

# *The Muslim League's Ministry in the Province of the Punjab: 1951-1953*

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## I

After the creation of Pakistan the Muslim League Ministries were formed in all the provinces and they worked very well under the leadership of Quaid-i-Azam. In the Punjab four members of the Assembly were sworn in as the cabinet ministers. Among them Nawab Iftikhar Hussain Mamdot as the Chief Minister holding Law and Order and General Administration; Mumtaz Daultana incharge of Finance and Industry; Sirdar Shaukat Hayat Khan holding several portfolios, namely Revenue, Irrigation, Information, Rehabilitation, Excise and Taxation, Islamic Reconstruction Cooperatives and Electricity and Sheikh Karamat Ali — the only urbanite, was incharge of Education and Public Works Department.<sup>1</sup> This was the size of the first cabinet. There were some four or five Parliamentary Secretaries to share parliamentary duties with them.<sup>2</sup>

Hardly six months had passed and the members of the Mamdot Ministry were at each others throats. Mumtaz Daultana, Finance Minister and Sirdar Shaukat Hayat the Revenue Minister, quit the Ministry as a protest.<sup>3</sup> Quaid-i-Azam, the Governor General summoned both Daultana and Shaukat to Karachi to

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1 Sirdar Shaukat Hayat Khan, *The Nation That Lost Its Soul* (Lahore: Jang Publishers, 1995), p.190.

2 *Ibid.*

3 Ahmad Salim, *Pakistan of Jinnah* (Lahore: Brothers Publishers, 1993), p.37.

determine what they were fighting about. Jinnah knew both the ministries and Chief Ministers Mamdot very well and appreciated the fact that, in the battle for Pakistan, the united team of these young men had done a great job.<sup>4</sup> The real reason behind the quarrel was that Mumtaz Daultana was not ready to accept the Chief Ministership of a less qualified person? Quaid-i-Azam had an idea about the ability of each. If this was the reason, Jinnah knew the solution very well, Mamdot could be taken into the central cabinet and the Chief Ministership should be given to Daultana, so he could show his worth. Quaid-i-Azam considered the three Punjab ministers as his obedient children and in this light he wanted to remove the differences among them.<sup>5</sup> Jinnah met with the three and arranged separate meetings with Mumtaz Daultana and Sirdar Shaukat Hayat. Mumtaz Daultana was not satisfied with Mamdot's leadership but would not volunteer himself to become Chief Minister. Indeed, Daultana stressed that he did not want to become the Chief Minister; he had no personal ambitions or lust for office and that was not the root of differences that had arisen between him and Mamdot.<sup>6</sup> He stated that the Nawab of Mamdot himself had created the atmosphere of mistrust and suspicions. He had a private and personal cabinet of his own apart from the regular cabinet from which he took advice. After listening Daultana carefully Jinnah finally advised all of them to let bygones be bygones and to begin with a future. He stressed them to work together as a team in this critical period for Pakistan and perform the responsibilities placed on the provincial government of the Punjab.<sup>7</sup>

Daultana made a personal announcement saying that he had dropped the idea of resigning from the ministry. Hardly ten days passed and they started quarreling again. The Governor of the Punjab, Francis Mudie was called along with them. This time Jinnah proposed that all the ministers in the Punjab should submit

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4 Ahmad Salim, *Mamdot Say Wattoo Tak*, [Urdu] (Lahore: Gora Publishers, 1996), p.14.

5 *Ibid.*, p.15.

6 Ahmad Salim, *Pakistan of Jinnah*, p.38.

7 Syed Nur Ahmad, *From Martial Law to Martial Law* (Lahore: Vanguard, n.d.), p.289.

their resignations to the Governor so that the ministry could be reconstituted. At the same time he told Daultana to be ready to become the Chief Minister of the province. But Mumtaz Daultana was still not ready to take this responsibility. The ministers wrote their resignations and handed them over to the Governor. Daultana declined to accept the proposition unless he was first elected leader of the Muslim League Provincial Parliamentary Party by an overwhelming majority.<sup>8</sup> However, the ministers resigned without arriving at any resolution of their conflict, and Jinnah referred the matter to the Governor for suitable action, and authorised him to take any step he thought necessary in the circumstances.<sup>9</sup> A short announcement to this effect was made from the office of the Governor General. With resignations in his pocket, Governor Mudie returned to Lahore. He considered his constitutional position and without getting involved any further, called the ministers and returned their resignations. The majority members of the Muslim League in the Assembly supported the Nawab of Mamdot, as well as the party council arranged a vote of confidence in his government. This irritated, both Daultana and Shaukat Hayat, and consequently they chose to resign again on 27 May 1948.<sup>10</sup>

