

Pak-Afghan Relations During 1975-77

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In the post 1971 years Pakistan improved its image in foreign relations tremendously. In October 1975, after straight contest with India, Pakistan obtained the Asian seat in the United Nation's Security Council.¹ At the same time it had been able to cultivate friendly ties with the three big powers — the United States, the Soviet Union and China, relations with Bangladesh despite frequent ups and downs, had also improved² though with India, the Delhi Agreement of May 1975 notwithstanding, tensions were still in existence.³ But Pakistan's main worry was Afghanistan, which had been 'getting irresponsible'.⁴ Bhutto considered relations with Afghanistan as 'sad and bad'.⁵ But in spite of Afghan hostility, the Government of Pakistan had occasionally tried to solve the differences with Afghanistan. In February 1975, for instance, when Aziz Ahmed, Deputy Foreign Minister of Pakistan, went to Nepal to attend the funeral ceremonies of the deceased King of Nepal, he met Sardar Mohammad Naim, the brother of President Daud. It became possible through the intercession of Senator Charles Percy of the United States, a friend of Afghanistan. Both the envoys agreed to try to decrease radio propaganda and gradually pave the

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1. *Le Monde* (Paris), 3 February 1976; *Foreign Press Digest*, No.50, 28 February 1976.
2. *Pakistan Times* (Rawalpindi), 15 August 1975.
3. *Pakistan Times*, 20 May 1975.
4. *Washington Post*, 10 March 1975; *Foreign Press Digest*, No. 46, 13 March 1975, p.782.
5. *Foreign Affairs Pakistan*, Vol. II, No. 3, March 1975, pp.17-18.

way for further talks.⁶ This was a big step forward because the propaganda played an important role in deteriorating relations between the two countries. By March 1975; it was reported that preparations were afoot secretly for negotiations at the Secretaries level before a meeting between the two heads of state. But the proposal fell through because of the Afghan preconditions.⁷ Waheed Abdullah, the Afghan Deputy Foreign Minister, declared in New Delhi that Pakistan must first lift the ban on NAP before negotiations could be taken up.⁸ Afghanistan also never stopped saying that it was their 'Islamic, moral and national duty' to support the 'liberation' of the Pakhtoons and Baluchis.⁹

During April 1975, the Pakistan authorities came across ample evidences of Afghan interference inside Pakistan. During the first half of 1975, the army had seized, mainly in Baluchistan and the Frontier approximately six hundred rifles, twenty machine guns, ten grenades and a large quantity of dynamites.¹⁰ Though it was not clear how many of these arms belonged to the local people who simply kept them for self-defence, the discovery created an atmosphere of distrust between the two Governments. When the NAP was banned in February 1975 and its leaders were arrested, Afghanistan expressed its deep anxiety and concern at these events and deplored that Pakistan had taken this extreme action without any proof of the accusations levelled against the party and its leaders.¹¹

Another event, which disturbed the situation, was the outbreak of violence in August 1975, in Panjsher valley,¹² about fifty miles North of Kabul. At the time of the happening several versions of

6. Louis Dupree, 'Towards Representative Government in Afghanistan', *Field Staff Report*, No.1, 1978, p.7.

7. *Dawn* (Karachi), 9 May 1976.

8. *Foreign Affairs Pakistan*, Vol. II, No.3, March 1975, pp.40-41.

9. Radio Kabul, 1800 hours, 19 March 1975, quoted in the 'Feature Service', Associated Press of Pakistan, Karachi, p.2.

10. *Foreign Affairs Pakistan*, Vol. II, No.5, May 1975, p.30.

11. *Kabul Times*, 4 November 1975. Also see Azmat Hayat Khan, *The Durand Line: Its Geo-Strategic Importance* (Islamabad: Area Study Centre, 2000).

