

Do Islamists Inaugurate Stone Age after Coming into Power? An Analysis of the Jamaat-e-Islami's Electoral Manifesto and News Content (1988-2006)

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Abstract

This research focuses on the politics and transformation of a mainstream Islamic political party i.e., the Jamaat-e-Islami Pakistan (JIP). Using multiple sources of information (news content, manifesto content, interviews); the research finds that the production of political Islamists in media and by semi-academic scholarship, as omens of Stone Age and radical transformation has no empirical basis. Also, the misgivings of a radical revolution, if the JIP gains control of Pakistani state, have weak empirical basis. The research makes methodological and substantial contributions. Methodologically, there are hardly any academic inquiries on political Islam in Pakistan that uses method and approach employed in this paper. The data and its descriptive analysis show that fears of a radical change in Pakistan, if the JIP comes into power, have no sound basis. The JIP, as the data set reveals, will more likely follow a modified-capitalist model of progress and development with some moral

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interventions leading at most to an Islamic trickle-down framework.

Introduction

The Jamaat-e-Islami Pakistan (henceforth the Jamaat/JIP/JI) represents one of the oldest religio-political parties in the contemporary Muslim world that claims to believe in the normative framework of an Islamic revivalism through the creation of an Islamic state. The ideational framework employed by the Jamaat is mainly inspired by the writings of Syed Abul Ala Maududi (1903-1979) who founded this organization in 1941. Although, it is difficult to disentangle the Jamaat from its tacit and latent connections with, and moral approvals of various jihadist organizations across the globe; yet it can be safely argued that in Pakistani politics, it has primarily opted for non-violent means through the electoral process. As a social force, the Jamaat struggles hard to clearly define and defend the on-campus violence perpetrated by its students' wing in colleges and universities which has dwindled over time; and the support it extended to its organizations like Al-Badar and Al-Shams during the secessionist movement in East Pakistan (now Bangladesh) in the early 1970s.

This research focuses on the politics of the JIP in the context of its manifesto content, electoral platforms and the news statements of its leaders since 1988 to 2006. The data was collected during the author's PhD fieldwork in Pakistan (2007-2008). The content analysis of 1997 electoral manifesto of the JI provides information which can serve as baseline data for any changes introduced by the party in relation to key socio-economic and political questions.

The JI's responses to various socio-economic and political issues portray a diversification exemplifying that the party has gradually distanced itself from its core project of creating a strict Islamic order. On the contrary, the party has slowly moved in the direction of accepting pluralism. Although, there are multiple reasons—mostly internal to JIP's ideational framework, secession of numerous critical and creative intellectuals, organizational structure and

Maududi's ideological legacy, the JIP has failed in winning the popular support in the national elections. Yet, empirical evidence, as shown in this paper, suggests a slow process of internalizing diversity and accommodation to an extent. The evidence provided in this research can help dispelling the popular impression about the homogeneity and continuity of Islamist social forces. This research highlights the diversity of JI's responses across issues. The paper uses multiple sources of information consisting of newspaper content, face to face interviews and manifesto content of the JIP. The data will respond to a number of pertinent questions regarding the politics of JI. For example, what are the most salient issues in the JI political discussion in Pakistan? What is the relative frequency of these issues discussed in their leaders' statements, and how can it be helpful in enriching a general understanding of the party politics in Pakistan?

Theoretical Perspectives

Renowned German scholar of Syrian origin, Bassam Tibi,¹ makes a clear but reduced division between Islam as religion and Islamism as 'totalitarian ideology', the latter aims at establishing a Shariah-based rule. For Tibi, thus, Islamism is not equal to liberation theology but an 'agenda of cultural-totalitarian purification.' He rules out the possibility of Islamism as democratic force like the impossibility of a 'democratic totalitarianism.'² Tibi argues that the Islamists may not abstain from violence and thus can never truly accommodate pluralist social order within a modern liberal state system.³ In an arbitrary fashion, Tibi employs Hannah Arendt's notion of totalitarianism to make his point that

1 Tibi is a German Muslim of Syrian descent who authored 28 books in German and 8 in English. For the study of Islam, he uses his own methodology of *Islamology: a social science-based inquiry that relates Islamic realities to the study of international conflicts in world politics...* Islamology deals with the relations of Islamic civilization not only with the West but more generally with the world at large. See, Bassam Tibi, *Islamism and Islam* (New Haven & London: Yale University Press, , 2012), IX.

2 Tibi, *Islamism and Islam*, 186.

3 Tibi, *Islamism and Islam*, 186.

Islamism has no room for diversity and difference. In haste, he attributes totalitarianism to Islamism (though not Islam) and thus rules out the possibility of any pluralist order within the fold of Islamism. Even a cursory look at Arendt's conceptualization of totalitarianism reveals the weak link that Tibi is resolute to establish between the two concepts: Islamism and totalitarianism.⁴

For essentialist and textualist writers, the Muslim societies have been unable to reconcile with the demands of modern age, and thus something has really gone 'wrong with Islam'.⁵ Criticizing this approach to Muslim societies, John Esposito thinks that only few Islamist movements across the Islamicate may perfectly fit on this stereotypical criterion. An overwhelming majority of the leaders and activists of Islamist movements studied in modern universities in the departments of medicine and engineering, for example.⁶ Bernard Lewis's charge of Islamists' rejection of all 'imported norms' is also not in line with factual data. On the contrary, "[t]he widespread use of radio, television, audio and videocassettes, computers and fax machines, has made for a more effective communication of Islam nationally and transnationally".⁷ In its tenure (2002-2007), the provincial government of the Muttehidha Majlis-i Amal (MMA) (Urdu:

4 For a brief introduction Hannah Arendt's notion of totalitarianism, see, for example, Anthony Court, "Hannah Arendt's Theory of Totalitarianism," *Rozenberg Quarterly*, posted 23 May 2012. Can be accessed at: <http://rozenbergquarterly.com/hannah-arendts-theory-of-totalitarianism-part-two/>

5 One of the main representative scholars in the modern era having Orientalist leanings is Bernard Lewis. See, Bernard Lewis, "What Went Wrong?," *Atlantic Monthly* 289, no. 1 (2002):43-45.