The struggle in the Punjab thus came to an end for the time being but it flared up again when Liaqat Ali Khan, after the Quaid-i-Azam's death, tried to persuade Chief Minister Mamdot to take Daultana back into the cabinet.<sup>11</sup> Right at the time of the swearing-in ceremony, Mamdot backed out and declined to accept any directive from the Central Government.<sup>12</sup> The humiliated Daultana now decided to bring down the Mamdot regime by obtaining control of the Punjab Muslim League Party organization. In November 1948, Daultana was elected the president of the Punjab Muslim League with the help of the Prime Minister Liaqat Ali

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8 M.Rafique Afzal, *Political parties in Pakistan, 1947-1958*, Vol-1 (Islamabad: National Institute of Historical and Cultural Research, 1986), p.55.

9 Muhammad Farooq Qureshi, *Pakistan Jumariat Ka Zawal*, [Urdu] (Lahore: Muktaba Fikr-o-Danish, 1987), p.195.

10 *The Pakistan Times*, 28 May 1948.

11 M. Rafique Afzal, p.55.

12 *Ibid.*

Khan.<sup>13</sup> He then started to alienate Mamdot's supporters in the Parliamentary Party with various promises.<sup>14</sup> But curiously enough, when he was in a position to defeat the Mamdot ministry, Daultana in his capacity of the president of the Punjab Provincial Muslim League, advised the Central Government that it should dissolve, not only the ministry, but also the Provincial Assembly.<sup>15</sup> The final victory for Daultana came in January 1949, when the Governor General dissolved both the Punjab ministry and the Legislature, under Section 92 A of the Provisional Constitution Act; and the Governor who took over the administration, was directed to arrange new elections.<sup>16</sup>

## II

On 9 November 1950, the Governor of the Punjab, Sardar Abdur Rab Nishtar announced the elections to the Punjab Legislative Assembly which were to be held in the second week of March 1951 and was to be completed in twelve days.<sup>17</sup> Mumtaz Daultana launched a province-wide elections campaign and addressed gatherings of the League workers at many places. The election manifesto of the Punjab Muslim League was issued on 21 November 1950 which included a wide range of subjects like rural economy, rural uplift, settlement of refugees, industrial development, labour and unemployment, civil liberties, education, health, public works, civil defence and minorities.<sup>18</sup> The manifesto stressed that the immediate programme would be the abolition of *jagirs* and *imams*. A "Manifesto Day" was observed all over the province and public meetings were organized. Over 800 candidates who had applied for the Muslim League tickets pledged their loyalty to the party and its programme.<sup>19</sup> A Fact-finding Committee was constituted to scrutinize the claims of the candidates with a view to recommending suitable names for the

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13 Safdar Mahmood, *Muslim League ka Daur-i-Hakumat*, [Urdu] (Lahore: Ghalib Publishers, 1982), p.151.

14 M. Rafique Afzal, p.55.

15 *Ibid.*

16 *Ibid.*

17 *Nawa-i-Waqt*, 11 November, 1950.

18 *The Pakistan Times*, 22 November, 1950.

19 Safdar Mahmood, p.171.

award of League tickets. The committee consisted of five members that included Prof A.B.Haleem, Ghulam Nabi Pathan, Malik Sfarif-ud-Din, Syed Hassan Mahmood and Khan Ibrahim Khan.<sup>20</sup> The committee made extensive tours of their respective constituencies to firm up recommendations. Eventually the Muslim League Parliamentary Board met in February 1951 and awarded League tickets to 197 candidates.<sup>21</sup>

