

# ***Pakistan's Security Concerns over Indo-US Post 9/11 Strategic Engagements***

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## **ABSTRACT**

*The end of cold war brought drastic changes in the US policies towards India. Within a short time, the estrangement between US and India was vanished and their relations concluded into strategic engagement in the post 9/11. This strategic cooperation comprised a broader range of areas inducing defense and trade, nuclear, missiles and space technology cooperation. The Indian desire to rise as a regional power and the US cooperation with huge supply of arm sales and advance defense technology to India, has disturbed the security environment of South Asia as well as the balance of power between Pakistan and India. Despite the fact that, Pakistan is a key partner of the United States in the war against terrorism and a major non-NATO ally, but US policy tilt towards India has kept Pakistan's security interests at stake. The article will examine the Indo-US strategic engagement in the post 9/11, and Pakistan's security concern.*

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## Introduction

Pakistan and the US have a very different perception of India. Americans attached great importance to India because of its enormous size, tradition of democratic rule and its strategic location. To the Americans, it was a bulwark against communism and the only effective competitor to communist China. During the cold war, the US policy makers thought that the fall of India to the Soviet Union and communist China would adversely affect the fate of the entire western world as well as American interest in South Asia and the Middle East. As John Kennedy said, “we want India to win that race with Red China. We want India to be a free and thriving leader of a free and thriving Asia.”<sup>1</sup> That was the reason that despite India’s non-alignment policy the United States pursued the objective of strengthening India militarily and economically and denying it to the communist bloc.

The whole security structure of South Asia has always been described by the traditional rivalry between India and Pakistan and the rise of one country is considered the disturbing of balance of power and destabilization of the region. From its very inception, the “threat perception in Pakistan has always been relevant to Indian ambitions regarding existence of Pakistan”<sup>2</sup>, thus the security and defense policy of Pakistan has always been India-centric, because of the New Delhi desire for regional hegemony, and Islamabad’s efforts for survival from Indian dominance. Rasul Baksh Rais noted.

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- 1 John F. Kennedy’s speech to the US Senate delivered on March 25, 1958, “the Choice in Asia-Democratic Development in India”, in John Fitzgerald Kennedy, *A Compilation of Statements and Speeches made during his service in the United States Senate and the House of Representatives* (Washington DC: Government Printing Office, 1964), 607-608. Cited in Paul M. McGarr, *The Cold War in South Asia: Britain, the United States and the Indian Subcontinent, 1949-1965* (UK: Cambridge University Press, 2013). See also Zafar Iqbal Cheema, “Pakistan’s Nuclear Status”, *Pakistan Journal of American Studies* (July 1990): 12.
  - 2 Syed Shahid Hussian Bukhari, “India-United States Strategic Partnership: Implication for Pakistan”, *Berkeley Journal of Social Science* 1, no. 1 (January 2011): 13.

For over half a century Pakistan's security dilemma has centered on how to balance, counter, and if necessary, fight the Indian threat. Unconsciously borrowing from the realist paradigm, the managers of Pakistan's security tried to address this dilemma by adopting two classic approaches: alliances with major world powers to augment defense capability, and, from the 1970s onward, nuclear deterrence to offset India's conventional superiority.<sup>3</sup>

Pakistan was aligned with the US through different pacts, while without entering into alliance; India was receiving huge assistance from the US. Since the early 1950s, the United States had been the largest source of defense equipment and foreign economic assistance to India. The reason was clear as the US first preference had been India. When India refused to become the ally of United States, the next option to America was Pakistan as it did not want to leave South Asia in the hands of the communist bloc. As Robert J. McMahon noted "When American officials did seriously consider a departure from the regional formula for South Asia, they tilted toward India, not toward Pakistan".<sup>4</sup> Another expert wrote that "When American officials did contemplate acquiring an ally in the region of South Asia they generally favoured India not Pakistan" because they considered India "much more effective bulwark against Communism than Pakistan. And India would serve as a much better counterweight to Communist China than much smaller Pakistan."<sup>5</sup> Thus during the cold war, the US tended to give Pakistan military aid, but at the same time balanced its relations with India. Pakistan was allied to the US; India was never left out of the US calculations in maintaining balance of power in the region of South Asia. An Indian writer wrote:

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3 Rasul Baksh Rais, "Conceptualizing Nuclear Deterrence: Pakistan's Posture", *Indian Review* 4, no. 2 (April 2005): 145-46.

4 Robert J. McMahon, "United States Cold War Strategy in South Asia: Making a Military Commitment to Pakistan, 1947-1954", *The Journal of American History* 75, no. 3 (Dec., 1988): 819-20.

5 Wade Jeffery Larson, "United States-Pakistan Relations, 1947-1954: The Conditions and Causes for Military Alliance" (Unpublished dissertation, The University of British Columbia, 1994): 26.

Time and again the US propped up Pakistan and enabled her to claim parity in the bilateral context. This process spread over the five decades of Cold War added to the intractability of bilateral relations between the two neighbours... each time there was a measurable addition to military aid to Pakistan ... America made visible efforts to somehow balance it by a connected raise in economic aid to and involvement in the welfare and social sectors in India. Consequently, over the years America's relations with the two countries tended to neutralise each other.<sup>6</sup>

The post-Cold War brought fundamental changes in the United States foreign policy towards South Asia generally and particularly Pakistan was hit to the rock-bottom and was pushed to the sidelines. The changing global environment and regional climate made the convergence of Indo-US interests much easier, which became a major irritant in Pak-US relations. The post-cold war era has proved very beneficial to India, since the US is constantly engaged in developing political and economic relations with India. The Indian defense related agreement and the purchase of military hardware in a huge quantity from the US in 1990's, and post 9/11, was because US had planned to replace Pakistan with India in terms of security matters.

Pakistan, US and India have been a triangular relationship whereby the relationship between any two parties is essentially affected by the other. Pakistan enjoyed an upper hand in the US policy calculation towards South Asia during the Cold War era. Pakistan's strategic importance has been decreased in the post-Cold War. With the US and India forging a strategic relationship, India is increasingly influencing US relations and policy towards Pakistan. This would also affect Pakistan's security at the regional and global level. Apart from China, Pakistan has always enhanced its defense through American's arms equipment and its financial assistance. But the US tilt policy towards New Delhi in the post 9/11 has pushed America to prefer India and Pakistan's security interest were put at stake.

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6 P.M. Kamath, ed., *Indo-Pakistan Relations: Courting Peace from the Corridors of War* (New Delhi: Promila and Co, 2005), 243.

In 1993, the US Department of Commerce's decision to designate India as one of the ten largest markets attracted the interest of US corporate sector. However, India's economic potential did not translate into high level of economic interaction. The end of the cold war did not translate into a close political partnership. Differences over nuclear non-proliferation and Kashmir remained major obstacle to rapprochement between the two countries. All energies in Indo-US relations were expended in dealing with these two problems with no real movement forward.

The Clinton era (1992-2000) was marked with warming up of relations between the two countries. While India's nuclear tests of May 1998 were initially condemned by the US and the rest of the world, they created the basis for ending the discord between India and the US on nuclear issue. Instead of opposing India and its nuclear program, the Clinton administration sought to engage New Delhi. The visit of US President Clinton to India in March 2000 marked a distinct change in tone and tenor of the US attitude towards New Delhi.<sup>7</sup>

The 1990s was a time when there was a paradigm shift in world politics. There were indications that US was beginning to tilt to India. India and the US were engaging with each other and beginning to realize that their interests increasingly converged. Although the Indo-US strategic engagement was at the nascent stage, India and the US were beginning to move closer to each other. While on other hand the 1990s saw a complete disengagement of the US from Pakistan. Most aid stopped and a flurry of sanctions followed. Pakistan's nuclear programme was also increasingly questioned by the US. The nuclear tests of May 1998 by Pakistan further unleashed sanctions against it. More sanctions followed as General Pervez Musharraf's *coup* of October 1999, which restricted expenditure of bilateral funds and financial assistance to Pakistan.

