i>	Transoxiana
<i>Millat</i>	Muslim Nationalism
<i>Mir Bakhshi</i>	Defense Minister
<i>Miskin</i>	Poor person/saint
<i>Mulla</i>	Cleric
<i>Munazira</i>	Religious debate
<i>Muqbara</i>	Mausoleum/Tomb/Graveyard
<i>Muqta</i>	Governor
<i>Naib</i>	second-in-command/Representative
<i>Nang</i>	Honour
<i>Nangiali</i>	Brave
<i>Padshah/Sultan</i>	King/Emperor
<i>Pakhtunwali</i>	Pakhtun code of conduct
<i>Pargana</i>	district/town
<i>Pir-i-Kamil</i>	Perfect spiritual guide
<i>Qabila</i>	Tribe
<i>Raja</i>	Ruler
<i>Samah</i>	Plain area/settled area called Peshawar valley in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa
<i>Sawars</i>	Horse-riders in the army
<i>Sayed</i>	A honorific title/descended of the Prophet Muhammad (SAW)
<i>Shaheedan</i>	Martyrs
<i>Shahi Farman</i>	Royal order
<i>Shariat</i>	Islamic code of conduct
<i>Sikah</i>	Coin

<i>Sunnah</i>	Deeds and sayings of the Holy Prophet Muhammad (SAW)
<i>Tarikh</i>	History
<i>Tawhid</i>	Oneness of Allah/Monotheism
<i>Tehrik</i>	Movement
<i>Thana</i>	Police station
<i>Umara</i>	Nobles
<i>Ushar</i>	One tenth deductions as from agricultural production
<i>Wahdat</i>	Unity/oneness of Allah
<i>Waqi Nawis</i>	Chronicler
<i>Wazir</i>	Minister
<i>Wesh</i>	Distribution of land
<i>Zamindar</i>	Landlord/Agriculturist

Bibliography

PRIMARY SOURCES

English

- Ahmad, Khwaja Nizam-ud-Din. *Tabaqat-i-Akbari*. Eng. trans. H.M. Elliot (Calcutta: the Royal Asiatic Society of Bengal, 1975).
- Babur, Zahir-ud-Din. *Tuzuk-i-Baburi*. Eng. trans. Annette S. Beveridge (Lahore: Sang-i-Meel Publications, 1979).
- Barani, Zia-ud-Din. *Tarikh-i-Feroz Shahi*. Eng. trans. H. M. Elliot (Lahore: Sang-i-Meel Publications, 1974).
- Begum, Gul Badan. *Humayun Nama*. Eng. trans. Annette S. Beveridge (Delhi: Goodwords Books, 2001).
- Bernier, F. *Travels in the Mughal Empire*. (Edinburgh: n.p., 1995).
- Dughlat, Mirza Muhammad Haider. *Tarikh-i-Rashidi*. Eng. trans. E. Denison Ross (Lahore: Book Traders, n.d.).
- Fazal, Abul. *Akbar Nama*, Eng trs. H. Beveridge (Kolkata: Asiatic Society, 2010).
- Harvi, Khwajah Niamatullah. *History of the Afghans: Translated from the Persian of Neamet Ullah*, Translated by Bernhard Dorn. 3rd edn., Karachi: Indus Publications, 2001.
- Jahangir, Noor-ud-Din. *Tuzuk-i-Jahangiri*. Eng Trans. Alexander Rogers, Vol. II (Lahore: Snag-i-Meel Publications, 1974).
- Kazim, Mirza Muhammad. *Alamgir Nama*. Eng. trans. H. M. Elliot (Calcutta: n.p., 1867).
- Khan, Abbas Sarwani. *Tarikh-i-Sher Shahi*, Eng trs. Sir H. M. Elliot and Prof. John Dowson. (Lahore: Sang-i-Meel Publications, 2006).
- Khan, Saqi Mustad. *Maasir-i-Alamgiri*. (Lahore: Sohail Academy, 1981).
- Khan, Muhammad Hayat. *Hayat-i-Afghani*. Eng. trans. Henery Priestly (Lahore: Sang-i-Meel Publication, 1981).
- Manucci. *Mughal India*. (Calcutta: n.p., 1969).
- Mushtaqi, Shaikh Rizquallah. *Waqiat-i-Mushtaqi*. Eng. trs. Iqtidar Hussain Siddiqui, (New Delhi: Indian Council of Historical Research, 1993)
- Timur, Amir. *Tuzuk-i-Timuri*, Eng. trans. H. M. Elliot. (Lahore: Sind Sagar Academy, 1974).

Urdu

- Danishmand, Mobid. *Kitab Dabistan-ul-Mazahib* (Mumbai: n.p., 1846).
- Gandapur, Sardar Sher Muhammad. *Tarikh-i-Khurshid Jahan*. (Karachi: Shaikh Shawkat Ali and Sons, 1991).
- Hazyani, Shaikh Muhammad Kabir. *Afsana-i-Shahan*, Urdu trs. Saud-ul-Hasan Khan Ruhila (Lahore: Book Fort, 2011).
- Khan, Shah Nawaz. *Ma'asir-ul-Umara*. Urdu Trans. Muhammad Ayub Qadri, Vol. II (Lahore: Urdu Science Board, 2004).
- Nizam-ul-Mulk, Khafi Khan. *Muntakhab-ul-Lubbab*. Urdu trans. Muhammad Ahmad Farooqi. (Karachi: Nafees Academy, 1976).
- Yadgar, Ahmad. *Tarikh-i-Shahi*. Urdu trs. Syed Nazir Niazi (Lahore: Urdu Science Board, 1985).

Pashto

- Abdullah. *Tarikh-i-Daudi*, Pashto trs. Abd-ul-Latif Yad Talibi (Kabul: Danish Publications, 2007).
- Ansari, Bayazid. *Khair-ul-Bayan* ed. Hafiz Abdul Quddus Qasmi. (Peshawar: Pashto Academy, 1967).
- Darwaiza, Akhund. *Makhzan*. (Peshawar: Pashto Academy, 1966).
- Khattak, Afzal Khan. *Tarikh-i-Murassa*. (Peshawar: University Book Agency, n.d.).
- Khattak, Khushal Khan. *Kulyat-i-Khushal Khan Khattak*, Haji Purdil Khan, ed. (Peshawar: Idara-i-Saqafat Sarhad, n.d.).
- _____. *Firaq Nama*, ed. Hamesh Khalil (Peshawar: Pakistan Study Centre University of Peshawar, 1982).
- _____. *Swat Nama*. (Peshawar: Pashto Academy, n.d.).
- _____. *Kulyat-i-Khashal Khan*, (Peshawar: Pashto Academy, n.d.).
- _____. *Da Khushal Khan Khattak Kulyat*. ed. Abdul Qayum Zahid Mashwani (Kabul: Danish Publications, 2013).
- _____. *Dastar Nama*. (Peshawar: Pashto Academy, n.d.).

SECONDRY SOURCES

Books in English

- Bellew, H W. *Afghanistan and the Afghans*. (Lahore: Sang-i-Meel Publications, 1879).
- Caroe, Olaf. *The Pathans*. (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 2003).
- Dani, Ahmad Hasan. *Peshawar: Historic City of the Frontier* (Lahore: Sang-i-Meel Publications, 1995).
- Erskin, William. *A History of India under Babur*. (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 1974).

- Hamadani, Agha Hussain. *The Frontier Policy of the Delhi Sultans*. (Islamabad, National Institute of Historical and Cultural Research, 1986).
- Haig, Wolsey. *The Cambridge History of India*. (Delhi: S. Chand and Company, 1958).
- Halim, Abdul. *History of the Lodi Sultans of Delhi and Agra*. (Decca: University of Decca Publications, 1961).
- Joshi, Rita. *The Afghan Nobility and the Mughals*. (Delhi: Vikas Publishing House, 1985).
- Kakakhel, Sayed Wiqar Ali Shah and Fazal-ur-Rahim Marwat. *Afghanistan and the Frontier* (Peshawar: Emjay Books International, 1993).
- Khan, Hussain. *Sher Shah Suri*. (Lahore: Ferozsans, 1987).
- Khan, Muhammad Nawaz. *Khattak: A Restless People*. (Mardan: Gandhara Markaz, 2004).
- Khattak, Ghani Khan. *Khushal Khan Khattak*. (Islamabad: Pakhtoon Culture Society, 2002).
- Lamb, Harold. *Babur: The Tiger*. (Karachi: Pak-Britain Publications, 1981).
- Lococo, Paul, Jr. *Genghiz Khan: History's Greatest Empire Builder*. (New Delhi: Pentagon Press, 2009).
- Macmunn, George. *The Romance of the Indian Frontier* (Quetta: Nisa Traders, 1978).
- Mohmand, Dost Muhammad Khan Kamil. *On a Foreign Approach to Khushal Khan*. (Peshawar: University Book Agency, 1968).
- Macmunn, George. *The Romance of the Indian Frontier* (Quetta: Nisa Traders, 1978).
- Niazi, Ghulam Sarwar Khan. *The Life and Works of Sultan Alauddin Khalji*. (New Delhi: Atlantic Publishers, 1992).
- Prasad, Ishwari. *The Life and Time of Humayun*. (Calcutta: Orient Longman Ltd, 1956).
- Quddus, Sayed Abdul. *The Pathans*. (Lahore: Feroz Sons, 1995).
- Raverty, H. G. *Notes on Afghanistan and Baluchistan*. (Published by the Secretary of State for India, 1888).
- Rahim, Muhammad Abdur. *History of the Afghans in India*. (Karachi: University of Karachi, 1961).
- Sarkar, Jadu Nath. *The History of Aurangzeb*. (Calcutta: M.C. Sarkar and Sons, 1928).
- _____. *A Short History of Aurangzeb* (New Delhi: Orient Blackswan, 2011).