Mumtaz Daultana being himself a big landlord prepared a list of big land-owning families of all the districts of the province and entered into political alliances with them. For instance in Multan district, Daultana-Gilani and Gardezi-Gilani pacts were concluded.<sup>22</sup> The agreement was written on a leaf of Holy Quran. In this agreement, Mumtaz Daultana agreed to acknowledge the leadership of the Gilanis in provincial politics in return for help in the district, where he could not get elect in the 1951 elections without their support. The Gilanis are an exceptionally pious and God-fearing religious family. Once they were manoeuvred into executing an agreement on a leaf of the Holy Quran, they could be easily exploited for long periods without Mumtaz Daultana himself honouring the agreement on his part. He was convinced that the Gilanis will not backtrack.<sup>23</sup> A parallel agreement on the same manner was executed by Syed Ali Hussain Gardezi, Mumtaz Daultana's lieutenant in the Multan district, in order to secure his success in the election from Multan city. This agreement too was never honoured by the Mumtaz Daultana group.<sup>24</sup> No doubt, Mumtaz Daultana won the elections because of these political moves, but he subsequently could not keep his promises as he had made more commitments than he could honour.<sup>25</sup>

On the opposing front, Suharwardy and Mamdot announced merger of their respective parties into the All-Pakistan Jinnah

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20 *Ibid.*

21 *The Pakistan Times*, 3 February, 1951.

22 Ahmad Salim, p.27.

23 Makhdumzada Syed Hassan Mahmud, *A Nation is Born*, (Lahore: Feroz Printing Works, 1958), p.21.

24 *Ibid.*

25 Khalid Bin Saeed, *Politics in Pakistan: The Nature and Direction of Change* (New York: Praeger, 1980), p.37.

Awami League.<sup>26</sup> Mian Iftikharuddin's Azad Pakistan Party elected an interim administrative committee to act as a Working Committee in January 1951 to contest the provincial elections.<sup>27</sup> During the election campaign, Mian Iftikharuddin equated the Muslim League with the Unionist Party, for it had ignored the Islamic principles of democracy, liberty and equality. He even declared that to vote for the Muslim League would be the greatest sin because the Leaguers were not the true representatives of the people.<sup>28</sup> Moreover, Mian Iftikharuddin pleaded that the Muslims of India struggled not to establish a state inhabited by the Muslims like other such states; their objective was to achieve an Islamic state without the domination of the foreigners and which was to be fully independent and truly democratic. Mian Iftikharuddin also condemned the League Government in the Centre for its failure in achieving complete independence, democratization of the state, withdrawal from the Commonwealth and repeal of the safety laws which he alleged were being used to consolidate the ruler's position.<sup>29</sup> In this context, the opposition parties proved to be a good refuge for candidates who were refused tickets by the Muslim League. Having failed to obtain tickets, most of them gave their support to Azad Pakistan Party and Jinnah Awami Muslim League. Indeed, as many as two-third of the League rejected candidates received tickets from these two parties.

Prime Minister Liaquat Ali Khan extended all out support to the Punjab Muslim League. He addressed public meetings at various places and presented the future course of action that was mainly economic in nature. He promised to provide every citizen with the basic and fundamental necessities of life which included food, clothing, shelter and education. In addition, he emphasized that the League was the Quaid's sacred trust. At Gujrat he declared: "I am not that sort of politician who makes false promises to catch votes".<sup>30</sup> His personal prestige was at its peak whereas those against the League were utterly inadequate in their

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26 Syed Nur Ahmad, p.306.

27 *Dawn*, 17 January, 1951.

28 *The Pakistan Times*, 7 January 1951.

29 *Ibid.*

30 *Dawn*, 3 March 1951.

stature and appeal to the people. Liaquat Ali Khan's speeches, his economic programme and administrative support to the ruling party paved the way for the victory of the Muslim League in the Punjab.

The election results announced on 30 March showed that the Muslim League had won 143 seats<sup>31</sup> but the next day its strength rose to 153 and four months later it increased to 166.<sup>32</sup> The Muslim League was the only organized party in the province. An attempt by six opposition parties to form a united front against the League failed.<sup>33</sup>