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7 Annupuran Nautiyal, ed., *Challenges to India's Foreign Policy in the New Era* (New Delhi: Gyan Publishing House, 2006), 246-47.

However, all these sanctions were waived on 22<sup>nd</sup> September and 17<sup>th</sup> October, 2001 when Pakistan joined the US war against terrorism in 2001.<sup>8</sup>

In the post 9/11, the US policy makers considered India as a rising global power and strategically more important to the US regional agenda, while Pakistan was recognized not as a peer of India but weaker and troubling country and less significant state. The Bush administration initiative for forging partnership with India was shaped to consolidate US primacy in the face of rising of China in Asia. With its large size, huge population, growing economic structure and military strength, was considered an important partner by Washington to serve “as a critical source of geopolitical balance *vis-à-vis* a rising China”. In November 1999, Bush stated that “This coming century will see democratic India’s arrival as a force in the world.” He stressed that the United States must pay its special attention to trade and investment with India “as it opens to the world. And we should work with the Indian government, ensuring it is a force for stability and security in Asia”.<sup>9</sup>

The 9/11 incident and the subsequent events resulted in reversal of Bush administration’s harsh policies towards Pakistan and within a short time, Pakistan became an ally of US in the war against terrorism. However, the Bush administration and senior officials in the Pentagon avoiding another tilt towards Pakistan that could further alienate India. They continued their efforts to look for larger geopolitical interest in the region and thus turned quickly towards India.<sup>10</sup>

September 9/11, radically changed the security environment and in view of newly emerging threats mainly from non-state actors has brought Pakistan and United States closer to each other just to counter terrorism while

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8 Fasahat Husain Syed and Sobia Haidar, eds., “Pak-US Relations”, *IPRI Fact Files* (Islamabad: March 18, 2002): 13-14.

9 Ashley J. Tellis, “The Merit of Dehyphenation: Explaining U.S. Success in Engaging India and Pakistan”, *The Washington Quarterly*, 31, no. 4 (Autumn 2008): 24.

10 Tellis, “The Merit of Dehyphenation...”, 26-27.

Indo-US defense relations were put on a fast track resulted in the signing of civil nuclear related agreement. Washington was initially focused on anti-terrorism cooperation and suggested to India that focus of military cooperation should be on joint intelligence gathering, counter-insurgency training and officer exchange program. Later, the dialogue was expanded to other areas and resulted in Indo-US the unexpected boost in defense relations.

The bipartisan consensus between India and US on their partnership, has considerably strengthened the prospects for its success in strategic department. After the beginning of economic liberalization in India, President Clinton "signalled Washington's desire to forge a new era of commerce and investment between the two countries". And after nuclear tests of India in 1998, 14 rounds of talks between Indian Foreign Minister Jaswat Singh and US Deputy Secretary of State, Strobe Talbot, were arranged which engaged both India and United States for warm relations in the near future. These negotiations were considered as "Washington's first truly sustained strategic engagement with the Indian leadership."<sup>11</sup> The statements coming out of the presidential campaign of President Bush favoured India. In early 2000, Condolezza Rice, the Bush national security advisor also stressed for close collaboration between United States and India and pointed out:

The United States...should pay closer attention to India's role in the regional balance. There is a strong tendency conceptually to connect India with Pakistan and to think only of Kashmir or the nuclear competition between the two states. But India is an element in China's calculation, and should be in America's, too. India is not a great power yet, but it has the potential to emerge as one.<sup>12</sup>

It showed that the new administration was giving importance to India in the US foreign policy. It saw India as a potentially important country for playing its role in US policies towards Asia. On January 17, 2001, speaking before the

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11 Nicholas Burns, "American's Strategic Opportunity with India: The New US-India Partnership", *Foreign Affairs* 86, no. 6 (Nov.-Dec. 2007): 131-46.

12 Condolezza Rice, "Campaign 2000: Promoting the National Interest", *Foreign Affairs* 79, no.1 (January-February 2000): 55-56.

Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Colin Powell, Secretary of State, stated:

There is another country...a country that should grow more and more focused in the lens of our foreign policy. That country is India. We must deal more wisely with the world's largest democracy. Soon to be the most populous country in the world, India has the potential to help keep the peace in the vast Indian Ocean area and its periphery. We need to work harder and more consistently to assist India in this endeavor, while not neglecting our friends in Pakistan.<sup>13</sup>

The deepening engagement between India and the US that started with the Clinton administration eventually culminated into a strategic engagement during the George Bush time. The Bush administration even declared India a growing world power. In 2002, a meeting of the US National Security Council (NSC) pointed out that:

The United States has undertaken a transformation in its bilateral relationship with India based on a conviction that U.S. interests require a strong relationship with India. We are the two largest democracies, committed to political freedom protected by representative government. India is moving toward greater economic freedom as well. We have a common interest in the free flow of commerce, including through the vital sea lanes of the Indian Ocean. Finally, we share an interest in fighting terrorism and in creating a strategically stable Asia...today we start with a view of India as a growing world power with which we have common strategic interests. Through a strong partnership with India, we can best address any differences and shape a dynamic future.<sup>14</sup>

There has been much discussion on the issue that the increasing defense cooperation of Washington with New Delhi is for countering Chinese influence in the region. However, it is a very complicated issue. Some policy makers and analysts in Washington believe that in the long run, India can emerge as a strong US partner to check expanding Chinese influence while others in defense

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13 U.S. Department of State, "Prepared Statement of Colin L. Powell, Confirmation Hearing before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, January 17, 2001", *Disarmament Diplomacy*, no. 54 (Dec 2000-Jan 2001), [Online] <http://www.acronym.org.uk/dd/dd53/53bush.htm>.

14 The White House, *The National Security Strategy of the United States of America* (Washington DC: Government Printing Publication, September 2002), 27.

establishment simply emphasize the China factor to get more funding from legislative branch. The emerging of China as a regional and global power, and intended assumption of making India a countervailing force to China in the next decade, led to the establishment of US-Indo strategic alliances in the security and defense fields. An expert of the Hudson Institute Lloyd Richardson told the *Financial Times*, that India has the “economic and military strength to counter the adverse of China’s rise as a regional and world power. India is the most overlooked of our potential allies in a strategy to contain China”.

Such analysis was not too different from the US Department of Defense Document in which it was urged that “If China emerges as a major power, the United States needs to have friends — preferably friends who share the same values (e.g. democratic). In the future, India will have more clout and weight.” The strategic location of India was considered important not only from regional but from global perspective too “which could give the United States the ability to quickly access many of the unstable areas in the region.” The document noted that “India is important if the U.S. economy does not recover by helping to stabilize the spill-over effects that could destabilize Southeast Asia, which is closely tied to the U.S. economy. India is positioned to help manage this problem if it occurs”.<sup>15</sup>

The report revealed that “American and Indian military officers recognize China as an emerging power regionally and globally, and most interviewees share a belief that China represents the most significant threat to both countries' security in the future as an economic and military competitor to both. US strategy saw India a “hedge”, or “counterweight” to China, and has focused on the balance of power to China in the future ambitions.