- Shinwari, Zabta Khan and Ashiq Ahmad Khan. *Land Tenure and Resource Ownership in Pakistan*. (Peshawar: By the editors themselves, 2002).
- Siddiqi, Iqtidar Hussain. *Some Aspects of Afghan Despotism in India*. (Lahore. Book Traders, n.d.).
- _____. *Sher Shah Sur and his Dynasty*. (Jaipur: Publication Scheme, 1995).
- Sultani-Rome. *The North-West Frontier (Khyber Pakhtunkhwa): Essays on History*. (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 2013).

Books in Urdu

- Abid, Abdullah Jan. *Pashto Zaban wa Adab ki Mukhtasar Tarikh*. [Urdu] (Peshawar: University Publisher, 2001).
- Bangash, Khanzada Shahab-ud-Din. *Tarikh-i-Bangash* (Peshawar: n.p., 2003).
- Barikoti, Sher Afzal Khan. *Bayazid: Pir Rokhan*. (Karachi: n.p., n.d.).
- Das, Gopal. *Tarikh-i-Peshawar*. (Lahore: Globle Publishers, n. d.).
- Ghorghashti, Abdul Ali. *Pushtunu Ka Tahzibi, Tarikhi aur Azadi Ka Safar* [Urdu] (Zhob: By the author himself, 2007).
- Jadoon, Ziaullah. *Shakhsyat-i-Swabi*. (Swabi: Diyar Khan Educational Foundation, 2014).
- Jan, Asar. *Dalazak: Tarikh, Shakhsiat, Shajary*. [Urdu] (Peshawar: n.p., 2011).
- Kakakhel, Bahadur Shah Zafar. *Pashtun Apney Nasal Kay Ayinaiy May*. [Urdu] (Peshawar: University Book Agency, 1994).
- _____. *Pukhtanah da Tarikh Pa Ranra Kay*. [Pashto] (Peshawar: University Book Agency, 1994).
- Khan, Roshan Khan. *Afghanu Ki Nasli Tarikh* [Urdu] (Karachi: By the author himself, 1984).
- _____. *Yusufzai Qaum ki Sarguzasht*. [Urdu] (Karachi: By the author himself, 1986).
- Khattak, Pareshan. *Pastun Kaun?: Tarikh, Tahqiq, Tanqid*. [Urdu] (Peshawar: Pashto Academy, 1984).
- Mohmand, Dost Muhammad Khan Kamil, *Khushal Khan Khattak* (Peshawar: Idara-i-Ishaat-i-Sarhad, 1951).
- Shah, Pir Muazzam. *Tawarikh Hafiz Rahmat Khani: Afghan Qabail aur unki Tarikh*. (Peshawar: Pashto Academy, 1977).
- Shah, Mian Zahir. *Akhun Darwaiza Baba* (Swat: Maktaba Ghusia, 2000).
- Yusufi, Allah Bakhsh. *Yusufzai Pathan* [Urdu], (Karachi: Muhammad Ali Educational Society, 1973).

Books in Pashto

- Akbar, Abdul Akbar Khan. *Rokhaniyan: Da Mugholo Tarikiyan*. [Pashto] (Peshawar: Idara-i-Ashaat-i-Sarhad, n.d.).
- Bakhtani, Abdur Rahim. *Babur au Pukhtana*. (Peshawar: By the author himself, 2007).
- Begum, Khadija Feroz-ud-din. *Khushal Khan Khattak: Zhwand wa Hunar*, Pashto trs. Ajmal Khkuly. (Kabul: Afghan Cultural Jirga, 2008).
- Khattak, Rajwali Shah. *Da Pukhtu Adabi Tahrikona*. (Peshawar: Pashto Academy, University of Peshawar, 1989).
- Layeq, Murad. *Aimal Khan Baba: Tahqiqi au Tanqidi Jaiza* (Peshawar: n.p., 2007).
- Masud, Saif-ur-Rahman. *Pir Rukhan aw Rukhnai Inqilab*. (Peshawar: University Book Agency, 1998).
- Mahsud, Ali Khan. *La Pir Rukhana tar Bacha Khana: Da Pukhtanu Milli Mubarizi ta Katana*, (Peshawar: n.p., n.d.).
- Rahim, Shah Rahim. *Swat Namah Jawab Namah*. (Mingawara: Shoiab Sons Publishers and Booksellers, 2006).
- Rasa, Mian Syed Rasul. *Armaghan-i-Khushal*. (Peshawar: University Book Agency, n. d.).
- Sayal, Khwaja Muhammad. *Khushaliyat aw Haqayaq (Inteqadi Jaj)*. (Peshawar: By the Author himself, 2006).

Unpublished Sources

- Haq, Hamidul. *Raushaniya Movement: Its Contribution to Pashto Literature*. (Islamabad: Unpublished M.Phil Thesis, National Institute of Pakistan Studies, 2002).
- Maghmoom, Yar Muhammad Khan. *The Raushanites and the Pashto Literature* (Peshawar: Unpublished Ph.D Thesis, Area Study Centre, 1994).
- Karamat, K Sadia. *The Western Frontier of West Pakistan*. (Michigan: Unpublished Ph.D Thesis, University of Michigan, 1958).

Journal Articles (English)

- Dasti, Humaira Faiz, 'Multan on the Eve of the Mughal Invasion,' *Journal of the Research Society of Pakistan*, Lahore, Vol. XXXII, (December, 1995).
- Khan, Yar Muhammad, 'The Political Relations of Indo-Pakistan Subcontinent with the Mongols in the 13 Century', *Journal of the Research Society of Pakistan*, Lahore, Vol. XXV (December, 1988).
- Rahman, Tariq. 'The First Book of Old Urdu in the Pashto Speaking Areas.' *Pakistan Journal of History and Culture*, Vol. 29, (August-September, 2008).

Siddiqi, Iqtidar Hussain, 'The Afghans and their Emergence in India as Ruling Elite During the Delhi Sultanate Period,' *Central Asiatic Journal*, Vol. 26, (July-September, 1982).

Yaqubi, Himayatullah. 'Religious Transformation and Development among the Pakhtuns: A Historical and Analytical Study.' in '*Pakistan Journal of History and Culture*' Vol. XXVIII, (No. 2, July-December 2007).

_____. 'Conservative Sufism in the Pakhtun Borderland: Bayazid Ansari and Roushaniya Movement.' *Journal of South Asian and Middle Eastern Studies*, Villanova, USA, Vol. XXXIII, No. 4. (Summer 2010).

Journal Articles (Urdu)

Yaqubi, Himayatullah. 'Pukhtunu aur Mughlu Kay Siyasi Tanazay Kay Bunyadi Awamil aur Muharrikat' *Majjala Tarikh wa Saqafat-i-Pakistan*. (October-2011- March-2012).

Journal Articles (Pashto)

Afghan, Qazi Abdul Halim Asar. 'Bayazid Ansari: Pir Rukhan ya Pir Tarik.' *Pashto*, (April 1983).

Lundkhwar, Masal Shah Ghulam. 'Khushal Khan Khattak aw Yusufzai,' *Khushal Review*. Vol. II. (Pashto Academy, University of Peshawar).

Qadir, Maulana Abdul. 'Bayazid Ansari.' *Pashto*, Vol. 4. (July-August-September, 1959).

Encyclopaedias

Gibbs, H. A. R, J. H. Karamers, E Levi and J Schacht, ed. *The Encyclopaedia of Islam* (Leiden: EJ Brill, 1967).

