

# ***The British Plan of the Partition of the Punjab in 1947***

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## **Abstract**

*Lord Mountbatten replaced Lord Wavell as the thirty fourth (and the last) Viceroy of India on March 22, 1947. Mountbatten announced the British Plan for the transfer of power on June 3, 1947. Under the Plan, the Governor General was authorized to set up Boundary Commissions, its membership and terms of reference were to be settled in consultation with those concerned in the event of partition of India. The provinces of Punjab and Bengal had been divided provisionally between Pakistan and India on the basis of Muslim and non-Muslim majority districts. The final boundaries of the Punjab and Bengal were to be determined by two Boundary Commissions, on which the Muslim League and the Congress had nominated two judges each. Sir Cyril Radcliffe, member of the British Privy Council, was appointed as Chairman of both the Commissions. The proposed study, however, concentrates exclusively on the British Plan of the Partition of Punjab.*

## **Introduction**

The British Plan of the Partition of Punjab has always been a conflicting case. This paper attempts to explore the reasons behind the ambiguities underlying the Partition. The Plan of the said province is very complicated. The political figures involved in the plan, need to be seen at close quarters to

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understand the implications behind their actions. First and foremost is the Viceroy, Lord Mountbatten, then the political figures of the Congress and the Muslim League i.e. Nehru and Muhammad Ali Jinnah, respectively.

The Partition in 1947 provoked a long and bitter controversy among historians, civil servants and the masses. The focus of controversy was Mountbatten, who was accused of influencing Radcliffe, the Chairman of Boundary Commission, in altering the demarcated lines of the boundaries at the last stage. It was alleged that Mountbatten prevailed upon Radcliffe to allot Ferozepore, Zira and a large portion of Gurdaspur district to India; linking it with the state of Jammu and Kashmir. In other words, the Award was altered to help India and harm Pakistan. Mountbatten wanted to become the common Governor General of the two new states i.e. India and Pakistan. While Nehru had agreed to oblige him, Jinnah did not. That infuriated Mountbatten, as his ego was hurt and thus, prompted him to create problems for Pakistan.<sup>1</sup>

On February 19, 1946 the British Government decided to send to India a Cabinet Mission to seek an agreement on the constitutional problems. The Mission arrived in New Delhi on March 24, 1946.<sup>2</sup> It met the leaders of different political parties in India and discussed the constitutional issues with them which could not reach at any agreement. On May 19, 1946 the Mission and the Viceroy offered their own plan, popularly known as 'Cabinet Mission Plan'.<sup>3</sup> The plan

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- 1 Mian Muhammad Sadullah, *The Partition of the Punjab 1947: A Compilation of official Document*, vol. I (Lahore: Sang-e-Meel Publications, 1993), 267-68; also see Philip Ziegler, *Mountbatten: The Official Biography* (London: Collins, 1985), 397-98.
  - 2 Chaudhri Muhammad Ali, *The Emergence of Pakistan* (Lahore: Research Society of Pakistan, 1958, reprinted for Service Book Club, 1973), 52; also see V. P. Menon, *The Transfer of Power in India* (Bombay: Orient Longmans, 1975), 236.
  - 3 Nicholas Mansergh and Penderel Moon, eds., *Constitutional Relations between British and India: The Transfer of Power, 1942-47*, vol. II (London: Her Majesty's Stationary Office, 1973-83), 583.

proposed a three tier constitutional scheme which suggested that:

- i. There should be a Union India embracing both British India and the States (Council accepted a Union Centre for ten years strictly confined to three subjects, viz, Defence, Foreign Affairs and Communications),
- ii. There should be three groups of provinces; group A, consisting of the six Hindu majority provinces; group B, comprising of the four provinces, the Punjab, North West Frontier province, Sindh and Balochistan, and group C, including the provinces of Bengal and Assam,
- iii. The provinces and the states should be the basic units. All subjects other than the Union subjects and all residuary powers would vest in the provinces; the states would retain all subjects and powers other than those seeded to the Union.<sup>4</sup>

The Congress rejected the proposal for an interim government, but agreed to participate in the Constituent Assembly to frame the constitution of a free United India.<sup>5</sup> The League Council after analyzing the pros and cons of the Plan; passed a resolution on June 6, 1946 to accept both the long and short term proposals of the Plan.<sup>6</sup> The League accepted the Plan because it desired a peaceful solution to the constitutional problems and, deep down, hoped that the compulsory grouping of the six Muslim provinces proposed by the Cabinet Mission Plan would ultimately result in the formation of Pakistan. The Sikh community of the Punjab did not like the Cabinet Mission Plan and the Congress exploited their sentiments.

On July 10, 1946, Nehru took over as President of the Congress from Maulana Azad. On the same day, he held a press conference in Bombay in which he stated that the

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4 Ali, *Emergence of Pakistan*, 55-57. Also see Sharif-al-Mujahid, *Quaid-i-Azam Jinnah: Studies in Interpretation* (Karachi: Quaid-i-Azam Academy, 1981), 502.

5 Menon, *Transfer of Power*, 269.

6 Ahmed Saeed, ed., *The Eastern Times on Quaid-i-Azam* (Islamabad: National Institute of Historical and Cultural Research, 1983), 307-308; also see Ali, *Emergence of Pakistan*, 60.

Congress would join the Constituent Assembly “completely unfettered by agreement and free to meet all situations as they arise”.<sup>7</sup> He further declared that the Congress had agreed only to enter the Constituent Assembly that it would see appropriate.<sup>8</sup> On July 18, 1946 Lord Pethick Lawrence and Stafford Cripps made statements in the Parliament supporting, more or less, the Congress position. In a meeting of the Council held on July 27, 1946 in Bombay, the Muslim League decided to withdraw its previous acceptance of the long-term Plan.<sup>9</sup>

The Viceroy on August 6, 1946 after consultation with the British Government invited Nehru to form an interim government. On August 8, 1946 the Congress Working Committee accepted the Viceroy’s invitation.<sup>10</sup> On August 24, 1946, the Viceroy announced the names of the members of the interim government and on September 2, 1946 the interim government took office without the League. The League protested the British interpretation of the Congress acceptance of the plan and thus refused to become part of any proceedings associated with the Cabinet Mission Plan. August 16, 1946 was declared to be the ‘Direct Action Day’ to achieve its Pakistan demand.<sup>11</sup> On that day, thousands were killed in Calcutta and a spate of communal violence triggered throughout India. The Viceroy was left with no option but to make the League join the Government. The Muslim League was given five portfolios, and it selected Liaquat Ali Khan as its first finance minister. On February 20, 1947 Prime Minister Attlee made an historic announcement

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7 Ali, *Emergence of Pakistan*, 67; also see H. M Seervai, *Partition of India: Legend and Reality* (Bombay: Maneek Davar for Emmennem Publisher, 1989), 57.

