

# *Junejo's Policies Towards Afghanistan and USSR 1985-1988: Challenges Pressures and Directions*

**Syed Umar Hayat\***

After eight years of martial law, democracy was introduced in Pakistan on 23 March 1985. Muhammad Khan Junejo was sworn in as the Prime Minister, while the military ruler General Muhammad Zia-ul-Haq remained the paramount head of the state with the office of President under covert martial law. It was generally viewed that Junejo would conduct the normal affairs of the government whereas, President, General Zia-ul-Haq, would take care foreign affairs, defence and national security.<sup>1</sup>

The Soviet Union viewed this changed political set-up in negative colours. It did not welcome the lifting of martial law in Pakistan. The induction of civilian government was termed as "a farce designed to prop up the rule of Zia-ul-Haq".<sup>2</sup> The Soviet official news agency TASS, in its 30 December 1985 broadcast, stated that the "The aim of the political farce is to try to cover up with a pseudo-democratic screen the crimes committed by the anti-popular military regime against its own country and peace and security of the region".<sup>3</sup> Thus the Soviet policy towards Afghanistan as well as Pakistan did not undergo any change

---

\* Research Fellow, NIHCR, (Centre of Excellence), Quaid-i-Azam University, Islamabad.

1. Mushahid Hussain, *Pakistan's Politics: The Zia Years*, (Lahore: Progressive Publishers, 1990), 244.
2. Darshan Singh, ed., *Soviet Foreign Policy Documents 1985* (New Delhi: Sterling Publishers, 1986), xxii.
3. *Ibid.*



despite the restoration of a civilian government in Pakistan. The USSR, however, remained committed to a political settlement of the Afghan crisis and ready to withdraw its forces from Afghanistan with certain preconditions.

Junejo's first speech in the National Assembly on 24 March 1985 showed no immediate desire to bring about a change in the foreign policy of Pakistan.<sup>4</sup> Addressing a Press Conference in Faisalabad, on 28 April 1985, he explicitly said, "The foreign policy would remain the same as before"<sup>5</sup> Thus the Junejo government remained fully committed to the continuation of the stances and positions initiated by Zia-ul-Haq. However, despite his public declarations in favour of continuing Afghan policy of the country, Junejo possessed and pursued different policies to bring about a radical change in the Afghanistan policy of the country. The disagreement over the Afghanistan issue became visible in early 1986.<sup>6</sup> In this article an effort will be made to analyse how Junejo went through to materialise his thoughts and policies regarding the Afghanistan issue.

The challenges that were inherited by the new government were, primarily, the security problem caused by Soviet military intervention in Afghanistan since 1979. Besides, the continuing Soviet military presence in Afghanistan and the consequent inflow of Afghan refugees<sup>7</sup> into Pakistan remained the dominating factors behind foreign policy considerations.

The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) invaded Afghanistan on 27 December 1979 had ordered its armed forces estimated at about 80,000 men to enter into Afghanistan. That invasion had surprised all peace-loving people around the world. As a consequence of this invasion, ultimately more than three million Afghans were forced to take refuge in Pakistan. The

---

4. Department of Films and Publications, *Wazir-i-Azam Muhammad Khan Junejo: Taqarir*, Part-1, (Islamabad: Ministry of Information and Broadcasting, N.d), 15-16. Also see *Dawn*, Karachi, 25 March 1985.

5. *Pakistan Times*, Rawalpindi, 29 April 1985.

6. Mushahid Hussain, 244

7. For details about the Afghan refugees see, Grant M. Farr, "The Effect of the Afghan Refugees on Pakistan", in Craig Baxter, (ed.), *Zia's Pakistan: Politics and Stability in a Frontline State*, (Lahore: Vanguard, 1985), 93-110.



presence of the Soviet army in large numbers in neighbouring Afghanistan posed a serious threat to Pakistan's own security. The fear was not unfounded that, after securing their hold over Afghanistan, the Red Army might any time undertake an adventure in Pakistan to serve its long-term interests.<sup>8</sup>

