

Pakistan's Security Quandary in the War Against Terrorism

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Abstract

Pakistan is encased in the corollaries which flow from the changes that have taken place since 9/11. As the edifice of world politics has been transformed in fundamental respects, following the U.S. attacks on Afghanistan, Iraq and Pakistan's tribal areas, the erstwhile international system of balance of power has also been replaced by pre-emptive strikes and the "War Against Terrorism" elsewhere in the world. Although, it is premature to predict with certainty about the upshot of this change in its regional or international dimensions, yet, one thing is for sure that this change is bringing about a disdain to the sovereignty of smaller countries. Particularly, Pakistan is facing a tenuous security situation as American drones are attacking its civilians in the tribal areas by violating its airspace on top of old smoky. On the other hand, armed militias of different outfits are clashing with governmental defense machinery not only in the tribal areas albeit urbanite settled areas too. According to foreign accounts, the security conditions in Pakistan have worsened very worryingly over the last couple of years and the country is more insecure than it had been during the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. Since, a

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friendly government in Afghanistan is one of the most important defining issues for Pakistan's security, domestic politics and strategic gains; hence, every political or strategic change in Afghanistan distresses internal dynamics of the politics in Pakistan. Pakistan's forgoing policy of supporting the Taliban regime was revised in the post 9/11 scenario; nonetheless a majority of western community suspects Pakistan's intentions in the ongoing War Against Terrorism. Ironically, Pakistan's contributions are not being acknowledged despite the heavy price it has paid. In this gloomy scenario, where the U.S. and NATO blueprints of domination of Afghanistan and adjacent territories, particularly, Central Asia, have been shattered, Pakistan has been left with minimum choices. Questions are being raised that in case Taliban manage to control Kabul again, would it be the beginning of an era of totalitarianism cloaked in religion? Or will an age of "new crusades" reshape the centre stage of global politics? Therefore, the discussion in this paper is an attempt to examine the pressure mounted by friends and foes on Pakistan in an environment where global changes have completely restructured the existing power equation in the world, giving new shape to national security.

Introduction

The domestic political dynamics and regional compulsions in the post 9/11 world scenario, the War Against Terrorism (WAT) became a prime focus of the General Musharraf's administration. The U.S. in collaboration with the NATO and the UN mandated International Security Assistance Force (ISAF), waged war against transnational Muslim revivalist network of organizations known as Al-Qaeda in Afghanistan and Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) in Pakistan. To consolidate their gains, the western coalition against terrorism entered into long term security pacts with its Asian allies. By doing so, they formed themselves into an advantageous and secure position to extend their

influence and control over the region.¹ However, their overall assessment proved to be a failure as in 2006, the southern provinces of Helmand and Kandahar became the sites of dramatic standing battles between foreign forces and Taliban led-Muslim extremists.² The Pashtun dominated militants attacked forward operating bases and held the ground. Although, the ISAF claimed to have eliminated 6000 militants during the years 2007-2010 in various vicious combats, however, the strength and level of retaliation of Taliban gained momentum amazingly. Soon after the U.S. control over Central Afghanistan, the Taliban who had earlier opted for a tactical retreat began a recruitment drive in Pashtun areas in Afghanistan and its adjacent part of Pakistani tribal belt, to launch a “renewed Jihad” against American-backed Afghan government.³

Pamphlets, distributed secretly at midnight, began to appear in villages in the former Taliban heartland in the South-eastern Afghanistan.⁴ Small mobile training camps were established along the border with Pakistan to train new recruits for long term guerrilla warfare and other terrorist campaigns. Despite countless combat operations and deadly battles between Taliban and ISAF forces, the situation showed no signs of any subsiding. Afghanistan was witnessing violent attacks on an average of 40 strikes per week — 90 percent of them had been against the Afghan and coalition forces.⁵ It is however, pertinent to note that the reasons for resurgence of Taliban and their strong position *vis-à-vis* the allied forces have been

1 Neal Riemer, “New Thinking and Developments in Global Politics”, *New Yorker* (New York: 2002).

2 Michael D. Sunrise, *et. al. China's Military and the US-Japan Alliance in 2030: A Strategic Net Assessment* (New York: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace), 175-78.

3 Szanton Cristina, *Pakistan and Afghanistan: Global Agenda versus Local Dynamics* (London: Oxford University Press, 2005).