8 Ali, *Emergence of Pakistan*, 67; also see Seervai, *Partition of India*, 57.

9 Sikandar Hayat, *Aspects of the Pakistan Movement* (Islamabad: National Institute of Historical and Cultural Research, 1998), 35; also see Seervai, *Partition of India*, 59.

10 Ali, *Emergence of Pakistan*, 74; Menon, *Transfer of Power*, 293.

11 Seervai, *Partition of India*, 39; also see Penderel Moon, *Divide and Quit* (London: Chatoo & Windus, 1962), 72. Penderel Moon was Revenue Minister of Bahawalpur State at the time of Partition.

in the House of Commons by saying that power will be transferred to Indian leaders by June, 1948.

On February 28, 1947 Liaquat Ali Khan, General Secretary of the All India Muslim League (AIML) and a member of the interim government presented to the Central Assembly the budget as an India's finance minister. It was a 'people's budget', as the finance minister himself called it. Measures had to be taken for the abolition of economic exploitation by the few rich.<sup>12</sup> His revolutionary budget created frustration among Hindu capitalists. It increased rift between the Hindus and the Muslims.<sup>13</sup> As the last Viceroy of British India, Mountbatten should have acted in a fair and impartial manner, but his behaviour, as the turn of events was to show, left much to be desired. Even before his appointment, "Mountbatten had the reputation of being pro-Congress and anti-Muslim League".<sup>14</sup> The British Government wanted to preserve United India at all costs. So, it gave powers to Mountbatten to act accordingly, while deciding the fate of the Subcontinent. He had to find out whether the Cabinet Mission Plan could still be implemented, and if not, then what would be the best alternative.<sup>15</sup>

Mountbatten arrived in Delhi on March 22, 1947 and took over the charge as Governor General of India. Though the British Government had announced the transfer of power in India by June 1948, he decided to bring forward the process of Indian Independence ten months earlier. Since his arrival in India, he was working closely with Menon, a Hindu bureaucrat with pro-Congress mindset, to carve out the Partition Plan. In a letter to Menon, Mountbatten acknowledged this association in these words:

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12 Ali, *Emergence of Pakistan*, 105-106.

13 Maulana Abul Kalam Azad, *India Wins Freedom* (Calcutta: Orient Longmans, 1988), 175-76.

14 Akbar. S. Ahmed, *Islamic Identity: The Search for Saladin* (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 1979), 120; also see Zafrullah Khan, *The Agony of Pakistan* (Oxford: Alden Press, 1973), 44.

15 Ali, *Emergence of Pakistan*, 116; also see Akber, *Islamic Identity*, 123.

It was indeed fortunate that you were Reforms Commissioner on my staff and thus we were brought together into close association with one another at a very earlier stage .... History must always rate that decision very high, and I owe it to your advice, given in the teeth of considerable opposition ....<sup>16</sup>

The British and the Hindu leaders failed to keep India united and therefore, they worked to concede Pakistan on such terms that could put its survival at stake. Nehru, Patel and Mountbatten had doubts about the creation, survival and future of Pakistan.<sup>17</sup> Besides, the Sikhs demanded the partition of Punjab. By this time, they were so taken in by Congress leaders that they became blind to their true interests. Jinnah and Liaquat Ali Khan tried their best to persuade the Sikh leaders, but all such efforts failed. To quote Ispahani:

It was during this critical period that the Quaid-i-Azam endeavoured his best to persuade the Sikhs to see reason, not to press for a tiny state but to join hands with the Muslims and share their good or bad fortune. He guaranteed all the freedom that they wanted and assure them a life free from the fear of overlordship, a life of peace and prosperity. But they refused to see reason and accept the hand of friendship which was being offered to them on behalf of the Muslims. With the approach of Independence, Liaquat Ali Khan had several talks with his Cabinet colleague, Baldev Singh. Mr. Jinnah met Sikh leaders and assured them that if they joined us, they would receive a very fair deal. In the later state, on the eve of Independence he was ever prepared to concede to the Sikhs a small homeland of their own within the borders of West Pakistan, wherein they could be autonomous in the day to day life and administration of the State.<sup>18</sup>

The Congress needed an ally against the Muslim League and thus gave the Sikhs all possible support "in removing their legitimate grievances".<sup>19</sup> In response to the

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16 Leonard Mosley, *The Last Days of the British Raj* (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1961), 127.

17 Mohammad Zahid Khan Lodhi, *Mountbatten: Facts about the Partition* (Lahore: Annore Publishers, 1993), 22.

18 M. A. H. Ispahani, *Quaid-i-Azam Jinnah as I Knew Him* (Karachi: Ferozsons, 1959), 258.

19 *Quaid-i-Azam Jinnah as I Knew Him*, 75.

demand of Sikh leaders, All India National Congress Committee passed a resolution during March 6-8, 1947 asking for partition of the provinces of Punjab and Bengal, so that predominantly non-Muslim part may be separated from Muslim part.<sup>20</sup> Gandhi was in Bihar at that time; his consent was not taken at all. So he wrote to Patel and Nehru to explain the resolution. Patel replied that it was hard to explain to him, but it was neither adopted thoughtlessly nor in a hurry. So he should not oppose the resolution.<sup>21</sup>

The Congress demand for the partition of Punjab and Bengal was put forward in the hope to prevent Jinnah from demanding Pakistan. It was generally believed that if Jinnah agreed to the partition of Punjab and Bengal, there would be violent reaction from the Muslim League.<sup>22</sup> The demand, in fact, appeared to be designed to make Pakistan so unattractive to the Muslim League that it may prefer a union centre over a truncated Pakistan. Otherwise the Congress wanted to minimize the size of Pakistan. They argued that if the Muslims were given a separate state, solely on the basis of religion, then, logically, areas with a Hindu majority should have the right to choose for India or Pakistan. That would mean the partition not of India only, but also the partition of Punjab and Bengal.<sup>23</sup>

Jinnah appealed to Mountbatten, in their early meetings, "not to destroy the unity of Bengal and Punjab, which had national characteristic in common history, common ways of life".<sup>24</sup> He pressed on him to avoid a 'moth-eaten Pakistan'.<sup>25</sup>

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20 Ishtiaq Ahmad, "The 1947 Partition of Punjab: Arguments Put Forth before the Punjab Boundary Commission by the Parties Involved", in Ian Talbot and Gurharpal Singh, ed., *Region and Partition Bengal, Punjab and the Partition of the Subcontinent* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999), 326.