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15 US Government, Office of the Secretary of Defence-Pentagon, *Indo-U.S. Military Relationship: Expectations and Perceptions* (Washington DC: Government Printing Office, October 2002), 21; See also Sultan Shahin, “India: The Games the Pentagon Plays”, *Asian Times Online*, (Jul 12, 2003).

The document quoted an unnamed U.S. admiral stated: "The USA and India both view China as a strategic threat and share an interest in understanding China's strategic intent, though we do not discuss this publicly. India's suspicions of China drive most of its nuclear strategy and weapon acquisitions." He added that "a positive relationship with India offers a hedge against China's potential ambitions in Northeast and Southeast Asia, and in the Persian Gulf. But a relationship with India will also contribute to other U.S. interests, such as promoting regional stability". An unknown US official statement was also quoted: "we cannot separate our thinking on India from our thinking on China. We want a friend in 2020 that will be capable of assisting the U.S. military to deal with a Chinese threat. We cannot deny that India will create a countervailing force to China."<sup>16</sup>

The administration of Bush gave importance to India by recognizing its role in the global politics. He subsequently deepened cooperation with India by pursuing an uncommonly ambitious and wide-ranging opening toward it and by strengthening relationship with India in the fields of civil nuclear energy, missile cooperation, high-tech commerce and space programs. The Indo-US defense relations received boost when on June 28, 2005, Indian Defense Minister Pranab Mukherjee and US Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld, signed 10 years Defence Framework Agreement commonly known as "New Framework for the U.S.-India Defense Relationship".<sup>17</sup>

However, the Indo-US civil nuclear cooperation is much more important. In a joint statement between US and India on July 18, 2005, the heads of the two countries declared their intention for global strategic partnership in the fields of economic, nuclear cooperation etc. It was followed by civil nuclear cooperation agreement signed by Manmohan Singh

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16 Shahin, "India: The Games the Pentagon Plays", 36-37.

17 Minister of Defence of India, Pranab Mukherjee and Secretary of Defence of the United States, Donald Rumsfeld Signed "New Framework for the U.S.-India Defence Relationship", on June 28, 2005 in Washington DC. [Online] available: [http://merln.ndu.edu/merln/mipal/reports/US\\_India\\_Defense\\_Framework.doc](http://merln.ndu.edu/merln/mipal/reports/US_India_Defense_Framework.doc).

and Bush on March 2006, at Delhi. It seemed that the US was ready to put aside its principles on non-proliferation and go for all out cooperation with India in the nuclear field, by recognizing India not only a *de facto* nuclear weapon state, but also assisting India's role as a regional power.

The growing convergence of strategic interests brought the U.S. and India closer to each other in the aftermath of 9/11. The two countries profess to share values such as commitment to democracy, combating the global threat of terrorism, "ensuring the integrity of Sea Lanes of Control (SLOC), and securing energy supplies throughout the Indian Ocean basin".<sup>18</sup> The US is mindful of the China's emergence as an economic and military power and this concern is also shared by India. Here again building India's potential as an economic, military and nuclear counterweight to China serves the interests of both India and US. Moreover, on Indian part, the emerging strategic partnership offers a promise of productive US technologies. For the US, besides the strategic consideration, India offers a large market for its trade, arms, nuclear and space technology.

The statements and official documents coming out from the US in the recent years give an indication of such kind of relationship and the nature of the evolving relationship. The US Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs, Nicholas Burns said:

The rise of democratic and increasingly powerful India represents singularly positive opportunities to advance our global interests. There is a tremendous strategic upside to our growing engagement with India. That is why building a close US-India partnership should be one of the United States highest priorities for the future. It is a unique opportunity with real promise for the global balance of power...We share an abundance of political, economic, and military interests with India today. Our open societies face similar threats from terrorism and organized crime. Our market-based economies embrace trade and commerce as engines of prosperity. Our people value education and a strong work ethics. We share an attachment

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18 C. Christine Fair, "US-India Army to Army Relations: Prospects for Future Coalition Operations", *Asian Security* 1, no. 2 (April 2005): 158.

to democracy and individual rights founded on an instinctive mistrust of authoritarianism.

He further wrote that in the changed global environment marked by “the rise of terrorism and its potential intersection with weapons of mass destruction...the basic interests of India and the United States — the world’s largest democracy and the world’s oldest — increasingly converged.”<sup>19</sup> These statements indicate how the US perceives India and are harbingers of ever deepening involvement of Washington and New Delhi. It also indicates that the US not only sees India as a huge economic market or arms/technology purchaser but also as a strategic partner with common interests and challenges.

The visit of US Secretary of State, Condoleezza Rice to India in March 2005, was remarkable one, where she told Prime Minister of India that the United States was breaking the long-standing orthodoxy of non-proliferation policy and intended to establish civil nuclear cooperation with India. Her statement heralded a deep change in the nature of Indo-US relations—from a limited cooperation in the 1990s to seeing India as a strategic partner and a natural ally in the 21<sup>st</sup> Century with increasingly converging interests. To strengthen Indo-US strategic partnership, Manmohan Singh visited Washington in September 2013. In his meeting with Obama, he underscored close ties between two countries where both leaders agreed on a number of close coordination on shared values and “reaffirm their shared interest in preserving regional peace and stability, which are critical to the Asia Pacific region’s continued prosperity”.<sup>20</sup>

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19 See Burns, “American’s Strategic Opportunity with India: The New US-India Partnership”.

20 The White House, “Fact Sheet: The United States and India-Strategic and Global Partners”, Office of the Press Secretary (Washington DC: September 27, 2013), <http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2013/09/27/fact-sheet-united-states-and-india-strategic-and-global-partners>

While in November 2014, President Obama stressed that US should “support a greater role in the Asia Pacific for India”.<sup>21</sup>

The post 9/11 saw a rapid rise in the Indo-US cooperation on a number of issues, culminating in a four strategic areas: a) civil nuclear energy deal, b) military cooperation, c) missile defense cooperation and d) civil space program. All these four strategic areas have deep repercussions for Pakistan.

**a) Indo-US Civilian Nuclear Cooperation:** The Indo-US Civilian Cooperation Agreement, known as 123 Agreement, was the most important dimension of the growing strategic engagement between the two countries. The stated goal of the deal is “promoting nuclear power and achieving energy security.” Before his visit to India, on February 22, 2006 President Bush recognizing India as a global leader, stated:

We have an ambitious agenda with India. Our agenda is practical. It builds on a relationship that has never been better. India is a global leader, as well as a good friend. ... My trip will remind everybody about the strengthening of an important strategic partnership. We'll work together in practical ways to promote a hopeful future for citizens in both our nations.<sup>22</sup>

However, the signing of nuclear deal presented a new turn in the Indo-US relations. After 30 years of opposition to India nuclear status and ambitions, the Bush administration agreed to provide full benefits to India of nuclear cooperation. The Fact Sheet of *U.S.-India Relationship: A Strategic Partnership* signed on September 28, 2008 stated that the “United States and India hold a responsibility as global powers to promote stability and security in Asia and around the world. We are building the foundation of a durable relationship that will support our common strategic and security interests well into the 21<sup>st</sup> Century”.

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21 The Brooking Institute, “*The second Modi-Obama Summit: Building the India-U.S. Partnership*”, Briefing Book-India Initiative (January 2015): 14.

22 President George W. Bush: “Remarks to the Asia Society”, February 22, 2006. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, *The American Presidency Project*. [Online] available: <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=65266>.

