

## ***British Policy in Tribal Areas: A Case Study of Waziristan.***

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British involvement in the North West Frontier began with the First Anglo Afghan War. In 1938 Afghanistan was invaded and a new *Amir* was placed upon the throne. It was believed in Calcutta and London that the existing regime had entered into secret negotiations with Russia. Kabul and Qandahar were captured without difficulty, and an Indian Army remained in Afghanistan as an Army of occupation. During the winter of 1841-2 the Kabul garrison abandoned their encampment outside the city in the face of mass revolt. Twelve thousand soldiers and followers began the hazardous march eastwards to the nearest British Indian Garrison at Jalalabad. The column had to negotiate a succession of mountain passes in treacherous winter conditions. Day after day Afghan tribesmen gradually destroyed the Army of Kabul. Only a handful of soldiers and civilians were taken prisoners. A single horseman, Dr. Brydon rode into Jalalabad to tell of his comrades' fate.<sup>1</sup>

From 1849 till 1887 the British adopted the policy of non-interference towards the tribal areas. Their advanced posts remained stationary. They held Bannu and Dera Ismail Khan under their regular troops while established their advanced posts along the Waziristan foot-hills, and conducted occasional military expeditions into the tribal area, followed by withdrawal. From 1879 to 1881 the British Government instituted a blockade of the

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1 Alan Warren, *Waziristan The Faqir of Ipi and The Indian army* (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 2000), p.xx Rai Bahadur Diwan Chand Obrai, *The Evolution of the North West Frontier Province*, (Peshawar: 1983), pp.55-56.

Mahsuds, which was not successful.<sup>2</sup> In 1887, the Government of India informed the Punjab Government that:

the time has arrived when it becomes of extreme importance that an effort be made to bring under control, and if possible to organize, for purpose of defense against external aggression, the great belt of independent tribal territory which lies along with our North West Frontier, and which has hitherto been allowed to remain a formidable barrier against ourselves.<sup>3</sup>

The emphasis at this moment was one of security, which meant the peace of the border and, in a wider sense, the defense of India. The peace of border required that the hills of Waziristan should provide neither a base for raids into the settled districts of Kohat, Bannu, Dera Ismail Khan and the Punjab nor a safe refuge for offenders from these settled districts. As far as the strategic defense of India was concerned, the British wanted to secure at least the neutralization, and if possible the co-operation of the tribesmen in the time of war. Their nuisance value if they were against the British in the event of war reaching the North West Frontier was obvious. It was equally clear that the fewer were locked up on purely local problems, the better.<sup>4</sup>

From 1887 to 1898 Policy in the forward direction replaced the Policy of non-interference during the viceroy ship of Lansdowne and Elgin. This policy was also supported by Lord Roberts and along with other certain prominent civil administrators.<sup>5</sup> In 1890 Sir Robert Sandeman whose Policy of Penetration and control through the tribes themselves was very successful in Baluchistan, made his first attempt at the solution of the Waziristan Problem on similar lines by negotiations with the Mahsuds and Wazir clans for the opening of the Gomal Pass.<sup>6</sup> But his arrangements failed to provide positive results.

In 1893 the negotiations between Sir Mortimer Durand and the Amir of Afghanistan resulted in the drawing of the Durand Line,

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2 Memorandum by His Excellency the Viceroy on Frontier Policy - 1939, T.R.C. Peshawar, p.4; see also IOR L/P and S/12/3265.

3 *Ibid.*

4 File No.4/89, F.R., Notes by O.K. Caroe, Resident in Waziristan on Policy in Waziristan, 29/1/42, T.R.C. Peshawar, p.1.

5 Arthur Swinson, *North West Frontier*, (London: 1969), pp.300-1.

6 Richard Issaq Bruce, *The Forward Policy and its Results*, (London: 1900), pp. 172-205.

and the same time gave birth to various problems and difficulties. The line for the first time established the respective spheres of responsibility in the ill-controlled territory lying between British administered frontier and the area under full control of the Amir.<sup>7</sup>

Between 1893 and 1897 further departure from the policy of non-interference took place in Waziristan. At the request of their Wazir and Daur inhabitants, the British Government occupied the Wana plain and the Tochi Valley.<sup>8</sup> Elsewhere in the frontier the British had a little earlier, occupied the Samana heights in 1890-91 in the first instance. This occupation had placed the British in a position to effectively control any tribal rising in Orakzai territory; the Kurram Valley was taken over, at the request of the Turis, in 1892; and in 1895 the British decided to retain a garrison in Chitral.<sup>9</sup>