Mumtaz Daultana was elected leader of the Muslim League Assembly Party and was invited by the Governor to form the ministry. Daultana readily did so, inviting Sufi Abdul Hameed, Sardar Abdul Hamid Dasti, Chaudhary Muhammad Hussain Chattha, Shaikh Fazal Elahi and Syed Ali Hussain Gardezi to join his government.<sup>34</sup> In his first speech he laid special emphasis on land reforms, speedy settlement of refugees, extension of social service and industrial development.<sup>35</sup> However, the first action which he took after assuming power was showed his intolerance for the opposition. He banned the publication of Urdu newspaper *Nawa-i-Waqat*, because its chief editor, Hameed Nizami was a friend of Nawab Iftikhar Hussain Mamdot and he had published many reports during the election campaign in which Liaquat Ali Khan and Mumtaz Daultana were severely criticized.<sup>36</sup> Other members of the League Ministry also favoured Daultana on this point, as they agreed that this newspaper was publishing notorious reports against the League leadership. Yet, the banning of the newspaper was a direct attack on the freedom of press. Editors of various newspapers took the stand against the Provincial

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31 Keith Callard, *Pakistan: A Political Study* (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 1968), p.55.

32 M. Rafique Afzal, p.58.

33 Craig Baxter, "The People's Party vs The Punjab Feudalists" in *Contemporary Problems of Pakistan*, ed., J. Henry Korson (Leiden: E.J.Brill, 1974), p.23.

34 *The Pakistan Times*, 17 April 1951.

35 Zahid Chaudhary, *Pakistan Ki Siyasi Tarikh*, [Urdu] (Lahore: Idara Mutalah-i-Tarikh, 1990), p.319.

36 *Ibid.*, p.320.

Government of the Punjab. However, due to efforts of Maulana Akhtar Ali Khan, a friend of Mumtaz Daultana and President of Pakistan Newspapers Editor Conference (PNPEC), the matter was resolved. Daultana relented and the publication of *Nawa-i-Waqat* was allowed.<sup>37</sup> It was certainly a bad start for a democratically elected government.

Mumtaz Daultana was conscious of the devious nature of provincial politics. He therefore, sought to secure his position against any future eventuality through all means available to him. He had little difficulty in controlling the Working Committee of the Provincial Muslim League after his election as President. But the source of power was the Muslim League Parliamentary Party, and he took appropriate steps to amend its constitution. The revised constitution, adopted after some heated discussion in September 1951, laid down that the parliamentary leader would hold office for the life of the Legislative Assembly, but other office-bearers were to be elected annually. A no-confidence motion against an office holder or cabinet minister required a requisition signed by at least one-third of the total membership, with a notice of at least fifteen days.<sup>38</sup>

After holding the two offices, the Chief Minister and President of the Punjab Provincial Muslim League, the Working Committee of the League was in a position to take disciplinary action against those who had violated the party discipline. In the first phase, 474 members were expelled from the organization for five years. Action was taken on complaints received from candidates regarding members who did not support the League candidates in the elections. Mumtaz Daultana showed keen interest in implementing the League election manifesto. He seriously wanted to improve the conditions of the people. To achieve this goal, he manoeuvred the Working Committee of the Punjab Muslim League into appointing advisory committees into each district for advising the district administration on issues concerning general welfare. The decision to appoint committees was aimed at bringing closer the district administration and the public. It was a useful

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37 *Ibid.*

38 *The Pakistan Times*, 28 September 1951.

step, firstly because the district administration would come to understand the general difficulties of citizens and secondly, the existence of such advisory committees would discourage the bureaucratic tendencies which were evolved by the British rulers to keep the officers and the citizens at a distance from each other.<sup>39</sup>

After appointing district administration committees, another major move of the Daultana ministry was the introduction of agrarian reforms in the province. The majority of the landlords were aware that Mumtaz Daultana himself was the biggest landlord in the province. Therefore, they did not believe that he was serious about the land reforms. This issue came up before the Provincial Muslim League Parliamentary Party in September 1951, when it considered land reform bill, which sought:

- i. To remove the loopholes in the Punjab Tenancy Act of 1950.
- ii. To give security of tenancy to occupancy tenants.
- iii. To exempt from tax all owners of under five acres of land.
- iv. The minimum land allowable for self cultivation should be 50 acres of irrigated and 100 acres of non-irrigated land. Contrary to the original proposal gardens, forests, cattle farms and seed farms were exempted.
- v. To change the traditional division crops between the landlord and the tenant from fifty percent each to seventy five percent for the tenant and from fifty percent to twenty five percent for the landlord.<sup>40</sup>