6 For more details see: Martin Kramer, "Coming to Terms: Fundamentalists or Islamists?," *Middle East Quarterly* 10 (2003): 65-78; Mumtaz Ahmad provides an account of the JI shura members and their diverse qualifications. Majority of the members were reported having modern professional education. Mumtaz Ahmad, "The Jamaat-e-Islami and the Tablighi Jamaat of South Asia," in *Fundamentalisms Observed*, ed. Martin E. Marty & R. Scott Appleby (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1991), 457-530.

7 John L. Esposito, *The Islamic Threat: Myth or Reality?* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1999), 8.

United Action Front), an alliance of all major Islamic political parties including the JI, did not feel constrained by their previous religious edicts to avoid a deal with the World Bank for restructuring of loans and credits.⁸ Needless to add that in the 2002 elections, the MMA capitalized on an anti-American sentiment in the post-9/11 scenario.⁹ The Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt (founded in 1928) and the JI in Pakistan (founded in 1941) represent 'new styles of Islamic organization', and their political discourse refrains from establishing 'pre-modern conditions.'¹⁰ As regards these parties, the last decade of the Twentieth century and beginning of the new millennium witnessed new intellectual trends and civil society based organizations.¹¹

Bryan S. Turner thinks that social and cultural crises in Muslim societies have generated four waves of political action: First, the Nineteenth century reformist movements that opposed the Western threat as well as traditionalism. Second, the 1940s wave of the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt, (one can also count here the development of the Jamaat in pre-divided India in 1941). The third wave began with the Arab defeat in 1967, reached a 'crescendo' with the 1979 Iranian Revolution, and culminated in the resistance against the USSR in Afghanistan; and the fourth wave arrived with the 1990 Gulf War, its aftermath in the form of 9/11 and the post-9/11 episodes.¹² Adding the fifth wave,

8 Khalid Nadvi & M. Robinson, "Pakistan Drivers of Change: Synthesis and Policy Implications," *Brighton: Institute of Development Studies for DFID Western Asia Dept.* <http://www.gsdrc.org/docs/open/DOC35.pdf> (accessed 20th April 2007), 38.

9 Nazish Brohi, *The MMA Offensive: Three Years in Power 2003-2005* (Islamabad: Action Aid International-Pakistan, 2006), 1-2.

10 John L. Esposito and John O. Voll, *Islam and Democracy* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1996), 5.

11 On the emergence of such new intellectual trends and social movements in the Muslim world, see: Fawaz A. Gergez, "The Islamist Movement: from Islamic State to Civil Islam?" *Political Science Quarterly* 128, no.3 (2013): 389-426; Gamez Cavdar, "Islamist *New Thinking* in Turkey: A Model for Political Learning?" 121, no. 3 (2006): 477-97.

12 Bryan S. Turner, "Class, Generation and Islamism: Towards a Global Sociology of Political Islam," *British Journal of Sociology* 54, no. 1 (2003): 139.

which was (implicitly) identified by Bayat—the post-Islamist turn, which was not only a response to the Western challenges, but also the internal tensions and declining energies of Islamic movements. The generation of such trajectories refer to change and continuity, and thus empirically does not support the textualist and essentialist articulations discussed above.¹³

Looking at the actual practice of Islamic movements by studying empirical examples, such as the current one, help us to critically reflect on assumptions in contemporary social theory that are deployed to make sense of the Islamic social forces in the Muslim world.

Conceptual basis of JIP's Ideational Framework

For Maududi, Islam exceeds the bounds of mere faith and seeks to change social, political and economic order. Invoking change of social order as an aim necessitated a hold on power positions and infrastructure of the state. This new conceptualisation entailed: 1) introducing new meanings for key Islamic notions that distinguishes them from traditional understanding; 2) instituting new relationships between concepts underpinning political programme, and 3) injecting new energy into the organisation of these concepts to equip them for mobilisation of the masses. To understand his state-centric vision and political reading of Islam, the four conceptual bases of Maududi's ideology/worldview *Ilah*, [Arabic: God] *Rabb* [Arabic: The Provider] *Ibadah* [Arabic: Worship] and *Din* [Arabic: Code of Life] are discussed. An understanding of these concepts, says Maududi, is important because the central theme of the Qur'an is constructed around them. Over time, the true

13 On the emergence of post-Islamist politics in Iran and Egypt, see Asef Bayat, *Making Islam Democratic: Social Movements and the Post-Islamist Turn* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2007). On the genesis of post-Islamist intellectual trends in Pakistan, Husnul Amin, "Post-Islamist Intellectual Trends in Pakistan: Javed Ahmed Ghamidi and his discourse on Islam and Democracy," *Islamic Studies* 51, no. 2 (2012): 169-92.