21 S. K. Majumdar, *Jinnah and Gandhi: Their Role in India's Quest for Freedom* (Lahore: People's Publishing House, 1976), 284.

22 Viceroy's Interview with Maulana Abul Kalam Azad, April 12, 1947, Mountbatten Papers, File No. 192.

23 Muhammad Yousuf Khan, *Glory of Quaid-i-Azam* (Multan: Carwan Book Centre, 1976), 190.

24 Ayesha Jalal, *The Sole Spokesman: Jinnah, The Muslim League and the Demand for Pakistan* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985), 252.

Mountbatten, however, insisted that he could not agree to the partition of India without agreeing to that of the Punjab and Bengal. He added that since partition was on the basis of the Muslim majority areas and there were Muslim minority areas in Punjab and Bengal, those provinces should also be partitioned. He appealed to the Congress leaders not to raise the question at this stage and assured them that he would himself raise it at a proper time.<sup>26</sup> On June 3, 1947 Mountbatten announced the partition and transfer of its authority to the dominions of India and Pakistan; the date of transfer of power would be August 15, 1947.<sup>27</sup>

The publication of the Partition Plan was preceded by a broadcast by the Viceroy in which he explained that more than a century, millions of people lived together in the Subcontinent and ruled as a single entity. His great hope was that communal differences will not break the single entity. He therefore, urged the political leaders to accept the Cabinet Mission Plan because it provided the best arrangement to fulfil the interest of all communities living in India. He regretted that the Cabinet Mission Plan, which could preserve the unity of India, was not accepted. He said that it was impossible for the people to live against their will under a government, which did not represent them. As the

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25 Meeting between Jinnah and Mountbatten, April 10, 1947, Nicholas Mansergh, *The Transfer of Power, 1942-47*, vol. X, 116 and No. 101, 159.

26 Azad, *India Wins Freedom*, 205.

27 The Partition Plan included that: As soon as a decision involving partition has been taken for the provinces [of the Punjab], a Boundary Commission will be set up by the Governor General, the membership and terms of reference of which will be settled in consultation with those the two parts of the Punjab on the basis of ascertaining the contiguous majority areas of Muslims and non-Muslims. It will also be instructed to take into account 'other factors...' until the report of a Boundary Commission has been put into effect, the provisional boundaries indicated in the Appendix will be used. Mian Muhammad Sadullah, *The Partition of the Punjab 1947: a compilation of official documents*, Vol. I, VII. The Appendix gave a list of the Muslim majority districts of the Punjab according to the 1941 Census, as follows: Lahore Division: Gujranwala, Gurdaspur, Lahore, Sheikhpura and Sialkot; Rawalpindi Division: Attock, Gujrat, Jehlum, Mianwali, Rawalpindi and Shahpure; Multan Division: Dera Ghazi Khan, Jhang, Lyallpur, Montgomery, Multan and Muzaffargarh. Sadullah, *The Partition of the Punjab*, vol. III, 5-6.

Muslim League and the Congress could not come to an agreement, it had been decided to partition India according to the wishes of the people of India.<sup>28</sup>

Nehru welcomed the Partition Plan as a "big advance towards complete independence".<sup>29</sup> Jinnah, of course, left it to the Muslim League to decide whether to accept the Plan as a 'compromise or a settlement'. In his broadcast of June 3, 1947, he observed that: "We cannot say or feel that we are satisfied or that we agree with some of the matters dealt with by the Plan. It is for us to consider whether the Plan... should be accepted as a compromise or a settlement..."<sup>30</sup> Although the Subcontinent was divided on the basis of 'Two-Nation Theory', Mountbatten tried his best to favour the Sikhs as if they were the 'third nation'.<sup>31</sup>

The Muslim League's nomination of Jinnah as Pakistan's first Governor General upset Mountbatten's plan to become one of both Pakistan and India, as India had already accepted him. Muslim masses were also not willing to accept anyone else as their leader other than Jinnah. He was their leader, and they wanted him to continue to lead them in the future state of Pakistan. Mountbatten, of course, had his own vanity and pride before him. He was distraught. In his personal note on July 4, 1947, he recorded the following exchange made on July 2, 1947 between the two of them: "Mountbatten; do you realize what this will cost you? Quaid-i-Azam; it may cost me several crores of rupees in assets. Mountbatten; it may well cost you the whole of your assets and the future of Pakistan".<sup>32</sup> Mountbatten stressed that he

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28 Sadullah, *The Partition of the Punjab*, Vol. I, 1-2.

29 Nehru's broadcast on June 3, 1947, Mansergh, *The Transfer of Power*, vol. I, 94-97.

30 Text of the broadcast by Jinnah on June 3, 1947, Mansergh, *The Transfer of Power*, vol. XI, 47.

31 Sadullah, *The Partition of the Punjab*, vol. III, 7.

32 H. V. Hodson, *The Great Divide: Britain, India, Pakistan* (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 1985), 331. Also see Seervai, *Partition of India*, 130-31.

said those words 'acidly' and then got up and left the room. He described that dialogue as a 'bombshell'.<sup>33</sup>

Jinnah protested against the partition of Punjab and Bengal. He offered a proposal for a proper referendum in the Punjab and Bengal on the basis of protection of the rights of the minorities. However, Congress as indicated earlier was keen on the partition of both the provinces. Jinnah argued, but in vain: "It is a mistake to compare the basic principle of the demand of Pakistan and the demand of cutting up provinces throughout India into fragmentation. I hope that neither the Viceroy nor his Majesty's Government will fall into this trap and commit a great error".<sup>34</sup>

Mountbatten, perhaps, had already in his mind the areas, which were to 'form Pakistan' and wanted to make it 'economically very difficult', so that it would be 'almost unworkable'.<sup>35</sup> The Muslim League Council met in Delhi on June 9, 1947, and passed a resolution authorizing Jinnah to accept or reject the Partition Plan. Finally, however, the Muslim League accepted the 'fundamental' principles of the partition not as a 'settlement' but as a 'compromise'.<sup>36</sup> It accepted the Plan, because it appeared to be the only possible solution of the constitutional problem of India.<sup>37</sup> Six days later, on June 15, the Congress accepted Partition Plan

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33 Muhammad Yusuf Khan, *The Glory of Quaid-i-Azam* (Multan: Carvan Book Centre, 1976), 190.

