

Disarmament between the two World Wars (1919-1939)

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The concept of disarmament — a term which is used here to include the limitation, control and reduction of the human and material instrumentalities of warfare as well as literal abolition — has occupied a prominent place in thinking of persons concerned with world peace for more than a century and a half. Immanuel Kant includes the elimination of standing army as the third of his “Preliminary Articles of Perpetual Peace between States.”¹

Armaments have never been considered something good in the modern world. Although there was a strong war hysteria in the European society as they were considering it as the solution of all their problems. But peace loving people never appreciated arms race in any period of time. People were feeling disturbed of the arms race before the First World War; although there was no serious realization about the harms which could be created by the arms race on the world development. There were some efforts in the world to control the arms race and the most prominent among them were the Hague Conferences of 1899 & 1907. Many countries participated in these conferences but no serious attempts were made to control the arms race. Most of the countries considered it as the issue of their security and prestige in the world. No power was ready to sacrifice its right to collect arms as much as possible. This kind of approach made these countries to spend more and more money on production of arms. The havoc which these arms could bring was seriously realized only after the outbreak of the First World War. It became a long war and caused wide spread destruction. It not only brought negative impact on economic development but also increased aggression in some countries. The lust and confidence of winning the war involved many countries in the war and as a result, there was great collection of arms. Whole collection of arms was used in war by every country and none of the countries was willing to surrender except it had lost its arms in the war.

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1 John Garnett, *Theories of Peace and Security* (Macmillan: St. Martin's Press, 1970), p.123.

After the war ended serious attempts were made to check the arms race to avoid facing the situation of pre-war period again. First of all, it was decided that the defeated powers should disarm themselves and then an arrangement would be made for a general disarmament of the whole world. There were prolonged efforts to achieve this end but without any prominent result. Thus the arms race continued till the outbreak of the Second World War and is still going on.

Disarmament is associated with a reduction in arms. However, disarmament is a more complex and self contradictory process which is not captured by this popular definition. There are many forms of disarmament such as reduction in military expenditure, reduction and destruction of the stocks of certain weapon system, a ban or a limitation on the production of some type of military equipment, reduction in the numbers of military personals and cuts in defence research and development. A disarmament process usually implies a modification of a nation's military strategies.

The word disarmament has been used to cover four distinct concepts:

1. The penal destruction of the armament of a country defeated in war.
2. Bilateral disarmament agreement applying to specific geographic areas.
3. The complete abolition of all armaments.
4. The reduction and limitation of national armament by general international agreement.²

Peace Settlement and Limitation of Army of Defeated Powers

The First World War was started with great enthusiasm as war was considered the only solution of the existing problems. But this prolonged war made every person to think against war and for the development of a mechanism which could prevent war in future. As some guarantee against early renewal of war the defeated powers were required to disarm. The German high seas fleet had been surrendered at the armistice and was interned at Scapa Flow. A new German navy might be built. The number and tonnage of vessels were described in the treaty and submarines were not to be included. The Austrian navy was to be surrendered and neither Germany nor Austria was to be permitted to build air craft for the purposes of war. Armies were to be limited. In the case of Germany upto hundred thousand men, Austria to 30,000 men,

2 *Encyclopaedia Britannica*, Vol.5, p.484.

Hungary to 35,000 men and of Bulgaria to 20,000. Conscription was to be seized. Mustafa Kamal refused to submit to any limitation of his armaments. Turkey was the only ex-enemy power which was not restricted in the manufacture or use of armaments or in number of her troops. Mustafa accepted the demilitarization of Straits but other humiliating clauses were rejected. These measures were treated as preliminary to a general reduction in the size of armaments throughout Europe but no general reduction was made.³ In the case of Ottoman Empire not any of the particular steps were taken regarding disarmament because of the treaty of Sevres. According to which it was divided into many parts which apparently reduced danger of its aggression for some time. It was not enforced in the case of victors as was done to vanquished, and their continued refusal to deal seriously with the matter led to the suspicion that they were preparing for further wars. Competition of armaments began again and possibility of the future war could not be ignored. Although Great Britain reduced her forces, navy military and aerial to such an extent that in the early part of World War II she was facing serious danger of defeat.⁴ In the covenant of league it was included that there would be a general disarmament to a low level, which would provide collective security to the members of the League. In due time league would remedy the injustices of peace treaties. Even France would come to see that Germany could not be kept down for ever.⁵