Mumtaz Daultana strongly argued for the reforms, threatening to back to the electorate for a fresh mandate if they were not accepted. He declared:

I am one of you. In fact, I am the biggest of you all and will be hit the hardest by the proposed agrarian reforms legislation...I solemnly declare that I will soon have the House dissolved and go the electorate for a fresh verdict rather than a single word of the manifesto.<sup>41</sup>

It required the landlord to declare the areas he wanted to keep for his personal cultivation. The date for this declaration was deferred again and again. As expected, even the provision relating

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39 National Planning Board, *The First Five Year Plan, 1955-1960* (Karachi: Government of Pakistan Press, 1958), p.137.

40 M. Rafique Afzal, p.59.

41 *Dawn*, 29 September 1951.

to fifty percent to seventy five percent share of produce could not be given practical effect because the tenants did not demand their increased share as this was likely to annoy the powerful landlord.

The land reforms met with great resistance even within the ranks of the League organization and Mumtaz Daultana faced great political pressure and resistance as most of the members of the Punjab Assembly were landlords and did not like legislation which affect their landed interests. In a meeting of the Muslim League Assembly Party, Syed Naubahar Shah dramatically waved his cap and declared that his land belonged to him as much as his cap. Thus, Mumtaz Daultana succeeded only in getting four highly diluted bills passed in the face of strong opposition. With the exception of *jagirs* conferred in lieu of military service or endowed to religious shrines, all other were abolished. The reforms failed to cut down big land holdings but the division of crops was fixed at sixty percent for the tenant and forty percent for the landlord.<sup>42</sup>

Under Daultana's personal initiative the Provincial Muslim League started a 'grow more food' campaign, and the League workers were directed to assist the government in its activities against black-marketing and food hoarding. A committee was formed consisting of party leaders which was to visit every district of the province to explain to the people the various aspects of the land reforms and food campaign.<sup>43</sup> Another committee was appointed consisting of the President of District Muslim Leagues to suggest practical methods of ensuring reforms in the administration to remove corruption, inefficiency and nepotism from the provincial administration.

### III

After the death of Liaquat Ali Khan, Khawaja Nazim-ud-Din who was then the Governor General and had been performing his duties as a constitutional head became Prime Minister. Ghulam Muhammad, the then Finance Minister moved up to the office of Governor-General. Mumtaz Daultana's hands were considerably weakened by the assassination of Liaquat Ali Khan. From the mid of 1952, Daultana's problems multiplied. For one, the *Anti-*

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42 *The Pakistan Times*, 28 June 1952.

43 Keith Callard, p.42.

*Ahmadiya* movement began to assume greater significance, as religious leaders of different schools of thought plunged into the controversy.

On 21 January a deputation of the *Ulema* authorized by the *Majlis-i-Amal* set up by the All Pakistan Muslim Parties Convention<sup>44</sup> delivered to Prime Minister Khawaja Nazim-ud-Din an ultimatum which threatened to launch a direct action if within a month *Qadiani* or *Ahmadis* were not declared a non-Muslim minority and Chaudhari Zafarullah Khan, the Foreign Minister, who was an *Ahmadi* and other *Ahmadis* occupying key posts in the state were not removed from different offices. There can be no better example of this desire to avoid action against any agitation which adopts the guise of religion, than the history of the events culminating in the Punjab disturbances of 1953. The point at issue was the hostility of the orthodox Muslims toward *Ahmadis*. The *Ahmadis* believed in the teaching of Mirza Ghulam Ahmad, who claimed to be prophet as well as the promised Messiah.<sup>45</sup> This claim was regarded as heretical by orthodox Muslims who hold that Muhammad (PBUH) was the last of the Prophet. The *Ahmadis* were reputed to have 200,000 members in Pakistan, and included some distinguished and prominent men.<sup>46</sup>

The agitation against the *Ahmadis* was led by religious leaders, and the early stages of the movement were conducted by members of the *Ahrar*, a political group which had aligned itself with the Indian National Congress before independence and was unsparing in its denunciation of the Muslim League and the Quaid-