Websites

Sonawani, Sanjay. Aryan Migration Issue: A Critique, sanjaysonawami.blogspot.com.

Index

- Abagan, 3.
Abdalis, 22.
Abdu, Pir, 213.
Abdul Ma'ali, Shah, 97.
Abd-ul-Qadir, 141.
Abd-ur-Rahim / Abdur Rahim, 166, 174.
Abd-ur-Rahman, 108.
Abd-ur-Razzaq / Abdur Razzaq, 12, 53.
Abu Bakar, 108.
Abu Said, Mirza, 37, 45.
Abul Fadl, 133.
Abul Fatah/Fath, Hakim, 131, 132.
Abul Fazal, 84.
Achaemenian Empire, 6.
Achaemenians migration, 6.
Adam Khel Afridis, 219.
Adhira Afghan, 11.
Adil, Muhammad, 96.
Adinapur / Adina-pur, 55, 57, 58.
Adinapur fort, 57.
Afghan (s), 1-7, 9-13, 15, 17-25, 27-30, 32-41, 43, 45-51, 53, 54, 56-61, 64-77, 79-80, 82-99, 101-108, 114, 117-121, 123-125, 128-131, 134-137, 139-148, 150-152, 154, 155, 157, 160-165, 168-174, 176-183, 186, 193, 196-204, 206, 207, 209, 211-223.
— Empire, 98.
— Kurt, 18.
— Malaks, 12, 30, 48, 50, 51, 65, 86, 87, 160, 218.
— Nationalist Discourse, 135.
— Resistance-I, 145, 193.
— Resistance-II, 193.
— Yusufzai malaks, 40.
Afghan, Muhammad Shah, 28.
Afghan, Sher Khan, 135.
Afghani Aghacha, 63.
Afghanistan, 1, 3, 6, 11, 17, 18, 21, 43, 75, 77, 103, 110, 116, 120, 137, 178, 222.
Afridi (s), 2, 54, 66, 103, 105, 113, 120, 121, 130, 133, 144, 146, 158, 160, 164, 171, 178, 179, 187, 194, 195, 198, 200, 201, 214.
Afridi, Darya Khan, 69, 136, 146, 160, 178, 194-196, 199, 200, 215, 218, 223.
Aghazpur, 119, 120.
Aghazpur, Battle of, 119.
Agra, 38, 73, 76, 81, 83, 84, 90-93, 101.
Ahdad, Shaikh, 134, 135, 139, 141, 142.
— death of, 135.
— revolt of, 135.
Ahmad, Khwaja, 38.
Aibak, Sultan Qutb-ud-din, 12, 16.
Aimaks, 58.
Aka Khel, 196.
Akbar Afghans, 105.

- Akbar, Emperor, 60, 64, 79, 98, 101-105, 110, 116, 117, 120, 121, 127-133, 138, 144, 145, 148-150, 209.
- Akbarabad, 145.
- Akor Khan, 131, 144, 147-152.
- Akor Khel Khattak, 151.
- Akora Khattak, 147, 158, 159.
- Akozai Yusufzai, 127, 167, 168, 171..
- Alai, Bibi, 139, 141.
- Alam, Shah, 92, 220.
- Alan-goat, 14.
- Ala-ud-Din, Sultan, 19, 24-28, 33, 34, 70, 72.
- Ala-ul-Mulk, 26.
- Al-Baladhury, 10.
- Albeit, 26, 175.
- Alberuni, Abu Rehan, 2.
- Alexander the Great, 6.
- Ali Khan, Sayed, 54.
- Ali Masjid, 54, 66, 130.
- Ali, Hyder, 58.
- Alishang Afghans, 57.
- Al-Jaitu, 24.
- Altaic, 15.
- Alukai Razzar, 167.
- al-Utbi, 3.
- Amina, 108, 109.
- Amir, Abdullah Ibn, 7.
- Amir, Syed, 165.
- Amu, river, 157.
- Amur river, 15.
- Andijan, 43.
- Ansari, Bayazid, 86, 87, 99, 105-110, 112-128, 131, 133, 135-144, 148, 185.
- Ansari, Hazrat Abu Ayub, 107.
- Ansari, Mirza Khan, 134, 141.
- anti-Mughal Hazaras, 157.
- anti-Mughal Roshniya Movement, 136.
- Apakan, 3.
- Apariti, 2.
- Arab (s), 2, 7, 10, 11, 81.
- Arabic, 10.
- Arail, 92.
- Arghun, Shah Beg, 71, 134, 148.
- Arik, 5.
- Aryan (s), 1, 2, 4-6, 11.
- Race Theory, 4, 6.
- Relics, 11.
- Arzani, Mullah, 117.
- Asha Khel, 196.
- Ashoka, 6.
- Asia, 9, 13, 17, 79.
- Askari, Mirza, 76.
- Attock, 60, 104, 128, 130, 132, 147, 149, 162, 169-171, 198, 209, 214.
- Aurakzai (s), 54, 113, 134, 158, 164.
- Aurangzeb, 144, 145, 146, 160-168, 170, 172, 173, 175-178, 180, 182, 193, 196-198, 200, 201, 206, 209, 211, 214, 215, 217, 220-223.
- Avesta, 2, 6.
- Azam Shah, Prince, 198.
- Azizullah, Mir, 176.
- Baba, Pir, 107, 116, 125, 131, 143.
- Babu, 95.
- Babur Mila, 56.
- Babur, Zahir-ud-Din Muhammad, 12, 13, 37, 40, 43, 44, 51, 53-67, 70-77, 79, 82-87, 94, 104, 108.

- Bachaghoti, Hasan Khan, 69, 101, 132.
- Bactrian, 10.
- Badakhshan, 66, 117, 121, 153, 156, 157, 158.
- Badayun, 33, 34.
- Badsha Khel, 178.
- Bagh-i-Babur, 77.
- Bagram, 55.
- Bahadar Tair, 19.
- Bahadar, Baz, 102.
- Bahlul Shah, Abul Muzaffar, 34.
- Baiqara, Mirza Hussain, 37.
- Baitani, 36, 102, 132.
- Baitur, 109.
- Baizai, 167.
- Bajaur, 4, 46, 51, 54, 58, 59, 61, 63, 132, 133, 171-173, 176, 183, 209, 210, 214, 220.
- Bakhd, 2.
- Bakhdi, 2.
- Bakhsh, Murad, 160, 162.
- Bakhshi, Khwaja Arab, 132.
- Bakhshi, Mir, 166, 179.
- Bakhshi, Nizam-ud-Din Ahmad, 114, 128.
- Balahisar Mountain, 77.
- Balakh / Balkh, 7, 124, 153, 156, 157, 213.
- Balban, Ghayas-ud-Din, 18-21.
- Baloch insurgency, 130.
- Balochistan, 1, 4, 6, 18, 25, 46, 56, 145.
- Banaras, 91.
- Bangash, 54, 55, 103, 105, 116, 120, 134, 135, 137, 141, 152, 153, 158, 160, 164, 178, 198-200, 215.
- Bangi Khel, 147.
- Bani Israelite Theory, 4.
- Bani-Israelites, 5.
- Baqar Eid, 61.
- Barak, 147.
- Barak Khattak, 147.
- Barakzais, 22.
- Barang, 214.
- Barani, 23, 25.
- Bargasta, 107.
- Barhayech, 38.
- Barki tribe, 107.
- Barlas, Junaid, 83, 84, 89.
- Barlas Tatar, 18.
- Barlas tribe, 30.
- Baro, 123.
- Basti Danishmandan, 107.
- Bayana, 29, 38, 69.
- Beg, Ali, 26.
- Beg, Hussain, 37, 69, 72, 80, 178.
- Begum, Gul Badan, 63, 92.
- Behaiqi, Abul Fazl, 2.
- Bellew, Henery Walter, 5.
- Bengal, 23, 75, 76, 85, 86, 88-93, 96, 102, 104.
- Beveridge, Annette S., 57.
- Bhai Khel Lodhis, 38.
- Bhatian Khatri, 70.
- Bhera, 54, 55, 58, 71, 72, 108, 159.
- Bhojpur, 21.
- Bihar, 23, 28, 53, 69, 75, 80-82, 84-86, 88-90, 92, 93, 96, 104.
- Bikramajit, Raja, 73.
- bin Abi Sufra, Al-Muhallab, 9.
- bin Abu-Sufyan, Muawiya, 10.
- bin Amar, Hayy, 10.
- bin Bakhtiar Khalji, Ikhtiar-ud-Din Muhammad, 23.