12. *New York Times*, 13 August 1975.

the incident were in circulation. The people of Bazark village, for instance, reported to the authorities that bandits had visited their village. Some people were of the view that they were saboteurs from Pakistan who had through Bazark gone South cutting the telephone lines between Bandar Panjsher (entrance to the valley) and Rokhar village.¹³ Yet another version was that it was a clash between the Afghan policemen and smugglers of lapis lazuli.¹⁴ According to Dupree, it was a scattered action involving attacks on police posts at Jalalabad and Naghlu but the main activity centred on the Panjsher and Laghman areas.¹⁵ In his opinion, no more than three hundred insurgents were involved among whom five to six were killed in the action and several others were wounded or taken prisoners. Among those arrested were two former elected members of the lower house of parliament, abolished during the July 1973 revolution. Almost all the insurgents belonged to the conservative religious parties such as the Ikhwanal Muslimin,¹⁶ or were unemployed school graduates or university students. The Afghan Government on its part, blamed Gulbuddin Hikmatyar, the head of Islamic Party, for colluding with the Pakistani intelligence in organizing the Panjsher insurgency.¹⁷ It is true that the religious conservatives were greatly disturbed by Daud's stress on the secular character of his administration and as such were expecting persecution. In all about ninety-three accused were tried by the military tribunals. Among these three were executed and the rest were given various terms of imprisonment. About eighteen were released.¹⁸ Some active members managed to escape to Pakistan. But they maintained contact with the insurgents in Afghanistan.¹⁹ Dupree's analysis of the Panjsher insurgency was that Pakistan had only a minor involvements and that, too, mainly to assess the

13. Dupree, p.2.

14. *New York Times*, 13 August 1975.

15. Dupree, pp.3-4.

16. *Ibid.*

17. M.S. Agwani, 'The Saur Revolution and After', in K.P. Misra (ed.), *Afghanistan in Crisis* (London: N.p., 1981), p.8. Also see Tahir Amin, *Afghanistan Crisis* (Islamabad: N.p., 1982), pp.69-70.

18. Dupree, p.5.

19. *Ibid.*, p.6.

strength of the Daud regime.²⁰ But the Afghan propaganda deliberately inflated the issue. The result was that not only Pakistan and Iran but also the entire Anglo-American block became worried about the possibility of the extension of Soviet influence from Afghanistan to South Asia.²¹ Naturally, therefore, Pakistan promptly denied any involvement in the insurgency.²² Later, the Afghan Government itself began to play down Pakistan's involvement because no positive evidence was available. It would also have amounted to acknowledging their weakness. Besides, the local Panjsheris had denied any outside involvement in the incident.²³ Nevertheless, the revolt had caught the Afghan security forces by surprise and displayed weakness in their command. Subsequently the Afghan authorities changed governors and administrative staff in many provinces.²⁴

The Daud regime, from its very inception, had been plagued by a succession of coups. When Daud took over in July 1973, two other plots were simultaneously being hatched: one by Abdul Wali and the other by Maiwandwal. But Daud acted promptly ahead of schedule in order to pre-empt a move by Abdul Wali.²⁵ In August 1973, Mohammad Hashim Maiwandwal made his move but it was too late. Then in September 1975, shortly after the Panjsher crisis, a third plot against the Government was unearthed when forty leftist officers from the 14th Armoured Division were arrested.²⁶ This unnerving experience made the ruling junta insecure. Daud felt threatened from both the left and the right who were, under the inspiration of the super powers, trying to create all sorts of problems for him. Even more worrying for him was the fact that the extreme left *Sho'la-i Javed* had joined hands with the extreme

20. *Ibid.*

21. *Pakistan Times* (Rawalpindi), 30 September 1975.

22. *New York Times*, 13 August 1975. Also see *Foreign Affairs Pakistan*, Vol. II, No.9, September 1975, p.51.

23. Dupree, p.6.

24. *Le Monde*, 7 October 1975, *Foreign Press Digest*, No.289, 18 October 1975, p.3306.