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44 The most prominent Ulema who joined the movement were: Maulana Ghulam Muhammad Turanam, President Jamiat al-Ulma-i-Pakistan, Punjab; Maulana Mufti Muhammad Hussain, Jamiat al-Ulma-i-Islam Punjab; Maulana Ahmad Ali, Amir Anjuman Khudam al-Din Lahore; Maulana Syed Muhammad Dawood Ghaznavi, President Jamiat Jamiat Ahil-hadith Punjab; Maulana Muhammad Ali, Nazam-i-Ala Majlis-i-Ahrar-i-Islam Punjab; Maulana Syed Nur-ul-Hassan Bukhari, Nazam-i-Ala Tenzim Ahal-i-Sunnat-o-al-Jamat Pakistan and Syed Muzaffar Ali Shamse, Idara Tufaz Huqooq Shia Pakistan.

45 Justice M.Munir, *Report of the Court of Inquiry Constituted under Punjab Act II of 1954 to Enquire into the Anti-Qadiani Riots of 1953* (Lahore: Government Printing Press, 1954), p.131.

46 *Ibid.*, pp.131-132.

i-Azam Muhammad Ali Jinnah down to the day of the partition.<sup>47</sup> The disillusioned *Ahrars* saw no political role before them, after independence. They had, now turned their organization into a purely religious body and had aligned themselves with Muslim League. The *Ahrar* party had been excluded from the list of the nineteen parties which were banned for the Muslim Leaguers.<sup>48</sup> As an *Anti-Ahmadiya*, the *Ahrar* won the support of many of the more reputable *Ulema*.<sup>49</sup> The methods, they employed were the holding of public meetings, especially in mosques, processions and the passing of emotional resolutions.

The leaders of the movement attended a meeting in Karachi and described it as the All Pakistan Muslim Parties Convention. The following resolutions were among those passed:

that since in view of the attitude of Khawaja Nazimuddin, Prime Minister of Pakistan, there is no hope of the demands in respect of the *Mirzais* (*Ahmadis*) being accepted, the All Muslim Parties Convention comes to the conclusion that in the circumstances *rast iqdam* (direct action) has become inevitable to secure acceptance of the demands. That since the demand for the removal of Sir Zafrullah Khan, the *Mirzai* Foreign Minister, has not yet been conceded, the convention demands the resignation of Khawaja Nazimuddin, so that the Muslims of Pakistan should be able to follow and preserve their religious beliefs and Islamic tradition.<sup>50</sup>

The Convention also appointed a Council of Action which was to make a last approach to the Central Government before resorting to other measures. The movement had various phases of intensity, in which deputations of *ulema* were sent from time to time to convince the Prime Minister of the validity of the Committee's demands. Indeed, as consequence of this continued *Anti-Ahmadiya* agitation, the *ulema* were able to get more Islamic provisions incorporated in the constitution report.<sup>51</sup>

The Central Government and Provincial Government made no serious attempt to suppress the fast growing campaign. On the

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47 L. Binder, *Religion and Politics in Pakistan* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1961), p.268.

48 Justice M. Munir, pp.263-264.

49 *The Pakistan Times*, 16 January 1953.

50 Justice M. Munir, pp.132.

51 Taquiddin Ahmad, *Pakistan Ke Siyasey Jamiatian Aur Terikhian* (Lahore: Fiction House, 1995), p.364.

contrary, there were substantial indications of government support or acceptance of the demands. Mumtaz Daultana, the Chief Minister of the Punjab, made it clear that he personally accepted the view that the *Ahmadis* were non-Muslims, but it presented a problem for the Constituent Assembly and the Central Government.<sup>52</sup> This was a clever political move, since it enabled Mumtaz Daultana to show his sympathy for the demands while explaining that the solution of the problem could come only from Karachi. Various agencies and supporters of the Punjab Government went much farther than the Chief Minister in their support for the *Anti-Ahmadiya* movement. The Punjab Education Department spent more than 200,000 rupees in two years in subsidies to newspapers.<sup>53</sup> The concerned newspapers, said the Munir report were all actively engaged in this controversy and went on fanning the agitation even during the days that they were receiving the payments.<sup>54</sup> In 1951, the Punjab Government established a Department of Islamiyat for purposes of religious education. A board of six *ulema* was set up, four of them played a prominent part in the movement and two of them were subsequently arrested. The department employed eighteen persons as lecturer, and of these eleven took a leading role in the agitation and seven were arrested later on.<sup>55</sup> The Punjab Muslim League was also prominent in its support for the forces of disorder. The police prepared a list of 377 members of the League who were involved in the disturbances.<sup>56</sup> It noted:

These gentlemen took part in processions, leading violent mobs, violating orders promulgated under section 144 and collecting funds with a view to financing the movement. Among the persons in this list were presidents, senior vice-presidents, secretaries, treasurers and other office holders of the various Muslim League organizations in the province. Four of them were councilors of the Provincial Muslim League, five were members of the Muslim National Guards, two were advocates and one an editor of Urdu daily.<sup>57</sup>

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52 Justice M.Munir, pp.263-264.

53 *Ibid.*, p.83.

54 *Ibid.*, p.144.

55 *Ibid.*, p.88.

56 *Ibid.*

57 *Ibid.*, pp.266-267.

The Central Government, even though its Foreign Minister was under personal attack, was little more resolute. Its policy for several months was described as one of 'indecision, hesitancy and vacillation'.<sup>58</sup> The Central Council of Action had couched their demands of January 1953 in the form of an ultimatum. This expired on 22 February 1953 and direct action was planned to begin on 27 February 1953. In the Punjab more than 55,000 volunteers were enrolled for the campaign.<sup>59</sup> On receipt of the four latest alarming reports, the Central Cabinet met in the morning of 27 February 1953. The Governor of Sindh, the Governor and Chief Minister of N.W.F.P, the Deputy Chief of Staff and police officials were in attendance.<sup>60</sup> It was decided to arrest the leaders of the agitation and to ban certain inflammatory newspapers.<sup>61</sup> But by this time the mob was ready to go into action. Mass demonstrations against the police, the *Ahmadis* and the government soon interrupted normal life in Lahore and other towns in the Punjab. By 4 March 1953, areas of the walled city of Lahore had been taken over by the rioters and the police had abandoned the pretence of having the situation under control. By midday on 6 March 1953, communications had been largely severed and the electricity supply had been partly suspended. Several shops were burnt and the situation inside the city became precarious. When the agitations were at its peak, Mumtaz Daultana himself openly demanded that *Ahmadis* be declared as non-Muslims and Zafarullah Khan may be dismissed from the cabinet.<sup>62</sup> Civil government had virtually ceased to exist and Mumtaz Daultana was prepared to capitulate. He issued a statement in Urdu which he later described in the following words,

On the 6<sup>th</sup> of this month, I appealed on behalf of my ministry and myself to the people of the province to help in the maintenance of law and order. I assured them that my government would be prepared to open immediate negotiations with the leaders of the *Tahafuz-i-Khatm-i-Nubuwwat Movement*, and that my ministers would place their demands before the

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58 *Ibid.*, p.167.

59 Hamid Yusuf, *Pakistan in Search of Democracy, 1947-1977* (Lahore: Afrasian Publications, 1980), p.41.

60 Keith Callard, p.207.

61 *The Pakistan Times*, 8 February 1953.

62 *Dawn*, 9 March 1953.

Central Government with a recommendation that these should be accepted.<sup>63</sup>

The province of the Punjab was up in flames. The disturbances which immediately broke out spread fast and grew alarmingly dangerous. Mumtaz Daultana was neither averse to these developments nor dared to oppose them. He sought to switch the agitation towards Karachi to the discomfiture of Khawaja Nazim-ud-Din. A political clash between the Punjab leadership and the Central Government of Khawaja Nazim-ud-Din cast its shadow over the whole country. Khawaja Nazim-ud-Din, when faced with the crisis appeared undecided, being torn by conflicting considerations. It was the Defence Secretary, Iskandar Mirza who decided to take firm action with the support of army, and imposed Martial Law in the province.<sup>64</sup> The order was restored by the army in a matter of six hours. Eleven people were killed and at least forty nine were wounded during the military operation. Martial Law remained in effect in Lahore until May 1953.<sup>65</sup>