4 Adams Bruce, “New Wounds”, *Friday Times* (Lahore: 2003).

5 Smith William, “Pakistan's Security Concerns”, *Business Recorder* (Lahore: 2006).

explained in quite a divergent manner by the U.S.-led coalition forces and by Pakistan. The western community is nearly unanimous in its view that re-emergence and radicalization of Taliban movement is due to Pakistan's double standards in the war against terrorism.⁶ On the other hand, Pakistan is of the view that the prolonged war has forced the Afghans to settle down their factional squabbles so as to bring unity for resistance on their war-ravaged land.⁷ Furthermore, the Americans' inability to win the hearts of the Afghans, their brutalities during the internecine war, their blatant intervention into Karazai government's political affairs and Afghan power politics ending up in utter chaos and heavy losses. Therefore, the core centre of gravity is the "renewed Jihad" which is taking its toll day by day.⁸ However, Pakistani viewpoint is not taken into consideration and a majority of allies believe that Pakistan is meddling in Afghanistan.

Resurgence of Taliban Resistance: An Afghan Phenomenon

Unlike other nations of the world, the Afghans do not convict in overthrow. They were invaded by the British, the Russians and the West Europeans-led coalition successively. However, things changed for the worse with every invader in Afghanistan after a certain period of time. The extant resurgence of Afghan or Taliban resistance can be viewed as a multi-dimensional phenomenon which has identical roots in history. Despite continuous clandestine and blatant military operations against the Taliban, the international security force has failed to capture Mullah Omar, the supreme commander who was leading from the front. Of course, this is a clear cut indication that majority

6 Alexander Moens, Lenard J. Cohen, and Allen G. Sens (ed.) *NATO and European Security: Alliance Politics from the End of the Cold War to the Age of Terrorism* (Westport, CT: Praeger, 2003).

7 Hooman Peimani, *Falling Terrorism and Rising Conflicts: The Afghan "Contribution" to Polarization and Confrontation in West and South Asia* (Westport, CT: Praeger, 2001).

8 *Ibid.*

of Afghan Pashtuns of South-eastern territory have refused to cooperate in hunting down Taliban leadership. There are reports that some Pashtun tribal elders of Taliban's former strongholds helped Mullah Omar and his stalwarts to avoid capture.⁹ The disillusionment of Southern Pashtuns with the Afghan government has served as the major source for the advancement of Taliban's interest. On the other hand, years of continuous warfare have created a complex constellation of regional, tribal and ethnic leaders; some disparaged as "warlords" in the western media. These stubborn and hardy survivors of Afghanistan's variegated politics cannot accede to foreign plans for the formation of a multi-ethnic Kabul-based central government, as they perceive that by doing so their authority will be endangered in the peripheral areas. It is also pertinent to mention that warlordism and drug cartels which have a very strong infrastructure (their own security system and trade mechanism) have come into conflict with the U.S.-led ISAF force on a number of occasions. This infighting between the allies has given enough space to the Taliban to workout strategies for re-emergence and counter attack. Despite spending billions of dollars to recruit, train and equip an Afghan National Army (35,000 men) as well as Afghan National Police (55,000 men), the Taliban move everywhere freely and without any fear.¹⁰ Actually, the factor that contributes most to the survival of the Taliban movement is the particular Pakhtun perception of Afghanistan. Historically, the ethnic dynamics of the Afghan society has been very volatile, yet it was balanced by the *Jirga* [Pashto: local counsel] system established locally. However, the U.S. military action affected the political balance and tilted power away from the Pakhtuns, who found this situation difficult to accept. That led to further chaos and imbalance in the country as the Americans were contributing much to non-Pakhtuns i.e.,

9 Mirza Saulat. "The Ghost of Terror", *Daily Times* (Lahore: 2007).

10 David Baldwin, "Narcotics Racket Unearthed", *The Washington Quarterly* (Washington D.C.: 2005).

Tajiks, Uzbeks and Hazaras. Reconstruction could not take place without addressing the genuine concerns of the Pakhtuns. On the other hand, the rulers of Afghanistan deliberately marginalized the Pakhtuns by ignoring their concerns about security, participation in national politics, opportunities in health, education and employment sectors. The Pakhtuns felt that ethnic minorities had too much of a voice at the table, not because of their political worth within the country, but because of international support, they acquired during the U.S. attack and occupation of Afghanistan. In the early years, after allied forces control of the country, there have been reprisals against Pakhtuns in the North and Northwest area that the Taliban once dominated. Besides, scores of Hazaras, Uzbeks and Tajiks were settled in the Pakhtun's traditional areas, which created a sense of deprivation amongst the majority of Pakhtuns.¹¹ Indeed, intimidating the Pakhtun's trading interests proved to be one of the major factors in their tilt towards Taliban.