Consequently, the Pakistan government launched a diplomatic campaign against the Soviet invasion, and, at the call of Pakistan, an extraordinary session of the Islamic Foreign Minister's Conference was held in Islamabad in January 1980 to exclusively discuss the Afghanistan problem. The Organisation of the Islamic Conference (OIC) condemned the invasion and supported Pakistan's policies on this vital issue. Thus Pakistan was able to get much-needed diplomatic support from the Muslim world. It sought this support, and that of the third world, because it could not bank solely on the rival super power, the United States of America.<sup>9</sup> With the help of the Muslim nations and non-aligned countries of the world, Pakistan was able to convene an emergency special session of the United Nations' (UN) General Assembly, during which, on 14 January 1980 a resolution was adopted calling for an immediate, unconditional and total withdrawal of foreign troops from Afghanistan.<sup>10</sup>

Pakistan pursued a four-point formula for a political solution of the Afghanistan problem, which was duly endorsed by the OIC. The points are:

The immediate, unconditional, and total withdrawal of Soviet forces from Afghanistan;

- 
8. According to the Soviet Defence Minister, Dimitri Ustinov, "the Soviet Union has everything it needs to fulfil worthily its sacred mission.... The Soviet Union has the military capability. Strategic Impact of Soviet Intervention in Afghanistan", *Pakistan Horizon* (Quarterly), Karachi, Vol. XXXIII, No. 3, 1980, 21. According to another source "Afghanistan crisis is a sharp reminder that the Soviet Union is an ideological state with an expansionist foreign policy. Afghanistan is a test case where the Soviets have shown their resolve to pursue their ideological interests with firm stunning demonstration of military power also shows that they are prepared to back up military power also shows that they are prepared to back up their interests with military power..." See Tahir Amin, *Afghanistan Crisis: Implications and Options for Muslim World, Iran, and Pakistan*, (Islamabad: Institute of Policy Studies, 1982), 112.
9. Mujtaba Rizvi, 28-29.
10. *Ibid.*, 29



- Restoration of the independent and non-aligned status of Afghanistan;
- Respect for the right of the Afghan people to determine their own destiny, and to choose their own form of government in accordance with their own wishes, free from external interference; and
- The creation of conditions that would permit the Afghanistan.<sup>11?</sup>

This policy was continued by the civilian regime of Prime Minister Muhammad Khan Junejo. However, after winning a vote of confidence in the National Assembly on 24 March 1985. He especially referred to the Afghanistan crisis and the latest Soviet threat<sup>12</sup> to Pakistan. On the one hand to express fears about the consequences of confronting a super power, and, on the other, hoped to meet the ensuing challenges. In short, he reiterated Pakistan's aforementioned principled stand towards the Afghanistan question without adopting a "confrontationist" stand.<sup>13</sup>

Like other peace-loving nations of the world, Pakistan was in favour of a political solution of the problem of Afghanistan. Therefore, after dropping the Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan as a precondition for talks on the issue, Junejo government formally requested the UN secretary-general to designate his special representative to conduct talks between Pakistan, Iran and Afghanistan as per demand of the UN General Assembly

- 
11. The OIC endorsed the formula through resolution passed in the Eleventh Islamic Foreign Ministers' Conference held in Islamabad in May 1980. President Zia-ul-Haq in his speech before the 35th session of the United Nations General Assembly on 1 October 1980 reiterated the formula. See *Pakistan Horizon*, Karachi, Vol. XXXIII, No. 4, 1980, 8.
  12. The latest Soviet threat to Pakistan was "that Pakistan's continued policy might adversely affect Soviet-Pakistan relations in other spheres, including the economic field". General Zia-ul-Haq stated this in his address to the joint session of the newly elected parliament on 23 March 1985 after his visit to the USSR where he met the new Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev on 14 March 1985. A Soviet spokesman on American television denied that any such warning was given to Pakistan and said that Gorbachev had actually called for an end to "foreign interference", See M. Yusuf Saeed, "Pakistan Foreign Policy - A Quarterly Survey", *Pakistan Horizon*, Karachi, Vol. XXXVIII, No. 2, 1985, 4-5.
  13. *Dawn* Karachi, 25 March 1985.



resolution passed in November 1980.<sup>14</sup> At the same time Pakistan demanded that the talks should be indirect, as it did not recognise the Soviet-backed Kabul regime.

The UN secretary-general, Perez de Cuellar, had appointed Diego Cordovez as his personal representative on Afghanistan in February 1982. Cordovez had undertaken a twelve-day visit to Islamabad, Kabul and Tehran in April of that year and prepared procedures, format and agenda for the proposed talks to be held under UN supervision.