The deal provides Indian access to civilian nuclear technology and material from members of the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) including US. In return India promised to separate its civil and military facilities, and adhere to obligation of NSG, NPT and MTCR. It also shows its willingness to sign the additional protocol related to civilian nuclear facilities; avoid from further nuclear tests; refrain from reprocessing and enrichment transfer to other countries and working with the US for the implementation of Fissile Material Cut off Treaty. All this was meant to bring India into the International non-proliferation mainstream which will not be easy in practical terms.<sup>23</sup>

The civil nuclear agreement between US and India was started on July 18, 2005 culminating into the formal 123 Agreement, approved by US Congress on September 28, 2008. It not only ended the decades old strategic mistrust between two countries, but also initiated the way for bilateral nuclear cooperation. Under the agreement, the US agreed to sale nuclear reactors to India for nuclear power plants. During Narendra Modi's visit to Washington in September 2014, both US and India agreed and established a Contract Group "to realize their shared goal of delivering electricity from U.S.-built nuclear power plants to India", in the provinces of Gujarat at Mithi Virdi and Andhra Pradesh at Kovvada. The Contract Group met more than twice before Obama's visit to India in January 2015.<sup>24</sup>

In a joint statement with Modi, in September 2014, Obama "affirmed that India meets MTCR requirements and is ready for membership in the NSG. He supported India's early application and eventual membership in all four regimes."<sup>25</sup> About the joint statement a top US think tank

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23 The White House, *Fact Sheet: The U.S.-India Relationship: A Strategic Partnership* (Washington DC: Office of the Press Secretary, September 26, 2008), [Online] available: <http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2008/09/20080926-10.html>

24 The Brookings Institute, "*The Second Modi-Obama Summit: Building the India-U.S. Partnership*", 51.

25 The Brookings Institute, "*The Second Modi-Obama Summit*", 53.

institute the Brooking noted: "to serve as their agenda omits controversial issues that have driven U.S.-India relations for decades. Not a word about Pakistan".<sup>26</sup>

The civil nuclear agreement and cooperation between India and United States have raised important questions that whether it would curb nuclear proliferation, or would weaken the efforts of nuclear non-proliferation treaty. There are a number of contentious issues regarding the Indo-US nuclear deal.

First is the India plan of separating its military and civilian spheres of nuclear technology and its civilian setup under IAEA inspection. According to the relevant information, "India will place approximately two-third of its nuclear installations under IAEA monitoring" and it has agreed to place under IAEA safeguard 14 nuclear facilities out of 22 (between 2006 and 2014). However, it is highly questionable whether the partial safeguards would be adequate for ensuring that there is no diversion of civil nuclear assistance to nuclear weapons use.

Second, available information also indicated that "a number of nuclear power reactors, using Canadian-supplied technology, will not be placed under IAEA inspection".<sup>27</sup> The Indians intended to use these nuclear power reactors for nuclear programme and thus placed in military list. These nuclear power reactors have the capacity to produce electricity and weapons-quality plutonium. Despite US insistence, the FBR (Fast Breeder Reactor), well-suited to producing bomb-grade plutonium, was not included in the civilian list, raises concern because it has the capacity of production of weapons grade plutonium.

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26 The Brooking Institute, "The Second Modi-Obama Summit, 7.

27 U.S. State Department, *United States-India Peaceful Atomic Energy Cooperation and U.S. Additional Protocol Implementation Act*, Senate Report 109-288, 109th Congress, 2nd Session Report of the Committee on Foreign Relations (Washington DC: Government Printing Office, 2006). [Online] available: <http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CRPT-109srpt288/html/CRPT-109srpt288.htm>

Third, it also appears that besides US, the other member countries of NSG i.e., Australia, Canada, France, Germany, Japan, Republic of Korea, United Kingdom, etc. agreed to provide uranium supplies for the nuclear program of India.<sup>28</sup> So, there are also reservations of Indo-US agreement that whether through this agreement the US and other NSG members would violate their obligations of the NPT.<sup>29</sup>

Fourth, the Indo-US agreement would encourage other nations “to seek comparable exceptions from existing international rules of nuclear commerce” and to civil nuclear technology agreements with other countries.

Fifth, in promoting its relations with India by signing the agreement, “the Bush Administration has emphasized that it is a key factor in cementing U.S.-Indian relations on such important issues as meeting the threat of radical Islam and serving as a military counterweight to China.” So the agreement will aid to significant “stockpile of material for the enlargement of the Indian nuclear weapons arsenal and will “actually facilitate India's ability to produce more fissile material.”<sup>30</sup> Moreover “India plans to build at least five commercial-scale breeder reactors and would have the option of dedicating any one or more of those to its military program”<sup>31</sup> as Indian Prime Minister Singh made it clear that for the exchange of its deal with US, India would open only few nuclear facilities for inspection. He said that being a non-signatory to NPT, the agreement was signed primarily because of the Indian growing energy needs. He further stated that “an important assurance given is the commitment of support for India's right to build up strategic reserves of

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28 “Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG)”, Center for Non-proliferation Studies, March 3, 2009. [Online] available: <http://cns.miis.edu/inventory/pdfs/nsg.pdf>.

29 Treaty on Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, Signed at Washington, London, and Moscow July 1, 1968. [Online] available: <http://www.fas.org/nuke/control/npt/text/npt2.htm>.

30 See U.S. State Department, *United States-India Peaceful Atomic Energy Cooperation and U.S. Additional Protocol Implementation Act*.

31 Sharon Squassoni, *India's Nuclear Separation Plan: Issues and Views*, Congressional Research Service Report (Washington DC: Library of Congress, December 22, 2006), 21-24.

nuclear fuel to meet the lifetime requirements of India's reactors" and "the agreement does not in any way affect India's right to undertake future nuclear tests, if it is necessary in India's national interest."<sup>32</sup>

The Indo-US nuclear deal has created uncertain situation in South Asia and has serious impacts on Pakistan as well as on the whole region. Some analysts concluded that the deal would disturb the balance of power in South Asia. Thus Pakistan has serious reservations on the Indo-US civil nuclear deal.

First, in effect, India gets to keep its military nuclear facilities while at the same time gets technology and fuel for its civilian nuclear program, means that India will be free to voluntarily place whatever facilities it deems appropriate under the IAEA safeguard — a status only accorded to Nuclear Weapons States (NWS). By agreeing to India's terms and conditions, the US has placed India in the company of NWS.

Second, the deal would also provide India an access to uranium supplies for the Indian nuclear power program, but would simultaneously release its ingenious uranium supplies for its nuclear weapons programme and will effectively solve India's uranium shortage problems. The placement of 14 nuclear power reactors under safeguard for getting supplied with foreign fuel will enable India to free up the indigenous uranium from these reactors which can be used for speeding up India's nuclear weapons productions. The deal will also speed up the growth of its nuclear weapon store. The Director of Arms Control Association stated:

The nonproliferation benefits of the arrangement have been vastly oversold by proponents. Put simply, it does not bring India into the nuclear nonproliferation mainstream. Not only does the arrangement fail to constrain India's nuclear weapons program, but it may indirectly assist the growth of India's nuclear arsenal, and it risks serious damage to other vital U.S. nuclear nonproliferation goals

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32 "This agreement does not in any way restrict our strategic autonomy", *The Hindu*, August 14, 2007.

and multilateral endeavours, including the Nuclear Suppliers Group and the nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty.<sup>33</sup>

A former official of India Intelligence Agency, RAW, J. K. Sinha, stated that "Under the deal, India shall retain six unsafeguarded reactors and shall have the capability of producing nearly 50 nuclear warheads per year." He added that the supply of nuclear fuel from US and NSG would enhance the Indian capacity of producing highly enriched uranium and plutonium for its nuclear weapons program. He also said that the entire Fast Breeder Reactor (FBR) program was kept out of safeguard, because of its potentiality of producing nuclear weapons, and there should be no doubt the India would continue the production of its fissile material for weapons.<sup>34</sup> Therefore the nuclear agreement with US would enable India to produce more nuclear warheads and will not bring India into the nuclear nonproliferation mainstream.