34 M. Rafique Afzal, ed., *Selected Speeches and Statements of the Quaid-i-Azam Muhammad Ali Jinnah [1911-34 and 1947-48]* (Pakistan: Research Society of Pakistan, 1966), 437. also see Quaid's Statement, May 4, 1947 quoted in Lodhi, *The Partition*, 30.

35 Mansergh, *The Transfer of Power*, vol. X, No.116, 186-87; also see Lodhi, *The Partition*, 30.

36 Resolution by AIML Council at Delhi, June 9, 1947, Mansergh, *The Transfer of Power 1942-7*, vol. X1 *The Mountbatten Viceroyalty Announcement and Reception of the 3rd June Plan, 31 May—7 July, 1947*, 1271; also see Quaid's statement, May 4, 1947 and Resolution of June 9, AIML, in Sharifuddin Pirzada, ed., *Foundation of Pakistan: All India Muslim League Documents, 1906-1947*, vol. III (Karachi: Royal Book Company 1990), 568.

37 Record of Interview between Viceroy, Jinnah and Liaquat, June 7, 1947, Mansergh, *The Transfer of Power*, vol. XI, 101.

as the final settlement.<sup>38</sup> That is how the partition of India was finally secured by the British Government.

Subsequent to the British Prime Minister, Clement Attlee's statement made on February 20, 1947, it was decided by the Government that the Punjab and Bengal assemblies (excluding the European members) would meet in two parts, one representing the Muslim majority districts and the other the non-Muslim majority districts. The members of the legislative assembly would have the power to vote in favour or against the partition. If a simple majority of both parts voted in favour of partition, the partition would take place and the two parts would decide which constituent assembly it would join.<sup>39</sup> For the purpose of ascertaining the population of districts, the 1941 Census figures will be the final count.<sup>40</sup> A Boundary Commission would be set up by the Governor General, the membership and terms of reference would be settled in consultation with the concerned people.

The Punjab Assembly was divided into two parts, Eastern and Western, and both the assemblies met on June 23, 1947. The West Punjab Assembly voted against the partition by 99 votes to 27, whereas the East Punjab Assembly voted in favour of the partition of the province by 50 votes to 22.<sup>41</sup> The fate of the Punjab was settled as the Sikh and Hindu members of the Punjab Assembly voted in favour of the partition. It resulted in the partition of the Punjab. The full machinery for administering partition was set in motion.

#### **Terms of Reference: 'Other Factors'**

In the meantime, the Viceroy, Mountbatten, discussed with the Indian leaders the terms of reference and the composition of the Boundary Commission. On June 12,

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38 AICC's Resolution, June 15, 1947, Mansergh, *The Transfer of Power*, vol. XI, 397-98.

39 Sadullah, *The Partition of the Punjab*, vol. I, 5.

40 Sadullah, *The Partition of the Punjab*, vol. I, 5.

41 Sadullah, *The Partition of the Punjab*, vol. I, VII.

Nehru sent his draft to Mountbatten regarding the terms of reference. "The Boundary Commission is instructed to demarcate the boundaries of the two parts of the Punjab on the basis of ascertaining the contiguous majority areas of Muslim and non-Muslims. In doing so it will also take into account other factors".<sup>42</sup>

In a meeting of Muslim League on June 13, Jinnah, Liaquat Ali Khan and Abdur Rab Nishtar accepted the terms of reference suggested by Nehru.<sup>43</sup> The 'other factors' were not specified so nothing could be said about them. Liaquat Ali Khan took notice of the wording 'in doing so'. On June 28, he sent his suggestions and sought that these words 'in doing so' should be omitted. Thus reverting to the original version of Mountbatten's draft, he emphasized the original wording: "The Commission will also take into account 'other factors'". Mountbatten rejected his proposal on the basis that Jinnah had already on June 23, 1947, accepted the Congress wording about 'other factors'.<sup>44</sup> As to the terms proposed by Liaquat Ali Khan, Sir George Abell, Private Secretary to the Viceroy, commented:

The elimination of the words 'in doing so it' [at the beginning of the second sentence] makes a substantial difference. These words indicate that the main emphasis is on the duty of demarcating the boundaries according to the population figures. If they are eliminated and it is simply stated 'that the Commission will also take into account 'other factors'', the Commission is given considerably more freedom than was intended by the terms of reference which was proposed by the Congress and definitely accepted by Mr. Jinnah at his interview on the 23<sup>rd</sup> June.<sup>45</sup>

Finally both parties agreed to the following terms which were announced by the Viceroy on June 30, 1947.<sup>46</sup>

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42 Sadullah, *The Partition of the Punjab*, vol. I, XI; also see Mansergh, *The Transfer of Power*, vol. XI, 729.

43 Nehru to Mountbatten, June 12, 1947, Mansergh, *The Transfer of Power*, vol. XI, 158, 756.

44 Sadullah, *The Partition of the Punjab*, vol. I, No. 56, 72-73.

45 Sadullah, *The Partition of the Punjab*, vol. I, XII.

46 Sadullah, *The Partition of the Punjab*, vol. I, XII.

According to Arthur Henderson, the British Under-Secretary of State for India, the Boundary Commission had the ultimate authority to decide various factors regarding the partition. The location of the shrines of any community was one of the important factors to be considered.<sup>47</sup>

The Muslims, Hindus and Sikhs ultimately agreed to let the Chairman of the Boundary Commission decide the matter.<sup>48</sup> Jinnah and Liaquat protested 'violently' against the statement made by Henderson. The provision that the 'other factors' would take into account had been made to enable the Commission to give special favour to the Sikh community in the Punjab.<sup>49</sup> Henderson readily admitted that the terms of reference of the Boundary Commission were unsatisfactory and not very precise: "So Commission would itself decide what 'other factors' were and how much importance should be attached to all or any of them".<sup>50</sup>

### **Suggestions for Setting up the Boundary Commission**

The leaders of the major political parties of India presented their own views for setting up the Boundary Commission. In a meeting with the Viceroy on June 7, 1947, Jinnah suggested that "the Chairman of the Boundary Commission should be a person with experience of broad-minded principles whereby boundaries were demarcated".<sup>51</sup> In the meeting of June 13, 1947 the Viceroy, the Muslim League, the Congress leaders, and Sardar Baldev Singh (a representative of the Sikhs) were present. The matter about the composition of the Boundary Commission was discussed.

Two alternative suggestions put forward for the composition of the Boundary Commission were as under:

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47 Lodhi, *The Partition*, 33.