Originally, tripartite talks among Iran, Pakistan and Afghanistan were planned, but the Iranian government declined to enter into any kind of dialogue with the "illegitimate" government of Kabul.<sup>15</sup> Iran also suggested that the representatives of the Afghan resistance groups should also be included in the talks. However, it did not oppose the talks between Pakistan and Afghanistan. Despite Iran's absence, the UN officials kept the Iranian government informed on the progress of the talks.

The first indirect<sup>16</sup> talks<sup>17</sup> under UN auspices began in Geneva on 16 June 1982. The agenda for the talks was:

- Withdrawal of the Soviet troops from Afghanistan;
- Non-intervention and non-interference in Afghanistan's internal affairs;
- International guarantees for non-intervention and non-interference;
- Safe return of refugees to their homes in Afghanistan.<sup>18</sup>

14. Hasan-Askari Rizvi, "Geneva Parleys on Afghanistan", *Pakistan Horizon*, Vol. XXXIX, No. 1, 1986, 77.

15. *Ibid.*, 179.

16. In the talks representatives of Pakistan and Afghanistan did not meet each other across the table, but on the contrary both had separate sessions with UN representatives to present their point of view on different matters. Cordovez played the role of intermediary.

17. The dates of Geneva talks were as follow: Geneva I, 16-25 June 1982; Geneva II, 11-22 April 1983 and 16-24 June 1983; Geneva III, 24-31 August 1984; Geneva IV, 20-25 June 1985; Geneva V, 27-30 August 1984; Geneva VI, 16-19 December 1985; Geneva VII, 5-23 May 1986; 31 July-8 August 1986; 25 February-10 March 1987; 7-10 September 1987 and 2 March-14 April 1988. The dates have been collected from different newspapers.

18. Hasan-Askari Rizvi, 80.



Three rounds of indirect talks had already been held in Geneva before the induction of a civilian government in Pakistan in March 1985. Geneva-IV was scheduled for February 1985, but was postponed due to general elections in Pakistan in the same month. The fifth round was held on 20-25 June 1985. The two sides reviewed the various aspects of the four-point draft agenda, and differed on the time frame for the Soviet withdrawal and the mode of international guarantees. Pakistan demanded early Soviet withdrawal<sup>19</sup> while Moscow and Kabul began to "insist that guarantees, delinked from any programme of Soviet withdrawal, should be given first priority".<sup>20</sup> After detailed consultations with both the parties, Diego Cordovez prepared a revised draft of the proposed agreement, which formed the basis of the fifth round of the Geneva proximity talks.<sup>21</sup>

Geneva-V was scheduled to begin on 27 August 1985. But the talks started two days late due to the stalemate caused by insistence from the Afghan side for holding direct talks between Islamabad and Kabul.<sup>22</sup> The talks proved inconclusive, though some important progress was made. Some sort of understanding was reached on non-interference, international guarantees and the return of Afghan refugees.<sup>23</sup>

The Geneva super powers' summit held in November 1985 contributed in removing the impasse on the question of a timetable for Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan. According to US officials, during the summit, Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev said "he was growing impatient with the drawn-out conflict with the Afghan Mujahideen".<sup>24</sup> US Secretary of State George Shultz also disclosed "the Soviet leader had indicated his willingness to

---

19. *Ibid.*, 85.

20. *Pakistan Horizon*, Karachi, Vol. XXXVIII, No. 2, 1985, 7-8.

21. Hasan-Askari Rizvi, 85.

22. *The Muslim*, Islamabad, 30 August 1985. Also see *Pakistan Horizon*, Karachi, Vol. XXXVIII, No. 3, 1985, 5.

23. Diego Cordovez stated this while commenting on the outcome of the Geneva-V. See, *Pakistan Horizon*, Karachi, Vol. XXXIX, No. 1, 1986, 6-7

24. *Pakistan Horizon*, Karachi, Vol. XXXIX, No. 1, 1986, 6-7



provide a schedule for Soviet troops withdrawal from Afghanistan".<sup>25</sup>

In such a situation, Geneva VI was held on 16-19 December 1985. The talks were supposed to continue till 20 December, but were suspended on the 19th for about two months due to the impasse on the format of the talks. After adjournment of the talks Diego Cordovez presented both the parties with fresh proposals made in the light of the discussions.<sup>26</sup> He said his proposals were "aimed at breaking the wall of distrust that had come to exist between the Pakistani and Kabul delegations" and described the adjournment of the talks as a "recess" to consider his proposals.<sup>27</sup> The main hurdle in the way of an agreement lay in Instrument IV (of the proposed agreement) i.e. disagreement over the time frame of the Soviet pullout from Afghanistan.<sup>28</sup>