There are, however, prodigious differences among Pakhtuns themselves and it would be wrong to guess that the whole community is standing alongside the Taliban. Since the Pakhtuns are divided internally on tribal, regional, ideological and leadership lines and the Taliban too were described as a "warring alliance" – an alliance of ideologues at the centre, with tribal chiefs, traders and other actors which perceive that their inclusive interests lay in supporting the Taliban. With the establishment of Karazai government, a sizeable number among Pakhtuns switched over from their past choice and began participating in day to day affairs with the coalition. Soon they came to realize that the non-Pakhtun "Northern Alliance" had gained a position of power-brokers which culminated into their disenchantment with the central

11 G. Campbel Daryl, "Pakistan in the Global Power Structure", *The Times of India* (New Delhi, 2007).

government.¹² Furthermore, it is also an open secret that a clear majority of the Pakhtuns practices the Sunni (Hanafi Deobandi) version of Islam and their coexistence with other religious Afghan factions has remained a “question”. Consequently, the failure of constructing a homogenous Afghan society has paved a way for Pakhtun’s inclination towards Taliban (Hanafi Deobandi). It reflects that the resurgence of Taliban is due to all the factors mentioned above. It further denotes that the wrong approaches of NATO in handling an already war-torn country, fiasco in the dispensation of justice among the Afghan’s various factions, a blemished political process which delivered little to Pakhtun’s divergent vision of the Afghan neighbours and their priorities, and above all, the failed military operations by ISAF forces are considered to be the major causes of the re-entry of the Taliban in the mainstream politics of Afghanistan.

Upsurge in Organized Terrorism in Pakistan: The Aftermath of Global Partnership

Since the time of Cold War, Pakistan’s establishment decided that it was imperative to be involved in Afghanistan. The policy of “strategic depth” led them to encourage — or at least, not to put down — groups of Pakhtuns in Pakistan that had strong affinities with their fellow Pakhtuns in Afghanistan, particularly in certain religious circles. There are millions of Pakhtuns in the Pakistani Pakhtun belt, which stretches across a wide swath of territory, from China to Iran. The common Pakhtun sentiment in this sparsely populated region has always played an important role in making vital decisions.¹³ This is exactly why Pakhtun belt in both the neighbouring countries has made it a launching pad for the

12 Benjamin Paul, “Drone Attacks: New Dimensions”, *Daily Times* (Lahore, 2008).

13 Ahmad Rasheed, *Descent into Chaos: The U.S. and the Disaster in Pakistan, Afghanistan, and Central Asia* (USA: Viking Penguin, 2008), 84-88. P. Cronin Richard, “U.S. Policy towards Pakistan: After 9/11”, *Report Presented to U.S. Congress* (New York: Henry L. Stimson Centre, 2003).

resurgent Taliban. The resurgence of Taliban provoked the NATO and the Afghan officials to become increasingly vocal in their criticism on Pakistan for a wave of suicide attacks that hit Afghan provinces bordering Pakistan.¹⁴ More than 150 attacks killed as many as 2000 people, both high value civil and military persons including foreign diplomats, elites and ISAF soldiers.¹⁵ The spate of violent events in Afghanistan affected the unprecedented closeness of the post 9/11 partnership between Pakistan and U.S.A. As long as the failure in hunting down Bin Laden, Mullah Omar and high value targets, the revelations of Dr. Abdul Qadeer Khan's "illicit nuclear network", the continuing attacks on NATO forces and presence of Al-Qaeda inside Afghanistan and the U.S. suspicions over Pakistani intelligence gradually reduced the level of confidence on both the sides. The U.S. officials began saying that the Pakistani establishment's own past policy of supporting extremist groups has made it difficult to clamp down on them. General Mollen once said that "they (Pakistanis) really do not want to go whole-heartedly against their past allies".¹⁶ That attitude of strategic partners rocked the people in Pakistan and raised serious questions about the war against terrorism. That as why the Operation Neptune Spear in Abbotabad, Pakistan on May 2011, in which Osama bin Laden was killed, was launched secretly and independently by the US forces without taking the armed forces of the state of Pakistan into confidence. It was a clear out violation of international laws and the sovereignty of Pakistan. Level of trust was worstly shaken and both the partners became more suspicious about each other. Finally, the leakage and appearance of the report of Abbotabad Commission intensified the situation more between both the partners.