- bin Sawwar al-Abdi, Abdullah, 10, 24, 108, 109, 133, 179, 214.
- Bir Afghani, Malak, 28.
- Bir Bhan, Raja, 92.
- Birbal, Raja, 131, 132.
- Bodonchar, 14, 15.
- Borjigin, 14, 15.
- Brahman, 11.
- Britishers, 136.
- Buddhism, 7, 11.
- Buddhist (s), 7, 10, 12.
- Bulaq, 147, 151, 152, 154, 156, 160, 196.
- Bulaq Khattaks, 151, 152, 196.
- Bundelkhand, fort of, 95.
- Buner, 104, 116, 125, 130-133, 143, 170, 173, 220.
- Burhan, 146.
- Burhanpur, 161.
- Bustan, 81.
- Carnatic, 221.
- Caroe, Sir Olaf, 9, 30, 36, 51, 52, 53, 71, 74, 79, 94, 95, 110, 209, 210.
- Caspian, 14.
- Central Asia, 1, 7, 9, 10, 12, 19, 32, 49, 67, 94, 95, 120, 125.
- Central Asian Empire, 32.
- Chach, 169, 171, 172.
- Chaghaniani, Baqi, 55.
- Chagharzai, 49, 125, 172.
- Chaghtai Turks, 44.
- Chakdara, 132, 133.
- Chanderi, 40, 83.
- Chandwar, 75.
- Changa, Hasan Ibn, 49.
- Chanju, Darwish Muhammad Khan, 147.
- Chauhan, Prithvi Raj, 12.
- Chaund, 82.
- Chaunsa, 91.
- Chenab, 54, 58.
- China, 1, 13, 16.
- Chinese, 6, 10, 13, 14, 15.
- Chiniot, 54, 58.
- Chittor, 86.
- Chora, 122.
- Chunar, 86, 88.
- Chuntra, 195, 199, 200.
- Dadikis, 2.
- Dag Ismail Khel, 151, 196.
- Dakka, 159, 201.
- Dalazak (s), 53-55, 58, 59, 61, 65, 66, 123, 127, 137.
- Dalazak malaks, 58, 61, 66.
- Dambarah, 219.
- Damghar, 208.
- Dandana, river, 31.
- Dani, Ahmad Hasan / A. H., 9, 132.
- Danishmand, Ibrahim, 108.
- Dar Mesteter, 5.
- Dara Shukuh, Prince, 156, 160.
- Darwaiza, Akhun 107, 122-126, 131, 138, 140, 143, 203, 205, 206.
- Darya Khan, Revolt of, 177.
- Darya Khan-Mughal conflict, 194.
- Das, Bhagwan, 130.
- Dava, 18.
- Dawar, 109, 113, 116.
- Dawlat Khel, 134.
- Dawlat, Khalifa, 117.
- Dawud, Fatah/Fateh Khan, 11, 93, 102.
- Dawudzai, 51, 141, 151.

- Dawudzai, Mesri Khan, 140, 166, 213.
- Deccan, 28, 141, 197, 198, 221.
- Delhi, 17-28, 30, 31, 33-37, 40, 43, 52, 53, 56, 64, 65, 67-75, 79, 86, 90, 93-97, 101, 103, 104, 107, 116, 117, 121, 128-130, 141, 145, 150, 155, 160, 161, 163, 166, 167, 170, 172, 215.
- Court, 65, 70.
 - Sultan (s), 17, 19, 24-26, 35, 38, 40.
 - Sultanate, 17, 19, 25, 40.
 - Throne, 25, 31, 36, 103.
- Dera Ghazi Khan, 93.
- Dera Ismail Khan, 93.
- Deria Khan, 55.
- Dharmat, battle of, 161.
- Dholpur, 40, 69.
- Dihlavi, Amir Khusraw, 20.
- Dipalpur, 20, 35, 71, 97.
- Diyarun, 61, 62.
- Doab, 72.
- Dodah, 215.
- Domas, 172.
- Dorah, 87.
- Dudu, Rai, 38, 76.
- Duki, 56.
- Durand Line, 1, 7.
- Durrani, Ahmad Shah, 222.
- Duwabah, 196.
- Earnest Trumpp, 5.
- Eastern Bihar, 23.
- Empress, 92.
- Erskine, William, 13, 22, 44, 55, 59, 63.
- Etowah, 69, 76.
- Europe, 17.
- European, 5, 13.
- Fakhr-i-Mudabbir, 11.
- Farghana, 40, 43-45.
- Farmuli (s), 36, 38, 66, 69, 76.
- nobles, 38.
 - Shaikhzadas, 76.
- Farmuli, Bayazid, 86.
- Farmuli, Malak Hussain, 38.
- Farmuli, Shah Mahmud, 76.
- Farmuli, Shahzada Sulaiman, 72.
- Farrukhabad, 141.
- Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA), 1, 137.
- Federally Administered Tribal Areas, 1, 107.
- Feroz Khalji, Malak Jalal-ud-Din, 21.
- Feroz Shah, Jalal-ud-Din, 21.
- Feroz-ud-Din, Khadija, 158.
- Firdausi, 2.
- Gadai, Shaikh, 124.
- Gadoon (s), 48, 51, 140, 173.
- Gandab Valley, 199, 200.
- Gandamak, 214.
- Gandhara, 2, 9-11.
- Gandharis, 2.
- Ganges, 44, 76, 91.
- Garmsir, 28.
- Gaur, 90, 92.
- Ghakkar, 32, 163.
- Ghala Dher, 213.
- Ghalji, 22, 54.
- Ghaur, 22.
- Ghauri, Muhammad, 12, 23.
- Ghauria Khel, 151, 158.
- Ghauride, 23.
- Ghazipur, 76.
- Ghaznavi / Ghaznawi, Sultan Mahmud, 7, 9, 11, 12, 20, 33,

- 35, 38, 49, 75, 76, 83, 84, 86, 87, 89, 90.
- Ghazni, 3, 7, 11, 12, 17, 22, 23, 28, 32, 37, 45, 46, 54, 56, 57, 65, 133, 159.
- Ghiljis, 22, 54.
- Ghiljis Afghans, 22.
- Ghilzai (s), 21, 214.
- Ghilzai Afghans, 214.
- Ghwarah Marghah, battle of, 48.
- Ginguta, 72.
- Girji, Rustam Khan, 135, 156, 202.
- Gobi desert, 13.
- Gogra, 76.
- Gomal Pass, 56.
- Gopal Das, 146.
- Gorakhpur, 38.
- Goundifer Abagan Rismaund, 3.
- Grand-Trunk Road, 131.
- Greeco-Bactrian, 6.
- Greek(s), 2, 6, 7.
- Grierson, Sir George Abraham, 5.
- Gugyani, 54, 55, 57, 140, 158.
- Gujar, Shaikh, 166.
- Gujarat, 27, 70, 89, 97, 102.
- Gujjars, 127, 213.
- Gulistan, 81.
- Gumbat, 215.
- Gung, 38.
- Gunjavi, Nizami, 81.
- Gwalior / Gwalyar, 40, 69, 74, 96.
- Habibi, Abdul Hay, 5.
- Haig, Wellesley, 21.
- Haji Begum, Queen, 92.
- Haji Zangi, Mulla, 126.
- Hakim, Mirza Muhammad, 104, 105, 115, 117-119, 122, 126, 128, 138, 148.
- Hamid, Malak, 173.
- Hamid, Sayed, 129.
- Hamza Khan, Malik, 167.
- Hangtohan, 13.
- Hangu, 54, 55.
- Harvi, Khwaja Niamatullah, 4.
- Hasan Khel Afridis, 219.
- Hasan Khel, 219.
- Hasanzai Akazai, 172.
- Hashtnagar, 65, 116, 119, 123, 172.
- Hazara (s), 18, 58, 71, 134, 172, 212.
- Hazara, Mir, 212.
- Hebrew, 2.
- Hejaz, 110.
- Helmand, 7, 93.
- Herodotus, 2, 13.
- Hindal, Mirza, 90, 91.
- Hindu (s), 1, 7, 9-11, 23, 30, 32, 38, 87.
- Hindu Kush, 1, 30.
- Hindu Shahi Dynasty, 7, 11.
- Hindu Shahis, 9.
- Hinduism, 7.
- Hindustan, 55, 58, 71, 224.
- Hindustani, 114.
- Hissar Ferozah, 72, 97.
- Hoelun, 16.
- Holy Prophet (SAW), 116.
- Holy Quran, 110, 125.
- Hudud-ul-Alam Minal Mashriq Ilal Maghrib, 2.
- Humayun, Azam, 86, 89.
- Humayun-Sher Shah Confrontation, 89.
- Hund, 168, 171-173.
- Hussain, Mian, 69.