Thirdly, the non-proliferation of the arrangements has been vastly oversold by many from within US, that the initiative was a net gain for global non-proliferation efforts. On the contrary, the US deal would fail to constrain or counter Indian nuclear program but would indirectly increase the growth and capacity of Indian nuclear arsenal; hence goes against article 1 of the NPT, of which the US is a signatory and legally obligated to adhere to it. Article 1 of the NPT states:

Each non-nuclear-weapon State Party to the Treaty undertakes not to receive the transfer from any transferor whatsoever of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices or of control over such weapons or explosive devices directly, or indirectly; not to manufacture or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons or other nuclear

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33 Testimony of Daryl G. Kimball (Executive Director, Arms Control Association), "Legislative Options for Congress Regarding the Proposal for Full U.S.-Indian Nuclear Cooperation", (Washington, DC: Arms Control Association, May 11, 2006). [Online] available: [http://www.armscontrol.org/projects/india/20060511\\_HIRC\\_Kimball.asp](http://www.armscontrol.org/projects/india/20060511_HIRC_Kimball.asp).

34 "India can make 50 N-warheads a Year", *The Hindustan Times*, June 18, 2006. See also "India can produce up to 50 nuclear warheads a year-Former Intelligence Official", *India Defence Report No. 2106*. [Online] available: <http://www.india-defence.com/reports/2106>.

explosive devices; and not to seek or receive any assistance in the manufacture of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices.<sup>35</sup>

Moreover, a country can only gain civilian nuclear assistance under the NPT by foregoing nuclear weapons. Yet India not only retains its nuclear weapons, but the nuclear deal gives it free access to international nuclear market. This is *de facto* recognition of India as a NWS by the US. This has also serious implications for the non-proliferation regimes by seriously damaging it creating important precedents for other states. Far from bringing India into the nuclear non-proliferation mainstream, the deal serves to undermine nuclear non-proliferation.

Fourth, for the implementation of the Indo-US nuclear agreement, the US needs to change the rules of NSG, as well as its domestic laws. The US amended its Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act (NNPA) of 1978, making India specific changes to the law. The US Congress passed a bill in December 2006, amended certain US laws and permitted US nuclear cooperation with India<sup>36</sup> but the NNPA required the recipient state to have safeguards on all its nuclear facilities. India did not fulfill this criterion. The 1974 NSG also forbid nuclear trade with a NWS outside of NPT among other restrictions. The US has also sought to get India specific amendments to NSG guidelines.

Fifthly, the nuclear energy related benefits of the deal for India are also questionable. Secretary of State, Condoleezza Rice before Senate Foreign Relations Committee stated: "Civil Nuclear Cooperation Agreement with India will help meet its energy needs without increasing its reliance on unstable foreign sources of oil and gas, such as nearby Iran."<sup>37</sup> It is interesting to note that out of the total of 11

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35 See Treaty on Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, July 1, 1968.

36 Malik Qasim Mustafa, "Indo-US Nuclear Cooperation Agreement Implication for International Nuclear Non-Proliferation Regime," *Strategic Studies* xxvi, no. 4 (Winter 2006): 130-31.

37 Remarks by Secretary of the State Condoleezza Rice at the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on the US-India Civil Nuclear Cooperation Initiative

percent of India's various "energy sources including oil, gas, coal" and wind used for producing electricity, only 2 to 3 percent is produced through nuclear power. Hence, through this agreement India would increase it up to 6.5 percent to 8 percent only.<sup>38</sup> Another study found the Indian dependency on oil will not be reduced due to nuclear energy. Nuclear potential will contribute only 8-9 percent of the electricity generation by 2032.<sup>39</sup> Therefore, there economics and resources argument for the Indo-US civil nuclear cooperation are overstated.

In short, the United States reversed its 30 years non-proliferation policy by providing civil nuclear technology to India, despite the fact that it is well-known to policy makers in Washington that India would never accept full scope safeguards for its nuclear installation and would continue to maintain its nuclear weapons production. So the Indo-US Nuclear deal would bring qualitative and quantitative improvements in India's nuclear weapons program. It gives India the status of *de facto* nuclear weapons state, and undermines the non-proliferation regime. India would be able to make many more nuclear warheads a year than it did before, therefore, directly impacting the existing level of deterrence between India and Pakistan. This would heighten Pakistan's threat perceptions, necessitating a readjustment to Islamabad's existing level of nuclear deterrence.

**b) Indo-US Military Cooperation:** For several decades Russia was the largest supplier of military equipment to India. It still is the largest supplier of India's defence

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(April 5, 2006), 6-7. [Online] available:

<http://www.foreign.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/RiceTestimony060405.pdf>.

38 Adil Sultan Muhamad, *Indo-US Civilian Nuclear Cooperation Agreement: Implications on South Asian Security Environment*. A Report of the Henry J. Stimson Centre (Washington DC: July 2006), 5. [Online] available: <http://www.stimson.org/southasia/pdf/AdilSultan.pdf>.

39 John Stephenson and Peter Tynan, "Will the US-India Civil Nuclear Cooperation Initiative Light India?", in *Gauging US-Indian Strategic Cooperation*, Henry D. Sokolsky, ed., A Monograph by the Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College (Carlisle: March 2007), 58. [Online] available: <http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pdffiles/pub755.pdf>.

equipment. However, in the post 9/11 India has sought to diversify its supplier base, partly of dissatisfaction with Russian equipment and of its cost effectiveness as well as the glitches in its domestic production programmes have led India to seek foreign sources and thus resulted in Indo-US Military cooperation. On the part of India, it gave great importance to arm sale from US due to the reasons: First, the arm sales seem an indicator of the seriousness with which the US views its relations with India in the post 9/11. Second, "it will confirm the U.S. understanding of India's rising importance as both a regional and global power." Third; that the US will be seen as a reliable strategic partner, to long-term partnership with India.<sup>40</sup>

On the part of the US, it is an opportunity to tap into a vast defense market where reportedly India intends to spend \$35 billion on military aircraft alone over the next 25 years.<sup>41</sup> According to a Congressional Research Report over the next decade India would spend "\$100 billion" on its arsenals. The US weapons industries "are eager to gain a slice of this lucrative pie, and American security companies also see in India a potentially huge new market for sophisticated equipment such as surveillance and detection systems."<sup>42</sup> One of the senior Indian military officials said that US was hoping "to supply up to a quarter of India's military hardware over the next decade as its current stocks, predominantly originating in Russia or the former Soviet Union, become obsolete." The International Institute of Strategic Studies noted that the military expenditure of India grew up by 24

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40 Stephen J. Blank, *Natural Allies? Regional Security in Asia and Prospects for Indo-American Strategic Cooperation*, A Monograph by the Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College (Carlisle: September 2005), 105-106. [Online] available: <http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pdffiles/pub626.pdf>.