14 Stein Albert, *Meeting Pakistan's Security Needs* (New York: Boston Globe, 2002).

15 W.N. Brown, "The Afghan Conflict: Fresh Directions", *Business Recorder* (Lahore: 2006).

16 Stein Albert, *Meeting Pakistan's Security Needs*.

Pakistan assumed the role of a frontline state in the U.S.-led global war against terrorism. The active role of Pakistan exposed it to multifarious security challenges from inside and outside. Although a door of opportunities got opened for both military and non-military sectors, but at the same time, Pakistan had to confront with a situation of multifaceted threats. The most lethal challenge came from extremist militancy for Pakistan's extraordinary contribution to the ongoing global war. The religious factions portrayed Pakistan's role as hypocrite which has made the nation completely subservient and compliant to U.S whims and wishes. Almost all the major urban centers of Pakistan had to face the wrath of extremist tendency, despite the presence of some 100,000 Pakistani troops on its western borders.¹⁷ In the first phase, violence spread to its North West Frontier Province (now Khyber Pakhtunkhaw) and Federally Administrated Tribal Areas (FATA) in particular. The years 2006, 2007 and 2008 witnessed the bloodiest violent engagements, skirmishes, rocketing, assassination, landmine blasts, air assaults, shelling and migrations in the entire FATA region.¹⁸ It will not be out of place to mention that the Al-Qaeda which had shifted 90 percent of its stuff from Afghanistan, made the adjacent tribal belt as a miniature copy of the previously Taliban-controlled Afghanistan and challenged the writ of the Pakistani government. There is no denying the fact that the FATA soil was used for radicalization of Taliban resistance in Afghanistan to some extent, but Pakistani security forces sharply reacted and crushed that uprising. Some 2000 soldiers and officers of Pakistan Army sacrificed their lives during the course of clean up operation. On the other hand, security forces also claim to have killed more than 300 foreign militants and 3500 of their local supporters in the periodic operations. However

17 Hadeed Ghani, "The Process of Peace: A Multi-Dimensional Agenda", *Business Recorder* (Lahore: 2009).

18 Afaq Hayder, *Talibanization: The Quest for Identity* (Yale: Yale University Press, 2004).

5000 innocent civilians also had to bear the brunt of armed clashes between state and non-state actors.¹⁹

Pakistan's multi-pronged strategy worked out successfully as the local community (lashkars) helped in the capture of dozens of Chechens, Arabs, Central Asians and even Muslims from West Europe. Feeling insecure, the local extremist outfits of Pakistan opted for other options, such as making Swat and Buner as their new war theaters and strongholds, which resulted in large scale military operations and migration. The escalation in these territories exposed a conspiracy in which Indian presence in Afghanistan played a pivotal role. However, the Pakistanis managed to take effective control of the trouble-torn parts of the western province. The gradual success forced the terrorist outfits to go in for large-scale sabotage in the urban centers.²⁰

In practice, the policy of participating with global alliance against terrorism created serious problems for Pakistan. The spill-over affect of this war has been seen in different quarters i.e., ethnic friction in the small provinces of Pakistan, economic turmoil and ongoing wave of bloodiest terrorism, particularly, Balochistan, which has witnessed sporadic violence as Afghanistan's porous borders allow drug trade, arms supplies and other illicit business, bringing with these, corruption and volatile organizations that are being operated and trained by the Indo-Afghan intelligence outfits.²¹ In addition, Baloch secessionist network has grown over the past four years and is posing an increasing security risk to the state by creating dissention, displacing non-Balochs from the province and attacking governmental machinery/sensitive installations. The resource-rich South-western Balochistan