- Hussaini, Mir, 196.
 Hyder Ali, Malak, 61.
 Hyder Ali, Sultan, 58.
 Ibni Samura, 9.
 Idak, 10, 123.
 Idri, 72.
 Iltutmish, Sultan Shams-ud-Din, 2, 12, 18, 23.
 Ilyas Afghan, 30.
 Indarab, 30, 157.
 Indarpal, 23.
 India, 6, 7, 9-11, 13, 14, 16, 18, 19, 21-24, 28-31, 36, 40, 41, 43, 44, 46, 50, 54-58, 68, 71, 72, 75, 77, 79, 80, 84, 86, 93, 94, 96, 98, 101, 107, 110, 116-118, 125, 133, 147, 153, 161, 164, 165, 183, 197, 220, 222, 224.
 Indian Afghan, 157, 164.
 Indian (s), 2-5, 10, 12-14, 18, 21, 23, 25, 29, 30, 32, 43, 45, 51-53, 55, 56, 58, 61, 70, 79, 80, 98, 107, 108, 157, 163, 165.
 Indo-Aryan, 5.
 Indo-European, 5.
 Indo-Germanic, 5.
 Indo-Persian, 5.
 Indus, 6, 11, 17, 25, 28, 37, 44, 55, 94, 95, 103, 104, 147, 170, 172, 173, 210.
 — Valley Civilization, 6.
 — Valley, 6, 11, 95.
 — river, 17, 24, 25, 51, 53, 55, 127, 128, 159, 169, 162, 168, 169, 171, 173, 183, 214.
 Iranian, 3.
 Isa Khel, 54.
 Islam, 9, 10, 23, 58, 96, 97, 110, 115, 124, 142, 143.
 Islamic, 7, 110, 113, 125, 126, 142.
 Ismael, 72, 111, 130.
 Ismaeli doctrine, 110.
 Ismaelite / Ismaili sect, 11, 110.
 Ismail Khel, 125.
 Ismail, Shaikh, 110.
 Isori Bala, 220.
 Jagdalak, 214.
 Jahan, Khan, 4, 141.
 Jahangir, Nur-ud-Din Muhammad, 4, 45, 56, 105, 127, 134, 135, 139, 141, 144, 145, 153, 172.
 Jaipal, Raja, 7, 11, 32.
 Jalalabad, 55, 57, 97, 214.
 Jalalah, 128-130, 133, 134, 139, 141.
 Jalali, 21.
 Jalal-ud-Din, 17, 21-23, 76, 128.
 Jalandhar, 25, 97, 107-110.
 Jalsai, 171.
 Jam, 54, 125.
 Jamal, Mir, 64.
 Jamrud, 55, 197.
 Jandol, 60.
 Janga, 50.
 Jats, 20.
 Jaunpur, 35, 37, 40, 52, 68, 81-83, 86, 87, 89.
 Jeewan-bin-Jannati, 124.
 Jhelum, 31, 53, 94.
 Jhelum river, 53, 55, 77.
 Jilo Sur, 89.
 Jilwani, Ahmad Khan, 38.
 Jilwani, Ismael, 72.
 Jiwan, Malik, 163.
 Jiwani, Mian Biban, 86.
 Joshi, Rita, 157.
 Kabul Shahis, 9.

- Kabul, 4, 9, 10, 28, 32, 35, 37, 40, 43-48, 50-53, 55-57, 60, 61, 65, 66, 70-72, 76, 93, 97, 104, 115, 116, 118-120, 122-124, 126-130, 134, 135, 138, 139, 141, 148-150, 157-159, 162, 165, 166, 170, 172, 174, 177, 178, 180, 197, 199, 213, 214, 216, 222.
- Kabul, river, 150.
- Kache, Malak, 173.
- Kadar, 24.
- Kafiristan, 59.
- Kafirs, 57.
- Kahraj, 63.
- Kaju, Khan, 52, 140, 159, 169.
- Kaka Sahib, Hazrat Shaikh Rahamkar, 158, 194.
- Kakakhel, Bahadar Shah Zafar, 2, 6, 13, 89, 90, 182, 210, 220.
- Kakar tribe, 145.
- Kakar, 36, 145.
- Kakar, Dilawar Khan, 69, 70, 72, 73, 145.
- Kaladhir, 116.
- Kalan, Khwaja, 59.
- Kalinjar, 95.
- Kalpani, 119, 123.
- Kalpi, 38, 69, 92.
- Kalu Khan, Malak, 131.
- Kamal, Muhammad, 113.
- Kamal-ud-Din, 128, 141.
- Kamil, Dost Muhammad Khan, 180, 195.
- Kampila, 21.
- Kamran, 91, 93, 104.
- Kandahar, 93, 145.
- Kanghra valley, 155.
- Kanghra, 155, 213, 217.
- Kaniguram, 105, 107-109.
- Kankoway, 173.
- Kapisa, 10.
- Karachi, 1.
- Karakar pass, 132.
- Karan, Raja, 27.
- Karbogha, 148.
- Karim, Abdul, 118, 124.
- Karimdad, 141.
- Karlanri tribe, 146, 178.
- Karlanris, 36, 80.
- Karrani, Sulaiman, 102.
- Kashgharia, 18.
- Kashmir, 6, 130, 131, 145, 170.
- Kasi, 117.
- Kasuria Afghans, 74.
- Katlang, 54.
- Katuzai, 196.
- Kerulen river, 15.
- Kesh, 30.
- Khadu Khel, 172.
- Khairabad, 149, 150, 151.
- Khair-ud-Din, 127.
- Khakhi, 45, 46, 172.
- Khalifa, 71, 73, 83, 117, 122.
- Khalil (s), 48, 51, 103, 105, 114, 120, 128, 130, 140, 141, 149, 151.
- Khalil and Khattak tribes, 128, 149.
- Khalil, Hamesh, 166, 208.
- Khalil, Shaikh, 95, 128.
- Khalji dynasty, 21, 23.
- Khalji, Ala-ud-Din, 24.
- Khalji, Sultan Jalal-ud-Din, 22, 23, 24, 27.
- Khalji, Sultan Mahmud, 33.
- Khaljis, 21, 22, 23.
- Khan, Abdul Ghaffar, 136.

- Khan, Abdul Qadir, 196.
 Khan, Abid, 196, 215, 219.
 Khan, Adil, 89.
 Khan, Afzal, 148, 161, 166, 180, 181, 201, 220.
 Khan, Ahmad Nabi, 20.
 Khan, Alahdad, 134, 141, 202.
 Khan, Ala-ud-Din Alam, 72.
 Khan, Ali Mardan, 145.
 Khan, Amanat, 155.
 Khan, Amir, 146, 167, 216, 217, 219.
 Khan, Asalat, 155-158, 164, 213, 216, 223.
 Khan, Asghar, 215.
 Khan, Ashraf, 181, 193-195, 213, 216-218, 223.
 Khan, Bacha, 136.
 Khan, Bahar, 116, 119.
 Khan, Bahram/ Bairam, 19, 97, 110, 181, 182, 193-195, 216, 218, 223.
 Khan, Bakhtiar, 163.
 Khan, Baqi, 166.
 Khan, Bhaku, 99, 140, 158, 159, 162, 163, 168, 169, 171, 172, 173, 177, 180, 183, 190, 207, 209, 210, 214, 215, 218, 223.
 Khan, Biban, 75, 87.
 Khan, Bihar, 69.
 Khan, Chaghtai, 18, 19, 43.
 Khan, Dalir, 162, 164.
 Khan, Deva, 18, 24, 28.
 Khan, Farid, 80, 82.
 Khan, Fidayi, 213, 215.
 Khan, Ganj Ali, 213.
 Khan, Genghiz, 12-18, 29, 43.
 Khan, Ghazan, 24.
 Khan, Habib, 115, 159.
 Khan, Hadi, 134.
 Khan, Haji, 101.
 Khan, Halaku, 19, 24.
 Khan, Hamid, 11, 32, 34, 159.
 Khan, Hamza, 127.
 Khan, Hazbar, 161, 214.
 Khan, Ibrahim, 86.
 Khan, Ilyas, 75.
 Khan, Ismael / Ismail, 72, 93.
 Khan, Ismael Quli, 130.
 Khan, Izzat, 214.
 Khan, Jamal, 81, 157.
 Khan, Khafi, 163, 164.
 Khan, Khalilullah, 216.
 Khan, Khawas, 89.
 Khan, Khizar, 29, 31, 32, 35.
 Khan, Khusraw, 55.
 Khan, Mahabat, 134, 174, 177, 180, 181, 195-197.
 Khan, Malak Ahmad, 50, 51, 53, 54, 61, 62, 63, 65, 139, 189.
 Khan, Malak Habib, 173.
 Khan, Malak Hamza, 65, 202.
 Khan, Malak Taj-ud-Din, 45.
 Khan, Mammun, 172.
 Khan, Mangli, 162, 164.
 Khan, Masum, 116, 119.
 Khan, Mirbaz, 166.
 Khan, Mohsin, 121, 122, 123, 126.
 Khan, Muhammad Amin, 166, 167, 170, 171, 172, 178, 179, 180, 217.
 Khan, Mukaram, 176, 209, 214, 219.
 Khan, Multafat, 213, 217, 223.
 Khan, Nasir, 86, 97.
 Khan, Nazu, 151.
 Khan, Nek Nam, 157.