meaning of these terms narrowed and obscured much of the intent of the Qur'an.¹⁴

Maududi proffers a new meaning to these terms. He argues that the comprehensive nature of *din* is unparalleled in meaning by any other term but the contemporary notion of state. To summarise, by *din* he refers to a comprehensive system of life in which an individual surrenders his will to an ultimate authority, obeys His rules and regulations, expects reward for his obedience of the system and fears punishment for transgression and disobedience.¹⁵ Islam is thus the *Din-e-Haq* (Arabic: True Religion) and comprehensive way of life, and the central aim of the Prophetic career was to triumph/establish/enforce it over all other orders/systems. A more systematic organisation and politicisation of these terms can be seen in Maududi's speech *Process of Islamic Revolution*.¹⁶

Maududi based his revivalist strategy on a political reading of the Prophetic career. According to Maududi, God sent all his apostles with an obvious mission—to establish 'Divine Order' on earth. The leaders of this Islamic movement were the Messengers and Islam was thus a party. For an Islamic revolution in the contemporary world, one should follow their strategy. He thinks that it is unfortunate that we cannot obtain a complete history of these Messengers for lack of data on much of their entire struggle. The Prophetic career of Muhammad (P.B.U.H.) offers a detailed account of all the stages through which the Islamic movement passed—from initial stages to the establishment of an Islamic order in the city state of Medina.¹⁷ It seems that

14 S. A. A. Maududi, *Qur'an ki Char Bunyadi Istelahain* [Urdu: Four Basic Terminologies of Islam]; *Ilah, Rab, Ibadat awr Din*. (Lahore: Islamic Publications Pvt Ltd., 2000), 6-13.

15 Maududi, *Qur'an ki Char Bunyadi Istelahain*, 132.

16 S. A. A. Maududi, "Islami Hukoomat kes tarah Qayem hoti hay?" [Urdu: The Process of Islamic Revolution] in *Tehreek-e-Azadi-e-Hind awr Musalman* Vol.1 (Lahore: Islamic Publications, 1996), 161-200.

17 Maududi, "Islami Hukoomat kes tarah Qayem hoti hay?" Vol. 2.

Maududi fails to substantiate his point by providing empirical examples from other Prophets.

According to Maududi, Muhammad (P.B.U.H.) encountered Roman and Iranian imperialism in the first stage of his career. The society was laden with exploitation, injustices and moral corruption. The first stage consists of the inauguration of this movement when the Prophetic leadership overlooked these partial issues in favour of a total and comprehensive change. His message touched on the very foundational issue of the system (the refutation of all system/Law and the affirmation of Divine Rule on earth). In this period, the leader, Muhammad (P.B.U.H.), demonstrated Islamic ideals through his moral excellence and personal character. Slowly and gradually, kind-hearted individuals gravitated towards him and joined the nascent movement, and thus inaugurated the second stage of the Islamic movement. This phase was full of suffering/agonies in terms of pain, hardship, imprisonment, hunger and exile. It proved to be the training camp of bearing with agonies.¹⁸ Muhammad (P.B.U.H.) elevated the holy community from their tribal and racial identities to an Islamic identity. The movement proliferated in Makkah until the next stage—migration to Medina arrived. After thirteen years of struggle at Makkah, a holy community of 250-300 individuals was available to establish and run an Islamic state. In the fourth stage, the Islamic state formed. The concretisation of abstracted Islamic ideals was made possible in the fifth stage at Medina when an Islamic system evolved. An Islamic political, economic, educational and judicial system appeared as a complete system of life.¹⁹ Finally, in eight years, the boundaries of this nascent Islamic state extended beyond Medina to all Arab territories. Historically, the contribution made by war in the Prophetic struggle is overestimated. In reality, the expansion was the outcome of a bloodless revolution, which claimed 1000-1200 lives only, a relatively

18 Maududi, "Islami Hukoomat kes tarah Qayem hoti hay?", 83.

19 Maududi, "Islami Hukoomat kes tarah Qayem hoti hay?", 186, 189.

small death toll in bringing about such a comprehensive revolution.²⁰

In short, based on a redefinition of the stated four concepts, Maududi invokes a new relationship between these concepts and their operationalization. All individual Muslims thus have an additional obligation to establish God's rule on earth and consider this an act as other key obligatory requirements (compulsory daily prayers and zakat, for example). For this purpose, the Muslims may be required to strictly follow the Prophetic strategy of mobilizing society and bringing about change in society. These were the conceptual bases on which the mainstream Islamic movement in the subcontinent, the JI was founded. The interpretation of these key terms by Maududi has always been contested (and in some cases thoroughly rejected) by a group of Islamic scholars within his party as well as from the traditional scholarship.