19 John Esposito, "Religion and Politics in the West-Asia", *The Times of India* (New Delhi: 2008).

20 Mumtaz Ahmad, *Revivalism, Islamization and Violence in Pakistan* (Lahore: Pak Book Corporation, 2009).

21 Peter Hogue, *Understanding Global Security* (London: Routledge, 2004), 69.

is becoming a major headache for Islamabad and is linked to a global agenda of the future. Desolate, but rich in mineral resources and hydrocarbons, providing Pakistan with most of its gas and having a major deepwater seaport serving as a gateway to Pakistan, Balochistan is very vital for the future development of the country. Therefore, the globalization of the Afghan conflict gave a rare opportunity to India to mobilize anti-Pakistan elements in an area which has a long unmonitored border with Afghanistan.²²

The Islamist militancy and ethnic friction on the other side of the Durand Line, the 2400 kilometers frontier between Afghanistan and Pakistan, are linked to the complex global and regional strategic designs. This situation has aggravated the relations among the allies in the war against terrorism. In spite of the fact that there was an urgent need for political engagement, policy of accommodation and a reconsideration of strategies, the coalition partners kept on targeting one another on one pretext or the other. Resultantly, Pakistan had to suffer as thousands of Pakistanis sacrificed their precious lives at the altar of terrorism. The dread has been created by the constant use of suicide bombings and blatant violations of human rights. This has deliberately been designed through cruel conspiracies, practically punishing the people of Pakistan for their participation in the global war against terrorism. Such intimidating and reprehensible agenda have targeted and eroded the spirit of a majority of Pakistanis against revivalism of religious extremism. This majority is of the opinion that participation with the global partners on a universal agenda, such as containment of terrorism, is the primary cause of volatility in Pakistan.

22 Noor ul Haq, et. al. (eds.) "Balochistan: Facts and Fictions", In *IPRI Fact File* (Islamabad: Islamabad Policy Research Institute, 2012), 18-20.

While the strategic partnership between Pakistan and U.S.A. is a fact and Pakistani establishment has extended indefinite cooperation to them. However, on the nuclear issue, the U.S. pressure remained more on Pakistan than on India. In the beginning of War Against Terrorism, it was hoped that the Pakistan's U-turn on the Afghan issue would help not only to ease U.S. pressure on Pakistan but also to underline the fact that the nuclear capability of Pakistan has a wider dimension and it has been developed to meet the energy crisis. But Pakistan's nuclear programme was always seen with suspicion as the U.S. feared that Pakistani nukes might be taken over by the extremist outfits. On the other hand, nobody in the world community ever checked the Indian nuclear fuel cycle. India's inventory of nuclear facilities makes an interesting read. It is perhaps the largest nuclear technology among developing countries with the exception of China. It has been estimated that India has produced considerable quantities of unguarded nuclear weapon grade material. The unsafeguarded plutonium inventory is about 5000 kg, out of which weapon-grade unsafeguarded plutonium is about 3000 kg. In addition, India has built ultra-centrifuges. It is thus possible that India could have nuclear material for manufacturing 800 – 1000 nuclear weapons. Having an aggressive programme for the development of long-range missiles i.e. 500 aircrafts capable of carrying nuclear war-heads and nuclear submarines, India keeps on projecting Pakistan "as an irresponsible state which needs to be disarmed."²³ All

23 Keith Callard, "9/11 and the Aftermath", *New Yorker* (New York: 2008). Also see Ishrat Hussain, "Pakistan & Afghanistan: Domestic Pressures and Regional Threats: The Role of Politics in Pakistan's Economy", *Journal of International Affairs* (Colombia: SIPA, Vol. 63, No.1, 2009), 1-8.

this is a partisan approach and propaganda that Pakistan is incapable of protecting its nukes from Taliban and other elements alike. This perception denotes that Washington and international community's pressures are quite unfair to Pakistan. Instead of exerting pressure on both the neighbours and competitors in the South-Asia, the American aim appears to be to cap the nuclear capability of Pakistan at the lowest possible level. Given the state of tension, mutual mistrust and suspicion among the coalition partners over an issue like nuclear programme control, it is becoming extremely difficult for coalition to face the challenge of terrorist menace.