25. Dupree, 'A Note on Afghanistan: 1974', *Field Staff Report*, XVII, No. 8, September 1974, p.3.

26. Dupree, 'Towards Representative Government in Afghanistan', p.2.

right Muslim brotherhood against the Government.²⁷ Gradually, however, Daud was able to gather strength and in the end dissociated himself from the left. One by one he replaced his radical ministers with his own relatives or former royalists. He also abandoned those young Parchamite civil servants whom he had sent to the provinces to implement his policies. According to Beverley Male, Daud's honeymoon with the Parchamites was a temporary phenomenon born of expediency. He called it off when the position was secure enough.²⁸ In doing so he established a new party called, The National Revolutionary Party,²⁹ and tried to impose a one party system in Afghanistan. Eventually, Daud was just another autocrat.³⁰ All political activities were banned. The Central Committee of ten military and civil personalities, who were the founding members of the Republic, was reduced to the status of rubber stamps. Daud himself took all decisions.³¹ He occupied the position of President, Prime Minister and Minister of Foreign Affairs and Defence. There was no sharing of power. He removed, dismissed, imprisoned or executed officials at will. Many fled to Pakistan and Iran.³² Those who were left in Afghanistan in the hope of keeping their positions of power were afraid to protest. There was 'no freedom of expression, academically, politically or for the press'.³³ The economic conditions, despite generous economic aid from the Soviet Union and Iran, had deteriorated. Dissatisfaction arose every where. The situation was no different from what it had been since the overthrow of monarchy.

The growing political vacuum around Daud was cause of welcome relief for Pakistan for it was accompanied by a change in Afghan foreign policy. Simultaneously, with his purge of the

27. *Patriot* (New Delhi), 14 September 1975.

28. Beverley Male, *Revolutionary Afghanistan* (London: N.p., 1982), pp.55-57.

29. Alvin Z. Rubinstein, 'Coexistence: Soviet-Afghan Relations, 1963-1978', *Middle East Journal*, XXXVI, No.2, Spring 1982, p.176.

30. *Washington Post*, 26 November 1975, *Foreign Press Digest* No.287, 1 December 1975, p.3291.

31. *Le Monde*, 3 February 1976. *Foreign Press Digest*, No.50, 28 February 1976.

32. Tahir Amin, 'Two years of Afghan Resistance', *Pakistan Journal of Social Sciences*, VII, Nos. 1 and 2, January-July-December 1981, p.78.

33. Dupree, 'Towards Representative Government in Afghanistan', p.2.

Parchamists, Daud had moved 'to disengage his government from the Soviet embrace'.³⁴ To some extent Iran's financial aid for various industrial and developmental projects in Afghanistan had cut down the Afghan dependence on the Soviet Union. There was also pressure from other Muslim countries. Because of their insistence, Daud Khan, by 1975, had begun to defuse the Pakhtoonistan issue and improve relations with Pakistan.³⁵ Now, Daud began to send Afghan military personal for training to India, Egypt and United States instead of the Soviet Union.³⁶ Relations with China also became more cordial. Already in December 1974, Mohammad Naim Khan had visited Beijing, which led to the signing of a new technical and economic cooperation agreement between China and Afghanistan.³⁷ Obviously, friendship with the Muslim world and China brought Afghanistan nearer to Pakistan. This became evident in late 1975, when in the United Nations General Assembly session, the speeches of both the Afghan and Pakistan delegates, by the standard of recent years were unusually mild and conciliatory.³⁸ The result was that Bhutto, in his address to the nation, offered to reopen negotiations with Afghanistan to settle the disputes.³⁹ A further gesture of goodwill was visible when in March-April 1976, a massive earthquake struck Northern Afghanistan and floods swept throughout most of the low land area. Pakistan immediately extended help of more than one million dollars worth of food and other supplies. Additional aid amounted to some four million dollars and 2,000 tons of rice to the victims.⁴⁰ In April 1976, Bhutto, during his visit to Quetta, again extended

34. Richard Newell, *The Struggle for Afghanistan* (Ithaca: N.p., 1981), p.49.

35. Newell, *The Struggle for Afghanistan*, 49 and Kuldip Nayar, *Report on Afghanistan* (New Delhi: N.p., 1981), p.126.

36. Rosemary Foot, 'Changing Pattern of Afghanistan's Relations with its Neighbours', *Asian Affairs*, XI, February 1980, 57. Also see S. Iftikhar Hussain, *Some Major Pakhtoon Tribes Along the Pak-Afghan Border* (Peshawar: Area Study Centre, 1990).