A Brief Account of the Jamaat Politics

The study of JI in Pakistani politics is premised on the significance of this party; not only in connection with the discussion on political Islam but also its model for global Islamic movements. The JI stands out as one of the key Islamist political forces in Pakistan. It is also one of the two oldest Islamist parties; the other is the Muslim Brotherhood (al-Ikhwan al-Muslimeen) in Egypt in the world. The party was led for around three decades (1941-1972) by Maududi himself. The JI's ideological literature, mostly authored by Maududi, was translated into many world languages, thus became the source of inspiration for activists across the globe. Unlike the Islamic revolution in Iran, which came about without any prior social movement, and Egypt where Islamic social movement triumphed without bringing a revolution,²¹ the Jamaat over the years confronted with

20 Maududi, "Islami Hukoomat kes tarah Qayem hoti hay?"

21 For a detailed historical account of the JIP, see, Vali Raza Nasr, *The Vanguard of the Islamic Revolution: the Jamaat-i Islami of Pakistan* (California: University of California Press, 1994).

diverse experiences from state repression in the 1960s and 1970s to co-optation with a military government in the 1980s. The JI actively participated in the political process in the 1990s; contested elections and exercised power in coalition with the Muttahida Majlis-e-Amal (MMA) during 2002-2007 and again as a coalition party in the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (KP) provincial government since 2013. Although, it failed in realizing its political dreams, the party was quite successful in achieving an Islamic constitution for Pakistan.²²

Likewise, from the perspective of political Islam, Pakistan ranks equal with the Middle Eastern countries and Iran. Although, in this respect, Pakistan has received little academic attention, yet, its importance stems from the fact that Maududi migrated to Pakistan (from India) and lived an active political life. The JI remained at the center of all political and social activities. Pakistan and the JI were also at the forefront of Afghan Jihad in the 1980s, which subsequently shaped important world events. In other words, Pakistan is where the intellectual fragments and ideological frames of Islamism graduated in its various phases. Geographically, Pakistan lies close to several Middle Eastern countries (the Arab countries, Iran and Turkey) to its West, and Indonesia and Bangladesh to its East. Likewise, Pakistan shares a border with Afghanistan along the north-western tribal regions, close to the Central Asian Muslim States.

The main objective of the party as envisioned by its founder was the establishment of God's Kingdom on earth, which he claimed to have derived from a Prophetic career, specifically the Prophet Muhammad (P.B.U.H.). As the division of India in 1947 gave birth to the independent states of Pakistan and India, the JI also split along national lines forming the Jamaat-e-Islami India and the Jamaat-e-Islami Pakistan; thus internalizing the western conceptions of state borders and boundaries. Since its inception, a multitude of

22 For a detailed historical account of the JIP, see, Nasr, *The Vanguard of the Islamic Revolution*.

dedicated activists, leaders, professionals, business elites, scholars, writers and intellectuals have either quit or been expelled from the JI on various grounds. The long list of such activists indicates that some of them revived their activism in various other social and political forms. Some of them excelled in public life as popular national figures, while others established separate Islamic groups, yet others joined various secular political parties. While certain dimensions of the Jamaat (ideology, history, organization, political activism, relations with the state etc.) have been a subject of an academic scrutiny, the dissenting voices of defected and seceded activists have rarely appeared on the researchers' radar screen. Other aspects of the JI have received wider academic attention.²³

To achieve its revivalist goal, the JI started off with an approach to plan reforms at the grass roots level with a bottom-up method. However, after Pakistan's inception in 1947, the party replaced this approach with a state-centric one—taking active part in politics, pursuit of state power and Islamisation of the state as a central goal through various socio-political means. The transition, however, was far from smoother. It caused internal fissures and ultimate fractures. Thus, the JI ideology, change in strategy and internal tensions consistently gave impetus to disagreement and dissent among its activists. Some of these cycles of discontent culminated in individuals seceding from the group (late 50s) and the creation of splinter groups (mid-1990s). In the early 1940s, shortly after the birth of JI, some religious scholars left Maududi on the grounds of 'slack observance' of Islamic life style; the length of his beard and socialisation of his wife. In the mid-1950s, alleged impermissible political tactics by JIP's candidates in the elections to the Punjab

23 See for example: Charles J. Adams, "The Ideology of Mawlana Maududi," *South Asian Politics and Religion* (1966: 371–97); Ahmad, D.S.R. *Islam and Modern Political Institutions in Pakistan: A Study of Mawlana Maududi* (Lahore: Ferozsons (Pvt). Ltd., 2004); Kalim Bahadur, *The Jamaat-i-Islami of Pakistan: Political Thought and Political Action* (New Delhi: Chetana Publications: 1977); S. Vali Reza Nasr, *Maududi and the Making of Islamic Revivalism* (USA: Oxford University Press, 1996).

Assembly created a new wave of disagreement. A number of influential scholars and Ulema left or were dismissed from the party during this period and some reputable scholars voiced their disagreements over the authority of the *Ameer* [Urdu: leader] and non-democratic decision-making processes in the JI. Thousands of other activists have quit the JIP at various times for various reasons.²⁴

The process of disaffiliation continued. Outside the party, various social and political activist groups proliferated into a plethora of social and political activism, joined these seceding voices with a separate story and trajectory of their own. Looking at these waves of secessionist tendencies since its inception in 1941, two main conclusions can be drawn. First, unlike some of the assumptions made by the textual reading of Islamism, the organisational history of the JI reveals that its political history is anchored in ruptures and discontinuity rather than linearity and cohesion. There have been series of internal criticisms inviting both scholars and lay activists contesting Maududi's interpretations and policy decisions. Second, the unabated secession of dissenting voices has produced an intellectual deficit depriving the organisation from fresh scholarly currents and counter-currents that are essential for the key revisions in its ideational framework. Whereas, the party welcomes all opportunity spaces made available to it in the realm of market, media and politics; it does so on pragmatic grounds without revisiting its original ideational framework. Random interactions with party leaders and activists show that this relentless outlook in the domains of culture for example, produces an ever-growing gap between its ideas and the harsh realities of market and politics. The gap inevitably leads to further tension and ruptures at the levels of both the elite, and the rank and file. The unfavourable outcome for the party is that it has largely failed in a clearly chalked out