It is also pertinent to note that Pakistan has gone after transnational Muslim militants as much as it could and the number of arrested or killed terrorists in Pakistan is exemplary as compared to any other coalition partner. Despite all this, Pakistanis have to keep on listening that "they do not want to go wholeheartedly against the local Taliban — that is, Pakistani Pakhtuns."²⁴ Furthermore, the U.S.-Indian strategic partnership forgot that during 2005, the war against terrorism turned out to be a pointer to the fluidity of the balance of power in the South-Asia.²⁵ That U.S. posture towards India determined their actual military, political and strategic priorities in this complex region. It would also be interesting to note that during the Cold War, the U.S. and Indians had very little collaboration and Pakistan remained very close to American interests. However, the strategic partnership between U.S and India emerged out as a

24 D. Smith Anthony, "The Country Betrayed Again", *The Times of India*, (New Delhi: 2009).

25 Jean, Hobsbawm. "The Terror of Revivalism", *The Telegraph* (Calcutta, 2008).

big blow to Pakistan. Now that the U.S. leanings toward India have become a settled fact, as a U.S. Spokesman made it clear that the U.S. role in the resolution of the Kashmir dispute will not be proactive or significant. Pakistan realistically fears that the U.S.-Indian strategic partnership could disturb its strategic position in South-Asia which would, in turn, have a serious impact on Pakistan's role of a balancer in the region. The U.S-Indian security interests have strongly diverged on the U.S-Pakistan strategic connection to combat global terrorism and have inspired anti-Pakistan outfits to indulge in cross border terrorism. Nevertheless, the civil nuclear technology deal between U.S. and India and the *de facto* recognition of India as a nuclear state, which was a non-signatory to NPT, has left Pakistan out in the cold. Pakistan wants an equitable treatment from the U.S. in this regard, but the U.S. attitude reflects an indifference of sort. This abundantly signifies that despite Pakistan's tremendous contribution in the war against terrorism, the U.S. and its western allies are not willing to recognize the primacy of Pakistan in the global security interests in Afghanistan. Within this context, if the coalition quits its earlier pro-Pakistan position, then its strategic designs would have to undergo a major shift and it would also be a constant dilemma for global peace.

Conclusion

Pakistan has been a key component of the international community's engagement in Afghanistan, assisting the Allied forces in providing reinforcement, monitoring security, paving the way for reconstruction and rehabilitation activities and negotiating with a number of parties involved in the conflict. Pakistan's engagement in Afghanistan is

multifold through participation in joint operations with the UN mandated International Security Assistance Force, an international force that assists US troops, Afghan authorities and the NATO in extending and exercising their authority and influence across the country, creating conditions for stabilization and reconstruction. Though the political direction and strategic coordination for the mission was provided by the US Army, however, there seemed a very little consensus on actual war strategies employed during the military operation. The loss of confidence among coalition partners is mainly held responsible for their failure to manage the crisis. Throughout the operation, Pakistan has not been viewed as a credible ally, thus, creating disillusionment among coalition partners. In this view of the matter, the failure of operation cannot be associated with Pakistan's intentions, as it has always expressed great solidarity and concern to the world community regarding the Afghan conflict.

To facilitate the global consensus on war against terrorism, Pakistan took a lead and in the presence of US army on the other side of the Durand Line, carried out an extensive operation in its own area and produced unprecedented results. Even then, the West wants to keep Pakistan under its thumb as a permanent tool for their corporate interests in the West Asia. Pakistan, however, has had to pay a heavy price for its cooperation, as decades of Pakistani investment in Pashtuns to gain strategic depth in Afghanistan has been wasted. On the other hand, the Islamist insurgency is becoming increasingly difficult to contain. Therefore, the newly elected government of MPL-N in Pakistan needs to reconsider its all out support policy, in the face of the gravity of risks that Pakistan faces from our neighbours to go for a tactical

advantage. In order to keep the tone of confrontation low in the South Asia, the U.N.O, the U.S, the NATO and other stakeholders in the War Against Terrorism, have to put a lid on their undue apprehension *vis-à-vis* Pakistan's role in the War Against Terrorism. The negative effects of terrorism will certainly multiply if the partners ditch one another and work out different approaches. An unequivocal strategic doctrine laying down broad parameters will certainly do a lot to the effective management of the Afghan crisis. Finally, Pakistan also has to make the global community believe that it is not responsible for the prevailing chaos in the Afghan conflict.

In sum, the un-answered challenge of terrorism can never be appropriately met unless and until Pakistan is recognized and respected as a sovereign country.