37. *Dawn*, 4 January 1975.

38. *Washington Post*, 26 November 1975, *Foreign Press Digest*, No. 287, 3 December 1975, p.3294.

39. *Foreign Affairs Pakistan*, Vol.II, No.12, December 1975, pp.6-8.

40. *Ibid.* No.4, April 1976, pp.30-31.

sincerest feelings of friendship for the people of Afghanistan.⁴¹ In return the Afghan Government publicly acknowledged and appreciated the help from Pakistan.⁴² In May 1976, when Pakistan experienced severe floods, the Afghan's reciprocated by extending help in the form of gifts and relief supplies worth dollars 50,000. This was highly appreciated in Pakistan.⁴³ During the Indian Prime Minister, Indira Gandhi's visit to Kabul in July 1976, Daud again expressed his thanks and feelings of goodwill towards Pakistan.⁴⁴

By all events, Pakistan and Afghanistan coaxed by friendly countries and natural calamities were coming closer to each other. Damaging propaganda through the media against each other had stopped. Speeches of Afghan officials at international forums had become subdued and there was now hardly any mention of Kabul's outstanding issues with Islamabad. For instance, Waheed Abdullah, the Afghan Deputy Foreign Minister, while speaking at the Istanbul Conference of Foreign Minister of Islamic Countries, did not make any mention of Kabul's problems with Islamabad.⁴⁵ It was for the first time that no controversy or difference of opinion between the Pakistan and the Afghan delegates had occurred at a major conference. This augured well for a proposed summit between Bhutto and Daud. Aziz Ahmed and Waheed Abdullah who met in Istanbul during the Islamic Foreign Ministers Conference prepared the ground.⁴⁶ Though in October 1975, Afghanistan had refused to accept Bhutto's offer of cultural exchanges,⁴⁷ Kabul had begun to take a soft line. Apart from the domestic pressures and coaxing from the Islamic world there were other reasons also for the Afghan shift in policy. Daud knew that the Pakistan army was superior to his own which was only a quarter of its size and not as well equipped for war.⁴⁸ Moreover,

41. *Pakistan Times* (Rawalpindi), 9 May 1976.

42. *Mashriq* (Lahore), 7 July 1976.

43. *New York Times*, 19 August 1976.

44. Dupree, 'Towards Representative Government in Afghanistan', p.7.

45. See the text of his speech in, *The Afghanistan Republic Annual-1977*, pp.144-149.

46. *Pakistan Times* (Lahore), 9 May 1976.

47. *Ibid.*

48. Alvin Z. Rubinstein, 'Coexistence: Soviet-Afghan Relations 1963-1978', p.170.

Pakistan's action against the NAP and the Supreme Court's decision that the action was entirely legal weakened the Afghan case for interference. Above all, Moscow had increasingly begun to take a friendlier attitude towards Pakistan and gave little encouragement to Afghanistan in its bellicose policies. During his visit to Afghanistan in November 1975, President Podgorny had publicly emphasized the need for peace in the region and amicable solution of the problems between Pakistan, Afghanistan and India. Daud was a realist enough to know that without the Soviet backing he had no case for a fight.⁴⁹ Then there was pressure from the Muslim world, particularly from Saudi Arabia, Iran, Libya and Turkey. The last but not the least, the Algiers Accord of March 1975, between Iran and Iraq, whereby the latter had ended its support for greater Baluchistan had its repercussion on Afghanistan. The Afghan Government, too, was compelled to disassociate itself from Baluchistan.⁵⁰ Afghanistan appeared to be moving towards a genuine non-alignment.⁵¹