The seventh round of the Geneva proximity talks began on 5 May 1986. But the representatives of Islamabad and Kabul failed to develop a consensus over the main issue, the mechanism for Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan. The impasse mainly centred on Pakistan's proposal for a UN supervisory role against any "flouting of the agreement" and Kabul's negation of any "third party involvement" on this issue.<sup>29</sup> Thus the negotiations were heading towards total breakdown. But due to Diego Cordovez' consultations, both the parties agreed to adjourn the talks till 30 July 1986.<sup>30</sup> Geneva VII resumed on 31 July 1986. This time the parties could not agree on the point of Soviet withdrawal and UN's supervisory role thereafter, so the talks were suspended on 8 August.

On the question of a time frame for the Soviet withdrawal, Pakistan took a harder stand. Prime Minister Junejo, during his tour of western countries from 10 July to 23 July, 1986, declared in clear terms that "Pakistan would not agree to a time frame spread over four years for Soviet troops withdrawal that could be done in

---

25. *Ibid.*, 7.

26. Hasan-Askari Rizvi, 86.

27. *Ibid.*

28. *The Muslim*, Islamabad, 21 December 1985.

29. *Pakistan Horizon*, Karachi, Vol.XXXIX, No. 2, 1986, 4.

30. *Ibid.*



four months".<sup>31</sup> The Soviet Union, which favoured a timetable, spread over four years, termed Junejo's proposal as "unrealistic" and aimed at deadlocking the Geneva talks.<sup>32</sup> It also threatened that it would not withdraw its troops from Afghanistan until foreign intervention in Afghanistan was ended.<sup>33</sup>

Such stands from the concerned parties led to another deadlock in the seventh round of the talks. Cordovez, however, denied that there had been any kind of stalemate in the negotiations. To him the absence of a new date for the talks did not mean a deadlock. He disclosed that both the parties were agreed to meet again to find a negotiated settlement. Cordovez asked Islamabad and Kabul to maintain secrecy on the issue of a time frame. He also said "the news items about the four-year time frame of troops' withdrawal, given by the Afghanistan regime, were based on speculations".<sup>34</sup>

Before the start of the third round of Geneva-VII, there came some good gestures from the Soviet Union, which were reciprocated by Pakistan. Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev expressed a desire for normalisation of relations between Pakistan and the Soviet Union during his visit to India in November 1986. Also, while over-flying Pakistani territory he greeted the Pakistan President and hoped that "relations between Soviet Union and Pakistan will develop in the interests of both the countries, strengthening peace, security and good neighbourhood among the states of Asia".<sup>35</sup> President Zia-ul-Haq received the gesture warmly and said, "I fully reciprocate your hope for further development of bilateral relations that would be in the interests of our countries and would serve the cause of regional and global peace".<sup>36</sup> During his visit to India, Gorbachev had said "Soviet Union favoured establishment of good relations with the people of Pakistan". Amidst these friendly overtures, Pakistan's Foreign Secretary Abdus Sattar visited Moscow in December 1986 at the invitation

31. *Morning News* (daily), Karachi, 19 July 1986.

32. *Pakistan Horizon*, Karachi, Vol. XXXIX, No. 3, 1986, 8.

33. *Ibid.*

34. *Ibid.*, 10.

35. *Pakistan Horizon*, Karachi, Vol. XXXIX, No. 4, 1986, 3.

36. *Ibid.*



of the Soviet First Deputy Foreign Minister. He held talks with Soviet Foreign Minister Edward Shevardnadze and First Deputy Foreign Minister Yuli Voronstov.<sup>37</sup> Their talks mainly centred on the time frame for withdrawal of Soviet troops from Afghanistan.<sup>38</sup> As a result of this visit to Moscow, the two sides agreed to develop relations in the spirit of good neighbourliness.