24 Author's field notes based on field data collected during 2006-2013.

strategy for socio-political and economic reform, and thus winning the popular support of Pakistani voters.²⁵

Whereas the above discussion on seceding individuals from the JI does not imply change and transformation of the party, there are multiple accounts that can be related to change. The discussion on JIP's steady march towards change and transformation has attracted scholars' attention. For some scholars, the Jamaat's political history shows the end of ideology and the beginning of pragmatic politics.²⁶ The party started off as proselytizing forum with an uncompromising stance on the question of democracy, women, non-Muslims and other key socio-economic concerns. It turned into a revolutionary organization with its tunnel vision on key economic questions. With the passage of time and opening up of political opportunities, the party gave way to accepting (western/liberal) democracy as the main framework in which to define its political activism. Till 90s, the party owned a hardliner's stance on the right of women to power positions (such as the head of the government); it not only compromised this position by keeping silence but also vehemently nominated its own female members against the reserved quota for women during the Musharraf era. Likewise, the party's anti-globalisation and agitation rhetoric against the international financial institutions (e.g. IMF and WB) slumbered. The party accepted ministry portfolios in the provincial government of KP (during MMA rule and now as coalition party with Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf) that deals with population control, local bodies, and finance. In all these ministries, the party has to deal with diverse partners such as the USAID, DFID, World Bank and other key institutions of global capitalism.

25 Author's field notes based on field data collected during 2006-2013.

26 On the Jamaat transformation and change, see: Irfan Ahmad, *Islamism and Democracy in India: the Transformation of Jamaat-e-Islami* (Oxford: Princeton University Press, 2009); Altaf A. Azmi, *Ahya-e-Millat awr Deeni Jamaatain* [Urdu: Rivival of Muslim Ummah and Religious Organisations] (Lahore: Dar-al-Tazkeer, 2002); Abdul Rashid Moten, *Revolution to Revolution: Jamaat-e-Islami in the Politics of Pakistan* (Kuala Lumpur: Islamic Book Trust, 2002); Nasr, *The Vanguard of the Islamic Revolution*.

Since in power, it has never shied away from accommodating the policy prescriptions of such institutions that it had abhorred in the past. Professor Abdul Rashid Moten has further improved our understanding of the party by focusing on the role of leaders such the Qazi Husain Ahmad who broadened the organization from its narrow support base to a wider one, and thus redefined the JI from its previous cadre party to a popular one.²⁷

In his study of the Jamaat politics in Pakistan, Abdul Rashid Moten analysed the party's organisational history that began as an ideological movement, turned into a pressure group, changed into a cadre party, evolved as a mass-based political party and finally transformed into an Islamic revolutionary movement. The transformation of the Jamaat, according to Moten, 'has been piecemeal and evolutionary'. While in discussion on the reasons for transformation of the Jamaat, Moten included power struggle and tactical moves. He failed to differentiate between conceptual-ideological and political transformation. This question seemingly should/could be at the heart of Moten's analysis which never received his central focus. In my analysis, I tend to infer from the Jamaat's political history that it has celebrated a political-strategic adjustment and thus as a modern social movement has fulfilled a condition of modernity. It seems relevant to refer to one of Irfan Ahmad's concluding points about the Jamaat's transformation in North-India. The "Jamaat's acceptance, defence, and celebration of secularism and democracy," concluded Ahmad, "echoes the line of the communists who initially denounced them as 'bourgeois' institutions but later on accepted them."²⁸

In her seminal study based on long ethnographic work in Lahore, Humeira Iqtidar extends an insightful analysis of the JI in comparison to a more militant organization (Jamaat-ud-Dawa: JuD). She comes up with a conclusion (which seems

27 Moten, *Revolution to Revolution*.

28 Ahmad, *Islamism and Democracy*, 310.

though far-stretched) that despite vehement opposition to secularism, the two parties in Lahore are involuntarily facilitating secularisation in Muslim countries.

Methodology

Electoral platforms and leaders' statements of political parties published in newspapers portray the priorities, ideational frameworks, and strategy for change in Pakistan. Despite gap in political practice and theory, the study of manifestoes and leaders' statements reflect an overall approach of the JI. The electoral platforms may be expressing ambitious plans of the JI, there are statements owned both by party elites and rank and file alike. An overtime analysis of the manifesto content can help in understanding the change in party's ideology. Similarly, a cross-party comparison can be helpful in analyzing policy positions. Using the Comparative Manifesto Project's (CMP) coding scheme²⁹, the JI's stance on various social, economic, political and global issues is captured.³⁰

Quantification of the News and Manifesto Content

With slight modification, the popular coding scheme introduced by the Comparative Manifesto Project (CMP) is mainly employed in the present study.³¹ The coding unit is the *quasi-sentence* which is an argument. An argument is the verbal expression of one political idea or issue. The CMP considers sentence as basic unit. However, if the sentence

29 Ian Budge, "Validating the Manifesto Research Group Approach: Theoretical Assumptions and Empirical Confirmations," in *Estimating the Policy Positions of Political Actors*, ed. Michael Laver (London and New York: Routledge, 2001), 50-65; Laver, ed. *Estimating the Policy Positions of Political Actors*, 3-9; Andrea Volkens, "Manifesto Data Set MDS2005 Data Handbook," [electronic version], 2005; Michael Lave *et al*, "Estimating Policy Positions from Political Texts Using Words as Data," *American Political Science Review* 97, no. 2 (May 2003): 311-31.