- Khan, Nizam, 69, 84.
 Khan, Painda, 116, 119.
 Khan, Prince Muhammad, 20.
 Khan, Purdil, 161, 162.
 Khan, Qasim, 69, 128.
 Khan, Qazaq, 146.
 Khan, Qazi, 115, 116.
 Khan, Qutub, 69, 75, 88.
 Khan, Ranmast, 164.
 Khan, Roshan, 51, 173.
 Khan, Sadat, 166.
 Khan, Safdar, 145.
 Khan, Sarang, 29, 31, 36.
 Khan, Sardar Shadi, 56.
 Khan, Sayed Amir, 166, 167, 170, 174.
 Khan, Shahbaz, 97, 152-154, 160.
 Khan, Shahdad, 167.
 Khan, Shaibani, 44.
 Khan, Shaista, 197.
 Khan, Shamsher, 89, 171, 176, 214.
 Khan, Sher Muhammad, 160, 198, 199, 215.
 Khan, Shihab, 89.
 Khan, Shujat, 197-199.
 Khan, Syed, 134, 141.
 Khan, Tawus, 63.
 Khan, Taza, 146.
 Khan, Toli, 17.
 Khan, Toman, 29.
 Khan, Ulghu, 23, 27.
 Khan, Yahya, 152.
 Khan, Yunus, 43.
 Khan, Zafar, 25, 26, 141.
 Khan-i-Azam, 81.
 Khanide (II), 24.
 Khanpur, 145.
 Khapush, 214.
 Khashi, 45, 46, 172.
 Khashi Afghan, 45.
 Khattab Afghan, Malak, 29.
 Khattak (s), 2, 103, 141, 144, 146-148, 150-154, 159, 160, 167, 177, 181, 182, 193-195, 201, 202, 206, 208, 210, 215, 218-220.
 Khattak, Khushal Khan, 22, 41, 74, 131, 136, 144, 146-148, 153, 154, 156-160, 162-169, 174-183, 188, 193-196, 198-204, 206-208, 210-221, 223.
 Khattak, Preshan, 22, 157, 165, 194.
 Khattak-Mughal Rapprochement, 146.
 Khawaspur, 81, 82.
 Khingan hills, 15.
 Khirilji, 57.
 Khizar Khel, 57.
 Khoezai, 178.
 Khokar, Shaikh, 29.
 Khokars, 20.
 Khudadad, Shaikh, 108, 109, 110.
 Khudai Khidmatgar Movement, 136, 137.
 Khurasan, 7, 46, 116, 122.
 Khurd-Kabul Pass, 58.
 Khurram, 147.
 Khushab, 54, 58, 108, 159.
 Khushal Khan, Revolt of, 194.
 Khushal Khan, Yusufzais, 206.
 Khwaja, Qutlagh, 25.
 Khwara, 148, 151.
 Khwarzam Shah, Jalal-ud-Din, 17.
 Khweshgi, 74, 157, 161, 164, 214.

- Khyber, 1, 54, 55, 72, 103, 116, 119-121, 125, 130, 147, 153, 159, 178.
- Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, 1, 116, 119, 125, 147, 153.
- Khyber Pass, 72, 103, 159, 178.
- Kilughari, 23.
- Klaproth, 5.
- Kobi, desert of, 14.
- Koh Lawaghar, 135.
- Kohat, 54, 55, 134, 135, 156, 160, 195, 199, 215.
- Koh-i-Jud, 25.
- Koh-i-Jud, Raja of, 20.
- Koka, Zain Khan, 130-132.
- Kotal Hindu Koh, 157.
- Kotal, 55, 157.
- Krappa, 214.
- Krhapa, 132.
- Kshatriya, 10.
- Kukuzai, 178.
- Kunar, 46, 178.
- Kundiala, 215.
- Kuriltay, 16.
- Kurt family, 18.
- Kurt, Shams-ud-Din, 18.
- Lad Malika, 85, 86.
- Laghman, 11, 32, 57.
- Lahor, 171.
- Lahore, Raja of, 11.
- Lake Buyur, 15.
- Lake Kolun, 15.
- Landi Khana, 179.
- Landi Kotal, 130, 179, 180, 201.
- Lang, Timur, 12, 13, 18, 29-31, 34, 43, 45, 75, 79.
- Langa, Sultan Hussain, 52.
- Langa, Sultan Qutb-ud-Din, 37.
- Langar Kot, 177, 202, 212, 217, 223.
- Langas, 37.
- Lodhi (s), 4, 11, 22, 30-32, 34, 36, 39, 40, 43, 52, 53, 65-69, 71, 72, 75-77, 80, 85, 98.
- Afghan dynasty, 34, 43.
 - Afghan tribe, 36, 80.
 - Dynasty, 32, 39, 66.
 - Empire, 53, 67.
 - Kingdom, 68.
 - prince, 53.
 - Sultan, 39, 52.
 - Sultanate, 39.
- Lodhi, Ahmad Khan, 81.
- Lodhi, Alam Khan, 69, 70, 71, 72, 74, 152.
- Lodhi, Dawlat Khan, 31, 56, 69-72, 74, 82, 117, 134.
- Lodhi, Hamid, 11, 32.
- Lodhi, Ibrahim, 40, 53, 58, 60, 64, 67, 68, 70-72, 74, 81, 114.
- Lodhi, Mahmud Khan, 12, 38, 75, 76, 83, 84, 87, 90.
- Lodhi, Malak Bahlul, 32-40, 68, 77, 91, 183, 224.
- Lodhi, Malak Mahmud, 12.
- Lodhi, Malak Shah Bahram, 29, 32.
- Lodhi, Shaikh Hamid, 11, 32.
- Lodhi, Sikandar, 36, 40, 52, 67, 81.
- Lodhi, Sultan Bahlul, 29, 34, 52, 70, 80, 107, 184.
- Lodhi, Sultan Mahmud, 75, 86.
- Lodhi, Sultan Ibrahim, 66-68, 70-73, 94, 184.
- Lodhi, Sultan Sikandar, 36, 52, 66, 86, 97.
- Lohani (s), 36, 54, 66, 76, 133.
- Lohani Afghan tribes, 66.

- Lohani, Jalal Khan, 68, 76, 85, 88, 89, 96, 134.
- Lohani, Khizar, 56.
- Loralai, 56.
- Lucknow, 23, 75, 87.
- Luqman, 146, 147.
- Macchiwara, 97.
- Macmunn, George, 7.
- Mada Khel, 172.
- Maghmoom, Yar Muhammad, 123, 136.
- Mahal, 156, 160.
- Mahmandi, 147.
- Mahmud Shah I, Malwa Sultan, 33.
- Mahmud Shah, Sultan, 89.
- Mahmud, Nasir-ud-Din, 19, 30.
- Mahram, Shah Quli, 130.
- Mahsud, Ali Khan, 56, 135.
- Maidan, 212.
- Maidani, Nand Ali, 135.
- Makhozai, 172.
- Makran, 6.
- Malakand, 53, 133.
- Malandaray, 132, 144.
- Mali, Shaikh, 151, 205.
- Malwa, 33, 93, 97, 102.
- Malwa Sultan, 33.
- Man Singh, Raja, 129, 149, 170.
- Manchus, 13, 14.
- Mandanr, 36, 46, 132, 164, 177, 202, 212.
- Mandanr Yusufzais, 164, 202, 212.
- Mandori, 199.
- Mandu, 90.
- Marathas, 197, 198, 221.
- Mard, Mubarak, 12.
- Mardan, 60, 65, 119, 123, 152, 155, 167.
- Mardan Dawlat, Malak, 29.
- Margalla hills, 93.
- Marwat, 36.
- Mastura valley, 134.
- Masud, Ala-ud-Din, 19.
- Matto, Bibi, 35.
- Maudud, Khalifa, 117.
- Maura Hill, 61.
- Mauryans, 6.
- Mavraunnahr, 25.
- Mayar, 152, 155.
- Maysara, 26.
- Meerut, 30.
- Mehsud, 54.
- Menai, 127.
- Mesh Khel Afghans, 57.
- Mewar, 69, 72, 75.
- Mewat, 20, 33, 69.
- Mewati, Hussain Khan, 72.
- Mian Doab, 31, 75.
- Mian Noor, Shaikh, 203.
- Mianwali, 94.
- Minhaj-ul-Siraj, 2.
- Miran Shah, 45.
- Miran, Mir, 216.
- Miru Mandanr, Mulla, 127.
- Mirza, Jahangir, 56.
- Mirza, Shah Rukh, 45.
- Mirza, Umar Shaikh, 43, 45.
- Misar Ahmad, Maulana Sayed, 125.
- Mixed Race Theory, 4.
- Miyana Afghan, 101.
- Miyana, Inayat, 162.
- Mohmand (s), 54, 57, 65, 103, 105, 120, 128, 130, 141, 144, 146, 149, 151, 171, 178, 179, 194, 199, 201, 214, 219.