Thus, in the broad context of efforts for detente in Asia, the Pak-Afghan rapprochement appeared to be part of a welcome trend. It could help in solving problems between other countries in the region, like Indo-Pak relations. Like other Asian countries Pakistan and Afghanistan, too, could have settled their conflicts with each other and move on to concentrate on their internal problems. Indeed, the ice was broken,⁵² in June 1976 when a direct contact was established between the two countries at the highest level. On 7 June, Bhutto arrived in Kabul which contributed to the growth of mutual confidence and amity. To avoid misunderstanding, the press and radio comments from both sides were virtually identical, as both had agreed beforehand to issue joint press releases.⁵³ It was also decided that no joint communiqué

49. *Ibid.*

50. Shirin Tahir Kheli, 'Iran and Pakistan: Cooperation in an Area of Conflict', *Asian Survey*, XVII, No.5, May 1977, p.484.

51. Pervaiz Iqbal Cheema, 'The Afghanistan Crisis', *Islamic Defence Review*, Vol.V, No.2, July 1980, p.12.

52. *New York Times*, 27 October 1976.

53. Dupree, 'Towards Representative Government in Afghanistan', p.8

would be issued at the end of the visit and no banquet speeches would be made.⁵⁴ Bhutto's entourage consisted of Aziz Ahmed, Minister of State for Foreign Affairs and Defence, Agha Shahi, Foreign Secretary, Arshad Ali, Pakistan's Ambassador to Afghanistan, Yusuf Buch, Special Assistant to the Prime Minister and S. Shahnawaz, Additional Foreign Secretary. Sardar Mohammad Naim, Foreign Minister, Mohammad Hassan Safq, First Deputy Prime Minister, Syed Abdullah Hirah, Second Deputy Prime Minister and Waheed Abdullah, Deputy Foreign Minister assisted the Afghan Prime Minister.⁵⁵ Between 7 and 11 June, Bhutto and Daud twice met privately. Both sessions lasted for about two and a half hours. The official meeting between the two Prime Ministers and their advisors took place on 10 June 1976.⁵⁶ Both sides emphasized the need of resolving the differences through peaceful means. As reported by *Patriot*, the talks were wide ranging, covering all aspects of Pak-Afghan relations.⁵⁷ This presumably meant that problems such as Pakhtoonistan, the Baluchistan insurrection the action against the NAP and its leaders all came under review. The Afghan Government had already shown restraint with regard to the Pakistan Supreme Courts decision to legalize the outlawing of the NAP.⁵⁸ The Afghan leadership seemed to have pressed for the restoration of normalcy in Baluchistan and the Frontier. Pakistan Government was also requested to take steps, to stop the continued influx of refugees from Baluchistan to Afghanistan. Bhutto, on his part, pleaded for time, because it was difficult to take any drastic steps due to the delicate balance he was holding with regard to the army, Bhutto wanted to defuse the political situation and create a climate whereby his talks with the NAP leadership were accepted without much opposition by the military.⁵⁹

54. *Ibid.*

55. *Pakistan Times* (Rawalpindi), 8 June 1976.

56. *Pakistan Times* (Rawalpindi), 8 June 1976. Also see Dupree, 'Towards Representative Government in Afghanistan', p.8.

57. *Patriot*, 18 June 1976.

58. Dupree, 'Towards Representative Government in Afghanistan', p.8.

59. *Patriot*, 18 June 1976.