In such a political background the third phase of Geneva-VII was held from 25 February to 10 March 1987. The three instruments of the proposed agreement were already agreed upon.<sup>39</sup> So the discussions centred on the time frame for Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan. The differences between the two parties persisted but "Pakistan reportedly doubled its earlier proposal of three to four months, whereas Kabul came down to eighteen months" timetable for Soviet withdrawal.<sup>40</sup> In such a situation the talks were suspended on 10 March 1987 with hope of their resumption.<sup>41</sup>

The fourth phase of Geneva-VII was held on 7-10 September 1987, after an interval of about six months. The talks were resumed at short notice as a result of a fresh initiative from the Kabul regime. The inspiring factor might have been a positive signal from Moscow. Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister I. Regachev on 25 August 1987 said in Moscow "the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Afghanistan will be set at the next round of Geneva talks".<sup>42</sup> The talks, however, proved inconclusive but there was some advance on the question of time frame of the withdrawal - the only unresolved instrument of the proposed agreement. Both the sides agreed to give concessions of three months in the time frame.<sup>43</sup>

---

37. *Ibid.*

38. *Ibid.*, 4.

39. They were: arrangements for the return of the refugees from Pakistan and Iran, international guarantees for an accord by the Soviet Union and the United States, and non-interference in internal affairs.

40. *Pakistan Horizon*, Karachi, Vol. XL, No. 1, 1987, v.

41. *Dawn*, Karachi, 12 March 1987.

42. *Dawn*, Karachi, 27 August 1987.

43. *Pakistan Horizon*, Karachi, Vol. XL, No. 3, 1987, XIII.



Then the newly raised issue of an interim government in Kabul caused a deadlock. Soviet leader Gorbachev first raised this question on 29 June 1987. He said to the UN Secretary General Perez de Cuellar in Moscow that "the main concern of the USSR was that Afghanistan should have a neutral and independent regime which would not be hostile to the Soviet Union nor indeed to any of its neighbours."<sup>44</sup> In November 1987 the USSR offered a pullout proposal with a time frame of 7 to 12 months provided that a formula of an interim government in Afghanistan could first be agreed upon.<sup>45</sup> But both Pakistan and USA rejected this precondition for a settlement.<sup>46</sup> Ultimately the USSR stopped insisting on the induction of an interim government before the withdrawal of its troops.<sup>47</sup>

President Zia-ul-Haq too had been insisting on the formation of a provisional government in Afghanistan, with equal representation of the Mujahideen, the refugees and the Peoples' Democratic Party of Afghanistan (PDPA), but he never made it a precondition for the Soviet withdrawal.<sup>48</sup> In the meantime, Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev on 8 February 1988 declared that if an agreement was reached at Geneva talks by 15 March 1988 the "Soviets will commence the withdrawal from 15 May 1988". He promised to complete the withdrawal within ten months and not to link with it the proposed formation of a new coalition government.<sup>49</sup> On the other hand President Zia insisted that the main issue was not the Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan but formation of an interim government there. That is why Zia met the Premier Junejo along with some of his most important cabinet members at late night on 27 February 1988 and during that meeting he reportedly warned the Minister of State for Foreign

---

44. Kamal Matinuddin, *Power Struggle in the HinduKush: Afghanistan (1978-1991)*. (Lahore: Wajid Ali, 1991), 199.

45. *Ibid.*

46. *Ibid.*, 199-200.

47. *Ibid.*, 200.

48. *Ibid.*

49. *Ibid.*, 202.



Affairs Zain Noorani, "... if you sign at Geneva in a hurry, you will be lynched by the people".<sup>50</sup>

Meanwhile, as a result of the statement by Gorbachev, the ball was pushed into Pakistan's court. In such a phenomenon the final phase of Geneva talks began on 2 March 1988. Pakistan insisted on the formation of an interim government in Kabul. To resolve the deadlock, the Minister of State for Foreign Affairs, Zain Noorani, left Geneva for Islamabad on 4 March for consultations with the Government of Pakistan. He told newsmen on arrival that "Pakistan has urged the UN mediator, Diego Cordovez, to continue his efforts for formation of a broad based government in Afghanistan as the Soviet Union is still hesitating to settle this issue"<sup>51</sup> Pakistan did not make the formation of a broad-based government in Kabul a precondition for signing the proposed agreement. At the same time it insisted on starting the process for the establishment of an interim government, which process could be continued even after the signing of the agreement?<sup>52</sup>

As a matter of fact Zia-Junejo differences on this issue existed from the very beginning. Perhaps Junejo shared the views of the non-rightist parties who were of the view that Zia was "fanning the Afghanistan dispute to prolong his autocratic rule".<sup>53</sup> That is why Sahabzada Yaqub Khan who was close to Zia was ousted in November 1987 and Junejo, reportedly, instructed the Foreign Office not to send any file to the President.<sup>54</sup> Thus on the question of Afghanistan, particularly on the form of the future political order, there emerged a political crisis within Pakistan. President Zia-ul-Haq insisted on a change of government in Kabul prior to the proposed Soviet withdrawal, while Prime Minister Junejo was ready to sign the accord without that provision in order to facilitate the Soviet withdrawal.<sup>55</sup> In such a situation Junejo wanted to make

---

50. Mushahid Hussain, 248.

51. *Pakistan Horizon*, Karachi, Vol. XLI, No. 2, 1988, 114.