Attitude of Winning Powers towards Disarmament

It was accepted by the winners of the war through peace settlement and through the covenant of League that after the disarmament of the losers of the war generally and that of Germany particularly they will also disarm themselves. Except Great Britain not even a single country abide by this promise, even in England the reduction of armaments may have been due more to the anxiety to improve social services rather than to any abstract devotion to the idea of disarmament. By 1925 Great Britain had reduced her total naval strength compared with 1914 by no less than 48%. In the same period that of the U.S.A was increased to 17%, of Italy by 20%, of Japan by 35%. The USA had in the same period increased her army by 40% while Great Britain was cut to the bone.⁶ Some authors appreciated British attitude. It is stated that no one can deny that the English set a good example by disarming to an extent that

3 G.W. Southgate, p.221.

4 *ibid.*, p.227.

5 Philip Gibbs, *Across the Frontiers* (London: Michael Joseph Ltd., 1938), p.122.

6 J.A.R. Marriot, *A History of Europe from 1815-1939* (London: Methuen and Co., 1966), p.58.

endangered the defence of the country.⁷ But it only concluded in England's loss of international influence in favour of peace. France was conscious of its security to such an extent that it was never ready to disarm unless its security against Germany is guaranteed. France was so much worried about its security that instead of responding to the League's disarmament clauses it helped small powers like Poland and Rumania in collecting arms. Italy was also not willing to work for the sake of disarmament.

Because of the aggressive and non cooperative attitude of different countries a need was felt that the world powers should reach an agreement which can prove to be helpful to check arms race. As it could be the only way to not allow to prevail the situation of pre-war period. To achieve this goal, efforts were made for disarmament under the banner of the League and also out of its jurisdictions.

Efforts for General Disarmament after the First World War

General disarmament for peace and security of the world was considered very important and that is why this was made part of treaty of Versailles and that of peace settlement. But this had never been an easy task. To achieve this goal, an already conflict torn world was supposed to be brought under an agreement which could never be achieved. There were two aspects of disarmament issue. The first motivated by sheer revulsion against war itself led to attempts to proscribe use of cruel weapons. Second approach was aimed at reduction of armaments by mutually agreed limitations on possession and production.⁸ There was a split among different countries into two camps: those who thought that disarmament will bring about an increase in security and those who thought that increased security must precede disarmament and that is why already difficult task became more difficult rather impossible. Efforts for disarmament were made inside as well as outside the League which will be dealt with separately.

Efforts for Disarmament under the League of Nations

Disarmament was a major clause of peace treaty and to achieve this end it was included in the covenant of the League. By article 8 of the covenant the members of the League recognized that the maintenance of peace required reduction of national armaments to the lowest point consistent with national security. Therefore the allied government had given Germany a promise to proceed to general disarmament. Article 8

7 *Ibid.*, p.581.

8 Alva Myrdal, *The Game of Disarmament* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1977), p.66.

of the covenant also placed the duty of reduction of armaments on the "Council of League". In November 1920 the council appointed "Temporary Mixed Commission" composed of civilians and military personals. In 1922 British delegates on temporary mixed commission proposed a numerical scheme for the limitation of armies. Armies were to be divided into imaginary units of 30,000 men; and a certain number of these units were to be allocated to each power. This plan was condemned by military experts of every European power. French delegation introduced the basis of increased security as a necessary condition of disarmament and won the consent of British delegation. During this period nothing practical was achieved except a convention which never came in to force to control international trade in arms. On 27 September 1922, the Assembly of "League of Nations" adopted certain principles. No scheme for disarmament could be successful unless it is general. There could be no reduction without a security guarantee. But it could never be decided what should be prior to the other.

A draft treaty of mutual assistance in the case of outbreak of war was brought out in 1923 according to which a military action will be taken against the aggressor by attacked party or by a state designated by the council. This could not receive a positive response from most of the countries. On 2 October 1924 Geneva Protocol was signed for the settlement of Intentional disputes of Albania, Brazil, Bulgaria, Chile, France, Greece, Poland, Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia, Portugal and Latvia. It was accepted unanimously by the League of Nations. The protocol prohibited recourse of war and made the application of sanctions compulsory after determination of aggressor. The protocol was signed by 19 states but it did not come into force at all.