In the light of the general tribal rising of 1897, which followed the British establishment at Wana, and the rising in the Tochi Valley in 1894-95 which rapidly spread from Tochi to Swat, the Mohmand area, the Orakzai and the Afridis, the question of Frontier Policy was exhaustively reviewed by the Government of India.<sup>10</sup>

### **Lord Curzon's Policy (1899)**

In June 1899 the whole matter was further reviewed by Lord Curzon, with particular reference to the military occupation of Tochi and Wana. He urged that the reason for holding Tochi and Wana by regular troops had no longer existed. Time had clearly proved that it was not a feasible line of advancement for the regular troops into Afghanistan. He accepted, on the other hand, that British position in the Tochi along their forces at Wana gave them some control over the Mahsuds. Apart from that there was the political argument that as the Daur and Wazir had been taken

7 *Ibid.*, pp. 261-62; see also Eknath Easwarans, *A Man to Match his Mountains: Badshah Khan, Non-violent Soldier of Islam*, (California: 1985), p.48. See Appendix 3, "The Durand Line Agreement."

8 File No.31/33 F.R.P., T.R.C. Peshawar.

9 Woosman Mills, *The Pathan revolts in North West India*, (Lahore: 1979), pp.134-40; see also Caroe, *The Pathans* (Karachi: 1986), pp.380-81; Elgin Papers, Correspondence with England (1895), No.51, IOL. Private letter.

10 Memorandum by His Excellency the Viceroy on the Frontier Policy, p.5.

over by the British and as the former were actually paying revenue, the British protection of them could not abruptly be withdrawn. Lord Curzon strongly urged the withdrawal of regular troops so far as possible to cantonments in rear, and the maintenance of frontier posts such as those in the Tochi and Wana, and in the Khyber and Kurram by militia.<sup>11</sup> Tribal levies of any sort, he regarded as without value. He opined:

It is of course inevitable that in the course of time the whole Wazir country up to the Durand line will come more and more under our control. No policy in the world can resist or greatly retard that consummation. My desire is to bring it about by gradual degrees and above all without the constant aid and presence of the British troops.<sup>12</sup>

### **Creation of N.W.F.P. in 1901**

Consequent on Lord Curzon's memorandum the North and South Waziristan militia were formed in 1899 and they gradually replaced the troops in the Tochi and Wana. Two years later in 1901, came a change of great importance affecting the political control, when the present North West Frontier Province was separated from the Punjab, and transferred together with the problem of its tribal areas, to the charge of a Chief Commissioner serving directly under the Government of India.<sup>13</sup> In 1908 the Secretary of State refused assent to a proposal by the Government of India after the Zakka Khel expedition to occupy the Bazar valley permanently, and reaffirmed the policy of non-interference.<sup>14</sup>

### **The First World War and Waziristan**

The tribes did not fail to turn the British pre-occupation with the Great War to advantage on various occasions during the war. The conclusion of the war quickly followed by the outbreak of the

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11 Swinson, *op.cit.*, p.301.

12 Milan Hauner, "One Man against the Empire: The Faqir of Ipi and the British in Central Asia on the eve of and during the Second World War" in *The Second World War*. ed. Walter Laqueur, (London: n.p.), p.376; see also Swinson, *op.cit.*, p.307.

13 Akbar S. Ahmad, *Resistance and Control in Pakistan*, (London and New York: 1991), pp.29-35; see also Stephen Alan Rittenberg, *Ethnicity, Nationalism and the Pakhtuns: The Independence Movement in India's North-West Frontier Province*, Ph.D Thesis, Columbia University, 1983, Chapter:2, p.2.

14 Memorandum by His Excellency the Viceroy, pp.6-7.

third Afghan war, from which the British emerged on terms much less satisfactory than she could have wished. The militia arrangements initiated by Lord Curzon in 1899, which held the field with great success for years broke down.<sup>15</sup> In 1919, the British concluded a not wholly satisfactory peace followed by a further in 1921, with Afghanistan. Between 1919-1922 the question of the future policy to be adopted in Waziristan became of great moment.<sup>16</sup> The outcome was the policy of 1922, which became the basis of the British policy later on.