- Mohmand, Arbab Mustajab Khan, 166.
- Mohmand/ Moomand, Aimal Khan, 136, 146, 177-180, 199, 215, 218, 223.
- Monghyr, 88, 91.
- Mongol (s), 4, 7, 12-21, 23-31, 35, 37, 43, 44, 58, 79.
- Empire, 16.
 - Khanate, 19.
 - Afghan, 13.
- Mongolia, 15, 16, 17.
- Mongolian, 15.
- Monia, 91.
- Muazzam, Prince, 197.
- Mubaraka, Bibi, 61-63, 65, 66, 76.
- Mughal (s), 1, 4, 7, 13, 14, 18, 30-32, 37, 39, 40, 43-45, 47-50, 52, 54, 56-58, 62, 64-66, 72, 73, 75-77, 79, 80, 82-85, 87-94, 97-99, 101, 102, 104-108, 110, 114-124, 126, 128-136, 138-160, 163-166, 168-183, 193-204, 206-223.
- Afghan conflict, 13, 40, 50, 180.
 - Afghan relations, 41, 45, 50.
 - Afghan, 1, 13, 40, 45, 50, 180.
 - army, 56, 59, 62, 73, 74, 76, 84, 104, 119, 131-133, 141, 157, 158, 159, 170, 214, 216.
 - Dynasty, 30, 43.
 - Empire, 13, 102, 104, 158, 165, 221-223.
 - sawars, 39, 132.
 - soldiers, 39, 72, 92, 97, 109, 110, 119, 156, 171, 177, 196, 197, 209, 212, 221.
- Mughalpura, 24.
- Muhammad Mirza, Sultan, 45, 90, 102.
- Muhammad Shah, Sultan, 32, 33.
- Muhammad, Nazar, 157, 158.
- Muhammad, Pir, 215.
- Muhammad, Shaikh, 108.
- Muhammadzai (s), 45, 48, 51, 54, 74, 116, 119, 124, 128, 139, 158.
- Muhammadzai areas, 139.
- Muhib Khel Mohmands, 166.
- Mukam, 54.
- Muller, Fr., 5.
- Multan, 11, 18, 19, 20, 29, 31, 32, 35, 37, 52, 93, 111, 162.
- Mungkur, 13.
- Muqem, Muhammad, 44.
- Murad, Prince, 132, 155, 157.
- Murshid, Mulla, 71.
- Musa Darrah, 219.
- Muslim, 2, 7.
- Muslim Arabs, 7.
- Muzaffar Shah, Sultan, 70.
- Nandrak, 147.
- Nangarhar, 57, 123, 124.
- Narawan, 133.
- Nasar, 11, 32.
- Nauhani (s), 36, 69, 75, 80, 82, 85, 86, 157.
- Nauhani chief, 69, 82.
- Nepal, 6.
- Niamatullah, 84.
- Niazi, 36, 54, 93, 94.
- Niazi areas, 94.
- Niazi, Haibat Khan, 89, 93.
- Niazi, Isa Khan Hajib, 86, 89, 92.
- Niazi, Malak Baha-ud-Din, 30.
- Niazi territory, 93.
- Nilab, 93.
- Nizam, Shaikh, 95.

- Nizampur, 148, 196, 200.
 Noor, Mian, 203, 204, 206-208, 212.
 North Waziristan, 10.
 North West Frontier, 7.
 Northern Bengal, 23.
 Newshehra, 60, 147, 149, 150, 151, 195, 196, 213, 220.
 Newshehra fort, 196.
 Onon river, 15.
 Orientalist (s), 5.
 Oxus, 14.
 Padshah, 55, 58.
 Painda, Mulla, 109.
 Pakatvis, 2.
 Pakht, 2.
 Pakhtun (s), 1, 3, 135, 168.
 Pakhtunkhwa, 52, 168, 189, 220.
 Pakistan, 1, 3, 17, 107, 137, 147.
 Paktha, 1.
 Paktika, 2.
 Paktvan, 2.
 Panipat, 33, 40, 64, 72, 73, 93, 94.
 Panipat, battle of, 64, 75, 82, 108, 114.
 Panjkora, 60.
 Panjkora, river, 61.
 Panjpir, 171, 212.
 Parwan, 17.
 Pashto, 5, 107, 124, 147.
 Pashtoon (s), 1, 136.
 Pashtun, 1, 3.
 Patiali, 21.
 Patna, 86, 87, 91.
 Peking, 16.
 Persia, 14, 19, 24.
 Persian (s), 2, 3, 5, 9, 13, 14, 43, 81, 124, 145, 156.
 Peshawar, 11, 12, 18, 43, 51, 54, 55, 60, 65, 71, 72, 80, 97, 115, 116, 119, 121, 126, 129, 130, 133, 139, 141, 142, 146, 148, 149, 158, 166, 199, 220, 222.
 Peshawar Valley, 139, 220.
 Pir Tarik, 126.
 Pir-i-Tarik, 114, 126.
 Pishin, 145.
 Poran, 172.
 Pukhtu, 6, 8.
 Pukhtun (s), 1-3, 74, 182, 202.
Pukhtunwali, 8, 121, 167.
 Punjab, 1, 9, 11, 17, 18, 31, 33, 38, 69, 72-74, 77, 80, 91, 93, 96, 97, 101, 104, 107, 161, 162, 171, 222.
 Qanauj, 38, 75, 76, 93, 109.
 Qandahar, 11, 22, 28, 35, 37, 54, 97, 117, 156.
 Qandahar-Quetta route, 35.
 Raisani, 146.
 Raisin, 93.
 Rajasthan, 93, 101.
 Rajgarh, 195, 196.
 Rajput (s), 20, 38, 69, 75, 157, 197, 221.
 Rajputana, 221.
 Rapri, 29, 69, 76.
 Rashid-al-Din, Khwaja, 24.
 Rasool Rasa, Mian Syed, 149.
 Ratbil, 10.
 Raverty, Major, 3, 21.
 Razzar Tehsil, 65.
 Razzar, Malak, 45.
 Red Khattaks, 159.
 Roman, 9.
 Roshani, Pir, 114.