On 3 October 1924 the League setup a Coordination Commission replacing Temporary Mixed Commission to deal with the problem of disarmament. It did not last long and later on dissolved. Signatory authorities of the Locarno treaties raised new hopes for reaching to an agreement for a general disarmament. In December 1925, the council appointed a preparatory commission for the "Disarmament Conference", which met for the first time in May 1926. The greater part of 1926 was occupied in defining the nature of armaments which were to be limited and reduced. In March 1927 British and French delegations submitted that disarmament conventions to show what would be limited and how. In the question of military personal the French delegation wished to limit men on service, other great powers wanted to limit all trained personnel. Same kind of conflicts were about military budgets and maintenance of naval fleets. The autumn session of Preparatory Commission of 1927

was enlivened by the first appearance of a Soviet delegation under M. Litvinov, who made an eloquent plea for total and universal disarmament, which received no support. After London Naval Conference it was decided that preparatory commission should hold a final session in the autumn of 1930 and that whatever the issue, long postponed conference should then be convened. In that meeting a dummy draft convention was passed which was not used by the conference when it was summoned for 2 February 1932. It was attended by 61 members. It continued for a long time and because of lack of mutual confidence no results could be achieved. Various methods of disarmament were discussed:

1. Proportionate reduction was proposed that all powers should agree to reduce their existing forces by one half, one third or one forth.
2. The prohibition of certain types of warfare such as submarine attack and aerial bombing.
3. Qualitative limitation of armaments.
4. Total military expenditure of a state should be kept within an agreed limit. To pursue this annual defence expenditure should be published.
5. Idea of a super national force under the jurisdictions of the League to check aggression could not receive a positive response.

Sir Ramsy Macdonald prepared a plan to secure some success for Disarmament Conference. First part of it was related to provision of security. Second part dealt with material on a qualitative basis, limiting the weight and calibre of certain weapons. One part of it banned chemical and bacteriological warfare and the other proposed a permanent disarmament commission with wide powers of inspection and control. The Draft convention was accepted by general commission as a basis and the conference adjourned.⁹

The Four Power Pact

In March 1933, British Prime Minister brought the Macdonald Plan to Geneva, continued his journey to Rome to discuss disarmament problem with Mussolini. In the draft the four powers declared their intention of coordinating their European policy. They also declared that one of the points of their common policy would be to consider a revision

⁹ E.H. Carr, *International Relations Between the Two World Wars: 1919-1939* (Macmillan: Macmillan Press Ltd., 1947), p.194.

of the peace treaties. The four powers agreed that if disarmament conference fails to find a solution they would recognize Germany's right to rearm by stages. Lastly they decided to coordinate their policy in all extra European issues along with the colonial sphere. With the efforts of France it revised text; the four powers undertook to cooperate with all powers within the frame-work of League of Nations. It was initiated in Rome by representatives of four powers on 7 June 1933. The four power pact never came into force but it sowed the seed of resentment between France and her allies.¹⁰ Germany demanded the right to rearm if disarmament to its level was not reached and in 1933, it left the conference altogether.¹¹ A further session of conference on 16 June 1934 was equally without any result and the powers of the world engaged in an armament race compared with which preceded in 1914 seemed trivial.¹² Sporadic sessions of conference's bureau were held until 31 May 1937 when it was dissolved formally.¹³

Disarmament Efforts outside the League

A convention on the limitation of armament was signed by Costa Rica, Guatemala, Honduras, Nicaragua and Salvador on 7 February 1923. It was decided that armies of the member countries were to be limited for five years. Naval and war aircrafts were also to be limited.

- A convention of the regime of the Straits was signed at Lausanne on 25 July 1923 by Great Britain, France, Japan, Italy, Greece, Turkey, Russia, Yugoslavia, Rumania and Bulgaria. It provided for the demilitarization of Dardanelles and Bosporus (near Turkey).
- The Locarno Pact 1924 guaranteed frontiers of Germany with Belgium and France. Kellogg Briand Pact 1928 outlawed war to resolve the differences.¹⁴
- In 1928 Litvinov put forward his idea for disarmament. He advocated the abolition of all armed forces and war ministries. He put forward the idea of destroying all heavy weapons, fortresses and factories manufacturing war materials. However, nothing came out of it.

10 *ibid.*, p.193.

11 *ibid.*, p.186.