### Terms of the Policy of 1922

The main terms of the policy were:

- a. The locations of strong forces in one or more central dominating positions in Waziristan;
- b. construction of a system of metalled roads interconnected with one another and with British India;
- c. disposition at nodal points along these roads of posts to be held by scouts irregular, all Pushtuns;
- d. but non-local forces with British Officers;
- e. employment of a large number of local tribesmen, called *Khassadars* along with their own arms; E. grant of increased allowances to recompense the tribes for the various responsibilities imposed on them and for the increased facilities required in their country, and to consolidate the position of the tribal *Maliks*.<sup>17</sup>

The construction of these roads was intended to enable columns from Razmak, Bannu and Manzai by the use of mechanical transport to reach various points in the country where trouble might threaten, and to carry relief to any scout post which might be beleaguered by a tribal *Lashkar* beyond the power of the scout themselves to deal with.

The main function of the scouts was to maintain political control and to prevent raiding. The effective discharge of their

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15 James W. Spain, *Pathan Borderland*, (Karachi: 1985), pp.150-51.

16 CH. Phillips, H.L. Singh and Dr. N.B. Panday, *The Evolution of India and Pakistan*, (London: 1962), pp.491-94; see also Sir George Macmun, *The Romance of the Indian Frontiers*, (Quetta: 1978), pp.259-60.

17 Official History of Operations on the N.W. Frontier of India 1920-35. MGS-014 (N)/750 Government of India Press, New Delhi, pp.15-16.

duties in normal times was held to be best fulfilled by constant and vigorous patrolling sufficient enough to over-come any raiding gangs likely to be encountered.<sup>18</sup>

As regards the Khassadars, the intention was that they should be the agency through which the tribes might be enabled to discharge the obligations they had undertaken and should develop into a sort of tribal police. In addition they should also be an agency for peaceful penetration and the extension of Government's influence in the remoter parts of the tribal territory.<sup>19</sup>

To gain these objectives the British Government initiated a series of agreements with the major tribes of Waziristan. These agreements enabled the Government to construct and use roads for military purposes.<sup>20</sup> In addition, she could establish check posts in the area where needed. The tribes were given allowances and *Khassadari* in reward of these agreements. They had also to give guarantee of safety to all passengers passing through the area; no shelter would be given to outlaws from British territory.<sup>21</sup>

In 1922, in return for a further and large increase of Madda Khel allowances and the grant of 128 Khassadars they renewed and re-affirmed that agreement and added the following undertaking:

We shall be responsible that nobody from our tribe will commit any offence in Government territory and that no ill-disposed person or persons of whatever tribe will be allowed to live in our territory or to pass through our limits to commit any offence in Government territory.<sup>22</sup>

Later on this agreement was extended to other tribes. The period of the agreement was fixed for 50 years w.e.f. April 1, 1923.<sup>23</sup> The area of Manza, about 411 acres was rented for ten years at an annual rental of Rupees two thousand and six

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18 *Ibid.*, pp.19-20.

19 Charles Chenevix Trench, *The Frontier Scouts*, (New York: 1986), p.XIV.

20 *Ibid.*, p.71.

21 File No.320 S.T.B. (I), Original Agreement received from political Agent, North Waziristan, T.R.C. Peshawar, pp.1-6.

22 File No.320 STB (I) Translation of a petition dated 10-7-1908, presented by the Madda Khel. Thumb mark of 146 *Maliks* and *Mu'tabars*, pp.16-31.

23 *Ibid.*, pp.32-37.

hundred.<sup>24</sup> In 1928, the asylum afforded to outlaws resulted in a blockade of Madda Khel. Later on the blockade was lifted and in 1929, they re-affirmed this agreement and made special mention of their undertaking to observe good conduct and loyalty to the Government.<sup>25</sup>

The task set by the British Government was to make the tribes control and take responsibility for their own tribesmen. The method was, on the one hand inducement like payment of allowance to the *Maliks* or tribal leaders, the employment of Khassadars, payment of direct rewards for specific services, freedom of access to British India, recruitment to the regular and civil forces, etc. and on the other fear of blockade, stoppage of recruitment and suspension or forfeiture of pay and allowances etc.<sup>26</sup>

### **The Howell Committee (1931)**

In 1931, the question of policy on the frontier was referred for consideration to an expert committee under the chairmanship of the then Foreign Secretary, Mr. Howell.<sup>27</sup> The committee recommended no radical change or reversal in the tribal policy or no large scale extension of the policy of occupation initiated by force.<sup>28</sup> They added that Government should aim at the “*peaceful penetration and civilization*” of the tribes. So far as the policy in Waziristan was concerned, they concluded that no radical reversal of policy was possible.<sup>29</sup>

This policy of gradual penetration continued between 1931 and 1935. It was proposed to make Ten million Rupees available for development of the tribal area. This decision appears to have represented an attempt to further peaceful penetration, more particularly by making roads.<sup>30</sup> This was followed in 1936 by the definition of the British policy in a written communication from

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24 *Ibid.*, p.43.