30 Usman Ashar, ed. *Pakistan ki Siyasi Jamaatain* [Urdu: Political Parties of Pakistan] (Lahore: Sang-e-Meel Publications, 2004), 677-96.

31 For more details of how the current author modified the CMP scheme, see: Husnul Amin, "The Islamist Politics in the Era of Neoliberal Globalization: The Case of Jamaat-e-Islami Pakistan," *Mediterranean Journal of Social Sciences* 5, no. 15 (2014): 507-18.

structure permits, it can be further broken down into numerous arguments. For instance, if a JI's leader statement says: The JI rejects foreign culture and the culture of corruption. This is one sentence carrying two arguments, i.e., rejection of foreign culture and rejection of corruption. In this fashion, all complex sentences are broken down into *quasi-sentences* depending on when the meaning and sense changes.³²

Table 1 provides the main classification scheme which is developed by the CMP. To capture JI's position on Islamic Shariah and Islamisation, a new domain is added: Islamic ideology (D8). Each domain is further divided into sub-themes. The positive (+) sign refers to a positive mention and a negative sign (-) means a negative mention of issue or theme.³³ The coding was restricted to news content leaving editorial content. The rule of thumb was defined: the news would be first traced in the *Daily Jang* Rawalpindi files and will be noted down. For all missing files of the *Daily Jang* Rawalpindi, the *Daily Jang* Lahore or Karachi would be consulted. If these were missing too, then the *Daily Nawa-e-Waqt* would be consulted. For the reliability of data, two more research assistants were hired who validated the data. After the news statements were noted down in notebooks, a coding scheme is developed and assigned similar numerical codes to similar statements. Following this elaborate and careful procedure, database for the news content had 2726 observations for the JIP.

32 Volkens, "Manifesto Data Set MDS2005 Data Handbook,".

33 See Amin, *Islamist Politics*.

Table 1: DOMAIN AND SUB-DOMAINS

Domain		Sub-Domains
D1	External Relations	Anti-Imperialism +; Military Defence +; Peace +; Internationalism +; Pan-Islamism +; Foreign Policy
D2	Freedom and Democracy	Freedom and Human Rights +; Freedom and Human Rights -; Democracy +; Constitutionalism +
D3	Political System/ Political Activism	Governmental and Administrative Efficiency +; Governmental and Administrative Efficiency -; Corruption and Accountability; Decentralization and Provincial Autonomy +; Centralization +;
D4	Economy	Free Enterprise +; Incentives +; Market Regulation +; Protection +; Economic Planning +; General Economic Goals +; Technology and Infrastructure +; Nationalization +; Privatization +
D5	Welfare and Quality of Life/ Social Activism	Social Justice +; Culture +; Welfare State Expansion +; Education Expansion +; Environmental Protection +
D6	Fabric of Society/ Ethno-politics	Social Harmony +; Law and Order +; Anti-Feudalism and Land Reform +; Anti-Capitalism +
D7	Social Groups	Labor Groups +; Farmers +; Underprivileged and Minority Groups +; Professional Groups +; Gender +; Youth +; Other Social Groups +
D8	Islamic Ideology/ Jihad Activism	Islamic Shar'iah +; Islamic Economy +; Islamic Morality +; Islamisation (general)

SOURCE: Modified from Volkens (2005)

Note: sub-categories not mentioned with positive or negative signs refer to general mention of the theme.

For the JI's electoral manifesto, the same coding scheme was adopted. After careful reading and

understanding of the manifesto content, the codes were assigned and thus total number of 625 observations was obtained (see Table 2).

Table 2: ALL DOMAINS: MANIFESTO AND NEWS CONTENT DATA (1988-2006)

Domain	Manifesto		News Content	
	Count	in %	Count	in %
D1: External Relations	56	9.0	597	21.9
D2: Freedom and Democracy	39	6.2	136	5.0
D3: Political System/Political Activism*	100	16.0	1088	39.9
D4: Economy	109	17.4	111	4.1
D5: Welfare and Quality of Life/Social Activism*	110	17.6	242	8.9
D6: Fabric of Society/Ethno-politics*	60	9.6	135	5.0
D7: Social Groups	113	18.1	125	4.6
D8: Islamic Ideology	38	6.1	292	10.7
Total	625	100	2726	100

SOURCE: Author's own database

* Only news content

Data Analysis

Table 2 provides an aggregated view of the main categories (D1-D8). The manifesto content reveals that the party paid more attention to social issues (18.08 per cent) than the rest of the domains. It is also visible that domains D3, D4, D5 and D7 capture around 70 per cent of the total. Theoretically speaking, the JI should have paid disproportional attention to D8, which is not the case. Likewise, the news content reveals that in practice (news content as indicator of political practice), 39.91 per cent is allocated to political activism while external relations received 21.90 per cent. Here again, the Islamic ideology category received only 10.71 per cent. In contrast to the manifesto content, economy received around 4 per cent, welfare and quality of life received 8.88