12 G.W. Southgate, p.235.

13 Mac. Graham, *Disarmament and Development* (Oxford: Pergamon Press, 1986), p.165

14 Norman Lowe, *Mastering Modern World History* (Macmillan: Macmillan Education Ltd., 1993), p.208.

- A convention regarding the regime of Straits was signed in July 1936 in Montreux. This convention set out measures for demilitarization of the straits from the Aegean Sea to the Black Sea.¹⁵

Naval Disarmament

Naval forces of all great powers played a very significant role during First World War. It caused heavy damages to the fleet of enemy. The main reason of conflict among British, American, French, Italian, and Japanese naval fleets posed challenge to each other before the war. Britain maintained huge fleets to maintain its naval supremacy. Germany had become the second greatest naval power. And other countries joined the race to maintain their hold on the colonies and to save themselves to be let down by other powers in this field. But the destruction and havoc brought by naval fleets during the World War made the great powers to think seriously about the naval forces. So, many conferences, held and agreements were signed by great powers to:

1. Maintain the status quo.
2. Introduce a system which could keep a check on the development of naval forces.

Although nothing practical came out of these conferences except signing the agreement but it succeeded partially to check development of naval forces during 1920's.

Washington Conference (1921-22)

Invitations were issued by the American government to all those countries who were interested in the Pacific. There were favourable circumstances for the success of the conference. There was no direct conflict between the policies of three great powers — Great Britain, United States and Japan. It fixed ratios on tonnage limits for capital ships of leading naval powers. It recognized the regional supremacy of Japan in Pacific and agreed that fortifications and bases would not be extended there. In return Japan agreed to overall inferiority to the navies of Great Britain and United States.¹⁶ The treaty was supposed to remain in force until 31 December 1936 and two years notice for retreating from the treaty was to be issued.¹⁷

15 Mac. Graham, *Disarmament And Development* (Oxford: Pergamon Press,1986), p.167

16 *Ibid.*, p.196.

17 Joel H. Wiener and J.H. Plumb (eds.) *Great Britain Foreign Policy and Span of Empire: 1689-1971*, Vol.1 (New York: Chelsea House Publishers, 1972), p.768.

Another treaty between Great Britain, United States, France, Italy and Japan for limitation of naval armament was signed by which total tonnage of aircraft carrier was as below:

US 13500, Britain 13,500, France 60,000, Italy 60,000 and Japan 81,000 tons. Certain other decisions were also made on the same design.¹⁸

Second Naval Conference (1927)

President Coolidge invited Great Britain, France, Italy and Japan to attend a conference to consider limitation of cruisers, destroyers and submarines. It was accepted by Great Britain and Japan but was rejected by France and Italy. The American government proposed a total tonnage restriction on each of the ship categories under discussion and proposed same ratio as agreed at Washington Conference. Great Britain did not agree to it. The conference lasted for two months but nothing came out regarding limitation of naval armaments. After its failure both the countries (USA and Great Britain) started spending more and more on naval armaments.

London Naval Conference (1930)

It was attended by Great Britain, America, France, Italy and Japan. France and Italy could not arrive at any agreed formula in case of their possessions in Mediterranean. The London Naval Treaty solved the problem of the relative cruiser strength of the three powers. It was also decided that if any of the three powers would have to increase its power in any shape like those of cruisers, warships etc. it would have to notify others so they could also increase it at the same ratio. The treaty received great criticism in Great Britain, USA and Japan.¹⁹

Naval Conference of (1935)

It was held in London. The clash between France and Italy in Mediterranean did not allow these countries to come at an understanding. The expansion of Italy in the Mediterranean was considered to be a permanent menace to British communications along the life line of the British Empire. Japanese conquest of Manchuria was another bone of contention. Great Britain and USA were not prepared to accept Japanese hegemony in Far East any more. In December 1934, Japan denounced the treaty of Washington. The conference failed to achieve any results. The nations of the world were left as they were before. In 1935, Germany had

18 *Ibid.*, p.768.

19 K. Perry, *Modern European History* (Made Simple Books Ltd., 1985), p.192.

entered into a naval agreement with Great Britain by which later allowed her to keep a navy equal to 35% of the strength of the British Navy.²⁰

USA, Great Britain, France, Canada, Australia and New Zealand signed a treaty in London on 25 March 1936 for the limitation of the naval armaments and for the exchange of information regarding naval construction. This was done because treaties of 1922 and 1930 were going to lapse in 1936.

Nothing significant or fruitful could be achieved through the whole process of disarmament whether it were the efforts regarding general or naval disarmament. The whole process went in vain.