25 *Ibid.*, p.47.

26 *Ibid.*, pp.11-12.

27 File No.4/89 F.R. Notes by O.K. Caroe, pp.1-2; see also Lovat Fraser, *India under Curzon and after*, (London: 1911), p.54.

28 Memorandum by His Excellency, the Viceroy, p.7.

29 File No.4/89 F.R. Notes by O.K. Caroe, *op.cit.*, p.2.

30 Memorandum by His Excellency, the Viceroy, p.8.

the Secretary of State for foreign affairs to the Afghan Minister in London in the followings terms:

The policy of the Government of India in regard to their tribal territory is to preserve the peace of the border, foster good relations with the tribes, and gradually to introduce standards of civilization and order into the tribal area together with the improvement of their economic conditions. Moreover, it is their policy to pursue these ends by peaceful means and an agreement with the tribes, and not to resort to do so in order to preserve the peace, and to repel attacks on British and protected areas, or British forces, or on friendly tribes.<sup>31</sup>

### **British Objectives in Waziristan**

The British objectives in Waziristan may be summarized as:

- a. The control of tribal areas adjoining the settled Districts to an extent which would admit of British protection of the settled Districts and their inhabitants from tribal raids; to direct such policy which could bring the tribes unquestionably within the Indian orbit, and enable them eventually to take their place in the Indian federation.
- b. The area lying between the administrative border and the Durand Line must not be used as a raiding base against Afghanistan.
- c. The enabling of military pressure to be applied with greater expedition and effect when disturbances required, or likely to require, military operations,
- d. The prevention of Afghan political influence from establishing itself in the tribal area on British side of the Durand Line and confining itself in that region.<sup>32</sup>

### **Analysis of the Objectives**

The statistics of tribal raiding during 1910-1939 disclose that so far as the British objectives of stopping the raids of the Districts were concerned, it was achieved to some extent during the period from 1923 to 1936. There were some sound reasons for it. These were economic benefit of Razmak and Wana, the threat of withdrawal of the Khassadari allowances, greater mobility and effectiveness of the scouts, the military roads and the knowledge that behind the Scouts there was the ultimate backing of troops.

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31 *Ibid.*

32 Memorandum by His Excellency, the Viceroy, p.8.

Once operations commenced, the very success of the tribes promoted a recrudescence of raids on the settled Districts for the time being, because in face of the superiority established by the troops and by the air, such raids along with the mining of road and the destruction of property, represented almost the only form of offensive action open against the tribes to take:<sup>33</sup> (see Table below showing details of raids committed by tribes)

Year	Bannu District	Dera Ismail Khan	Total
1910-11	15	5	20
1911-12	5	9	14
1912-13	7	12	19
1913-14	9	11	20
1914-15	12	36	48
1915-16	46	126	172
1916-17	37	74	111
1917-18	26	54	80
1918-19	21	27	48
1919-20	126	198	324
1920-21	149	84	233
1921-22	78	51	129
1922-23	24	49	73
1923-24	9	35	44
1924-25	3	22	25
1925-26	1	6	7
1926-27	1	3	4
1927-28	..	7	7
1928-29	..	1	1
1929-30	1	..	1

33 *Ibid.*, see also File No.4/89 F.R. Notes by O.K. Caroe, pp.4-8.

1930-31	..	4	4
1931-32	1	2	3
1932-33	1	2	3
1933-34	..	1	1
1934-35	..	6	6
1935-36	1	12	13
1936-37	11	2	13
1937-38	34	23	57
1938-39	45	20	65
1-4-39 29-5-39	2	9	11

Source: File No. Zero, “Memorandum by His Excellency the Viceroy on Frontier Policy. 1939”, Tribal Research Cell, Home Dept, Civil Secretariat, N.W.F.P. & Fazlur-Rahim *et al.*, “Faqir of Ipi” “A study in religious militancy”, *Pakistan* 11 and 12 (spring and summer, 1985) p.145.

The experience of the Frontier problem led to the first conclusion that it was inseparably bound up with the Empire’s relations with Afghanistan. Afghanistan stood as a limiting factor to all that she did in the tribal belt. In the first place she could not go much faster in extending her control over her tribesmen than the Afghans could do.