41 Harichandan A. A. "Aero India unveils promise", *Indo-Asian News*, February 15, 2005, [Online] available <http://www.sukhoi.org/eng/exhibitions/aeroIndia/articles>.

42 K. Alan Kronstadt, Paul K. Kerr and Michael F. Martin, *India: Domestic Issues, Strategic Dynamics, and U.S. Relations*, Congressional Research Services Report (Washington DC: Library of Congress, September 1, 2011), 85.

percent in 2007, and it became one of the largest consumers of arms and defense equipment. Indian defense purchases are “projected to double to more than £15 billion by 2012, climbing to £40 billion by 2022”.<sup>43</sup> Moreover, with a defence budget of 19.8 billion dollars for just the year 2006-07, India is indeed a big business opportunity for the US arms supplies.<sup>44</sup>

Since 1960s, India had been a permanent user of United States arms, but the defense relationship between these two countries never went deeper like the post 9/11 period, because during the Cold War, the United States observed India in the USSR bloc. The end of Cold War changed the overall policies of the United State towards the region of South Asia. In the post-Cold War, being a big market for arms sales, the United States has shown increasing willingness to sell arms and major weapons system to India. However, it kept military relations with India, but lacked strategic underpinning as during 1990s the New Delhi had differences with Washington on certain issues including NPT and CTBT. The Clinton administration soon realized that India was an emerging global power and would not alienate Americans. Steps towards establishing significant military and defence relations were taken in the 1990s. The first step was the signing of Agreed Minutes signed in New Delhi in January 1995 relating to defence relations, which provided for closer ties at the level of civilian defence leadership; between the uniformed services; and the field of defence production and research.<sup>45</sup>

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43 Rahul Bedi and Richard Spencer, “US-India Defence Deal to Counter China”, *Daily Telegraph*, London: February 25, 2008. [Online] available: <http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/1579938/US-India-defence-deal-to-counter-China.html>

44 Staff Writers, “Pakistan Criticises Hike in Indian Defence Budget”, *Agence France-Presse*, Islamabad: (AFP) March 01, 2006. [Online] available: [http://www.spacewar.com/reports/Pakistan\\_Criticises\\_Hike\\_In\\_Indian\\_Defence\\_Budget.html](http://www.spacewar.com/reports/Pakistan_Criticises_Hike_In_Indian_Defence_Budget.html).

45 Gurmeet Kanwal, “Indo-US Defence Cooperation: Forging Ahead”, *Asia Tribune*, August 30, 2007. [Online] available: <http://www.asiantribune.com/index.php?q=node/7170>.

The second major initiative came in the forms of NSSP (Next Steps in Strategic Partnership), which was launched in January 2004, drew its inspiration from November 2001, Bush-Vajpayee Joint Statement. Through NSSP, several layers of sanctions on India were removed by US and both countries agreed for cooperation in the fields of civil nuclear, civil space and high technology trade. It was called the trinity of issues between US and India. It was later dubbed the quartet of issues when cooperation was pledged on missiles defense as well.<sup>46</sup>

Indo-US defence relations were tremendously strengthened with the signing of "New Framework for US-India Defence Relationship" on June 28, 2005. This agreement superseded the 1995 Agreed minutes and chartered the course of Indo-US defence relations for the next ten years including activities of five consultative groups which help to keep the momentum of defence cooperation. These include the Defence Policy Group (DPS); the Military Cooperation Group which deals with military to military discussion and joint training and exercise. These groups have regular meetings which have resulted in agreements in numerous areas including missile defence, regional security issues, peacekeeping/air combat training, counter terrorism, search and rescue, joint patrols and exercises etc. These agreements resulted in several training exercise, seminars, personnel exchanges, senior visits, unit/ship visits, organization/agency relationship, technology cooperation and weapons sales.<sup>47</sup>

Within the framework of these defence agreements, Indo-US defence relationship has proceeded at a fast pace

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46 U.S. State Department, "United States-India Joint Statement on Next Steps in Strategic Partnership", (Washington DC: Office of the Press Secretary, September 17, 2004). [Online] available: <http://2001-2009.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2004/36290.htm>

Embassy of India in the United States of America, Joint Press Statement: Next Steps in Strategic Partnership between India and the United States, September 17, 2004. [Online] available: [http://indianembassy.org/newsite/press\\_release/2006/Mar/sepplan.pdf](http://indianembassy.org/newsite/press_release/2006/Mar/sepplan.pdf).

47 See Kanwal, "Indo-US Defence Cooperation: Forging Ahead".

in the post 9/11. Many important weapons and arms deals have come over the past few years. The first major weapons deal between US and India was signed in April 2002. The US agreed the sale of 8 Raytheon radars, to India worth \$146 million. It was designed to locate enemy rocket launcher, mortars, and artillery. On May 22, 2003, India agreed to buy from US early warning system, the Phalcon airborne of worth \$1.2 billion.<sup>48</sup> Later on, the US also offered India the sale of maritime surveillance planes P-3 C Orion, patriot anti-missile system, C-130 aircraft, Sea Hawk helicopters, F-16, Perry Class frigates, electronic sensors, and other arms for counter terrorism.<sup>49</sup>

The Indian armed forces capability were enhanced by US supplied defense article including C-130J and C-17 transport aircraft, and state-of-the-art maritime survival aircraft P8-I Poseidon. Both countries participated in joint military training and bilateral exercise i.e. Red Flag, Malabar, and Yudh Abhyas. The US strategic trade exports to India have increased and exceeded \$5.8 billion in 2012. The Indo-US bilateral trade grew from \$59.9 billion to 92.5 billion between 2009 and 2012.<sup>50</sup>

In January 2007, the US transferred an amphibious transport ship, the *USS Trenton*, to India, which was called by Indian Naval officials as “a new era in naval cooperation”. The US has also offered F/A-18 to meet India’s advanced fighter jet needs.<sup>51</sup> The *Guardian* reported in 2008, that India would spend “\$45bn in the next five years” and was looking for buying new multi-role fighter jets from US valued up to

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48 Shireen M. Mazari, “Indo-US Strategic Partnership”, *Strategic Studies* xxv, no. 3 (Islamabad: Autumn 2005): 3.

49 See Stephen J. Blank, *Natural Allies? Regional Security in Asia and Prospects for Indo-American Strategic Cooperation*, (Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, US, Army College, 2005), 110-111.

50 The White House, “Fact Sheet: The United States and India-Strategic and Global Partners”, September 27, 2013.

51 Kim R. Holmes, *The US and India: Partnership for the 21st Century*, Lecture no. 998, Delivered on February 26, 2007, Washington DC: The Heritage Foundation, 3. [Online] available: [http://www.heritage.org/research/asiaandthepacific/upload/hl\\_998.pdf](http://www.heritage.org/research/asiaandthepacific/upload/hl_998.pdf).