52. *Ibid.*, 116

53. General K. M. Arif, *Working with Zia: Pakistan's Power Politics, 1977-1988* (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 1995), 324,

54. Mushahid Hussain, 248.

55. Robert G. Wirshing, *Pakistan's Security under Zia, 1977-1988: Policy Imperatives of a Peripheral Asian State* (Hampshire: Macmillan Academic & Professional, 1991), 66-67. According to certain sources, Zia-ul-Haq wanted to install Islamic



his hands strong by gaining support of the political parties. Hence, in early march 1988, he called a round table conference on Afghanistan that was perceived by Zia "as a move directed against him".<sup>56</sup> Junejo and Noorani briefed political leaders, including those of nineteen opposition parties. On 6 March 1988, speaking at the concluding session of the conference, Junejo assured the political leaders that their views would be carefully considered before taking any final decision.<sup>57</sup> Then at a three-hour session with a cross-section of the people on 9 March, he said it was too late for Pakistan to have new elements added to the four instruments that were being finalised in Geneva.<sup>58</sup> Addressing another gathering of people from all walks of life in Lahore on 10 March he asked the two super powers to make arrangements for the safe and honourable return of the Afghan refugees to their homeland and to "help in the formation of a government which enjoys the support of the Afghan people".<sup>59</sup> He also denied any difference of opinion with the President on the Afghanistan question.<sup>60</sup> On his part, the President chose to adopt a staff stance on the question of changing the regime in Kabul. In an interview with a Dubai Daily, *The Gulf News*, on 7 March, he said, "There is

---

fundamentalist government in Kabul. For details see Muhammad Ali Khalid, *G.H.Q. Siyasat* (Hyderabad: Masiha Publishers, N.d.), 270.

56. Mushahid Hussain, 248.

57. *Pakistan Horizon*, Karachi, Vol. XLI, No. 2, 1988, 114. The political leaders who participated in the conference were: Ghulam Mustafa Jatoi (National Peoples Party), Ghous Bakhsh Bizenjo (Pakistan National Party), Prof. Sajid Mir (Jami'yat Ahl-e Hadith), Mawlana Shah Ahmed Noorani (Jami'yat Ulama'-i Pakistan) Maulana Fazil Hussain Musavi (Tehrik-e-Nifaz-e-Fiqh-e-Jafria), Nawabzada Nasrullah Khan (Pakistan Democratic Party), Fatehyab Ali Khan (Mazdoor Kisan Party), Maulana Fazalur Rahman (Jami'yat Ulama'-i Islam), Khawaja Khairud Din (Muslim League Khairuddin Group), Qazi Hussain Ahmed (Jamaat-e-Islami), Benazir Bhutto (Pakistan Peoples Party), Malik Mohammad Qasim (Muslim League Qasim Group), Sardar Sherbaz Mazari (National Democratic Party), Abdur Rahim Mandokhel (National Awami Party Pakhtoonkhawa) Air Marshal (Retd.) Asghar Khan (Tehrik-e-Istiqlal). Mawlana Moeenud Din Lakhvi (Markazi Ahl-e Hadith), Rasul Bakhsh Mairaj Muhammad Khan (Qawmi Mahaz-e- A'adi). See, *The Muslim*, Islamabad, 6 March 1988.

58. *Ibid.*, 115.

59. *Ibid.*

60. *Ibid.*, In an interview Mohammad Khan Junejo said that Zia-ul-Haq's wishes regarding the issue were similar to his and the President termed the agreement as "best one". Azhar Sohail, *Sindhri se Ojhri Camp Tak*, (Lahore: Jang Publishers, 1988), 134.



no flexibility in Pakistan's stand on the question of setting up an interim government in Kabul".<sup>61</sup> He too rejected any difference with the Prime Minister and said, "Any decision about the agreement in Geneva will have to be taken by the Prime Minister and his government".<sup>62</sup>

As has been discussed earlier, Junejo was not in favour of raising new issues at this stage of the talks on Afghanistan. So ultimately Pakistan's stand on the formation of an interim government in Afghanistan was sidetracked, and Zain Noorani said in Geneva on 16 March "the issue of formation of an interim government in Kabul and the signature on an accord in Geneva were not linked".<sup>63</sup> This arrangement was not acceptable to the Afghan *Mujahideen*. Their seven-party alliance was not a party to the Geneva deliberations and they made it clear that no agreement without their participation would be acceptable to them. Their aim was to install an impartial Islamic government in Afghanistan.<sup>64</sup> The Government of Pakistan, however, ignored their demands.