48 *Civil and Military Gazette*, July 17, 1947.

49 Lodhi, *The Partition*, 33.

50 *Civil and Military Gazette*, July 16, 1947

51 Sadullah, *The Partition of the Punjab*, vol. I, VIII.

- a. That each Commission should consist of three persons selected through UNO and three experts assessors from each side of each partitioned province;
- b. That each Commission should have an independent Chairman and four other persons two to be nominated by the Congress and two by the Muslim League.<sup>52</sup>

Nehru gave his opinion that suggestion 'a' would involve considerable delay. A lot of time would be wasted as the UNO Headquarters would have to contact and consult each member government. Moreover, there was a possibility that the choice might not be appropriate. He preferred the suggestion 'b', and suggested that all the four persons should be of highly judicial calibre.<sup>53</sup> Jinnah preferred suggestion 'a', but was ready to accept suggestion 'b' also. He wanted to avoid lawyers, because, in his opinion, two or more lawyers would create problems, instead of coming to a settlement. Jinnah then proposed to appoint three judges of the judicial committee of the Privy Council as the member of the proposed commission.<sup>54</sup> Mountbatten rejected the proposal on the ground that the elderly judges would not tolerate the heat of the Indian summer.<sup>55</sup> Mountbatten, however, put forward the suggestion that an experienced person might be obtained through UNO and such a person could be attached to each commission as an advisor.<sup>56</sup>

### **Formation of the Boundary Commission**

There were different suggestions about the formation of a Boundary Commission. It was ultimately decided that the commission would have an independent chairman and four

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52 Sadullah, *The Partition of the Punjab*, vol. I, viii; also see Mansergh, *The Transfer of Power*, vol. XI, 328.

53 Alan-Campbell Johnson, *Mission with Mountbatten* (London: Robert Hale, 1972), 124.

54 Muhammad Zafrullah Khan, *Tehdis-i-Neimat*, 500, quoted by Waheed-uz-Zaman, *Quaid-i-Azam Muhammad Ali Jinnah: Myth and Reality* (Islamabad: National Institute of Historical and Cultural Research, second revised ed, 1985), 111. also see Ali, *Emergence of Pakistan*, 204.

55 Sadullah, *The Partition of the Punjab*, vol. I, viii.

56 Sadullah, *The Partition of the Punjab*, vol. I, ix.

other persons — two nominated by the Congress (of which one was to be a Sikh) and two by the Muslim League. All the four nominated members were to be of high judicial standing. The Muslims and non-Muslim members were equally represented in the Commission.<sup>57</sup> Jinnah and Nehru suggested the names for the Boundary Commission on behalf of Muslim League and Congress. The Muslim League nominated Justice Din Muhammad and Justice Muhammad Munir while the Congress proposed Justice Mehr Chand Mahajan and Justice Teja Singh as their representatives.<sup>58</sup> The chairman of the commission was to be appointed later.<sup>59</sup> The leading counsels also represented the main parties and the cases of the minor communities.<sup>60</sup>

### **Appointment of Sir Cyril Radcliffe as Chairman of the Boundary Commission**

Radcliffe (1899-1978) was a British Lawyer and had little knowledge about India.<sup>61</sup> In spite of it, he was appointed as a Chairman of both the Boundary Commissions and allotted the most complex task to divide the provinces in a very short time.

On June 7, 1947, Mountbatten telegraphed Secretary of State for India, Earl Listowel, and asked him to suggest a member of the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council to be appointed as Chairman of the Arbitral Tribunal.<sup>62</sup> Listowel consulted the Lord Chancellor, Viscount Jowilt, and replied that members of the judicial committee must be ruled out because of their age and that the possibility to make a high court judge available had also to be ruled out due to the

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57 Sadullah, *The Partition of the Punjab*, vol. I, 55.

58 Mansergh, *The Transfer of Power*, vol. XI, 750.

59 Mansergh, *The Transfer of Power*, vol. XI, 755.

60 Sadullah, *The Partition of the Punjab* vol. II, ii.

61 *The Concise Dictionary of National Biography: From Earliest Times to 85*, vol. III, N-Z (New York: Oxford University Press, 1992), 2468. also see Andrew Roberts, *Eminent Churchillians* (London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1994), 91, Hodson, *Great Divide*, 346.

62 Mansergh, *The Transfer of Power*, vol. XI, 259 [n].

pressure of the work. An approach was, however, being made to Radcliffe, who might accept the offer.<sup>63</sup>

In a confidential letter on July 4, 1947, the Earl of Listowel informed Mountbatten that he was satisfied with the appointment of Radcliffe as Chairman of the Boundary Commission. He was sure that Radcliffe would deal with the whole matter in a public spirit. He told Mountbatten that Radcliffe would leave for Delhi.<sup>64</sup> As far as the appointment of the chairman of the Boundary Commission was concerned, Mountbatten clearly played a major role in the selection of Radcliffe. Secondly, Listowel recommended Radcliffe as Chairman of the Arbitral Tribunal only.<sup>65</sup>

### **Radcliffe's Arrival in India**

Radcliffe arrived in India on July 8, 1947. It was agreed that Radcliffe as Chairman of Boundary Commission will have a final 'casting vote'.<sup>66</sup> He stayed with Mountbatten for two days 'to get into the picture'.<sup>67</sup> At his arrival, he was invited by the Viceroy to meet the Indian leaders, Pundit Nehru and Sardar Patel from the Congress and Jinnah and Liaquat Ali Khan from the Muslim League.<sup>68</sup> In that meeting, the Viceroy informed Radcliffe that he had to complete his Award within five weeks.<sup>69</sup> Radcliffe was taken aback, and pointed out that it was a job which would take years to decide properly, but realized the emergency.<sup>70</sup>

Radcliffe stayed at the Controller's House in the Viceregal estate to work in peace, Christopher Beaumont; an

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63 Mansergh, *The Transfer of Power*, vol. XI, 336.

64 Sadullah, *The Partition of the Punjab*, vol. I, 101.

65 Mansergh, *The Transfer of Power*, vol. XI, 259.

66 Sadullah, *The Partition of the Punjab*, vol. I, x.

67 *Viceroy's Personal Report, July 11, 1947* (Islamabad: National Documentation Centre). also see Mansergh, *The Transfer of Power*, vol. XII, 12.