\$10 billion while US companies have been more than eager to compete for jet deal. In this connection in February 2008, US Defence Secretary Robert Gates travelled to India for the civil nuclear deal and to push American bids for the 126 fighter jets deals.<sup>52</sup>

Along with these deals, there is also considerable maritime cooperation between India and US. On March 2, 2006, they signed the *Indo-U.S. Framework for Maritime Security Cooperation*, whereby both countries agreed on cooperation for ensuring a secure maritime domain and pledged to address maritime security issues like “piracy and armed robbery at sea; threats to safety of ships, crew, and property as well as safety of navigation; transnational organized crimes in all dimension” such as piracy and armed robbery at sea; “the illicit trafficking in weapons of mass destruction, their delivery systems, and related materials; environmental degradation; and natural disasters.”<sup>53</sup>

This agreement institutionalized the already existing maritime cooperation between the two countries. During the Operation Enduring Freedom several US warships used Indian port facilities for rest and recuperation. There have also been a number of exercises between the two countries covering maritime interdiction search and rescue operation, and anti-submarine warfare. The Indian Navy by its size is already 7<sup>th</sup> largest in the world and the largest in the Indian Ocean region, and already has an offensive maritime security doctrine. Its maritime cooperation with the US and provision of state-of-the-art maritime technologies by the later would further strengthen Indian Navy. It would allow India to exercise hegemony in Indian Ocean. This in turn, would threaten Pakistan's security and its trade. “The

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52 Randeep Ramesh, “US rushes to get slice of \$45bn Indian arms pie”, *The Guardian*, February 22, 2008), [Online] available: <http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2008/feb/22/armstrade.india>.

53 U.S. Department of Defence, “Indo-U.S. Framework for Maritime Security Cooperation”, *American Forces Press Services*, March 2, 2006. [Online] available: <http://www.defenselink.mil/news/Mar2006/d200600302indo-usframeworkformaritimesecuritycooperation.pdf>.

perceived Indian naval expansion in Indian Ocean Region should also be viewed at the geopolitical level with strong repercussions on geo-economics in the backdrop of a worldwide recession” because “97 percent of the Pakistan trade is carried through the sea”.<sup>54</sup>

**c) Indo-US Missile Cooperation:** The Indo-US collaboration on missile defence is also enshrined in several agreements signed over the years. Although initial Indo-US discussion on missile defence took place during the Defence Policy Group (DPG); meeting of December 2001, it was first formally mentioned in January 2004, in the NSSP agreement, whereby both sides agreed “to expand our dialogue on missile defence”.<sup>55</sup> Similarly, June 28, 2005 defence agreement reiterated the intention to “expand collaboration relating to missile defense”.<sup>56</sup>

Since 2002, discussions have been underway between two countries for the sale of PAC-2 and PAC-3 missile defense system to India. Over the past few years, India also attended several meetings, workshops and conferences along with missile defense exercise.<sup>57</sup> In February 2008, in a

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- 54 “The Changing Threat Axis-Development in Indian Ocean”, *ISPR News*, [Online] available: <https://www.ispr.gov.pk/front/main.asp?o=t-article&id=8>. See also Sardar F.S. Lodhi (Patron Lt Gen (Retd)), “Indian Ocean and Our Security”, *Defence Journal* (Karachi: March 2000). [Online] available: <http://www.defencejournal.com/2000/mar/indian-ocean.htm>, and Clarence Earl Carter, *The Indian Navy: A Military Power at a Political Crossroads*. A Research Report of the Air War College Air University (Alabama: 1 April 1996), 7-10. [Online] available: [http://www.fas.org/nuke/guide/india/agency/carter\\_ce.pdf](http://www.fas.org/nuke/guide/india/agency/carter_ce.pdf).
- 55 The White House, “Next Steps in Strategic Partnership with India”, January 12, 2004. [Online] available: <http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/release/2004/01/print/20040112-1.html>. See also U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of Industry and Security, “Announcement on U.S.-India Next Steps in Strategic Partnership”, September 2004. [Online] available: <http://www.bis.doc.gov/news/2004/us-indianextstep.htm>.
- 56 Embassy of India in the United States of America, “New Framework for the U.S-India Defense Relationship”, (Washington DC: June 28, 2005). [Online] available: [http://www.indianembassy.org/press\\_release/2005/June/31.htm](http://www.indianembassy.org/press_release/2005/June/31.htm).
- 57 Qudssia Akhlaque, “Patriot Sale to India will Fuel Arms Race: FO-Concern Conveyed to US”, *Dawn*, February 24, 2005. Also see Ghazala Yasmin, “Missile Defence in South Asia: Implications for the Region”, *Strategic*

meeting with US Defence Secretary, Robert Gates, Indian leadership plan to buy 126 combat fighter jets of multi-role worth \$10.6 billion. Robert Gates said, "I expressed our pleasure obviously with the purchase by India of the six C-130Js. There are some other deals in the works". Gates said that India would need to study the possibilities of joint missile defence system stressing talks were only in their early stages. This signal is a clear willingness of the US for selling missile system to India. Within few years, the sale of PAC-3 to India might be occurred. The sale of US missile system to India, would be of great concern for both Pakistan and China, since missile defenses erode their nuclear deterrents *vis-à-vis* India.<sup>58</sup>

The Indo-US-Israel nexus is also important in this connection and it has resulted in the supply of several missile defence components and weapons technology to India over the last few years. The Indian interest in the Israel Arrow system and Israel's willingness for sale to India also raised concern in Pakistan. However, the Arrow ballistic missile defense system is a joint venture of both Israel and US, and its sale to India would heighten tension in Pakistan, because the Arrows system has the capability of countering Pakistan's nuclear-capable Ghauri and Shaheen missiles. Some experts believe that the Indian authority would deploy the Arrow system on LOC (Line of Control) for the protection of military centers.<sup>59</sup>

The Phalcon Airborne Warning and Control System (AWACs), used American technology in its development, and thus it is subject to US export law. In the 1990s, the US pressed Israel to cancel its deal Phalcon with China because of its conflict with China over Taiwan. However, the US had

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*Studies* Vol. xxvi, no. 3 (Islamabad: Autumn 2006). [Online] available: [http://www.issi.org.pk/journal/2006\\_files/no\\_3/article/a4.htm](http://www.issi.org.pk/journal/2006_files/no_3/article/a4.htm).

58 "N-deal no bar, US-India to study missile defence", *Reuters*, February 27, 2008.

59 Andrew Feickert and K. Alan Kronstadt, *Missile Proliferation and the Strategic Balance in South Asia*, Congressional Research Services Report (Washington DC: Library of Congress, October 17, 2003), 15-16.

no objection over Israel-India arms sales of Phalcon. It showed its green signal for Indo-Israel deal. According to a former CIA official Bruce Riedel, Clinton made it clear that the US “would not raise concerns about the arms balance with Pakistan since it has no commitment to the defense of Pakistan and conventional balance of forces was already tipped in India’s favour in 2000.” He noted that for Indo-Israel deal of Phalcon the “Bush’s National Security Council staff worked closely behind the scenes”, and thus defense interaction between India and Israel followed.

Thus with the backing of US, “India is Israel’s largest arms export market in the world”. In 2006, Israel arms sale to India were \$1.5 billion the “same as in each of the preceding three years as well.” The arms sale includes, MIG 21 aircraft and T72 tanks upgrading, anti-missile ships etc. With the approval of US, a deal of \$1.1 billion for the sale of five Phalcon Airborne was signed between Israel and India in March 2004 and in 2007, the first of five Phalcons was delivered to India. India also showed its willingness to purchase Arrow II anti-tactical ballistic missile system from Israel, which need US approval. While the Green Pine Radar system was already purchased by India, which is a critical component of the overall ATBM system. Israel had already sold Green Pine Radar System to India that is a significant component of the overall ATBM system, and is useful for tracking incoming missiles and transmit data up to 500km.