- Roshnites, 115, 118, 120-123, 126-129, 131, 133-135, 138, 139, 141, 143, 145.
- Roshniya / Rowshani Movement, 99, 101, 105-107, 117, 118, 120, 121, 124, 126, 127, 129, 134-138, 140-142.
- literature, 118, 138, 144.
- Decline of the, 140.
- Royal Palace (Agra), 91.
- Ruh, 3, 7, 30, 33, 35, 36, 40, 68, 77, 93, 94, 95.
- Ruhila, Bahadar Khan, 156, 157, 158, 160, 164, 166.
- Ruhtas Fort, 94, 102.
- Ruhtasgarh Fort, 90.
- Sabaq, Pir, 152.
- Sabhtin, 13.
- Sadi, Shaikh, 124.
- Safi, 178.
- Saghris, 147.
- Sahsaram, 81, 82, 83.
- Saidpur, 117.
- Sakit Singh, Rai, 38, 130.
- Salak, Akhun, 172.
- Saldi, 25.
- Samana, 21, 31.
- Samarqand, 30, 37, 44.
- Sambhal, 69, 74, 76, 91.
- Sanga, Rana, 69, 72, 73, 75.
- Sangawu, 167.
- Sanjar Pabini, Maulana, 125.
- Sanskrit, 5, 10.
- Sarab, 157.
- Sarai Akora, 220.
- Sarang Khani Lodhis, 36.
- Sarang Khani, Taj Khan, 76, 85, 135.
- Sarang Khani, Tatar Khan, 69.
- Sarawan, 146.
- Sarbani, Malak Habib, 30.
- Sarbani, Sarmast Khan, 89.
- Sarhind, 32, 33, 71, 93, 97.
- Sarkar, Jadu Nath, 197.
- Sarkavai, 127.
- Sarun, 38.
- Sarwani, Abbas, 84, 87, 95.
- Sarwani, Dawlat Khan, 82.
- Sarwani, Humayun, 38, 63, 72, 73, 76, 79, 85, 87-94, 97, 98, 101, 104.
- Sarwani, Malak Khizar Khan, 30.
- Sarwani, Shaikh Bayazid, 93.
- Sarwanis, 36.
- Sassanian Dynasty, 3.
- Satagidis, 2.
- Sayal, Khwaja Muhammad, 147.
- Sayed Dynasty, 31, 35.
- Sayed Sultans, 32, 79.
- Seni, 147, 151.
- Seri, 26.
- Sewistan, 17, 25.
- Shadi Khan, Malak, 73, 152.
- Shah Jehan, Emperor, 105, 141, 144.
- Shah, Kabul, 9, 10.
- Shah Mansur, Malak, 59-63, 171.
- Shah Mansur, Throne of, 62.
- Shah, Mubarak, 33.
- Shah, Nadir, 222.
- Shah, Nusrat, 76, 85.
- Shah, Pir Muazzam, 61.
- Shah, Sikandar, 96.
- Shah, Sulaiman, 46-49, 82, 102, 121, 122.
- Shahbazgarhi, 54, 65, 119, 171, 202.

- Shaheedan-i-Yusufzai Muqbara, 51.
- Shahu Khel Lodhis, 36.
- Shahu, Malak, 12.
- Shaikh, Amir, 45.
- Shaimu Khel, 57.
- Shalkot, 145.
- Shangla, 172.
- Shapur I, 3.
- Shapur III, 3.
- Sharqi Sultan (s), 37, 39, 52.
- Sharqi, Jalal-ud-Din, 76.
- Sharqi, Mahmud Shah, 35, 90.
- Shinwari, 66, 123, 178, 179.
- Shirani (s), 30.
- Shirin, Mulla, 132.
- Shivaji, 197, 221.
- Shukuh, Dara, 156, 158, 160-163, 168, 172.
- Siberia, 13, 14.
- Sibi, 4, 18, 25, 145.
- Siddiqui, Iqtidar Hussain, 3, 9, 80, 86.
- Sigh, Kanwar Man, 130.
- Sih-kana, 57.
- Sijistan, 10.
- Sikandar Shah, Sultan, 97.
- Sikandar Sur, Sultan, 97.
- Sikri, 167.
- Sindh, 6, 18, 19, 93, 97, 117.
- Singh, Jagat, 155.
- Singh, Kirat, 95.
- Singh, Maharaja Jaswant, 161, 197-199, 201.
- Siri, 26, 31.
- Sironj, 101.
- South Asia, 1, 12-14, 43, 44, 79, 94, 168, 170.
- South Asian, 12, 13, 43, 44, 79.
- South Bihar, 69.
- South Waziristan, 105, 107.
- Spinwam, 10.
- Subuktigin, 11, 32.
- Sudham, 54.
- Sufi Islam, 143.
- Sufic, 137.
- Sukkah, 89.
- Sulaiman Shah, Malak, 45-47, 50, 51, 139.
- Sulaiman, Mirza, 116, 117, 121, 122.
- Sulaiman, Mullah, 110.
- Sultan Awais, 63.
- Sultan, Chaghtai, 94.
- Sultan, Malik, 33.
- Sultanate, 17, 19-21, 23, 26, 29, 32-34, 38, 67.
- Sultani, 38.
- Sultan-i-Rome, 62, 132, 203, 206, 207, 209, 210.
- Sur, 76, 77, 80, 89, 94, 96, 98, 101.
- Sur Afghan Dynasty, 94.
- Sur Afghan Empire, 96.
- Sur, Alauat Khan, 76.
- Sur, Ibrahim, 36, 80.
- Sur, Muhammad Shah, 82, 97.
- Sur, Sher Khan, 76.
- Suri, Sher Shah, 36, 76, 77, 79, 80, 83, 85, 89-98, 101, 104, 183, 186, 191, 223, 224.
- Suri, Sikandar, 101.
- Suris, 22, 36, 98.
- Sutlej, 97.
- Sutra, 194.
- Swabi, 54, 60, 65, 127.

- Swat, 4, 6, 43, 51, 53, 54, 59-61, 63, 104, 105, 124, 130-133, 138, 140, 143, 144, 146, 170-172, 200-210, 212, 220.
- Swat Valley, 6, 43, 53, 63, 140.
- Swat Yusufzai (s), 200, 206, 212.
- Taijiut, 15.
- Tajik (s), 9, 124.
- Tamerlane, 18.
- Taqwim-ul-Haq, Sayed, 117, 138.
- Taragarh, 155.
- Taragarh fort, 156.
- Tarin, 46, 117, 146.
- Tarin, Ghazi Khan, 37, 52, 54, 70, 72, 74, 93.
- Tarin, Hayat Khan, 145, 157.
- Tarin, Sher Khan, 145.
- Tarklanri, 45.
- Tarmizi, Sayed Ali, 106, 125.
- Tartaq, 26.
- Tartar (s), 12, 13, 172.
- Temujin, 16.
- Temuride dominion, 40, 45, 54, 71.
- Temuride rulers, 53, 57.
- Tengri, 16.
- Teri Khattaks, 147.
- Teri-Bulaq, 160, 180.
- Thanda, 81, 82.
- Thanseri, Ahmad, 30.
- Tibet, 14.
- Timur, Amir, 18, 29.
- Tirah, 104, 113, 114, 116, 118, 120-122, 128, 129, 131, 133, 134, 138, 139, 141, 164, 171, 200, 201.
- Tirahis, 113.
- Tirhat, 109.
- Topi, 127.
- Tora Ragha, 123.
- Tordher, 171, 173.
- Tory, Shibli Ibn, 49.
- Totki, 193.
- Transoxiana, 18, 24, 27, 28, 29, 46, 125.
- Tsang, Hiuen, 10.
- Tughlaqpur, 28.
- Tui tribe, 118.
- Tundra, 13.
- Tungus, 13.
- Turan, 133, 157.
- Turi, 54.
- Turk (s), 9, 12-15, 18, 21, 22, 33, 44, 58, 79.
- Turkestan, 6, 217.
- Turkic, 14, 15, 22, 30, 43.
- Turkish, 4, 12, 13, 19, 21.
- Turmaan, 147.
- Ulugh Beg, Mirza, 40, 43-51, 53, 64, 65, 198.
- Umar, Shaikh, 127, 134, 143.
- United Provinces, 101.
- Urmah, 107.
- Urmah, 107.
- Usman, Hazrat, 7.
- Uthman Khel, 51, 214.
- Utmanzai, 171.
- Uzbek (s), 44, 133, 153.
- Uzbekistan, 43.
- Vindapharn Afghan Kazm Had, 3.
- Vindapharn, 3.
- Wazir tribes, 66.
- Wazir, 54, 66.
- Western, 5, 19.
- Wolga, 14.
- Yahya Khan, Malak, 55.
- Yaik, 14.

- Yaqubi, 54, 65.
 Yarhussain, 55.
 Yesugei, 16.
 Yusuf Khel Lodhis, 36.
 Yusuf Qureshi, Shaikh, 35.
 Yusuf Sarwani, Malak, 30.
 Yusuf, Khalifa, 117.
 Yusufi, Allah Bakhsh, 127, 182.
 Yusufzai (s), 36, 45-49, 51-55, 59-66, 99, 101, 103-105, 107, 116, 117, 121, 124, 126, 127, 129-133, 137-141, 143-146, 148-155, 158, 159, 162-164, 167-174, 176-178, 183, 185, 190, 199-214, 217, 220, 223.
- Afghans, 169, 174, 207, 213, 214.
 — malak (s), 46, 49, 52, 60, 65, 66, 127, 140, 152, 201, 204.
 — Resistance, 101.
 Zabul, 10.
 Zakariya, Shaikh Baha-ud-Din, 111.
 Zaman, Muhammad, 139, 142.
 Zarif, Malak, 159, 173.
 Zend, 6.
 Zia, Qazi, 75.
 Ziara, 199, 219.
 Zia-ud-Din, Shaikh, 194, 195.
 Zoroastrian, 12.