

Pakistan and SEATO

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This paper seeks to investigate why Pakistan became a member of South-East Asian Treaty Organization (SEATO) when it was not part of South East Asia. By joining SEATO, Pakistan became an ally of the American Power System in Cold War against Communism. This strategic partnership strengthened non-democratic forces in Pakistan eroding the fragile democratic institutions and established a “constitutional dictatorship” which was used as a vehicle for ensuring Pakistan’s membership in SEATO.

Cold War and American Power System

The year 1946 is marked with the Cold War demonstrations when Harry Truman declared that “no more recognition of communist governments” and “I am sick of babying the Soviets”.¹ Under the influence of his advisors, especially George Marshall, Truman supported their hard-line advice and policies against the Soviet Union. By 1947 these policies came to be known as “containment”. George Kennan became the “father of containment” with his “long telegram” of February 22.² Kennan’s depiction of communism as a “malignant parasite” that had to be contained by all possible measures, became the ideological foundation of the Truman Doctrine, Marshall Plan, and National Security Act of 1947. In his inaugural address of 20 January 1949, Truman declared four points about his “program for peace and freedom”: to support the UN, the European Recovery Program, the collective defence of the North Atlantic region, and a “bold new program” for technical aid

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1 *Harry Truman to James Byrnes*, 5 June 1946. Cold War Policies, Retrieved, 21 December 02. <http://history.sandiego.edu./truman46.html>.

2 See, Thomas Paterson, *Meeting the Communist Threat* (New York, 1988).

to the poor nations.³ It was believed that because of his programs, “the future of mankind would be assured in a world of justice, harmony and peace”.⁴ Thus the containment was not only a policy, rather it was a way of life. The probable fission bomb capacity of the Soviet Union greatly intensified the Soviet threat to the security of the United States, which culminated in NSC 68.⁵ Fearing the threat of Soviet atomic capabilities, it was felt that the US programs and plans were dangerously inadequate in terms of timing and scope, to accomplish the rapid progress towards the attainment of the United States’ political, economic, and military objectives. It was argued that the “continuation of ...[present] trends would result in a serious decline in the strength of the free world relative to the Soviet Union and its satellites...These trends lead in the direction of isolation not by deliberate decision but by lack of the necessary basis for a vigorous initiative in the conflict with the Soviet Union.”⁶ The Europe was defeated and US became the “centre of power in the free world”. This was reflected in the conclusion, which stated, “we must organize and enlist the energies and resources of the free world in a positive program for peace which [would] frustrate the Kremlin design for world domination by creating a situation in the free world to which the Kremlin... [would] be compelled to adjust”.⁷ It was believed that without such a cooperative effort, led by the United States, the free world would have to make gradual withdrawals under pressure until they discover one day that they had sacrificed positions of vital interest.⁸ To secure these “positions of vital interest”, a much more “rapid and concerted build-up of the actual strength” of both the United States and the other nations of the free world was suggested in the analysis. The program envisaged “the political and economic measure with which and the military shield behind which the free world [could] work to frustrate the Kremlin design by the strategy of the Cold War”.⁹ Avoiding the direct war with the Soviet Union, the Cold War was conceived with the aim to frustrate “the Kremlin’s design by the steady development of the moral and material strength by the free world and its projection into the

3 *Cold War Policies*. Retrieved, 21 December 02 <http://history.sandiego.edu/gen/20th/truman46.html>.

4 *Ibid.*

5 *Cold War Policies*. Retrieved 19 December 02 <http://history.sandiego.edu/gen/1950s/nsc68.html>.