The Yahya Khel dynasty remembered that its founder ascended the Kabul throne with the aid of tribesmen of Waziristan. It was impossible for any Afghan patriot to forget that in times past, and without doubt in times to come the tribal strength had forged and might again forge, a potent weapon in case of war with the Government of India. The tribesmen were therefore in Afghan eyes something of heroes and ogres in one. King maker and king breaker, as the spirit of the occasion moved them.<sup>34</sup> It is known that in the preface or his political testament, Nadir Shah set down

34 File No.260 S.T.B.(I) Vol IV Dispatch No.74, from His Majesty’s Minister Kabul, to His Majesty’s Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, London, July 12, 1937, T.R.C. Peshawar, p.1.

the injunctions to maintain at all costs equilibrium in the tribal belt. For the year 1936 and onwards it was difficult to gainsay the conclusion that the Afghan Policy was to permit the Government of India to exercise just enough control to save Kabul from tribal inroads. The result can be well seen in the history of the years 1936 and onwards. Faqir of Ipi had drawn inspiration and reinforcements in men, money and material from Afghan tribes, who in many actions had formed the main array of the British opponents in the field. He himself, when hard pressed, had more than once taken refuge in Afghan territory and communed with Afghan officials.<sup>35</sup>

Meanwhile Afghan Allowance holders in the case of Kabul Khel of Birmal and the Zilli Khel of Nikaband had appeared as Ipi's lieutenants among the tribes. They had murdered British officers and attacked British troops.<sup>36</sup> On another occasion, an adventurer, the *Shami Pir* set on to overthrow the Kabul throne, attached himself in the Mahsud tribes, emphasizing the cleft between one set and the other. In the *Shami Pir's* case the British allowance holders were speedily dismissed, but the suspicion and intrigue remained embittering the relations of the Governments. The existence of the Afghan Party, by turning tribal minds to Kabul, provided exactly the fuel on which such dissension fed.<sup>37</sup> Without removing this source of advantage, it was impossible to control the tribes of Waziristan. Olaf Caroe recorded his note in this regards as:

As a condition of its removal we must give the Afghans a clear guarantee, and enforce it that we would allow no threat from our tribal areas to endanger the Kabul throne. The cessation of allowances

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35 "British Advance in the Khaisora Valley" *The Inqilab*, (Lahore), 10 December, 1936.

36 File No.260 S.T.B.I. Expression from Intelligence Peshawar to Foreign, New Delhi, survey of Waziristan situation with special reference to infiltration of Afghanistan tribesmen, 1/4/37, T.R.C. Peshawar, p.3.

37 File No.260 S.T.B.I., Vol V, Afghan subjects with hostile Lashkar in Lower Khaisora during the month of December 1936 and January 1937, from A.D. I. Miranshah to the D.D. I. Peshawar, dated 6/1/37, pp.190-91; see also Telegram No.C-38, from Wazirforce Bannu to Norwef Nathiagali, dated 26/5/37, p.81; Telegram No.60, from Wazirforce Razmak to Norwef Nathiagali, dated 15/6/37, T.R.C. Peshawar, p.145.

would compel every element in the frontier tribes to turn toward India.<sup>38</sup>

As far as the enhancement of the welfare of the tribes and the extension of 'civilization' among them was concerned, British Government failed to do so. She put money into the area, but it contributed to more armament.

The British claim in this regard was that:

Had it not been for our occupation of Waziristan we should have been most awkwardly placed in 1930, given the very serious nature of the rising in the northern part of the province.

Despite this she bore disastrously heavy expenditure in 1936-39, but for her occupation of Waziristan in pursuance of the 1922 policy, the Financial drain upon her would have been far more serious.<sup>39</sup> (see Table below)

Name of Operation	Year	<u>Expenditure</u> Rupees
<u>N.W.F.P. 1916</u>  (Operations against Mohmand, 1916. Operation on Mohmand Blockade line, 1916-17. Operations in Waziristan against Mahsuds, 1917.)  Operation in Baluchistan. (Operation in Kalat, 1915-16, and Operations against Marris, 1918.)	1918-1919	1,56,86,185

38 File No.274-F 1938. Memorandum No.20/D/38, from the Deputy Director, Intelligence, Government of India, Peshawar, to the Director Intelligence Bureau, Simla, Etc. 2210-16, April 29, 1938, T.R.C. Peshawar, pp.1-2.