68 Sadullah, *The Partition of the Punjab*, vol. I, iii. also see Hodson, *Great Divide*, 349.

69 Penderal Moon, *Divide and Quit* (London: Chatto & Windus, 1961), 349.

70 Mansergh, *The Transfer of Power*, vol. XI, Mountbatten Staff Meeting, July 8, 1947, 12.

Indian political service officer (retired English Circuit Judge) served him as Secretary.<sup>71</sup> A ‘thirty minutes session’ was the only briefing that was given to him by the British Government (the India Office in London).<sup>72</sup> Radcliffe had to submit the final report by August 15, 1947. He wanted to know whether the urgent decision of the Boundary Commission was more important than all other considerations and should it be made by August 15, 1947, ignoring the flaws that would be the outcome of such hurried work.<sup>73</sup> The answer was that it must be ready by August 15 at any cost.<sup>74</sup>

After two days of stay with Mountbatten and some meetings with the Indian leaders, Radcliffe “plunged into an experience which was to haunt him for the rest of his life”.<sup>75</sup> Both governments (India and Pakistan) had promised to accept the Award of the Boundary Commission, whatever it may be.<sup>76</sup> On July 22, 1947, the Partition Council signed a joint statement to the effect that both the Governments would take steps to enforce the Award as soon as it was announced.<sup>77</sup> Johnson noted that “Mountbatten regarded it as a personal triumph and was greatly elated and excited over this coup, but frankly did not believe that either party really knew what it was signing.”<sup>78</sup>

### **Functioning of the Boundary Commission**

Radcliffe started work in New Delhi on July 8, 1947. He reached Lahore on July 14, 1947, where the Commission had already started its work. All the parties i.e. Muslims,

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71 Burke, *The British Raj*, 500.

72 Alastair Lamb, *Incomplete Partition: The Genesis of the Kashmir Dispute 1947-1948* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1997), 72.

73 Hodson, *Great Divide*, 347.

74 Mansergh, *The Transfer of Power*, vol. XII, Minutes of Viceroy’s fifty-fourth Staff Meeting, Item.1, Boundary Commission, 12. Also see Roberts, *Eminent Churchillians*, 92.

75 Prem Vati Ghai, *The Partition of the Punjab 1849-1947* (New Delhi: Munshiram Manoharlal, 1986), 126.

76 Mansergh, *The Transfer of Power*, vol. XII, 237.

77 Sadullah, *The Partition of the Punjab*, vol. I, xv.

78 Johnson, *Mission with Mountbatten*, 139.

Hindus, and Sikhs submitted their cases to Radcliffe on July 18, 1947.<sup>79</sup> The public sittings of the commission took place at Lahore for ten days, from July 21, 1947 to July 31, 1947, in the High Court building.<sup>80</sup> Radcliffe proposed that in his absence Justice Din Muhammad and Justice Mehr Chand Mahajan should preside over the meetings of the commission alternately.<sup>81</sup> Radcliffe attended the second and third procedural meetings of the commission held on July 14 and 15, 1947, respectively. He did not attend the public sittings of commission, but studied the daily reports of their proceedings and submitted material.<sup>82</sup>

The Boundary Commission invited different parties to give their suggestions with regard to the Partition of Punjab which was completed on July 31, 1947. The Muslim, Hindu and Sikh politicians presented their recommendations to Radcliffe for the protection of their particular interests.<sup>83</sup> Radcliffe was utterly confused with the presentations because the various maps produced by the concerned parties differed and the statistics seemed to contradict each other.<sup>84</sup> His only briefing for the task was a thirty-minute session with Arthur Henderson at the India Office London, over a large scale map. He felt that it would take years of careful research to make a just demarcation.<sup>85</sup> The four nominated members of the Punjab Boundary Commission could not come to a unanimous decision and, therefore, they submitted their separate reports.

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79 Massarrat Sohail, *Partition and Anglo-Pakistan Relations: 1947-51* (Lahore: Vanguard Books, 1991), 17.

80 Sadullah, *The Partition of the Punjab*, vol. I, xv. also see Mehr Chand Mahajan, *Looking Back: The Autobiography* (Bombay: Asia Publishing House, 1963), 112.

81 Sadullah, *The Partition of the Punjab*, vol. I, xv.

82 Sadullah, *The Partition of the Punjab*, vol. I, xv, 474-77. Also see Ali, *Emergence of Pakistan*, 205.

83 Muhammad Munir, "Freedom at Midnight and the Conspiracy in Kashmir", *Pakistan Times*, February 22, 1976.

84 Sadullah, *The Partition of the Punjab*, vol. I, xvi.

85 Ghai, *Partition of the Punjab*, 127. Also see Mosley, *The last days of the British Raj*, 224.

### Problems in Publication of the Award

Radcliffe Award was written before the deadline of August 15, 1947.<sup>86</sup> On July 10, 1947, Mountbatten had informed the Partition Council that he had been assured by Radcliffe that he will submit his reports by August 14, 1947.<sup>87</sup> On July 12, 1947, *Morning News* gave a report about the Punjab Boundary Commission's announcement. It said: "The Punjab Boundary Commission will announce its decision on the boundaries of the province by August 15, learns the Associated Press of India from reliable quarters. This decision was arrived at after a conference of top-ranking leaders with the officials connected with the boundaries."<sup>88</sup> However, Stuart E. Abott, Personal Secretary to Evan Jenkins, the then Governor of Punjab, wrote to George Abell, personal secretary to Mountbatten on July 16, 1947, in connection with two letters of Jenkins of July 13, which dealt with a dispute in the partition committee about certain adjustments pending the decision of the Boundary Commission.

On July 22, Mountbatten wrote a letter to Radcliffe in which he pointed out that all parties involved have insisted on an early declaration of the Award to avert disturbances. He suggested Radcliffe that copy of Award should be given to him by August 10, 1947.<sup>89</sup> Radcliff acknowledged the importance of early announcement of the Award but he told it could be done by August 12.<sup>90</sup>

Jenkins requested Mountbatten for intimation in advance of the date of the Award and its contents. He insisted to take precautions especially in those districts which were likely to be affected, particularly in the central Punjab.<sup>91</sup> Abell wrote

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86 Ghai, *The Partition of Punjab*, 128-29.