Discussion on such issues as the resumption of air links, promotion of trade and transit traffic through Pakistan and easing of border restrictions was not held. However, certain follow-up steps such as better and liberal transit facilities were approved.⁶⁰

Contrary to earlier announcements, a joint communiqué was issued simultaneously from Kabul and Islamabad at the end of the visit, which incidentally, had to be extended by one day.⁶¹ The two sides agreed to refrain from hostile propaganda against each other.⁶² For the first time Pakistan admitted that political differences were in existence between the two countries. The Afghans agreed to solve the political differences within the spirit of the five principles of 1955 Bandung Conference.⁶³ The five principles were: to respect each other's territorial integrity and sovereignty, mutual non-aggression, mutual non-interference in each other's internal affairs, equality and mutual benefit and peaceful co-existence. The word Paktoonistan was not mentioned during the talks.⁶⁴

Daud maintained that 'Afghanistan had no territorial ambitions against Pakistan and that Kabul did not wish to see further disintegration of Pakistan'.⁶⁵ But many Pakistanis did not take Daud's assurances as reliable. It was pointed out in some circles that similar promises by King Zahir Shah to Ayub Khan in 1960 had not been honoured.⁶⁶ It was also apparent from the communiqué that no dramatic breakthrough had been achieved in bilateral relations.⁶⁷ And yet, Pakistan newspapers hailed the summit as rewarding.⁶⁸ Daily *Dawn*, Karachi, of 13 June 1976 for instance, editorially called it an important landmark in Pak-Afghan

60. *Kabul Times*, 5 June 1976.

61. *The Afghanistan Republic Annual-1977*, p.68.

62. *Morning News*, 12 June 1976.

63. Dupree, 'Towards Representative Government in Afghanistan', p.8.

64. *Kabul Times*, 13 June 1976.

65. *Morning News*, 12 June 1976.

66. Salamet Ali, 'Kabul Warns to an Old Enemy', *Far Eastern Economic Review*, IXIII, No.31, July 1976, p.23.

67. *The Afghanistan Republic Annual-1977*, p.68.

68. *Morning News*, 13 June 1976.

Relations. It was thought that the summit was the beginning of a dialogue which might in due course of time change the whole pattern of inter-state relationship in South Asia.⁶⁹ *The Pakistan Times* called it a significant step in the direction of peace and friendship between the two countries.⁷⁰ The same paper opined that Bhutto and Daud had breathed some warmth into the frosty relations between the two countries. It was a diplomatic gesture unthinkable a year ago.⁷¹ Even the Afghan Foreign Minister, in an interview to BBC reporter Andrew Whitley, gloated that the summit had inaugurated an era of goodwill and confidence.⁷²

The relations between Pakistan and Afghanistan were further strengthened when on 21 August 1976 Daud, after attending the fifth non-aligned Summit at Colombo, stopped in Pakistan for an official visit. He was visiting Pakistan after twenty long years. Therefore, impartial observers attached high hopes to the event. The Afghan delegation consisted of Waheed Abdullah, Deputy Foreign Minister, Abdul Samad Ghaus, Director General Afghan Foreign Ministry, Rahim Sherzoy Afghan Charge d' Affaires in Pakistan, Mohammad Gul Jahangir, Director Afghan Foreign Ministry, Abdul Abad Nasir, Deputy Chief of the Foreign Minister's Office and an eight-member team of newsmen. Bhutto was assisted by Aziz Ahmed, Minister of State for Defence and Foreign Affairs, Agha Shahi, Foreign Secretary, S. Shahnawaz, Additional Foreign Secretary, Ali Arshad, Pakistan's Ambassador to Afghanistan and A.A. Farooqi, Director General in Ministry of Foreign Affairs.⁷³

The talks were held in Islamabad, Lahore and Murree in an atmosphere of 'frankness and understanding'. But both sides maintained a 'cautious attitude', because they did not want 'even a small dent', which might harm the efforts towards normalization.⁷⁴ Both leaders were very brief in their banquet speeches. Daud laid

69. *Dawn*, 13 June 1976.

70. *Pakistan Times* (Rawalpindi), 12 June 1976.

71. *Ibid.*

72. *The Afghanistan Republic Annual-1977*, p.218.

73. *Pakistan Times* (Rawalpindi), 25 August 1976.