39 File No.4/89 F.R.. Notes by O.K. Caroe, p.3.

<p><u>N.W.F. 1916</u></p> <p>(Operations against Mohmand, 1916. Operation on Mohmand Blockade line, 1916-17. Operations in Waziristan against Mahsuds, 1917.)</p> <p>N.W.F.P., 1919, and 3rd Afghan War and measures for defense of N.W.F.</p> <p>(3rd Afghan War, 1919. Operations in Zhob and Waziristan, 1919.)</p>	1919-1920	23,87,44327
<p><u>N.W.F., 1916</u></p> <p>(Operations against Mohmand, 1916. Operations on Mohmand Blockade line, 1916-17. Operations in Waziristan against Mahsuds, 1917.)</p> <p>N.W.F.P., 1919, and 3rd Afghan War and measures for defense of N.W.F.</p> <p>(3rd Afghan War, 1919. Operations in Zhob and Waziristan, 1919.)</p> <p>Wana Column (Advance to Wana, 1920). Occupation of Waziristan, 1920-21.</p>	1920-1921	19,16,26414
<p><u>N.W.F. 1919, and 3rd Afghan War and measures for defense of N.W.F. (3rd Afghan War, 1919. Operations in Zhob and Waziristan, 1919.)</u></p> <p>Waziristan and Wana occupation and operations, 1921-24 (occupation charges not booked separately after 1924.)</p>	1921-22	6,39,57,539
<p>Waziristan and Wana occupation and operations, 1921-24 (occupation charges not booked separately after 1924.) Razmak operations (occupations against Mahsuds, 1923.)</p>	1922-1923	3,33,33,67

Waziristan and Wana occupation and operations, 1921-24 (occupation charges not booked separately after 1924.)	1923-1924	1,20,12,035
<u>Sararogha Road Restoration Operation.</u> (Operations covering the reconstruction of the road Razmak-Jandola to take Military Transport.)	1924-1925	2,72,784
<u>Sararogha Road Restoration Operation.</u> (Operations covering the reconstruction of the road Razmak-Jandola to take Military Transport.)	1925-1926 1926-1927 1927-1928 1928-1929 1929-1930	1,32,560 Negligible
<u>Peshawar District Disturbances</u> (Operations against Afridis: In Waziristan, in Kurram and in defense of Peshawar District against Mohmand and Bajaur. Khajuri Operations)	1930-1931	89,87,000
<u>Khajuri Operations.</u> Khajuri Operations Chitral Relief, 1932. (Operations against Shamoza, 1932.)	1931-1932	9,000
Kohat Rebellion (Cordon Operations in Waziristan to prevent incursions of tribesmen into Khost.)	1932-1933	7,24,000
<u>Khajuri Operations.</u> Chitral Relief, 1932. (Operations against Shamoza, 1932.) Kohat Rebellion (Cordon Operations in Waziristan to prevent incursions of tribesmen into Khost.)	1933-1934	30,63,000
<u>Mohmand Bajur Operations</u> (Operations in Gandab against Mohmand and covering force to construction of Balambat		

Bridge, including cost of Gandab road.)		
Mohmand Bajaur Operations (Operations in Gandab against Mohmand and covering force to construction of Balambat Bridge, including cost of Gandab Road.)	1934-1935	1,77,000
Mohmand Operations	1935-36	42,15,000
Loe Agra Operations		
Mohmand Operations		
Waziristan Operations	1936-1937	30,56,000
Waziristan Operations	1937-1938	1,58,11,000
Waziristan Operations (Preliminary Actuals.)	1938-1939	29,79,000
Waziristan Operations	April 1939	2,85,000

Source: File No. Zero

Subject: Memorandum by His Excellence the Viceroy on Frontier Policy. 1939, T.R.C., Home Dept, Civil Secretariat, N.W.F.P.

V. The British Government tried to rid herself of the system of Afghan allowance holders, and to induce the Afghan Government to implement fully their formal agreement as regards spheres of influence, and to refrain altogether from intrigue on her side of the line.<sup>40</sup> The imposition of 1922 policy and the occupation of Waziristan, was a severe blow to Afghan influence and to Afghan ambitions in that area. At the same time it was arguable that while she might had decreased active afghan influence in this area she might equally had stimulated their interest in it, since in the process of applying her own control to the degree to which she had been able to apply it. She had inevitably provoked tribal elements with Afghan connections to appeal for sympathy and for assistance

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40 Memorandum by His Excellency, the Viceroy, p.13.

to the rulers of Afghanistan against her growing if gradual, penetration and against the increase of her influence.<sup>41</sup>

(Statement showing cost of Military Operations on the North West Frontier of India )