Causes of Failure

We can see the whole process of disarmament as a complete failure. But a whole lot of reasons can be traced out. In the process of history there is nothing mono causal. The process of disarmament is much more complex thing than it can be perceived apparently. A whole lot of things were involved in the process. Many countries of the world were involved in the issue and every country had its own constraints. Every country wanted to achieve its own end and every one wanted implementation of the disarmament according to its own choice. There were so many causes of failure of the process — some were personal or individual constraints of the participating countries and some were international causes of the failure of the process. Both types of causes are analyzed here.

There has been no strong organization to pursue the cause of disarmament. Peace organizations everywhere lacked strength both in numbers of participants and in resources. Politicians did not need to give in their pressures. On account of their weakness they are often forced to speak in generalities and enable to act in unison in specifics.

Human aptitude for aggression is innate or socially determined and render little guidance for actual policy. Civil movements have been remarkably weak on the arms race at both the national and international levels. Although these were strong but could not bring proper impact on the arms race and control. Religious movement has not as yet much of an impact for creating peace or against preparing for war.²¹

Of primary relevance to disarmament are the vested interest of military and business concerns engaged in arms production, often bolstered by the trade unions and those engaged in military research and

20 Norman Lowe, *Mastering Modern World History* (Macmillan: Macmillan Education Ltd., 1993), p.260.

21 Norman J. Padelford, *The Dynamics of International Politics* (New York: Macmillan Publishers Co., 1976), p.435.

development, whose concerns and employment give them stake in continued production and technical advance. Behind this all is the competitive spirit of different nations.²²

There were people who were convinced that huge armaments could give them security. The war lords refuted the argument that international problems could be resolved by peaceful means. Countries like France believed that security must precede disarmament. On the other hand countries like Great Britain argued that presence of great armaments makes the nations feel insecure. Germany announced that she will not maintain disarmaments unless other nations are ready and agreed for disarmament at the same level. French question of security and German demand for equality could not be reconciled.

Economic disaster of 1930s was also a blow to disarmament as in the conference of 1932 most of the countries adopted an extremist attitude for their nation's safety and security without giving weightage to the argument of others.

Another reason of failure of the effort of disarmament was that it also brought negative impact on economy as it caused unemployment for workers of armament industry. It also brought misery to the researchers and scientists/experts who do manage the production of arms but no body took into consideration that duration of negative impacts of defence expenditures was usually short term. In the long run, it could result in significant and beneficial gains through expansion of production of civilian goods and services and other social welfare works.²³ The arms race had always been inconsistent with efforts aimed at achieving disarmament and the new international economic order. In view of the urgent need to divert the resources utilized for the acceleration of arms race towards socio-economic development, particularly for developing countries.

To be a military power had become a status symbol of the countries and none was willing to accept any type of constraints on their military strength. Maintenance of status quo is something very important on which every powerful country emphasized.

The basis of the efforts were already conflict torn as some believed that provision of security must be prior to that of reaching at any results regarding disarmament. Others believed that if disarmament is achieved

22 Alva Myrdal, *The Game of Disarmament* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1977), p.318.

23 Peter Batchelor, *Disarmament and Defence Industrial Adjustment in South Africa* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1998), p.169.

security will ultimately be provided. So from the beginning the discussion was at conflicting point.

“Disarmament Conferences” wasted a lot of time in the discussion to differentiate between defensive and offensive arms as the same weapon could be defensive or offensive according to the situation in which it was used. So no conclusion. Another difficulty arose as “what constituted armaments” many thought of battleships, cruisers tanks and fighting aero planes etc. were armaments. While others include everything with which a nation could fight. Along with weapons, men who use them, who produce them, war office staff, chemical compound, instruments of propaganda were also categorized as arms. So nothing could be concluded about what should be controlled or limited.²⁴

There was another matter of concern for certain powers and that was the issue of collective security. Disarmament was feasible only within the context of an institutional system which fell somewhere within the range of ambitiousness bounded by the League of Nations and the world governments. There was supposed to be a negotiated collective security treaty which could provide an alternative guarantee of the security of the disarmed states — the difficulties of such a system had often been pointed out. Collective security was made impossible in the social conditions of the existing world order. Many thinkers suggested for the collective security but none advised any workable plan which could lead to the collective security and ultimately to the general disarmament.²⁵

There are distinctive attitudes towards security, defence and disarmament. These differences could be interpreted partially as the impact of different interests arising as a result of different socio-economic and geo-strategic positions. Correlation between arms race and socio-economic under development seems to be quite clear.