6 *Ibid.*

7 *Ibid.*

8 *Ibid.*

9 *Ibid.*

Soviet world in such a way as to bring about an internal change in the Soviet system.”¹⁰ The conclusion summarized that “by means of a rapid and sustained build-up of the political, economic, and military strength of the free world, and by means of an affirmative program intended to wrest the initiative from the Soviet Union”, the USA would be in a position to “confront with convincing evidence of the determination and ability of the free world to frustrate the Kremlin design of a world dominated by its will”.¹¹ It was thought that ‘such evidence [was] the only means short of war, which eventually [might] force the Kremlin to abandon its [existing] course of action and to negotiate acceptable agreements on issues of major importance’.¹²

The election of 1952 in the U.S. brought former Allied Commander Dwight Eisenhower to the White House, who chose John Foster Dulles as his Secretary of State. Together, Eisenhower and Dulles further modified the Containment Doctrine as articulated in NSC-68. With Eisenhower in office, the U.S. Defence Policy took a more offensive “New Look”. His Secretary of State John Foster Dulles, “a patrician, visceral anticommunist closely tied to the nation’s financial establishment, was obsessed with communism’s challenge to the U.S. corporate power in the Third World.”¹³ Dulles criticized the foreign policy of Truman and argued that the policy of “containment” should be replaced by a policy of “liberation”. Dulles considered neutrality as an obsolete and an immoral and shortsighted conception. Alliances such as NATO were the part of his “liberation strategy”.

Cold War, Defence Pacts and Pakistan

For American policy makers, the Cold War was in fact a real war in which the survival of the free world was at stake and Pakistan before its birth was destined to enter into this war. Pakistan’s proximity to the Soviet Union and China, the emerging Communist Block and the Middle East and Iran the centre of oil resources or “wells of power” placed it in a very critical position on the “security map of the free world”. The key event in the South Asian arena of Cold War competition was the signing of the Mutual Defence Assistance Agreement between Pakistan and the United States on 19 May 1954 with the major objective to build defence establishment in Pakistan to be used to block any Soviet thrust into the

10 *Ibid.*

11 *Ibid.*

12 *Ibid.*

13 ‘Cold War (1953-1962)’ *Wikipedia, The Free Encyclopedia*. Retrieved 26 June 2004. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/cold_war.

crucial Middle East and provide United States with valuable military bases against Soviet Union. The Mutual Defence Agreement resulted in Pakistan's signing the SEATO and the Baghdad Pact also referred to as the Middle East Treaty Organization (METO). The SEATO was established by the Southeast Asia Collective Defence Treaty (Manila Pact), which was signed at Manila in September 1954. The SEATO became effective on 19 February 1955 and was signed by Pakistan, Australia, France, Great Britain, New Zealand, the Philippines, Thailand and the United States. Pakistan was included in the alliance though it was not a part of South East Asia.

By signing these Defence pacts, Pakistan became one of the first few allies of the American Power System in its war against Communism in an environment when most of the Third World countries were campaigning for nationalism, social reformism and anti-imperialism and refused to be part of the American Power System in the Cold War era. Dulles is known in history for his efforts to "integrate the entire noncommunist Third World into a system of mutual defence pacts, travelling almost 500,000 miles in order to cement new alliances that were modelled after (NATO)".¹⁴ The emphasis on pacts was a logical culmination of Truman-Acheson containment, which called for strong alliance systems directed by the U.S. and collective security pacts. Dulles, along-with most U.S. foreign policy-makers of the era, failed to distinguish indigenous Third World social revolutionaries and nationalists from the Soviet influence. Neutrality for Dulles was "an obsolete, immoral and short-sighted conception".¹⁵

In its war against Communism, Dulles found cooperative partners-generals and bureaucrats who were trained by the British colonial strategist minds believing in a concept of a security state and groomed in a colonial tradition of "controlled democracy". They were put in control of affairs at the expense of the democratic institutions to steer Pakistan towards Dulles's collective security pacts. In April 1953 the Governor-General destroying the notion of the cabinet government dismissed the Prime Minister Nazimuddin to pave the way for negotiating the Mutual Defence Agreement under an "authoritarian regime" which was unaccountable to the people of Pakistan and backed by the army. This authoritarian regime led by Governor-General Ghulam Muhammad was again successful in dismissing the provincial government of East Pakistan in May 1954 when it voiced against the signing of the Mutual

14 'Dulles', *Ibid.*

15 *Ibid.*

Defence Agreement. An authoritarian regime under the disguise of a democratic set up was felt necessary to influence Pakistan to join the Defence Pacts, SEATO and Baghdad Pact, since the majority of the parliamentarians and the people of Pakistan were not in favour of joining these defence pacts. The fear of widespread public protest over the question of Pakistan's joining these defence pacts and support of Soviet Union for any such popular movement was keeping Pakistan's authoritarian regime in a dilemma to publicly announce its intentions to join any defence pact against Communism.