Now the only unresolved question was ensuring symmetry in cutting of military aid to the Mujahideen and the Kabul government by the USA and USSR respectively.<sup>65</sup> Prime Minister Junejo was in favour of a negative symmetry on the supply of arms.<sup>66</sup> On 7 April President Zia-ul-Haq informed the National Assembly that the issue of 'arms symmetry' between the USA and the USSR had been eventually resolved paving the way for signing the Geneva Accord.<sup>67</sup>

The Geneva Accord was formally signed on 14 April 1988. It had four instruments:

Instrument-I was signed between Pakistan and Afghanistan it was regarding non-interference and non-intervention in each other's internal affairs.

61. *Pakistan Horizon*, Karachi, Vol. XLI, No. 2, 1988, 114.

62. *Ibid.*

63. *Ibid.*, 9.

64. Ghafoor Ahmad, *General Zia ke Akheri Das Saal*, (Lahore: Jang Publishers, 1993), 380.

65. *Pakistan Horizon*, Karachi, Vol. XLI, No. 2, 1988, 116.

66. Kamal Matinuddin, *op.cit.*, 206-207

67. *Pakistan Horizon*, Karachi, Vol. XLI, No. 3, 133.



Instrument-II was signed between the USA and the USSR; with the two super powers giving guarantees that Pakistan and Afghanistan would not intervene or interfere in each other's internal affairs.

Instrument-III was signed by Pakistan and Afghanistan to facilitate the voluntary return of Afghan refugees.

Instrument-IV: the USSR and Afghanistan signed this for withdrawal of the Soviet forces from Afghanistan with effect from 15 May 1988. Total Soviet withdrawal would be completed within nine months and one half of the total Soviet forces in Afghanistan would leave by 15 August 1988.<sup>68</sup>

President Zia-ul-Haq described the signing of the historic Geneva Peace Accord as a "consequence of the untold miseries suffered by the Afghan people and the supreme sacrifices of life of the brave and valiant Afghan people".<sup>69</sup> He further said, "As a result of their valiant struggle and supreme sacrifices by 12 million people the Soviet Union was forced to an agreement to withdraw its troops from Afghanistan".<sup>70</sup> He emphasised the restoration of a non-aligned, independent and autonomous status for Afghanistan, and was of the view that the formation of a representative government in Afghanistan was necessary to assure early return of Afghan refugees from Pakistan, Iran and elsewhere.<sup>71</sup> Prime Minister Junejo termed 14 April 1988 as "a historic day".<sup>72</sup> He said, "the door for peace, tranquillity and freedom, that we were looking for the last eight years, is today opening and Afghanistan will be free once again".<sup>73</sup>

As a result of the Geneva agreement, only one issue out of the four-point stand of Pakistan and the Muslim world was addressed and that was regarding total Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan. Restoration of its independent and non-aligned status was not

---

68. *The Muslim*, Islamabad, 15 April 1988.

69. The President was talking to a group of Pakistani and foreign newsmen at the *Aiwan-i-Sadr* on 14 April 1988, *Dawn*, Karachi, 15 April 1988.

70. *Ibid.*

71. *Ibid.*

72. The Prime Minister was giving his comments on 14 April 1986 to Pakistan Television on the signing of the Geneva Accord. See, *ibid.*

73. *Ibid.*



immediately possible due to the presence of a puppet regime in Kabul as a result of non-agreement on the question of change of government. In this situation the people of Afghanistan were not allowed to form their own government free from external interference, which was the third point of the principled stand. The presence of the puppet regime remained the primary cause of the continuing Civil War, and as a result necessary conditions for the return of the Afghan refugees in safety and honour could not be possible. Thus the fate of the people and refugees of Afghanistan remained hanging in mid-air. The Geneva Accord, however, eliminated the root cause of the Afghanistan problem by arranging the Soviet withdrawal.