87 Mansergh, *The Transfer of Power*, vol. XII, 66.

88 Mansergh, *The Transfer of Power*, vol. XII, 55. Also see *Morning News*, July 12, 1947.

89 Mansergh, *The Transfer of Power*, vol. XII, 290.

90 Mansergh, *The Transfer of Power*, vol. XII, Radcliffe to Mountbatten, July 23, 1947, 305.

91 Mansergh, *The Transfer of Power*, vol. XII.

to Beaumont on July 21, 1947, that Jenkins wanted an advance copy of the Award as its nature would affect the distribution of police and troops.<sup>92</sup>

Mountbatten was worried about the Punjab and he assured Jenkins on August 6 that his request should not be ignored. On August 8, 1947, in a confidential letter to Abbott, in which a map showing roughly the boundary which Radcliffe proposed in his Award and also a note by Beaumont, saying that: "There will not be any great change from the boundary, but it will have to be accurately defined with reference to village and Zilla boundaries in Lahore district."<sup>93</sup> Abell further informed Abott that the Award was expected within the next 48 hours and he would let him know later about the probable time of announcement.<sup>94</sup>

Radcliffe and the members of the Punjab Boundary Commission were ready to announce the Award on August 9, 1947. However, at the Viceroy's staff meeting on August 9, 1947, Mountbatten emphasized the need for maintaining the secrecy to avoid bearing the responsibility for the disturbances which would undoubtedly occur.<sup>95</sup> Mountbatten insisted that he would prefer to postpone the announcement of the Punjab Award until the Independence Day celebrations to celebrate it without any major disruption.<sup>96</sup>

By August 12, Radcliffe felt quite disturbed due to the fact that "his Award, which Mountbatten had pressed him to finish as early as possible remained under Viceregal 'embargo'. Dickie was, however, adamant about not releasing a word officially until after August 15."<sup>97</sup>

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92 Sir G. Abell to Beaumont R/3/1/157: f 187, No. 1446/17, July 21, 1947, Mansergh, *The Transfer of Power*, vol. XII, 279.

93 Mansergh, *The Transfer of Power*, vol. XII, 579.

94 Mansergh, *The Transfer of Power*, vol. XII, 611. No copy of this map or of the note by Beaumont describing it is on the file.

95 Mansergh, *The Transfer of Power*, vol. XII, 611. Also see Sadullah, *The Partition of the Punjab*, vol. I, 248.

96 Stanley Wolpert, *Nehru: A Tryst with Destiny* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1996), 405.

97 Stanley, *Nehru*, 405.

Mountbatten had a private meeting with Radcliffe to postpone the date for the announcement of the Award till August 15. Radcliffe replied firmly that he could not delay the matter beyond August 13. The Viceroy agreed that the reports should be sent to his office on August 13, but, since he was leaving for Karachi that afternoon, he would not have time to see them until he returned on August 14, 1947. This would automatically delay publication until August 15 or later. In fact, that was the plan which was actually followed.<sup>98</sup>

Under the Award, 13 districts comprising the whole of Jullundur and Ambala divisions and Amritsar district of Lahore division were awarded to East Punjab. Similarly, three tehsils (Pathankot, Gurdaspur and Batala) of Gurdaspur district and a part of Kasur tehsil of Lahore district were allocated to the East Punjab and the remaining areas went to the West Punjab. Mountbatten in a telegram, dated August 14, 1947, presented a summary of the Award of the Punjab to the Earl of Listowel.<sup>99</sup> Copies of the Award were given to the representatives of the governments of Pakistan and India after a Joint Defence Council's Meeting.<sup>100</sup> As expected, the Award evoked a mixed and divergent response. According to Pandit Nehru, the Award was likely to have a bad effect upon the Sikhs and thus, it created a problem. Sardar Baldev Singh had similar views about the Award and felt that the Sikhs would react vehemently against it.<sup>101</sup>

Liaquat Ali Khan stressed that the Award would have an unfavourable reaction among the Muslims. As the Prime Minister of Pakistan, he considered it as his duty to take care of the rights of Sikhs in West Punjab as Indian leaders stood up for their rights in East Punjab. He assured that complete

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98 Hodson, *Great Divide*, 351.

99 Viscount Mountbatten to the Earl of Listowel. IOR. L/P & J/16/117. New Delhi, 14th August, 1947; Sadullah, *The Partition of the Punjab*, vol. I, 267.

100 Sadullah, *The Partition of the Punjab*, vol. I, 270.

101 Sadullah, *The Partition of the Punjab*, vol. I, 271-72.

religious freedom would prevail in the province.<sup>102</sup> The Radcliffe Award of the Punjab was presented at a meeting held on August 16, 1947, between Mountbatten and the representatives of Pakistan and India.<sup>103</sup> It was made public in both the countries on the following day. By then Radcliffe had left India. None of the major communities was satisfied with the Award.

The people in Pakistan were convinced that the Award was unjust, and thus it created strong feelings of resentment, shock and frustration. Many opined that Mountbatten was the real culprit and not Radcliffe. It was he who wanted to create problems for Pakistan and change the boundary line of Punjab, because Jinnah had frustrated his ambition to be the Governor General of both India and Pakistan.<sup>104</sup>

As a result Pakistan had to suffer. For instance, from the district of Gurdaspur, Radcliffe transferred to East Punjab not only the non-Muslim majority tehsil of Pathankot, but also two Muslim majority tehsils-Gurdaspur (population 328.819, Muslim majority 52.1%) and Batala (population 380.053, Muslim majority 55.06%) as also a portion of the third Muslim majority tehsil of Shakargarh (Muslim majority 51.3%).<sup>105</sup> It enabled India to have a land link with Kashmir. Besides, from the Muslim majority district of Lahore, Radcliffe transferred to East Punjab portion from two of its tehsils, Kasur (Muslim majority 57.2%) and Lahore (Muslim majority 62.05%).<sup>106</sup> In contrast, Radcliffe did not transfer to the West Punjab any area from non-Muslim majority districts. List of some of the Muslim majority areas that were given to India is given below:

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102 Z.H. Zaidi, *Jinnah Papers, Pakistan: Pangs of Birth, 15 August–30 September 1947*, Vol.V (Islamabad: Quaid-i-Azam Papers Project, 2000), 33.

103 Zaidi, *Jinnah Papers*, vol. v, 33.

104 Viceroy's Personal Report No. 11, July 4, 1947.

105 Sherwani, *Mountbatten*, 171.

106 Sherwani, *Mountbatten*, 171.

S.No.	Name of city	Total Population	Muslim majority
1.	Ferozepore tehsil	290.286	55.2%
2.	Zira tehsil	210.819	65.2%
3.	Ajnala tehsil	237.049	59.4%
4.	Jullundur tehsil	443.010	51.1%
5.	Nakodar tehsil	228.783	59.4% <sup>107</sup>

Source: Sadullah, *The Partition of the Punjab*, vol.I.