Pakistan's Forced Entry into the SEATO

In the following discussion, we will examine how Pakistan was persuaded to join SEATO. Dulles initiated the SEATO as a security arrangement for the region of Southeast Asia. The idea was publicly discussed in Geneva Peace Conference in May 1954 in the aftermath of Indo-China conflict. On July 24, 1954, presenting his "Five Point Program on South-East Asia and Europe", Dulles, the U.S. Secretary of State highlighted following points:

First. As an interim protection, to fill what is clearly a dangerous vacuum in South-East Asia, there should be a prompt declaration of intention on the part of all the free nations, including the so-called neutralist block, against further aggression by means of external invasion or internal penetration. Second. Simultaneously, every effort should be made to move ahead on the longer range of hard and fast military commitments under a South-East Asia defence pact. With all the many Asiatic powers we would like to see join such a pact may not be willing to enter it that should not serve as a veto on all the others.¹⁶

During the Geneva Peace Conference, the Foreign Office, London was informed that Dulles had already invited the Colombo Powers to join in a pact for the defence of South-East Asia and that Burma had refused.¹⁷ Following the Geneva Conference, the joint United Kingdom-United States Study Group on South-East Asia agreed upon "collective security pact and declaration of intention."¹⁸ It was recorded that the United States had agreed that "invitations should be issued by 7 August for a meeting at the beginning of September to draw up a treaty". It was further recorded that "an approach should now be made to the Colombo

16 Extract from Pages 11288-9 of Congressional Record, 24 July 1954, Foreign Office [henceforth FO] 371/111875, The National Archives: Public Record Office [henceforth TNA: PRO].

17 Geneva to FO, 17 May 1954, D 1074/10, FO 371/111862, TNA: PRO.

18 FO Minute, 30 July 1954, D 1074/302, FO 371/111875, TNA: PRO.

Powers to urge their participation in talks on the treaty". Earlier, the State Department informed all the U.S. embassies in Asia on 24 July 1954 that an agreement had been reached between America and Britain to hold a conference on Southeast Asian defence as the first step. The diplomatic missions were also told that the British Government was assigned the responsibility to invite the governments of Australia, New Zealand, Ceylon, India, Indonesia and Pakistan on the possibility of participating in establishing a collective security agreement in South-East Asia.¹⁹ On 30 July 1954, Commonwealth Relations Office, London sent a telegram to its high commissioners in India, Pakistan, Ceylon (Sri Lanka), Australia, New Zealand, Canada and South Africa which stated that "the Foreign Secretary [had] undertaken that invitation should be issued not later than 7 August to the Conference to be held not later than 1st September to prepare recommendations on the conclusion of a Collective Defence Agreement".²⁰ To make an immediate approach to Colombo Powers, a telegram containing the text of a message from the Foreign Secretary to the Prime Ministers of India, Pakistan and Ceylon was sent by the Commonwealth Relations Office, London on the same day. A similar message was sent to the Prime Ministers of Burma and Indonesia. In the telegram the fears were expressed that the Indian reaction to the approach was bound to be negative, therefore, it was considered important "to ensure that Nehru's reaction should be as favourable as possible". It was hoped that positive reaction from Pakistan, Ceylon and Burma would "exercise a moderating influence on Nehru". The Commonwealth Relations Office was "cognizant of the difficulties *vis-à-vis* India, if Pakistan were to go it alone without the support of any other Colombo Power, but there [could] be no question of our dissuading either Pakistan or Ceylon from joining". The Commonwealth Relations Office conveyed to high commissioners that they were "indeed most anxious to have the support of any Asian country or countries, other than Siam and the Philippines that [could] be persuaded to join or to be associated with the organization". In his message the British Foreign Secretary, invited the Prime Ministers of Colombo Power by informing that:

We have long been in favour of creating a broadly based defensive organization in South East Asia and the South West Pacific. After careful study of this problem, our ideas have now crystallized sufficiently for me