<b>Name of Operation</b>	<b>Year</b>	<b><u>Expenditure</u> Rupees</b>
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<u>N.W.F., 1916</u>  (Operations against Mohmand, 1916. Operations on Mohmand Blockade line, 1916-17. Operations in Waziristan against Mahsuds, 1917.)  N.W.F.P., 1919, and 3rd Afghan War and	1920-1921	19,16,26,414

41 File No.260 S.T.B.(I) Vol(IV). Receipt Telegram No.95 dated 7/9/37 from Macann, Kabul to Norwef, Nathiagali, Civil Secretariat Office. p.170.

measures for defense of N.W.F. (3rd Afghan War, 1919. Operations in Zhob and Waziristan, 1919.)  Wana Column (Advance to Wana, 1920). Occupation of Waziristan, 1920-21.		
<u>N.W.F. 1919</u> , and 3rd Afghan War and measures for defense of N.W.F. (3rd Afghan War, 1919. Operations in Zhob and Waziristan, 1919.)  Waziristan and Wana occupation and operations, 1921-24 (occupation charges not booked separately after 1924.)	1921-22	6,39,57,539
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Waziristan and Wana occupation and operations, 1921-24 (occupation charges not booked separately after 1924.)	1923-1924	1,20,12,035
<u>Sararogha Road Restoration Operation.</u>  (Operations covering the reconstruction of the road Razmak-Jandola to take Military Transport.)	1924-1925	2,72,784
<u>Saraogha Road Restoration Operation.</u>  (Operations covering the reconstruction of the road Razmak-Jandola to take Military Transport.)	1925-1926 1926-1927 1927-1928 1928-1929 1929-1930	1,32,560 Negligible

<u>Peshawar District Disturbances</u>  (Operations against Afridis: In Waziristan, in Kurram and in defense of Peshawar District against Mohmand and Bajaur. Khajuri Operations)	1930-1931	89,87,000
Khajuri Operations. Khajuri Operations Chitral Relief, 1932. (Operations against Shamoza, 1932.) Kohat Rebellion (Cordon Operations in Waziristan to prevent incursions of tribesmen into Khost.)	1931-1932  1932-1933	9,000  7,24,000
<u>Khajuri Operations.</u>  Chitral Relief, 1932. (Operations against Shamoza, 1932.) Kohat Rebellion (Cordon Operations in Waziristan to prevent incursions of tribesmen into Khost.)  <u>Mohmand Bajaur Operations</u>  (Operations in Gandab against Mohmand and covering force to construction of Balambat Bridge, including cost of Gandab road.)	1933-1934	30,63,000
Mohmand Bajaur Operations (Operations in Gandab against Mohmand and covering force to construction of Balambat Bridge, including cost of Gandab Road.) Mohmand Operations  Loe Agra Operations	1934-1935  1935-36	1,77,000  42,15,000
<u>Mohmand Operations</u>  Waziristan Operations	1936-1937	30,56,000

<u>Waziristan Operations</u>	1937-1938	1,58,11,000
Waziristan Operations (Preliminary Actuals.)	1938-1939	29,79,000
Waziristan Operations	April 1939	2,85,000

Source: File No. Zero

Subject: Memorandum by His Excellence the Viceroy on Frontier Policy. 1939, T.R.C., Home Dept, Civil Secretariat, N.W.F.P.

### The Main Alternatives

1. Retreat from central Waziristan to the administrative border.
2. Effective occupation up to the Durand Line.
3. Total or partial disarmament of the tribes either,
  - i. Up to the Durand Line or
  - ii. Up to some point falling short of that line.
4. The Baluchistan solution of control from within the tribal area, through tribal leaders.

### Analysis of the Alternatives

It would represent a complete reversal of policy. From the tribal point of view it seemed clear that the results would not be confined to Waziristan but to other parts of the frontier as well.<sup>42</sup> Secondly, the political void left by such a retreat must inevitably be filled by the Afghans, who would increase their influence in the frontier, with the result that in due course the effective frontier would run along the administrative border. Thirdly it would initiate again raiding of settled areas.<sup>43</sup>

Effective military occupation up to the Durand Line had the attraction of many advantages which would accrue from complete

42 File No.260 S.T.B.(I) Vol(IV). Extract from Kurram Political Diary No.15 for the week ending Wednesday the 14th April, 1937, from the Political Agent, Kurram, p.13.