Radcliffe's explanation for not transferring above tehsils and other Muslim majority areas was:

It would be in the true interests of neither state to extend the territories of the west Punjab to a strip on the far side of Sutlej and that there are factors such as the disruption of railway communications and water systems that sought in this instance to displace the primary claims of contiguous majorities.<sup>108</sup>

Ali wondered as to why the true interests of Pakistan should suffer because of a strip of territory, East of the Sutlej River, and how Radcliffe could be a better judge of the true interests of Pakistan than the representatives of Pakistan? He also pointed out that the boundary line drawn by Radcliffe was not really following river courses. Moreover, it was cutting the railway communications.<sup>109</sup> He observed that if that justification for those decisions was sought in the phrase, 'other factors', it was very strange that 'other factors' worked consistently in favour of India and not Pakistan. Although, Pakistan had suffered in case of rivers and railway communication, but nothing hurt it more than being deprived of two important districts, that is, Gurdaspur and Ferozepore, which had Muslim majorities and were contiguous to Pakistan.<sup>110</sup> Radcliffe's Award gave control of canal head

<sup>107</sup> Sadullah, *The Partition of the Punjab*, vol. I, xiii.

<sup>108</sup> Ali, *Emergence of Pakistan*, 214.

<sup>109</sup> Ali, *Emergence of Pakistan*, 214.

<sup>110</sup> Mansergh, *The Transfer of Power*, vol. XII, 746-47. Also see Ali, *Emergence of Pakistan*, 214.

works on the Sutlej and Ravi rivers to India and put the economic life of West Punjab at stake.<sup>111</sup>

Stanley Wolpert in *Shameful Flight* writes that Radcliffe in his initial maps awarded the Gurdaspur and sub-districts of Ferozepur to Pakistan. Moreover, he was in favour of joint control of canal system and electricity generated in the Bikaner's princely state of Rajput. Hindu Maharaja had the control over state dam, canal head works and hydroelectric generators that supplied energy to Ferozepur, Montgomery and districts of Lahore. The central Punjab economic growth and development was largely dependent upon the energy supplying system of Bikaner.<sup>112</sup>

Nehru on hearing about the initial award of Radcliffe, sent message to Mountbatten that:

Both from the strategic and irrigation point of view it will be most dangerous to let Ferozepur go to Pakistan. Whatever may be the decision about area west of [River] Sutlej, no area east of the Sutlej must on any account go to Pakistan. The joint control of irrigation canals must on no account be accepted, even as a recommendation of the Boundary Commission. Similarly no joint control of electricity must be accepted.<sup>113</sup>

The Maharaja of Bikaner on the very next day informed Mountbatten "every confidence that your Excellency in finally arriving at decision on awards of Boundary Commission will be good enough to safeguard interests of Bikaner State."<sup>114</sup>

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111 Ali, *Emergence of Pakistan*, 215; Majumdar, *Jinnah and Gandhi*, 285, Saad Khari, *Jinnah Reinterpreted: The Journey from Indian Nationalism to Muslim Statehood* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995), 401. Also see *The Pakistan Times*, August 19, 1947; *Dawn*, August 21, 1947; Justice Muhammad Munir, "Days to Remember", *The Pakistan Times*, June 23-24, 1964 and Munir, "Freedom at Midnight and the Conspiracy in Kashmir", *Pakistan Times*, February 22, 1976.

112 Stanley Wolpert, *Shameful Flight: The Last Years of the British Empire in India* (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 2006), 167.

113 Wolpert, *Shameful Flight*, 167, quoted from A. N. Kosla's Secret enclosure of 8-8-47 appended by Nehru to his Secret letter to Mountbatten of August 9, 1947.

114 Wolpert, *Shameful Flight*, 167-68, quoted from Maharaja to Mountbatten, August 10, *Transfer of Power*, X11, 638.

Zaidi has analyzed the Radcliffe Award and the general policy of British towards the Muslims. He noted that “the award reflected an unbroken stand of British policy against the Muslims and Pakistan which had been manifested in the attitude of the Viceroy as well as the plans prepared by Glancy, Jenkins, Menon-Rau, George Abell and Wavell during 1945 and 1946.” These plans, according to him centred round the objective to make Pakistan as small and unattractive as possible.<sup>115</sup> The Radcliffe Award was published on August 17, 1947 and as indicated all along, it shocked everybody, including Jinnah. However, Jinnah advised his followers to face it with courage. He told that:

The division of India is now finally and irrevocably affected. No doubt we feel that the carving out of this great independent Muslim State has suffered injustices. We have been squeezed in as much as it was possible, and the latest blow that we have received was the Award of the Boundary Commission. It is an unjust, incomprehensible and even perverse award. It may be wrong, unjust and perverse; and it may not be a judicial but a political award, but we have agreed to abide by it and it is binding upon us. As honourable people we must abide by it. It may be our misfortune but we must bear up this one more blow with fortitude, courage and hope.<sup>116</sup>

Apart from Jinnah, other leaders of Pakistan, and particularly its officials, criticized the Award as ‘extremely unjust and unfair’.<sup>117</sup> The British Prime Minister, Clement Attlee, announced on February 20, 1947 that power would be transferred to Indians not later than June 1948. The plan was further changed and it was practically implemented well ahead of decided time.

### Conclusion

It has thus been concluded with a factual analysis that the British did not want to handover a strong Pakistan to the Muslims of this region for which they decided to divide the provinces of Punjab and Bengal. Divided these provinces

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115 Zaidi, *Jinnah Papers*, vol. V, 378.

116 Zaidi, *Jinnah Papers*, vol. V, 378. Also see Ali, *Emergence of Pakistan*, 221; and Afzal, *Speeches and Statements of Quaid-i-Azam*, 432.

117 Zaidi, *Jinnah Papers*, vol. V, 380.

could help India to intercede in the progress of these regions particularly and that of Pakistan generally. To achieve this objective Radcliff was briefed about the plans of the viceroy of India.

Cyril John Radcliffe, who was entrusted with the grand responsibility of drawing the boundary lines of Pakistan and India, did not act honestly. He deprived Pakistan of its sources of irrigation water. Three-fourth area of the Gurdaspur, a Muslim majority district, was awarded to India. That area provided India with a vital land link to Kashmir. By and large, Pakistan was the main loser. Jinnah was possessed with an overwhelming sense of Justice and impartiality. Perhaps, he could never accept that his faith in British justice would be deceived. He was greatly disappointed with the Award, but he accepted it with some reservations. The Muslim League was bound to abide by it. However, Pakistan endured a lot and is still suffering the implications of this unjust, unfair and unwarranted Award, in the midst of disputes with India over the issues of water and Kashmir.