74. Dupree, 'Towards Representative Government in Afghanistan', p.9.

stress on the fact that Pakistan and Afghanistan had no other path than the path of friendship. He emphasised that the Afghan goodwill for Pakistan and concern for its prosperity was not merely a part of worldly relationship, but was inherent in the ties of Islamic brotherhood and any contrary sentiment between the two peoples was unnatural.⁷⁵ Bhutto, on his part, declared that 'no matter what the mutual difference, there never was and never will be any enmity between the peoples of the two countries... the hard reality of their physical proximity was bound to bring them closer together'.⁷⁶ He expressed the hope that 'once our differences... are resolved we know that many vistas will open up for the betterment of both people'.⁷⁷

The four day visit ended on 24 August after reaffirming the communiqué of 11 June. The talks, as the new communiqué stated, 'formed part of the continuing dialogue to find an honourable solution to their political and other differences'.⁷⁸ It was stated that the final session would resume at Kabul at the highest level. Bhutto was invited to visit Kabul for the final settlement. The invitation was accepted with pleasure.⁷⁹ Before he left Islamabad for home, Daud described the talks as useful.⁸⁰ Both leaders acknowledged that the issues dividing the two countries were of long standing and of a serious nature and that it would be unrealistic to expect them to be resolved instantly. According to Kuldip Nayar, Bhutto and Daud had decided to bury the Pakhtoonistan issue once and for all and had signed a secret agreement to that effect. Under the arrangement, Pakistan was to hold a plebiscite in its Pushto-speaking areas. Daud assured Bhutto that he would accept the 'verdict' on behalf of the Afghan Government.⁸¹ It was reported that the draft agreement called for provincial autonomy for the

75. Nawa-i-Waqt (Rawalpindi), 24 August 1976. Also see *The Afghanistan Republic Annual-1977*, pp.103-106.

76. *Pakistan Times* (Rawalpindi), 26 August 1976.

77. Dupree, 'Towards Representative Government in Afghanistan', p.9.

78. *Pakistan Times* (Rawalpindi), 26 August 1976.

79. *Ibid.* Also see, *The Afghanistan Republic Annual-1977*, p.101.

80. *Dawn*, 26 August 1976.

81. Kuldip Nayar, *Report on Afghanistan*, p.126.

NWFP and Baluchistan in exchange for 'simultaneous recognition by Afghanistan of the Durand Line as the permanent border between the two countries'.⁸² Bhutto also later confirmed that the Afghans had agreed to recognize the Durand Line as the frontier between the two countries and thus bury the Pakhtoonistan issue provided Pakistan freed the Pathan and Baluchi leaders.⁸³

The final shape to the decisions at the talks was given on a 'give-and-take' basis. Though an atmosphere of mutual amity and understanding seems to have developed but there were still certain issues which had remained vague and undefined. The foremost among these were the 'Pakhtoonistan' and the 'Durand Line' issues. However, Kuldip Nayar and Michael Richardson have referred to a secret agreement which they think had been reached between the two heads of state on their controversial issues. The Afghans were reported to recognise the Durand Line as the permanent border between the two countries but in return demanded a plebiscite in the Pushto-speaking areas and the release of the Pathan and Baluchi leaders who had been jailed by Pakistan. If this be true then two of the trickiest and the long standing issues between Pakistan and Afghanistan had almost been settled. This would naturally have had its impact on the internal situation resulting in the improvement of Bhutto's relations with the Opposition leaders. But this did not happen. Therefore, the reliability of Nayar's and Richardson's information is in doubt. However, there is no denying the fact that after the talks the pace of Wali Khan's trial was slowed down. It seems that both the Governments were cautious in their moves perhaps in line with the spirit of the 11 June communiqué.