43 "Surprising Ignorance" *The Frontier Advocate*, (Peshawar) 22 December, 1936.

occupation.<sup>44</sup> But the problem was that in such a case it was impossible for the Afghan Government to stand aloof, or if it did stand aloof, how to survive whereas the Survival of Zahir Shah Government was essential for the British Government.<sup>45</sup> Major campaign to subjugate and to disarm the tribes up to Durand Line at that stage would most seriously lead to a war with Afghanistan. Secondly, occupation must mean effective control up to the boundary. It would definitely require a major operation against the tribes, and it would involve the possibilities at all time of hostilities with an Afghan Government. Finally, occupation and disarmament meant effective protection of the area occupied and disarmed. The burden, involved whether financial or military was unimaginable.<sup>46</sup>

Total disarmament was impractical without a major war with the tribes, and probability of serious hostilities with Afghans. Another vital problem would be of protecting the disarmed area and finally, the fact that if disarmed area tribes sided with an armed and weakly controlled Afghan tribal belt it would involve her not merely in frontier raiding, but also in incidents which would not fail to assume an international character. The British Government considered partial disarmament in council in considerable detail in the summer of 1937. Linlithgo, the Viceroy concluded that:

We might disarm a small selected area such as Ahmadzai salient. But even in an area so limited as this, I am very doubtful, whether we should be able to prevent re-arming, while disarmament would have to be accompanied by effective administration and protection on our part.

The disarmament of a larger area such as Waziristan with a hinterland stretching back into a country over which she had no control was task far heavier than she should be justified in undertaking. The Government in this regard, in concert with the Afghan Government, tried to establish control over sources of

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44 Memorandum by His Excellency the Viceroy, p.46.

45 Lovat Fraser, *op.cit.*, p.42.

46 File No.260.S.T.B. (I) Vol(IV). Receipt Telegram No.32 dated 22/4/37 from Minister Kabul to Norwef, Peshawar. p.15; See also File No.324-F (Secret.) of 1937. Telegram from Secretary of State for India, London, to Governor General (External Affairs Department), No.1983, 29th July, 1937, p.4.

ammunition supply and in particular, on her side of the Durand Line, over the arms factories.<sup>47</sup>

The system operating in Baluchistan was the administrative and political capacity of Sir Robert Sandeman, who laid down this policy in 1879.<sup>48</sup> But there was a wide difference between Baluchistan and Waziristan. In the first place tribal conditions, and the social structure, differed so widely in Baluchistan and Waziristan as to constitute a substantial obstacle in the way of adopting the policy with latter area which had been so successful in the former.<sup>49</sup>

In Waziristan, the problem was one of negotiations, not through acknowledged leaders as with the tribal *Jirgas* in which the influence of individuals is bound to be limited. The final voice rests in effect with the whole body of the tribes.<sup>50</sup> As a result there was a greater difficulty in negotiations, a greater risk of the emergence of the "turbulent priest", and a greater risk that the settlement arrived at would not be honoured or that the intransigence of a small section or sections would delay its conclusion. In other words, the methods applicable to those areas which had come under a greater degree of feudal influence on the borders of N.W.F.P. and to the traditionally feudal areas of Baluchistan could not be applied with confidence to the very democratic areas of Waziristan. Finally, Waziristan and the adjoining areas were part of an international problem to an extent that was not the case with Baluchistan. The whole Afghan position, which was of fundamental importance in any decision of policy had radically changed in those years. She was subject to the reserves, and within the limits prepared to co-operate with British Government and under her present rulers (Zahir Shah), she had now for some years back pursued on the whole a generally friendly policy.<sup>51</sup> Conditions differed in Waziristan from those in

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47 File No.260. S.T.B.(I) Vol(IV). Diary No.174-P.S. Political Branch. From D.D.I. Peshawar, to the Chief Secretary to Government of N.W.F.P., dated 8/4/37.

48 File No.324-F/37, Policy in Waziristan. Terms to be imposed in connection with the disturbance. Question of disarmament of Frontier tribes. Telegram No.1621, to Secretary of State for India, London, July 22, 1937, T.R.C. Peshawar, p.2.

49 Bruce, *op.cit.*, p.3.

50 Memorandum by His Excellency, the Viceroy, p.46.

51 Caroe, *op.cit.*, p.411.

Baluchistan to a degree that made it impossible to even consider with any confidence to apply the policy here especially, at stage at which she found herself at that time.

In late 1930s Waziristan was on fire. The Faqir of Ipi was up in arms and was challenging the presence of British troops in the hills. To combat this threat, the British were forced to flood Waziristan with military reinforcements.