per cent. Overall that data reveals that differential concern is shown to various issues, however, what is reflected is diversity and not homogeneity. The database constructed and published elsewhere provides further breakdown of the Table 2. It shows that the JI was more attentive to the issues like global politics, Kashmir, Afghanistan, and pan-Islamism. Military budgets and defence were salient issues whereas global peace and internationalism slumbered. It is also visible from the database that freedom, human rights and democracy were not the key issues in JI's discourse. As far as the political issues are concerned, the affairs related to administrative efficiency received more attention (57 per cent) followed by corruption and accountability (32 per cent), which are potentially more populist in nature; however, decentralization and provincial autonomy, which are more pressing in the Pakistani context are not central to the Islamists debates. A more interesting feature standing out is the economy and economic question. Far from radically different configuration of the economy as claimed in Maududi's literature, the JI seems to be in compliance with the existing socio-economic arrangement of a capitalist order. At most what can be inferred is the patchwork done in the Capitalist model with Islamic moral interventions. A Summary Table constructed on the database stated above is provided in the Table 3.

Table 3: SUMMARY TABLE

	Manifesto Content	News Content
1. Does the JIP call for a bloody and violent revolution against the state in Pakistan?	No	No
2. If the JIP stands for democracy, then what is its conception of democracy?	An Islamic democracy	An Islamic democracy. The original position in Maududi's literature in the pre-partition era was based on rejection of western democracy. Over time, as the opportunities opened up, the JI's stance on democracy dampened.
3. Does the JIP demand for the implementation of Shariah laws?	Yes, in more clear terms: 21.05%	Yes more clearly: 72.26%
4. Which form of Shariah?	Weak Form Islamic Shariah + : 21.05% Islamic Economy/banking + : 18.42% Islamic Morality + : 47.37% Islamisation (general) : 13.16%	Strong form in the 1990s but emphasis has gradually declined from Islamic Shariah to other socio-economic issues Shariah Activism + : 72.26% Islamic Economy/banking + : 4.45% Moral Activism + : 9.59%
5. Who will adjudicate disputes over the meaning of the Shariah?	Supports parliamentary legislation, opposes military dictatorship but a strong emphasis on Shariah-compliance	Supports parliamentary legislation, opposes military dictatorship but a strong emphasis on Shariah-compliance in 1990s which has drastically declined recently
6. The JIP on women's rights?	Mentions under Islamic Shariah, public morality	Positive mention of gender relations

	with positive mention of gender relations (18.5%) and positive stress on Social Harmony (23.33%)	(41.6%). Positive stress on Social Harmony and integrity of family system (25.19%)
7. The JIP on the question of minorities?	Positive mention of minorities as distinct but equal (18.5%)	Positive mention of minorities but a tiny part of other Social Groups (58.4%)
8. The JIP's proposed welfare programmes (pensions, poverty relief, and medical care for those in need)?	Social Justice + : 37.27% Welfare State Expansion + : 20.91% Education Expansion + : 15.45% Environmental Protection + : 15.45%	Social Justice + : 59.9% Welfare State Expansion + : 9.5% Overall Social Activism: 31.4%
9. What does the JIP say on "Jihad" in Kashmir and Afghanistan?	Kashmir & Afghanistan: 0% Anti-imperialism + : 8.9% National Defence + : 14.3%	Overall Jihad Activism: 13.7% Kashmir & Afghanistan + : 29.2% Anti-imperialism: 9.6% National Defence: 13.9%
10. Does the JIP present an explicit position on the Israel/Palestine conflict?	Explicit support for Hamas and independence of Palestine; Harsh on anti-Israel stance	Explicit support for Hamas and independence of Palestine; Harsh on anti-Israel stance
11. Does the JIP hold an anti-corruption and pro-accountability stance?	Yes: 32%	Yes: 8.2%
12. Does the JIP forward proposals for an Islamic economy?	Yes: 18.42%	Yes: 4.45%
13. Does the JIP show an acceptance for a free market economy?	Free Enterprise + : 6.42% Market Regulation + : 14.68% Economic Planning + : 4.59 % Technology & Infrastructure: 51.38%	General Economic Goals that include free enterprise, incentives for foreign investment, better economic planning, positive mention of technology and infrastructure

	Nationalization + : 0%	
	Incentives Foreign Investment + : 10.09%	

SOURCE: Husnul Amin, "Mainstream Islamism without Fear: the Cases of Jamaat-e-Islami and Jamiat Ulema-e-Islam in Pakistan," *Romanian Journal of Political Science* 14, no. 2 (Winter 2014): 126-57.

On the question of land reforms and agriculture taxation, the JI's political discourse seems not very clear and proactive. Maududi opposed the then Prime Minister, Liaquat Ali Khan's land reforms in the Punjab province in the 1950s on the basis of protecting individual's private property rights in Islam.³⁴ For Binder, such move by Maududi was an attempt to win the support of *zamindars* in the Punjab that might have a positive influence on the Jamaat's electoral outcomes.³⁵ Similar is its stand on the issue of ethnicity and ethno-politics. The overwhelming discourse on Islam as the basis of ethnicity and negation of race and territory as the basis of nationalism has a negative impact on the rights and conflicts among diverse ethnic groups. In a country like Pakistan, the idea of nationalism is a concept based on Islam, and it provides an opportunity to the religious groups to claim a political leverage in playing a cementing role in holding ethnicities together based on religious identity. However, this very role of religion subsidizes and undermines the issues of rights and identities of the various ethnicities. The Jamaat's political discourse also reveals an abstract conceptualisation of issues based on moral ideals and worldviews that enables it to escape concrete solutions of specific issues. For an ideological movement, in Gramscian sense, "the discourse of political Islam seeks to unify individuals on the level of ideas and a common world perception, not necessarily by economic status or on the

34 Nasr, *Maududi and the Making of Islamic Revivalism*, 74-76.

35 Leonard Binder. *Religion and Politics in Pakistan* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1961).

basis of material deprivation".³⁶ Islamists mention the totality of human predicament and the totality of systemic failure as the gross basis of miseries and problems. Whereas, such gross generalisations could be helpful in understanding the overall gravity of human miseries in Pakistan, they are less helpful in determining specific social and economic needs of society and the strategy to overcome them.