The impact of the second summit on Pak-Afghan relations was evident from the calm and quiet that ensued along the Khyber Pass. All tension seemed to have vanished. One major result was that the Pakhtoonistan Day, which had always been celebrated in Afghanistan on August 31 with great fan-fare and anti-Pakistan

82. Michael Richardson, 'Breaking the Territorial Ice', *Far Eastern Economic Review*, C 1, No.39, September 1978, p.31.

83. Anwar Syed, 'Pakistan and Its Neighbourhood, Pressure and Politics', *International Security Review*, IV, No.4, winter 1979-80, p.412.

speeches 'fell flat after Daud's trip in 1976'.⁸⁴ The crowds were small and subdued. Ghulam Sakhi Nourzed, the Mayor of Kabul in his keynote address emphasized the talks between Daud and Bhutto and the good will that they had generated.⁸⁵

In the months that followed Afghanistan refrained from any negative comments on the events in Pakistan in late 1976, especially with regard to the affairs of Dir and Wana. Some efforts were also made towards giving effect to the decisions reached at the Summit. The air services, which had been suspended in 1974, were resumed after an agreement signed in Kabul.⁸⁶ Time and again Daud and Bhutto reassured each other that they were sincere in their efforts. In January 1977, Daud, in his speech to the Loya Jirgah, once again affirmed that the exchange of views 'makes us hopeful of reaching an honourable solution to our political disputes'. He added that whether a final settlement was reached or not, the agreement to end 'hostile propaganda' against each other was reflective of the desire on both sides 'that this main dispute be ended'.⁸⁷ Similar sentiments were also expressed in Pakistan. Answering a question in the National Assembly, Bhutto on 28 March 1977, expressed his confidence in the words of Daud and stressed that Afghanistan had stopped interfering in Pakistan's internal affairs.⁸⁸

By spring 1977, however, the situation in Pakistan had become tense owing to the political activity following the announcement of general elections in the country. Bhutto had made his decision to go to the polls in March in the hope that he would win a two-third majority. Before the elections he undertook a whirlwind tour of the country appealing to the masses to vote for his party. When the results came the PPP was declared to have won as many as 126 out of the 200 seats in the National Assembly.

84. Dupree, 'Towards Representative Government in Afghanistan', p.9.

85. *Ibid.*

86. *New York Times*, 2 March 1977.

87. Shahid Javed Burki, *State and Society of Pakistan 1971-77*, (London: N.p., 1980), pp.195-198.

88. *New York Times*, 3 February 1977. Also see Kuldip Nayar, *Report on Afghanistan*, p.126.

Among these 19 candidates had been returned unopposed. Some 8 candidates had also aligned themselves with the PPP. The PNA opposition obtained only 29 seats.⁸⁹ Because of the disproportionate results the Opposition leaders alleged that the Government had resorted to massive riggings in the elections, and, therefore, refused to accept the results. They also boycotted the provincial elections.⁹⁰ On 16 April 1977, Bhutto had an emergent Cabinet meeting and decided to negotiate with the Opposition in an attempt to end the deepening political crisis. But the Opposition, thinking perhaps that the moment was ripe for a successful agitation, disdainfully turned aside his overtures. Subsequently, they staged violent protest marches in various parts of the country in support of their demand that Bhutto should resign and had re-elections under military supervision.⁹¹ In retaliation Bhutto increased repression. Martial law was imposed in Karachi, Lahore and Hyderabad where the demonstrators had killed many people and otherwise life had come to a standstill. On 13 May, Bhutto announced that he would hold a referendum to decide whether he should remain in power or resign. But the Opposition refused to accept the proposal.⁹² In July, Bhutto put forward a plan for fresh elections but the Central Council of the PNA turned it down as unacceptable.⁹³ A workable formula might have been found but on 5 July, the armed forces under General Zia-ul Haq, Chief of the Army Staff, seized power, dismissed the Bhutto Government and dissolved the National Assembly. The constitution was held in abeyance and martial law imposed throughout the country.

89. Nearly 16 seats reserved for women and minorities had yet to be filled. *National Assembly Debates*, Government of Pakistan, 28 March 1977.

90. *New York Times*, 8 March 1977.

91. *Pakistan Times* (Rawalpindi), 15 April 1977.

92. *Ibid.* 12 May 1977. Also see, Burki, *State and Society in Pakistan*, pp.199-200.

93. *New York Times*, 2 July 1977.