19 Laithwaite to CRO, 23 July 1954, D 1074/271, FO 371/111873, TNA: PRO.

20 Telegram no. 334, 30 July 1954, D 1074/302, FO 371/111875, TNA: PRO.

to seek your views on them, and I hope you will give them very serious consideration.²¹

The Foreign Secretary in his message expressed the hope “to see the Asian powers play a leading role in the defence of South-East Asia”. Emphasizing the importance of the area, he was of the view that “its peace [was] as yet so insecure, that [they felt it] vital to safeguard its peaceful development and ensure its stability”. The purpose of the meeting was “to consider possible measures of collective defence for South-East Asia and the South-West Pacific in the hope of producing agreed recommendations for consideration by the participating governments and a draft collective defence agreement”. Three specific subjects to be considered at the meeting were: “a) measure of military, economic or technical assistance to countries wishing to strengthen their resistance to external interference of any kind; b) consultation with a view to common action, should the territorial integrity, political independence or security of one of the parties, or the peace of the area, be endangered; c) action in the event of overt aggression”.²² The treaty was said to be discussed with Chou En-lai in Geneva and the Chinese were reported to be “well aware that [Anglo-American block] intende[d] to press forward on these lines”. It was informed that “during these discussions Chou En-lai was mainly concerned to obtain assurances about the neutrality of Laos, Cambodia and Vietnam”. It was made clear that these countries were not going to “be the members of the proposed organization”.²³

The news that Pakistan had decided to participate in the conference on South-East Asia defence was received with great pleasure and considered “an excellent development”.²⁴ Although, Pakistan had decided to participate in the Manila Treaty Conference, she was not yet ready to become a member of the South-East Asia Organization. The message of Mohammad Ali Bogra stated:

My colleagues and I have carefully considered your secret personal message of 30 July. I am glad to be able to inform you that Pakistan will be represented at the proposed meeting, which is planned for the beginning of September to consider possible measures of collective defence for South-East Asia and South West Asia. Our participation in the meeting does not imply prior acceptance of any scheme that might emerge from the

21 Telegram no. 335, 30 July 1954, D 1074/302, FO 371/111875, TNA: PRO.

22 *Ibid.*

23 *Ibid.*

24 FO Minute, 5 August 1954, D 1074/300, FO 371/111875, TNA: PRO.

discussions in the meeting. Any recommendations made by the meeting will be considered on their merits.²⁵

On the other hand, Nehru's reaction to the Manila Treaty Conference as expected was very critical. Refusing to be associated with any such proposed organization, Nehru argued that "an organization of the kind proposed was more likely to promote mistrust and suspicion than security".²⁶ He observed that "though it was called a defensive arrangement it was by inference directed against China and was motivated by fear about Chinese intentions". He opined that any such organization "would only serve to divide South and South-East Asia into rival groups and would therefore, in his opinion largely undo much of the great achievement of Geneva". Nehru was seen convinced that "China harboured no aggressive intentions" and there was no need for its neighbours to feel threatened. This was not the view upheld by the Anglo-American block, that professed that "China was the exponent of a militant political philosophy to which [they] were unalterably opposed and which by its very nature could scarcely allow weak neighbours to develop freely along lines of their own choosing".²⁷ Criticizing the South East Asian and South West Pacific Organization, Nehru asserted that "it was far from being a collective peace system rather a military alliance".²⁸ Nehru warned that it would "possibly result in the formation of a counter-military alliance". He further argued that "the majority of Asian countries [would] not be participating in the organization. Some would even be strongly opposed to it, thus rendering South-East Asia a potentially explosive theatre of the Cold War".²⁹

Nehru's stand made it more essential that either Ceylon or Pakistan should be persuaded to participate in the organization. It was more convenient to press the authoritarian regime in Pakistan to bow before the wishes of Dulles and his partners. In view of India's criticism and anticipated strong reactions from Moscow and Peking (Beijing), it was easy for Pakistan's pro-West leadership to offer unconditional support to the proposed organization, a fact reflected in Mohammad Ali Bogra's message accepting the invitation to participate in the Manila Conference. However, the governments of U.K. and U.S. were "anxious to secure Pakistan's participation or association with a South-East Asian

25 *Laithwaite to CRO*, 4 August 1954, D 1074/323, FO 371/ 111876, TNA: PRO.