Apart from these views and discussions prevalent among the Jamaat's formal and informal meetings (which are abstract and general in nature), the time trend in the Figure 1, reveals that the media has captured a growing emphasis in the Jamaat's politics on issues related to social groups, economy and social welfare.³⁷ In the recent past, interaction with a number of provincial leaders in the provinces of Punjab and KP also revealed that the awareness is growing within the Jamaat about re-organisation of its welfare organ (*al-Khidmat Foundation*) on professional lines.³⁸ However, deeper analysis of figures reveals abrupt spikes in the post-2002 period, when the Jamaat as a part of the MMA came into power in the province of KP, and thus most of the statements coded in this period were of the Jamaat provincial ministers.³⁹


36 Thomas J. Butko. "Revelation or Revolution: a Gramscian Approach to the Rise of Political Islam," *British Journal of Middle Eastern Studies* 31, no. 1 (2004): 41-62.

37 The shifting emphasis of the Jamaat's responses over time can be seen in author's unpublished dissertation available online:
http://www.google.de/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&source=web&cd=1&ved=0CCwQFjAA&url=http%3A%2F%2Frepub.eur.nl%2Fpub%2F19340%2FHusnulAminPhDThesispdf.pdf&ei=7c_9UoSIHc7KsgarnYCIBA&usg=AFQjCN GtB9PxoZs9XceCWUSI6TEV1tfooQ&sig2=3w4U2EPI5xet4IzMdc3M4w.
 see Appendix B1- B8.

38 Personal interviews with Inayat Ullah (member of the Jamaat provincial shura and position holder in Al-Khidmat Foundation), June 2009; Telephonic interview with Sayed Amir Jafri, Director Ghazzali Foundation, October 2009.

39 See Husnul Amin's Dissertation, Appendix B1-B8.

Figure 1: TIME TREND IN JIP POLITICS 1988-2006



SOURCE: Islamism as a Transformative Force

To gain an insight of the empirical data, a limited number of face to face interviews were conducted in the rural areas of KP in Mardan and Swabi districts. The interviews data reveals that in the 1970s, elders and the local *ulama* did not

welcome Maududi's ideas, which worked as a transformative force for conversion from traditional Islam to Islamism. The Jamaat's workers were accused of heresy and departure from the old religion to 'Maududiyyat' (roughly means Maududism). The latter symbolised 'deviation' and distance from the traditional religion (Deobandi Islam) in the KP villages. However, being mindful of resistance from traditional religious circles and local customs, Maududi had always exhorted activists that they are harbingers of the true message of the Prophet (P.B.U.H.) and must be prepared for physical hardships and material losses.

The Deobandi *ulama* and *imams* were apprehensive of not only their 'heretic ideas' but also their 'fashionable/modern Islam' manifested through their lifestyle. Almost all of these activists were subject to religious stress and social pressures from families and friends. As expected, the *ulama* spearheaded the attack with active support of the political elites of the village. The social discord with families and religious rejection from *ulama* would at times result into expulsion or forced migration of male activists from home. The religious and political elites of the villages had sensed an emerging threat to their dominance. These classes were conscious enough to understand that the Jamaat literature, long-meetings, network of well-placed friends, fusion of Islam with politics, social and political activism had set-in motion a strong force for change in areas of interests. However, their fears did not materialise as with the passage of time, the Jamaat revolutionary spirit lost the stream. Despite numerous internal contradictions and inconsistent policy pursued by the Jamaat on issues of women, jihad and democracy, its activists can be categorised more as latent forces of change than forces of *status quo*.

Conclusion

The manifesto and news content data analyzed in this paper questions the perpetual portrayal of Islamists by invoking stereotyped images. The Islamists themselves are no less active, at least in their public discourse if not actual practice, in publicizing their image as harbingers of radical change.

The conflation of both produces an image of the Islamists promoting a fear of radical transformation of state and society. Such stereotypical images can be seen in some of the bold assertions by a body of scholarship. The data set used in this paper in a multidisciplinary setting compels us to rethink and thus to (re)interpret the Jamaat's position in at least two different ways: in its political discourse, the JI leadership has been reflecting on a set of diverse issues ranging from the issues of economy and foreign policy to culture, ethnicities and Shariah. This diversification of issues coupled with pragmatic political compromises point to the fact that after coming into power the JI may not drag the country into a Stone Age. On the contrary, their recent experience in power in KP suggests that they largely follow a capitalist model of development. The manifesto content further specifies the nature of an Islamic trickle down model. It means that despite rhetoric in its political campaigns, the JI's position on key economic questions will be defined as a patchwork anchored in the existing socio-economic arrangements and will not discard the prevailing financial system rooted in capitalist model of development. Its position on welfare programmes, privatization, land reforms, banking and finance, and the public-private mix boils down to an approach of the Christian democrats in Europe.