According to a former CIA official Bruce Riedel, “United States helped inspire” the defense relationship between Israel and India and it “has a strong interest in its success”, and “with the U.S. blessing”, these relations are good for both countries as well as US. Along with Arrow and Green Pine Radar system, the Phalcon Airborne would provide Indian’s surveillance over much of the territory of Pakistan and while combined with missile defense of Early Warning

Command and Control System (AWACS), enhanced the ability of India to counter the first strike of Pakistan.<sup>60</sup>

**d) Indo-US Space Cooperation:** In the post 9/11, the Indo-US space cooperation has also developed under the framework of several agreements including nuclear civil technology, which have been described by several US officials as part of a "glide path", to enhance its relations with India. The initiative for civil space technology was started between these two countries with the meeting of Vajpayee and Bush in November 9, 2001.<sup>61</sup> The NSSP of January 2004 pledged expanded cooperation where both leaders agreed to further expand their commitments to civil space cooperation in July 2005 whereby they resolved to "build closer ties in space exploration, satellite navigation and in commercial space arena".<sup>62</sup> The working mechanism for cooperation was enhanced through the Joint Working Group (JWG) on civil space cooperation in its meeting in June 2005. It resulted in negotiation of memorandum of understanding "to place two instruments provided by the U.S. National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) on India's Chandrayaan-1 lunar mission, negotiations on space launch agreements, and discussions on promoting interoperability between Indian and U.S. civil space-based positioning, navigation and timing systems."<sup>63</sup>

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60 Bruce Riedel, "Israel & India: New Allies", *Middle East Bulletin*, March 21, 2008, [Online] available: <http://www.brookings.edu/research/opinions/2008/03/21-india-riedel>. See also "Israel and India Seal Radar Deal", *BBC News*, (March 5, 2004), [Online] available: [http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/south\\_asia/3536901.stm](http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/south_asia/3536901.stm).

61 U.S. Department of State, "Fact Sheet on U.S.-India Space Cooperation", (Washington, DC: Bureau of Oceans, Environment and Science, March 5, 2006). [Online] available: <http://www.moontoday.net/news/viewpr.html?pid=19182>.

62 The White House, *Joint Statement by President George W. Bush and Prime Minister Manmohan Singh* (Washington DC: Office of the Press Secretary, July 18, 2005). [Online] available: <http://2001-2009.state.gov/p/sca/rls/pr/2005/49763.htm>.

63 U.S. State Department, "U.S.-India Space Cooperation", Bureau of Oceans, Environment and Science, March 2, 2006. [Online] available: <http://2001-2009.state.gov/p/sca/rls/fs/2006/62489.htm>

During Bush visit to India in March 2006, the US showed its willingness to assist India in its space program. Through various agreements Bush agreed to “launch of US satellite and satellite containing US components by Indian space launch vehicles, and welcomed the inclusion of US instruments in a planned Indian lunar mission”.<sup>64</sup> It means that India could use US space technology for improving ballistic missile technology, for improving Indian ICBMs (Inter-Continental Ballistic Missile), the Surya or for expanding capacity to construct ICBMs. Different reports analyzed that the “Surya program will result in several different missiles with ranges from 5,000 to 20,000 kilo meters” and “will have the option of a nuclear payload, and sometimes the claim is made that the payload will consist of multiple nuclear warheads”.

A report of the Arms Control Association highlighted that India wants Surya program to “establish India as a global power and to enable India to deal with high-tech aggression” because “Surya-1 might overlap the range of a reported 5,000-kilometer upgrade of the Agni missile”, and have advantage over upgraded Agni missile, to carry a larger payload of warhead or multiple nuclear warheads. The report further stated: “India has no reason to need a missile of this range for use against Pakistan”, but such missiles are appropriate against China as “the range from New Delhi to Beijing is 3,900 kilometres; the range from New Delhi to Shanghai is 4,400 kilometres; and the range from Mumbai to Shanghai is 5,100 kilometres.”<sup>65</sup> However the Indian ex-Army Chief of Staff, General Depak Kapoor, said that the “India’s imagery satellite capability is now critical to the nation’s early warning capability with regards to both

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64 K. Alan Kronstadt, *India-U.S. Relations*, Congressional Research Service Report (Washington DC: Library of Congress, April 6, 2006), 8. [Online] available: <http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/crs/ib93097.pdf>

65 Richard Speier, “US Space Aid to India: On a “Glide Path” to ICBM Trouble?”, A Policy Research Paper of the Nonproliferation Policy Education Center (Washington DC: February 7, 2006), 6. [Online] available: <http://www.npolicy.org/files/060207SpeierICBM.pdf>.

Pakistan and China.”<sup>66</sup> Therefore, Indo-US space cooperation would directly or indirectly aide Indian's ballistic missile program and would assist India in developing an ICBM as well. Just like the Indo-US civil nuclear deal, the civilian space cooperation would advance India's military programmes. This directly affects Pakistan's security since they engage in tit for tat missile developments.

A renowned United States foreign policy expert Ashley J. Tellis summarized American policy towards South Asia in the post 9/11 and noted:

The elevated importance accorded to India at the expense of Pakistan derived from the strong perception that although both countries were relevant to U.S. interests in different ways, their respective geopolitical weights were radically divergent, their prospects for success as pivotal states in the international system were remarkably dissimilar, and their significance to U.S. grand strategic interests in various geographic and functional arenas were so unlike that they could not be discussed in the same breath.<sup>67</sup>

## Conclusion

The Indo-US strategic engagement would have adverse implications for Pakistan's security and strategic stability in South Asia. The partnership would negatively affect Pakistan's security in three ways. First, the Indo-US security engagement is essentially long-term, covering both conventional and non-conventional defense, while Pak-US strategic dialogue is far behind with virtually no cooperation in the nuclear field. Second, Pakistan viewed its relations with the United States through the prism of pain with India. It has historically used its alliances with the US to strengthen its security *vis-à-vis* India. With the Indo-US strategic engagement, the US is likely to disturb the balance of power between Pakistan and India in South Asia. The Indo-US nuclear deal is considered as the *de facto* recognition of

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66 Bruce Riedel, "Israel & India: New Allies", *Middle East Bulletin*, March 21, 2008. [Online] available: <http://www.brookings.edu/research/opinions/2008/03/21-india-riedel>.

67 Ashley J. Tellis, "The Merit of Dehyphenation: Explaining U.S. Success in Engaging India and Pakistan", *The Washington Quarterly* 31, no. 4 (Autumn 2008): 23.

India as a nuclear weapons state and aims to de-link India's nuclear status from that of Pakistan. The partnership would also result in qualitative and quantitative improvements in India's nuclear arsenal. The selling of missile technology to India would undermine the minimum nuclear deterrence posture and restraint of Pakistan and would directly destabilize the prevalent structure of South Asian nuclear deterrence. It would further tilt the conventional balance in favour of India, and would force Pakistan to bring qualitative changes in its conventional arsenal.

The overall effect of the Indo-US strategic cooperation would be a change in the balance of power in the region. The resultant instability would bring more uncertainty to an already volatile and war-prone region. With the Indo-US strategic partnership, the US would take a pro-India stance on the Kashmir dispute, which would leave Pakistan weaker in resolving the disputes at a bilateral level with India. By rising India as a regional power would make India more belligerent in its dealings with Pakistan in the issues like Kashmir, composite dialogue, and bilateral disputes would be harder to resolve.

The growing Indo-US strategic engagement, from civil nuclear to space-missile and arms deal, and military-to-military contacts and joint exercises increase Pakistan's threat perceptions, and compel it to think of its very survival and build up strong military and defense capability. The gap between the military capability of both nuclear South Asian rival states would be further widened. Thus, Pakistan feels and considers the Indo-US strategic cooperation, a direct threat to its security.