26 Telegram No. 734, D 1074/303, FO 371/111875, TNA: PRO.

27 *Ibid.*

28 Telegram No. 739, D 1074/303 (A), FO 371/111875, TNA: PRO.

29 *Ibid.*

Organization even if she were the only Colombo Power".³⁰ It appeared that there were some serious Anglo-American differences over the strategy and control of a South East Asia Organization. It is interesting to note that, how both the parties were exploiting Pakistan's association for gaining their specific interests. After knowing that Dulles had already invited the Colombo Powers to join in a pact for the defence of South-East Asia, the Foreign Office, London and the Secretary of State for Commonwealth Relations were keen to show that they were more "anxious" than the U.S. for Pakistan's association hoping that "there would be at least one Asian country to act as a counter-weight to the American protégées-Siam and the Philippines".³¹ It was argued that "Pakistan could make a more useful military contribution than either Siam [Thailand] or the Philippines". The Foreign Office felt "if Pakistan were excluded, it would be widely believed that [the British], rather than the Americans, were responsible, and there would be a repetition of the resentment towards the United Kingdom felt at the time of the conclusion of the agreement with Turkey". The fear was expressed that the United States might prefer to dominate SEATO by excluding Colombo Powers. Therefore, Pakistan's association was considered essential. To make their case more convincing, the Foreign Office, London argued "if Pakistan were to come in now it would make it easier for other Colombo Powers to come in later, e.g., Ceylon, Burma, and if there [was] a victory of the Masjumi (Moslem Party) in the elections next February [in] Indonesia."³² To convince Pakistan to participate, it was argued that "Pakistan's interests in East Bengal give her a direct interest in South-East Asian security".³³ According to American analysis, the closeness of former East Pakistan to the vulnerable areas in South East Asia could serve as a justification for Pakistani participation. It was emphasized that it would be more difficult to justify the introduction of American military equipment into East Pakistan, if Pakistan's security interests were primarily directed towards the Middle East.³⁴

It was widely believed that "Foreign Minister [of Pakistan] by signing the instrument in Manila had gone rather further than his

30 *Pakistan and S.E.A.T.O.* D 1074/300 (A), 29 July 1954, FO 371/111875, TNA: PRO.

31 *Ibid.*

32 *Ibid.*

33 *Ibid.*

34 Allen to State Department, 28 July 1954, Telegram No. 118, 310 SEATO, NDD.842430, RG 84, Box 42, File 350-Pak.Pol., National Archives USA, Washington D.C.

Government had intended, and that there had been genuine embarrassment between the Prime Minister and the Foreign Minister about something which the latter had done in order to be as cooperative as possible with Mr. Dulles".³⁵ The Pakistan Ambassador was concerned to maintain the "balance between tacit approval of South-East Asia Treaty Organization and strict neutrality supported by fear of possible Chinese reaction".³⁶ As expected, the South-East Asia Collective Defence Treaty provoked great criticism in Moscow and Peking. Defending the Manila Treaty, the British Ambassador in Bangkok observed in a press conference on 24 September 1954, that:

The propaganda attack against the treaty made by Moscow and Peking and echoed by other communist agencies have been very violent. All have denounced the Manila Treaty as "aggressive". The falseness of this charge and the fury with which it had been levelled show how effective it must appear in communist eyes for the purpose for which it was designed, namely the defence of South-East Asia against aggression. It should not be forgotten that Chinese have their own treaty with the Soviet Union and hence have no right to question whatever arrangement we may make with our friends for our mutual defence.³⁷

Despite the difficulties Pakistan could face over ratification of SEATO, Prime Minister Mohammad Ali was not given a sympathetic hearing whenever he tried to explain Pakistan's difficult position. The minutes of such a meeting with the Secretary of State and Minister of Defence held in the Foreign Office London, reveal how the Prime Minister's position was humiliated rather showing an understanding attitude for the difficult position in which Pakistan was being placed by signing SEATO.³⁸ It was reported that Mohammad Ali Bogra "haggled a lot and adopted a stupid and rather blackmailing attitude on the lines of what "do we get out of it if we did become members, what about India etc? The minutes recorded that "the Secretary of State and Minister of Defence pressed Mohammad Ali Bogra strongly on loss of prestige and other good reasons why it would be very short sighted of Pakistan to back down now".³⁹ The record further reveals that "later the Foreign Secretary and Lord Alexander had a further discussion with Mohammad