Italy had grievances regarding the war indemnities or reparations; it expected more than what it got. The economic conditions which prevailed in Italy after the First World War took it in the grip of Fascism; Fascism and disarmament were opposite to each other. Italy not only remained busy in the collection of armament but also kept providing arms to others. Germans were ready to accept disarmament and in the early days after the treaty of Versailles it disarmed itself completely but when it realized the fact that no other power was taking any serious steps regarding disarmament it started rearmament under the Nazi rule and left

24 Evan Luard, *Conflict and Peace in the Modern International System* (London: University of London Press, 1970), p.174.

25 John Garnett, *Theories of Peace and Security* (Macmillan: St.Martin's Press, 1970), p.131.

the disarmament conference in 1933. France was too much concerned regarding its security. It was severely frightened from German aggression. On the other hand it had propagated the fear of German aggression to that extent that if it were willing to accept any clause regarding disarmament it had to face strong internal pressure from the masses as well as the elites and the army. USA and Britain had their own constraints. They were never ready to surrender their international position at any cost. For that matter although they made attempts for disarmament but their more attention was towards maintaining the status quo. They seriously attempted for the disarmament of the defeated powers after conclusion of First World War and achieved their goal in shape of complete disarmament of defeated powers.

It was clearly evident that none of the nations was willing to disarm herself and it was the most difficult problem to overcome to achieve general disarmament during the inter-war period and even afterwards. There could be no disarmament so long as there was mutual distrust and suspicions, fears and hatred, and it was somewhat impossible to eliminate these feelings among the countries in the presence of existing world order.

Rearmament

The decade of 1930s is the decade of rearmament of all great powers. In 1933 Germany resigned from the disarmament conference and openly indulged in development of arms industry and production of arms. France and Italy never accepted any clauses regarding disarmament as France had developed hyper sensitivity regarding its security against Germany although Germany was fully disarmed under the treaty of Versailles. Italy was under the rule of Mussolini, the leader of the fascist movement. America worked for the disarmament of others but never applied any of the clauses on itself. Britain demobilized its army and limited it but only to lessen the burden on its economy but because of the disarmament conference and the efforts for disarmament outside the banner of League did not allow these countries to work for arms production openly. In March 1935 Germany also denounced the clauses of the treaty of Versailles concerning disarmament and also article 42 and 43 of the treaty of Versailles and sent her troops in to the Rhine land.²⁶ After 16 years circle of frustration was closed efforts at the world disarmament through the League had begun with unilateral disarmament of Germany. The efforts seized with unilateral rearmament of Germany. By the beginning of 1937, all treaties imposing quantitative

26 Philip Gibbs, *Across the Frontiers* (London: Micheal Joseph Ltd., 1938), p.138.

restrictions of three great naval powers came at an end. In March, London announced plans for constructing new battle ships, Washington followed it and Tokyo struggled to keep pace with her rivals in a naval race.²⁷ On 28 April 1938 Hitler denounced Anglo-German Naval Pact of 1935. Disarmament had become a memory which had reached at that point through large scale successive failed conferences for achievement of general and naval disarmament to maintain peace and to check the threat of aggression and war. Every country had its own justifications for rearmament but none of them made efforts to prevent it.

Conclusion

“I have the power to make laws; so I have the right to break.” This was the formula which was acted upon by every great power regarding disarmament. Economic power was then the main form of international power, which needed not necessarily to increasing political or military competition. Indeed a combination of shared prosperity and positive diplomacy ensured a more cooperative international climate, hence the shift towards greater economic, political and military cooperation. The shift in balance towards military and economic power had important policy implications for those countries who had large arms industries, because the strong economies of twentieth century such as Germany and Japan were those countries that prioritized the development of civil high technology industries than feather bedding their defence sector.²⁸

The main reasons of the failure of the efforts of disarmament were clash in national interests of different nations, hyper sensitivity for security and the wish of the so-called powers to maintain the status quo caused failure for the efforts of disarmament. Efforts for disarmament never came to an end. Great powers under the banner of the UN and the Security Council are still working for one or the other shape of disarmament. Most prominent examples of these efforts are “CTBT”, “Non Proliferation Act” etc. The picture is same as was during the inter war period. Smaller nations for their security are bound to buy arms and great powers have to strengthen their hold in international politics so they have to keep themselves as stronger as possible. However, they are raising the slogans of disarmament and control on arms; and developing their strength in production of arms.

27 Paul Kennedy, *The Rise and Fall of Great Powers* (New York), p.390.

28 Peter Batchelor, p.22.