Another issue which became a cause of an unending controversy between Mumtaz Daultana and Khawaja Nazim-ud-Din was the Basic Principles Committee Report which published in December 1952. Mumtaz Daultana visited Karachi in January 1953 to convey the feelings of the Punjab people to the League leaders and to the members of the Central Cabinet.<sup>66</sup> During the same period, meetings were held in Lahore, which criticized the Report and expressed dissatisfaction against it. Sardar Abdur Rab Nishtar came to Lahore and addressed the Provincial League Council meeting. He elucidated the Islamic aspects of the Report, but even then the League Council urged the Constituent Assembly to postpone the consideration of the Report. The Council also authorized the Working Committee to negotiate with the High Command. Meanwhile, it was announced that the Prime Minister himself was coming to Lahore for finding out the peoples' reactions.<sup>67</sup> But these efforts failed to convince the people of the

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63 *Ibid.*, 13 March 1953.

64 *The Pakistan Times*, 26 March 1953.

65 Syed Nur Ahmad, p.321.

66 Z. A. Sulleri, *Pakistan's Lost Years* (Lahore: Progressive Publishers, 1962), p.78.

67 *Dawn*, 11 April 1953.

Punjab. Consequently, the consideration of the Basic Principles Committee Report was postponed.<sup>68</sup>

On 25 March 1953, came the news of the resignation of Mumtaz Daultana and his ministry. According to a news report, Daultana was “understood to have taken this step on the mandate and at the behest of Khawaja Nazim-ud-Din. His resignation is an outcome of two days behind the curtain scene activities in Lahore and is the culmination of the month old *Anti-Ahmadiya* agitation”.<sup>69</sup> When the law was being violated in Lahore, Khawaja Nazim-ud-Din continued to approve the decisions of the officials but he also tried to avoid a clash. He held conciliatory talks and compromised on the issue which resulted in more opposition to him. It was the time for Governor General, Ghulam Muhammad to take a decisive step but he waited about a month and permitted Khawaja Nazim-ud-Din to announce some actions in his own name. The decisions were;

- i. Daultana was to be asked to resign as Chief Minister of the Punjab and as President of the Punjab Muslim League.
- ii. In Daultana’s place, the Governor of East Bengal, Malik Firoz Khan Noon would become Chief Minister.
- iii. Chaudhury Khaliquzzaman would replace Noon.
- iv. Daultana himself was to propose Noon as his successor, and he would leave the Punjab for sometime.<sup>70</sup>

### Conclusion

It was generally believed that two factors led to Daultana’s exit. First, the Basic Principles Committee Report was responsible for widening the gulf between him and Khawaja Nazim-ud-Din. It was found at a later stage that Daultana refused to sign the Report although he was a member of the Committee. Later, he signed it with a dissenting note and this was not liked by Khawaja Nazim-ud-Din. The second reason was the *Anti-Ahmadyia* agitation. This movement completely shattered law and order in the Punjab. Lahore, the nerve centre of the agitation, remained under Martial Law from March to May 1953. Mumtaz Daultana tried to divert

68 *The Pakistan Times*, 29 November 1953.

69 Wakil Anjum, *Daultana Dastan*, [Urdu] (Lahore: Jang Publishers, 1996), p.363.

70 *Ibid.*

the movement toward the centre to destabilize the Khawaja Nazim-ud-Din Government, but this cost him his own office and paved the way for the dismissal of Khawaja Nazim-ud-Din too. Mumtaz Daultana also resigned from the Presidentship of the Punjab Muslim League.

After gaining an obvious power in the province, Mumtaz Daultana started interfering in the affairs of the Central Government. His ministry in the Punjab was trying to destabilize Khawaja Nazim-ud-Din's administration in the center, like organizing *Anti-Ahmadiya* disturbances for which he willfully misused public money for which it was not intended. Not only that he did not take effective measures against lawless and reactionary elements, but he either encouraged them or took decisions which were clearly unwarranted from the administrative point of view. For instance, he allowed the withdrawal of criminal cases instituted against the agitators and even directing the release of some convicted persons. So, it was an attempt to undermine the stability of Pakistan by diverting the subversive *Anti-Ahmadiya* movement against the Central Government with the intentions of impairing and, if possible, destroying its authority and prestige. In the early years of Pakistan, the Muslim League's Government in the province of the Punjab, instead of focusing on resolving the problems of its masses, it mainly revolved around its' political leadership for their personal interests which not only degenerated its fame within the province rather it had effected its recognition in the entire country.