35 The Pakistan Ambassador told the British High Commissioner in Sri Lanka, A letter by the British High Commissioner in Sri Lanka to (Peterson) South-East Asia Department Foreign Office, D 1074/693, FO 371/116933, TNA: PRO.

36 *Ibid.*

37 *Bangkok to CRO*, FO 371/111890, TNA: PRO.

38 *FO Minute*, 30 September 1954, FO 371/111890, TNA: PRO.

39 *Ibid.*

Ali Bogra when the latter said that he would like to think more about this and have another meeting after he returned from Washington".⁴⁰

Bogra's reluctance was due to the increasing pressure from the Bengali members of the Constituent Assembly. These members opposed to any Defence pact, were also in the process of finalizing the future constitution of Pakistan. The Constituent Assembly was reconvened on 14 March 1954 after a long break of four months and had resumed the work on the finalization of the remaining clauses of the Basic Principles Committee Report. The Governor-General, who was in control of the central executive but was unable to extend its authority over the Constituent Assembly, was not pleased with these developments. Once the constitution was framed, the Governor-General's position was about to change and the focus of the power had to shift to the representative forces. In July, Sir Ivor Jennings arrived in Pakistan to assist in the drafting of the constitution on the invitation of the Assembly's Constitutional Drafting Committee. On 15 September, Bogra announced in the Assembly that, "he [was] grateful to God that at long last [they had]... crossed the last hurdle in Pakistan".⁴¹ On 20 September, the Assembly abolished the Public and Representative Offices Disqualification Act (PRODA), the most powerful executive weapon, since it was passed during Liaquat's ministry. The next day, the Constituent Assembly amended the Government of India Act 1935, which prevented the Governor-General from dismissing the cabinet, which was made responsible to the National Assembly through this amendment. "This was the move to make the government completely dependent upon the Assembly and to prevent the repetition of the exercise of the Governor-General's power of intervention".⁴² According to the fifth Amendment only members of the Assembly were to be selected as cabinet ministers and could continue to hold only as long as they retained the confidence of the legislature and similarly the Prime Minister was required to be a member of the Assembly at the time of his appointment.⁴³ Furthermore, the cabinet was decided to be collectively responsible to the Assembly, and would be required to resign if any one of its members lost the confidence of the Assembly. By making these

40 *Ibid.*

41 XVI CAD (Con.), pp.353-65.

42 Keith Callard, *Pakistan: A Political Study* (London: George Allen and Unwin, 1957), p.105.

43 XVI CAD (Con.), p.251 Government of India (5th Amendment) Act, 1954, amending Sections 9, 10, 10A, 10 B, and 17. *Pakistan Times*, 22 September 1954; *Dawn*, 21 September 1954.

amendments, the Assembly declared its supremacy and its objective to ensure that “formation and working of government” should be in accordance with the “accepted principles and conventions” of a parliamentary system of government”.⁴⁴ With the caption, “Parliament Made Supreme Body”, *Dawn* stated that “the Constituent Assembly of Pakistan yesterday laid down in clear and unambiguous terms that from that day the supreme authority in the country shall be the Parliament”.⁴⁵

On 21 September, the Assembly voted its approval of the constitution in the form of the Basic Principles Committee Report as amended.⁴⁶ Out of 40 votes polled, 27 were in favour, 11 Hindu members voted against and none of the members from the Punjab voted on the constitution. The Assembly then was adjourned until 27 October, concluding what was called a “historical session”.⁴⁷ In contrast, this was seen as “veritable coup” carried out by Bengali members of the assembly backed by ‘some have-nots’ of the Muslim League.⁴⁸ The British High Commissioner observed that “one result [of the constitutional changes was] to bring a step nearer the possibility that the Army and the higher Civil Services...[might] one day come to the conclusion that the politicians have made such a mess that it is necessary for non-political forces to take over”.⁴⁹ This observation was the mirror image of the thinking of the “neo-colonial powers”, who claimed to be the champions of democracy and protectors of the “free world” but to secure their strategic interests found justification in promoting the non-political and non-democratic forces at the expense of derailing the democratic process in Pakistan. “Pakistan’s international supporters were ambivalent about democracy too. The American Agenda was clear: a pro-Western Pakistan, a stable Pakistan, prosperous Pakistan, and a democratic Pakistan were all desirable, but in that order. When democracy threatened to remove a leadership that was less than pro-America, the U.S. Embassy conveyed this priority to Pakistanis”.⁵⁰ Supported by these protectors of the “free world”, the Governor General ordered the police to bar the members of the Constituent Assembly from attending the session of the Assembly on 27 October 1954 which was called

44 Keith Callard, p.107.

45 *Dawn*, Karachi, 22 September 1954.

46 XVI CAD (Con.), pp.499-510, 570-72.

47 *Dawn*, 22 September 1954.

48 Karachi to CRO, 30 September 1954, DO35/5135, TNA: PRO.

49 *Ibid.*

50 Stephen P. Cohen, *The Idea of Pakistan* (Lahore: Vanguard Books, 2005), p.56.

specifically to vote on the draft constitution approved in the Assembly's previous session.⁵¹ The next day, the Governor General dissolved the Constituent Assembly, and appointed a 'semi dictatorial executive' praised as a "cabinet of talents", in which the Army Chief, General Muhammad Ayub was included as the Defence Minister. "From all accounts available, it seems clear that Ghulam Muhammad's plan to dismiss the Constituent Assembly once for all and to start again was worked out with General Ayub's prior knowledge. It is, moreover, probable that without the assurance of the Army's support, Ghulam Muhammad might have hesitated".⁵² General Ayub's inclusion in the cabinet was the indication to suggest that "this was no time for nonsense"⁵³ and that there should be no doubt left that the Army was the negotiating power in the state construction and the real partner in Dulles's defence strategic plans.

"On 28 October 1954, the Assembly, which until then had been an operating political body and had produced a new constitution, became a 'failure'. But it was the success not the failure, which brought about its demise."⁵⁴ The termination of parliamentary democracy was not the result of "failure" within the Assembly or defects in the new constitutional changes as suggested by the British High Commissioner and campaigned by the Governor General and his associates, rather the strategic partnership with the American Power System that promoted authoritarianism was the real culprit. It was declared that the electorate was bound to act foolish, as they had done in the East Pakistan election clearly. This was so because masses were illiterate and needed further training in democratic institutions. The assertion was until that was accomplished there would be a need of "controlled democracy". Governor General's action of dissolving the Constituent Assembly got the judicial legitimacy by the Federal Court's theory of "Law of Necessity" declaring "that which otherwise is not lawful, necessity makes lawful".⁵⁵ The effect of this theory was that those in command of coercive powers of the state had the right to suspend constitutional government when and for however long they thought necessary. The subsequent courts in Pakistan have retroactively cited the theory of Law

51 *Ibid*, p.60.

52 Herbert Feldman, *Revolution in Pakistan* (London: Oxford University Press, 1967), p.41.

53 *Ibid*.

54 Allen McGrath, *The Destruction of Democracy* (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 1996), p.218.

55 Stephen P. Cohen, p.58.

of Necessity “to justify coups against civilian governments by generals Ayub, Yahya, Zia and Musharraf”.⁵⁶

The bureaucrat-military alliance with the support of their strategic partners was successful in eroding the democratic institutions and establishing a “constitutional dictatorship” in Pakistan. This constitutional dictatorship was the vehicle to be used for ensuring Pakistan’s membership in SEATO. “The interplay of domestic, regional and international factors had brought about a decisive shift in the institutional balance of power; bureaucrats and generals had triumphed over politicians”.⁵⁷

56 *Ibid.*

57 Ayesha Jalal, *The State of Martial Rule: The Origins of Pakistan’s Political Economy of Defense* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990), p.193.